# Amicus Curiae Brief — Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0706%3A11

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 541 U.S. 752

## Text

MAR 1 1 2004

IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the united States

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ef ai.
Petitioners,
Vv.

PUBLIC CITIZEN, et ai.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION & LEGAL DEFENSE
FUND IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

ANDREW SCHLAFLY KAREN B. TRIPP *

521 Fifth Ave. - 17th Floor 2245 Shakespeare Road
New York, NY 10175 Houston, TX 77030
(212) 292-4510 (713) 658-9323

* Counsel of Record Counsel for Amicus

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages
TABLE OF AUTHORITIEBG...............ccccccocsscosssscsoseosees il
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ......ccccccccccccsesseseeseeee I
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.............cccccccccsceceeseseesees 2
IN aCe a 3

I. NAFTA, AS ENACTED BY CONGRESS,
DOES NOT AUTHORIZE PRESIDEN-
TIAL BYPASS OF DOMESTIC LAW TO
ADHERE TO A_ DECISION OF AN
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL............00000000. 4

Il. NAFTA UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CRE-
ATES A FOREIGN COURT WITHOUT
AUTHORIZATION BY TREATY ................... 10

Ill. THE REQUISITE ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT MUST INCLUDE
EFFECTS ON HUMAN SAFETY AND
Sa aalll eihieieseiniiecinirincenbnnsanenattenmcesemttintianiinainetansintteies 14

Soe NTEITT sensesinstsencctussasterntbiniisaiiiiininiemammsaninitans 21

(i)

il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Pages
Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901)... 5
Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889) ......... 5
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581

(| EE eee 5
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).. 11
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530

U.S. SBS (QOD) nccccecccsssccsscesensnscnsnnsensnnnanann 8
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992)... Y
Highland Cooperative v. City of Lansing, 492 F.

Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mich, 1980) ..........cccsceeeeeeeee 18
Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211 (1872) wecccceceeeeeeeeees 10
Made in the USA Foundation vy. United States,

242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534

U.S. 1GBD (BEDI ) eccoceccosessesesstsasesnteemnnenneinias 13,14
Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear

Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) ......ccceseseeeseeeeeeees 20
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) ............ 14
New York vy. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)... 14
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe

Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)..........ccccccrccessseseees 12
Oregon Environmental Council v Kunzman, 714

F.2d S01 (Sele Cig, 1SGS) .coccccscccsesscccsnsorssesnossiiens 18
Public Citizen v. Department of Transp., 316

F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.

AY |) ee 8, 10, 17
Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. 1959), cert.

denied, 362 U.S. 957 (1960)..........cssecsccssessrereees 8
Taylor v. Morton, 23 F, Cas. 784, 2 Curt. 454 (D.

Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. 481 (1863)............. 6
United States vy. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 83MM.

Files, 413 US. 123 (UDTS) cccocccsocessecensenninastnians 13
United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 760 F.

Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ....cccccscsseseeereseseeeens 17

iil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND Pages
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

SE IES GUIs Wily Ge Sb cccncsccccnsnesscrssccssesssoscesesees |
SIS TE TIT ortrcsenserecieneemensseemenenecseseosenevescssecsees
SEITE TIT cceseriestnesunsennencnsnssnsnssnensesncessees
STII TIPU cosneccecercsnscssussesesssnecsesesevenseaees
SIIIIIIE TET IIIT cntnsnnsesusssnstecsienssessmssssecesscconsscescees
EE tt IID cxencecenesscesnseussesssconsocesacsscetee
Se it ELIE cccrssnecsseesnserecsecssecsesseevececeses
Be is 0 SERIE esd coceececcscececcsccvesccccceseesesssseess
Satta tt EEE D ccrssnttcessenscnsssnesscesscceessssoceses
_ — cca
BP UBA. § USIGBICK 1 WA) nccccccccsccsccccccscsscesccscesees
Ss OF RUUIINDEAD ccnseccscecessesescesesesessocsssescsses
GP ics ©) SSO UIENDLID conccsecsscesccssscseecesevscesccceccecs
5 Annals of Cong. 760-62 (1796) .........:cccccceeeeeeees
5 Annals of Cong. 771-72 (1796) ........ccccccccceeeeeeee
139 Cong. Rec. $16,712-13 (daily ed. Nov. 20,

—eFe nnn t &BwWUWDAHh SOOO

S
»
-—s

OTHER

Jorge Chabat, “Mexico’s War on Drugs: No
Margin for Maneuver,” 582 The Annals of The
American Academy of Political and Social

SCHMCS 134 (Fely ZOUZ) .nccrcccccccosvesecevesesereeeseoees 19
“Company that Hired Illegal Driver to Pay
$10.7M,” USA Today, June 19, 2001 ............... 15

Paul Stephen Dempsey, “Free Trade But Not
Free Transport? The Mexican Stand-Off,” 30

Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol’y 91 (Winter 2001)....... 16
Federalist No. 75, The Federalist Papers (Ros-
siter & Kesler 0s. 1999) ......ceccrccrcscorssecveseceeeees 11

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Craig Jarvis, “N.C. Seen as Hub where Illicit
Drugs Repackaged,” The News & Observer
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 22, 2004 ..........ccccscesseeeeee

Alan Larson, “Outlining the Potential for
Expanded US-Mexico Trade,” Remarks to
54th Plenary of the Mexico-U.S. Business
Committee (Mar. 5, 2001), http://www.state.
gov/e/ris/rm/2001/1133pf.html (visited Apr.

J. Patrick LaRue, “The ‘ILL-ICIT’ Effects of
NAFTA: Increased Drug Trafficking into the
United States Through the Southwest Border,”
9 Currents Int’! Trade L.J. 38 (Summer 2000)..

Majer Drug Traffickers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, DEA BRIEFING BOOK, (Oct. 1999),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/briefing-book/page
34-48.him (visited Nov. 20, 1999)... cece

Jason C. Messenger, “Opening the U.S.-Mexico
Border: Problems and Concerns for the Bush
Administration, the Countries, and the Legal
System to Consider,” 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l
ao G5 GRIND ZIIIED excnscccnsnanscsssacsenssemsssssnessnsens

Kirk Mitchell, “Police: Deadly I-76 Crash Fits
Immigrant-Smuggling Profile,” Denver Post,

Jim Muir, “Glenn Poshard: On the Record:
Speaking Frankly About the Corruption,
Wrongdoing and Cover-Ups,” The Southern
DG OU

James Pinkerton, “Semi-Conscious State; Inspec-
tion of Trucks on Border Threadbare,” Hous-
ton Chronicle, Aug. 12, 2001 ........cccccccceeeeeseees

Page

18

20

16

15

17

\
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Ciro Rodriguez, “Safety on the NAFTA Super-
highway, ” Congressional Press Releases, Feb.
Diy GDS cncsnmenanteenmmsnmstnanmarensnetianinsmaneasenees

Laurence H. Tribe, “Taking Text and Structure
Seriously; Reflections on Free-Form Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, ” 108 Harv. L.
STs Cee Qe cnencnnsmnnscnnnnecssmeansnscesenissnenes

World Almanac 79 (2004) .........cccccesseescesseeesceeees

John C. Yoo, “Laws as Treaties?: The Con-
stitutionality of | Congressional-Executive
Agreements,” 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757 (2001)......

Page

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

No, 03-358

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ef al.,

Petitioners,
Vv .*

PUBLIC CITIZEN, et al.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION & LEGAL DEFENSE
FUND IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund
(“EFELDF”) is a nonprofit organization founded in 1981.
For more than twenty years it has defended American
sovereignty. EFELDF has consistently opposed the abdica-
tion of authority by American governmental entities to newly
created international institutions. EFELDF promotes adher-
ence to the U.S. Constitution and respect for the obligations

' This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties. No counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or
entity, other than amicus, its members, or its counsel make a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

and power that it mandates for the federal government free
from control by global entities. EFELDF has repeatedly
taken a stand against delegation of power by any American
governmental entity to an international tribunal.

Amicus has a direct and vital interest in the issues presented
to this Court based on its longstanding defense of American
sovereignty.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is being
tested here for the first time. Implicitly at stake is whether
congressional bypass of the Treaty Clause, Article II, Sec-
tion 2, can trump federal law in favor of a decision by an
international tribunal. On February 6, 2001, a five-member
foreign panel mandated that the United States lift its restric-
tions on Mexican trucks and allow them full access. Though
NAFTA could not be ratified by the Senate as required by the
Treaty Clause, the tribunal repeatedly referred to NAFTA as a
“treaty” and purported to enforce it as such. The Adminis-
tration has arbitrarily and capriciously ignored applicable
federal law in adhering to that decision.

In creating an international tribunal and then ignoring
domestic obligations in submitting to that tribunal, NAFTA
implementation has gone overboard. In the first fifty years
after ratification of the Constitution, the vast majority of
international agreements complied with the Treaty Clause.
But since World War Il, over 90% of international agree-
ments have ignored that constitutional requirement. Un-
checked, the agreements have assumed increased power, as
exemplified by the contemplated invasion of Mexican trucks
in the case at bar. It is time to reaffirm limits on con-
gressional-executive agreements that were never properly
ratified as treaties.

The judiciary abdicates its responsibilities if it allows
international tribunals to usurp adjudicative power. Vigilant

a

3

in invalidating congressional expansion in jurisdiction of
Article I courts, this Court should likewise strike down
congressional submission to international tribunals that
dictate domestic issues such as use of our highways.
Congress cannot create or endorse a new adjudicative entity
to wield power over domestic issues. At a minimum this
violates the separation of powers inherent in our con-
stitutional system. If allowed, the erosion of the judiciary in
the face of global tribunals could dramatically worsen.

The Ninth Circuit correctly required the Department of
Transportation to comply fully with domestic laws before
allowing Mexican trucks to travel on our highways and
byways. An environmental impact statement must be
prepared. It should include not only the adverse effect of the
trucks on nature, but also on human safety. It should analyze
not only the pollution caused by truck emissions, but also the
loss of life through accidents. Mexican trucks are older and
more dangerous than domestic trucks, and their drivers are
less familiar with our roads and our language. The resulting
loss of life from a predictable increase in accidents must be
part of the requisite environmental impact statement.

ARGUMENT

The Ninth Circuit properly found that a federal agency had
failed to comply with federal law, and had acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in violating the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act (CAA). The
court was right in remanding the case to the Department of
Transportation with instructions to comply with those laws.
Simply put, the Department adhered to an_ international
tribunal opinion at the expense of domestic law. Such agency
action must be reversed.

Though the government maintains that admitting Mexican
trucks is within executive discretion, in fact it adhered to an
international tribunal never authorized by any treaty. The

4

arbitral panel established by NAFTA encroaches imper-
missibly on the sovereignty of our domestic laws and
institutions. By effect if not design, the executive branch has
become subservient to the judicial decisions of a tribunal
lacking in constitutional authority. The tribunal was neither
established under the Treaty Clause nor pursuant to a
recognized congressional power. Rote implementation of its
decision must be invalidated.

Finally, the requisite environmental impact statement must
address the impact on human lives, not merely the impact on
nature. Life-threatening and fatal accidents caused by older
trucks like those in Mexico should be analyzed and included
in the statement. Deaths caused by language incompatibility,
such as misunderstanding directions or road signs, are an
essential aspect of this required analysis. An analysis of the
indirect harm caused by increased pollution must accompany
a study of the threat of direct harm to men, women and
children. Increased drug trafficking should also be included
in the impact statement.

Allowing tens of thousands of hazardous Mexican trucks
on American roads is not a “foreign affairs action” exempt
from application of domestic laws. The decision below
should be affirmed.

I. NAFTA, AS ENACTED BY CONGRESS, DOES
NOT AUTHORIZE PRESIDENTIAL BYPASS
OF DOMESTIC LAW TO ADHERE TO A DE-
CISION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.

NAFTA, as enacted by a simple majority in Congress, did
not repeal the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
$§ 701-706, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)C), or the Clean Air Act
(CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1). 19 U.S.C. § 3311. To the
contrary, Congress expressly mandated that “[njo provision
of the Agreement . . . which is inconsistent with any law of

eo ne Re emer +

5

the United States shall have effect.” 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1).
Moreover, Congress prohibited any construction of NAFTA
that would “amend or modify any law of the United States,
including any law regarding . . . the protection of human,
animal, or plant life or health [or] the protection of the
environment.” /d. § 3312(a)(2). See Barker v. Harvey, 181
U.S. 481, 488 (1901) (“*[S]o far as the act of Congress is in
conflict with the treaty with Mexico, that is a matter in which
the court is bound to follow the statutory enactments of
its own Government.’”) (quoting Botiller v. Dominguez, 130
U.S. 238, 247 (1889), emphasis added).

This Court has emphasized that our border security cannot
be surrendered, and surely not by a mere congressional-
executive agreement:

To preserve its independence, and give security against
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty
of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other
considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in
what form such aggression and encroachment come,
whether from the foreign nation acting in its national
character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in
upon us. . . . [The powers of exclusion] cannot be
abandoned or surrendered. Nor can their exercise be
hampered, when needed for the public good, by any
considerations of private interest. The exercise of these
public trusts is not the subject of barter or contract.

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606, 609
(1889). NAFTA cannot compel the opening of our borders to
hordes of Mexican trucks.

The President may not bypass domestic law in attempting
to comply with an international tribunal pursuant to NAFTA.
“Almost immediately after the arbitrators’ decision, President
Bush made clear his intention to lift the moratorium on cross-
border operations following the preparation of new regu-
lations governing grants of operating authority to Mexican

6

motor carriers, in order to comply with NAFTA and
promote trade between the United States and Mexico.” Govt.
Br. at 7 (citing Pet. App. 10a; J.A. 53; Pet. 5 & n.2, emphasis
added). The Bush Administration announced that “we have
assured the Mexican government that we intend to live up to
our NAFTA obligations to open the U.S.-Mexico border to
trucking [and] discussions are underway on how to im-
plement the recent NAFTA Panel decision in a safe and
orderly fashion.” Alan Larson, “Outlining the Potential for
Expanded US-Mexico Trade,” Remarks to 54th Plenary of
the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee (Mar. 5, 2001).

The Administration seeks to ignore the APA, NEPA and
CAA in the name of “foreign relations” and “foreign trade,”
phrases it invokes repeatedly in its brief before this Court.
Govt. Br. at I, 2, 3, 18, 22, 23, 35. That argument may invite
support in connection with a military conflict abroad or even
an economic dispute in a foreign land. When the presidential
action is directed outside of the borders of the United States,
then there is little reason for the foregoing restraints on
administrative action. But here the action is directed at
domestic highways entirely within the United States, and
even at intrastate roads. Invocation of a desire to improve
foreign relations is no excuse for bypassing domestic legal
requirements. See, e.g., Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784,
785, 2 Curt. 454 (D. Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. 481 (1863)
(“The foreign sovereign between whom and the United States
a treaty has been made, has a right to expect and require its
stipulations to be kept with scrupulous good faith; but
through what internal arrangements this shall be done, ts
exclusively, for the consideration of the United States.”).

The government cannot justify its failure to comply with
NEPA and CAA in opening the borders to Mexican trucks by

* http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rm/2001/1133pf.html (visited Apr. 16,

2002).

a ee ee eee en —

7

relying on 49 U.S.C. § 13902. That statute permits the
President or his delegate to combat discriminatory practices
by foreign countries against United States transportation
companies by restricting access from those foreign countries.
Section 13902(c), for example, expressly targets “[p]reven-
tion of discriminatory practices” by foreign countries and
mandates “[e]qualization of treatment” for domestic com-
panies. “Any action taken under [Section 13902(c)(1)(A)] to
eliminate an act, policy, or practice shall be so devised so as
to equal to the extent possible the burdens or restrictions
imposed by such foreign country on United States trans-
portation companies.” 49 U.S.C. § 13902(c)(2). But that
provision is designed to protect domestic transportation
companies, not subject them to a foreign invasion using
workers paid less than the minimum wage. Nothing in
Section 13902 allows the Department of Transportation to
open the borders in violation of the NEPA and CAA.

The government brief distorts this statute by changing its
remedial purpose—to combat discrimination by foreign
countries against United States transportation companies—
into a blanket presidential authority to ignore domestic law.
In fact, the Section 13902(c)(3) grant to the President of
authority to modify the moratorium only applies to ac-
tions taken under “paragraph (1)(A)", which consist of
responses to discriminatory actions taken by foreign nations
against United States transportation companies. 49 U.S.C.
§ 13902(c)(3). No such discrimination is the cause of the
Administration’s action here, and thus it cannot be justified as
a remedy for domestic transportation companies faced with
discrimination by a foreign power.

The government insists that opening the borders “was the
result of the joint exercise by Congress and the President of
their constitutional responsibilities for foreign trade and
foreign relations, and was made in accordance with NAFTA
obligations and pursuant to statutory provisions vesting trade

8

authority directly in the President.” Govt. Br. at 3. But who
drives on U.S. highways is surely a domestic rather than
“foreign” issue. Moreover, the government cannot create a
new loophole for avoiding statutory restraints on admin-
istrative action by having the President issue an adminis-
trative rule directly. This is unavailing because numerous
administrative actions are essential to implement a presiden-
tial directive, and those actions may be properly challenged.

This lawsuit is not against the President, and the court
below did not order or enjoin the President. “The President
of the United States is not a party to this action, and the issues
before us do not touch on his clear, unreviewable discre-
tionary authority to modify the moratorium pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 13902(c).” Public Citizen v. Department of Transp..,
316 F.3d 1002, 1020 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 957
(2003). The court observed that “neither the validity of nor
the United States’ compliance with NAFTA is before us.” /d.

The government misplaces reliance on Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000). That
decision merely applied the Supremacy Clause to invalidate a
“state Act’s provisions [in] conflict with Congress’s specific
delegation to the President of flexible discretion.” /d. at 388.
There the presidential action concerned sanctions against a
foreign country, not activity on domestic roads. /d. at 368-69.
Congress has never delegated, implicitly or explicitly,
authority to the President to open internal roads to tens of
thousands of Mexican trucks in derogation of NEPA and
CAA. See Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 957 (1960) (“Whatever force appellant's
argument might have in a situation where there is no
applicable treaty, statute, or constitutional provision, it has
long been settled in the United States that the federal courts
are bound to recognize any one of these three sources of law
as superior to canons of international law.”)

9

The government insists that the President himself is not
subject to the APA even though its definition of “agency”
includes “each authority of the Government of the United
States” and excludes specific entities like Congress without
excluding the President. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 701(b)(1). See
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). There this
Court did hold that “textual silence” in the APA’s definition
of “agency” would not subject the President to the procedural
requirements of the APA. /d. at 800.

But Franklin does not support the presidential action here.
In Franklin, the President had a statutory duty to decide
whether or not to send a census report to Congress.
Massachusetts, facing a loss of a seat under the decennial
census, sued the Secretary of Commerce and the President
over the census. But the presidential action there was nothing
like the presidential action here. In Franklin, Congress had
delegated specific duties to the President, who then acted
within that delegation without the need for further admin-
istrative action. Here, the President acted beyond his stat-
utory authority and the implementation by the Department of
Transportation has violated multiple federal statutes.

In essence, the government blithely seeks to ignore federal
law under the pretext of allegedly “serious and ongoing harm
to United States’ businesses and consumers and to inter-
national relations with Mexico.” Pet. at 26. And what is that
supposed harm? In its Petition, the government argued that it
will be more efficient simply to open the borders to trucks
from Mexico, and that the court below protects inefficiency.
“The Ninth Circuit’s decision prevents the President’s action
from taking effect and thereby hampers commerce. On a
border where there are approximately 4.5 million northbound
truck crossings each year, cargo from Mexico must be
transferred at the border onto U.S. trucks before it can
be shipped to points in the United States beyond the border
zone. Passengers using scheduled bus services must follow

10

similarly inefficient procedures.” Pet. at 25-26 (citation
omitted). But this inefficiency has sound justifications, and
other applicable federal laws cannot be ignored in the name
of efficiency.

The action by the Department of Transportation to expose
our highways and byways to tens of thousands of trucks from
Mexico is the impermissible result of a foreign adjudication
rather than compliance with applicable federal law. The
decision below properiy held that the Department acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in violating federal law.

Il. NAFTA UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CREATES A
FOREIGN COURT WITHOUT AUTHORIZA-
TION BY TREATY.

The NAFTA tribunal, the court below, and most com-
mentators repeatedly describe and interpret NAFTA as
though it were an actual treaty. See, e.g., Public Citizen, 316
F.3d at 1009, 1011, 1913, 1017, 1018. This is error. “Ex-
press power is given to the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-
thirds of the senators present concur.” Holden v. Joy, 84
U.S. 211, 242-43 (1872) (emphasis added). This is, after all,
what the U.S. Constitution expressly requires. The President
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.” U.S. Const. Art. Il, Sec. 2. There is no
other constitutional authority for binding the United States to
major international commitments. Nothing else can subject
Americans to the rulings of international tribunals. Approved
by a vote of only 61-38 in the Senate, NAFTA fell short of
the requisite two-thirds majority for passage as a treaty. 139
Cong. Rec. $16,712-13 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).

NAFTA, sweeping in scope, far surpasses most bona fide
treaties in breadth and impact. The House Ways and Means
Committee itself declared that NAFTA “is the most com-

prehensive trade agreement ever negotiated and creates the
world’s largest integrated market for goods and services.”
House Report No. 103-361(1), at 8 (1993). NAFTA is unique
in American history in how it integrates the domestic
economy with those of two other large nations. NAFTA has
everything that one would expect in a treaty; most treaties
duly ratified by the Senate pale in comparison. The House
has no authority to pass such a treaty. 5 Annals of Cong.
760-62 (1796) (reprinting President Washington's message in
which he denied any role by the House in determining
whether to implement treaties that were properly approved by
the President and then duly ratified by the Senate); id.
at 771-72 (resolution adopted by the House disclaiming “any
agency in making Treaties,” while reserving some authority
with respect to treaties that stipulate regulations on matters
within enumerated congressional powers).

“If there is to be a new procedure in which the President
will play a different role in determining the final text of what
may “become a law,’ such change must come not by
legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in
Article V of the Constitution.” Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998). See also Federalist No. 75, The
Federalist Papers 419-20 (Rossiter & Kesler eds. 1999) (“The
[treaty] power in question seems therefore to form a distinct
department, and to belong, properly, neither to the legislative
nor to the executive. ... However proper or safe it may be in
governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary
monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making
treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust
that power to an elective magistrate of four years duration.
..« [T]he joint possession of the power in question, by the
President and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of
security, than the separate possession of it by either of
them.”). Lacking approval as a treaty, the delegation by
NAFTA of adjudicatory authority is particularly objection-
able. It implicitly transfers power from the federal judges

12

confirmed by the Senate to foreign arbitrators appointed by
foreign countries.

The creation by Congress, without treaty authorization, of
an international tribunal to dictate who may travel on our
roads is no more acceptable than shifting jurisdiction from
Article III to Article I courts. See Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (invali-
dating an attempt by Congress to shift jurisdiction from
Article Ill courts to Article | bankruptcy courts). Justice
Brennan noted in his plurality opinion that “of course,
virtually all matters that might be heard in Art. III courts
could also be left by Congress to state courts . . . [and] the
principle of separation of powers is not threatened by leaving
the adjudication of federal disputes to such judges.” 458
U.S. at 64 n.15. But transferring the same power to a new
tribunal other than an Article II] court would be consti-
tutionally infirm:

Art. Ill bars Congress from establishing legislative
courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to
those arising under the bankruptcy laws. The estab-
lishment of such courts does not fall within any of the
historically recognized situations in which the general
principle of independent adjudication commanded by
Art. Ill does not apply. Nor can we discern any
persuasive reason, in logic, history, or the Constitution,
why the bankruptcy courts here established lie beyond
the reach of Art. III.

ld. at 76.

The same constitutional prohibition applies with greater
force to NAFTA’s tribunals. As the Marathon decision made
clear, Congress does not have the power to establish new
courts to decide a new category of commercial disputes, nor
can it endow such courts with the power to dictate entry by
tens of thousands of trucks from a foreign country. It matters
not, as the government argues, that “[t}his Court has recog-

ee ee ee

13

nized that ‘[t}he Constitution gives Congress broad, com-
prehensive’ and ‘plenary’ powers to regulate foreign
commerce.” Pet. at 3 (quoting United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Super 838MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125-126 (1973)).
The Constitution does not allow Congress to subject federal
law to decisionmaking by international tribunals. This sort of
dispute could only be handled by an Article II] court rather
than a tribunal outside of the judiciary, and presidential
implementation of the foreign decision does not justify it.

Currently the executive branch enforces decisions by the
judiciary. Does the Constitution authorize the executive
branch to enforce decisions by extraterritorial tribunals? That
is what NAFTA, through a congressional-executive agree-
ment rather than Senate ratification, purports to accomplish.
Unsatisfied with the American judiciary, Congress and the
President could then apparently limit its jurisdiction and
establish adherence to courts outside of the United States. If
NAFTA’s method of resolving disputes is affirmed without
ratification by a treaty, nothing would prevent Congress and
the President from moving judicial authority offshore.
implicitly transferring authority to an international tribunal in
the Hague over disputes concerning a multinational cor-
poration would become possible without even complying
with the Treaty Clause.

“Few constitutional provisions seem so easily evaded” as
the Treaty Clause. John C. Yoo, “Laws as Treaties?: The
Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements,”
99 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 759 (2001). If NAFTA need not
comply, one wonders why any controversial treaty need be
submitted to the Senate for ratification again. “According to
this logic, President Bush could now resubmit the Test-Ban
Treaty to Congress for approval by majority vote, and
President Wilson could have brought the United States into
the League of Nations through a statute, even after the defeat
of both agreements in the Senate.” /d. See also Made in the
USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1311-17

14

(lith Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001) (reviewing,
without deciding, whether NAFTA is constitutional despite
bypassing the Treaty Clause); Laurence H. Tribe, “Taking
Text and Structure Seriously; Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation,” 108 Harv. L. Rev.
1221 (1995) (arguing, in the context of NAFTA, that the
Constitution may require treaty ratification for major
congressional-executive agreements).

The growing use of congressional-executive agreements as
a bypass to the Treaty Clause threatens even federalism.
Agreements with foreign powers have traditionally enjoyed
greater latitude in infringing on state sovereignty, perhaps
implicitly justified by the requisite 2/3rd approval re-
quirement in the Senate. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
434 (1920) (“No doubt the great body of private relations
usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may
override its power.”). Congressional-executive agreements,
in contrast, lack the legitimacy of approval by a supermajority
of the Senate. A simple majority in Congress should not
enjoy treaty authority that would thereby enable it to erode
state sovereignty. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 168 (1992) (invalidating a federal statute in part because
it caused “the accountability of both state and federal officials
[to be] diminished”’).

The U.S. Constitution does not allow treaties to be passed
by simple majorities of Congress. Nor does it allow Congress
to create a mechanism for the President to enforce a decision
of an international tribunal.

Ill. THE REQUISITE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT MUST INCLUDE EFFECTS ON
HUMAN SAFETY AND LIVES.

The requisite environmental impact statement (EIS) should
thoroughly address the safety, pollution and even drug
hazards posed by an influx of tens of thousands of Mexican

«eel

Re Oe a oe —_

15

trucks on roads throughout the United States. The risks are
substantial and NEPA requires an objective and realistic
assessment of them. The Department of Transportation
and its Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) failed in their obligations to evaluate completely
these dangers.

The Department and FMCSA underestimated the threat to
the safety of American citizens posed by a vast increase in
trucks from Mexico on our roads. Tragic stories of needless
deaths caused by a foreign driver who failed to understand or
obey the rules of our roads are all too familiar. In 1994, Rev.
Duane Willis and his wife Janet lost all six of their children in
a fiery crash caused by a truck illegally driven by Ricardo
Guzman. “Company that Hired Illegal Driver to Pay
$10.7M,” USA Today, June 19, 2001. Former Democratic
Congressman Glenn Poshard later explained, “We found out
that there were at least three people that tried to tell Guzman
to get off the road only minutes before the crash, that the
huge taillight assembly on the truck was about to fall off and
cause a wreck. Several truck drivers even tried reaching
Guzman by radio, but they said he couldn't speak English so
he didn’t understand a word they said.” Jim Muir, “Glenn
Poshard: On the Record: Speaking Frankly About the Cor-
ruption, Wrongdoing and Cover-Ups,” The Southern
Illinoisan, Mar. 1, 2003.

Texas legislator Ciro Rodriguez observed the following at
the time of the NAFTA panel decision mandating access by
Mexican trucks:

Mexican trucks are held to less stringent safety standards
than U.S. trucks. Unlike American drivers, Mexican
drivers do not have to meet minimal medical quail-
fications, submit to drug testing, or maintain logbooks
which monitor the length of time they spend behind the
wheel. Additionally, Mexican trucks are older, heav-
ier, 4nd more likely to transport unmarked toxic or

16

hazardous materials. Overall, Mexican trucks are
reported to have three times as many safety deficiencies
than U.S. trucks and without a standard regulatory
apparatus in place, Mexico has been unable to improve
the safety of its trucks or enforce a border safety
inspection program of its own.

Ciro Rodriguez, “Safety on the NAFTA Superhighway,”
Congressional Press Releases, Feb. 17, 2001 (quoted in Paul
Stephen Dempsey, “Free Trade But Not Free Transport? The
Mexican Stand-Off,” 30 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 91, 96
(Winter 2001)). Mexican truck drivers are also not covered
by the minimum wage laws, creating an incentive for
employers to overutilize the Mexican drivers. Dempsey, 30
Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol’y at 95.

Particularly frequent are road accidents by vans or trucks
filled with illegal aliens, driven by “coyotes” who are paid
handsomely to transport them into the United States. As
reported by the Denver Post, “[s]mugglers stuff cars, vans
and trucks with Latin Americans willing to pay up to $10,000
to be transported illegally into the U.S. Several times a year,
the outcome is similar to Tuesday’s crash that killed five
people on Interstate 76." Kirk Mitchell, “Police: Deadly 1-76
Crash Fits Immigrant-Smuggling Profile,” Denver Post, Jan.
29, 2004. The van in that crash was carrying eleven people
from Guatemala; one of the fatalities was a pregnant woman
who was rushed to the hospital in order to save and deliver
her unborn child. “Tuesday’s early-morning crash of
her sport utility vehicle, packed dangerously full with
Guatemalan families on a long-distance trip, was all too
familiar for investigators.” /d.

Road accidents pose a greater safety hazard than any other
environmental issue. In 2002, 30.7 million drivers were
involved in motor vehicle accidents in the United States.
See World Almanac 79 (2004) (citing the National Safety
Council). Far more people die in car accidents than from

A et ce in a

17

terrorism, for example. /d. (noting that 44,000 people died in
2002 in car accidents). Truck accidents now kill more than
5,000 people annually in the United States. Sixty federal
officers inspected Mexican trucks along the border in fiscal
year 2000 and found that safety violations required taking
36% out of commission; fifty-three Texas officials did
inspections in calendar year 2000 and safety violations
required taking 37% out of service. James Pinkerton, “Semi-
Conscious State; Inspection of Trucks on Border Thread-
bare,” Houston Chronicle, Aug. 12, 2001, Al. Opening the
border would flood our highways with unsafe trucks, creating
a hazard for all American drivers. The ability to com-
municate in English and understand the flow of traffic is
crucial to avoiding accidents, ascertaining afterwards what
happened, and planning how they can be prevented in
the future.

Pollution from the Mexican trucks should also be ad-
dressed by an EIS. The court below observed “a wealth of
government and private studies showing that diesel exhaust
and its Components constitute a major threat to the health of
children, contribute to respiratory illnesses such as asthma
and bronchitis, and are likely carcinogenic.” Public Citizen,
316 F.3d at 1024. The court properly found that the
Department of Transportation was remiss in failing to prepare
an environmental impact statement “to consider whether any
negative health effects could be associated with increased
diesel exhaust emissions.” /d. (citing United States v. 27.09
Acres of Land, 760 F. Supp. 345, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that “even [the] marginal degradation of drinking
water” has been considered enough to trigger the need for an
environmental impact statement)).

There is no “interference” with “presidential discretion,” as
the government now argues, in requiring the Department of
Transportation to obey the law, Pet. at 24. The Department
lacks treaty authorization to override domestic law. Its failure

18

to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious. Like a
spraying program, the introduction of numerous pollution-
emitting vehicles from Mexico poses a direct threat to the
well-being of American citizens, and this threat must be
thoroughly analyzed and vetted. See, e.g., Oregon Envir-
onmental Council v Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir.
1983) (EIS must address the effects of the pollutant on
children and others, and must analyze carcinogenic effects).

Allowing tens of thousands of Mexican trucks onto our
highways is surely as threatening to our environment as
highway construction itself, and both require preparation of
an EIS. “The health and safety of the residents of this
neighborhood will be significantly affected by the in-
troduction of a highway through their community,” and
therefore required preparation of an EIS. Highland Coop-
erative v. City of Lansing, 492 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (W.D.
Mich. 1980). That court enjoined the city “from acquiring the
rights-of-way, awarding construction contracts, commencing
construction, or in any other way proceeding with the
Edgewood Project pending the preparation and issuance of an
Environmental Impact Statement.” /d. at 1383. Far more
compelling is the case for an EIS here, with the attempted
opening of all highways to numerous old trucks from a
foreign country.

The EIS should also address the inevitable increase in
illicit drugs coming into the United States in Mexican trucks.
U.S. Attorney Frank Whitney admitted that, even without the
influx of endless numbers of Mexican trucks, “It’s virtually
impossible for the border patrol or customs to truly check
every one of these vehicles.” Craig Jarvis, “N.C. Seen as
Hub where Illicit Drugs Repackaged,” The News & Observer
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 22, 2004, Al. The Department of
Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) “found
that the number of trucks crossing the U.S.-Mexico border
increased from 2.5 million in 1993 (the year NAFTA was

On a ae a ee eee ie eee a acl

19

passed) to 3.7 million in 1997. Out of the millions of trucks,
only about one percent of trucks are inspected.” J. Patrick
LaRue, “The ‘ILL-ICIT’ Effects of NAFTA: Increased Drug
Trafficking into the United States Through the Southwest
Border,” 9 Currents Int'l Trade L.J. 38, 40 (Summer 2000)
(citations omitted). Mexico is an “important supplier of
marijuana and heroin to the United States and emerged as a
point of transit for the cocaine coming from South America.”
Jorge Chabat, “Mexico’s War on Drugs: No Margin for
Maneuver,” 582 The Annals of The American Academy of
Political and Social Science 134, 136 (July 2002).

NAFTA has already increased illegal drug trafficking so
much in border states that the Texas Attorney General
described it as the “North American Free Trafficking
Agreement.” Major Drug Traffickers, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, DEA BRIEFING BOOK (Oct. 1999) (emphasis
added).* “NAFTA has undoubtedly ‘opened’ the floodgates
for Mexican drug traffickers by not only increasing trucking
and railway traffic, but by crippling the Southwest border’s
economic development.” LaRue, 9 Currents Int’! Trade L.J.
at 45. The hazard to be caused by opening our borders
further would be catastrophic. One commentator observed:

Recent intelligence reports indicate that Mexican traf-
fickers . . . have focused on three major means of
transport into the U.S.: truck cargo, railway and illegal
or migrant workers known as ‘mules’. For example, one
truck that was stopped near San Diego carried eight tons
of cocaine in cans of jalapeno peppers. Law enforcement
officials believe that the cocaine belonged to a busi-
nessman who owns one of the biggest trucking
companies in Mexico. ... In May 1997 a tractor-trailer

http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/briefing -book/page34-48.htm (visited Nov.
20, 1999),

20

load of commercial size cans of Del Monte tomatoes
were opened by the DEA in New York City revealing
sealed bundles of cash in the tomato sauce.

Id. at 40-41. The more trucks that enter the country from
Mexico, the greater the potential for drug smuggling.

Another commentator echoed identical concerns:

Drug traffickers smuggle record levels of narcotics into
the U.S. via the U.S.-Mexico border, and are presenting
a growing risk to the security of the U.S. Mexico is a
major source of heroin, marijuana, and cocaine traf-
ficking to the U.S. Three of the four primary points of
cocaine importation are located along the Mexico border
in Texas, Arizona, and California. Marijuana trafficking
through Mexico accounts for the majority of marijuana
smuggled into the U.S. This high volume of narcotics
trafficking has established Mexican traffickers as “the
world’s preeminent drug traffickers.”

Jason C. Messenger, “Opening the U.S.-Mexico Border:
Problems and Concerns for the Bush Administration, the
Countries, and the Legal System to Consider,” 9 Tulsa J.
Comp. & Int’! L. 607, 617 (Spring 2002) (citations omitted).
He concluded that “[t}]he essential role of commercial traffic
and the U.S.-Mexico border is obvious since rather large
amounts of these illegal drugs are carried on tractor-trailers
and are reused to carry the funds from the sales in the U.S.”
Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted).

Increased importation of drugs has a devastating effect on
the human environment, and should be addressed in the
requisite EIS. This is not merely a psychological harm as
alleged and rejected in Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against
Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983). Increased levels and
usage of narcotics inflict serious and often fatal harm to
innocent human beings. Regardless of whether the increased
drug trafficking would itself trigger the need for an EIS, the

21

compilation of an EIS required for independent reasons
should not ignore the devastating effect of drugs in its
analysis.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW SCHLAFLY KAREN B. TRIPP *

521 Fifth Ave. - 17th Floor 2245 Shakespeare Road
New York, NY 10175 Houston, TX 77030
(212) 292-4510 (713) 658-9323

* Counsel of Record Counsel for Amicus
March 11, 2004.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0706%3A11. Public record. Not legal advice.
