# Reply Brief — Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0706%3A05

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 541 U.S. 752

## Text

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No. 03-358 | Ontict OF THE CLERK |

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

PUBLIC CITIZEN, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
-TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217

a4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. The interference with Presidential discretion will
not “resolve itself” and has not been ratified by
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II. The court of appeals erroneously required the prep-
aration of an EIS concerning the President’s dis-
cretionary TEIIEIIIUID ‘constebnnnvestetinbedinhidesebatnttnigenentenneenicinenenemenesnces

III. The court of appeals’ clean air analysis was

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 442 U.S. 289
ETIITTUIED cadence dientsiiepd psiieniiapatnatatiaiasatsdiaiabemneuenbiieimecetennneceneee
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) .... ee
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530
SF, SP IO eceecesnessnenscesmmnscsccsemmsansemnessensmneaseneemnsesemsescssecees
Environment Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451,
amended, 92 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ........ccccecceseeeeees
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
| ESTE eae oe OER
United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984
| cae en TN

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. T50G(C)(1) ......ccccccccsccsscssscssesesseseeees
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-87, § 350,
Is TIED cxccinniensincinnneiciesnmninesnndincenioninnineemmenmanieneees
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
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In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

Regulations—Continued: Page
40 C.FLR.:
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| 6 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Section BEGB.IG ...ccccceccscsssssssovsscesseeveietsnestatianmiasaaaaa 6 ET AL., PETITIONERS
Miscellaneous: v
148 Cong. Rec. 87429-87430 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) ........ 3
Determining Conformity of General Federal Actions PUBLIC CITIZEN, ET AL.
to State or Federal Implementation Plans, 58 Fed.
Poem, GR, SBI (ROBB) ..ccccscencvosnssnnsesessscnssesanamnameniiammnne 10
S. Rep. No. 224, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) ....ccccccseesseeen 3,4 ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

. TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

This is anything but the “routine” case (Br. in Opp. 9)
respondents make it out to be. The court of appeals in-
correctly construed and applied the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the
conformity-review requirement of the Clean Air Act (CAA),
42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1), to override Presidential discretion that
those statutes preserve. The Ninth Circuit’s unwarranted
extension of NEPA and the CAA to require environmental
review of a foreign affairs decision that is within the Pre-
sident’s sole discretion “compromise|[s] the very capacity of
the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in deal-
ing with other governments.” Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000); see Pet. 24-25. Fur-
thermore, looking no further than this particular case, the
decision below is delaying substantially the United States’
compliance with the arbitration decision of February 2001,

(1)

»

thereby preventing the resolution of a trade dispute that
affects millions of border crossings each year and that,
Mexico asserts, is causing billions of dollars of economic
injury. See Pet. 24-26.

I. THE INTERFERENCE WITH PRESIDENTIAL DIS-

CRETION WILL NOT “RESOLVE ITSELF” AND HAS
NOT BEEN RATIFIED BY CONGRESS

A. Respondents’ first argument against review by this
Court is that, because the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Ad-
ministration (FMCSA) has begun the environmental review
required by the court of appeals despite the pendency of the
instant petition, the case “will soon resolve itself.” Br. in
Opp. 10. That is plainly wrong. As the petition explains (at
15 n.7), FMCSA has entered into a contract for preparation
of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and CAA
analysis contemplated by the court of appeals, if that
analysis is required. There is no genuine possibility that
FMCSA would complete the necessary work before the end
of this Court’s current Term. See Br. in Opp. 10. Moreover,
the agency’s CAA review might thereafter require addi-
tional consideration of air emissions in certain areas. And
because the court of appeals’ decision provides respondents
future opportunities to attempt to prevent opening of the
border by again claiming that FMCSA undertook inade-
quate environmental review, another judicial challenge to
FMCSA’s safety rules would be virtually certain. Unless the
Court intervenes, resolution of this dispute is unlikely until
2005 or 2006 at the earliest—and that assumes the Ninth
Circuit would reject any subsequent challenge.

Trying to downplay the significance of that delay, respon-
dents assert (Br. in Opp. 17) that the Ninth Circuit's decision
does not “interfere with any commitments of this country.”
Undeniably, however, the decision below is preventing the
United States from implementing the February 2001 arbi-

3

tration decision that found a NAFTA violation. See Pet. 5,
26.

B. Respondents similarly are incorrect when they con-
tend (Br. in Opp. 11-14, 20-21) that, in February 2003, Con-
gress ratified the court of appeals’ decision by re-enacting
Section 350, the appropriations rider that governs FMCSA’s
expenditure of funds on registering new operations of
Mexican motor carriers. See Pet. 7 (discussing rider).
Section 350 addressed safety issues associated with the
registration of the Mexican trucks that would be permitted
to enter the United States under the President’s decision to
open the border. Section 350 did not amend the environ-
mental statutes on which the court of appeals relied and it
makes no mention of environmental issues. As respondents
concede, such legislative inaction “has generally been re-
jected as an interpretive aid.” Br. in Opp. 13 (citing Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994)).

Respondents’ ratification argument seems to be that, by
reenacting the appropriations rider a few weeks after the
Ninth Circuit panel issued its decision in this case, Congress
endorsed the practical result of delaying implementation of
the President's border-opening decision. See Br. in Opp. 12-
14. There was no such congressional endorsement. The
court of appeals entered its judgment on January 16, 2003.
Pet. App. 2a. The rider was in the Fiscal Year 2003
appropriations bill when it was reported by the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations in July 2002—six months before
the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision in this case. See 148
Cong. Rec. S7429-S7430 (daily ed. July 26, 2002); S. Rep. No.
224, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (2002).

Moreover, the Senate Committee’s reasons for including
the rider were unrelated to the instant litigation. The
Senate Report focused entirely on safety concerns. When
the Report was issued, FMCSA already had published its

4

final safety rules, and the Senate Report addressed one task
that remained to be performed under Sectjon 350: the
Secretary of Transportation’s consideration of findings by
the agency’s Inspector General that opening the border does
not pose an unacceptable safety risk. See S. Rep. No. 224,
supra, at 84-85. Notably, respondents do not suggest that
legislators considered the decision below in connection with
the appropriations process, see Br. in Opp. 12-13, and there
is no evidence that they did.

In any event, Congress’s unexplained reenactment of
Section 350, which makes no mention of environmental
concerns, says nothing about the question before this Court:
whether the court of appeals correctly applied the environ-

mental laws to a foreign affairs determination of the
President.

Il. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY RE-
QUIRED THE PREPARATION OF AN EIS CON-
CERNING THE PRESIDENT’S DISCRETIONARY
DECISION

A. The petition explains (at 14-19) that the President’s
border-opening decision is exempt from NEPA’s EIS re-
quirement, and that the exemption of Presidential action
cannot properly be overridden by treating the border
opening as an effect of FMCSA’s safety rules. Respondents
argue (at 14-15) that this issue was not preserved below.
Again, respondents are mistaken.

In the court of appeals, the government argued precisely
that respondents “misappllied] [Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ)] guidelines as to the proper scope of NEPA
analysis” in urging the application of the EIS requirement to
“effects that may result from a Presidential decision to
modify the trade moratorium.” Gov't C.A. Br. 50-51; see id.
at 53 (“[T}he President’s discretionary action on the mora-
torium * * * cannot be said to be ‘caused by’ [FMCSA’s]
rulemaking.”), 54 (environmental impacts alleged by respon-

5

dents “are * * * impacts of the moratorium modification
alone”). The government made the same argument in the
stay proceedings below, see Gov’t Response in Opp. to Pet.’s
Mot. for an Emergency Stay Under Circuit Rule 27-3, at 8
(“(T]he President's actions relating to international trade
and the trade moratorium * * * are beyond this Court’s
review.”); id. at 17 (citing potential harm to “diplomatic rela-
tions and the President’s conduct of foreign affairs”), and in
its petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc (at 1) (“At
issue is the ability of the President to conduct foreign affairs
and trade policy free of interference from the courts.”).
Although the court of appeals disagreed with the govern-
ment’s position, it clearly understood that the government
had raised the issue whether the President’s decision to open
the border is exempt from NEPA review. See Pet. App. 26a,
30a-31a, 47a, 5la.

B. Respondents next suggest (Br. in Opp. 17) that the
President’s ability to exercise his lawful discretion is not
genuinely at issue in this case because Congress has the
power to regulate foreign commerce. As the petition ex-
plains (at 4, 25), Congress has vested the President with sole
authority to lift the moratorium on cross-border operations.
The President’s discretionary decision to take that step in
response to the February 2001 ruling of the international ar-
vitration panel is an exercise of the combined authority of
both Political Branches.

C. FMCSA had no authority, either before or after the
enactment of Section 350, to override the President’s deter-
mination to lift the moratorium or to impose its own bar to
the entry of Mexican trucks and buses. Because FMCSA
operates under a statutory mandate to grant registration to
all domestic and foreign carriers that are “willing and able to
comply with” applicable safety and financial responsibility
requirements, 49 U.S.C. 13902(a)(1), FMCSA’s task was con-
fined to issuing appropriate rules to govern the safe opera-

6

tions of trucks and buses that would be allowed to enter the
United States when the President lifted the moratorium.
Because FMCSA has no authority to prohibit the entry of
those vehicles into the United States, it had no obligation to
prepare an EIS to examine the environmental consequences
of either allowing entry or maintaining a general prohibition.

Respondents further contend (Br. in Opp. 18-23) that
F MCSA was required to prepare an EIS addressing the
President’s border-opening decision because, under the
appropriations rider, “Mexico-domiciled trucks cannot travel
throughout the United States unless the challenged rules are
implemented,” id. at 19. Respondents echo the court of
appeals’ view (Pet. App. 30a-31a) that, under the CEQ regu-
lations implementing NEPA, any environmental effects of
opening the border are “caused by” FMCSA’s safety rules,
see 40 C.F.R. 1508.8(b), because “Congress has prohibited
F MCSA from processing applications from Mexico-domiciled
trucks until the rules are in place,” Br. in Opp. 19.

The Ninth Circuit’s “but for” approach is inconsistent with
NEPA and the CEQ regulations, for the reasons stated in
the petition (at 14-18). First, that approach would in prac-
tical effect subject to NEPA analysis a decision of the Pre-
sident that is expressly exempt from NEPA under 40 C.F.R.
1508.12. Second, it would require FMCSA, which is vested
under its authorizing statute strictly with safety responsi-
bilities (see Pet. 6), to treat its 2002 safety rules as the
“cause” of a border-opening action that the President made
in 2001, and that FMCSA has no power to change. Third, in
compelling FMCSA to suspend its safety rules while it
prepares an EIS addressing a NEPA-exempt determination
that the President made several years ago in light of foreign-
affairs considerations—and thereby delaying this Nation’s
compliance with NAFTA and the 2001 arbitral decision—the
“but for” approach does nothing to advance NEPA's purpose

7

of “helpling| publie officials make decisions.” 40 C.F.R.
1500. 1(e).

The decisions respondents cite as being “no different”
from the use of a “but for” approach (Br. in Opp. 20) are
entirely unhelpful to them. In Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989), the Forest Service
prepared an EIS to assist its own discretionary decision
whether to grant a permit for the construction of a ski resort
on federal land. See id. at 336-338. Similarly, in Aberdeen
& Rockfish Railroad y. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289 (1975), the
subject of the EIS prepared by the Interstate Commerce
Commission was the environmental impact of the Com-
mission’s own decision concerning rates for rail transport.
See id. at 297-306. SCRAP in fact confirms that NEPA
review is not required if “no purpose |would be] served” by
such review. /d. at 325. That is precisely the situation here.

Respondents also assert (Br. in Opp. 21) that “i]t is not
the President's decision that is subject to review” under the
court of appeals’ decision, but rather FMCSA’s rules. See id.
at 2 (“This case does not involve the application of the
environmental laws to a presidential decision.”). The court
of appeals disagreed. It declared that any “distinction be-
tween the effects of the regulations themselves and the
effects of the presidential rescission of the moratorium on
Mexican truck entry” is “illusory,” Pet. App. 47a, and it
concluded that “the President’s rescission of the moratorium
was [a] ‘reasonably foreseeable’ |effect]” of FMCSA’s regu-
lations that should have been studied by the agency, id. at
3la. Under the decision below, the action that FMCSA must
examine in an EIS is the President's decision to lift the mora-
torium on new cross-border operations.

D. Finally, respondents argue (Br. in Opp. 25) that
FMCSA’'s NEPA review was deficient because FMCSA
might have been able to tailor its safety regulations to
“alleviate environmental effects” of the President's decision.

S

As pointed out in the certiorari petition (at 21-22 n.10),
however, none of the respondents argued in FMCSA’s
rulemaking proceedings that FMCSA should consider alter-
native rules, let alone adopt especially stringent safety
requirements so as to prevent Mexican trucks from meeting
those requirements and thereby lessen any environmental
consequences of the President’s border opening. There is,
moreover, a substantial question whether that would be a
proper use of FMCSA’s rulemaking authority under a statu-
tory scheme that requires the agency to grant registration to
all carriers that are willing and able to meet safety and
financial responsibility requirements.

Respondents likewise did not raise this issue in their
petition for judicial review, but rather adverted to it only in
passing in a reply brief. See Pet. 21 & n.10. Respondents
assert that the inclusion of the issue in a reply brief means
that it was timely presented under Ninth Circuit precedent
and, therefore, provides potential grounds for affirmance by
this Court. Br. in Opp. 25 n.5. Respondents are mistaken.
Ninth Circuit cases do not say that parties may raise new
issues in their reply brief by calling them “rebuttal” (cbid.),
but rather that the court may consider an appellant’s argu-
ments concerning issues the appellee injected into the case.
See United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 993 n.6
(9th Cir. 2002). Respondents do not identify anything in the
government’s appellate brief that raised, on their behalf, the
alternative claim of agency error they seek to advance.

Because respondents’ agency-discretion argument was
not properly raised before FMCSA or in the court of appeals,
it cannot support affirmance. See Pet. 21. Furthermore,
even if this Court agreed with respondents’ alternative
ground and it became the basis for a remand order, the
government would receive substantial relief from this Court
because FMCSA’s task on remand then would not include
studying the environmental effects of the President’s

9

border-opening decision, but instead would be limited to
examining the environmental consequences of the relatively
narrow range of safety-related options open to FMCSA in
light of the President’s decision to open the border. See
ibid.
Ill. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ CLEAN AIR ANALYSIS
WAS INCORRECT

Respondents say little about the petition’s showing (at 22-
24) that the court of appeals also fundamentally misinter-
preted the CAA’s conformity-review requirement. Respon-
dents do not attempt to argue that the President is a “de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Govern-
ment,” 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1), whose activities are potentially
subject to the conformity-review obligation. See Br. in Opp.
26 n.8. Instead, tracking their NEPA argument, respon-
dents contend (id. at 27) that FMCSA had to conduct a
conformity review because “[FMCSA’s] rules will result in
Mexico-domiciled trucks traveling beyond the border com-
mercial zones and emitting pollution.”

The controlling regulations of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), as construed by the District of Columbia
Circuit in upholding those regulations, see Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 463-465 (per
curiam), amended, 92 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996), compel the
opposite conclusion. See Pet. 23-24. First, FMCSA cannot
“practicably control” the additional emissions that sup-
posedly will result from opening the border, as would be
required for those emissions to be “indirect emissions” of the
FMCSA rules (and thus subject to the conformity-review
requirement). See Pet. 22-24; 40 C.F.R. 93.152 (definition of
indirect emissions). FMCSA has no control over the Pre-
sident’s decision to open the border to Mexican motor

10

carriers and no programmatic responsibility for emissions by
those carriers. See Pet. 24.”

Second, FMCSA will not “maintain control over” emis-
sions that result from opening the border, as EPA’s “indirect
emissions” definition also requires. 40 C.F.R. 93.152.
FMCSA’s role in this context is the essentially ministerial
one of granting registration to any Mexican motor carrier
that is “willing and able to comply with” applicable safety
and financial-responsibility requirements. 49 U.S.C.
13902(a)(1). FMCSA’s authorizing statute does not make it
responsible for limiting carrier registration to accomplish
environmental objectives, and FMCSA likewise is not re-
sponsible for opening or closing the border. For that
additional reason, the conformity-review requirement does
not apply to FMCSA’s safety rules.

« x * * *

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General
NOVEMBER 2003

* The “practicabl[e|] control” requirement is separate from, and in
addition to, the “continuing program responsibility” requirement that
respondents say (Br. in Opp. 27) is satisfied in this case. See Determining
Conformity of General Federal Actions to State or Federal Imple-
mentation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,221 (1993) (“indirect emissions” are less-
proximate emissions “that would be brought about by agency action, and
that the agency can practicably control, and that are subject to a con-
tinuing program responsibility of th{e] agency”) (emphasis added). Re-
spondents, moreover, are incorrect when they argue (Br. in Opp. 27) that
FMCSA has continuing program responsibility over the emissions of
Mexican trucks and buses because those emissions are the “result” of
FMCSA’s rules. As explained in Point II.C, above, under the correct
analysis the additional emissions that respondents contend will occur
would result, not from FMCSA’s safety rules, but from the President's
decision to open the border to new Mexican motor carriers-

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0706%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
