# Amicus Curiae Brief — Al Odah v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0705%3A18

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 541 U.S. 933

## Text

Nos. 03-334, 03-343

In The
Supreme Court of the Ani
SHAFIQ RASUL, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

GEORGE W. BUSH,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.,

Respondents.
¢
FAWZI KHALID ABDULLAH
FAHAD AL ODAH, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES, et al.,
Respondents.
°
On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals
For The District of Columbia Circuit

°

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE GMAR AHMED KHADR
BY HIS NEXT FRIEND FATIMA EL-SAMNAH
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

eo
DENNIS EDNEY JOHN A. E. Pottow
EDNEY, HATTERSLEY & DOLPHIN Counsel of Record
#1970, 10123 — 99th Street UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Edmonton, AB, T5J 3H1 Law SCHOOL
Telephone: (780) 423-4081 625 South State Street
Facsimile: (780) 425-5247 Ann Arbor, MI, 48109
Na a Telephone: (734) 647-3736
gman - Facsimile: (734) 764-8309

PARLEE McLaws LLP
#1500, 10180 — 101 Street
Edmonton, AB, T5J 4K1
Telephone: (780) 423-8658
Facsimile: (780) 423-2870

Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae Omar Ahmed Khadr
January 12, 2004

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............:ccceceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ..........::00000000e00000 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ...........-.::ccceeeeeeeeeeenees 2
ARGUMENT. ........-ccccccccccsccsssccccccccscccressscescssecssorsscess 4

I. The Rights of Children Under International
LAUD... nunsndcccccoesencnssnestosnencossovespecssessosoooosoosesss 4

Il. The Extra-Territorial Application of Consti-
tutional Law ............c..cecceeeeseeeeecseeeeeeeenereeseeees 8

A. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, and R.
DV. TOrry.cccccccsssesssesescceeeenseasseenssnnecessnseaeeaces 8
BBR. ve. COOR .....ccccccccccccscccsccccccccvccscssscccosceees 10

C. Adoption and Application to the Circum-
stances of this Case............::ccsseeeeeseeeeeeres 12

TIT. Conclusion. .............::ccceeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeneeeeneeenees 13

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
UNITED STATES JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584 (E.D.N.Y.
2002), revd on other grounds, Beharry uv.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2008)..............-ccccssccsssssssseessessseees 6
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)............0ccccee0e 8
Sadeghi v. I.N.S., 40 F.3d 1139 (CA10 1994)..........:::cccceeees 6
The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 US. (7
Cranch) 116 (1822) ....0csccccsecscescosesesesensssnsninienaannnn 10
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1980) ...00000crcecccsscessccseesesonseesennsnsesnneneiiinnnnnnnnnnnnn 9,13
FOREIGN JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.0... .ccececcsceeeseeeeeeeeneenes 5
R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 ......... ce eeeeeee 3, 10, 11, 12, 13
R. v. Sharpe, (2001) 1 B.C.BR. 46.....ccccssosccscssssssssscssenssnnnnnn 4,5
R. v. Terry, (1996) 2 S.C.R. 207.......csssecssscsssocssseesees 9,10, 11

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, PROTOCOLS
AND RESOLUTIONS

Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N.G.A.
Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49)
at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into
force 2 September 1900 ........0c.ccccccosscosscessesesessnensanannannan 5

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
U.N.TS., vol. 1155, p. 331, entered into force 27
January 1980 ........cccccccccesseeseeersseeenesseseeenssensensnsansnsseenens 5

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, U.N.G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I,
54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/54/49
(2000), entered into force 12 February 2002.................+ 5

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prosti-
tution and Child Pornography, U.N.G.A. Res.
54/263, Annex II, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49),
U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000), entered into force 18
Jamuary 2002 ........cccccccccscessesseeeeseesnenserseeenenesenansensnsensess 5

International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doce. A/6316
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 3 Janu-

ATY 1976........cccsssssseesesesrerenenenensnsssseeseensenenenenanansesesseeesees 7
Parliamentary Assembly Resolution No. 1340
(2003) (Adopted June 26, 2003) ...........cscssceeeeereereenesesess 7
TREATISES
Oscar Schachter, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1991) ........ccccsseesesseceeesseeeeeneereeeeesseennensens 11

Bernard H. Oxman, Jurisdiction of States, vol. 10,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(19B7)...ccccceccsscesscsssessssccssssssserseessesssecsscesssessesennsensssesess 12

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
OTHER AUTHORITY
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(, 4) 7 | g

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE’

The amicus curiae Omar Ahmed Khadr (“Omar”) is
one of several children and the only Canadian citizen
currently detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Like the
Petitioners, Omar is virtually in communicado and his
grandmother Fatima El-Samnah acts as his Next Friend.

Reports indicate that Omar was first captured in
Afghanistan in July of 2002 when he was fifteen years old.
Since that time, Omar has been forcibly separated from
his mother, his siblings, and his grandparents. There is no
present indication of an intention to reunite Omar with his
family.

It is known that Omar sustained serious injuries at
the time of his capture and that he experiences ongoing
health concerns. He has lost approximately ninety percent
of the vision in his left eye and is also believed to be
recovering from bullet wounds.

In approximately the late fall of 2002, Omar was
taken from Bagram, Afghanistan, and flown across the
globe to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As a consequence of
Omar’s plane having landed some ninety miles short of the
coast of Florida, he has not been brought before any
independent judicial authority for a determination of his
legal status, nor has he been advised of any formal charges
or allegations raised against him. Although Canadian
intelligence officials have been permitted to question

' ‘This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties. No
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any
person or entity, other than amicus or his counsel, make a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

Omar on at least one occasion, he has been accorded visits
from neither his family nor independent counsel.

Omar wishes to exercise his fundamental right to
challenge the legality of the deprivation of his liberty
before a court of competent, independent and impartial
authority, and to a prompt decision thereon. He submits
this brief, through his Next Friend, in support of Petition-
ers’ position seeking reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

°

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The amicus curiae Omar Ahmed Khadr is mindful of
Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
States, as well as the fact that many other parties and
amici have filed briefs before this Court in these appeals.
As such, these submissions are limited to two topics
arising from the amicus curiae’s status as a child and as a
Canadian national.

The amicus curiae refers this Court to the principles
of international law that require states to protect the
rights of children deprived of their liberty. While children
also enjoy protection under such generally applicable
instruments as the Geneva Conventions, instruments such
as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child emphasize the need to accord special protection to
children. The amicus curiae contends that in deciding the
issues raised in these appeals, the Court should interpret
the Constitution in a manner consistent with the funda-
mental principles of international law contained in these
instruments.

+. thas
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3

As a Canadian, and to assist this Court in confronting
new and difficult issues recently addressed by sister
common law jurisdictions, the amicus curiae refers this
Court to recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.
These decisions, while of course not binding upon this
Court, may prove instructive. They address the extent to
which the Constitution of Canada may be applied to the
conduct of Canadian government officials committed
outside Canada’s geographic boundaries. It is submitted
that a similar balancing test to that enunciated by the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R.
597, ought to be adopted by this Court in these appeals.
The test in Cook - which may be invoked by Canadian
nationals and foreigners alike — provides that the domestic
courts of Canada may apply the Constitution beyond
Canada’s sovereign territory where: (1) the conduct in
question is that of Canadian government officials, and (2)
the application of the Constitution will not interfere with
the sovereign authority of the foreign state and thereby
generate an objectionable extra-territorial effect.

In sum, the amicus curiae submits that this Court
ought to interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent
with the principles of international law and consistent
with the decisions of other nations whose government
actors travel the world. This Court should recognize
jurisdiction on the part of the domestic courts of the
United States to review the conduct of United States
government actors in Guantanamo Bay, and reverse and
remand these matters for further proceedings on the
merits.

4

ARGUMENT
I. The Rights of Children Under International Law

The amicus curiae supports and adopts the submis-
sions of the Petitioners and amici regarding the applicabil-
ity of customary international law as domestic law and the
use of international law as an aid in constitutional inter-
pretation.

The Supreme Court of Canada has recently empha-
sized the importance of standards and principles of inter-
national law in ensuring the protection of children. In the
concurring reasons of L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Basta-
rache JJ. in R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, it was stated:

The protection of children from harm is a univer-
sally accepted goal. While this Court has recog-
nized that, generally, international norms are not
binding without legislative implementation, they
are relevant sources for interpreting rights do-
mestically. .. .

[A] balancing of competing interests [in constitu-
tional interpretation] must be informed by Can-
ada’s international obligations. The fact that a
value has the status of an international human
right is indicative of the high degree of impor-
tance with which it must be considered. . . .

Both legislators abroad and the international
community have acknowledged the vulnerability
of children and the resulting need to protect
them. It is therefore not surprising that the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child has been rati-
fied or acceded to by 191 states as of January 19,
2001, making it the most universally accepted
human rights instrument in history.

Id. at 140-41.

5

As noted in Sharpe, supra, the most significant
instrument regarding the rights of children under interna-
tional law is the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
U.N.G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49)
at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 2
September 1990 (the “CRC”). Although never adopted as
domestic legislation by the Parliament of Canada, the
provisions of the CRC were nevertheless applied by the
Supreme Court of Canada as an interpretive aid to federal
legislation in the case of Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. In
that case, the Court interpreted provisions of immigration
statutes relating to families in removal proceedings in a
manner consistent with the CRC.

The United States and Somalia are the only two
nations not to have ratified the CRC. However, on Febru-
ary 16, 1995, the United States signed the CRC, thereby
affirming its obligation “to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty,” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N.T.S., vol. 1155, p.
331, entered into force 27, Art. 18. Additionally, on January
23, 2003, the United States ratified two Optional Protocols
to the CRC, namely the Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, U.N.G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex
I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000),
entered into force 12 February 2002, and the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornog-
raphy, U.N.G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, 54 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000), entered into force
18 January 2002.

6

More importantly, in light of its near-universal accep-
tance, the CRC has been recognized and applied by the
courts of the United States as customary international
law. For example, in Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584,
600 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, Beharry v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2003), the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York noted the widespread accep-
tance of the CRC: “This overwhelming acceptance is strong
reason to hold that some CRC provisions have attained the
status of customary international law.” And in Sadeghi v.
I.N.S., 40 F.3d 1139, 1147 (CA10 1994), it was noted that
“The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been
ratified by 166 nations, including Iran! Moreover, it has
attained the status of customary international law.”

Article 37 of the CRC provides:
States Parties shall ensure that:

(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her lib-
erty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, deten-
tion or imprisonment of a child shall be in
conformity with the law and shall be used only as

a measure of last resort and for the shortest ap- -
propriate period of time;

(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty
shall have the right to prompt access to legal and
other appropriate assistance, as well as the right
to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his
or her liberty before a court or other competent,
independent and impartial authority, and to a
prompt decision on any such action.

7

Article 37 of the CRC codifies longstanding and
widely-accepted principles of law. Moreover, the rights
enshrined in the CRC apply to “every child” regardless of
citizenship or reasons for detention. These same principles
are embodied in the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993
U.N.TS. 3, entered into force 3 January 1976 (the
“ICCPR”), which both the United States and Canada have
signed and ratified. Article 9.4 of the ICCPR provides:

Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings
before a court, in order that court may decide with-
out delay on the lawfulness of his detention and
order his release if the detention is not lawful.

It has been widely recognized throughout the world
that the indefinite detention without charge of the amicus
curiae and other children by the Respondents constitutes a
“flagrant breach” of international law. In the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of Europe’s Resolution No. 1340 (2003)
(Adopted June 26, 2003), it was resolved:

1. The Parliamentary Assembly:

ii. notes that a number of children are be-
ing held in Guantanamo Bay, including a
“handful” of children between 13 and 15
years of age transferred from the Bagram Air
Base in 2003, and a 16-year old Canadian na-
tional transferred at the end of 2002;

iii. believes that children should only be
detained as a last resort and that they re-
quire special protection; that the continuing

8

detention of these young people is a most
flagrant breach of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child.

The protection of children from harm is a universally
accepted goal and a fundamental tenet of both interna-
tional law and domestic law. The Constitution should be
interpreted in a manner requiring executive authority to
be exercised in a manner consistent with these most
fundamental of principles. An interpretation contrary to
that advanced by the Petitioners in this case would entail
a conclusion that the United States has acted in violation
of international law — a result which must be avoided
where an alternative conclusion is available.

Il. The Extra-Territorial Application of Constitu-
tional Law

Between the United States and Canada lies the
longest undefended border in the world. Each nation
shares an interest in ensuring the fair treatment of its
citizens by its neighbor’s government, and each has a
proud constitutional tradition of recognizing basic human
rights. In assessing the issues in this case, this Court
ought to consider and adopt the jurisprudence recently
developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to
the treatment of U.S. citizens by Canadian government
officials outside Canada’s sovereign territory.

A. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez and R.
v. Terry

In addition to Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950), the decision of the Court of Appeals below was
based in large measure upon this Court’s decision in

——- es - — -

9

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). In
Verdugo-Urquidez, federal agents of the United States had
arranged to conduct searches of defendant Verdugo-
Urquidez’s residences in Mexico. The searches were
authorized by the Director General of the Mexican Federal
Judicial Police, and carried out in concert with Mexican
officials. Under those circumstances, this Court held that
Verdugo-Urquidez had no right to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the searches because the Fourth Amendment
did not apply extra-territorially to the conduct that oc-
curred in Mexico.

A decision similar to Verdugo-Urquidez was rendered
by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Terry, [1996] 2
S.C.R. 207. In that case, defendant Terry had been appre-
hended by American police officers in Santa Rosa, Califor-
nia, pursuant to an extradition warrant issued by a
federal district court. At the request of Canadian police
officers, the Santa Rosa police interviewed Terry and
obtained incriminating statements from him. Following
his extradition to Canada, Terry sought to have his state-
ments excluded by operation of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). Writing for the
unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, Justice McLachlin
(as she then was) held that Terry could not challenge the
constitutionality of the interview since the Charter did not
apply extra-territorially to the conduct of the Santa Rosa
police. This was so despite the fact that the interview had
been conducted at the behest of Canadian police officers.
Noting the historical pedigree of territorial jurisdiction
(and implicitly acknowledging the value of considering the
case law from sister jurisdictions), Justice McLachlin held
that applying the Charter to the conduct of the Santa Rosa
police would offend traditional notions of sovereignty:

10

Such a finding would run counter to the settled
rule that a state is only competent to enforce its
laws within its own territorial boundaries. As
Marshall C.J. put it in The Schooner Exchange v.
M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), at p.
136, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and abso-
lute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed
by itself.”

Id. at 215.

B. R. v. Cook

In the subsequent case of R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R.
597, Cook, a U.S. citizen, had been arrested in New
Orleans by U.S. officials pursuant to a warrant issued in
response to a Canadian extradition request for a murder
committed in Canada. Canadian detectives attended in
New Orleans and interviewed Cook about the murder.
Following his extradition, Cook applied to have his state-
ment excluded by operation of the Charter. The Crown
argued that Terry was controlling precedent and had
previously established that the Charter did not apply to
conduct committed outside the geographic boundaries of
Canada.

In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada noted
that Terry had addressed an exercise of legal authority by
the government officials of a foreign nation; the interview
in Terry had been conducted by American police officers,
and the fact that they were acting at the behest of (and
conceivably as agents for) Canadian police officers did not
change that fact. By contrast, in Cook, the interview was
conducted by Canadian police officers themselves (albeit in

11

United States territory). This consideration was found to
be decisive requiring Terry to be distinguished.

Having declined to follow Terry, the Court in Cook
enunciated a new approach to the extra-territorial applica-
tion of the Canadian Charter. The domestic courts of Canada
may now apply the Charter beyond Canada’s sovereign
territory where a two part test is satisfied: (1) the conduct in
question was that of Canadian government officials, and (2)
the application of the Charter will not interfere with the
sovereign authority of the foreign state and thereby generate
an objectionable extra-territorial effect. Id. at 616, 625, 626,
627.

The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Cook was
informed by well established principles of international
law and comity. The court noted that it was consistent
with established principles of international law for the
domestic courts of Canada to assert jurisdiction on the
basis of the nationality of the police officers who had
conducted the interview. The following passage by Oscar
Schachter in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE —
(1991), at p. 254 was adopted:

It had long been accepted that a State was enti-
tled to apply its legislative (or prescriptive) au-
thority to events and persons within its territory
and to its nationals outside of the country. “Terri-
toriality” and “nationality” were referred to as
“bases” of jurisdiction and functioned as criteria
of permissible authority. Territoriality is gener-
ally considered the normal basis of jurisdiction;
nationality more exceptional, but always ac-
cepted in international relations.

Id. at 618.

12

The court in Cook also noted that jurisdictional
competence on the basis of the nationality of the police
officers was an incident of Canada’s sovereign equality and
independence:

The fundamental bases for the exercise of
jurisdiction by a State are rooted in two aspects
of the modern concept of the State itself: defined
territory and permanent population. In principle,
a State has jurisdiction over all persons, property
and activities in its territory; a State also has ju-
risdiction over its nationals wherever they may
be.

Id. at 618. (Quoting Bernard H. Oxman, Juris-
diction of States, vol. 10, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987), at p. 279, with
emphasis added by the court.)

The Attorney General of Canada had been granted
intervener status in Cook and had argued that the appli-
cation of the Charter to the New Orleans interview would
ultimately confer Charter rights upon every person in the
world. The Supreme Court of Canada was not persuaded
by these arguments. At paragraph 53 the Court noted that
the Charter will only apply extra-territorially under those
exceptional circumstances where the two-part test is met.
Id. at 628-29.

C. Adoption and Application to the Circum-
stances of this Case

The amicus curiae respectfully submits that this
Court ought to adopt an approach to the extra-territorial
application of the Constitution similar to that established
by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Cook. This
approach has been developed in the context of today’s

13

global economy where people and goods travel across
borders at rates previously unimagined. It is carefully
crafted to strike an appropriate balance between the basic
human rights of the individual and the need to avoid
interference with the sovereign legal authority of foreign
governments.

As was the case in Terry, supra, this Court’s previous
decision in Verdugo-Urquidez addressed conduct that was
specifically authorized and carried out by Mexican gov-
ernment authorities in accordance with Mexican law.
Under these circumstances, the application of the Fourth
Amendment to the searches at issue would have consti-
tuted an interference with the sovereign authority of
Mexico and thereby generated an objectionable extra-
territorial effect, i.e., it would have failed the Cook test.

By contrast, in the present case, there can be no serious
suggestion that the application of the laws of the United
States to the government officials who are currently detain-
ing the Petitioners and amicus curiae would generate an
objectionable extra-territorial effect. The government of
Cuba, while technically retaining “ultimate sovereignty”
under the terms of the lease of Guantanamo Bay, does not
purport to exercise legal authority over the persons detained
therein. In the absence of such an objectionable extra-
territorial effect, it is appropriate for this Court to distin-
guish its previous decision in Verdugo-Urquidez.

Ill. Conclusion

It is submitted by the amicus curiae Omar Ahmed
Khadr that the Constitution must be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the universally recognized goal to
protect children from abuse and arbitrary detention.

14

With respect to the extra-territorial application of the
Constitution, the nationality of the government officials
who are arbitrarily detaining the Petitioners and amicus
curiae is a valid basis for an exercise of jurisdiction under
international law, and should be so as a matter of domestic
constitutional law provided that no impermissible in-
fringement on sovereignty is generated. Other constitu-
tional democracies, sharing traditional common law
notions of sovereignty, have so held.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse
and remand these appeals for further proceedings consis-
tent with such an approach.

Respectfully submitted,

DENNIS EDNEY

EDNEY, HATTERSLEY & DOLPHIN
#1970, 10123 — 99th Street
Edmonton, Alberta, T5J 3H1
Telephone: (780) 423-4081
Facsimile: (780) 425-5247

JOHN A. E. Pottow

Counsel of Record

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL
625 South State Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
Telephone: (734) 647-3736

Facsimile: (734) 764-8309

NATHAN WHITLING

PARLEE McLaws LLP
#1500, 10180 — 101 Street
Edmonton, Alberta, T5J 4K1
Telephone: (780) 423-8658
Facsimile: (780) 423-2870

Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0705%3A18. Public record. Not legal advice.