# Jurisdictional Statement — Adams v. Federal Election Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 539 U.S. 975

## Text

(') , Sup.c.ria Cour

‘, u.S,
No. , FILED

FUMAY 9 9 2003

In The
Supreme Court of the Anited States

o

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,
Appellants,

Vv.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,

Appellees.
°

On Appeal To The United States District Court,
District Of Columbia

—?

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

¢

BOoNnITA P. TENNERIELLO
Counsel of Record

JOHN C. BONIFAZ

LISA J. DANETZ

BRENDA WRIGHT

NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS
INSTITUTE

27 School Street

Suite 500

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 624-3900

DAvID A. WILSON

Avi SAMUEL GARBOW

HALE AND DorR LLP

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
10th Floor

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 942-8400

Attorneys for Appellants

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that a
challenge to the increased “hard money” contribution
limits found in sections 304, 307 and 319 of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81, 97-100, 102-03, and 109-112 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a and 441a-1) is nonjusticiable
due to lack of cognizable injury, even though the increases
will confer preponderant electoral power on wealthy
donors and will effectively exclude candidates and voters
without access to networks of large donors from electoral
participation, in violation of the equal protection guaran-
tee incorporated by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

ii

PARTIES

Actual parties to the proceedings in the United States
District Court were:

(1) Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, Carrie Bolton,
Cynthia Brown, Derek Cressman, Victoria Fitzgerald,
Anurada Joshi, Nancy Russell, Kate Seely-Kirk, Rose
Taylor, Stephanie L. Wilson, California Public Interest
Research Group, Massachusetts Public Interest Research
Group, New Jersey Public Interest Research Group,
United States Public Interest Research Group, Fannie Lou
Hamer Project, and Association Of Community Organizers
For Reform Now, plaintiffs, appellants herein,

(2) The United States of America, defendant,

(3) The Federal Communications Commission, defen-
dant,

(4) The Federal Election Commission, defendant,

(5) John Ashcroft, in his capacity as Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States, defendant,

(6) Sen. John McCain, Sen. Russell Feingold, Rep.
Christopher Shays, Rep. Martin Meehan, Sen. Olympia
Snowe, and Sen. James Jeffords, defendant-intervenors.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

None of the appellants has a parent corporation, and
no publicly held company owns 10% or more of the stock of
any of the appellants.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Table of Authorities ...............ccccccccccscscsssccssssccessceeeees v
Opinions Below. ..............:ssseeeseeseeseeeseeseeeeeennensenssenees 1
BeaGA GANG cccccoccccccceccccsccscsccccccccesecccecssssessessssossssooses ]
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.... 1
Statement of the Case ...............cccccccseeeeeeeeeeenneeeeennees 2

A. The electoral exclusion of candidates lacking

D.
E.

F.

personal wealth or access to large networks
of wealthy Gomors.................ccccccseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees

The exclusion of non-wealthy voters from the
Slocteral PFOCSES ...........cccccresessccccccsccssseseceesees

electoral Process .............csceceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenneeeees
The entrenchment of incumbents ..................

The further exclusionary effects of the
“millionaire” ProviSiOns ...............+.--eseseeeeeeees

Reasons for Noting Probable Jurisdiction.................
A. The appellants have presented a cognizable

ietinie"~1. a ee

Se ee em a ee

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASEs:
Albanese v. FEC, 78 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996) ..0.0......ccccccccccee 20
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) .0..........cccccc00- 13
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)..........cccccccccecseseeeeseseeees 14
Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000)................ 17, 18
Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000)........ 17
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).........c.ccccccceeeee. 15, 16, 21
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) .................. 12, 13, 14
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) ..........ccccccccceeeeeees 12
FEC v. Mass Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238

a 15
Fulani v. Brady, 948 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991)............... 17
Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882

EE 13, 17
Ga. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox,

183 F.3d. 1259 (11th Cir. 1999) 00.0.0... cccccceeeeeeeees 13, 20
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) ............cccccccccccececeeeee 14
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663

Sia hecncncnsrenmnnncnnensnmicimenteetampasnntenmmensistmsmaimtmatamaniaenes 12
Int'l Assn. of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092

UD CIEE Me ccrsiricnrnensccetrcistinintidineeidientintaermaamtaain 12, 17, 18

Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) .......ccccccccccceeceeees 12, 13
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).......... 20
NAACP Los Angeles Branch v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317

TEED MUU ictvieitiecenitnnibcennicebttinietarsiniasemematciatnthinarannieaanasiaed 20

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528
| oT. aa 15, 16
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)............ 12, 14, 15, 16
Vote Choice Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir.
ee 12, 17, 20
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) ............cccceeeeeeeseeees 23
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).............ccceeeeeeeees 14
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) ..........ccecceeeeeeerenees 14
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
UB. Comst.. Ammemd. V ....cccccccccsererccccrssccccccccsccsssosesese 1, 2, 11
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)..................:0++ 1
Title Ii
§ 94, 116 Btat. OF .....ccccccccccecccsccsscccccseccssecssoscssessess 2,11
§ 907, 116 Stat. 102...................cccccrsrosersrsrrerersssssrorsesees 2
§ BIO, 116 Beat. 10O.........0......ccsccccscssssseceeseerseesoseee 2,11
Title IV
§ 403(aX3), 116 Stat. 113-14 ...........ccccseeeeeeeneeeneenenees 1
OTHER AUTHORITIES:

of Democracy, in IF BUCKLEY FELL 63 (E. Joshua
Rosenkranz ed., 1999) ..............:cccccsseceeereeseenenreeeeseneenenees 22

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71

Towa L. Rev. 1405 (1986) ..........cccccccccccececccseeeeececeeeeeee

Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered
Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L.

Oe Ga ae ocrctccencnenssennenesenestenenentenssenennscssesseanouns

Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Bush’s Heaviest Hitters to
Be Called Rangers,” New York Times, May 24,
2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/
05/24/politics/campaigns/24DONA.html?ex= 1054

Sharon Theimer, “Bush Volunteer Fund-Raising
Group Formed,” Associated Press, May 23, 2003,
available at http://www. washingtonpost. com/ac2/

wp-dyn/A30660-2003May23.html................ccccccceeeeees

U.S. Census Bureau, “Income 2001,” available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/income0 l/inc

i> Ci crerenccnnensnnccencnensnnsanentenmmeneueeseensencatenansennees

U.S. PIRG, “Presidential Candidates Getting More
Money from Big Donors,” available at http-/www.

pirg.org/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=9950.............

+ ee ee ee

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the three-judge United States District
Court for the District of Columbia are not yet reported. In
accordance with this Court’s order of May 15, 2003 (Nos.
02-M-98 and 02-M-99), they are omitted from the appendix
that is bound with this jurisdictional statement and will
be reprinted in a single appendix to be filed on behalf of all
appellants.

¢

JURISDICTION

The final judgment of the court below was entered on
May 2, 2003. The Adams appellants, Victoria Jackson
Gray Adams, Carrie Bolton, Cynthia Brown, Derek
Cressman, Victoria Fitzgerald, Anurada Joshi, Nancy
Russell, Kate Seely-Kirk, Rose Taylor, Stephanie L.
Wilson, California Public Interest Research Group, Massa-
chusetts Public Interest Research Group, New Jersey
Public Interest Research Group, United States Public
Interest Research Group, Fannie Lou Hamer Project, and
Association Of Community Organizers For Reform Now,
filed their notice of appeal on May 4, 2003. See Appendix
(“App.”) la. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(3), 116 Stat. 81, 113-114
(2002).

¢

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This constitutional challenge is brought pursuant to
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

2

United States Constitution, set forth a! App. 3a. The
challenged sections of the Bipartisan Caipaign Finance
Reform Act of 2002 are codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 44la and
441a-1 and set forth beginning at App. 4a.

¢

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The case arises out of radical increases in the limits
on individual campaign contributions contained in the
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),
§§ 304, 307 and 319, 116 Stat. 81, 97-100, 102-03, and 109-
112 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a and 441a-1).
These provisions raise the amount that an individual may
contribute to a federal campaign from $1,000 per election
to $2,000 per election. BCRA § 307. The individual contri-
bution limit is further raised in races where a candidate
faces an opponent who has spent over a threshold amount
in personal funds. Under such circumstances, a candidate
for Representative may receive individual contributions of
up to $3,000 per election, and a Senate candidate may
receive individual contributions of up to $12,000 per
election. BCRA §§ 304 and 319.

The appellants are candidates lacking personal wealth
and access to large networks of wealthy donors; non-
wealthy voters supporting such candidates; and organiza-
tions representing the interests of non-wealthy voters.
They assert that the increased contribution limits deprive
them of the equal opportunity to participate in all integral
aspects of the electoral process, in violation of the equal
protection guarantee incorporated by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Voluminous evidence submitted by the

in.

3

appellants demonstrates that by increasing exponentially
the amount of money that the highest donors can give to
their favored candidates, the challenged BCRA provisions
will magnify the influence of the wealthy in the electoral
process to such an extent that candidates lacking personal
wealth or access to large networks of high donors will
effectively be excluded from electoral competition. The
ruling of the three-judge district court, that the appellants
lack standing because there is no cognizable injury fairly
traceable to the BCRA, Per Curiam op. at 10-11; Hender-
son op. at 339-343, fails to take adequate account of this
evidence.

A. The electoral exclusion of candidates lacking
personal wealth or access to large networks
of wealthy donors.

Under the BCRA hard money limit increases, candi-
dates without access to netwsiks of wealthy donors will be
effectively excluded from seeking political office, as the
war chests of well-connected candidates grow and the
financial bar rises far beyond the reach of those lacking
such connections. Candidates with a financial advantage
nearly always win elections, and won congressional office
94 percent of the time in the 2000 general election. Adams
Exh. 1, Declaration and Expert Report of Derek Cressman
(“Cressman Decl.”), 42, App. 22a. A large proportion of
winning campaigns are funded through maximum contri-
butions; maximum donations made up 60 percent of the
individual funds raised by winning candidates in the 2000
election cycle. Id. 95. These pandemic realities are con-
firmed by numerous individuals who have previously run
for federal office and are considering doing so again, but
who testified that BCRA increases would deter them from

4

future caudidacies because they lack access to large
networks of maximum donors.’ Senator Russell Feingold, a
defendant-intervenor and a co-sponsor of BCRA, admitted
that the hard money limit increases will likely further
enable certain candidates to build up campaign war
chests, “potentially discouragling] some people from
running” for federal office. Deposition of Russell Feingold
(“Feingold Deposition”), September 9, 2002, 264, line 14 to
265, line 3.

B. The exclusion of non-wealthy voters from the
electoral process.

In opposing the hard money limit increases, Senator
Christopher Dodd eloquently described how increased
hard money limits would marginalize the great majority of
voters to the point of “de facto exclusion.”

[W]hat are we doing here by raising these
amounts? We are moving further and further and
further away from the overwhelming majority of
Americans. I would like to see the average
American participate in the electoral process of
the country . . . I do not see many campaigns that
are going to bother any longer with smaller do-
nors. It is the de facto exclusion of more than 99
percent of the American adult population who
could support, financially, the political process in
this country, that worries me the most.

' See Adams Exh. 19, Declaration of Dr. Thomas A. Caiazzo, App.
79a; Adams Exh. 20, Declaration of Gail Crook, App. 83a; Adams Exh.
21, Declaration of Victor Morales, App. 88a; Adams Exh. 22, Declara-
tion of Cynthia Brown (“Brown Decl.”), App. 93a; Adams Exh. 23,
Declaration of Ted Glick (“Glick Decl.”), App. 96a.

sa eae eey Atte ey he

5

Congressional Record — Senate, March 27, 2001, S2965
(emphasis added).

If elite donors are permitted to double the hard money
they now channel to their favorite candidates, the candi-
dates favored by non-wealthy voters and communities will
not stand a chance. Most Americans are unable to make
contributions anywhere near the BCRA limit. A $2,000
contribution would represent nearly five percent of the
median U.S. family income, which U.S. Census Bureau
data puts at $42,228. See U.S. Census Bureau, “Income
2001,” available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/
income0l/inctabl.html. The $12,000 limit applicable in
some races under the millionaire provisions would repre-
sent over 28 percent of median income.

The ability of the average person to have a meaningful
impact on elections will diminish as the electoral weight of

‘the largest donors increases. Voter-plaintiffs and other

non-wealthy voters have testified that the hard money
increases would make their vote less meaningful, and that
they would therefore be discouraged from forms of elec-
toral participation such as volunteering, making small
contributions, and even voting itself. As one voter-plaintiff
testified, “[tJhe increases in the hard money contribution
limits make it no longer conceivable that I can access the
political process. They undermine the meaning and value
of my vote.” Adams Exh. 25, Declaration of Carrie Bolton
(“Bolton Decl.”), 412, App. 106a.’ Representatives Hilliard

* See also Adams Exh. 24, Declaration of Victoria Jackson Gray
Adams (“Adams Decl.”) 45, App. 101a (“The largest donors get more
attention, and when the ceiling is raised the voices of small] contributors
and voters like myself will be lost.”); Adams Exh. 30, Declaration of

(Continued on following page)

6

and Thompson testified that the increases will harm the
ability of low- and moderate-income communities, and
communities of color, to elect the representatives of their
choice.’

C. The predominance of the high donors in the
electoral process.

The appellants presented substantial, uncontroverted
evidence that the challenged provisions would give grossly
disproportionate weight in the electoral process to a small
portion of the population able to contribute the maximum
amount permitted. Only a small minority of the voting-age
population, 0.11 percent, gave maximum hard money
contributions to federal candidates in the 2000 election
cycle, yet these contributions constituted nearly half of all
individual funds raised. Cressman Decl. 494-5, App. 22a-
23a. These highest donors come disproportionately from
the ranks of corporate management and wealthy commu-
nities, and are overwhelmingly white and male. See Adams
Exh. 2, Declaration and Expert Report of Prof. John Green,
43 (“Green Decl.”), App. 31a. The challenged increases in

Chris Saffert, 418, App. 125a-126a (“The effect of the contribution limit
increases will be to drown out the voices of people from low and
moderate-income communities ...”); Adams Exh. 26, Declaration of
Daryl Irland, App. 107a; Adams Exh. 27, Declaration of Anuradha
Joshi; Adams Exh. 28, App. 110a, Declaration of Howard Lipoff, App.
113a; Adams Exh. 29, Declaration of Nancy Russell, App. 116a; Adams
Exh. 31, Declaration of Kate Seely-Kirk, App. 127a; Adams Exh. 32,
Declaration of Stephanie L. Wilson, App. 130a.

* See Thompson Deposition, 87, lines 9-12 (“[Bly doubling the hard
money contribution, you price low and moderate communities out of the
market for electoral participation”); Hilliard Deposition, 103, lines 4-7.

7

BCRA will “result in increased giving by the elite pool of
individual donors to federal campaigns,” Jd., 94, and
would permit this elite group to double the disproportion-
ate weight they already enjoy in the electoral process.
Indeed, analysis of FEC data for the first quarter of 2003
shows that fully 80 percent of funds raised for primary
campaigns came from donors giving over $1,000. See U.S.
PIRG, “Presidential Candidates Getting More Money from
Big Donors,” available at http://www.pirg.org/democracy/
democracy.asp7id2=9950.

Candidates with networks of maximum donors are
able to further augment their fundraising advantage by
encouraging these donors to bundle (i.e. solicit or facili-
tate) maximum contributions from business associates,
friends and family members. Adams Exh. 3, Declaration
and Expert Report of Craig McDonald (“McDonald Decl.”)
95, App. 47a. The BCRA hard money limit increases will
multiply the amounts bundled by well-connected donors,
giving these donors even greater electoral power. Candi-
dates lacking networks of large donors will be even more
greatly disadvantaged when faced with sophisticated
bundling operations.

The Bush Pioneer program — the hard money bun-
dling operation employed in the 2000 election cycle by the
George W. Bush Presidential Exploratory Committee, Inc.,
and its successor organization, the George W. Bush For
President Committee — exemplifies the disproportionate
electoral influence that bundlers enjoy. Each Pioneer was
responsible for gathering at least $100,000 in hard money
contributions, and the 212 Pioneers channeled over $22
million to the 2000 Bush presidential campaign. Jd., 713,
App. 53a. Under the BCRA increases, this small group
could have potentially collected twice as much from the

8

same number of donors. In fact, press accounts indicate
that the Bush campaign for 2004 is asking a new group,
called “Texas Rangers,” to bundle at least $200,000 each.
See Sharon Theimer, “Bush Volunteer Fund-Raising Group
Formed,” Associated Press, May 23, 2003, available at; http://
www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30660-2003May
23.html; Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Bush’s Heaviest Hitters
to Be Called Rangers,” New York Times, May 24, 2003,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/24/politics/
campaigns/24DONA_html?ex=1054353600&en=ff0eeb59d76f
3bb5&ei=5062&partner=GOOGLE.

The Pioneer program also demonstrates that those
who bundle contributions often do so with the aim of
gaining enhanced access and influence with elected
officials. The Pioneers — who were comprised largely of
corporate executives and lobbyists, McDonald Decl., 410,
App. 50a-51a — were each assigned a tracking number so
that the Bush Campaign could record the total amount of
money raised by each individual. See id., 415; Deposition
of John L. Oliver III, 30(b)(6) witness on behalf of Bush for
President, Inc., 46, line 10 to 57, line 11, 106, lines 10-16.
As wealthy individuals such as the Pioneers are increas-
ingly able to determine electoral outcomes under BCRA,
they will also expand their ability to influence legislative
outcomes. A wealth of evidence documents the dispropor-
tionate access and influence that maximum donors and
bundlers enjoy in Congress.‘

* See Adams Exh. 18, Declaration of Pat Williams, former Member
of Congress from Montana, 94 (“Williams Decl.”), App. 77a (“There is no
doubt in my mind that those giving the largest contributions expect
preferential access and disproportionate influence”); Adams Exh. 17,

(Continued on following page)

D. The entrenchment of incumbents.

By aiding candidates favored by the wealthy, incum-
bent members of Congress dealt themselves a powerful
advantage, for incumbents most often are the favorites of
the wealthy. Appellants’ expert witnesses Professor Tho-
mas Stratmann, Derek Cressman, and others testified
that BCRA’s hard money increases will benefit incum-
bents, who enjoy greater access to large donors than do
challenger candidates. See Cressman Decl., 419, App. 29a;
Stratmann Decl., 795-12, App. 57a-60a. A leading co-
sponsor of the BCRA, Defendant-Intervenor Senator
Feingold has admitted that the hard money limit increases
will benefit incumbent candidates facing challengers
without access to wealth. Feingold Deposition 260, lines 7-
8.

These predictions are buttressed by evidence docu-

menting incumbents’ strong advantages in raising maxi-
mum contributions. An analysis of Federal Election

Declaration of Paul Simon, former U.S. Senator from Illinois, 44,
(“Simon Decl."), App. 73a (“No member of Congress, not even the most

10

Commission data from the 2000 election cycle finds,
“Senate incumbents in 2000 raised, on average, nearly
three times as much as their challengers did from donors
of $1,000 or more: $1.8 million v. $650,000. House incum-
bents in 2000 raised more than twice as much from donors
of $1,000 or more ar tieir challengers, on average:
$178,000 v. $85,000.” Awams Exh. 35, “Why the Battle
over Hard Money Matters: Hard Facts on Hard Money,”
Public Campaign, App. i152a-153a. Raising the hard
money limit would exacerbate the advantage incumbents
already have over challengers.

E. The further exclusionary effects of the “mil-
lionaire” provisions.

The burdens on non-wealthy candidates described
above will increase exponentially in races where a self-
funded candidate triggers provisions allowing opponents
to raise funds in increments of $3,000 per election in
House races, and up to $12,000 per election in Senate
races. See BCRA §§ 304 and 319. The record demonstrates
that when one candidate takes advantage of these “mil-
lionaire” provisions to multiply maximum contributions, a
competing candidate whose supporters cannot make large
donations will be buried in her opponents’ cash. Candi-
dates who have in the past faced wealthy, self-funded
opponents have testified that the burden of simultane-
ously confronting a second campaign with vast infusions of
cash from wealthy donors would make it impossible for
them to compete. For example, North Carolina Senate
candidate Cynthia Brown testified, “The people that I
know can hardly afford to contribute twenty-five dollars,
let alone $12,000. There is no way that any candidate like

11

in the hard money contribution limits would effectively
eliminate any future campaign I might hope to wage for
the U.S. Senate.” Brown Decl., ¢98-9, App. 95a; See also
Glick Decl., 46, App. 98a (“It is impossible to participate
facing that tremendous disparity in resources. I just do not
run in the circles of people who can contribute $12,000.”).

F. Proceedings in district court.

The Adams plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia on May 7, 2002.
Count I alleged that the increases in the individual hard
money contribution limits contained in BCRA Sec. 307
violate the equal protection guarantee incorporated by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Count II alleged that the BCRA provisions
providing for further contribution limit increases in
response to expenditures from personal funds (the “mil-
lionaire” provisions), BCRA §§ 304 and 319, similarly
violate the Fifth Amendment.

The case was consolidated with ten other challenges
to various provisions of the BCRA and assigned to a three-
judge panel. A two-day trial based on recorded testimony
was held on December 4 and 5, 2002 The defendants and
defendant-intervenors presented no evidence counter to
that presented by the Adams plaintiffs. Rather, they
argued that the plaintiffs’ injuries were insufficient to
confer standing. Defendants’ Opening Brief (“Def. Br.”) at
208-209. The three-judge District Court issued a final
judgment on May 2, 2003 ruling the claims of the Adams
plaintiffs nonjusticiable.

12

REASONS FOR NOTING PROBABLE
JURISDICTION

A. The appellants have presented a cognizable
injury implicating core constitutional values

of equality.

The appellants’ evidence demonstrates that the
challenged BCRA provisions will multiply the electoral
power of donors able to give the maximum contributions,
and will thereby deny any realistic hope of gaining office to
candidates drawing their support from non-wealthy
voters. While this Court has not previously addressed an
equal protection challenge to a law creating inequalities in
campaign finance, it has long held that wealth discrimina-
tion in elections violates equal protection principles, see
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(poll tax violates equal protection clause of Fourteenth
Amendment); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)
(candidate filing fees violate equal protection clause);
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (same), and that all
citizens are entitled to an equally meaningful vote. See,
e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (dilution of
voting strength based on geography violates equal protec-
tion clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Davis v. Bande-
mer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (dilution of voting strength of
political group is justiciable under equal protection
clause). The district court’s ruling of nonjusticiabilty, Per
Curiam op. at 10-11; Henderson op. at 339-342, stands in
of equality embodied in these cases. It also conflicts with
established case law recognizing that an injury to the
ability to compete in elections is justiciable. See, e.g., Int'l.
Assn. of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 £.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993)

13

(“Vote Choice”); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ.
Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Fulani I”).

The only member of the three-judge district court to
discuss the court's nonjusticiability ruling was Judge
Henderson, who wrote that the appellants “have not
suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest,” be-
cause “no one has a ‘right to equal influence in the overall
electoral process.’” Henderson op. at 340 (citing Ga. State
Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1259,
1263-64 (11th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis in original). As is clear
on the face of the appellants’ pleadings, they seek not
equal influence but an equal ability to participate in the
electoral process regardless of economic status. This is
precisely the right that this Court affirmed when it struck
mandatory candidate filing fees as unconstitutional wealth
discrimination. In Bullock and Lubin, the Court held that
candidates “lacking both personal wealth and affluent
backers are in every practical sense” excluded from the
electoral process by mandatory filing fees, and that “[tJhe
effect of this exclusionary mechanism on voters is neither
incidental nor remote.” Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143-144. See
also Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716 (rights of excluded candidates
are “intertwined with the rights of voters”); and see Ander-
son et al. v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786-787 (1983)
(striking early candidate filing deadline which unconstitu-
tionally burdened rights of voters supporting independent
candidate). While Judge Henderson supports her ruling by
noting that “none of the Adams plaintiffs has been, or
conceivably will be, stripped of his right to vote or of access
to the ballot,” Henderson op. at 340, the same was true in
Bullock and Lubin. The challenged statutes in those cases
did not directly abridge the right to vote, but rather denied
non-wealthy voters a meaningful vote. The exclusion of

14

voters and their preferred candidates was de facto rather
than de jure; those lacking wealth were not literally but
“in every practical sense” excluded from elections. Bullock,
405 U.S. at 143-144.

Similarly, the apportionment cases recognize that “the
right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution
of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (vote dilution claim is justiciable); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (violation of equal protection
and due process clauses of fourteenth amendment, and of
seventeenth amendment, to weight rural votes more
heavily than urban votes); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US. 1
(1964) (vote dilution violates Art. I, § 2); Davis, 478 U.S.
109 (dilution of voting strength of political group is justici-
able under equal protection clause). The multimember
districts invalidated in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973), did not explicitly restrict the vote of racial minori-
ties, yet this Court upheld the lower court’s conclusion
that such districts “effectively excluded” minority groups
from participation in the primary because such groups
“had less opportunity than did other residents in the
district to participate in the political process and to elect
legislators of their choice.” Jd. at 766-67 (emphasis added).
Cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (claim of
racial vote dilution from multi-member districts is justici-
able but not shown on the record).

The district court’s ruling takes a far more constricted
view of the righi to vote than the wealth discrimination
and apportionmeni cases permit. Indeed, the district
court’s standard would bar all voting rights claims except
where the right to vote were explicitly and directly

15

abridged by the state. No voter is stripped of the right to
vote by a mandatory candidate filing fee, and no voter is
stripped of the right to vote by unfair legislative appor-
tionment, yet such practices indeed deny these voters
equal protection of the law. This Court has recognized the
right of each citizen to “an equally effective voice” in
elections, declaring, “Modern and viable state government
needs, and the Constitution demands, no less.” Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 565. The appellants’ claim that the BCRA hard
money provisions deny them an “equally effective voice”
may not be dismissed as nonjusticiable merely because the
law does not, on its face, abridge the vote.

Judge Henderson summarily rejects the above-cited
wealth discrimination and apportionment case law as
“inapposite,” with no more than a citation to Buckley's
well-known admonishment that the voting rights cases do
not support “abridging the rights of some persons to
engage in political expression in order to enhance the
relative voice of other segments of our society.” Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n. 55 (1976). That statement was
written in regard to the FECA’s expenditure limitations
which, on the record in Buckley, the Court held to be an
unconstitutional restriction of speech. Jd. at 51. The
appellants in this case do not seek to “abridge” the speech of
anyone; rather they seek to maintain the very contribution
limits which Buckley held entail “only a marginal restric-
tion upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free commu-
nication,” 424 U.S. at 20, and do not substantially infringe
the speech or associational rights of donors. Id. at 22; see
also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 US.
377, 386-88 (2000) (distinguishing between spending and
contribution limits and upholding Missouri’s contribution
limits ranging from $250 to $1,000); FEC v. Mass Citizens

16

for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-260 (1986) (“We have consis-
tently held that restrictions on contributions require less
compelling justification than restrictions on independent
spending”). The appellants here seek to “assure that
citizens are accorded an equal right to vote for their
representatives regardless of ... wealth,” a principle
affirmed in Buckley, 424 U.S. 49 n. 55, and not to validate
“governmentally imposed restrictions on the franchise” as
Buckley prohibits. Id. Far from stifling speech, contribu-
tion limits “aim to democratize the influence that money
itself may bring to bear upon the electoral process. In
doing so, they seek to build- public confidence in that
process and broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful
financial support, encouraging the public participation and
open discussion that the First Amendment itself presup-
poses.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., joined
by Ginsburg, J., concurring), citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
565."

* Further, in his Shrink concurrence Justice Breyer cautioned
against reading Buckley's disapproval of spending limits as a prohibi-
tion of any effort to promote electoral equality, particularly through
contribution limits.

[Buckley] said ... that it rejected ‘the concept that govern-
ment may restrict the speech of some elements of our soci-
ety in order to enhance the relative voice of others.’ But
those words cannot be taken literally. The Constitution of-
ten permits restrictions on the speech of some in order to
prevent a few from drowning out the many... . Regardless,
as the result in Buckley made clear, the statement does not
automatically invalidate a statute that seeks a fairer elec-
toral debate through contribution limits, nor should it forbid
the Court to take account of the competing constitutional in-
terests just mentioned.”

528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).

17

Additionally, the district court decision conflicts with
case law explicitly recognizing competitive electoral injury
as a justiciable claim. See Int'l. Assn. of Machinists, 678
F.2d 1092; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d 26; Fulani I, 882 F.2d 621;
Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000); Buchanan v.
FEC, 112 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000); cf. Fulani v. Brady,
953 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Fulani IZ”). To deny
cognizable injury from a candidate’s loss of competitive
advantage “would tend to diminish the import of depriving
a serious candidate for public office of the opportunity to
compete equally for votes in an election.” Fulani I, 882
F.2d at 626.

The competitor standing doctrine has clear application
in a case such as this one, where the appellants suffer an
economic disadvantage from the challenged provisions.
For example, under this doctrine, a candidate has been
granted standing to challenge a statute which permitted
her competitors participating in public financing to accept
contributions of $2,000 per year, while she would be
limited to $1,000 per year as a non-participating candi-
date. Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 37. Elsewhere, voters had
standing to challenge FECA provisions that they alleged
allowed corporations greater latitude in solicitation than

* The Court in Fulani II noted that “(ujnquestionably, there is
such a concept as ‘competitor standing,” 953 F.2d at 1327, but denied
standing because plaintiffs sued under the Internal Revenue Code and
plaintiffs’ injuries were not fairly traceable to the tax status of the
defendant. The Buchanan decision notes that in Fulani II, “the fact
that the plaintiffs did not sue under FECA, but rather under the
Internal Revenue Code, proved dispositive.... The FECA, unlike the
Internal Revenue Code, confers a broad grant of standing.” See Bu-
chanan, 112 F.Supp.2d at 63.

18

unions, giving corporate political committees an economic
advantage. Int’l Assn. of Machinists, 678 F.2d at 51. The
court was satisfied with allegations that the plaintiffs
“suffer a relative diminution in their political voices —
their influence in federal elections — as a direct result of
the discriminatory imbalance Congress is alleged to have
ordered in the 1976 FECA amendments.” Id. Here, the
appellants similarly claim that by advantaging wealthy
donors and their favored candidates, the BCRA will cause
the appellants to suffer a relative diminution in their
political voice. The appellant candidates’ and voters’
assessment of the disadvantage they will suffer is entitled
to deference. A court should not second-guess “a candi-
date’s reasonable assessment of his own campaign,” for
this “would require the clairvoyance of campaign consult-
ants or political pundits - guises that members of the
apolitical branch should be especially hesitant to assume.”
Becker, 230 F.3d at 387.

Finally, the district court finds a lack of injury from
the millionaire provisions because “none of the Adams
plaintiffs is a candidate in an election affected by the
millionaire provision.” Henderson op. at 343. This ignores
the claims of plaintiff Cynthia Brown, who testified that
she was a candidate for the United States Senate from
North Carolina in the 2002 Democratic Primary, Brown
Decl. 43, App. 94a; that one of her opponents was a mil-
lionaire who “contributed enormous sums of money to his
own campaign;” that another opponent “raised large sums
of money from wealthy contributors” id. 95; that her own
contributions averaged approximately $25, id. 94; and
that she would consider running again for the U.S. Senate,
but the BCRA millionaire provisions would “seriously
discourage” her from participating. Id. 47. “If I were to run

19

for the U.S. Senate again from North Carolina, I would
likely face again a millionaire opponent. Under the in-
creases in the hard money contribution limits, my other
opponents would be free to raise up to $12,000 per indi-
vidual per election. The people I know can hardly afford to
contribute twenty-five dollars, let alone $12,000. There is
no way that any candidate like me can compete under
these new conditions.” Jd. 98, App. 95a.’

Neither Ms. Brown nor any of the other candidates
challenging various provisions of the BCRA in the consoli-
dated litigation could have demonstrated complete cer-
tainty that they would compete in the 2004 elections,
given that the lawsuits were filed during the 2002 elec-
tions. However, there is a clear likelihood that if Ms.
Brown were to run for Senate in North Carolina in 2004
she would be in a race where the millionaire amendment
provisions apply. Incumbent Senator John Edwards spent
$6.15 million of his own money to win election in 1998, see
Center for Responsive Politics, “John R. Edwards: Politi-
cian Profile,” available at http://www.opensecrets.org/
19980s/index/N00002283.htm, and he will face re-election
in 2004.

B. The appellants’ injuries are fairly traceable
to the BCRA.

The district court concluded that the appellants’
injuries are not fairly traceable to BCRA because “any

" Carrie Bolton, a North Carolina voter supporting Ms. Brown, also
testified regarding her desire to support Ms. Brown in future elections.
Bolton Decl., App. 103a-106a.

20

inequality the Adams plaintiffs may suffer would be at the
hands of other individuals, not BCRA.” Henderson op. at
340-41, citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. In so concluding, the
court relied nearly entirely on cases in which plaintiffs
sought to challenge the entire system of privately funded
campaigns as a violation of equal protection, and sought
judicial imposition of public campaign financing as a
remedy. See id., citing Cox, 183 F.3d 1259; NAACP Los
Angeles Branch v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1997);
Albanese v. FEC, 78 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996). However, in
contrast with these “wealth primary” cases, the appellants
here challenge an enactment of Congress that directly
impairs their ability to participate in elections.

The Adams plaintiffs are not asking the Court to craft
a judicial remedy for general inequalities in campaign
finance, but rather to enjoin a statute that actively creates
inequalities so severe as to disenfranchise the plaintiffs.
Here, Congress has empowered the wealthiest donors to
give double the amount previously permitted (and many
times more in the case of the millionaire provisions), and
there can be no doubt of the link between the challenged
statute and the inequalities of which the appellants
complain. The appellants here, as in Vote Choice, seek “a
permanent injunction against enforcement of the very
statutes which cause[] [their] injury. This produces the
causal connection between the injury alleged and the relief
requested.” Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 37. The fact that the
challenged statute injures the plaintiffs by advantaging
private individuals does not destroy the causal link be-
tween the statute and the injury. If that were the case,
then there would have been no standing in Vote Choice,
where the candidate plaintiff claimed harm from increased
private contributions to her competitors. See id.

21

While Buckley did not find that the promotion of
equality justified the imposition of spending limits, 424
U.S. at 48-49, neither does that decision give constitu-
tional license to a law which creates gaping inequalities.
Since Buckley, the threats posed by money in politics have
become clear. Before the BCRA increases, a mere 0.11
percent of the voting-age population was providing nearly
half of all money raised in individual contributions,
Cressman Decl., App. 22a-23a, and the largest donors had
learned to multiply their electoral power through bun-
dling. See McDonald Decl., App. 45a. Now, with BCRA,
this miniscule elite has permission to double its ability to
determine electoral outcomes, locking disfavored candi-
dates out of contention and stretching democracy to the
breaking point.

Justice Breyer has observed that contribution limits
“protect the integrity of the electoral process — the means
through which a free society democratically translates
political speech into concrete action.” Shrink Missouri, 528
U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring).
The evisceration of contribution limits accomplishes the
inverse, striking at the integrity of the electoral process.
Many observers have noted the dangers to democracy
posed by the increased influence of wealth in elections.
See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered
Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1055,
1072-73 (1999) (“[Wlealth disparity introduces massive
political inequality skewed to a predictable set of self-
interested positions” and permits “wholly unjustifiable
differences in political power to emerge ... The obvious
inequalities introduced by massive wealth disparities
cause many persons to lose faith in the system.”); Owen M.
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev.

22

1405, 1412 (1986) (in an election campaign, the resources
at the disposal of the rich “enable them to fill all available
space for public discourse with their message”); Ronald
Dworkin, Free Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy,
in IF BUCKLEY FELL 63, 78 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed.,
1999) (“People cannot plausibly regard themselves as
partners in an enterprise of self-government when they
are effectively shut out from the political debate because
they cannot afford a grotesquely high admission price”).
The BCRA’s hard money increases turn these dangers into
accomplished fact.

Equal protection principles require that the Court act
to preserve the franchise for all citizens, just as it did in
the wealth discrimination cases, Harper 383 U.S. 663;
Bullock, 405 U.S. 134; Lubin, 415 U.S. 709, and the one
person — one vote cases. See Baker, 369 U.S. 186; Gray,
372 U.S. 368; Wesberry. 376 U.S. 1; Reynolds, 377 U.S.
533; Davis, 478 U.S. 109. When this Court enforced the
one person — one vote standard in Wesbery, it recalled
Madison’s words:

Who are to be the electors of the Federal Repre-
sentatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not
the learned more than the ignorant; not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than
the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious for-
tune. The electors are to be the great body of the
people of the United States.

376 U.S. at 18 (citing The Federalist, No. 57 (Cooke ed.
1961)). With the BCRA hard money increases, the rich will
in every practical sense become the electors of federal
officeholders, for nobody lacking their favor will have a
significant chance of success. In Wesbery, this court fa-
mously observed, “No right is more precious in a free

23

country than that of having a voice in the election of those
who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the
right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no
room for classifications of people in a way that unnecessar-
ily abridges this right.” 376 U.S. at 17-18. It is this vision
of the Constitution which the Court must now act to
protect.

¢

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should note
probable jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted

BonITA P. TENNERIELLO
Counsel of Record

JOHN C. BONIFAZ

° LISA J. DANETZ

BRENDA WRIGHT

NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS
INSTITUTE

27 School Street

Suite 500 ~

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 624-3900

DAVID A. WILSON

Avi SAMUEL GARBOW

HALE AND Dorr LLP

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue,
NW, 10th Floor

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 942-8400

Attorneys for Appellants

la

APPENDIX A

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON ) Civil Action NO.
GRAY ADAMS, et ai., ) 02-cv-877 KLH CKK RJL

Plaintiffs, ‘ consolidated with
po |) 02-ev-582-KLH-CKK-RJL
) (lead case)
THE FEDERAL ELECTION )
COMMISSION et al., \°
02-cev-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

Defendants. ) 02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

NOTICE OF APPEAL
(Filed May 4, 2003)

Notice is hereby given that Victoria Jackson Gray
Adams, Carrie Bolton, Cynthia Brown, Derek Cressman,
Victoria Fitzgerald, Anurada Joshi, Nancy Russell, Kate
Seely-Kirk, Rose Taylor, Stephanie L. Wilson, California
Public Interest Research Group, Massachusetts Public
Interest Research Group, New Jersey Public Interest
Research Group, United States Public Interest Research
Group, Fannie Lou Harner Project, and Association of
Community Organizers For Reform Now, plaintiffs in

2a

the above named case, hereby appeal to the United
States Supreme Court from the final judgment entered
in this action on the 2nd day of May 2003. This appeal is
taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113-114 (2002). .

Dated: May 5, 2003 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David A. Wilson

DAVID A. WILSON
(D.C. Bar # 430400)

HALE AND Dorr LLP

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
10th Floor

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 942-8400

JOHN C. BONIFAZ
(admitted pro hac vice)

LISA J. DANETZ
(admitted pro hac vice)

BONNIE TENNERIELLO
(admitted pro hac vice)

BRENDA WRIGHT
(admitted pro hac vice)

NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS INSTITUTE

27 School Street

Suite 500

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 624-3900

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

3a

APPENDIX B

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides as follows:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.

4a

APPENDIX C

The relevant sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 provide as follows:

PUBLIC LAW 107-155 — MAR. 27, 2002

SEC. 304. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION
LIMITS IN RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM
PERSONAL FUNDS.

(a) INCREASED LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS. — Section 315
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.
441a) is amended —

(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking “No person”
and inserting “Except as provided in subsection (i), no
person”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(i) INCREASED LIMIT To ALLOW RESPONSE TO EXPENDI-
TURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. —

“(1) INCREASE. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to paragraph
(2), if the opposition personal funds amount with
respect to a candidate for election to the office of
Senator exceeds the threshold amount, the limit
under subsection (a1)A) (in this subsection re-
ferred to as the ‘applicable limit’) with respect to
that candidate shall be the increased limit.

“(B) THRESHOLD AMOUNT.

“(i) STATE-BY-STATE COMPETITIVE AND
FAIR CAMPAIGN FORMULA. — In this subsec-
tion, the threshold amount with respect to

5a

an election cycle of a candidate described in
subparagraph (A) is an amount equal to the
sum of —

“(I) $150,000; and

“(II) $0.04 multiplied by the vot-
ing age population.

“(ii) VOTING AGE POPULATION. - In this
subparagraph, the term ‘voting age popula-
tion’ means in the case of a candidate for the
office of Senator, the voting age population
of the State of the candidate (as certified
under section 315(e)).

“(C) INCREASED LIMIT. — Except as provided
in clause (ii), for purposes of subparagraph (A), if
che opposition personal funds amount is over —

(i) 2 times the threshold amount, but
not over 4 times that amount —

“(I) the increased limit shall be 3
times the applicable limit; and

“(II) the limit under subsection
(aX3) shall not apply with respect to any
contribution made with respect to a can-
didate if such contribution is made under
the increased limit of subparagraph (A)
during a period in which the candidate
may accept such a contribution;
“(ii) 4 times the threshold amount, but

not over 10 times that amount —

“(I) the increased limit shall be 6
times the applicable limit; and

“II) the limit under subsection
(a)(3) shall not apply with respect to

6a

any contribution made with respect toa
candidate if such contribution is made
under the increased limit of subpara-
graph (A) during a period in which the
candidate may accept such a contribu-
tion; and

“(iii) 10 times the threshold amount —

“(I)_ the increased limit shall be 6
times the applicable limit;

“(II) the limit under subsection
(a3) shall not apply with respect to
any contribution made with respect to a
candidate if such contribution is made
under the increased limit of subpara-
graph (A) during a period in which the
candidate may accept such a contribu-
tion; and

“(III) the limits under subsection
(d) with respect to any expenditure by a
State or national committee of a politi-
cal party shall not apply.

“(D) OPPOSITION PERSONAL FUNDS AMOUNT.
— The opposition personal funds amount is an
amount equal to the excess (if any) of

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of
expenditures from personal funds (as de-
fined in section 304(a)(6)(B)) that an oppos-
ing candidate in the same election makes;
over

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expendi-
tures from personal funds made by the can-
didate with respect to the election.

7a

“(2) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER
INCREASED LIMIT.

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subpara-
graph (B), a candidate and the candidate’s
authorized committee shall not accept any
contribution, and a party committee shall
not make any expenditure, under the in-
creased limit under paragraph (1) —

“(i) until the candidate has re-
ceived notification of the opposition
personal funds amount under section
304(a\(6)(B); and

“(ii) to the extent that such con-
tribution, when added to the aggregate
amount of contributions previously ac-
cepted and party expenditures previ-
ously made under the increased limits
under this subsection for the election
cycle, exceeds 110 percent of the opposi-
tion personal funds amount.

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOS-
ING CANDIDATE. — A candidate and a candidate’s
authorized committee shall not accept any con-
tribution and a party shall not make any expen-
diture under the increased limit after the date on
which an opposing candidate ceases to be a can-
didate to the extent that the amount of such in-
creased limit is attributable to such an opposing
candidate.

“(3) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The aggregate amount of
contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s
authorized committee under the increased limit under

8a

paragraph (1) and not otherwise expended in connec-
tion with the election with respect to which such con-
tributions relate shall, not later than 50 days after
the date of such election, be used in the manner de-
scribed in subparagraph (B).

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. — A candidate or
a candidate’s authorized committee shall return the
excess contribution to the person who made the con-
tribution.

“G) LIMITATION ON REPAYMENT OF PERSONAL LOANS. —
Any candidate who incurs personal loans made after the
effective date of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 in connection with the candidate’s campaign for
election shall not repay (directly or indirectly), to the
extent such loans exceed $250,000, such loans from any
contributions made to such candidate or any authorized
committee of such candidate after the date of such elec-
tion.”.

(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL

FUNDS. — Section 304(a)(6) of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(6)) is amended

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as sub-
paragraph (E); and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the fol-
lowing:

“(B) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL
FUNDS. —

“(i) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL
FUNDS. — In this subparagraph, the term ‘expenditure
from personal funds’ means

9a

“I) an expenditure made by a candidate
using personal funds; and

“(II) a contribution or loan made by a can-
didate using personal funds or a loan secured us-
ing such funds to the candidate’s authorized

committee.

“(ii) DECLARATION OF INTENT. — Not later than
the date that is 15 days after the date on which an
individual becomes a candidate for the office of Sena-
tor, the candidate shall file a declaration stating the
total amount of expenditures from personal funds
that the candidate intends to make, or to obligate to
make, with respect to the election that will exceed the
State-by-State competitive and fair campaign formula
with

“(I) the Commission; and
“(II) each candidate in the same election.

“(iii) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. — Not later than 24
hours after a candidate described in clause (ii) makes
or obligates to make an aggregate amount of expendi-
tures from personal funds in excess of 2 times the
threshold amount in connection with any election, the
candidate shall file a notification with

“(I) the Commission; and
“(II) each candidate ir the same election.

“(iv) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. — After a candi-
date files an initial notification under clause (iii), the
candidate shall file an additional notification each
time expenditures from personal funds are made or
obligated to be made in an aggregate amount that ex-
ceed $10,000 with —

10a

“(I) the Commission; and
“(II) each candidate in the same election.

Such notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours
after the expenditure is made.

“(v) CONTENTS. - A notification under clause
(iii) or (iv) shall include —

“(I) the name of the candidate and the of-
fice sought by the candidate;

“(II) the date and amount of each expendi-
ture; and

“(III) the total amount of expenditures from
personal funds that the candidate has made, or
obligated to make, with respect to an election as
of the date of the expenditure that is the subject
of the notification.

“(C) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBU-
TIONS. — In the next regularly scheduled report after the
date of the election for which a candidate seeks nomina-
tion for election to, or election to, Federal office, the
candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee shall
submit to the Commission a report indicating the source
and amount of any excess contributions (as determined
under paragraph (1) of section 315(1)) and the manner in
which the candidate or the candidate’s authorized commit-
tee used such funds.

“(D) ENFORCEMENT. — For provisions providing for
the enforcement of the reporting requirements under this
paragraph, see section 309.”.

(c) DEFINITIONS. — Section 301 of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431), as amended by

lla

section 101(b), is further amended by adding at the end
the following:

“(25) ELECTION CYCLE. — For purposes of sections
315(1) and 315A and paragraph (26), the term ‘elec-
tion cycle’ means the period beginning on the day af-
ter the date of the most recent election for the specific
office or seat that a candidate is seeking and ending
on the date of the next election for that office or seat.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, a primary
election and a general election shall be considered to
be separate elections.

“(26) PERSONAL FUNDS. — The term ‘personal
funds’ means an amount that is derived from —

. “(A) any asset that, under applicable State
law, at the time the individual became a candi-
date, the candidate had legal right of access to or
control over, and with respect to which the can-
didate had —

“(i) legal and rightful title; or
“(ii) an equitable interest;

“(B) income received during the current
election cycle of the candidate, including —

“(i) a salary and other earned income
from bona fide employment;

“(ii) dividends and proceeds from the
sale of the candidate’s stocks or other in-
vestments;

“(iii) bequests to the candidate;

“(iv) income from trusts established
before the beginning of the election cycle;

12a

“(v) income from trusts established by
bequest after the beginning of the election
cycle of which the candidate is the benefici-
ary;

“(vi) gifts of a personal nature that
had been customarily received by the candi-

date prior to the beginning of the election
cycle; and

“(vii) proceeds from lotteries and simi-
lar legal games of chance; and

“C) a portion of assets that are jointly
owned by the candidate and the candidate’s
spouse equal to the candidate’s share of the asset
under the instrument of conveyance or owner-
ship, but if no specific share is indicated by an
instrument of conveyance or ownership, the
value of 1/2 of the property.”.

SEC. 307. MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS.

(a) INCREASE IN INDIVIDUAL LIMITS FOR CERTAIN
CONTRIBUTIONS. — Section 315(a)(1) of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a\1)) is amended

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “$1,000”
and inserting “$2,000”; and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “$20,000”
and inserting “$25,000”.

(b) INCREASE IN ANNUAL AGGREGATE LIMIT ON INDIVID-
UAL CONTRIBUTIONS. — Section 315(aX3) of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a\3)) is
amended to read as follows:

~~

13a

“(3) During the period which begins on January
1 of an odd-numbered year and ends on December 31
of the next even-numbered year, no individual may
make contributions aggregating more than —

“(A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to can-
didates and the authorized committees of candidates;

“(B) $57,500, in the case of any other contribu-
tions, of which not more than $37,500 may be attrib-
utable to contributions to political committees which
are not political committees of national political par-
ties.”.

(c) INCREASE IN SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
Limit. — Section 315(h) of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 44la(h)) is amended by striking
“$17,500” and inserting “$35,000”.

(d) INDEXING OF CONTRIBUTION Limits. — Section
315(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2
U.S.C. 441a(c)) is amended —

(1) in paragraph (1) —

(A) by striking the second and third sen-
tences;

(B) by inserting “(A)” before “At the begin-
ning”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), in any
calendar year after 2002 —

“(i) a limitation established by subsections
(aX1)(A), (aX 1B), (aX3), (b), (d), or (h) shall be in-
creased by the percent difference determined under

subparagraph (A);

l4a

“(ii) each amount so increased shall remain in
effect for the calendar year; and

“(iii) if any amount after adjustment under
clause (i) is not a multiple of $100, such amount shall
be rounded to the nearest multiple of $100.

“(C) In the case of limitations under subsections
(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a3), and (h), increases shall only be
made in odd-numbered years and such increases shall
remain in effect for the 2-year period beginning on the
first day following the date of the last general election in
the year preceding the year in which the amount is in-
creased and ending on the date of the next general elec-
tion.”; and

(2) in paragraph (2\B), by striking “means the
calendar year 1974” and inserting “means —

“(i) for purposes of subsections (b) and (d),
calendar year 1974; and

“(ii) for purposes of subsections (a)(1)(A),
(aX(1)B), (a3), and (h), calendar year 2001”.

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendments made by
this section shall apply with respect to contributions made
on or after January 1, 2003.

SEC. 319. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION
LIMITS FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES IN RE-
SPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL
FUNDS.

(a) INCREASED Limits. — Title III of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is

15a

amended by inserting after section 315 the following new
section:

“MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN LIMITS FOR
HOUSE CANDIDATES IN RESPONSE TO
PERSONAL FUND EXPENDITURES OF OP-
PONENTS

“Sec. 315A. (a) AVAILABILITY OF INCREASED LIMIT. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — Subject to paragraph (3), if
the opposition personal funds amount with respect to
a candidate for election to the office of Representative
in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
Congress exceeds $350,000 —

“(A) the limit under subsection (a)(1)A)
with respect to the candidate shall be tripled;

“(B) the limit under subsection (aX3) shall
not apply with respect to any contribution made
with respect to the candidate if the contribution
is made under the increased limit allowed under
subparagraph (A) during a period in which the
candidate may accept such a contribution; and

“(C) the limits under sub-section (d) with
respect to any expenditure by a State or national
committee of a political party on behalf of the
candidate shall not apply.

“(2) DETERMINATION OF OPPOSITION PERSONAL
FUNDS AMOUNT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The opposition personal
funds amount is an amount equal to the excess
(if any) of —

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of
expenditures from personal funds (as defined

l6a

in subsection (b)(1)) that an opposing candi-
date in the same election makes; over

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expendi-
tures from personal funds made by the can-
didate with respect to the election.

“(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR CANDIDATE'S CAM-
PAIGN FUNDS. —

“(ij) IN GENERAL. — For purposes of de-
termining the aggregate amount of expendi-
tures from personal funds under sub-
paragraph (A), such amount shall include
the gross receipts advantage of the candi-
date’s authorized committee.

“(ii) GROSS RECEIPTS ADVANTAGE. — For
purposes of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts
advantage’ means the excess, if any, of —

“(I) the aggregate amount of 50
percent of gross receipts of a candidate's
authorized committee during any elec-
tion cycle (not including contributions
from personal funds of the candidate)
that may be expended in connection
with the election, as determined on
June 30 and December 31 of the year
preceding the year in which a general
election is held, over

“(II) the aggregate amount of 50
percent of gross receipts of the opposing
candidate’s authorized committee dur-
ing any election cycle (not including
contributions from personal funds of
the candidate) that may be expended in
connection with the election, as deter-
mined on June 30 and December 31 of

17a

the year preceding the year in which a
general election is held.

“(3) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER IN-
CREASED LIMIT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subparagraph
(B), a candidate and the candidate’s authorized
committee shall not accept any contribution, and
a party committee shall not make any expendi-
ture, under the increased limit under paragraph
(1)-

“Gi) until the candidate has received
notification of the opposition personal funds
amount under subsection (b)\1); and

“(ii) to the extent that such contribu-
tion, when added to the aggregate amount of
contributions previously accepted and party
expenditures previously made under the in-
creased limits under this subsection for the
election cycle, exceeds 100 percent of the op-
position personal funds amount.

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING
CANDIDATE. — A candidate and a candidate’s au-
thorized committee shall not accept any contri-
bution and a party shall not make any
expenditure under the increased limit after the
date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be
a candidate to the extent that the amount of such
increased limit is attributable to such an oppos-
ing candidate.

“(4) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The aggregate amount
of contributions accepted by a candidate or a can-
didate’s authorized committee under the increased
limit under paragraph (1) and not otherwise

18a

expended in connection with the election with re-
spect to which such contributions relate shall,
not later than 50 days after the date of such elec-
tion, be used in the manner described in sub-

paragraph (B).

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. — A candi-
date or a candidate’s authorized committee shall
return the excess contribution to the person who
made the contribution.

“(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL
FUNDS. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. —

“(A) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PER-
SONAL FUNDS. — In this paragraph, the term ‘ex-
penditure from personal funds’ means —

“(i) an expenditure made by a candi-
date using personal funds; and

“(ii) a contribution or loan made by a
candidate using personal funds or a loan se-
cured using such funds to the candidate’s
authorized committee.

“(B) DECLARATION OF INTENT. — Not later
than the date that is 15 days after the date on
which an individual becomes a candidate for the
office of Representative in, or Delegate or Resi-
dent Commissioner to, the Congress, the candi-
date shall file a declaration stating the total
amount of expenditures from personal funds that
the candidate intends to make, or to obligate to
make, with respect to the election that will ex-
ceed $350,000.

19a

“(C) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. — Not later than
24 hours after a candidate described in subpara-
graph (B) makes or obligates to make an aggre-
gate amount of expenditures from personal funds
in excess of $350,000 in connection with any elec-
tion, the candidate shall file a notification.

“(D) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. — After a
candidate files an initial notification under sub-
paragraph (C), the candidate shall file an addi-
tional notification each time expenditures from
personal funds are made or obligated to be made
in an aggregate amount that exceeds $10,000.
Such notification shall be filed not later than 24
hours after the expenditure is made.

“(E) CONTENTS. — A notification under sub-
paragraph (C) or (D) shall include —

“(i) the name of the candidate and the
office sought by the candidate;

“(ii) the date and amount of each ex-
penditure; and

“(iii) the total amount of expenditures
from personal funds that the candidate has
made, or obligated to make, with respect to
an election as of the date of the expenditure
that is the subject of the notification.

“(F) PLACE OF FILING. — Each declaration or
notification required to be filed by a candidate
under subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) shall be filed
with —

“(i) the Commission; and

“(ii) each candidate in the same elec-
tion and the national party of each such
candidate.

20a

“(2) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CON-
TRIBUTIONS. — In the next regularly scheduled report
after the date of the election for which a candidate
seeks nomination for election to, or election to, Fed-
eral office, the candidate or the candidate’s authorized
committee shall submit to the Commission a report
indicating the source and amount of any excess con-
tributions (as determined under subsection (a)) and
the manner in which the candidate or the candidate’s
authorized committee used such funds.

“(3) ENFORCEMENT. — For provisions providing
for the enforcement of the reporting requirements
under this subsection, see section 309.”.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. — Section 315(a)(1) of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.
44la), as amended by section 304(a), is amended by
striking “subsection (i),” and inserting “subsection (i) and
section 315A.”.

2la

APPENDIX D
Exhibit 1

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ? Civil Action No.
ADAMS, et al., . 02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL

Plaintiffs, ) consolidated with
_ ) 02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) ‘lead case)
COMMISSION et al., Jand
02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL
Defendants. ) 02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL
02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT
OF DEREK CRESSMAN

1. My name is Derek Cressman. I am the Democracy
Program Director of the State Public Interest Research
Groups. The PIRGs are a network of non-profit, non-
partisan research and advocacy organizations that have
analyzed campaign finance issues and other public inter-
est issues for the past 30 years. I have professionally
studied federal hard money contributions since 1995 with
U.S. PIRG, the national policy office of the State PIRGs. In
that time, I have authored or co-authored nine studies and

white papers regarding the financing of federal campaigns. I

22a

have provided testimony before the United State Senate
Rules Committee on the topic of increasing federal contri-
bution limits. I have not received any compensation for
providing this declaration and expert report.

2. It is my expert opinion that hard money contributions
and expenditures significantly influence the outcome of
elections. In 440 of 469 (or 94%) of 2000 general election
races for the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate,
the candidate who spent the most money won their race
[see exhibit A, Look Who’s Not Coming to Washington, U.S.
PIRG, January 2001, Appendix A]. Winning candidates
outraised opponents by a margin of 2.6 to 1 [see exhibit B,
The Best Elections Money Can Buy, U.S. PIRG, November
2000. page 4]. In 1998, the candidate who spent the most
won 94% of House races and 95% of Senate races. Further,
in every presidential primary since 1976, the candidate
who has raised the most money has won his party’s nomi-
nation [see exhibit C, Running for the Money, U.S. PIRG,
September 1999, page 5].

3. While money is not the sole factor in determining
elections, it is an overwhelming factor. This is the reason
that candidates and campaign directors, who are experts
in the business of winning elections, spend so much time
and energy raising campaign funds. If money did not
largely determine election outcomes, then candidates
would not bother raising it.

4. Federal campaign funds come from a small minority of
citizens. In the 2000 election cycle, fewer than 232,000
individuals gave contributions of $1,000 or more to federal
candidates. This represents just 0.11% of the voting age
population [see exhibit D, Reinforcing the Rich, Public
Citizen, February 2, 2001, page 2]. Clearly the current

23a

federal limits only affect a miniscule proportion of U.S.
citizens, the vast majority of whom are limited by their
disposable incomes in what they can give at amounts far
lower than $1000.

5. The small number of donors who give the maximum
amount comprise a significant source of candidate funds.
Contributors who gave $1000 or more to a federal candi-
date gave 46% of all individual contributions to federal
candidates from January 1, 1999 to November 28, 2000
[see exhibit E, The Consequences of Raising Federal
Contribution Limits, U.S. PIRG, March 2001, page 5]. Of
those candidates who were successful, 60% of their indi-
vidual funds came from donors who gave $1000 or more
[see exhibit A, page 6].

6. Common sense would indicate that citizens who can
afford to give $1000 will tend to be wealthier than those
who cannot. This has been documented by surveys show-
ing that of large donors to federal elections, 95% had
family incomes greater than $50,000 while almost two-
thirds of American households had incomes below that
level. Large donors are 95% white, 80% male, and 50%
were over 60 years of age. This compares to a U.S. popula-
tion that is 17% non-white, 51% female, and only 12.8%
over the age of 60. Large federal donors are much more
likely to be employed in business or law professions than
the public at large. They are more conservative than the
public at large on economic matters and environmental
matters. However, one-third of large donors identified
themselves as liberal compared to one-fifth of the general
public, so it is primarily the middle of the political spec-
trum that is underrepresented among large donors [see
exhibit F, Pushing the Limit, U.S. PIRG, July 1999, page
7 and exhibit G, Individual Campaign Contributors:

24a

WEALTHY, CONSERVATIVE — AND REFORM MINDED,
Green, Hernson, Powell, and Wilcox, June 1998].

7. In the first 15 months of the 1999-2000 election cycle,
2/3 of Fortune 500 CEOs gave at least one maximum
$1000 contribution to a candidate, compared to less than
one percent of the general population [see exhibit H,
Legalizing the Loophole, U.S. PIRG, June 2000 page 3).
Clearly, CEOs have greater influence over election results
than ordinary citizens.

8. Because campaign fundraising is such a large factor in
electoral success, many potential candidates choose not to
run for office or drop out of contention because they do not
have the backing of large donors. For example, Congress-
man John Kasich and Elizabeth Dole withdrew from the
Republican Primary for President in the last election
before a single vote was cast in large part due to fundrais-
ing. Had these candidates had similar large donor support
to frontrunner George W. Bush, or had Bush raised
amounts similar to Kasich and Dole, those candidates
would likely have remained in the race. At the time John
Kasich dropped out of the Republican presidential pri-
mary, George W. Bush had raised 74.4% of his funds from
maximum $1000 donors [see exhibit C, page 2].

9. Therefore, through giving hard money contributions of
$1000, a small and unrepresentative group of citizens has
vastly more influence than most Americans in determining
who runs for federal office, and who wins elections. All
citizens do not have equal opportunity to participate in the
electoral process in America, and the accompanying
results cannot be interpreted to represent the will of the
majority of citizens.

25a

10. Low and moderate-income citizens are aware that
their voices do not carry equal weight in federal politics. In
1999, only 29% of Americans trusted the government in
Washington to do the right thing, according to a poll by the
Council for Excellence in Government. The same survey
found that 63% of respondents feel that government serves
the special interests, while only 25% said it serves the
public interest. Just 39% said that they believed our
current government meets Abraham Lincoln’s goal of
government of, by, and for the people, while 54% said we
do not have a government of, by, and for the people [see
exhibit I, Testimony of Campaign Finance Reform, Derek
Cressman, March 29, 2001]. The feeling of disenfran-
chisement is a significant reason for declining rates of
voter participation and a barrier to citizens getting in-
volved in federal elections through volunteering or making
small contributions. This then exacerbates the undue
influence of large donors on the process.

11. Members of Congress are also aware of the dispropor-
tionate role that money plays in influencing election
outcomes. Even if a member of Congress grants no access
to a donor, and has no personal communication let alone
quid pro quo understanding with a donor, that member of
Congress knows that the donor can influence his or her re-
election and is therefore more accouatable to that donor
than to other constituents. For politi :ians who favor their
political career more than their personal wealth, the
unequal influence of large donors on election outcomes can
be more corrupting in the form of distortion to the political
process than traditional bribery. A recent study by political
scientists Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro found that
in 1980, federal lawmakers followed the wishes of the
majority of Americans about two-thirds of the time. In

26a

2000, that was down to 40% of the time. The professors
concluded that lawmakers answer “to the extreme ideo-
logical elements of their parties, to their contributors, and
to special interests” [see exhibit J, Politicians Don’t Pan-
der, Washington Post, March 19, 2000.]

12. If legislators do not follow the wishes of large donors,
they may find themselves defeated by candidates who do.
For example, with one exception, the candidates in the
2000 election who received the most money from Enron
and Arthur Anderson defeated their opponents. One
specific example involves the 1994 election for the 18th
Congressional District in Texas. Enron CEO Kenneth Lay
recruited Sheila Jackson Lee to challenge then-incumbent
Craig Washington because of Washington’s opposition to
NAFTA. Lay and other Enron employees helped raise
nearly $600,000 for Jackson Lee, three times as much as
Washington had raised in his previous re-election. The
result was an overwhelming win for Jackson Lee. This
demonstrates how large contributions can influence policy
decisions without any quid pro quo or even access grafted
by the candidate. Representative Jackson Lee’s position on
NAFTA was likely not influenced by her contributors.
However, Lay and his fellow large donors were able to
change the vote of the representative of the 18th District
of Texas by dint of large campaign contributions. This
avenue of political influence is unavailable to most voters
in the 18th District of Texas [see exhibit K, Phantom Fixes,
U.S. PIRG, January 2002, page 10).

13. The influence of large donors on election outcomes
has increased significantly since the Supreme Court
upheld the current $1000 limit in 1976. The techniques
of television advertising, polling, focus groups, direct mail
marketing, and other expensive modern campaign practices

27a

were in their infancy in the 1960s and early 1970s. As
professional campaign managers have become more
skilled at employing these marketing techniques to win
political campaigns, the competitive advantage of candi-
dates who have significant large donor backing over those
who do not has increased and the influence of large donors
has grown correspondingly. A Wall Street Journal Poll in
1997 found that 68% of respondents think that the Ameri-
can political system was more influenced by special
interest money than it was twenty years earlier [see
exhibit I, page 1).

14. Increasing contribution limits will further reduce the
role of small donors in influencing federal elections. I
estimate that the proportion of individual funds raised by
federal candidates from donors who give less than $200 to
candidates will shrink from 30% to 21-25%. Meanwhile,
the percentage of individual funds federal candidates raise
from donors who give the maximum amount allowed will
increase from 46% currently to 55-63% [see exhibit E, page
5).

15. Increasing federal contribution limits will reduce the
free speech opportunities of low and moderate-income
donors, and of candidates who are backed by these donors.
There is a limited amount of advertising time available for
purchase during a campaign season. As candidates com-
pete for this limited time, the cost of advertising increases.
The price of advertising triples in some markets as a
result of increased campaign season demand [see exhibit
L, The Case for Free Air Time, Alliance for Better Cam-
paigns, March 2002, page 9]. Candidates need to purchase
air-time to compete, but those candidates backed by lower
income voters are effectively priced out of speech opportu-
nities by candidates who have large donor backing. If the

28a

large donor candidates raise even more money under
higher contribution limits, it will further drive up the cost
of advertisements and literally reduce the number of
advertisements that a lesser-funded candidate could
purchase, potentially driving their campaigns below the
level of notice.

16. Even in races that do not depend upon TV or radio
advertising, which is limited by its very nature, voters
have a limited capacity to absorb political information.
This is limited not only by the time in the day, but by
competing demands for a voters attention in their every-
day lives. Candidates backed by large donors can effec-
tively capture nearly all of most voters’ attention spans
through saturation advertising techniques, and literally
drown out the voices of lesser-funded candidates.

17. The rationale used by Congress to increase federal
contribution limits is not compelling. Although inflation
has occurred since the limits were set, federal candidate
fundraising has risen even faster. House and Senate
candidate fundraising increased by 425% from 1977-78 to
1999-2000, with inflation accounting for less than half of
this increase [see exhibit E, page 4). Candidates are
raising and spending more money than ever in the history
of our republic under the current $1000 limits.

18. Increasing contribution limits will not reduce the
time candidates spend raising funds. Many states have no
contribution limits at all, yet there is no evidence from
those states that candidates spend any less time raising
funds. Candidates will spend time raising funds to the
extent that they believe their opponent is doing so and
could therefore defeat them. In fact, higher limits may
encourage candidates to spend more of their personal time

29a

raising funds. The higher the donation level, the greater
the incentive for a candidate to personally speak with a
donor as opposed to letting a direct mail piece, internet
site, or campaign staff make the solicitation. Further, the
larger the donation, the more the donor expects a personal
call from the candidate, or a seat at the same dinner table
at a fundraiser, or a photograph. Only limits on candidate
spending would effectively reduce the time candidates
spend raising funds.

19. Increasing contribution limits will not help challeng-
ers. Under the current limits, House incumbents outraised
House challengers by margins ranging from 2.3 to 1 up to
4 to 1 in elections from 1990-1998. Since there is no reason
to believe that higher contribution limits will allow either
challengers or incumbents to find additional donors, only
receive more from existing donors, it is certain that higher
contribution levels will only increase the fundraising
disparity between challengers and incumbents [see exhibit
F, page 11).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
the United States of America that the foregoing is true and
correct.

Executed on: Sept. 20, 2002
/s/ Derek Cressman

Derek Cressman

30a

Exhibit 2

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY Civil Action Ne
ADARES, < ef. ) 02-ev-877-KLH-CKK-RJL
Plaintiffs, )
consolidated with
— 02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL
THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) (lead case)
COMMISSION et al., ead

Defendants. ) 02-ev-581-KLH-CKK-RJL
‘ 02-ev-633-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-ev-751-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL
) 02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL
‘ 02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT OF
PROF. JOHN C. GREEN

1. My name is John C. Green. I am the director of the
Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University
of Akron, where I teach courses on campaign finance and
fundraising. I have published widely on American cam-
paign finance, especially on the behavior of individual
campaign contributors. I am the editor and a contributor
to Financing the 1996 Election, and I am a contributor to
Financing the 2000 Election. My curriculum vitae further
establishing my expertise on campaign finance matters is
attached to this declaration as Exhibit A. I have not

3la

received any compensation for providing this declaration
and expert report.

2. I am the co-author with Clyde Wilcox, Paul S.
Herrnson and Peter L. Francia of “Raising the Limits,”
published in the May/June 2002 issue of the Public
Perspective. A copy of the “Raising the Limits” article is
attached to this declaration as Exhibit B.

3. In “Raising the Limits,” we analyzed the impact of the
increased contribution limits in the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act. Our findings were based on a national ran-
dom sample survey of hard money contributors to congres-
sional campaigns, conducted at the University of Akron in
1997-98. In an earlier report based on this survey re-
search, we found that 81 percent of such donors had
annual family incomes higher than $100,000, ninety-five
percent were white, and eighty percent were men.

4. In “Raising the Limits,” we concluded that the cumu-
lative impact of doubling the individual contribution limits
would result in increased giving by the elite pool of indi-
vidual donors to federal campaigns.

5. We further concluded that this increased giving is
likely to exacerbate the upper status character of the
donor pool, providing greater voice to wealthy business-
men and individuals already heavily engaged in giving.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
the United States of America that the foregoing is true
and correct.

32a

Executed on: September 18, 2002

/s/
John C. Green
Exhibit 2B
C . i f } l l : .
Raising
the Limits

By Clyde Wilcox, John C. Green, Paul S. Herrnson, Peter
L. Francia, Lynda W. Powell, and Benjamin A. Webster

The United States has embarked upon a major reform of
the federal campaign finance laws, something that hap-
pens only about once a generation. Congress has passed,
and the president has signed, the most extensive regula-
tion of campaign money since the Watergate-era Federal
Election campaign Act (FECA).

Unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,
the new law will restrict “soft money” contributions to
political parties and “issue advocacy” spending by parties
and interest groups (neither regulated by FECA). The new
law will also increase “hard money” contributions (those
regulated by FECA).

Clyde Wilcox is professor of government and Benjamin A.
Webster is a doctoral student, Georgetown University. John C.
Green is professor political science, University of Akron. Paul
S. Herrnson is professor of government and politics, and Peter
L. Francia is a research fellow at the Center for American
Politics and Citizenship, University of Maryland. Lynda W.
Powell is professor of political science, University of Rochester.

33a

For example, it will double the limit on the amount individu-
als can give to congressional candidates in an election from
$1,000 to $2,000, so that in a typical race, an individual will
be able to give a candidate a total of $4,000 ($2,000 in the
primary and $2,000 in the general election). The law also
expands to $95,000 per year the total aggregate amount
individuals can give to candidates, parties, and PACs.

Some reformers, many of them Republicans, argue that
doubling the individual limits will largely restore the
value of contributions eroded by inflation, thus expanding
participation and helping wean candidates away from soft
money and issue advocacy. Other reformers, many of them
Democrats, say the new limits will mostly increase the
participation of Republican and conservative donors, and
thus mostly help GOP candidates. Still others think the
new limits will allow candidates to spend less time raising
money, and more time legislating, because their fundrais-
ing efforts will yield more money.

Further analysis is needed, however, because the effects of
reform are often unanticipated by reformers. Labor unions
pushed for language permitting the formation of political
action committees (PACs) in 1974, but did not foresee the
tidal wave of corporate PAC formation in the 1980s.
Likewise, the activists who supported the creation of party
soft money in 1979 did not fully anticipate the sheer
magnitude of those funds twenty years later. Thus, it is
worth asking: with increased individual limits, who will
give more money, and which candidates will benefit?

We can offer some tentative answers to these questions
with a combination of survey and campaign finance data.

34a

Supported by a grant from the Joyce Foundation, we
conducted a mail survey of a random sample of individuals
who gave $200 or more to congressional candidates in
1996 (hereafter referred to as “major donors”), drawn from
the records of the Federal Elections Commission.

Because these records list specific contributions and not
contributors, we weighted the major donor sample to
correct for oversampling those who made many contribu-
tions. To make sure we understood the donors who gave
the most, we also surveyed a special list of individuals who
had given to at least eight candidates and/or gave a total
of $8,000 (hereafter referred to as “most active donors”).

The surveys were conducted at the University of Akron,
and the survey responses were matched to the actual
donation records, thus linking donor attitudes directly to
contributing behavior. [See the July/August 2000 issue of
Public Perspective for an earlier article on this study. ]

As part of a battery of campaign finance reform questions,
we asked both samples of donors, “How might your own
contributions to congressional candidates be affected if the
following changes were enacted? If larger individual gifts
were allowed?” The response categories were “would give
more,” “would give the same,” and “would give less.”

Just 15% of the major donors reported that they would
give more if the limits were raised — we refer to these
respondents as “Expanded Givers” — and 5% said that they
would give less if contribution limits were raised (“Re-
duced Givers”. Among the most active donors, 30% were
Expanded Givers and only 3% Reduced Givers. However,
the great bulk of both samples said they would be unaf-
fected by the change: 80% of the major donors and 67% of

35a

the most active said their contributions would remain the
same. We call them “Stand-Pat Givers.”

Speculation on the impact of increased contribution limits
has naturally focused on those donors who “maxed out” at
the current limit of $1,000, since only they were restricted
by the old law. Yet our study yields a surprising result:
nearly one-half of major donors who would give more did
not make a maximum contribution in 1996, and this was
true of nearly one-quarter of the most active donors as
well.

Why would someone who does not make a maximum
contribution give more if the limit were doubled? Many
donations are made at events, such as dinners and cocktail
parties, which typically require a minimum contribution,
set below the legal limit. An increase in the limit is likely
to produce higher minimum contributions for these events:
a senators $500-a-plate dinner may become $750 or
$1,000, and all attendees will give more. Indeed, many
Stand-Pat Givers might have to contribute more to par-
ticipate in the same events.

Why would a donor give less if the legal limit for contribu-
tions were raised? The Reduced Givers are deeply disillu-
sioned with the campaign finance system, with one-half
saying that the current campaign finance system is
“broken and needs to be replaced.” As a consequence, they
are strong supporters of limits on campaign spending and
television advertising, and a ban on soft money. Many
already contribute only occasionally and in small amounts.
Thus, they may well reduce their giving — or stop it com-
pletely — if the role of “big money” grows.

Expanded Givers have a different perspective. For start-
ers, they have a more positive opinion of the campaign

36a

finance system, witha plurality claiming “it has some
problems but is basically sound.” Many are habitual
donors who regard campaign contributing as a legitimate
form of political activity. They also support campaign
finance reform, and one of their favorite reform proposals
is raising individual limits.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the demographic and political
characteristics of Expanded Givers compared to the entire
donor samples. These results must be viewed with caution
because the Expanded Givers make up only a small
portion of the donor pool, but the patterns are neverthe-
less quite interesting.

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39a

As can be seen in Figure 1, major congressional donors are
disproportionately wealthy, well-educated, middle-aged,
and male. Among the major donors, the Expanded Givers
fit this profile well. Twenty-two percent report incomes of
over $500,000, compared with 14% of the entire sample. In
terms of occupation, Expanded Givers are more likely
(43% vs. 35%) to be business managers. (Business manag-
ers are defined as corporate CEOs, vice presidents, and
other high-level business bureaucrats.)

Education and age show more a more complex pattern.
Expanded Givers tend to have some graduate training,
rather than just a college degree or a graduate degree.
Likewise, they tend to be middle-aged, with most between
46 and 60 years of age. There is also a gender gap: Ex-
panded Givers are even more masculine than the sample
as a whole.

The Reduced Givers tend to have the opposite characteris-
tics, being less affluent, less educated, and more female,
but comprising more older and younger donors. Most of
these demographic characteristics are less important for
the most active donors. Here the Expanded Givers are
wealthier and more likely to be less than 60 years old. But
there are few differences in occupation or education, and
the gender gap is smaller.

Thus, Expanded Givers tend to be wealthy, middle-aged
businessmen, with some variation among the most active
donors. And, thus, increased giving is likely to intensify
the existing upper-status bias of the donor pool and reduce
the representation of women. Raising the limits may well
increase individual participation in campaign finance, but
in a highly selective fashion.

40a

This conclusion is reinforced by the motives the donors
report as “very important” for their giving. Compared to
the samples as a whole, Expanded Givers were most likely
to report business motives, such as “so my business will be
treated fairly,” “candidate is friendly to my industry or
line of work,” or “[I was] asked by someone I cannot say no
to.” Reduced Givers were less likely to cite this kind of
motive as important.

Given the demography and motivation of Expanded
Givers, their political profile in Figure 2 should come as no
surprise. Among the major donors, Expanded Givers were
more likely to be strong Republicans and strong conserva-
tives compared to the sample as a whole.

These patterns extended to specific issues, especially
economic questions. Expanded Givers were more likely to
support tax cuts “even if it means reducing public ser-
vices.” Similarly conservative-leaning results obtained for
Expanded Givers on national health insurance, anti-
poverty programs, and environmental protection.

Much the same thing occurred on social issues. For exam-
ple, Expanded Givers were more likely than other donors
to agree that “abortion should be outlawed except to save
the mother’s life,” and were also more conservative on gay
rights and affirmative action.

In addition, there is an organizational component to these
figures. Fully 30% of the self-identified members of busi-
ness or conservative interest groups qualified as Expanded
Givers. In contrast, just 7% of members of both environ-
mental and liberal groups said they would give more if the
limits were raised.

4la

These partisan and ideological tendencies hold for the
most active donors — an important finding, because the
most active donors are more Democratic and liberal than
the major donors. Thus, increased giving may erode a
Democratic counterbalance to the Republican tilt of the
major donors. Overall, the Reduced Givers are more likely
to be liberals, independents of various sorts, and Democ-
rats.

What kind of congressional candidates did Expanded
Givers support in 1996? Not surprisingly, they directed
more than 70% of their money to Republicans. This figure
contrasts sharply with the Reduced Givers, who gave just
38% of their 1996 funds to Republicans, and the Stand-Pat
Givers, who gave 56%. Taken together, all of this evidence
suggests some factual basis for the opposition to increased
individual limits by Democratic reformers.

It is very difficult to estimate the amount and distribution
of new funds resulting from the doubling of the individual
limits. Much depends on the circumstances of the election
and how a wide range of political actors responds to the
entire reform package. We can, however, use our major
donor sample to estimate the extra funds that might have
been raised in 1996, had the increased limits been in
place.

For this purpose, we assume that all the Expanded Givers
doubled their 1996 contributions, the Reduced Givers cut
their contributions to zero, and the Stand-Pat Givers
remained unchanged. Table 1 reports the results of this
estimate overall and for various kinds of candidates.

42a

Table 1
What If Limits Had Applied in 19967?

1996 ESTIMATED ESTIMATED ESTIMATED

TOTAL IN % NEW FUNDS TOTAL IN
MILLIONS: CHANGE’ IN MILLIONS’ MILLIONS‘
TOTAL $203.5 16.7% $34.0 $237.5
REPUBLICAN
INCUMBENTS $62.8 25.6% $16.0 $78.8
NOon-
INCUMBENTS $50.1 19.6% $9.8 $59.9
DEMOCRATIC
INCUMBENTS $38.2 13.3% $5.0 $43.2
Non-
INCUMBENTS $52.4 6.2% $3.2 $55.6

Note: ‘total funds raised by congressional candidates from
individual contributions of $200 or more in 1996. *Esti-
mated increase in individual donations of $200 or more
assuming: a) all Expanded Givers doubled their 1996
contributions, and b) all Reduced Givers reduced their
1996 contributions to zero.’ Column one multiplied by
column two.‘ Column one added to column three.

Source. Estimated by the authors from the University of
Akron Fall 1997 survey and Federal Election Commission
data.

The first row in Table 1 reports the total funds raised in
1996 from individuals’ donations of $200 or more to
congressional candidates ($203.5 million). We estimate
that these funds would have been 16.7% higher if the
increased limits had been in place and the above assump-
tions were met, producing an additional $34 million.

43a

There is a sharp partisan bias in the distribution of the
estimated funds. For Republican incumbents, funds
increased by 25.6% and accounted for almost one-half of
the increased funds ($16 out of $34 million). Republican
non-incumbents (challengers and open-seat candidates)
showed a smaller increase of 19.6% and obtained a little
more than one-quarter of the estimated new money.

By comparison, Democrats fared less well: incumbents
increased by 13.3% and non-incumbents by 6.2%. The total
Democratic increase was $8.2 million, about one-third of
the total Republican gain.

These estimates must be viewed with caution, of course,
since different assumptions will produce different results,
and future campaigns may not resemble that of 1996. The
total figures could be much higher if the Stand-Pat Givers
are induced to contribute more, or the Reduced Givers
continue to participate rather than abstaining.

It is possible that Democratic candidates will more suc-
cessfully exploit the new limits than Republicans, or that
the larger maximum donations will help non-incumbents
by providing crucial “seed money” for their campaigns.
However, it is also possible that these patterns will also
apply to the increased contributions to parties and PACs,
to the further advantage of the GOP and conservative
candidates.

Finally, the level of estimated new money is high enough
to suggest that some candidates may be able to spend less
time on fundraising and more time on other duties —
especially if they are Republicans and incumbents.

What, then, is the likely impact of doubling individual
contribution limits? Although only one in six major donors

44a

claim they would give more, and one in twenty would give
less, the cumulative impact could be significant. Increased
giving is likely to exacerbate the upper status character of
the donor pool, providing greater voice to wealthy busi-
nessmen and individuals already heavily engaged in
giving.

More of the new funds are likely to go to Republican
congressional candidates, particularly incumbents, and
may allow these candidates to spend less time on fundrais-
ing and more time legislating. Thus, the new reforms may
produce some political consequences unforeseen — but not
unforeseeable — by the reformers.

45a

Exhibit 3

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No.

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY
ADAMS , et. al., 02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL
— consolidated with
Plaintiffe, 02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL
-Vs- (lead case)
THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) and
COMMISSION et ai., 02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL
Defendants. 02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL
02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL
02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL
02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL
02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL
02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL
02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

Nee NN eee eee eee ees Ga

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT
OF CRAIG MCDONALD

I, Craig McDonald, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am the Director of Texans for Public Justice, a
non-profit research organization based in Austin, Texas. I
have served as director of Texas for Public Justice since its
establishment in 1997. Prior to that I was employed by
Public Citizen, Inc. and the Center for New Democracy
and as an employee of those organizations, I have accumu-
lated over 20 years of experience in studying and analyz-
ing campaign financing practices and policy with a focus
on both federal and state campaigns. My curriculum vitae

46a

is attached to this declaration as Exhibit A. I have not
received any compensation for providing this declaration
and expert report.

2. Texans for Public Justice monitors, documents
and analyzes political campaign donation activity of
political candidates and political committees. In July 1999,
Texans for Public Justice began monitoring and gathering
information on the Governor George W. Bush Presidential
Exploratory Committee, Inc. and its successor organiza-
tion, the George W. Bush For President Committee. A
particular focus of our research was the establishment and
activity of the Pioneer fundraising network that was
established by the Bush Exploratory Committee and
functioned as an ongoing activity of the George W. Bush
for President Committee. Since July of 1999, Texans for
Public Justice has produced several reports documenting
the operation of the Pioneer network and detailing the
identities, occupations and economic interests of the Bush
Pioneers.

3. The existence of the Bush Pioneer program first
became public in May 1999, two months after the creation
of Bush’s presidential exploratory committee on March 7,
1999. The program was designed to circumvent the $1,000
limit on individual contributions to the Bush Presidential
Exploratory Committee and the Bush For President
Campaign Committee. The Pioneer program solicited
individual campaign supporters to commit to raising a
minimum of $100,000 for the campaign by reaching out to a
network of personal contacts and encouraging those contacts
to contribute directly to the campaign. To reach their goal of
$100,000 a Pioneer would have to build a network of at least
100 donors who could contribute the $1,000 maximum
amount allowed under law. Each volunteer participant in

47a

the Pioneer program was assigned an identification, or
tracking number, which was to appear on all checks the
individual Pioneer successfully solicited for the campaign.
The Bush campaign monitored the progress of each volun-
teer at it Austin headquarters. In May 1999, when the
existence of the Pioneer program became public, Mr.
Donald Evans, the Bush campaign fundraising chairman,
acknowledged that 150 individuals had signed up for the
Pioneer program, but noted he did not expect all to reach
the $100,000 goal.

4. To build the fundraising network and meet the
campaign’s goal of raising $50 million by the end of 1999,
Bush had courted hundreds of money men who had trav-
eled into Austin to lunch with the Governor either in a
downtown restaurant or at the Governor’s mansion. While
the campaign initially refused to publicly disclose the
identities of the 150 participants in the Pioneer program,
the campaign revealed that Bush had enlisted the help of
an undisclosed number of Republican governors and
Washington lobbyists. Texas-based lobbyist Tom Loeffler
was named as a Pioneer, as was Washington-based lobby-
ist Haley Barbour.

5. Essentially, the Pioneer program is what is
commonly referred to as a “bundling” operation. Bundling
is the term used when supporters of a particular candidate
or campaign assist the campaign in raising money from
their own networks of family, employees, friends, co-
workers, etc. A “bundler” is often a donor that has pledged
or contributed the maximum contribution allowed by law,
but is willing to engage in further fundraising outreach to
their own networks and encourage an unlimited number of
other individuals to contribute to the candidate or cam-
paign. Bundlers, therefore, facilitate the delivery of — and

ften take and receive credit for - amounts of money that
are many times the amount allowed by law for individual
‘ontributions. The practice of “bundling” campaign contnri-
butions and delivering them to candidates or campaigns 1s
not new and is practiced by many modern federal cam-
paigns. However, the Bush Pioneer program elevated this
practice to new levels of sophistication. The practice of
bundling campaign contributions, while contrary to the
spirit of the federal campaign laws limiting individual
contributions to candidates to $1,000 per election, is not
prohibited as long a those who engage in it do not coerce
others to give a campaign contribution.

6. In July of 1999, the campaign revealed further
information about the Pioneer program. Jim Francis,
Director of the Texas Public Safety Commission, served as
the head of the Pioneer program. According to Francis, 115
individuals had reached the goal of bundling $100,000
each. Francis acknowledged there were close to 400 Bush
supporters working toward the $100,000 goal, including
the 115 that already there.

7. The degree to which the Bush Pioneer program
was systemically tracking — and crediting — donors with
contributions exceeding the individual limits, was further
brought to light when a May 27, 1999 memo from Pioneer
and Edison Electric Institute president, Tom Kuhn to
electric utility industry executives became public. The
Kuhn memo, written on Bush campaign committee station-
ary [sic], revealed that the campaign was not only tracking
and crediting individuals for bundling over the limits, but
was tracking bundlers with respect to the industries they
represented. An excerpt from the Kuhn memo:

49a

“My personal thanks to all of you for taking a
leadership role in gathering support for the June
22 reception honoring Governor George W. Bush
... As you know, a very important part of the
campaigns outreach to the business community
is the use of tracking numbers for contributions.
Both Don Evans and Jack Oliver have stressed
the importance of having our industry incorpo-
rate the #1178 tracking number in your fundrais-
ing efforts. Listing your industry's code does not
prevent you, any of your individual solicitors or
your state from receiving credit for soliciting a
contribution. It does ensure that our industry is
credited, and that your progress is listed among
the other business/industry sectors. If you have
any questions about your industry's tracking in-
formation, please do not hesitate to let me know

8. Clearly, the conclusion that can be derived from
the Bush campaign’s own characterization of the program
and the explicit description by Tom Kuhn of the impor-
tance of making sure the proper “codes” were included on
donations so that the individual, state and industry would
receive “credit for soliciting a contribution” from the
campaign’s key staff, must be that some benefit(s) would
accrue to those who delivered the largest amounts or share
of money. If there were no expectation of special access,
rewards, or favors, there would have been no need to
“track” contributions and “credit” them according to the
industries, states and individuals generating them.

9. The Bush campaign made public a list of 115
Pioneers on July 19, 1999. According to the campaign,
these 115 individuals were those who had met the goal of
bundling a minimum of $100,000 in contributions to Bush.
According to campaign spokespersons, individuals who

50a

had not yet fulfilled the goal of reaching the $100,000
mark were not considered Pioneers and their names were
not disclosed. Neither did the campaign publicly disclose
(at the time or anytime subsequently) the total amounts
that Pioneers were credited with raising. This and subse-
quent limited disclosures by the campaign were criticized
by TPJ. We believed the public had the right to know the
total amounts Pioneers were being credited with raising,
and the right to know the names and amounts credited to
any individuals the campaign might be tracking regard-
less of whether they had reached the magic $100,000
number.

10. Periodic disclosures of those considered to be
Pioneers according the campaign’s definition resulted in
the release of 226 names. In July 2000, TPJ published an
analysis of the occupations and economic interests of 212
Pioneers whose names had been disclosed through June
2000. The report concluded that the ranks of the Pioneers
were dominated by corporate executives and lobbyists. The
report classified the known Pioneers by their business and
primary economic or ideological interests, tracked the total
money each spent on politics, and provided individual
profiles of each. The major findings of the report were:

¢ 133 Pioneers were business executives, 16 of
whom George W. Bush appointed to state gov-
ernment posts.

¢ The 212 identified Pioneers, who by definition
had raised a minimum of $21.2 million for
Bush’s presidential effort, had also personally
contributed an additional $7.1 million to fed-
eral candidates and PACs since the ‘96 elec-
tion cycle.

5la

* When the 212 were identified by their pri-
mary economic interest or profession 44 of
the Pioneers were classified as Lawyers &
Lobbyists, 38 represented the Financial sec-
tor, 28 were from the Energy & Natural Re-
sources sector (dominated by oil and gas), 24
were from the Real Estate sector, and 23 were
classified as representing Miscellaneous
Businesses.

11. Members and/or potential members of the Pio-
neer network enjoyed special access to Governor Bush and
the campaign, prior to the officiel announcement that he
would pursue the presidency, and during the campaign
itself. Governor Bush met with Pioneers and future or
potential Pioneers on a number of occasions as docu-
mented in the media:

* On December 18, 1998 a group gathered at
the Governors Mansion to discuss the cam-
paign. That group included California financier
Brad Freeman and California agribusiness ty-
coon Howard Leach, both later designated by
the campaign as Pioneers.

¢ In the Spring of 1999, Bush met in Austin
with Christine Toretti, head of Pennsylvania
drilling company who pledged to deliver $1
million to the primary campaign yet was
never designated a Pioneer.

* At least seven “Pioneers” stayed at least one
night in the Texas governor’s mansion be-
tween February 1, 1999 and March of 2000.
These Pioneers included Don Jordan of Re-
lient Energy, investment banker Brad Free-
man, Craig Stapleton of Marsh and McLellan,
and Roland Betts of Chelsea Piers Manage-
ment.

12. Many of the Pioneers were rewarded with
government appointments. A report released by Texan [sic]
for Public Justice on March 5, 2002 shows that 43 of the
publicly named Pioneers had received presidential ap-
pointments of some kind. Again, by definition, these 43
Pioneer appointees delivered more than $4.3 million to

Bush’s presidential race. Pioneers who received Bush

52a

According to the Center for Responsive Poli-
tics, in June 1999, Charles Cawley, president
of MBNA America Bank, hosted a dinner at
his summer home in Kennebunkport, Maine.
More than 200 guests gathered to help un-
derwrite the presidential campaign of George
W. Bush, the party’s guest of honor. Over the
next year, Cawley would personally raise at
least $100,000 for the Bush campaign, quali-
fying him as a Pioneer, helping to secure
MBNA’ slot as Bush’s single top contribution
with more than $240,000 in contributions
from its employees during 1999-2000.

On November 15, 1999, the Bush campaign
hosted a gathering of 300 top fundraisers in
Austin, TX, 150 of whom had been designated
“Pioneers.”

August 16, 2002, Bush held a gathering at his
Crawford, TX residence for the “Pioneer”
network.

appointments include:

19 U.S. ambassadors to countries from Aus-
tria to Uruguay;

Five members of the Energy Department
Transition Team that first envisioned Bush's
supply-side energy policy (including ex-Enron
CEO Ken Lay); and

53a

¢ Two seats on the President’s Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board.

13. It is impossible to determine exactly how much
money the Pioneer network was responsible for raising for
the Bush campaign, given the fact that the campaign has
not publicly disclosed that information nor produced that
information for this litigation. At a bare minimum, relying
on the Bush campaign’s limited public disclosure, the
Pioneers were responsible for raising $22.6 million, or
approximately one-fifth of the private money raised by the
campaign. (Based on the campaign’s public release of the
names of 224 Pioneers who achieved their “goal” of raising
$100,000.)

14. It is likely that the Pioneer network raised many
millions more than the acknowledged $22.6 million.
According to documents produced by the Bush for Presi-
dent Committee for this litigation, the campaign was
tracking a total of 431 individuals as part of the Pioneer
program. This means there were at least 207 individuals
who pledged to raise $100,000 but apparently fell short of —
the goal, or achieved the goal but were not disclosed by the
campaign. It is also quite likely that several, if not many
of the Pioneers raised well more than $100,000 for the
campaign. Again, documents produced by the Bush for
President Committee for this litigation reveals that 34
Pioneers pledged to raise more than $100,000 with 29 of
them committing to raise $250,000 or more and three
pledging to raise more than $1,000,000. When considering
that the campaign did not disclose how much the “under-
achieving” and “overachieving” Pioneers delivered, it is
reasonable to speculate that the total amount of money
raised by the Pioneer bundling operation may have
reached $50,000,000 or more.

15. The increased limits on individual contributions
called for under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA) would undoubtedly increase the ability of
elite fundraisers, such as those who comprise the Bush
Pioneers, to deliver larger amounts of money to political
campaigns. With those larger amounts of funds, would
likely come more access and potential influence over public
policy and governmental actions. 1 believe it is reasonable
to speculate that under the more indulgent contribution
limits of BCRA, the same Bush Pioneer network might
have been able to provide the campaign with many mil-
lions of dollars more than it delivered for the 2000 election
effort. It is not unrealistic to speculate that, under BCRA,
the Pioneers would be able to double the amount of contri-
butions delivered in 2000, meaning that a relatively small
handful of citizens could be responsible for delivering
anywhere from $45 million up to $100 million to a federal
presidential effort - enough money to fund an entire

campaign.

16. The sources that I have relied on in forming my
opinions are attached as Exhibits B-Q.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
the United States of America that the foregoing is true and
correct.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0673%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
