# Joint Appendix — Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Joint Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 543 U.S. 481

## Text

rs) Supreme Court, U.&
/ FILED

| OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The an
Supreme Court of the Anited States
°
WILLARD STEWART,
Petitioner,
V.
DUTRA CQNSTRUCTION CO.,
Respondent.
r
On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The First Circuit
o
JOINT APPENDIX
e
DAVID B. KAPLAN* HARVEY WEINER*
THOMAS M. BOND FREDERICK E. CONNELLY, JR.
TIMOTHY M. BAROUCH JOHN J. O'CONNOR
THE KAPLAN/BOND GROUP PEABODY & ARNOLD LLP
Boston Fish Pier 30 Rowes Wharf

West Building, Suite 304 Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Boston, Massachusetts 02210 (617) 951-2100
(617) 261-0080 (617) 951-2125 fax

(617) 261-1558 fax Counsel for Respondent
DAVID W. ROBERTSON

MICHAEL F. STURLEY

727 Eest Dean Keeton Street

Austin, Texas 78705

(512) 232-1350

(512) 471-6988 fax

Counsel for Petitioner

May 24, 2004 *Counsel of Record

Petition For Certiorari Filed December 3, 2003
Certiorari Granted February 23, 2004

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
District Court Docket EntrieS..............:cccccscccssseeseseseeeereeees 1
Court of Appeals Docket Entries ....................ccccscceeeeeeeeeeees 7

Amended Complaint, Willard T. Stewart v. Dutra
Construction Company, Inc., No. 95-11046-RCL
(D. Mass. Filed: September 12, 1996) ................:::ccceeeee 11

Defendant, Dutra Construction Company, Inc.’s,
Motion for Summary Judgment, Willard T. Stew-
art v. Dutra Construction Company, Inc., No. 95-
11046-RCL (D. Mass. Filed: September 16, 1996)........ 17

Defendant, Dutra Construction Company, Inc.’s,
Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment,
Willard T. Stewart v. Dutra Construction Com-
pany, Inc., No. 95-11046-RCL (D. Mass. Filed:
October 18, 1996)..................... sseduapeaininindnimanditiemiaiainnieine 42

Answer of Dutra Construction Company, Inc. to
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Willard T. Stew-

art v. Dutra Construction Company, Inc., No. 95-
11046-RCL (D. Mass. Filed: December 3, 1996)........... 67

Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs Request For
Admissions (Originally Attached as Exhibit C to
Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing) Willard T.
Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company, Inc.,
C.A. No. 95-12311-NG (D. Mass. Filed: October 6,

United States Coast Guard Certificates of Inspec-
tion for Super Scoop (Originally Attached as Ex-
hibit D to Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing)
Willard T. Stewart v. Dutra Construction Com-
pany, Inc., No. 95-11046-RCL (D. Mass. Filed:
BIE GEE CIE ciucensriesitninenepesiileionensianinessnenntetininapiensnasedin 89

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
~ Page
International Load Line Certificate by the Ameri-
can Bureau of Shipping for the Super Scoop
(Originally Attached as Exhibit E to Plaintiffs
Motion for Rehearing) Willard T. Stewart v.

Dutra Construction Company, Inc., No. 95-11046-
RCL (D. Mass. Filed: October 6, 1999) ....................06. 103

Section 148 of Dutra Construction Company, Inc.’s
Contract for Dredging (Originally Attached as
Exhibit F to Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing)
Willard T. Stewart v. Dutra Construction Com-
pany, Inc., No. 95-11046-RCL (D. Mass. Filed:
Coatebber 6, 1GBB). .ccccccccceccodecscoccsnccssensnnennsniennenaaaaaane 109

Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Rehearing, Willard T. Stewart v. Dutra Construc-
tion Company, Inc., No. 95-11046-RCL (D. Mass.
Filed: Osteber 3B, 2GGGP ..cocceccescccsocsccoseseussennanuaann 148

The following documents have been omitted in the
printing of this Joint Appendix. They may be found
in the Appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at the following pages:

Motion for Summary Judgment, United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts,

Dated Marels 3B, 1660 ....ccccccccccessssssscsccsosssosnensennenl App. 33
Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, Filed October 31, 2000.................... App. 15

Defendant, Dutra Construction Co., Inc.’s Motion
for Renewed Summary Judgment on All Remain-
ing Counts, United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, Filed November 5,
>) TN HN EN App. 30

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

Judgment, United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, Filed May 21, 2002.....App. 32

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, Filed September 4, 2008 ................... App. 1

1

Relevant Docket Entries

United States District Court

District of Massachusetts (Boston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:95-cv-11046-RCL

Filing Date #

05/19/1995

09/10/1996

09/12/1996

09/16/1996

09/16/1996

10/02/1996

1

14

17

18

19

Docket Text
Complaint filed. Case assigned to Judge:
Lindsay. Receipt #: none Amount: $ waived.
(fmr) (Entered: 05/23/1995)
Answer by Dutra Construction to com-
plaint; jury demand, filed c/s. (fmr)
(Entered: 06/09/1995)

Motion by Willard T. Stewart for leave
to file amended complaint, filed. (sat)
(Entered: 09/11/1996)

baa * *

Amended complaint by Willard T.
Stewart filed. (Answer due 9/22/96 for
Dutra Construction). Amended com-
plaint amends [1-1] complaint. (sat)
(Entered: 09/12/1996)

Motion by Dutra Construction for
summary judgment, filed; c/s. (sat)
(Entered: 09/16/1996)

Memorandum by Dutra Construction in
support of [18-1] motion for summary
judgment, filed; c/s. (sat) (Entered:
09/16/1996)

Response by Willard T. Stewart in
opposition to [18-1] motion for summary
judgment, filed; c/s. (sat) (Entered:
10/03/1996)

10/18/1996 23

10/18/1996 24

12/03/1996 28

02/06/1997 30

02/10/1997 32

06/17/1998 36

2

Supplemental Motion by Dutra Con-
s*ruction for summary judgment, filed
c/s. (mh) (Entered: 10/18/1996)

Supplemental Memorandum by Dutra
Construction in support of [23-1] motion
for summary judgment, filed c/s. (Imh)
(Entered: 10/18/1996)

* * *

Answer by Dutra Construction to amended
complaint, filed.; jury demand; c/s. (sat)
(Entered: 12/03/1996)

* * *

Suggestion of bankruptcy by Dutra
Construction, filed; c/s. (sat) (Entered:
02/06/1997)

* * *

Judge Reginald C. Lindsay. Procedural
Order entered. In order to avoid the
necessity for counsel to appear at peri-
odic status conference, the Court enters
the following Administrative Order: The
above-captioned case is dismissed
without prejudice to either party moving
to restore it to the docket, upon final
determination of bankruptcy proceed-
ings, by filing an appropriate motion.
Entered cc/cl (lau) (Entered: 02/10/1997)

~ * *

Judge Reginald C. Lindsay. Clerk’s
Notes: re: status conference; plaintiff
moves to restore this case to the docket-
motion allowed. Case to be reopened.
Counsel report that there is a motion

for summary judgment pending. Only

03/26/1999

03/29/1999

04/19/1999

06/09/1999

06/15/1999

42

45

47

49

3

remaining discovery has to do with
experts depositions; depositions to be
held once the summary judgment has
been decided, if necessary. Counsel to
check with their clients to see if they
agree to mediation. (lau) (Entered
06/18/1998)

* * *

SUPPLEMENTAL Memorandum of law
by Willard T. Stewart re: Contra Defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment,
filed; c/s. (sat) (Entered: 03/26/1999)

Judge Reginald C. Lindsay. Clerk’s Notes:
re: motion hearing held. After oral argu-
ment, court ruled from the bench, granting
[18-1] motion for summary judgment, and
denying [23-1] motion for summary judg-
ment, all for reasons stated on the record.
Court Reporter: Teri Gibson (sat) (Entered:
03/30/1999)

* * *

Notice of appeal by Willard T. Stewart
filed. Appeal record due on 5/19/99 (lau)
(Entered: 04/20/1999)

* * *

Motion by Willard T. Stewart to stay
pending appeal, filed; c/s. (sat) (Entered:
06/09/1999)

Response by Dutra Construction in opposi-

tion to [47-1] motion to stay pending
appeal, filed. (seh) (Entered: 06/16/1999)

* * ”

4

10/06/1999 56 Motion by Willard T. Stewart for rehear-

10/26/1999

12/17/1999

01/05/2000

11/21/2000

11/29/2000

11/05/2001

11/05/2001

61

69

70

81

82

ing, filed. (sat) Modified on 10/27/1999
(Entered: 10/06/1999)

* * *

Response by Dutra Construction in
opposition to [56-1] motion for rehearing,
filed; c/s. (sat) (Entered: 10/27/1999)

* * *

Judge Reginald C. Lindsay. Endorsed
Order entered denying [56-1] motion for
rehearing. [EOD Date 12/21/99]. Copy
sent to counsel on 12/21/99. (sat) (En-
tered: 12/21/1999)

* * *

Notice of appeal by Willard T. Stewart
filed. Appeal record due on 2/4/00 (sat)
(Entered: 01/06/2000)

* * *

Opinion of the Court of Appeals re: [65-
1} appeal, [45-1] appeal, entered. (jr)
(Entered: 11/21/2000)

Mandate of US Court of Appeals re: [65-
1) appeal, [45-1] appeal affirming the
judgment of the district court. (jr)
(Entered: 11/29/2000)

* * *

Motion by Dutra Construction for
RENEWED summary judgment on all
remaining counts, filed; c/s. (sat) (En-
tered: 11/06/2001)

Memorandum by Dutra Construction in
support of [81-1] motion for RENEWED

02/08/2002

05/21/2002

05/21/2002

05/21/2002
05/30/2002

09/30/2003

91

92

5

summary judgment on all remaining
counts, filed; c/s. (sat) (Entered: 11/06/2001)

* * *
Response by Willard T. Stewart in opposi-
tion to [81-1] motion for RENEWED
summary judgment on all remaining

counts, filed; c/s. (sat) (Entered:
02/08/2002)
-_ * *

Judge Reginald C. Lindsay. Endorsed
Order entered granting [81-1] motion for
RENEWED summary judgment on all
remaining counts.... Motion allowed
based on the application of Morehead v.
Atkinson-Kiewit, 97 F.3s 603 (lst Cir.
1996) to the undisputed facts of record in
this case. [EOD Date 5/21/02]. Copy sent to
counsel on 5/21/02. (sat) (Entered:
05/21/2002)

Judge Reginald C. Lindsay. Judgment on
all counts entered for Dutra Construction
against Willard T. Stewart. [EOD Date
5/21/02]. Copy sent to counsel on 5/21/02.
(sat) (Entered: 05/21/2002)

Case closed. (sat) (Entered: 05/21/2002)

Notice of appeal by Willard T. Stewart
filed. Appealing: [90-1] judgment order.
Appeal record due on 6/14/02 (kf) (En-
tered: 05/31/2002)

* * *

MANDATE of USCA as to [91] Notice of
Appeal filed by Willard T. Stewart; This
cause came on to be heard on appeal
from the United States District Court for

6

the District of Massachusetts, and was
argued by counsel. Upon consideration
whereof, it is now here ordered, ad-
judged and decreed as follows: The
district Court’s grant of summary
judgment is affirmed. (Ramos, Jeanette)
(Entered: 09/30/2003)

* * *

7

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

4/27/99

3/15/00

3/15/00

4/14/00

4/14/00

4/17/00

No. 99-1487

CIVIL CASE docketed. Notice filed by
Appellant Willard Stewart. [99-1487] (eiln)
[99-1487]

* * *

BRIEF filed by Appellant Willard Stewart in
99-1487. Pages: 44, Copies: 9, delivered by
mail. Certificate of service date 3/15/00.
[462726-1] Appellee brief due 4/14/00. [99-
1487] (eiln) [99-1487]

APPENDIX filed by Appellant Willard
Stewart in 99-1487. Copies: 5. Volumes: 1.
Delivered by mail, filed. Certificate of service
date 3/15/00 [462727-1] [99-1487] (eiln) [99-
1487]

BRIEF filed by Appellee Dutra Construction
in 99-1487, Appellee Dutra Construction in
00-1090. Pages: 31, Copies: 10, delivered by
hand. Certificate of service date 4/14/00.
[465855-1] Reply brief due 4/28/00 in 99-
1487, in 00-1090. [99-1487, 00-1090] (lina)
[00-1090 99-1487]

* * *

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT on behalf of
Appellee Dutra Construction filed. [99-1487]
(lina) [99-1487]

PETITION filed by Appellant Willard Stewart
in 99-1487, and 00-1090 Petition for initial
hearing en banc. Certificate of Service dated
4/17/00. (99-1487, 00-1090] (eiln) [00-1090
99-1487]

* * *

6/14/00

6/14/00

9/7/00

10/31/00

10/31/00

1/28/00

8

ORDER filed by Chief Judge Juan R. Torru-
ella, Judge Bruce M. Selya, Judge Michael
Boudin, Judge Norman H. Stahl, Judge
Sandra L. Lynch, Judge Kermit V. Lipez
denying petition request for hearing enbanc.
[99-1487, 00-1090] in 99-1487, 00-1090 (eiln)
[99-1487]

ORDER filed by Chief Judge Juan R. Torruella,
Judge Bruce M. Selya, Judge Michael Boudin,
Judge Norman H. Stahl, Judge Sandra L.
Lynch, Judge Kermit V. Lipez denying petition
request for hearing enbanc. [99-1487, 00-1090]
in 99-1487, 00-1090 (eiln) [99-1487]

* * *

CASE ARGUED 09/07/00. Selya, Bownes,
Stahl, JJ. (ceca) (00-1090 99-1487]

OPINION issued by Selya, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and Stahl,
Circuit Judge. Signed Judge Bruce M. Selya,
Authoring Judge. PUBLISHED [511310-1]
[99-1487, 00-1090] (turn) [00-1090 99-1487]

JUDGMENT entered closing case. The
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
{511315-1] (99-1487, 00-10901 (turn) [00-
1090 99-1487]

x * *

No. 00-1090

ORDER filed to consolidate for purposes of
briefing and oral argument the following
cases: 99-1487. [00-1090] (eiln) [00-1090]

* * x

6/12/02

6/12/02

11/15/02

11/15/02

12/16/02

1/17/03

1/17/03

9

No. 02-1713

CIVIL CASE docketed. Opening forms sent.
Notice filed by Appellant Willard Stewart.
Appearance form due 6/26/02. Docketing
Statement due 6/26/02. Transcript Re-
port/Order due 6/24/02. Fee due 6/26/02. [02-
1713] (mlyn)

RECORD filed: Pleading included: 1-91. No
Transcript(s) filed. (663149-1] [02-1713]
(mlyn)

* * *

BRIEF filed by Appellant Willard Stewart.
Length: 7,404 words, Copies: 9, delivered by
hand. Certificate of date 11/15/02. [703492-1]
Appellee brief due 12/16/02. brief due
12/30/02. [02-1713] (mlyn)

* * *

APPENDD. filed by Appellant Willard
Stewart. Copies: 5. Volumes: 1. Delivered by
hand, filed. Certificate of service date
11/15/02. [703494-1] [02-1713] (mlyn)

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT on behalf of
Appellee Dutra Construction filed. [02-1713]
(mlyn)

* * *

ORDER filed by Judge Juan R. Torruella,
Judge Sandra L. Lynch, Judge Jeffrey R.
Howard. Upon consideration of motion, It is
hereby granted that appellant’s reply brief
be accepted for filing this day. [02-1713]
(mlyn)

REPLY BRIEF filed by Appellant Willard
Stewart. Length: 6 pgs, Copies: 8, delivered

9/4/03

9/4/03

12/12/03

10

by hand. Certificate of service date 1/15/03.
(718483-1] [02-1713] (mlyn)

baad * *

JUDGMENT filed Judge Juan R. Torruella,
Judge Sandra L. Lynch, Judge Jeffrey R.
Howard. This cause came on to be heard on
appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts, and was
argued by counsel. Upon consideration
whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged
and decreed as follows: The district court’s
grant of summary judgment is affirmed.
[785881-1) [02-1713] (mlyn)

OPINION: Judge Juan R. Torruella, Judge
Sandra L. Lynch, Judge Jeffrey R. Howard.
Signed Judge Juan R. Torruella. PUB-
LISHED. [785884-1] [02-1713], (mlyn)

* * *

U.S. SUPREME COURT NOTICE filed
regarding petition for writ of certiorari. Filed
in the Supreme Court on 12/3/3. Supreme
Court case number: 03-814. [02-1713] (darl)

11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

WILLARD T. STEWART

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 95-11046 (RCL)

DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CoO.,
INC.

Defendant.

ee ee i ee

ED CO
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

(Filed Sept. 12, 1996)
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Plaintiff hereby claims of the defendant a sum in
excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in
damages upon the following causes of action:

1. Plaintiff is a seaman.

2. This action is brought pursuant to the Maritime
Law of the United States as modified by the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. §688, et seq.

3. At all times material hereto, defendant, Dutra
Construction Company, Inc., was doing business at 347
Congress Street, Suite 204, Boston, Massachusetts.

4. At all times material hereto, plaintiff was in the
employ of the defendant as a member of the crew of
defendant's #4 scow to the dredge “SUPER SCOOP” at the
rate of pay and for the terms as set forth in his contract of
employment.

12 :

5. On or about July 15, 1993, while the said scow
and dredge were in Boston Harbor, Boston, Massachu-
setts, plaintiff suffered injuries while under the employ-
ment of defendant. .

6. Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligence
of the defendant, by its agents, servants, workmen and
employees, by the unseaworthiness of the scow and
dredge, and by the defendant’s breach of its obligations
under the circumstances.

7. Solely by reason of the negligence of the defen-
dant, plaintiff sustained personal injuries.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against
the defendant in excess of the sum of One Hundred Thou-
sand Dollars ($100,000.00), with costs and interest, and
brings this action to recover same.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

In Admiralty

Plaintiff claims of defendant maintenance and cure
and wages in such amount as may be determined by the
Court upon the following cause of action:

8. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every
allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 7 inclusive
of this complaint, with the same force and effect as if fully
set forth and repeated herein.

9. Plaintiff, by virtue of his services upon the said
scow and dredge, claims maintenance and cure and wages
for the period off this disability in an amount which to
your Honorable Court shall deem just and proper upon the
trial of this cause.

13

10. All and singular, the premises contained herein
are true and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion of the United States and this Honorable Court.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that judgment be
entered against the defendant for such maintenance and
cure and wages as the court may determine to be due and
owing upon the trial of this cause, and for such interest,
costs, and counsel fees as the court may deem just and
proper.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

11. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every
allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 10 inclusive
of this Complaint, with the same force and effect as if fully
set forth and repeated herein.

12. Jurisdiction herein arises under the Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of
1972. Public Law No. 92576, §18(a), 86 Stat. 1263, 33
U.S.C. §905 amending §5 of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, Ch. 509, §5, 44 Stat. 1426, 33
U.S.C. §905 (LHWCA).

13. Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligence
of the defendant, its agents, servants, and/or employees
and/or ostensible agents, servants, and/or employees
and/or the unseaworthiness of the “SUPER SCOOP” in the
following respects, including but not limited to:

(a) failing to provide a safe place for plaintiff to
perform his duties;

14

(b) failing to provide plaintiff with proper, safe,
seaworthy, and/or adequate vessel appliances, gear,
appurtenances, and/or equipment;

(c) failing to properly and adequately inspect,
maintain, and/or repair the vessel’s gear, lines, shackles,
deck, and/or appurtenances in a safe and seaworthy
condition;

(d) failing to warn plaintiff and/or his co-workers
of a defective, dangerous, and/or hazardous condition of
the vessel’s gear, lines, shackles, deck, and/or appurte-
nances when defendant knew or should have known of
such condition;

(e) failing to inspect, remove, remedy, and/or
correct a defective, dangerous, and/or hazardous condition
when defendant knew or should have known of its exis-
tence;

(f) failing to discover, in the exercise of reason-
able care, a defective, dangerous, and/or hazardous condi-
tion of the vessel;

(g) permitting a defective, dangerous, and/or
hazardous condition to exist;

(h) failing to take proper and necessary precau-
tions and/or steps to prevent injury;

(i) failing to comply with governmental and/or
other applicable safety regulations;

(j) failing to observe safe boating methods,
practices, and/or procedures during the boom-jump opera-
tion;

15

(k) failing to properly remove, store, clean,
and/or clear poly bags, trash, and/or other items from all
boat deck working surfaces;

(1) failing to properly and adequately coat the
boat decking surface with anti-slip and/or other non-skid
materials;

(m) failing to use due care under the circum-
stances and being otherwise negligent under defendant’s
rules, regulations, customs, and/or practices; and

(n) otherwise being careless, reckless, and/or
negligent in the maintenance and/or operation of the
vessel.

14. The injuries in question were caused solely by
the negligence of defendant, its agents, servants, and/or
employees and/or ostensible agents, servants, and/or
employees and were due in no manner to any act and/or
omission on the part of plaintiff.

15. As a direct and proximate result of the negli-
gence of defendant, plaintiff has suffered, and will in the
future continue to suffer, pain and hardship, loss of in-
come, medical expenses, and an inability to perform his
usual duties.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against
the defendant in excess of the sum of One Hundred Thou-
sand Dollars ($100,000.00), with costs and interest, and
brings this action to recover same.

16

LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. HUNT

By: /s/ Thomas J. Hunt
Thomas J. Hunt, Esquire
One Union Street
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 227-8081

and

MARVIN I. BARISH LAW OFFICES,
PC.

By: /s/ Marvin |. Barish
Marvin I. Barish, Esquire
Gregory L. Nester, Esquire
Suite 801 — The Curtis Center
Sixth and Walnut Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 923-8900

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

WILLARD STEWART )
Plaintiff ) CIVIL ACTION
V ) NO. 95-11046-RCL
s.
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION _)
CO., INC., )
Defendant )

(Filed Sept. 16, 1996)

Now comes the defendant, Dutra Construction Co.,
Inc. and asks the Court to grant it Summary Judgment on
all counts. As grounds, therefore, the defendant argues
that there is no genuine issues of material fact and the
defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Specifically, the Court should find as a matter of law that
the plaintiff is not a seaman within the meaning of the
Jones Act (46 U.S.C. 688) and has no standing to bring a
claim pursuant to the Jones Act or the doctrine of mainte-
nance and cure. -

The plaintiff has recently filed a motion for leave to
amend complaint to add a count under Section 905B of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. It is
the defendant’s position that as a matter of law the plain-
tiff is not entitled to Section 905B benefits. The defendant
reserves the right to supplement its Motion for Summary
Judgment if the Court allows the plaintiff to amend its
complaint.

18

In support of this Motion, the defendant refers to and
incorporates herein the attached Memorandum of Law,
relevant portions of the transcript of the plaintiff’s deposi-
tion and the Complaint. -

“REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT”
The defendant believes that oral argument will assist

the Court in deciding this matter and therefore requests to
be heard.

By its attorneys,

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr. __
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.,
BBO# 544538
PEABODY & ARNOLD
50 Rowes Wharf
Boston, MA 02110
617/951-2100

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frederick E. Connelly, Jr., hereby certify that I have
this 12th day September, 1996 served a copy of the forego-

ing upon the plaintiff by mailing same postage prepaid to:

Gregory L. Nester, Esq.

Marvin I. Barish Law Offices, P.C.
Suite 801 — The Curtis Center
Independence Mall West

Sixth and Walnut Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Thomas J. Hunt, Esq.
One Union Street
Boston, MA 02108

/s/

19

Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.

20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

WILLARD STEWART )
Plaintiff ) CIVIL ACTION
V ) NO. 95-11046-RCL
s.
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION _)
CO., INC., )
Defendant )
DEFENDANT, DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.’S,
M T I
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendant, Dutra Construction Co. (“Dutra”),
asserts that no genuine issues of material fact exist in this
case, and submits the following memorandum in support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).

I. CONCISE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
RE CH _IT N-

The plaintiff, Willard Stewart (“Stewart”) was injured
on July 15, 1993 while employed by Dutra. Stewart was
hired to work on the dredge Superscoop. Ninety-nine
percent of his time while on the job was on the Superscoop

21

(Stewart Deposition Transcript at 33, Ex “A”).' Dutra was
hired to perform drilling, blasting and dredging for an
immersed tube tunnel (later to be christened the Ted
Williams Tunnel). This was the first time Stewart had
worked for Dutra (S. Tr. at 28, Ex “A”). The plaintiff was
hired as an engineer (S. Tr. at 34, Ex “A”).

The Superscoop is a dredge (S. Tr. at 31, Ex “A”) which
does its digging with a clamshell bucket (S. Tr. at 31, Ex
“A”). The Superscoop’s only form of propulsion was its
anchors and cables (S. Tr. at 35, Ex “A”). The Superscoop
does not have a propeller. (Jd.) While on the job, over a
twelve hour period, the Superscoop would be moved six
times and the average move was between thirty and fifty
feet (S. Tr. at 35, Ex “A”). Each move would take approxi-
mately five Minutes. (/d.) The remainder of the time the
Superscoop would be in one location for dredging (S. Tr. at
36, Ex “A”). While dredging, the Superscoop would be
secured by four anchors. (Jd.)

The Superscoop did not contain sleeping quarters. The
workers were brought to shore after each shift by a work
boat (S. tr. at 32, Ex “A”). The plaintiff was living in East
Boston (S. Tr. at 38, Ex “A”).

At the time the plaintiff was injured, he was on Scow
#4 working on the wiring (S. Tr. at 53, Ex “A”). The Scow
was tied up along side the Superscoop. The Scow was out
of commission and no dredging had been done that day (S.
Tr. at 49, Ex “A”). The engine on the scow that controlled

The deposition transcript of Willard Stewart shall herein after be
referred to as “S. Tr.”

22

the hopper had been repiaced (S. Tr. at 45, 46, Ex “A”). The
plaintiff was not wearing a life vest (S. Tr. at 65, Ex “A”).

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that his injuries
were caused by the negligence of the defendant, its agents,
servants, workmen and employees, by the unseaworthi-
ness of the dredge, and by the defendant’s breach of its
obligations under the circumstances (Stewart Complaint,
Ex “B”).

Stewart brought suit against his employer, Dutra
Construction Co. pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§688 et seq and the doctrine of maintenance and cure. (Jd.)
The plaintiff alleges that he was a member of the crew of
defendant’s dredge “Superscoop”. (Jd). On September 3,
1996 the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint and to add a third count. The defendant re-
serves the right to address this count if the Court allows
plaintiff’s motion despite the late filing. (In this last cause
of action, the plaintiff makes a claim under §905 of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
Amendments of 1972.)

Il. ARGUMENT

A. Summary Judgment is Appropriate when there

is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides that a summary judg-
ment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The non-
moving party must come forward with proof that a genuine
issue of material fact precludes judgment if a motion for

23

summary judgment is properly supported. Thomas v.
Digital Equipment Corporation, 880 F. 2d 1486, 1489 (1st
Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original), citing Anderson uv.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91
L. Ed. 2d. 202 (1986). See also Mack v. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company, 871 F. 2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989),
United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 900 F. 2d 470,
474 (lst Cir. 1990). A defendant moving for summary
judgment is entitled to have its motion allowed if it pro-
duces evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to an essential element
of the plaintiff’s claim and the plaintiff cannot come
forward with “genuine” evidence to rebut the motion.
Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106
S. Ct. 2548, 2552-2553, 91 L. Ed. 265 (1986).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that determination
of seaman status under the Jones Act is a mixed question
of fact and law. McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander,
498 U.S. 337, 358 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L. Ed. 2nd 866
(1991). However, the Court went on to say that summary
judgment is “mandated where the facts and the law will
reasonably support only one conclusion”. Jd at 356. Such is
the case here. That summary judgment is appropriate in
some circumstances was reasserted by the Supreme Court
in Chandris v. Latsis, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 2191 (1995). The
court wrote that where undisputed facts reveal that a
maritime worker has a clearly inadequate temporal
connection to vessels in navigation, the court may take the

question from the jury by granting summary judgment. /d.
Dutra maintains that when the law of the First

Circuit is applied to the facts in this case, the only conclu-
sion is that Stewart was not a Jones Act seaman working

24

on a vessel. Likewise, he is not entitled to recover pursu-
ant to the General Maritime Law for unseaworthiness.

B. The Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Recover as a
Jones Act Seaman Employed on a Vessel and
His Claim Should be Dismissed as a Matter of

Law.

The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688, states that:

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in
the course of his employment may, at his elec-
tion, maintain an action for damages at law.

1. The Plaintiff Was Not a Seaman Under the
_— DiGiovanni r Br r

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that he
qualifies as a “seaman” under the Jones Act. Bernard v.
Binnings Construction Co. Inc. 741 F. 2d 824, 827 (5th cir.
1984). The plaintiff is a “seaman” for the purposes of the
Jones Act if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that
“(1) he was assigned permanently to a “vessel” or per-
formed a substantial part of his work on a vessel, and (2)
he performed duties which contributed to the function or
operation of the vessel during a trip or at anchorage in
preparation for a trip or which contributed to the mission
of a trip. Dean v. McKie Co. 771 F Supp 466, 470 (D. Mass.
1991); Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 409
Mass 179, 192, 565 N.E. 2d 422, 430 (1991). See also
Bennett v. Perini Corporation, 510 F. 2d 114, 115 (1st cir.
1975). In every instance the Court must first decide
whether the structure in question was a vessel.

The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit
decided the issue of what constitutes a vessel under the

nN

25

Jones Act in the case of DiGiovanni v. Taylor Brothers Inc.
959 F. 2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1992). Finding that past decisions
in both the first and fifth circuits “produced a difficult
dividing line” Jd. at 1122, the Court decided to look first at
the use of the structure rather than simply to the physical
characteristic in deciding whether a structure is a vessel
under the Jones Act. Jd. at 1123. In summation the Court
wrote:

if a barge, or other float’s purpose or primary
business is not navigation or commerce, then
workers assigned thereto for its shore enterprise
are to be considered seaman orly when it is in
actual navigation or transit. Jd. at 1123.

In applying this simplified and effective rule to the
facts presented it, the DiGiovanri court denied the plain-
tiff Jones Act recovery. Those facts were set forth by the
court as follows:

Briefly, the facts are these. The BETTY F was a
barge, 100 fe-i in length, with a 40 foot beam
and a raked bow and stern, and with nautical
equipment, such as navigation and anchor lights.
In all respects it met the commonly understood
characteristics of a vessel, and, indeed, was in-
spected by the Coast Guard. It had no means of
self-propulsion, except that positional movement
could be achieved by manipulating its spud an-
chors. Its current use was to float at the James-
town, Rhode Island, bridge, bearing a crane that
was being used for bridge construction. Its per-
manent station was Davisville, Rhode Island,
from which it was towed, by a tug, from time to
time, to perform various shore jobs. It had been
at the Jamestown bridge for a month. It was po-
sitioned about the bridge, and moved away from

the pilings at night, to prevent damage.

26

Plaintiff ’s principal duty was to handle a tag line
to guide the crane, but he also did maintenance
work, such as painting, and tended lines. Al-
though he was attached to the BETTY F, at the
time of his injury he was standing on the deck of
a supply barge in order better to manipulate the
line. Its deck proved to be slippery, and he fell.
The supply barge was in general use to carry
supplies, but also served as a work platform. /d.
at 1120, 1121.

The use of the barge in the DiGiovanni case is very
similar to the way the Superscoop barge was used by
Dutra. The Superscoop has many of the same characteris-
tics as the BETTY F. It contains some nautical equipment
and was inspected by the Coast Guard. Like the BETTY F
the Superscoop had no means of self-propulsion, except
that positional movement could be ».hieved by use of
winches and anchors. (S. Tr. at 3&, Ex “A”) Its use in
Boston Harbor was to float bearing a crane that was used
for dredging to lay a tunnel (as opposed to bridge construc-
tion). Like the BETTY F, the Supersccop was towed to the
site by tug. (S. Tr. at 31, Ex “A”) The Superscoop was more
stationary than the Betty F, which had to be moved away
from the bridge every night.

The DiGiovanni court went on to say that looking to
the use of the structure, rather than simply to the physical
characteristics of the structure, does appear a reasonable
resolution of Jones Act principles as agaimst mere defini-
tions of vessels. Jd. at 1123. If a structure is operational in
navigation than a worker is entitled to seaman status no
matter the characteristics of the structure. Just as clearly,
if the worker on a barge is not in navigation he is not
covered under the Jones Act. A worker is not exposed to
seaman’s hazards “by what the vessel did in the past, or by

27

its future potential”. Jd. at 1123. Therefore, Stewart can
find no support for his claim of being a Jones Act seamen
by the fact that the Superscoop may have been used in
some sort of navigation before his accident or may be so
used in the future. There is no dispute that at the time he
was injured the Superscoop was stationary and that
during the Boston Harbor project it was used as a platform

for a dredging crane.

The Superscoop fails to meet the “vessel” test and
definition set forth in Bernard v. Binnings Construction
Co. 741 F.2d 824 (5th cir. at 1984) and adopted by the First
Circuit in DiGiovanni:

Floating is not enough /d. at 828. Nor is capabil-

ity of movement across navigable water Jd. at

829. Rather, the test is whether it was designed

or used primarily for the transportation of cargo,

equipment or persons across navigable waters or

was, at the time of Bernard's injuries, engaged in

navigation. DiGiovanni at 1123.

The DiGiovanni court, satisfied it now had a workable
rule, applied the rule for the sake of comparison to the
facts in the Supreme Court case of Southwest Marine Inc.
v. Gizoni 112 S.Ct. 486, 494 cited at DiGiovanni, 1123. In
Gizoni the worker was a ship repairer who at the time of
his accident was on a work platform engaged in transport-
ing a rudder to a ship. He was injured when his foot went
through the deck. In discussing the Gizoni case the DiGio-
vanni court wrote: “The platform, in other words, at the
time of plaintiff’s injury, was engaged in transportation,
and the plaintiff was a participant in that operation.
Under our rule we would be more favorable to the worker
than was the Gizoni court.” Jd. at 1124. While the Gizoni
court remanded the case, the DiGiovanni court if presented

28

with the same facts would have ruled as a matter of law
that the plaintiff was a seamen. /d. at 1124.

The court was very clear in pointing out that Mr.
DiGiovanni does not measure up to the plaintiff in Gizoni.
The movement of the barge “about the piers for working
convenience and at night for safety ... This was hardly
navigation or commerce, and did not diminish the primary
nature of the platform’s shore use and purpose.” Jd. at
1124. The DiGiovanni court held as a matter of law that
Mr. DiGiovanni was not entitled to Jones Act recovery.
Presented with the facts in Stewart, there is no doubt that
following the rule as set forth in DiGiovanni, as a matter
of law the plaintiff’s claim for Jones Act recovery must be
denied. Stewart is no more of a seaman than was DiGio-
vanni.

2. The First Circuit’s Decision in DiGi :
is Now Widely Followed
The United States District Court, E.D. New York in
the matter of Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting Co 847
F. Supp. 12 (E.D. N.Y. 1994) wrote:

other courts, including the court of appeals for
the ninth circuit, have followed the first circuit’s
holding in DiGiovanni. See Kathriner v.
UNISEA, Inc. 975 F. 2d. 657, 661 (9th cir 1992);
Hatch v. Durocher Dock & Dredge, Inc. 820 F.
Supp 314, 316 (E.D. Mich. 1993). The Court
could not locate any courts which had rejected
DiGiovanni, or applied an alternative standard.
Id. at 15.

The Court added:

The Court concludes that this standard is well
reasoned, clear, and easy to apply. Most impor-
tantly the Court concludes that the first circuits
analysis correctly applies the law as enumerated
by the Supreme Court in Wilander and Gizoni.
Id. at 16.

Many of the recent cases share facts similar to those
in Duncan. In Tonnesen the plaintiff was injured when he
was struck by a wooden building form that swung free
while suspended from the crane on the barge on which
plaintiff worked. Jd. at 14. Like the Superscoop, the barge
in Tonnesen was a “crane barge” which only moved in
navigation while being towed to and from a work site, and
when changing position at the site. Jd. Applying the
DiGiovanni standard, the Court first determined the
primary purpose of the “vessel”. Jd. at 15. The Court
further cited DiGiovanni:

If the primary purpose in navigation (i.e. the
transportation of people or goods on the water)
then the vessel is presumed to be in navigation.
See Jd. at 1122. If the primary purpose is other
than navigation then the question of whether the
worker is there to perform a maritime function or
a shore enterprise must be answered. See Jd. If
the worker’s function is not maritime (i.e. fur-
thering the navigation of the structure at sea)
then the worker is only considered a seaman
when the structure is [in navigation] (i.e. mov-
ing) see Jd. at 15.

Stewart fares no better than did Mr. Tonnesen in

claiming Jones Act seaman status. The primary purpose of
the Superscoop is dredging, work which is performed with
the crane. The plaintiff can not seriously argue otherwise.

30

There is no evidence that the Superscoop was involved in
the transportation of goods or people (i.e. navigation). If
the Superscoop’s purpose is not navigation then the
plaintiff’s function is not navigation and thus not mari-
time. Also, the building of a tunnel to be used by automo-
biles is no more a maritime function than the building of a
bridge for the same purpose. Therefore, Stewart is left to
prove the Superscoop was in navigation at the time of the
accident. It was not. The Superscoop was stationary. It is
not enough that the barge could move up and down with
the tide. Jd.

The same conclusion has been reached in other cases
with facts nearly identical to those facing the Court in
Stewart. In Nielsen v. Weeks Marine Inc. 910 F. Supp. 84
(E.D.N.Y 1995) the plaintiff worked on a derrick barge
renovating certain ships and piers on Staten Island. Jd. at
86. Like the Superscoop the barge in Nielsen could not
travel independently through open waters but could move
by its own cables by using anchors and motorized winches.
Id. The Court held that:

The fact that plaintiff on occasion participated in
handling the lines as the barge was moved along
the pier did not transmogrify it into a vessel in
navigation. Since plaintiff had no relationship to
a vessel in navigation he has no claim under the
Jones Act. Id. at 88.

Likewise, the fact that Stewart may have tended lines
or worked on the anchor winches on occasion as one of his
duties of a deck hand does not transform the Superscoop
into a vessel in navigation.

In Hatch v. Durocher Dock & Dredge, Inc. 33 F.3d 545
(6th cir. 1994), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found

31

DiGiovanni to be well reasoned and highly persuasive. In
Hatch the “deckhand/pile driver was assigned to a derrick
barge with no internal propulsion system and used as a
piledriver in a dock building project. Plaintiff sometimes
helped to move the barge. He injured his back stepping
from a platform onto the barge. Since the barge’s primary
purpose was construction rather than transportation and
was not “actually underway” when plaintiff was injured,
the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. See Jd. at 548. The Court added:

It is clear, however, that a plaintiff alleging sea-
man status must at a minimum show that the
purported vessel was “in navigation” at the time
of the injury. Id.

Stewart can not meet this minimum prerequisite.

While many of the cases cited involve the construction
of bridges, use of the Superscoop to dredge for a tunnel
makes it no more of a vessel than the other crane barges.
All are being used as work platforms.

3. , — a

7 ue, a, bl Not Rel )

Counsel for the plaintiff recently filed am opposition to

a motion for summary judgment filed by Dutra in an

action with nearly identical issues. The defendant antici-

pates that Stewart will rely upon maiiy of the same
arguments and addresses them here.

The plaintiff is expected to cite the case of McDermott
International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U 8. 337 (1991) for the
proposition that there is no requirement that ai..employee
aid in the navigation of a vessel in an order ‘o qualify as a

32

Jones Act Seaman. This issue is not in dispute. The
defendant acknowledges that Stewart’s duties contributed
to the function of the Superscoop. The relevant issue is
whether the Superscoop is a vessel pursuant to the Jones
Act. That issue was never before the McDermott court, a
case that was dealing not with a work platform but the
American-Flag Vessel M/V Gates Tide, a paint boat. The
court in McDermott wrote “The question presented here is
narrow.... we are asked only if Wilander should be
precluded from seaman status because he did not perform
transportation-related functions on board.” Jd at 356, 357.

The plaintiff will also cite the 1995 Supreme Court
case of Chandris v. Latsis, 115 S. Ct. 2172 (1995). While
the Court in McDermott addressed the type of activities a
worker must perform to fall within the protection of the
Jones Act, the Chandris court determined “what relation-
ship a worker must have to the vessel” in order to obtain
seaman status. Jd at 2181. As in McDermott, whether or
not the “structures” were vessels under the Jones Act was
not in question and thus not an issue. The subject vessels
in Chandris consisted of six passenger cruise ships.
Whether the structure was a “vessel in navigation” was
also not in question in Chandris. At the time of his injury,
the plaintiff was on board one of the cruise ships sailing to
Bermuda. /d. Therefore, answering the two part Chandris
test in the affirmative is irrelevant to the issue whether
the Superscoop was a vessel in navigation. It should be
pointed out that the Court in Chandris was not unaware
of the First Circuit’s decision in DiGiovanni and cited
DiGiovanni. Id. at 2192. At no point did the Chandris
court address the rule for seaman established by the
DiGiovanni court.

33

The plaintiff may also cite cases from the Fifth Circuit
(Offshore Company v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959)
and Ducote v. Keeler & Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir.
1992)) which the DiGiovanni court has specifically decided
not to follow or would surely have rejected.

The holding by the first circuit in DiGiovanni that the
barge’s prior use or future use is irrelevant, is a clear
rejection of the fifth circuits thinking in Ducote. The
Ducote court reversed the district court’s summary judg-
ment for the defendant and remanded the case. Jd. at
1004. In Ducote the plaintiff was operating a drag-
line/crane from the deck of a spud barge. He was in the
process of driving piles at the time he was injured.

In reversing the lower court the court in Ducote
focused on two factors. First, the court looked at “the
purpose for which this barge was constructed”. Jd. at 1003.
Secondly, the court looked at the future use of the barge
during the project. The court wrote “the scope of the
project, however, called for the spud barge to be moved
approximately five miles along the bank of the Red River.
This planned movement distinguishes this spud barge
from the structures in the Cook line of cases”. Id. at 1004.
This way of thinking was rejected by the first circuit in
DiGiovanni. The DiGiovanni court made clear that it was
more interested in the use of the barge at the time of the
plaintiff’s injury and not the shape of the barge or its
potential use in the future.

Ill. CONCLUSION

The evolution of the definition of “seamen” and “ves-
sel” in the First Circuit for purposes of recovery under the
Jones Act bars the plaintiff from recovery in this case. The

34

same standards apply to Count II of the plaintiff’s com-
plaint (Maintenance and Cure). There exists no genuine
issue of material fact in this case, and summary judgment
should enter for Dutra Construction Co. on all counts.

By its attorneys,

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.,

BBO# 544538
PEABODY & ARNOLD
50 Rowes Wharf
Boston, MA 02110
617/951-2100

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frederick E. Connelly, Jr., hereby certify that I have
this day September, 1996 served a copy of the foregoing
upon the plaintiff by mailing same postage prepaid to:

Gregory L. Nester, Esq.

Marvin I. Barish Law Offices, P.C.
Suite 801 — The Curtis Center
Independence Mall West

Sixth and Walnut Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Thomas J. Hunt, Esq.
One Union Street
Boston, MA 02108

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr. __
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.

35

EXHIBIT “A”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CA # 95-11046 (RCL)
WILLARD T. STEWART

Plaintiff
VS.
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CoO., INC.
Defendant

DEPOSITION OF WILLARD T. STEWART, taken
pursuant to Notice under the applicable provisions of the
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the
Defendant, before Joan M. Barry, a Notary Public in and
for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at the offices of
Peabody & Arnold, &§0 Rowes Wharf, Boston, Massachu-
setts, on Tuesday, May 21, 1996, commencing at 11:30 a.m.

NEAL A. SALLOWAY — COURT REPORTERS
FIVE CARDIGAN ROAD
WEST PEABODY, MA 01960
(617) 581-3993 — (508) 535-0313

PE ES:

PEABODY & ARNOLD

(by Frederick E. Connelly, Jr., Esq.)
50 Rowes Wharf

Boston, Massachusetts 02110

On behalf of the Defendant
MARVIN E. BARISH, ESQ.

36

(by Gregory L. Nester, Esq.)
The Curtis Center

Sixth and Walnut Streets
Suite 801
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
On behalf of the Plaintiff
INDEX

DEPONENT DIRECT CROSS
Willard T. Stewart
By Mr. Connelly 4

EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT NO. DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.
1 Photocepy 136

[4) MR. NESTER: I would like him to read and
sign. Okay. I'll explain that to him afterwards. We'll waive
notary. He doesn’t have to do it in front of a notary.

MR. CONNELLY: All objections reserved until
the time of trial, except as to form. All motions to strike
are reserved. As far as reading and signing, twenty-one
days will be enough time once he receives it?

MR. NESTER: Once I receive it, it should be. If
that’s problematic, I'll let you know.

WILLARD T. STEWART

37

having been first duly sworn, deposes and terti-
fies as follows:

EXAMINATION
BY MR. CONNELLY:

Q. Mr. Stewart, my name is Frederick Connelly, and
I represent the defendant, Dutra Construction Company. I
am going to be asking you some questions today.

I first want to go over a few groundrules so the pro-
ceedings will go a little smoother. You may have discussed
some of this with your attorney already. You’re going to
have to answer each question outloud, okay, and

* * *
[28] A. Uh-huh

Q. So, for those ten years, you were assisting them
in building an island, right?

A. They were still working on it.
Q. What is that island for?

A. Containment area for dredge from the Baltimore
Harbor, from Baltimore Harbor and the ship channel.

Q. Where is Great Lakes located?

A. Their main office is in Chicago. They have an
office in Baltimore, one in, I think, New York, and I think
in Florida somewhere.

Q. Had you ever worked for Dutra before the Boston
job?

A. No.

38
Q. So, Great Lakes job ended, and you had about
four mounts off?
A. Approximately, yes.

Q. And when you were not working, would you
collect unemployment?

A. Uh-huh.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
MR. NESTER: One second.

* * *

[31] Q. Had you ever worked on a dredge like that
before?

A. That particular — every one is a little different. I
have worked on that similar, but not exactly the same.

Q. All right. Describe for me this dredge. What is it
called, the Super Scoop?

A. Yes.

Q. What is a Super Scoop?
A. It’s a dredge, yes.

Q. Describe it for me?

A. It does, it’s digging with a clamshell bucket. It’s
like a crane, a crane laddered on a barge.

Q. Okay. When you arrived in Boston, was the Super
Scoop already here?

A. Yes.

39

Q. Do you know how it got here?
A. It had been here, I guess, approximately a week.
Q. Do you know how it got here?
A. I believe it was towed by a tug, I believe.
Q. From California?
A. Yes.

* * *

[33] there.

Q. Okay, and there was only one dredge on the Super
Scoop?

A. Yes.

Q. And that always remained on it as far as you
know?

A. Yes.

Q. Hew much of your time was spent on the Super
Scoop during the time you were on the job?

A. I would say 99 and 9/10s.
Q. 99 and 9/10s?
A. Right.

Q. So, just about all your time was on the Super
Scoop?

A. Yes.

Q. What engines on the Super Scoop did you have
responsibility for?

40.

A. The main engine on the hoist. They had two deck
engines. Occasionally, if they had a problem with the boat,
I would deal with that. They would ask me to come check
it out, but — F

Q. What boat is that?
A. The work boat they had.
[34] (Discussion held off the record.)

Q. We were discussing the engines that you are
responsible for, three main ones were the main engine to
hoist and the two deck engines?

A. Yes.

Q. Ard you had spent all your time on the Super
Scoop working on those?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you the only person or engineer on the
Super Scoop?

A. No. There’s three engineers. Not at the same
time. I mean, shift work.

Q. Okay. During your shifts, were you the only
engineer on the Super Scoop?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I take it none of these engines had anything
to do with the movement of the Super Scoop and the water?

A. The deck engines do. They operate, hoist, cables
and ankers and so on.

Q. What would these be used for?

41

A. Moving Super Scoop to do the dredging operation.

* * *

(53) Q. And you were going to say, hey, I'll help you,
tell me what to do?

A. Yes, basically, yes.

Q. Did you start working with him before you were
i. jured? .

A. I wasn’t working with him. He said, he had — He
was finishing up with the engine, he was finishing up. I
said, well, since you're all right, I'll feed the wires down
through and go ahead and wire up the remote control and

take care of that. That’s something he would have done if I
weren't there to help him.

Q. What job was this to huok it up? I don’t under-
stand. What are you hooking up?

A. They had a remote control unit. They operated a
scow from the tug boat by remote control.

Q. And that was unhooked when he replaced the
engine?

A. Yes. They took the top building off of the scow.
They took the top building off where the wires are up
through and up through and then there was the control
panel down blow.

They disconnected it. So, they could take this building
off and disconnected the wiring from the

* * *

42

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

WILLARD STEWART,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO.
- 95-11046-RCL
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION
CO., INC.,

Defendant.

DEFENDANT, DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC."S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now comes the defendant, Dutra Construction Co,
Inc. (“Dutra”), and respectfully requests the Court to grant
it summary judgment on all counts. Dutra submitted a
Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to all counts
of the plaintiff's original Complaint. Since that time, the
court has allowed the plaintiff to amend his Complaint to
add a count under Se ‘ion 905(b) of the Longshore and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Having reserved its
rights to supplement its initial Motion for Summary
Judgment, the defendant hereby submits its Supplemental
Motion for Summary Judgment and argues that there is
no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiff is
not entitled to Section 905(b) benefits as a matter of law.

In support of its Supplemental Motion, Dutra refers to
and incorporates herein the attached Memorandum of
Law, relevant portions of the transcript of the plaintiffs
deposition and the Amended Complaint.

43

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

The defendant believes that oral argument will assist
the court in deciding this matter and therefore requests to
be heard.

By its attorneys,

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.,
BBO #544538
Moujan M. Walkow,
BBO #630658
PEABODY & ARNOLD
50 Rowes Wharf
Boston, MA 02110
617/951-2100

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frederick E. Connelly, Jr., hereby certify that I have
this 17 day of October, 1996, served a copy of the foregoing
upon the plaintiff by mailing same postage prepaid to:

Gregory L. Nester, Esq.

Marvin I Barish Law Offices, P.C.
Suite 801 — The Curtis Center
Independence Mall West

Sixth and Walnut Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Thomas J. Hunt, Esq.
One Union Street
Boston, MA 02108
/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.

44

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

WILLARD STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO.
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION 95-11046-RCL
CO., INC.,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT, DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC."S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendant, Dutra Construction Co. (“Dutra”),
incorporates herein by reference its Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and submits
the following memorandum in support of its Supplemental
Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). Dutra asserts that no genuine issues of material fact
exist in this case and that Dutra is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law on all counts of the plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint.

The plaintiff was hired by Dutra out of the union hall
in late 1992 (Stewart Deposition Transcript at 26, Exhibit

45

“A”).' He was responsible for maintaining the engines on
the Superscoop (S. Tr. at 33), and generally, it was part of
his job to “do what it took to get [the dredge] running
again” when it shut down (S. Tr. at 50). He also checked
the oil on the scows once per week or checked the engine
(S. Tr. at 46). His employment duties included working on
the scows, as the operation of the scows was necessary for
dredging (S. Tr. at 49-50).

Il. ARGUMENT

C. The Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Recover Und
the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compen-
sation Act (“LHWCA")

The LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 905(b), provides in pertinent
part that

in the event of injury to a person covered under
this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel,

then such person . . . may bring an action against
such vessel.

Although Jones Act and LHWCA actions are mutually
exclusive, and the plaintiff would be entitled to proceed
under the LHWCA in the absence of a Jones Act case, the
facts of this particular case bar LHWCA recovery.

In his amended complaint, the plaintiff has added a
count under Section 905(b) authorizing covered employees
to sue a vessel as a third party for injury caused by the
negligence of the vessel (Stewart Amended Complaint,

' The deposition transcript of Willard Stewart shall hereinafter be
referred to as “S. Tr.”

46

Exhibit “B”). While Dutra may be subject to suit under
Section 905(b) in its capacity as “vessel owner,” Dutra is
immune from tort actions under the LHWCA in its capac-
ity as the plaintiff’s employer. See DiGiovanni v. Traylor
Bros., Inc.” 855 F. Supp. 37 (D.R.I. 1994) (citing Levens v.
Pintail Enters. Inc., 943 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 940 (1992)). To prevail, \he plaintiff must
show that any negligence on Dutra’s part is attributable to
it as vessel owner rather than as Stewart’s LHWCA
er.ployer. See id. Thus, the court must decide whether
Dutra’s alleged negligence occurred in its vessel capacity
(allowing suit to be brought under Section 905(b)) or in its
employer capacity (immunizing it from suit).’

The nearly identical issue was before the Unites
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the case of
Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 75 F.3d 736 (1st Cir. 1996).°
In Morehead, the plaintiff was injured when he stepped
backwards into an open hatch on one of the barges (Mare-
head Opinion at 4). The evidence showed that the hatch
had been left open for several days to allow access to a
marine surveyor. (/d.) The plaintiff alleged that the vessel

* The plaintiff has alleged in his amended complaint negligence of
Dutra and unseaworthiness of the Superscoop. Section 905(b) provides
in pertinent part: “The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall
not be based upon the warranty of the seaworthiness or a breach
thereof at the time the injury occurred.” Because of this statutory bar to
the plaintiff's urseaworthiness claim, the defendant will only address
the plaintiff's negligence allegations.

* While the Morehead opinion has been withdrawn from publica-
tion because a rehearing en banc is pending, the court’s decision is
sound. The slip opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit “C” and will
hereinafter be referred to as “Morehead Opinion.”

47

owner was negligent for allowing the hatch to remain open
and for failing to warn. (Jd. at 5).

In deciding under what capacity the barge
owner/employer, Atkinson-Kiewit, was negligent, the court
followed the reasoning that “a court may have to divide
the single defendant into a hypothetical independent
employer and independent vessel owner.” (/d. at 24). The
Morehead court explained that the plaintiff’s burden
would not and should not be easy:

The statutory language and the legislative his-
tory of the 1972 and 1984 Amendments plainly
evidence Congress’ intent that the workers’ com-
pensation scheme be the primary remedy for all
covered workers, regardless of an employer’s
commercial practice in regard to vessel owner-
ship.... We are not disposed to upset the bal-
ance by expanding the liability of employers that
act simultaneously as vessel owners.

(Id. at 24-25). The court further wrote that “[t]he exception
in Section 905(b) for third-party negligence, removed in
1984, explicitly requires a finding of vessel fault.” (More-
head Opinion at 30).

The Morehead court adopted the reasoning of the
seminal case of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De los
Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981):

[O}nce longshore workers came on board and be-
gan carrying out their cargo duties under a ste-
vedore’s supervision, the vessel itself had no
general duty to exercise reasonable care to in-
spect for unsafe workplace conditions; rather it
could rely on the longshore worker’s employer to
do so. °

48

(Id. at 26, quoting Scindia, 451 U.S. at 172). Applying the
reasoning of Scindia to the facts before it, the Morehead
court concluded that “Scindia’s principle of limited liability
of the vessel sensibly and logically applies, because the
employees effectively assumed control of the barge work-
ing under [Atkinson-Kiewit] in its capacity as their em-
ployer rather than ... as the charterer (hence owner) of
the barge.” (/d.)

The Morehead court rejected the argument that a
vessel assumes a greater duty of care when there is no
independent employer responsible for workplace condi-
tions. (Morehead Opinion at 19). The court cited Castorina
v. Lykes Bros. S.S., 758 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 846 (1985). In Castorina, a longshore worker
exposed to asbestos during cargo operations alleged that
his employer-vessel owner knew of the harm of a vessel
and failed to make the vessel safe. The court refused to
impute any knowledge of this damage by the employer to
it as vessel, writing: “To impute this knowledge to a
shipowner-employer would be to hold it liable in tort for
damages arising from its negligence as stevedore, and
effectively to eliminate the exclusivity provisions of Sec-
tions 905(a) and (b).” Jd at 1033.

Therefore, the plaintiff cannot argue that Dutra had
knowledge as dredging company/contractor that the hatch

was open or unguarded and that the knowledge should be
imputed to Dutra as vessel owner.

The plaintiff is expected to argue that the allegedly
negligent acts performed by co-workers which led to his
accident were performed in furtherance of the vessel or
that the work he was performing when injured was in
furtherance of the vessel. The Morehead court recognized

49

this competing analysis and rejected it. (Jd at 29). In
Morehead the plaintiff argued that the act of leaving the
hatch open was to help the vessel and not in furtherance of
some construction activity. In response the court wrote: -

One of the essential purposes of the 1972 and
1984 Amendments was to provide employees and
employers with a greater degree of certainty as
to the coverage in effect. The legislative history
of the 1984 Amendment documents this concern:

[T]he situation in which a worker may be
covered at one time, and not covered at an-
other, depending on the nature of the work
which the worker is performing at the time
of the injury must be avoided since such a
result would be enormously destabilizing,
and would thus defeat one of the essential
purposes of these amendments.

1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2736-2737. A “functional”
interpretation, hinging the type of liability on the
nature and purpose of the duties being per-
formed by covered employees at any given time,
would increase uncertainty and the frequency of
disputes over the scope of coverage.

(Morehead Opinion at 31). In referencing the dual capacity
of the employee, the Morehead court noted that both types
of activities — construction and scowmen’s work, — as-
signed to the harbor workers were performed for Atkinson-
Kiewit as employer and not as vessel owner. (Jd. at 26).
The Morehead court emphasized that because the em-
ployment contemplated both construction and linehan-
dling, a single, overall classification was most appropriate
for determining the types of remedies available. (Jd. at 31).
Thus, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument in that case, the
Morehead court pointed out that “[a]s is typical in the case

50

of harbor workers ... the men were expected to lend a
hand with supporting maritime chores as well as pursuing
their particular construction trade,” and therefore, “the
barges tended by its carpenters/scowmen were operated
within [Atkinson-Kiewit’s]- control and knowledge qua
employer.” (Jd. at 28).

The same holds true in the case at bar. Stewart and
his fellow dredge workers’ employment contemplated that
their duties would also alternate between work for Dutra
as employer and for Dutra as vessel owner. Dutra hired
harbor workers through the union hall (S. Tr. at 26). The
plaintiff and the other employees on the Superscoop were
hired to do tasks relating to both dredging and work on
the vessels (S. Tr. at 33, 34, 46, 50). The various engines
that Stewart was hired to maintain were used for dredging
(the engines that ran the crane), dumping (the engines on
the scows) and moving the dredge (deck winches). (S. Tr. at
33-35, 46). At the time he was injured, the plaintiff was
working on the remote control for the scow engine which
allowed easier dumping of the dredged materials. (S. Tr. at
45). He was therefore performing his regular duties as
engineer on a dredging operation. Attempts by the plaintiff
in Morehead to bifurcate his vessel and construction
activities were rejected by the court because the workers
were hired to perform both. (See Morehead Opinion at 18).

Other employees were also performing “employment
duties” when the plaintiff was allegedly injured on the
scow (S. Tr. at 50, 53), The operator of the crane was
maneuvering the bucket while the deckhands/scowmen
were tending lines. (S. Tr. at 129-131). Brad Shoffit was
the supervisor of the dredging operation and the captain of
the superscoop. (S. Tr. at 129-131). All employees were
involved in the dredging process. The Morehead court

51

noted that the owner did not employ a separate crew on its
barges. (Morehead Opinion at 17). The same applies to
Dutra in the case at bar.

Thus, the Superscoop and the adjoining scow were

‘ operated within Dutra’s control and knowledge qua em-

ployer. Furthermore, there is no claim or evidence that the
alleged negligent conditions are attributable to the errors
of separate maritime agents acting specifically for the
vessel. (See Morehead Opinion at 26-27).

Ill. CONCLUSION

Wherefore, the defendant, Dutra Construction Co.,
Inc., respectfully requests that the court grant its Motion
for Summary Judgment on all counts of the plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint.

By its attorneys,

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.,

BBO #544538
Moujan M. Walkow,

BBO #630658
PEABODY & ARNOLD
50 Rowes Wharf
Boston, MA 02110
617/951-2100

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Frederick E. Connelly, Jr., hereby certify that I have
this 17 day of October, 1996, served a copy of the foregoing
upon the plaintiff by mailing same postage prepaid to:

52 -

Gregory L. Nester, Esq.

Marvin I Barish Law Offices, P.C.
Suite 801 — The Curtis Center
Independence Mall West

Sixth and Walnut Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Thomas J. Hunt, Esq.
One Union Street
Boston, MA 02108

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.

EXHIBIT A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CA # 95-11046 (RCL)
WILLARD T. STEWART

Plaintiff
VS.
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CoO., INC.
Defendant

DEPOSITION OF WILLARD T. STEWART, taken
pursuant to Notice under the applicable provisions of the
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the
Defendant, before Joan M. Barry, a Notary Public in and
for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at the offices of
Peabody & Arnold, 50 Rowes Wharf, Boston, Massachu-
setts, on Tuesday, May 21, 1996, commencing at 11:30 a.m.

53

NEAL A. SALLOWAY — COURT REPORTERS
FIVE CARDIGAN ROAD
WEST PEABODY, MA 01960
(617) 581-3993 — (508) 535-0313
APPEARANCES:
PEABODY & ARNOLD
(by Frederick E. Connelly, Jr., Esq.)
50 Rowes Wharf
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
On behalf of the Defendant

MARVIN E. BARISH, ESQ.

(by Gregory L. Nester, Esq.)

The Curtis Center
Sixth and Walnut Streets
Suite 801
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
On behalf of the Plaintiff
INDEX
DEPONE DIRECT CROSS
Willard T. Stewart
By Mr. Connelly 4

54

EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT NO. DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.
1 Photocopy 136

[4] MR. NESTER: I would like him to read and
sign. Okay. I'll explain that to him afterwards. We'll waive
notary. He doesn’t have to do it in front of a notary.

MR. CONNELLY: All objections reserved until
the time of trial, except as to form. All motions to strike
are reserved. As far as reading and signing, twenty-one
days will be enough time once he receives it?

MR. NESTER: Once I receive it, it should be. If
that’s problematic, I'll let you know.

WILLARD T. STEWART

having been first duly sworn, deposes and testifies as
follows:

EXAMINATION
BY MR. CONNELLY:

Q. Mr. Stewart, my name is Frederick Connelly, and
I represent the defendant, Dutra Construction Company. I
am going to be asking you some questions today

I first want to go over a few groundrules so the pro-

ceedings will go a little smoother. You may have discussed —

some of this with your attorney already. You're going to
have to answer each question outloud, okay, and

* * *

55
[26] Q. Do your hammer toes in any way affect the
work you can do?
A. No.

Q. If at any time during the deposition today you
think of any other injuries or claims you’ve made that you
didn’t think of before, just let me know.

Okay?
A. Sure.
Q. When did you first start working for Dutra?

A. I believe it was December, 1992. November or
December. I know it was cold weather.

Q. And you were hired out of the union hall?
A. Yes.

Q. Okay. When had you last worked before you
began working at the Boston job?

A. Where did I last work before that?
MR. NESTER: For Dutra or anybody?
Q. Anybody?

A. Iworked for —I was off work for like four months
before I worked — I worked in Baltimore.

Q. You worked where?
A. In Baltimore, Baltimore area.
Q. And what company was that for?

56

[33] there. ,
Q. Okay, and there was only one dredge on the Super

A. Yes.
Q. And that always remained on it as far as you

A. Yes.

Q. How much of your time was spent on the Super
Scoop during the time you were on the job?

A. I would say 99 and 9/10s.

Q. 99 and 9/10s?

A. Right.

Q. So, just about all your time was on the Super

A. Yes.

Q. What engines on the Super Scoop did you have
responsibility for?

A. The main engine on the hoist. They had two deck
engines. Occasionally, if they had a problem with the boat,
I would deal with that. They would ask me to come check
it out, but —

Q. What boat is that?
A. The work boat they had.
[34] (Discussion held off the record.)

57 i

Q. We were discussing the engines that you are
responsible for, three main ones were the main engine to
hoist and the two deck engines?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had spent all your time on the Super
Scoop working on those?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you the only person or engineer on the
Super Scoop?

/. No. There’s three engineers.~Not at the same
time. I mean, shift work.

Q. Okay. During your shifts, were you the only
engineer on the Super Scoop?
A. Yes.

Q. Now, I take it none of these engines had anything
to do with the movement of the Super Scoop and the
water?

A. The deck engines do. They operate, hoist, cables
and ankers and so on.

Q. What would these be used for?
A. Moving Super Scoop to do the dredging operation.
[35] Q. Okay.

A. And-

Q. Do they have any other purposes than moving the
Super Scoop?

A. No.

58
Q. And those would be used how — Would it be by
ankers?
A. Yes, ankers and the cables.

Q. And did it have any other form of propulsion
_ other than that?

A. No.

Q. It didn’t have a propeller, no.

Q. And how many times during a day would it move?
Let me rephrase that.

How many times during a shift would it move?

A. I don’t know. Say working a twelve-hour shift,
maybe, mostly I guess the work, I would guess six times.

Q. And how far would it be moved?

A. On each move, thirty feet, fifty feet.

Q. How long would each move take?

A. Normally, just a few minutes, maybe five
minutes.

* * *

[45] So, I went over to see what I could do to help the
Caterpillar man finish up and get the show on the road.

He was finishing up with the engine. So, I decided, I
disconnected the wiring the day before. So, I fed the wires
back down there and connected the wires back up for the
remote control for the lights and so on and on that little
building on that thing, and while I was doing this, I was
on my knees feeding the wire down through, and they

59

decided to move the scow around to the other side of the
dredge to start filling it up and apparently, I could pretty
much nearly drop the bucket in there, swing it around and
everything went flying and when it snapped, I don’t know
what happened, and when I slipped, that’s when it all

happened.
Q. We'll break it down to make it a little clearer.

Starting with the — Was the engine on the scow that
needed replacing?

A. Yes.

Q. They were going to replace the entire engine?
A. The scow 4.

Q. How many scows were being used out there?
[46] A. I think two.

Q. What were the other scow’s number?

A. 151 — something like that. 151. I can’t remember
exactly.

Q. Had you been on the scows at all either shortly
before the accident? Had you been on either scow before
the day of your -

A. Yes. I check the oil once a week or check the
engine.
Now, the scows, do they have self propulsion?
No.
They have to be torqued, don’t they?
Yes.

> & Pe ©

60

Q. The engine you're talking about is the hopper?

A. Yes.

Q. Which opens up into the ocean and dumps the
dredging material?
Yes.
Onto the fish and clams below?

Yes.

> 2 >

Q. So, the engine in the scow number 4 blew out or
something?

* * *

[50] Q. All right.

A. I wasn’t ordered to. It was part of my job when
the dredge is shut down to do what it took to get it run-

Q. Okay. The dredge was shut down. So, you couldn’t
work.

There was no reason for you to work on the engine of

the dredge?
A. Not at that time, no.

Q. So, basically, until this scow gets fixed, you had
nothing to do?
MR. NESTER: I'll object to the form of the
question.

Q. Let me ask you, did you have any work to do on
the Super Scoop until scow number 4 was fixed?

61

A. I could have. I probably — but not that it was
important as getting the scow, to get the dredge back in
operation.

Q. Now, was a Caterpillar mechanic there?
| A. Yes.
Q. His job was to replace the scow engine?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he have anyone helping him?
[51] A. .No, not at that time, no.
Q. What was the first day he was out there?
A. Firstday.
Q. Was that the first day?

A. I believe the day before, I believe he got there the
day before.

Q. Did you check with anyone, any supervisor before
you went on to the scow?

A. I talked to the captain, yes.
Q. Who was that?

A. Brad Shoffit.
Q

. What did you say to him and what did he say to
you?

A. Idon’t remember.

Q. In any event, you went from the Super Scoop onto
the scow?

62

A. Yes.

Q. And was the scow along side of the Super Scoop
at this point?

A. Yes.
Q. Directly along side?
A. Yes.

Q. And how would you get from the Super Scoop to
[52] the scow?

A. It was like a, the ladder built right into the side of
the — You step off the deck, go off the ladder and onto the
scow.

The scow was higher than the Super Scoop?
Yes.

Would the scow be tied to Super Scoop?
Ropes.

Okay. Several different ropes?

Ropes or cables from the winches.

And were there any buffers between the two?
Normally, yes. There are tires in there.

Just black tires?

Yes.

Hung along side?

Yes.

> Oro Pro > Oo > OPO

63

So, you climb aboard the scow?
Yes.

Did you have any tools with you?
I don’t think so.

Q. Okay. And then you, I take it, went to find the
Caterpillar mechanic?

A. Yes.

> © > ©

[53] Q. And you were going to say, hey, I'll help you,
tell me what to do?

A. Yes, basically, yes.

Q. Did you start working with him before you were
injured?

A. I wasn’t working with him. He said, he had — He
was finishing up with the engine, he was finishing up. I
said, well, since you're all right, I'll feed the wires down
through and go ahead and wire up the remote control and
take care of that. That’s something he would have done if I
weren't there to help him.

Q. What job was this to hook it up? I don’t under-
stand. What are you hooking up?

A. They had a remote control unit. They operated a
scow from the tug boat by remote control. -

@. And that was unhooked when he replaced the
erigine?

A. Yes. They took the top building off of the scow.
They took the top building off where the wires are up

64

through and up through and then there was the control
panel down blow.

They disconnected it. So, they could take this building
off and disconnected the wiring from the

* * *
[129] A. No.

Q. What people, what crew members were onboard
the Super Scoop at the time you were injured. You men-
tioned Malcolm Oldham?

A. Malcolm Oldham, Bill Duncan, I think, was
onboard.

Q. What was he?

A. Pardon me.

Q. What was his job?

A. He was a mate.

Q. Did he ever operate the Super Scoop?

A. I don’t think so. I don’t know.

Q. Who else was onboard? Was Brad Shoffit on-
board? \

A. Yes.

Q. He was?

A. Yes. I’m trying to think. Stanley Oldham, I think
he was on. I think Roger Hammond. He was a civil engi-
neer. I believe he was on.

Q. Roger Hammond?

65

A. Yes.
Q. Who would you take orders from?
A. Roger.

[130] Q. Roger would give you orders?
A. No. Who did I take orders from?
Q. Yes.

A. The only one that gave me orders, if anybody,
would be Brad Shoffit. He was the captain.

Q. Okay. Any other names of people out —
A. Pardon me.

Q. Can you recall names of any other people working
out there?

A. I think Stanley Oldham, I think, was working. I
am bad at remembering names. You'll have to ask me.

Q. Okay. In the six or seven months you had been
working on the Super Scoop before the day of your acci-
dent, how many times had you seen a scow being brought
along side the Super Scoop, a couple of times a week or —

A. Oh, yes, early in the job, it was a couple of times a
day.

Q. Were they all brought in the same way by putting
the bucket in the scow?

A. No. They brought them in with a tug boat some-
times and push. Once, occasionally, they put the bucket in
to, you know, bring it in a little closer to hold it until they

66
got it tied up mostly was what they [131] used the bucket
for.

Q. Okay. When you went from the Super Scoop onto
the scow, it was tied up.

Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So, it had to be untied by the deck hands?
A. Yes.

Q. And then the bucket would have pushed it away
and brought it around?

A. Yes.
Q. And you didn’t realize any of that was going on?
A. No.

Q. And just, I believe I asked you this, just so I’m
clear, the engine that was being worked on on the scow
was the engine used to open the hoppers?

A. Yes.

It wasn’t to propel the scow?

No.

You never slept on the Super Scoop. Is that right?
Pardon me.

op & Pp

There was no place for you to sleep on the

* * *

67

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

WILLARD T. STEWART, )

a )
Plaintiff ) CIVIL ACTION
V. ) NO. 95-11046 (RCL)
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION ?
CO., INC., '
Defendant. )
ANSWER OF D TION

O PLAINTIFF’ r
(Filed Dec. 3, 1996)

Now comes the Defendant, Dutra Construction Co.,
Inc., by and through its attorneys, Peabody & Arnold, and
herewith gives its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint,
reserving all rights to seek additional defenses to the
complaint by appropriate motion.

All allegations not specifically admitted herein are
denied. The defendant, Dutra Construction Co., Inc.,
(hereinafter “Dutra”) answers each numbered paragraph
as follows:

First Cause of Action
1. The defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph one.

2. The defendant denies that the plaintiff has stand-
ing or is entitled to bring an action under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. §688 et seq or under the General Maritime Laws of
the United States District Court.

a.

3. The defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph three.

68

4. The defendant admits that it employed the plaintiff
but denies that he was the member of a crew. The defen-
dant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph four.

5. The defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph five.

6. The defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph six.

7. The defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph seven.

Wherefore, the defendant demands that the plaintiff’s
complaint against it be dismissed and that judgment enter
for the defendant, together with its costs.

on se of Acti

The defendant denies that the plaintiff is entitled to
maintenance and cure and wages and further answers as
follows:

8. The defendant incorporates herein by reference its
answers to paragraphs 1-7 and makes that its answer to
paragraph eight.

9. The defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph nine.

10. The defendant is unable to admit or deny the
allegations of jurisdiction and calls upon the plaintiff to
prove same. The defendant denies that the plaintiff has
standing or is entitled to bring an action under the Jones
Act (46 (USC §688 et seq) or under the General Maritime
Laws ot the United States District Court.

69

Wherefore, the defendant demands that the plaintiffs
complaint against it be dismissed and that judgment enter
for the defendant, together with its costs.

Third C f Acti

11. The defendant incorporates herein by reference
its answers to paragraphs 1-10 and makes that its answer

to paragraph 11.

12. The defendant denies the allegations contained
in paragraph twelve.
13. The defendant denies the allegations contained
in paragraph thirteen.
(a) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (a).

(b) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (b).

(c) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (c).

(d) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph th)rteen (d).

(e) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (e).

(f) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (f).

(g) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (g).

(h) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (h).

70

(i) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (i).

(j) The defendant denies ‘* allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (j).

(k) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (k).

(1) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (I).

(m) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (m).

(n) The defendant denies the allegations con-
tained in paragraph thirteen (n).

14. The defendant denies the allegations contained
in paragraph fourteen.

15. The defendant denies the allegations contained
in paragraph fifteen.

THE DEFENDANT, DUTRA CONSTRUCTION
CO., INC. ASSERTS THE FOLLOWING
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Now comes the defendant and incorporates the follow-
ing affirmative defense into each and every count con-
tained in its Answer to Plaintiff’s complaint as follows:

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says
that if the plaintiff was injured as alleged, which is spe-
cifically denied, those injuries were the sole and proximate
cause of actions of third parties for who the defendant is
not legally responsible.

71

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says
that if the plaintiff was injured as alleged, which is spe-
cifically denied, those injuries were the result of an Act of
God for which the defendant is not legally responsible.

FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COMPLETE
AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says that if
the plaintiff was injured as aileged, which is specifically
denied, it was due in whole or in part to the plaintiff’s
own negligence and failure to exercise his duty of care,
skill, and knowledge in the performance of his work
reasonably to be required of a person of the plaintiff’s
experience and not due to any negligence or fault on the
part of the defendant or any persons for whom the defen-

dant may be legally responsible.

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says
that if the plaintiff was injured as alleged, which is spe-
cifically denied, such injury was without fault, knowledge
or privity of the defendant, that the damages claimed
herein exceed the value of the vessel, including her pend-
ing freight; and the defendant herewith claims benefits of
any and all laws and statutes of Liability of the defendant,
including 46 U.S.C. Section 183(b).

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says
that if the injury alleged was sustained, they did not occur
while the plaintiff was in the service of the vessel.

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says
that the plaintiff breached his contractual duties to the

72

vessel owner and, therefore, cannot recover under the
Walker Doctrine.

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says
that the Dredge Superscoup and Scow No. 4 is not a vessel
as that term is used in the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Section
688 et seq, General Maritime Law, or any other applicable
statute, both state and federal, and, therefore, plaintiff is
not entitled to recover.

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says
that the plaintiff is not entitled to a trial by jury.

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant states
that it did not own the “vessel” as alleged. As a result the
plaintiff lacks jurisdiction under either the Merchant
Marine Act or the general maritime law to pursue this
case of action.

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A. COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says
that the plaintiff is barred from bringing a civil claim
because he received payments as a result of a workers
compensation claim or similar claim.

AND FURTHER ANSWERING, AND AS A COM-
PLETE AND SEPARATE DEFENSE, the defendant says
that if it was negligent it was negligent in its capacity as
employer and not as vessel owner, thus barring the plain-
tiff’s claim brought pursuant to Section 905(b) of the
Longshore & Harbor Workers Compensation Act.

73

WHEREFORE, the defendant demands that the
plaintiffs complaint against it be dismissed and that
judgment enter for the defendant, together with its costs.

JURY CLAIM

The defendant demands a trial by jury for all applica-
ble Counts.

By its attorneys,

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.,
BBO #544538
PEABODY & ARNOLD
50 Rowes Wharf
Boston, MA 02100
617/951-2100

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frederick E. Connelly, Jr., hereby certify that I have
this 2 day of December, 1996, served a copy of the forego-
ing upon the plaintiff by mailing same postage prepaid to:
Gregory L. Nester, Esq.

Marvin I Barish Law Offices, P.C.
Suite 801 — The Curtis Center
Independence Mall West

Sixth and Walnut Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Thomas J. Hunt, Esq.
One Union Street
Boston, MA 02108

74

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.

75

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

WILLIAM P. KROMHOUT, ?

Plaintiff ‘
v. C.A. NO. 95-12311-NG
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION )
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant )
DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S RE-
QUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

(Filed Oct. 6, 1999)
REQUEST NO. 1

On December 14, 1992, the defendant, Dutra, owned,
operated, and controlled the BARGE SUPER SCOOP.

RESPONSE NO. 1

Objection on the grounds that the term “controlled” calls
for a legal determination which the defendant is not
qualified to make. Without waiving this objection and
subject to it, the defendant states that on December 14,
1992 it owned and operated the Superscoop.

REQUEST NO. 2

On December, 14, 1992, the SUPER SCOOP was located
in Boston Harbor on navigable waters of the United States
and was engaged in the dredging operations referred to as
“Third Harbor Tunnel.”

76

RESPONSE NO. 2

The defendant admits that on December 14, 1992 the
Superscoop was located in Boston Harbor and was en-

gaged in the dredging operation referred to as “Third
Harbor Tunnel.”

“REQUEST NO. 3

The defendant admits that construction of the Superscoop
was completed in approximately June, 1976.

RESPONSE NO. 3

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 3.

REQUEST NO. 4

The SUPER SCOOP was formerly operating on the west
coast of the United States and sailed through the Panama
Canal under tow to the Boston area to participate in the
dredging operation for the Third Harbor Tunnel.

RESPONSE NO. 4

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 4.

REQUEST NO.5

Movement of the SUPER SCOOP was a necessary part of
the dredging operation and was done by the use of the 4
anchors and this was a daily operation.

RESPONSE NO. 5

The defendant admits that on most days during the time
that the Superscoop was performing dredging it would be
moved a short distance by use of its anchors.

77

REQUEST NO. 6
The SUPER SCOOP had a raked bow.
RESPONSE NO. 6

The defendant denies that the Superscoop has a standard
raked bow.

REQUEST NO. 7
The SUPER SCOOP was A.B:S. qualified.
RESPONSE NO. 7

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 7.

REQUEST NO. 8

The SUPER SCOOP had load line markings under Ameri-
can Bureau of Shipping Certificate No. 61-29, 944 and had
inspection periodically.

RESPONSE NO. 8

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 8.

REQUEST NO. 9
The SUPER SCOOP was a documented vessel.
RESPONSE NO. 9

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 9.

REQUEST NO. 10
The SUPER SCOOP was Coast Guard inspected.

78

RESPONSE NO. 10

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 10.

REQUEST NO. 11
The SUPER SCOOP had navigation lights.
RESPONSE NO. 11°

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 11.

REQUEST NO. 12
The SUPER SCOOP had deck engines.
RESPONSE NO. 12

The defendant admits that the Superscoop had deck
engines but denies that the engines were for propulsion
other than the short distances the Superscoop would be
moved by its anchors.

REQUEST NO. 13
The SUPER SCOOP’s purpose is for dredging operations.
RESPONSE NO. 13

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 13.

REQUEST NO. 14

The SUPER SCOOP mission was to dredge for the Third
Harbor Tunnel.

79

RESPONSE NO. 14

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 14.

REQUEST NO. 15

The SUPER SCOOP had ballast tanks to maintain a
seaworthy trim.

RESPONSE NO. 15

The defendant admits that the Superscoop had ballast
tanks.

REQUEST NO. 16

The SUPER SCOOP had a head and an area for the crew
to eat in.

RESPONSE NO. 16.

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 16.

REQUEST NO. 17
Brad Shoffit was the captain of the SUPER SCOOP.
RESPONSE NO. 17

The defendant admits that Brad Shoffit was the person in
charge of all employees on the Superscoop and was at
times referred to as “Captain.”

REQUEST NO. 18
Brad Shoffit hired and fired the members of the crew.

80

RESPONSE NO. 18

The defendant admits that Brad Shoffit was one of several
employees of Dutra who had the authority to hire and fire
employees working on the Superscoop.

REQUEST NO. 19
Crewmembers were required to wear life jackets.

RESPONSE NO. 19

The defendant admits that persons working on the Super-
scoop were required to wear life jackets.

REQUEST NO. 20

Crewmembers were transported to and from the SUPER
SCOOP by a crew boat.

RESPONSE NO. 20

The defendant admits the persons working on the Super-
scoop were transferred to the Superscoop by boat.

REQUEST NO. 21

Captain Brad Shoffit considered Bill Kromhout to be a
member of the crew of the SUPER SCOOP.

RESPONSE NO. 21

The defendant admits that at times the employees work-
ing on the Superscoop, including engineer Bill Kromhout,
were referred to as members of a crew.

REQUEST NO. 22

Captain Brad Shoffit specifically asked to hire Malcolm
Oldham as the operator.

81

RESPONSE NO. 22

The defendant admits that Malcolm Oldham was already
employed on the Superscoop and was filling in on a regu-
lar basis as an operator. When a position for a full time
operator became available, Brad Shoffit asked the union
representative whether or not Malcolm Oldham could fill
that position.

REQUEST NO. 23

Greasing the upper sheaves can be done externally of the
housing but greasing the lower sheaves requires that you
must get within the confines of the housing.

RESPONSE NO. 23

Objection on the grounds that the request is confusing,
overly broad and subject to varying interpretations. There
are many sheaves located upon the Superscoop.

REQUEST NO. 24

The lattice work does not prevent a person’s body from
entering the area where the plates go up and down.

RESPONSE NO. 24

Objection on the grounds that the request is confusing,
overly broad and subject to varying interpretations.

REQUEST NO. 25

In order to grease the sheaves on the tag line tower, you
grease from one side and then go to the other side of the
tag line towers and grease from that side.

82

RESPONSE NO. 25

The defendant admits that this is usually the procedure
followed by the engineer.

REQUEST NO. 26

Captain Shoffit believed that an operator must have good
hearing and remembered that Malcolm Oldham had a
hearing aide on December 14, 1992.

RESPONSE NO. 26

The defendant admits that Brad Shoffit testified at his
deposition that in his opinion Malcolm Oldham was
wearing a hearing aide on December 14, 1992. Brad
Shoffit also testified that many persons working on a
dredge because of the loud noise have imperfect hearing.

REQUEST NO. 27

Malcolm Oldham did not get a hearing aide until after this
incident occurred.

RESPONSE NO. 27

The defendant is not able to admit or deny due to insuffi-
cient information at this time and will supplement after
additional investigation and discovery.

REQUEST NO. 28
It is not noisy in the operator’s cabin.

RESPONSE NO. 28

Objection on the grounds that the request is confusing and
subject to varying interpretations. Specifically, what is
noisy to one person is not noisy to another.

REQUEST NO. 29

Captain Shoffit was by himself at the Massachusetts
General Hospital when he saw and talked to the plaintiff.

RESPONSE NO. 29

The defendant denies the allegations contained in Request
No. 29.

REQUEST NO. 30

Malcolm Oldham told Captain Shoffit that Kromhout was
trying to get the hose off when the injury occurred.

RESPONSE NO. 30

The defendant admits that Malcolm Oldham told Brad
Shoffit that as far as he was aware Mr. Kromhout was
trying to free his hose when the injury occurred and that
Malcolm Oldham was not aware that Mr. Kromhout was
performing greasing operations on the tag line counter-
weights until after the accident.

REQUEST NO. 31

Since there was no “lockout-tagout” in place on December
12, 1992 to perform the greasing of sheaves operation, the
method to perform the greasing operation was through
oral communication.

RESPONSE NO. 31

The defendant denies the allegations contained in Request
No. 31.

REQUEST NO. 32

When greasing the counterweights, the upper sheaves can
be greased from the outside because the grease fittings are
accessible from outside the tower.

RESPONSE NO. 32

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 32.

REQUEST NO. 33

When greasing the counterweight, the lower sheaves can
only be greased from the inside the tower.

RESPONSE NO. 33

The defendant admits that the proper procedure to grease
the lower sheaves of the tag lire counterweight was to
make certain that the bucket was on deck before begin-
ning greasing. At that time it was safe to place one’s hands
through the tower which housed the tag line counter-

weight.
REQUEST NO. 34

On December 14, 1992, the battery box was located far-
thest away from the operator on the side of the tower in
which the counterweights go up and down.

RESPONSE NO. 34

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 34.

REQUEST NO. 35

At some time after December 14, 1992, the battery box
was moved to its present location.

RESPONSE NO. 35

The defendant has insufficient knowledge upon which to
base his response and will supplement this answer after
further investigation and discovery.

REQUEST NO. 36

Mark Korkowski, while acting as an agent of Dutra
Construction Company, Inc., signed and delivered APPLI-
CATION FOR INSPECTION OF U.S. VESSEL (See
Exhibit 1).

RESPONSE NO. 36

Although the defendant believes that Request No. 36 is an
accurate statement, it is not able to admit or deny since no
Exhibit 1 was attached to the Plaintiff's Request For
Admissions.

REQUEST NO. 37

Dutra Construction Company, Inc. and SUPER SCOOP

were under the jurisdiction of OSHA as of December 14,
1992.

RESPONSE NO. 37

Objection on the grounds that this request requires the
defendant to make a legal conclusion which it is not
qualified to make. Further, this is an issue to be decided
by the fact finder at trial.

REQUEST NO. 38

The crane aboard the SUPER SCOOP has been an inte-
gral part of the barge since it was affixed.

RESPONSE NO. 38

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Re-
quest No. 38.

REQUEST NO. 39

Movement of the SUPER SCOOP was done by deck
members and was done during the dredging operation as a

necessary part of the dredging operation.
RESPONSE NO. 39

The defendant admits that the Superscoop would be
moved a short distance by use of its anchors and deck

engines during the dredging operation.

KENNETH W. SMITH, HEREBY CERTIFIES THE
FOLLOWING: I AM GENERAL COUNSEL FOR DUTRA
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., A DEFENDANT IN
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION AND I SIGN THE
FOREGOING RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMIS-
SION FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE SAID DEFEN-
DANT AND AM DULY AUTHORIZED TO DO SO.

THE MATTERS STATED WITHIN THE FOREGO-
ING RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION ARE
NOT WITHIN MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND I AM
INFORMED THAT THERE IS NO SINGLE OFFICIAL
OF DUTRA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. WITH
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF ALL SUCH MATTERS
AND THAT THE MATTERS STATED IN THE FOREGO-
ING RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION
HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE DEFENDANT.

87

I AM INFORMED BY SAID REPRESENTATIVES
THAT THE MATTERS SET FORTH IN THE AFORE-
SAID RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION
ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INFORMATION
POSSESSED BY THE DEFENDANT AND ARE TRUE
RESPONSES AS FAR AS IT IS POSSIBLE TO VERIFY
THEM. |

SIGNED UNDER THE PAINS AND PENALTIES OF
PERJURY THIS 24th DAY OF JUNE, 1998.

DUTRA CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.

/s/ Kenneth W. Smith
By: Kenneth W. Smith,
General Counsel
Dutra Construction
Company, Inc.

AS TO OBJECTIONS:

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.,
BBO # 544538
PEABODY & ARNOLD
50 Rowes Wharf
Boston, MA 02110
617/951-2100

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I Frederick E. Connellv, Jr., hereby certify that I have
this 25 day of June, 1998, served a copy of the foregoing

upon the plaintiff by mailing same postage prepaid to:

David P. Kaplan, Esq.
The Kaplan/Bond Group
Boston Fish Pier

West Building, Suite 304
P.O. Box 1404

Boston, MA 02205-1404

/s/ Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.

Frederick E. Connelly, Jr.

89

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD CERTIFICATES
OF INSPECTION FOR SUPER SCOOP (ORIGI-
NALLY ATTACHED AS EXHIBIT D TO PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR REHEARING)

WILLARD T. STEWART
V.
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CoO., INC. CIVIL ACTION
NO. 95-11046-RCL
(D.MASS. FILED: OCTOBER 6, 1999)

CERTIFICATION DATE: 10JAN94
EXPIRATION DATE: 10JAN96°

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

[SEAL] Certificate of Inspection

VESSEL NAME OFFICIAL NUMBER
SUPER SCOOP D574373
CALL SIGN SERVICE
INDUSTRIAL VESSEL
HOME PORT HULL MATERIAL
SAN FRANCISCO, CA STEEL
HORSEPOWER PROPULSION
PLACE BUILT DATE BUILT
MERMENTAU, LA 01JAN76
GROSS TONS NET TONS
1290 1290
DWT LENGTH
176.00
OWNER OPERATOR

DUTRA CONSTRUCTION ‘DUTRA CONSTRUCTION
CO INC CO INC

90

1000 POINT SAN PEDRO _=_—: 1000 POINT SAN PEDRO
RD RD
SAN RAFAEL, CA 94901 SAN RAFAEL, CA 94901

THIS VESSEL MUST BE MANNED WITH THE FOL-
LOWING LICENSED AND UNLICENSED PERSONNEL
INCLUDED IN WHICH THERE MUST BE 0 CERTIFI-
CATED LIFEBOATMEN AND 0 CERTIFICATED
TANKERMAN.

__.. MASTER ___ MASTER & 1ST
CLASS PILOT
__.. -CHIEFMATE ___. CLASS PILOT
__. 2ND MATE __. RADIO OFFICER(S)
__.. MATES ___ OPERATOR(S)
__.. ABLE SEAMEN __.. CHIEF ENGINEER
__.. ORDINARY SEAMEN ____ 1ST ASST.ENGINEER
__.. DECKHANDS __.._ 2ND ASST.
ENGINEER
ENGQ’RS.
__.._ :- FIREMEN-
WATERTENDERS
OILERS

IN ADDITION, THIS VESSEL MAY CARRY 0 PASSEN-
GERS, 0 OTHER PERSONS IN CREW, 0 PERSONS IN
ADDITION TO CREW, AND NO OTHERS. TOTAL
PERSONS ALLOWED: 0

ROUTE PERMITTED AND CONDITIONS OF OPERA-
TION:

91

~OCEANS-
UNMANNED.

2 he ie 2h 2h i a ie ie 2k aie oie ie ofc 2h 2s 2c ak ak 2c 2h 2c 2c 2 fe 2c 2k 2k 2k 2c 2c 2c 2c 2c 2c 2c 2c 2c 2c aie 2k 2k a ae afc 2c ofc 2k afc 2c ac ac akc fc

VESSEL MAY CARRY UP TO 10 INDUSTRIAL PER-
SONNEL WHEN OPERATING ON PROTECTED WA-
TERS. ALL PERSONS SHALL WEAR COAST GUARD
APPROVED PERSONAL FLOATATION DEVICES
WHILE ON DECK.

WHILE VESSEL IS MANNED A RESCUE VESSEL (M/V
HUMMINGBIRD) SHALL BE STANDING BY

2A 2h ee 2 a Te a oe ok ae oe ok eo A a a a a oa i a i eo oe ok oe ok oe a oe oo ak ok ake

NO MORE THAN 466 SHORT TONS OF DECK CARGO
MAY BE -CARRIED. THE VERTICAL CENTER OF
GRAVITY OF THIS DECK CARGO MUST NOT EXCEED
SIX FEET ABOVE THE DECK. CARGO MUST BE
POSITIVELY SECURED AGAINST SHIFTING BEFORE
LEAVING PROTECTED WATERS.

***SEE NEXT PAGE FOR ADDITIONAL
CERTIFICATE INFORMATION ***

WITH THE INSPECTION HAVING BEEN COMPLETED
AT CAPE CANAVERAL, FLORIDA

CERTIFIED BY THE OFFICER IN CHARGE MARINE
INSPECTION, JACKSONVILLE, FL

WITH THE APPLICABLE VESSEL, INSPECTION LAWS
AND THE RULES AND REGULATIONS PRESCRIBED
THEREUNDER.

7:

ON 10JAN90 THIS VESSEL IS
TO BE IN ALL RESPECTS IN CONFORMITY

92
PERIODIC REINSPECTIONS
DATE ZONE SIGNATURE

THIS CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY:
A. REGALBUTO, CAPTAIN, USCG

OFFICER IN CHARGE, .iARINE INSPECTION

JACKSONVILLE, FL
INSPECTION ZONE
~HULL EXAMS-
-EXAM TYPE- -NEXT EXAM-
DRYDOCK 31JAN95
INTERNAL STRUCTURAL —— 31DEC94
~LAST EXAM- ~PRIOR EXAM-
26APR93 08JAN90
18DEC91 08JAN90
~STABILITY-
LETTER APPROVAL DATE/22DEC87 OFFICE/GMSC
-INSPECTION STATUS-
*PRESSURE VESSELS*
TYPE LOCATION
AIR RECEIVER CRANE MACH SPAC
AIR RECEIVER MAIN DECK COMP
LAST NEXT
10JAN94 10JAN96
10JAN94 10JAN96

93

-LIFESAVING EQUIPMENT-

. NUMBER PERSONS
TOTAL EQUIPMENT FOR LIFEBOATS (TOTAL)... 10
LEP OATE (PUREED cccccccccccscccccescccccscccesccocsenesesees
LIFEBOATS (STARBD)* .............:cccccccceceeeeeeeeeeeeeees
MOTOR LIFEBOATS%™..............ccccccccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees
LIFEBOATS W/RADIO™ ..............:ccccccccceeeeeeeeeeeeenees
RESCUE BOATS/PLATFORMG.............cccccceeeeeeeeeeees 1
SOUL ATATE Se TREO cccccevccccccccccsescccccsssscsesccnsssconnes
LIFE FLOATS/BOUYANT APP WORKBOATS
CRE TRIED ccccccccccsceccccccsesccccccscsscososacenoncsecs

LIFE PRESERVERS (ADULT) .............::::ceceeeeeeeeeeees 10
LIFE PRESERVERS (CHILD) ...............cccccceeeeeeeeeeees
RING BUOYS (TOTAL) ............::cccccceseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeseeees 2

WOE BNI” crcccescccccecsssscsccrcccsscsosccssocnssccsssosoooes 2

WITH LINE ATTACHED ...............::cccccceseeeeeeeeeees 2

EEE cetnsnccncsnasssinocsscnsecesnssccseesscessseninesnmnensasonts
Tee GFE BB eccccecccccsescccescccscccescnssvssconcnescossoss
PORTABLE LIFEBOAT RADIOS ................::0cecceeeeees
EQUIPPED WITH EPIRB?.................ccccecccceeeeeeeeeeeees NO
(*INCLUDED IN TOTALS)

-FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT-
*FIXED EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS*

SPACE PROTECTED AGENT CAPACITY
FUEL TRANSFER ROOM/ CO2 50
MAIN DECK

*FIRE EXTINGUISHERS — HAND PORTABLE
AND SEMI-PORTABLE*

A-II B-I 6 B-II B-III
B-IV B-V C-I C-II

*** EB ND***

94

Department of Transportation
United States Coast Guard
Washington, D.C. 20593-0001
[SEAL] [SEAL]

CERTIFICATE OF FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY (WATER POLLUTION)

KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS THAT
___ No. 830 416-07 Vessel Operator DUTRA CONSTRUC-
TION CO., INC. has established financial responsibility to
meet liability under section 311(p) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, as amended, which may result from
the operation of the vessel named below:

Name of Vessel

SUPER SCOOP Expires FEB 20, 1995

The use of this certificate is subject to the provisions
of Part 130 of Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
as it is or may be amended, and the conditions on the
reverse of this Certificate. This Certificate is void if there
are any erasures or alterations hereon, and is void if the
operator named hereon is not the party responsible for
operating the vessel.

/s/ Robert M. Skall
Assistant Chief, Marine

Environmental Response
Division

Office of Marine Safety,
Security and

Environmental Protection

By Direction of the Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard

95

United States of America
Department of Transportation
United States Coast Guard

[SEAL] TEMPORARY CERTIFICATE OF INSPECTION

This Temporary Certificate of Inspection is issued
under the provisions of Title 46 United States Code
Section 3309 in lieu of the regular certificate of inspection,
and shall be in force only until the receipt or board said —
vessel of the original certificate of inspection, this certifi-
cate in no case to be valid after one year from the date of

inspection.

VESSEL OFFICIAL NUMBER
SUPER SCOOP D574 373

CLASS GROSS TONS HOMEPORT
INDUSTRIAL = j999 SAN FRANCISCO,

VESSEL CA

OWNER/ADDRESS OPERATOR/ADDRESS

DUTRA CONSTRUCTION DUTRA CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY INC. COMPANY INC.

2199 CLEMENT AVENUE 2199 CLEMENT AVENUE
ALAMEDA, CA. 94501 ALAMEDA, CA. 94501

The following complement of licensed officers and crew is
required to be carried; included in which there must be __
Certificated Lifeboatmen and ___ Certificated Tankermen:

____ Master ____ Master & 1st Class
Pilot

_____ Chief Mate ____ Class Pilot

_____ 2nd Mate _____ Radio Officer

_____ Mate(s) _____ Operator(s)

_____ Able Seamen _____ Chief Engineer

_____ Ordinary Seamen _____ 1st Asst. Engineer

Deckhands 2nd Asst. Engineer

Engineer(s).

96

Firemen-Watertenders
Oilers

In addition, this vessel may carry __ other persons in
crew, ___ passengers, ___ persons in addition to the crew,
and __. Total persons allowed 0.

Maximum steam pressure allowed N/A p.s.i.
DATE DAY DOCK NO. 26APR98

ROUTE PERMITTED AND CONDITIONS OF OPERA-
TION

—~OCEANS-
UNMANNED
—-RIVERS-—

VESSEL MAY CARRY UP TO TEN (10) INDUSTRIAL
PERSONNEL WHEN OPERATING ON PROTECTED
WATERS ALL PERSONNEL SHALL WEAR COAST
GUARD APPROVED PERSONNEL FLOATATION
DEVICES WHILE ON DECK.

WHILE VESSEL IS MANNED A RESCUE VESSEL (M/V
HUMMINGBIRD) SHALL BE STANDING, BYE.

NO MORE THAN 446 SHORT TONS OF DECK CARGO
MAY BE CARRIED THE VERTICAL CENTER OF
GRAVITY OF THIS CARGO SHALL NOT EXCEED (6)
SIX FEET ABOVE THE DECK, CARGO MUST BE
POSITIVELY SECURED AGAINST SHIFTING BEFORE
LEAVING PROTECTED WATER.

97

Inspection of the above vessel, was completed on 10
JANUARY 1994 DH I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
date the vessel was in all respects in conformity with
applicable vessel inspection laws and regulations pre-
scribed thereunder.

OFFICER IN CHARGE MARINE INSPECTION
A. REGALBUTO, CAPTAIN, USCG

INSPECTION ZONE
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

CERTIFICATION DATE: 12DEC91
EXPIRATION DATE: 12DEC93

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
[SEAL] Certificate of Inspection
VESSEL NAME OFFICIAL NUMBER
SUPER SCOOP D574373
CALL SIGN SERVICE
INDUSTRIAL VESSEL
HOME PORT ~ HULL MATERIAL
SAN FRANCISCO, CA STEEL
HORSEPOWER PROPULSION
PLACE BUILT DATE BUILT
MERMENTAU, LA 01JAN76
GROSS TONS NET TONS
1290 1290
DWT LENGTH

176.00

98

OWNER OPERATOR

DUTRA CONSTRUCTION DUTRA CONSTRUCTION
CO INC CO INC

2199 CLEMENT AVENUE 2199 CLEMENT AVENUE

ALAMEDA, CA 94501 ALAMEDA, CA 94501

THIS VESSEL MUST BE MANNED WITH THE FOL-
LOWING LICENSED AND UNLICENSED PERSONNEL
INCLUDED IN WHICH THERE MUST BE O CERTIFI-
CATED LIFEBOATMEN AND 0 CERTIFICATED
TANKERMAN.

__.. MASTER __. MASTER & 1ST
CLASS PILOT
__.. - CHIEFMATE __. CLASS PILOT
__.. - 2ND MATE __. RADIO OFFICER(S)
__.. MATES __. OPERATOR(S)
__. ABLE SEAMEN __. CHIEF ENGINEER
__.. ORDINARY SEAMEN ____ 1ST ASST. ENGI-
NEER
__. DECKHANDS __.. 2ND ASST.
ENGINEER
ENG’RS.
____- FIREMEN-
WATERTENDERS
OILERS

IN ADDITION, THIS VESSEL MAY CARRY 0 PASSEN-
GERS, 0 OTHER PERSONS IN CREW, 0 PERSONS IN
ADDITION TO CREW, AND NO OTHERS. TOTAL
PERSONS ALLOWED: 0

ROUTE PERMITTED AND CONDITIONS OF OPERA-
TION:

99

~OCEANS-
UNMANNED.

24 He ee eee a oe fe ae ae ae oe ae ae he oe he a ae oe a ae ae ae oe ac he a ae he ae ae ae ae ae ae ae a ae oe ae a he ae ae oie a oe ae a ae

-RIVERS-

VESSEL MAY CARRY UP TO 10 INDUSTRIAL PER-
SONNEL WHEN OPERATING ON PROTECTED WA-
TERS. IN BOSTON HARBOR BETWEEN EAST
BOSTON AND SOUTH BOSTON UNDER REASON-
ABLE OPERATING CONDITIONS. ALL PERSONS
SHALL WEAR COAST GUARD APPROVED PERSONAL
FLOATATION DEVICES WHILE ON DECK.

WHILE VESSEL IS MANNED A RESCUE VESSEL (M/V
CASTINE) SHALL BE STANDING BY.

2H ee he oe ee ae ae ee he he oe ae oe oe ae he he ae he ae he ae ae hee ae ae a hee a he oe ae oe oe ee a oe a a

NO MORE THAN 466 SHORT TONS OF DECK CARGO
MAY BE CARRIED. THE VERTICAL CENTER OF
GRAVITY OF THIS DECK CARGO MUST NOT EXCEED
SIX FEET ABOVE THE DECK. CARGO MUST BE
POSITIVELY SECURED AGAINST SHIFTING BEFORE
LEAVING PROTECTED WATERS.

***SEE NEXT PAGE FOR ADDITIONAL
CERTIFICATE INFORMATION ***

WITH THE INSPECTION HAVING BEEN COMPLETED
AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

CERTIFIED BY THE OFFICER IN CHARGE MARINE
INSPECTION, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

WITH THE APPLICABLE VESSEL, INSPECTION LAWS
AND THE RULES AND REGULATIONS PRESCRIBED
THEREUNDER.

100

ON 12DEC91 THIS VESSEL IS
TO BE IN ALi RESPECTS IN CONFORMITY

PERIODIC REINSPECTIONS

DATE ZONE SIGNATURE

THIS CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY:
/s/ W.H. Boland, Jr.
W. H. BOLAND, JR. CAPTAIN, USCG

OFFICER IN CHARGE, MARINE INSPECTION
BOSTON. MASSACHUSETTS

INSPECTION ZONE
—HULL EXAMS-—
—EXAM TYPE- -NEXT EXAM-
DRYDOCK 31JAN93
INTERNAL STRUCTURAL 31DEC94
-LAST EXAM- -PRIOR EXAM-
08JAN90 29APR87
18DEC91 08JAN90
-STABILITY-
LETTER APPROVAL DATE/22DEC87 OFFICE/GMSC
-INSPECTION STATUS-
*PRESSURE VESSELS*
TYPE LOCATION
AIR RECEIVER MACHINERY SPACE
AIR RECEIVER PUMP ROOM
LAST NEXT
12DEC91 12DEC93
12DEC91 12DEC93

101

-LIFESAVING EQUIPMENT-

NUMBER PERSONS

TOTAL EQUIPMENT FOR LIFEBOATS (TOTAL)... 10
EA ESD CE IEED” cocvecccccccccccccscensovecsonoesensssscseee
LIFEBOATS (STARBD)* .............ccccccccesssseeeeeseeeeees
MOTOR LIFEBOATS.~................sscssssssseeessssesseeeees
LIFEBOATS W/RADIO™ ...............ccccceesceeeeeeeeeeeeeeess

RESCUE BOATS/PLATFORMGB................:ccccecceeeeeeees 1
INFLATABLE RAPT. ..............cccccscsssssssssssssseesseeeeees
LIFE FLOATS/BOUYANT APP WORKBOATS
FRE TRIED coccccccccesccccccncsscesecsoncccnseessssveonees

REQUIRED
LIFE PRESERVERS (ADULT) .........csc:scessessesseeeeesees 10
LIFE PRESERVERS (CHILD) ...........:.00sessesseeseeeeeen
RING BUOYS (TOTAL) ........:csescessessesssessesseeseesseesees 2.
Fe AACA TL RET Te 2
WITH LINE ATTACHED™.....0......ccscccsessesssessesseeses 2
Ss NE TEER EE IIT
IMMERSION SUITS. ..........csessessessesssessesseeseeseesseesees
PORTABLE LIFEBOAT RADIOS ..........:0::0s000e00000000
EQUIPPED WITH EPIRB?...............scssessessessessesseeses NO
(INCLUDED IN TOTALS)
-FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT-
*FIRE EXTINGUISHERS - HAND PORTABLE AND
SEMI-PORTABLE*
A-II B-I 6 B-II B-III
B-IV B-V C-I C-Il
~CERTIFICATE AMENDMENTS-
PORT AMENDING/BOSMS
DATE AMENDED/07FEB92

102 103

—-AMENDMENT- - INTERNATIONAL LOAD LINE CERTIFICATE BY
THE AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING FOR THE
DRYDOCK INTERVAL CHANGED FROM ONCE IN 5 SUPER SCOOP (ORIGINALLY ATTACHED AS
YEARS TO TWICE IN 5 YEARS DUE TO PERMISSIVE EXHIBIT E TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION |
MANNING FOR REHEARING)
+** END*** . WILLARD z STEWART

DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 95-11046-RCL
(D.MASS. FILED: OCTOBER 6, 1999)

: | INTERNATIONAL LOAD LINE CERTIFICATE (1966)

Issued under the provisions of the International
Convention on Load Lines, 1966, under the
authority of the Government of the

[SEAL] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard,

by the American Bureau of Shipping
duly authorized for assigning purposes under the provi-
sions of the Convention
7609467-2
: Certificate No.

Official number
Name of Ship or
Distinctive Letters

SUPER SCOOP 574,373

Length (L) as defined in
Port of Registry Article 2 (8); i.e., 46 CFR
42.13-15

ALAMEDA 168'-11-1/2"

104

Freeboard assigned as: * ( Anew ship
¢ ( Delete whatever
( is inapplicable.

Type of Ship ¢ ( Type “B” with
( increased freeboard
Freeboard from deck line
Tropical 5 feet 2 inches (T)
Summer 5 feet 3-% inches (S)
Winter 5 feet 5-% inches (W)
Winter: North Atlantic 5 feet 7-% inches (WNA)
Load Line

1-5/s inches above (S)
Upper edge of line at level of center of rim

1-5/ inches below (S)

3-/s inches below (S)

Note: Freeboards and load lines which are not appli-
cable need not be entered on the certificate.

Allowance for fresh water for all freeboard 1-'/s inches.

Note: All measurements are to upper edge of the
respective horizontal lines.

The upper edge of the deck line from which these free-
boards are measured is OPPOSITE TOP OF STEEL
UPPER deck at side.

NOTE:

STABILITY OF THIS VESSEL HAS BEEN CHECKED
AND FOUND SATISFACTORY PROVIDED THE RE-
STRICTIONS SET FORTH IN THE ATTACHED STA-
BILITY LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1977 ARE
OBSERVED.

105

THIS CERTIFICATE IS VALID. FOR UNMANNED
OPERATION ONLY.

Date of initial or periodical survey 26 FEBRUARY 1981

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that this ship has been sur-
veyed and that the freeboards have been assigned and

load lines shown above have been marked in accordance
with the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966.

This Certificate is valid until 26 FEBRUARY 1986 **,
subject to annual surveys in accordance with Article
14(1)(c) of the Convention, and endorsement thereof on the
reverse side of the Certificate. -

**At the expiration of this certificate, applicable
reissuance should be obtained in accordance with the Load
Line Regulations.

[SEAL]
Issued at New York, N.Y. 1 JUNE 1981

The undersigned declares that he is duly authorized
by the said Government to issue this Certificate.

/s/ A.M. Crahan
A.M. CRAHAN,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
American Bureau of Shipping

ANNUAL SURVEYS

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that at an annual survey
required by Article 14(1)(c) of the Convention, this ship
was found to comply with the relevant provisions of the
Convention.

106

Place Date

Surveyor to the American Bureau of Shipping

(Signature)

Place Richmond California Date 31 August 1983
K.Kaufman Surveyor to the American Bureau of Shipping
(Signature)

Place San Diego, Ca. Date 3 October 1984

/s/ [Illegible] Surveyor to the American Bureau of Shipping
(Signature)

Place Date

Surveyor to the American Bureau of Shipping

(Signature)

EXTENSION OF LOAD LINE CERTIFICATE

The provisions of the Convention being fully complied
with by this ship, the validity of this Certificate is, in
accordance with Article 19(2) of the Convention, extended
until

Place Date

Surveyor to the American Bureau of Shipping

(Signature)

Notes:

1. When a ship departs from a port situated on a
river or island waters, deeper loading shall be permitted
corresponding to the weight of fuel and all other materials

107

required for consumption between the point of departure
and the sea.

2. When a ship is in fresh water of unit density the
appropriate load line may be submerged by the amount of
the fresh water allowance. Where the density is other than
unity, an allowance shall be made proportional to the
difference between 1.025 and the actual density.

3. It is the owner’s responsibility to furnish the
master wit approved information and instructions for
loading and ballasting this vessel to provide guidance as to
stability of the vessel under varying conditions of service
and to avoid unacceptable stresses in the vessel’s struc-
ture, as defined in 46 CFR 42.09-1.

4. The Winter North Atlantic Load Line applies only
to vessels of 328 ft. in length or less, which enter any part
of the North Atlantic Ocean during the winter months as
defined by the Load Line Regulations in 46 CFR 42.30-5
and 42.30-35. The periods during which the other seasonal
load lines apply in different parts of the world are as
stated in the Load Line Regulations of 46 CFR 42.30-5 to
42.30-30, inclusive.

5. This Load Line Certificate will be canceled by the
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, if -

(a) The annual surveys have not been carried
out within three months either way of each
anniversary date of the certificate.

(b) The certificate is not endorsed to show that
the ship has been surveyed as indicated in
(a).

108

(c) Material alterations have been made to the
hull or superstructures such as would neces-

sitate the assignment of an increased free-
board.

(d) The fittings and appliances for the protec-
tion of the openings, guardrails, freeing
ports, or the means of access to the crew’s
quarters have not been in as effective a con-
dition as they were when the Certificate was
issued.

(e) The structural strength of the ship is low-

ered to such an extent that the ship is un-
safe.

6. When this Certificate has expired or been can-
celed, it must be delivered to the assigning Authority.

109

SECTION 148 OF DUTRA CONSTRUCTION
CO., INC.’"S CONTRACT FOR DREDGING
(ORIGINALLY ATTACHED AS EXHIBIT F

TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
REHEARING)

WILLARD T. STEWART

V.
DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 95-11046-RCL
(D.MASS. FILED: OCTOBER 6, 1999)

SECTION 148
DREDGING
Item No. Description Unit
148.01 Dredging (Alt. 1) CY
148.02 Dredging (Alt. 2) CY

148.31 Removal and Disposal of Ledge (Alt.1) CY
148.32 Removal and Disposal of Ledge (Alt.2) CY

Except as indicated below and on the Plans, all work shall
be in accordance with the pertinent requirements of
Standard Specifications Section 148, Dredging.

DESCRIPTION
ADD THE FOLLOWING TO SECTION 148.20 GENERAL

148.20 GENERAL

When the nature of the material to be dredged requires
blasting, the Contractor’s blasting program and methods
shall be those necessary to accomplish the dredging shown
on the Contract Drawings in accordance with the proce-
dures specified herein. The Contractor will be required to
make necessary plans, examinations, surveys, test blasts

110

to determine the quantity of explosives that can be fired,
and thereafter control the quantity of explosives in any
one blast.

The foundation course method shall consist of either
screeded gravel (Alternate 1) or sand placed by pumping
methods (Alternative 2). The two methods require differ-
ent amounts of dredging.

The Work of this Section also includes furnishing, install-
ing and maintaining geotechnical instrumentation as
shown on the plans and collecting, reducing, plotting,
interpreting and reporting instrumentation data for both
the Contractor installed instrumentation and the instru-
mentation installed by the Department’s Management
Consultant prior to award of this Contract.

ADD THE FOLLOWING NEW SECTIONS:
148.26 APPLICABLE PUBLICATIONS

The Contractor shall comply fully with all state, local and
federal regulations including, but not limited to, the
following regulations and reports:

A. Code of Massachusetts Regulations, 527 CMR: Board
of Fire Prevention Regulations.

B. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title XI, Regu-
lation of Explosives (P.L. 91-452).

C. Commerce in Explosives, Part 181 of Title 26, Code of
Federal Regulations.

D. Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, Title
29, Labor Chapter XVII, Bureau of Labor Standards,
Department of Labor Parts 1910 and 1926.

E. Interstate Commerce Commission Regulations.

111

F. Applicable U.S. Coast Guard Regulations and state,
county, municipal, or port authority codes, rules, regu-
lations and laws.

G. Federal Register, Volume 36, Number 10, 15 January
1971, Department of the Treasury.

H. The Erosion and Sedimentation Control Plan (Exhibit
II-C).

I. USDOT Geotechnical Engineering Notebook, Geo-
technical Guideline No. 7, Guide Controlled Blasting

Specification.
Should two regulations or requirements conflict, the most
stringent shall apply.

148.27 MATERIAL TC BE REMOVED

The material to be removed includes hard material. Hard
material is defined as material requiring blasting or the
use of special equipment for econom

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---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0723%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.
