# Jurisdictional Statement — National Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0671%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement - **Published:** January 1, 2003 - **Citation:** 539 U.S. 975 ## Text AN. 02173838 MY 262008 OFFICE OF THE CLERE No. 02- In The Supreme Court of the United States NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., ET AL., Appellants, Vv. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, =T AL., Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia Jurisdictional Statement James Bopp, Jr. Counsel of Record Richard E. Coleson Thomas J. Marzen JAMES MADISON CENTER FOR FREE SPEECH Bopp, COLESON & BOSTROM 1 South 6th Street Terre Haute, IN 47807-3510 812/232-2434 May 28, 2003 Counsel for JMC Appellants SS Questions Presented 1. Whether the prohibition of § 101 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) on the solicitation, receipt, redirection, or use of “soft money” by any national political party for any communication that “promotes or supports . . . or attacks or opposes” a federal candidate, violates the First and Fifth Amendment and principles of federalism. 2. Whether the prohibition on federal officeholders and candidates from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending “soft money” contained in BCRA § 101 violates the First Amendment. 3. Whether the prohibition on state officeholders and candidates from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending “soft money” in connection with an election for federal office in BCRA §101 violates the First Amendment. 4. Whether the backup “electioneering communication” definition at BCRA§ 201, or its construction by the district court, violates the First Amendment. 5. Whether the requirements that “disbursements” and “expenditures” be reported as occurring when contracted for, rather than when made, BCRA §§ 201 and 212, are justiciable and violate the First Amendment. 6. Whether District Court injunction should extend to activities outside the District of Columbia. 7. Whether BCRA § 403(b), permitting members of Congress to intervene, and the permitted intervention by Intervenor-Defendants without regard to whether they have Article III standing, violates the Constitution. Parties to the Proceedings This jurisdictional statement is filed on behalf of the following Plaintiffs-Appellants represented by the James Madison Center for Free Speech (JMC Appellants): U.S. Representative Mike Pence, Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor, Libertarian National Committee, Inc. (LNC), Club for Growth, Inc. (CFG), Indiana Family Institute, Inc. (IFI), National Right to Life Committee, Inc. (NRLC), National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund (NRL Ed Fund), and National Right to Life Political Action Committee (NRL PAC).' As to the appeal of the denial of the Madison Center Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment herein, Trevor M. Southerland, and Barret Austin O’ Brock were also plaintiffs below and are appellants along with the previously listed JMC Appellants.’ Plaintiffs below not represented by the Madison Center were U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, former U.S. Representa- tive Bob Bar, American Civil Liberties Union, Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., Associated Builders and Contractors Political Action Committee, Center for Individual Freedom, National Right to Work Committee, 6-Plus Associa- tion, Inc., Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., U.S. English d/b/a/ ProENGLISH, Thomas McInerney. ‘Withdrawn Plaintiffs below are Alabama Republican Execu- tive Committee, Libertarian Party of Illinois, Inc., DuPage Political Action Council, Jefferson County Republican Executive Committee, Christian Coalition of America, Inc., and Martin Connors. ?The Madison Center represented these two minors, who would be appellees as to their successful challenge to the ban on contribu- tions by minors to candidates or political party committees. Mr. Southerland will become 18 years of age on May 28, 2003. . il Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants, Appellees, herein, are the Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Communication Commission (FCC), John D. Ashcroft, in his capacity as Attorney General of the United States, the United States Department of Justice; and the United States of America, U.3. Senator John McCain, U.S. Senator Russell Feingold, U.S. Representative Christopher Shays, U.S. Representative Martin Meehan, U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, and U.S. Senator James Jeffords. Defendants in consolidated cases: (in addition to those named above) David W. Mason, Ellen L. Weintraub, Danny L. McDonald, Bradley A. Smith, Scott E. Thomas, and Michael E. Toner, in their official capacities as FEC Commissioners. Plaintiffs in consolidated cases: * National Rifle Ass'n v. FEC, No. 02-581 — National Rifle Association of America (NRA) and NRA Political Victory Fund ¢ Echols v. FEC, No. 02-633 — Emily Echols, Daniel Solid, Hannah McDow, Isaac McDow, Jessica Mitchell, and Zachary White. * Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, No. 02-751 — Chamber of Commerce of the United States, U.S. Chamber Political Action Committee, and National Association of Manufac- turers (Plaintiff National Association of Wholesaler- Distributors withdrew. ) ¢ National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FEC, No. 02-753 — National Association of Broadcasters ¢ AFL-CIO v. FEC, No. 02-754 — AFL-CIO and AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education and Political Contribu- tions Paul v. FEC, No. 02-781 — U.S. Representative Ron Paul, Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners of America Political Victory Fund, Realcampaignreform.org, Citizens United, Citizens United Political Victory Fund, Michael Cloud, and Clara Howell Republican National Committee v. FEC, No. 02-874 — Republican National Committee, (RNC), Robert Michael Duncan, former Treasurer, current General Counsel, and Member of the RNC, the Republican Party of Colorado, the Republican Party of New Mexico, the Republican Party of Ohio, and the Dallas County (lowa) Republican County Central Committee California Democratic Party v. FEC, No. 02-875 — California Democratic Party, Art Torres, Yolo County Democratic Central Committee, California Republican Party, Shawn Steel, Timothy Morgan, Barbara Alby, Santa Cruz County Republican Central Committee, and Douglas Boyd, Jr. Adams v. FEC, No. 02-877 — Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, Carrie Bolton, Cynthia Brown, Derek Cressman, Victoria Fitzgerald, Anurada Joshi, Peter Kostmayer, Nancy Russell, Kate Seely-Kirk, Rose Taylor, Stephanie Wilson, California Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), The Fannie Lou Hamer Project, and Association of Community Organizers for Reform Now Thompson v. FEC, No. 02881 — U.S. Representatives iv Corporate Disclosure Statement None of the appellants has a parent corporation and no publicly held company owns ten percent or more of the stock of any of the appellants. Rule 29.6. Rs. 6 bcc dedecensededabeeses i FIED dcccocsescccsecessussoosens ii Corporate Disclosure Statement ..................... v WD nccoccnueuscdsdnceseosessosesnes vi SEED covcecocccdcnccedéssbcccecens viii SE cnccdccocccccecseséeseeseusteteseses 1 Se caccccecccedeccecesscceunncccocssestes 1 Constitutional & Statutory Provisions ................. 1 BEE Pccceccocesddcccsccecedceeséoss 2 Wc ccccéstsccedscsnsocscccecesseces 2 The Uniqueness of JMC Appellants ............... 5 Questions Presented Are Substantial ................. 16 Oppose Federal Candidates ..................... 16 Federal Officeholders and Candidates. ......... 18 State Officeholders and Candidates ............ 18 The Truncated Backup Electioneering Communication” PD cccccccéeseséesesseesecesesaseseese 18 Disclosure Requirements on “Electioneering Communi- cations” and Independent Expenditures. ........... 22 Extent of the District Court's Injunction .......... 223 Article III Standing of Congressional Intervenors 24 SD bneccoccusetucdédbcdsecconssceescceees 28 Main Appeal Appendix A, Notice of Appeal ............-----055: la Appendix B, Opinion of District Court ............... 3a Appendix C, U.S. Const. art. 1,§4 ........-...00005: 4a Appendix D, U.S. Const. amend-I ............-554+: Sa Appendix E, U.S. Const. amend V ...........--.--+: 6a Appendix F, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 : pedoceeseeedonseesseedssuddeesetesedeoosess a Denial of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Appendix G, Notice of Appeal .............-----+: 69a Appendix H, Opinion of District Court .............. Tla Appendix I, Order of District Court ................. 83a vii Table of Authorities Cases Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 Ee ee 25 Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688 PED pb cdcdbrdcscdcctndsedéossduaness 27 Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (ist Cir. 2000) ........... 26 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) .... 15 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) .......... 24 Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, SG Cer SEGUE BOOED cccccccccccccccecces 21 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ........ 2, 3, 16, 18-22 Building and Constr. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Reich, 40 CE EEE cooccsecsececesoceescs 27 California Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 2003 WL 21027288 (9th Cir. 2003)... 2.2.2... eee ee eee 22 Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187 (Sth Cir. SEED Ceddcncedocceccesedenssscesenoessaness 20 Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F3d. 185 (1997) ......... 26 Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) .... 2... 6. ee ee 16 Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000) ... 2.0.0... cee ee 20 Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, Pe PE cc ceccsvesecccescecssesesss 17 Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 26-27 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) .............. 25 Faucher v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468 (ist PEED Seccdddduhecdadscoisscdacceenéeseees 21 FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th PRED hn sadedddbdccesddedsesccdseeeneneeees 21 FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) ......... 21 FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 RR RS acai A ee: 13, 15, 21 FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., Se EE occ cnncedunécdsceesoosenvess 16 FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. , 647 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. N.Y. 1986) .. 0... 6.6 eee eee 23 FEC v. Pub. Citizen, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D. Ga. TOUED cccccccsevcccccccceeecccocoooeqesesoese 23 - s PPTTTTITITITTTTTTTT TTT 21 Hoffman v. Jeffords, 175 F. Supp.2d 49 (D.D.C. 2001) ... 26 lowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963 (8th See SESE weccosescncavecccccesocesecucessece 21 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 64 (1973) .......... 25 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .. 25-26 Mausolf v. Babbit, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996) ........ 27 National Credit Union Admin. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 1146 (1998) ..... 0.6.6.6 c eens 25 Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. I eal pe hee en eee eS 27 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) ........-.020000. 25 Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) 0.0... cece cece cece cece 23 Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ........ 26 Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1996)... 0... eee eee 27 United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188 (2d EEEEEEED cocovcesdeceseceessoncesessoecesos? 27 DEED Socscdoccocenccsoesoceseonneesse< we a Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d POD EPEEE EEE ccccceesesssonccesececcesess 20 Virginia Soc'y for Human Life v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379 (4th GR EE 6 oS ed cdcedcdescdecdeseddiueseedes 20, 23 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 49 (1975) . 20... cc cee 25 Yniguez v. State of Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.1991) . 27 Constitution, Statutes, Regulations & Rules DO BI i ivndniiddncdcnevieinsiascsdes 24 I IIE oii iiicticccvedecenceteineees 23 RO cut sasdsadigtasasandiauel i, 16-18 Ren ee i, 3, 4, 14, 19, 22 CPLR AS ER ICIS PDS OED 4,19 ESTEE PP eae A aL E 3, 4, 18, 19 0 RR len f ARPS RE PR eke 3, 19 ETE PPLE IDEA A PONS i, 4, 22 I So osncdacduanascvennneadenscuccans 4 onc cciccsnniidaddentacanabeakaaes 4 ERE A ERS Pig Senki MEM soi 4,19 RIP Se) eRe BRE AB corte 4 EEE Ee Eber hea rye 4 LORS I AEE,» MMA 4 PERSE cecnccceccensddchecccecneséane 24, 25 NO 0 00:06 c0cecbccvesnsedncdecscbecenceess 4 PRED icbucticndduuébencadsansceves 24 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92- Seay G0 BUR, SQTSTED 0 cc cccccvecccce 2, 3, 6, 7, 14, 19 Re SUD Secscaccccccuaccnaceessccs 8, 10, 12, 13 PEED ccdeddcessececancnrencesesececeese 8,14 Other Authorities U.S. Const. amend.I ............. i, 2, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24 ee es GUE, Fhe c ceccnewcccsctcccsteces 2, 17, 18 Se A GE TINS ccc ciccccseccnccscccesecss 2 a SGI EBS cccccccccseccccccnscescccccess l U.S. Const. art. Hl, §2,cl. 1 ............ i, vii, 1, 5, 24-27 xii Opinions Below The district court’s opinions have not yet been reported. See Appendix (App.) 3a. JMC Appellants’ Notice of Appeal is reprinted at App. la-2a. Their Second Notice of Appeal is reprinted at App. 69a. Jurisdiction The district court issued judgment on May 1, 2003. Appeal is direct. BCRA § 403(a)(1). JMC Appellants noticed appeal on May 7, 2003. On May 19, 2003, the district court deniéd Madison Center Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on May 19, 2003, and their Second Notice of Appeal as to this issue was filed on May 28, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Constitutional & Statutory Provisions BCRA is reprinted at App. 7a-68a. Article I, § 4, of the U.S. Constitution is at App. 4a. Article Ill, §2, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution provides: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; — to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; — to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; — to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; — to Controversies between two or more States; — between a State and Citizens of another State; — between Citizens of different States, — between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. The First Amendment to the Constitution is at App. Sa. 2 The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is at App. 6a. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. Statement of the Case The Litigation This case involves multiple challenges to BCRA, which itself amends the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455). FECA set limits on the amount of money that individuals, political parties, and political committees may contribute to candidates, i.e., limits on “hard money.” BCRA raises the contribution limits on individuals to candidates and political parties and the amount individuals may contribute, in aggregate, to all candidates, political committees, and political party committees. JMC Appellants do not challenge these FECA or BCRA “hard money” limits. Many of the restrictions contained in the 1974 amendments to the FECA were challenged in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, this Court recognized that contributions and expenditures involved the First Amendment rights of free speech and association. /d at 19-23. At the same time, the Court recognized a compelling governmental interest in “prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” that would justify limits on contributions to candidates. /d. at 25. As a result, the Buckley Court upheld FECA’s contribution limits to candidates, but stuck down its limits on campaign 3 expenditures. Jd. at 24-59. In the course of so deciding, this Court carefully distinguished between funds used for “express advocacy” (communications which expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate by use of explicit words of advocacy) and “issue advocacy” (communications on issues of public concern that do not contain express advocacy). /d. at 44. BCRA contains four titles that significantly expand the reach of FECA and that contain elements subject to challenge in this litigation. Title I prohibits national political party committees for using money raised in compliance with state law, but not in compliance with federal law (“soft money”), for any purpose and from transferring it to any other entity, including state and local party committees. It forbids state and local party committees from spending non-federal money for any “federal election activity,” which includes voter registration, voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, and generic campaign activity when there is a federal candidate on the ballot, including advertising with certain references to federal candidates. It generally forbids federal officeholders and_ candidates from participating in raising or spending any non- federal funds, for themselves or others for “federal election activity.” It bars state candidates from using non-federal funds for communications regarding candidates for federal office, even if those communications do not contain express advocacy. Title II of BCRA, §§ 201 and 204, forbids corporations, unions, and entities using monies donated by unions and corporations from disbursing funds for “electioneering communications” — which § 203 defines as any broadcast advertisement within 30 days of a primary and 60 days of a general election that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.” Section 203 includes a fallback definition of 4 “electioneering communications” that includes any broadcast advertising at any time that “promotes,” “supports,” “attacks,” or opposes a federal candidate and is “suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.” Disclosures to the FEC are also required of all persons who spend $10,000 on “electioneering communications.” Sections 201 and 212 of Title II also impose disclosure requirements on those who enter into contracts to disburse funds for electioneering communication, regardless of whether communication occurs. Section 202 treats coordinated disbursements for electioneering communications as contributions to candidates. Section 213 requires political parties to choose whether to make independent or coordinated expenditures on behalf of a candidate. Title Ill of BCRA, § 318, forbids minors from contributing “hard money” to any federal candidate and either “hard” or “soft” money to a political party committee. Section 305 conditions securing the lowest rates for broadcast advertising for federal candidates on certification that other candidates will not be referred to in the advertisement or that the advertisement will include a specified statement or identification. Section 311 requires detailed identification of sponsors of express advocacy or “electioneering communications.” Sections 304, 316, and 319 increase the limitations on contributions and coordinated expenditures for candidates who have opponents with certain levels of personal funds in their campaigns. Title V of BCRA, § 504, requires broadcasters to collect and disclose records of requests to buy broadcast time for communications “relating to any political matter of national importance,” regardless whether the communications are made. After BCRA was signed into law, eleven complaints were filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the constitutionality of multiple 5 provisions of BCRA. The cases were consolidated under BCRA § 403 before a three-judge panel. Expedited discovery was ordered; witnesses filed written statements and were cross- examined without immediate judicial oversight. Expedited briefing ensued, oral argument was held on December 4 and 5, 2002; the district court issued its Final Judgment on May 1, 2003, upholding and striking down various provisions of BCRA. JMC Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on May 19, 2003. JMC Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal as to the judgment on May 7, 2003, and their Notice of Appeal as to the denial of Madison Center Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on May 28, 2003. The Uniqueness of JMC Appellants This Jurisdictional Statement is filed on behalf of JMC Appellants with special characteristics that render their standing unquestionable. They include a unique minority national political party, a federal officeholder and candidate, a state officeholder and candidate, a broad spectrum of nonprofit issue advocacy groups, and a political action committee. Their wide range assures that, on nearly all issues, a JMC Appellant has Article III standing to challenge the particular BCRA provisions in question. Particular details about four of these Appellants highlights their uniqueness and clear standing, describing the conduct in which they engage that would violate BCRA. Libertarian National Committee (LNC) is the governing body of the Libertarian Party at the national level.’ The LNC is a nonprofit corporation that seeks to advance the principle that all individuals have the right to exercise sole dominion over their lives and have the right to live in whatever manner they *The Libertarian National Committee is the only national political party committee in McConnell v. FEC, thus the only party with standing to challenge BCRA’s many restrictions on the conduct of national political parties. 6 choose, so long as they do not forcibly interfere with the equal right of others to live in whatever manner they choose. The impact of BCRA on the Libertarian National Committee is significantly greater than on the Democratic National Committee (DNC) or Republican National Committee (RNC). The Libertarian Party is much smaller than either of the major parties. In size and administrative sophistication, the LNC is similar to a typical state affiliate of the RNC or DNC. The LNC does not seek, accept, or use any federal funds to conduct its campaigns. The general administrative burdens imposed by FECA are the same on all political parties, regardless of size, so that the LNC must expend a relatively higher percentage of its resources on compliance with FECA than the RNC or DNC — a situation exacerbated by BCRA. Moreover, the LNC has less relative expertise and sophistication, a greater likelihood that it will commit errors in administering the requirements of FCA, and as the result of BCRA — all to the further relative detriment of the LNC. Considerable administrative expenses will be incurred and changes in the infrastructure of the Libertarian national and state parties will also be required in order to comply with BCRA. Only 10-15% of LNC funds are placed in its “soft money” account, a far lower percentage than for the RNC or DNC, which place more than half their funds in “soft money” accounts. At preset, the LNC has three principle sources of non-federal money: | ) list rental fees, 2) dues paid through state affiliates and forwarded from the state affiliates to the LNC, and 3) advertising in the LNC’s newspaper, the Libertarian Party® News, and elsewhere. Only 7 of the 51 state affiliates of the national Libertarian Party have registered as political committees with the FEC, subject to FECA requirements. Very 7 littke money received by LNC is from any corporate source (if funds from renting lists or advertising in the Libertarian Party® News are discounted) or from large individual contributions. In 2002, for example, only one individual contribution exceeded $20,000. During the past six years, no more than 4 donors to the LNC have exceeded this limit in any one year. No federal officeholder has been a candidate of the Libertarian Party, and no candidate of the Libertarian Party has ever won a race for federal office. Libertarian Party federal candidates know that they have only a remote chance to win federal office, and they use their candidacies for running educational/issue advocacy campaigns that concentrate on advancing libertarian principles. Libertarian Party federal candidate campaigns are also focused on fostering party growth and gaining and maintaining ballot access in order to assure that there will be an electoral forum in which federal candidates might advocate libertarian principles. The Libertarian Party also sometimes raises issues without any express reference to any Libertarian Party federal candidate when major party candidates are not addressing them. The LNC has in the past and intends in the future to engage in conduct that would violate BCRA. It solicits, receives, and uses non-federal funds to advocate issues, and, as a means to this end, supports Libertarian Party candidates in campaigns for federal and state elective office — although no Libertarian Party candidate has ever been elected to federal or statewide office. It solicits, receives, and uses non-federal funds to finance issue advocacy communications. It transfers non-federal funds to state-affiliated parties that have in the past and intend in the future to receive such funds. It communicates with candidates for federal office and with federal officeholders and spends issues supported by federal candidates and federal officeholders. The LNC makes both independent and coordinated expenditures on behalf of it’s candidates for state and federal office, after the party’s candidates are nominated, and transfers funds between national, state, and local party to LR.C. § 527 and LR.C. § 501(c) organizations that make expenditures and disbursements in connection with federal elections. The Lil ‘an National C , —_ hershi Organization that requires the regular payment of dues from members to the LNC. Dues are frequently paid to state- affiliated Libertarian Parties, with a portion to be distributed to the Libertarian National Committee, so that those who pay dues may be members of both the state and national parties. Dues are often paid by one person on behalf of another, as a wife might pay for a husband, and are often paid with delays in forwarding them to the LNC. In these circumstances, the funds are appropriately deposited in state affiliates’ “soft money” accounts. Under BCRA, these funds may not be transferred to the LNC, so that members who pay dues in such a manner must be denied membership in the Libertarian National Committee. Further, the LNC is substantially sustained by non- federal funds dues transfers from state-affiliated parties to the LNC and by purchases of literature and other educational materials from the LNC by state-affiliated parties. By forbidding such non-federal current structure of the Libertarian Nationa! Committee as a hershi tae The LNC has in the past and intends in the future to use non-federal funds to finance its ballot access drives and to finance all of its national conventions, which are held every other year. Libertarian Party conventions, held in years when there are no federal presidential elections, are solely devoted to discussion and advocacy of issues; no candidates for public 9 office are nominated for or selected to run as Libertarian Party candidates at these conventions. Bill Pryor is presently the Attorney General of the State of Alabama and, unti! he is confirmed as a federal judge — a position for which he has been nominated, but for which he has not been confirmed — he will be a candidate in the next election for the office of Alabama Attorney General or for some other State office in Alabama. As he has in the past, General Pryor intends in the future to make public communications that refer to clearly defined candidates for federal office and that promote or support candidates or attack or oppose a candidate for that office, including communications that do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of any federal candidate. General Pryor has received and intends in the future to receive non-federal funds contributions from the Republican National State Elections Committee, a division of the Republican National Committee. As a candidate (and as a candidate in association with or in a group of candidates for state or local office or of individuals holding state or local office), he has in the past and intends in the future to spend funds lawfully raised under the laws of the State of Alabama, by BCRA, for the purpose of: (a) making public communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and that promote or support a candidate or attack or oppose a candidate for that office, including communications that do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a federal candidate; (b) engaging in voter registration activities conducted within 120 days of a federal election, and (c) engaging in voter identification, get-out-the-vote, and generic 10 campaign activities conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for federal office is on the ballot.‘ The Club for Growth, Inc. (CFG) is a nationwide ideological membership organization with approximately 5,000 members dedicated to advancing public policies that promote economic growth which is tax-exempt under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code. The mission of CFG is to identify for its members the candidates for elective office who believe in these ideals, to monitor their performance in elected office, and to help finance their elections through CFG’s connected PAC. CFG also helps finance strategic issue campaigns to advance its policy goals. In pursuit of these goals, CFG would violate BCRA in several ways. CFG regularly makes disbursements for the direct costs of producing and airing “electioneering communications” in excess of $10,000 in a calendar year that: (a) refer to clearly identified candidates for federal office, (b) are made within 60 days before general, special, and runoff elections for the offices sought by the candidates and within 30 days before primary elections, and (c) are targeted to relevant electorates. CFG regularly talks with candidates about their positions on the issues in interviews and forums. On a regular and recurring basis, CFG (1) consults with both incumbent and challenger candidates on their positions on issues, (2) does “electioneering ‘General Pryor is the only plaintiff in McConnell v. FEC who complained against provis ‘ons of BCRA that forbid state candidates forbid raising or using non-federal money to refer (without express advocacy) to federal candidates or for registration, get-out-the-vote, and other generic election activities. Furthermore, General Pryor is the only state public official subject to provisions of BCRA that to a clearly identified candidaie for federal office. communications,” and (3) publishes communications with information about candidates’ positions on issues. Some of these communications are done without any communication with any candidate and some are done after a communication with a candidate. CFG is presently affected by BCRA. On May 13, 2003, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee filed a complaint against CFG alleging that CFG had violated BCRA by broadcasting an “electioneering communication,” under the lower court’s truncated backup definition that prohibits any broadcast communication that “promotes or supports . . . or attacks or opposes” a candidate during the time that the backup definition was in effect. Letter from Robert F. Bauer & Marc E. Elias, Counsel for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), to Lawrence Norton, FEC General Counsel (May 13, 2003). The advertisement at issue was broadcast in South Dakota and told listeners to urge U.S. Senator Tom Daschle to support President Bush’s pending tax cut plan. The complaint on behalf of the DSCC alleges that the advertisement “attacks [Daschle] for opposing the President's ‘tax cut plan,”” in violation of the truncated backup definition. This advertisement is part of a broader effort by CFG to gain public and Congressional support for the President’s tax cut plan.” ‘CFG has been running broadcast advertisements in support of President Bush’s proposed tax cut, one of which has become the subject of the complaint by the DSCC to the FEC described. An advertisement was also run in Ohio depicting Ohio Senator George Voinovich, during the 18 days that the truncated backup definition was in effect, and has the following text: President Kennedy cut income taxes and the economy soared. President Reagan cut taxes more, and created fifteen million 12 National Right to Life Committee, Inc. (NRLC) is a 501(c)(4) corporation whose purpose is to promote respect for the worth and dignity of all human life from conception to natural death. NRLC’s and its affiliated organizations’ conduct would violate BCRA in several ways. NRLC regularly makes disbursements for the direct costs of producing and airing “electioneering communications” in excess of $10,000 in a calendar year that: (a) refer to clearly identified candidates for federal office, (b) are made within 60 days before general, special, and runoff elections for the offices sought by the candidates and within 30 days before primary of political parties with authority to nominate candidates for the offices sought by the candidates, and (c) are targeted to relevant electorates. On a regular and recurring basis, NRLC: (a) lobbies candidate legislators on legislation, (b) consults with both incumbent and challenger candidates on their positions on issues, (c) engages in “electioneering communications,” and (d) new jobs. President Bush knows tax cuts create jobs, and that helps balance the budget. But Senator George Voinovich opposes the president. Ohio has lost thousands of jobs, and president Bush has a plan to help. Tell George Voinovich to support the Kennedy, Reagan, Bush tax policy that will bring jobs back to Ohio. Senator Voinovich is a candidate for federal office. While CFG believes that its advertisement is “neutral” and lawful, it depicts a federal candidate and could be considered by someone (as happened with the DSCC complaint to the FEC regarding the South. Dakota ad), as not “neutral” under the truncated backup definition of BCRA. 13 These communications are done both with and without communications with candidates. At present, NRLC is in the midst of Congressional legislative battles to ban human cloning, pass the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, and pursue other legislative interests. As part of these campaigns, NRLC plans to run broadcast advertisements in the Congressional districts of key members of Congress, naming the members of Congress, many or all of whom are candidates (i.c., have transacted $5,000 in “contributions” or “expenditures”), and could be viewed as attacking/opposing their positions on these legislative issues. The ads will be paid for with general corporate funds and will be similar to the AFL-CIO advertisement, “No Two Way,” that Judge Leorr found “not neutral”and thus contrary to BCRA because “it attacks [the candidate’s] position on the federal budget.” Leon Memorandum Opinion at 92. National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund (NRL Ed Fund) is an internal § 501(c)(3) fund of NRLC. It qualifies as an “MCFL-type” organization under FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). NRL Ed Fund has spent, and intends to do so again, more than $10,000 in a calendar year on broadcast communications that mention no candidate but advocate for or against issues that are hotly contested in contemporaneous political campaigns on which candidates running in the same geographic area have taken a position. Under the vague alternative definition of “electioneering communication,” which examines whether a “communication ... promotes or supports” or “attacks or opposes a candidate,” § 201(a), it is unclear whether such conduct would be considered an “electioneering communication.” National Right to Life Political Action Committee (NRL PAC) is aconnected § 527 fund of NRLC that is registered with the FEC as a political action committee subject to the FECA. 14 NRL PAC regularly makes contracts for independent expenditure communications in federal elections days, weeks, and months in advance of the time the actual independent expenditures are made. NRL PAC has suffered harassment and interference with contractual relationships as a result of federal candidates learning about arrangements with broadcasters to air independent expenditure in opposition to these candidates. NRL PAC intends to continue making independent expenditures, but its freedom of expression is burdened by the necessity of reporting them when contracts are made instead of when the independent expenditure is made.° Mike Pence is the U. S. Representative from the Second Congressional District of the State of Indiana, first elected in 2000.He is an Assistant Majority Whip, Chairman of the Small Business Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform and Oversight, and serves on the Judiciary and Agriculture Committees. Representative Pence has raised, assisted to raise, and wishes to continue to raise and to assist in raising funds for Appellant Indiana Family Institute, Inc. (IFI), and he has communicated and wishes to continue to communicate with IFI with regard to raising and assisting in raising funds for IFI — conduct that would violate BCRA.’ Indiana Family Instituie, Inc. (IFI), is an Indiana non- profit corporation that qualifies as an “MCFL-type” organization under FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986), and it qualifies as an “expressive association” °NRL PAC is the only Plaintiff in McConnell v. FEC that makes independent expenditures subject to BCRA. "U.S. Representative Mike Pence is the only plaintiff in McConnell v. FEC to challenge provisions of FEC that torbid federal candidates from raising funds for entities involved in federal election activities, as defined by BCRA. “15 as described in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). IFI is dedicated to encouraging and invigorating Indiana families by offering them time-proven solutions to problems which harm the family, the church, and society. Over 10,000 Indiana residents receive IFI publications and many hear IF1 radio programs and commentaries throughout the State of Indiana. IFI has made and intends to make disbursements for the direct costs of producing and airing “electioneering communications” in excess of $10,000 that: (a) refer to clearly identified candidates for federal office, (b) are made within 60 days before general, special, and runoff elections for the offices sought by the candidates and within 30 days before primary elections, preference elections, and conventions and caucuses of political parties with authority to nominate candidates for the offices sought by the candidates, and (c) are targeted to relevant electorates. IFI also: (a) lobbies candidate legislators on legislation, (b) consults with both incumbent and challenger candidates on their positions on issues, (c) engages in “electioneering communications,” and (d) publishes printed materials, including voter guides. Some of these communications are done: (a) without any communication with any candidate, (b) after communication with a candidate, and (c) done with the agreement and/or formal collaboration of a candidate. Appellant U.S. Representative Mike Pence has raised end intends to continue to raise and to assist in raising funds for IF1; IFI has communicated and will continue to communicate with Representative Pence with regard to raising and assisting in raising funds for IFI.* *IFI is the only Plaintiff in McConnell v. FEC to complain against provisions of BCRA that forbid federal candidates from raising non-federal money for entities engaged in federal election 16 Questions Presented Are Substantial Raising or Using “Soft Money” By National Political Party Committees to Promote, Support, Attack, or Oppose Federal Candidates While the district court held unconstitutional most of the soft money provisions of BCRA (§ 101), it upheld its prohibitions on “soft money” solicited, received, redirected, or used by national, state, or local political committees that “promotes or supports . . . or attacks or opposes” a federal candidate. Section 101 violates the First Amendment. It restricts the freedom of speech and association in a manner that exceeds the contribution and expenditure limitations at issue in Buckley. It directly restricts speech, and it restricts the right of national political party committees to associate with officeholders, such, it should properly be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981). Under this standard of review, § 101 cannot survive scrutiny. The only interest that this Court has recognized to justify restrictions in the context of campaign finance is in reducing apparent or actual corruption. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985). Special restrictions on political party committees cannot be justified since there are no “special dangers” of corruption associated with political parties.” Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996). Moreover, use of campaign funds bear only an “attenuated” relationship to corruption unless there the funds are used “exclusively” to elect a candidate. /d. In any event, § 101 is not activities. 17 narrowly drawn. Even if there is a constitutionally cognizable compelling interest served by § 101, Congress might simply have restricted the amount of non-federal money raised rather than entirely banning its use. Insofar as BCRA purports to regulate state election activities, the also violates the Tenth Amendment by subsuming powers reserved to the States. BCRA unconstitutionally interferes with state election activities if they even indirectly and remotely can be said to impact on federal elections in a manner that cannot be reconciled with our federal system. Further, by unjustifiably discriminating against political parties, § 101 violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Political party committees are entirely forbidden from using or raising non-federal money for any number of purposes - including specifically for communications to promote, attack, support, or oppose federal candidates. But all other citizens’ groups are permitted to continue to raise and use nonfederal money for these purposes. This makes no constitutional sense when political parties have already been deemed to pose no “special dangers.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996). Finally, the terms used by § 101 to restrict freedom of speech — forbidding a communication that “promotes or supports . . . or attacks or opposes” a federal candidate — are unconstitutionally vague. Federal Officeholders and Candidates. The district court also upheld BCRA § 101 insofar as it forbids federal officeholders and candidates from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending “soft money.” Like the direct restrictions on free speech of § 101, this prohibition violates the First Amendment. It restricts the freedom speech and association in a manner that exceeds the contribution and 18 expenditure limitations at issue in Buckley v. Valeo. It directly restricts speech by banning solicitation of funds. As an absolute ban, it is not narrowly drawn, as a restriction on amount might be. State Officeholders and Candidates. Similarly, the district court upheld BCRA. § 101 insofar as it forbids state officeholders and candidates from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending “soft money” in connection with an election for federal office. This prohibition violates the First Amendment in the same manner as restrictions on federal candidates/officeholders. Moreover, it proceeds beyond the legitimates scope of the federal constitution reflected by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by purporting to regulate the conduct of state political candidates and officeholders. The Truncated Backup Electioneering Communication” Definition The district court also upheld the “backup” definition of “electioneering communications” of BCRA § 203, which, as construed by the lower court, reaches any broadcast reference to any candidate for federal office at any time “that is not neutral as to [the] candidate.” Leon, J., Mem. Op. 92. The court also largely upheld the “electioneering communications” provisions of BCRA involving disclosure of electioneering communications (§§ 201 and 311), coordinated electioneering communications as contriSutions (§ 202), and the ban on electioneering communications by corporations and unions (§§ 203 and 204). The definition of “electioneering communications” violates the First Amendment under this Court’s decisions in Buckley and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL). In light of serious constitutional overbreadth considerations, this Court in Buckley narrowly construed 19 provisions in the FECA restricting expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate” and requiring disclosures for the purpose of “influencing” federal elections to embrace only “communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” 424 U.S. at 44 and n. 52. “Express terms” were defined to include “communications containing express words of advocacy of election of defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’” Id. at 80. See also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 248-49. The plain language of neither of § 203’s definitions of “electioneering communications” can be reconciled with Buckley. Both embrace communications that go beyond “express advocacy” to include “issue advocacy.” Judge Leon’s attempted saving construction of the backup definition of §203 to any communication “that is not neutral as to [the] candidate” generates the same conflict with Buckley: A communication that is “not neutral” about a candidate still does not necessarily in “express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Moreover, the truncated backup “electioneering communication” definition is unconstitutionally vague. The terms it employs — “promotes,” “supports,” “attacks,” and “opposes” — are all open to interpretation with regard to any specific advertisement. The Circuit Courts of Appeal that have considered cases involving the express advocacy test’s protection for issue advocacy do not agree with the district court below as to the constitutionality of tests abandoning this Court’s own formulation of the express advocacy test. These courts have uniformly recognized that this Court’s holdings in Buckley and MCFL are binding and require the bright-line test of explicit words expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 20 identified candidate for federal office. Thus, there is a conflict between these circuits and the three-judge panel below. “These courts rely primarily on Buckley’s emphasis on (1) the need for a bright-line rule demarcating the government’s authority to regulate speech and (2) the need to ensure that regulation does not impinge on protected issue advocacy.” Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 193 (Sth Cir. 2002). See, e.g. Virginia Soc'y for Human Life v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 391-92 (4th Cir. 2001) (VSHL) (a regulation that “shifts the focus of the express advocacy determination away from the words themselves to the overall impressions of the hypothetical, reasonable listener or viewer . . . is precisely what Buckley warned against and prohibited”); Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187, 1193-95 (10th Cir. 2000) (Statutes unconstitutional where they could not be narrowly construed to apply “only to expenditures for communications that contain explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 386 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding all the parties “in reporting provisions . . . are necessarily unconstitutional unless they apply only to [communications] ‘that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80)); Florida Right to Life v. Lamar, 238 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2001); Jowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969-70 (8th Cir. 1999) ( To be regulable, “the communication must contain express language of advocacy with an exhortation to elect or defeat a candidate,” and “[t}he Supreme Court has made clear that a ‘finding of “express advocacy”depend|s] upon the use of language such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ etc.” (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, n. 52)); Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 21 137 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1998) (The Court [in Buckley] recognized the important First Amendment interest in protecting political speech, including discussions surrounding elections and candidates. . .. Because of the vital importance of protecting such speech, the Buckley Court articulated what has come to be known as the ‘express advocacy’ test .. . .”); Faucher v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 470 (ist Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court, recognizing that such broad language . . . creates the potential for first amendment violations, sought to avoid future conflict by explicitly limiting the statute’s prohibition to “express advocacy.”). Even the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Furgaich, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), recognized the binding nature of the express advocacy test, although in dicta it discussed the test in ways that seemed broader than the Supreme Court’s articulation of the test.” However, the 9th Circuit has now affirmed that it fully embraces the Buckley formulation, by declaring that “a close reading of Furgaich indicates that we presumed express advocacy must contain some explicit words of advocacy.” California Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 2003 WL 21027288 at *7 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). This ruling eliminates any arguable federal circuit court support for a contextual approach, which is contained in BCRA’s alternate definitions of “electioneering communication.” Disclosure Requirements on “Electioneering _ Communications” and Independent Expenditudes °Cf, FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049, 1054 (4th Cir. 1997) (CAN 11) (Furgatch contains broad dicta, but the Fourth Circuit summarized the narrower holding of Furgatch as: “where political communications . . . include an explicit directive to voters to take some [unclear] course of action, . . . ‘context’ . . . may be considered in determining whether the action urged is the election or defeat of a... candidate ... .”). 22 The district court held BCRA § 212 (disclosure of independent expenditures) nonjusticiable and largely upheld § 201 (disclosure of “electioneering communications”). Both provisions require reporting to the FEC of “disbursements” and “expenditures” when contracted for rather than when they are made — and regardless whether the service contracted for is ever provided and, in fact, the independent expenditure or are thus significantly different than the reporting requirements this Court upheld in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76-82, which required only disclosure of communications actually made. Further, the disclosure provisions are not narrowly drawn to serve any compelling governmental interest. Though the government may have an interest in assuring that the electorate is informed of the source of expenditures made on behalf of candidates, there no such interest at stake unless these expenditures are, in fact, made. In the absence of an actual communication, there is no expenditure made on behalf of a candidate. Moreover, prior disclosure requirements would often result in prior notice to political opponents of political and media strategies, thereby chilling and effectively penalizing free speech. The prospect of chilled free speech or harassment of those with whom entities contract, for example, for media services, renders these provisions justiciable even in the absence of immediate harm. Extent of the District Court’s Injunction JMC Appellants filed Madison Center Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment in the district court, which was denied on May 19, 2003. See App. 87a. JMC Appellants appeal denial of that Order insofar as it denied JMC Appellants’ 23 request to explicitly extend the district court’s injunction against the Defendants by ordering that the Defendants be enjoined from enforcing any unconstitutional BCRA provision against the Plaintiffs anywhere in the United States. It is the policy of the FEC and the position that they have adopted in other similar cases that FEC rules and regulations that have been struck down in one jurisdiction will nevertheless be enforced by the FEC in other jurisdictions."° See VSHL, 263 F.3d 379, 382 (4th Cir. 2001); Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252-53 ( S.D. N.Y. 1998). Under this policy, the district court’s judgment would bind the FEC only in the District of Columbia, leaving the FEC free to enforce enjoined BCRA provisions in other jurisdictions. The FEC policy and the VSHL holding are in error. Under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), agency action can be entirely set aside if it is “not in accord with the law,” including agency action found “contrary to constitutional right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(B). This justifies injunctive relief beyond the scope of any particular jurisdiction, especially when First Amendment rights are at issue and the “very existence [of a statute] may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). In view of FEC policy, the state of the law, and the silence of the district court on the geographical scope of its injunction, JMC Appellants have every reason to believe that the FEC "Similarly, the “FEC has in the past prosecuted groups in the judicial districts where they distributed advertising materials, as opposed to the states where they are chartered or headquartered.” VSHL, 263 F 3d at 389 (citing FEC v. Pub. Citizen, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1327(N.D. Ga. 1999); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 647 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. N.Y. 1986)). a4 would, consistent with its policy, enforce provisions of BCRA outside the District of Columbia absent a nationwide injunction. As an Act of Congress, BCRA applies nationwide, so any of its provisions held unconstitutional should be also enjoined nationwide. In addition, BCRA § 403(1) provides that suit for declaratory and injunctive relief may only be brought in the United States District Court for theDistrict of Columbia. Thus, there can be no protection from other courts from the FEC’s enforcement actions in jurisdictions beyond the District of Columbia. JMC Appellants therefore request this Court to reverse the decision of the district court denying their Motion to Alter or Amend and to direct the district court on remand to enjoin the FEC from enforcing any BCRA provision held unconstitutional anywhere in the United States. Article II Standing of Congressional Intervenors Senator John McCain, Sen. Russell Feingold, Rep. and Sen. James Jeffords (Intervenors) intervened under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1), invoking BCRA § 403(b) (“any member of the House of Representatives . . . or Senate shall have the right to intervene either in support or opposition to the position of a party to the case regarding the constitutionality of the provision or amendment’). Applying BCRA § 403 does not, however, answer the separate question of whether all intervenors must have Article Ill standing, a matter this Court has not addressed. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 (1977) (expressing “grave doubts whether the [initiative sponsors] have standing under Article III to pursue appellate review”); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 and n.21 (1986) (an intervenor may not appeal, or continue a suit, without the party on whose side intervention was permitted, unless intervenor has Article III standing). 25 Intervenors must satisfy both constitutional and prudential requirements for standing. See, e.g., National Credit Union Admin. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 1146 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Section 403(b), by permitting members of Congress to intervene, removes any prudential standing concerns. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n. 3 (1997) (“Congress’s decision to grant a particular plaintiff the right to challenge an act’s constitutionality . . . eliminates any prudential standing limitations and significantly lessens the risk of unwanted conflict with the Legislative Branch when the plaintiff brings suit.”). However, “Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” /d. at 820.n. 3. This Court has long held that Congressional power to create standing is, at least in theory, subject to the limitations of Article III. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 64 (1973). Thus, Article III's injury in fact requirement functions as a limit on Congress’ power to confer standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Intervenors do not satisfy Article II] standing requirements. First, they do not satisfy the requirement that suffer an “injury in fact” consisting of an “invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . .and (b) actual or imminent.” Lujan, 504 U.S. 560 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A generalized, abstract interest as members of a regulated class of legislators or as citizens participating in the political process is insufficiently concrete and particularized to grant them Article III standing. Voters’ “concern for the corruption of the political process is not only widely shared, but is also an abstract and indefinite nature, comparable to the common concern for obedience of the 26 law.” Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381, 390 (ist Cir. 2000). See also Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F3d. 185, 187 (1997); Hoffman v. Jeffords, 175 F. Supp.2d 49, 55 (D.D.C. 2001). Likewise, this Court has held that individual members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, although the federal Line Item Veto Act provided that any member might bring suit, because the members had alleged no cognizable injuries to themselves, and their claimed institutional injury was widely dispersed and abstract. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829. See also, e.g., Roe v. Casev, 464 F. Supp. 486, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980) (in constitutional challenge to statute, a legislator as member of Assembly and co-sponsor had no legally protectable interest). Second, the Intervenors lack Article III standing because there is no causal connection between their “injury”and the conduct complained of. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Any injury suffered by a holding that BCRA is unconstitutional would simply mean that the Intervener would have to continue to campaign in the absence of BCRA and within the established, relatively unregulated, system of election finance control. However, “[i]n those cases where a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, it is substantially more - difficult to establish injury in fact, for in such cases one or more of the essential elements of standing depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.” Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, whether the Intervenors lack Article III standing is in itself a plainly substantial question that warrants review by this Court. 27 Moreover, there is a conflict of circuits with regard to this matter that this Court ought properly to resolve. Several circuit courts require that interveners must have Article III standing. Planned Parenthood of Mid- Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 576-77 (8th Cir. 1998); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1996); Mausolf v. Babbit, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996); Building and Constr. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir.1994). One circuit has stated that intervention under Rule 24 requires more of an interest than that required by Article III analysis. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir.1985). But at least three other circuits do not require Article III standing for intervention. United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir.1978); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir.1994); Yniguez v. State of Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1991). 28 Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court should note probable jurisdiction. Respectfully submitted, Bopp, Jr., C Record Richard E. Coleson Thomas J. Marzen JAMES MADISON CENTER FOR FREE SPEECH Bopp, COLESON & BOSTROM 1 South 6th Street Terre Haute, IN 47807-3510 812/232-2434 (fax: 812/235-3685) Counsel for JMC Appellants Appendix Table of Contents Main Appeal Appendix A, Notice of Appeal ................-++5- la Appendix B, Opinion of District Court ............... 3a Appendix C, U.S. Const. art. 1,§ 4 ............02545. 4a Appendix D, U.S. Const. amend. I ...............+.-- Sa Appendix E, U.S. Const. amend V ...........-..-+-: 6a Appendix F, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 $96 04600000080d000068646000850666000bR60 06008 Ta Denial of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Appendix G, Notice of Appeal ..........-...-.-+-- 69a Appendix H, Opinion of District Court .............. Tila Appendix I, Order of District Court ...............-. 83a la APPENDIX A NOTICE OF APPEAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSION, et al., ) SENATOR MITCH ) McCONNELL, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Case No. 02-0582 ) (CKK, KLH, RJL) FEDERAL ELECTION ) ) ) | Madison Center Plaintiffs' Notice of Appea' Madison Center Plaintiffs U.S. Representative Mike Pence, Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor, Libertarian National Committee, Inc., Club for Growth, Inc., Indiana Family Institute, Inc., National Right to Life Committee, Inc., National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund, and National Right to Life Political Action Committee hereby give notice that they appeal to the United States Su- preme Court from the final judgment entered in this and consolidated actions on May 2, 2003. 2a Respectfully submitted, Alan P. Dye (Bar No. 215319) James Bopp, Jr. Heidi K. Abegg (Bar No. Richard E. Coleson 463935) Thomas J. Marzen WEBSTER, CHAMBERLAIN & JAMES MADISON CENTER BEAN FOR FREE SPEECH 1747 Pennsylvania Ave..N.W. BOPP, COLESON & Suite 1000 BOSTROM Washington, D.C. 20006 1 South Sixth Street (202) 785-9500 Terre Haute, IN 47807 (202) 835-0243 facsimile (812) 232-2434 3a APPENDIX B OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT The opinions of the district court are reported at 2003 WL 2010983, 21003118, 21003103, and 21003124 (D.D.C. May 1, 2003). Pursuant to the Court’s May 15, 2003, Order, the James Madison Center for Free Speech Appellants anticipate jointly filing an appendix containing the opinions of the district court. 4a APPENDIX C UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different day. Sa APPENDIX D UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT I Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 6a APPENDIX E UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT V No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 7a APPENDIX F BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002 PUB. L. NO. 107-155, 166 STAT. 81 [March 27, 2002] An Act To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide bipartisan campaign reform. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) SHORT TITLE. — This Act may be cited as the “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002”. 7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS. — The table of contents of this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE | — REDUCTION OF SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE Sec. 101. Soft money of political parties. Sec. 102. Increased contribution limit for State committees of Sec. 103. Reporting requirements. TITLE t& — NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES Subtitle A — Electioneering Communications Sec. 201. Disclosure of electioneering communications. Sec. 203. Prohibition of corporate and labor disbursements Sor ehaatt oe 8a Sec. 204. Rules relating to certain targeted electioneering communications. Subtitle B — Independent and Coordinated Expenditures Sec. 211. Definition of independent expenditure. Sec. 212. Reporting requirements for certain independent expenditures. Sec. 213. Independent versus coordinated expenditures by party. Sec. 214. Coordination with candidates or political parties. TITLE If! — MISCELLANEOUS Sec. 301. Use of contributed amounts for certain purposes. Sec. 302. Prohibition of fundraising on Federal property. Sec. 303. Strengthening foreign money ban. Sec. 304. Modification of individual contribution limits in response to expenditures from personal funds. Sec. 305. Limitation on availability of lowest unit charge for Federal candidates attacking opposition. Sec. 306. Software for filing reports and prompt disclosure of Sec. 307. Modification of contribution limits. Sec. 308. Donations to Presidential inaugural committee. Sec. 309. Prohibition on fraudulent solicitation of funds. Sec. 310. Study and report on clean money clean elections laws. Sec. 311. Clarity standards for identification of sponsors of Lecti seat efvanial Sec. 312. Increase in penalties. Sec. 313. Statute of limitations. Sec. 314. Sentencing guidelines. 9a Sec. 315. Increase in penalties imposed for violations of conduit contnbution ban. Sec. 316. Restriction on increased contribution limits by taking into account candidate’s available funds. Sec. 317. Clarification of right of nationals of the United States to make political contributions. Sec. 318. Prohibition of contributions by minors. Sec. 319. Modification of individual contribution limits for House candidates in response to expenditures from personal funds. TITLE IV — SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATE Sec. 401. Severability. Sec. 402. Effective dates and regulations. Sec. 403. Judicial review. TITLE V — ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS Sec. 501. Internet access to records. Sec. 502. Maintenance of website of election reports. Sec. 503. Additional disclosure reports. Sec. 504. Public access to broadcasting records. TITLE I — REDUCTION OF SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE SEC. 101. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. (a) IN GENERAL. — Title Ill of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: “SEC. 323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. “(a) NATIONAL COMMITTEES. — “(1) IN GENERAL. — A national committee of a political party (including a national congressional campaign committee 10a of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. “(2) APPLICABILITY. — The prohibition established by paragraph (1) applies to any such national committee, any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee. “(b) STATE, DISTRICT, AND LOCAL COMMITTEES. — “(1) INGENERAL. — Except as provided in paragraph (2), an amount that is expended or disbursed for Federal election activity by a State, district, or local committee of a political party (including an entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a State, district, or local committee of a political party and an officer or agent acting on behalf of such committee or entity), or by an association or similar group of candidates for State or local office or of individuals holding State or local office, shall be made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. “(2) APPLICABILITY. — “(A) IN GENERAL. — Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of section 301(20)A), and subject to subparagraph (B), paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount expended or disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political party for an activity described in either such clause to the extent the amounts expended or disbursed for such activity are allocated (under regulations prescribed by the Commission) among amounts — “(i) which consist solely of contributions subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act (other than amounts described in subparagraph (B)(iii)); and “(ii) other amounts which are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act (other than any requirements of this subsection). “(B) CONDITIONS. — Subparagraph (A) shall only apply if — “(i) the activity does not refer to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; “(ii) the amounts expended or disbursed are not for the costs of any broadcasting, cable, or satellite communication, other than a communication which refers solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office; “(iii) the amounts expended or disbursed which are described in subparagraph (A)(ii) are paid from amounts which are donated in accordance with State law and which meet the requirements of subparagraph (C), except that no person (including any person established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such person) may donate more than $10,000 to a State, district, or local committee of a political party in a calendar year for such expenditures or disbursements; and “(iv) the amounts expended or disbursed are made solely from funds raised by the State, local, or district committee which makes such expenditure or disbursement, and do not include any funds provided to such committee from — “(I) any other State, local, or district committee of any State party, “(II) the national committee of a political party (including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party), “(IIl) any officer or agent acting on behalf of any committee described in subclause (I) or (II), or “([V) any entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by any committee described in subclause (I) or (I). 12a “(C) PROHIBITING INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL PARTIES, FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND OFFICEHOLDERS, AND STATE PARTIES ACTING JOINTLY. — Notwithstanding subsection (e) (other than subsection (e)(3)), amounts specifically authorized to be spent under subparagraph (B){iii) meet the requirements of this subparagraph only if the amounts — “(j) are not solicited, received, directed, transferred, or spent by or in the name of any person described in subsection (a) or (e); and “(ii) are not solicited, received, or directed through fundraising activities conducted jointly by 2 or more State, local, or district committees of any political party or their agents, or by a State, local, or district committee of a political party on behalf of the State, local, or district committee of a political party or its agent in one or more other States. “(c) FUNDRAISING COSTS. — An amount spent by a person described in subsection (a) or (b) to raise funds that are used, in whole or in part, for expenditures and disbursements for a Federal election activity shall be made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. “(d) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS. — A national, State, district, or local committee of a political party (including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party), an entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by any such national, State, district, or local committee or its agent, and an officer or agent acting on behalf of any such party committee or entity, shall not solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations to — “(1) an organization that is described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an application for determination of tax exempt status under such 13a section) and that makes expenditures or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal office (including expenditures or disbursements for Federal election activity); or “(2) an organization described in section 527 of such Code (other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office). “(e) FEDERAL CANDIDATES. — “(1) IN GENERAL. — 4A candidate, individual holding Federal office, agent of a candidate or an individual holding Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or more candidates or individuals holding Federal office, shall not “(A) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in connection with an election for Federal office, including funds for any Federal election activity, unless the funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act; or “(B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in connection with any election other than an election for Federal office or disburse funds in connection with such an election unless the funds — “(i) are not in excess of the amounts permitted with respect to contributions to candidates and political committees under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 315(a); and - “(ii) are not from sources prohibited by this Act from making contributions in connection with an election for Federal office. “(2) STATE LAW. — Paragraph (1) does not apply to the solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds by an individual described in such paragraph who is or was also a candidate for a State or local office solely in connection with such election for l4a State or local office if the solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds is permitted under State law and refers only to such State or local candidate, or to any other candidate for the Staie or local office sought by such candidate, or both. “(3) FUNDRAISING EVENTS. — Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(2)(C), a candidate or an individual holding Federal office may attend, speak, or be a featured guest at a fundraising event for a State, district, or local committee of a political party. “(4) PERMITTING CERTAIN SOLICITATIONS. — “(A) GENERAL SOLICITATIONS. — Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, an individual described in paragraph (1) may make a general solicitation of funds on behalf of any organization that is described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an application for determination of tax exempt status under such section) (other than an entity whose principal purpose is to conduct activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 301(20)(A)) where such solicitation does not specify how the funds will or should be spent. “(B) CERTAIN SPECIFIC SOLICITATIONS. — In addition to the general solicitations permitted under subparagraph (A), an individual described in paragraph (1) may make a solicitation explicitly to obtain funds for carrying out the activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 301(20)(A), or for an entity whose principal purpose is to conduct such activities, if — “(j) the solicitation is made only to individuals; and “(ii) the amount solicited from any individual during any calendar year does not exceed $20,000. “(f) STATE CANDIDATES. — 15a “(1) IN GENERAL. — A candidate for State or local office, individual holding State or local office, or an agent of such a candidate or individual may not spend any funds for a communication described in section 301(20)(A)(iii) unless the funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. “(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS. — Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an individual described in such paragraph if the communication involved is in connection with an election for such State or local office and refers only to such individual or to any other candidate for the State or local office held or sought by such individual, or both.” (b) DEFINITIONS. — Section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: “(20) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY. — “(A) IN GENERAL. — The term ‘Federal election activity’ means — “(i) voter registration activity during the period that begins on the date that is 120 days before the date a regularly scheduled Federal election is held and ends on the date of the election; “(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or generic campaign activity conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the ballot (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office also appears on the ballot); “(iii) a public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or identified) and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office 16a (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate); or “(iv) services provided during any month by an employee of a State, district, or local committee of a political party who spends more than 25 percent of that individual's compensated time during that month on activities in connection with a Federal election. “(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY. —- The term ‘Federal election activity’ does not include an amount expended or disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political party for — “(i) a public communication that refers solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office, if the communication is not a Federal election activity described in subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii); “(ii) a contribution to a candidate for State or local office, provided the contribution is not designated to pay for a Federal election activity described in subparagraph (A); “(iii) the costs of a State, district, or local political convention; and “(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign matenials, including buttons, bumper stickers, and yard signs, that name or depict only a candidate for State or local office. “(21) GENERIC CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY. — The term ‘generic campaign activity’ means a campaign activity that promotes a politica] party and does not promote a candidate or non-Federal candidate. “(22) PUBLIC COMMUNICATION. — The term ‘public communication’ means a communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of general public political advertising. 17a “(23) MASS MAILING. — The term ‘mass mailing’ means a mailing by United States mail or facsimile of more than 500 pieces of mail matter of an identical or substantially similar nature within any 30-day period. “(24) TELEPHONE BANK. — The term ‘telephone bank’ means more than 500 telephone calls of an identical or substantially similar nature within any 30-day period.” SEC. 102. INCREASED CONTRIBUTION LIMIT FOR STATE COMMITTEES OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Section 315(a)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)) is amended — ~ (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “or” at the end; (2) in subparagraph (C) — (A) by inserting “(other than a committee described in subparagraph (D))” after “committee”; and (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and (3) by adding at the end the following: “(D) to a political committee established and maintained by a State committee of a political party in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $10,000.” SEC. 103. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. (a) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. — Section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434) is amended by adding at the end the following: “(e) POLITICAL COMMITTEES. — “(1) NATIONAL AND CONGRESSIONAL POLITICAL COMMITTEES. — The national committee of a political party, any national congressional campaign committee of a political party, and any subordinate committee of either, shall report all receipts and disbursements during the reporting period. 18a “(2) OTHER POLITICAL COMMITTEES TO WHICH SECTION 323 APPLIES. — “(A) IN GENERAL. — In addition to any other reporting requirements applicable under this Act, a political committee (not described in paragraph (1)) to which section 323(b)(1) applies shall report all receipts and disbursements made for activities described in section 301(20)(A), unless the aggregate amount of such receipts and disbursements during the calendar year is less than $5,000. “(B) SPECIFIC DISCLOSURE BY STATE AND LOCAL PARTIES OF CERTAIN NON-FEDERAL AMOUNTS PERMITTED TO BE SPENT ON FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY. — Each report by a political committee under subparagraph (A) of receipts and disbursements made for activities described in section 301(20)A) shall include a disclosure of all receipts and disbursements described in section 323(b)(2)(A) and (B). “(3) ITEMIZATION. — If a political committee has receipts or disbursements to which this subsection applies from or to any person aggregating in excess of $200 for any calendar year, the political committee shall separately itemize its reporting for such person in the same manner as required in paragraphs (3)(A), (5), and (6) of subsection (b). “(4) REPORTING PERIODS. — Reports required to be filed under this subsection shall be filed for the same time periods required for political committees under subsection (aX4)(B).” (b) BUILDING FUND EXCEPTION TO THE DEFINITION OF CONTRIBUTION. — (1) IN GENERAL. — Section 301(8)(B) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431(8)(B)) is amended — (A) by striking clause (viii); and 19a (B) by redesignating clauses (ix) through (xv) as clauses (viii) through (xiv), respectively. (2) NONPREEMPTION OF STATE LAW. — Section 403 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 453) is amended — (A) by striking “The provisions of this Act” and inserting: “(a) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subsection (b), the provisions of this Act”; and (B) by adding at the end the following: “(b) STATE AND LOCAL COMMITTEES OF POLITICAL PARTIES. — Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a State or local committee of a political party may, subject to State law, use exclusively funds that are not subject to the prohibitions, limitations, and reporting requirements of the Act for the purchase or construction of an office building for such State or local committee.” TITLE If — NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES Subtitle A — Electioneering Communications SEC. 201. DISCLOSURE OF ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS. (a) IN GENERAL. — Section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434), as amended by section 103, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: “(f) DISCLOSURE OF ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS. — “(1) STATEMENT REQUIRED. — Every person who makes a disbursement for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering communications in an aggregate amount in excess of $10,000 during any calendar year shall, within 24 hours of each disclosure date, file with the Commission a 20a statement containing the information descnbed in paragraph (2). “(2) CONTENTS OF STATEMENT. — Each statement required to be filed under this subsection shall be made under penalty of perjury and shall contain the following information: “(A) The identification of the person making the disbursement, of any person sharing or exercising direction or control over the activities of such person, and of the custodian of the books and accounts of the person making the disbursement. “(B) The principal place of business of the person making — the disbursement, if not an individual. “(C) The amount of each disbursement of more than $200 during the period covered by the statement and the identification of the person to whom the disbursement was made. ‘“(D) The elections to which the electioneering communications pertain and the names (if known) of the candidates identified or to be identified. “(E) If the disbursements were paid out of a segregated bank account which consists of funds contributed solely by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 101(aX(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(aX(20))) directly to this account for electioneering communications, the names and addresses of all contnbutors who contnbuted an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to that account during the period beginning on the first day of the preceding calendar year and ending on the disclosure date. Nothing in this subparagraph is to be construed as a prohibition on the use of funds in such a segregated account for a purpose other than electioneering communications. 2la “(F) If the disbursements were paid out of funds not described in subparagraph (E), the names and addresses of all contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to the person making the disbursement during the period beginning on the first day of the preceding calendar year and ending on the disclosure date. “(3) ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION. — For purposes of this subsection — “(A) IN GENERAL. — (i) The term ‘electioneering communication’ means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which — “(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; “(ID is made within — “(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or “(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and “(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. “(ii) If clause (i) is held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial decision to support the regulation provided herein, then the term ‘electioneering communication’ means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to 22a affect the interpretation or application of section 100.22(b) of title 11, Code of Federal Regulations. “(B) EXCEPTIONS. — The term ‘electioneering communication’ does not include — “(i) a communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distnbuted through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate; “(ii) a communication which constitutes an expenditure or an independent expenditure under this Act; “(iii) a communication which constitutes a candidate debate or forum conducted pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commission, or which solely promotes such a debate or foram and ts made by or on behall of the persen epensesing the debate or forum; or “(iv) any other communication exempted under such regulations as the Commission may promulgate (consistent with the requirements of this paragraph) to ensure the appropriate implementation of this paragraph, except that under any such regulation a communication may not be exempted if it meets the requirements of this paragraph and is described in section 301(20, Ai). “(C) TARGETING TO RELEVANT ELECTORATE. — For purposes of this paragraph, a communication which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office is ‘targeted to the relevant electorate’ if the communication can be received by 50,000 or more persons — “(i) in the district the candidate seeks to represent, in the case of a candidate for Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress; or “(ii) in the State the candidate seeks to represent, in the case of a candidate for Senator. 23a “(4) DISCLOSURE DATE. — For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘disclosure date’ means — “(A) the first date during any calendar year by which a person has made disbursements for the direct costs of producing or airing electioneering communications aggregating in excess of $10,000; and “(B) any other date during such calendar year by which a person has made disbursements for the direct costs of producing or airing electioneering communications aggregating in excess of $10,000 since the most recent disclosure date for such calendar year. “(S5) CONTRACTS TO DISBURSE. — For purposes of this subsection, a person shall be treated as having made a disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the disbursement. “(6) COORDINATION WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS. — Any requirement to report under this subsection shall be in addition to any other reporting requirement under this Act. “(7) COORDINATION WITH INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. — Nothing in this subsection may be construed to establish, modify, or otherwise affect the definition of political activities or electioneering activities (including the definition of participating in, intervening in, or influencing or attempting to influence a political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office) for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” (b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. — The Federal C eations C ission shall ile and maintain ony information the Federal Election Commission may require to carry out section 304(f) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as added by subsection (a)), and shall make such information available to the public on the Federal 24a SEC. 202. COORDINATED COMMUNICATIONS AS CONTRIBUTIONS. Section 315(a)(7) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(aX(7)) is amended — (1) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and (2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following: “(C) if — “(i) any person makes, or contracts to make, any disbursement for any electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 304(f)(3)); and “(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with a candidate or an authorized committee of such candidate, a Federal, State, or local political party or committee thereof, or an agent or official of any such candidate, party, or committee; such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a contribution to the candidate supported by the electioneering communication or that candidate’s party and as an expenditure by that candidate or that candidate’s party, and”. SEC. 203. PROHIBITION OF CORPORATE AND LABOR DISBURSEMENTS FOR ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS. (a) IN GENERAL. — Section 316(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is amended by inserting “or for any applicable electioneering communication” before “, but shall not include”. (b) APPLICABLE ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION. — Section 316 of such Act is amended by adding at the end the following: “(c) RULES RELATING TO ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS. — 25a “(1) APPLICABLE ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION. — For purposes of this section, the term ‘applicable electioneering communication’ means an electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 304(f)(3)) which is made by any entity described in subsection (a) of this section or by any other person using funds donated by an entity described in subsection (a) of this section. “(2) EXCEPTION. — Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the term ‘applicable electioneering communication’ does not include 2 communication by a section 501(c)(4) organization or a political organization (as defined in section 527(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) made under section 304(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this Act if the communication is paid for exclusively by funds provided directly by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 101(a\(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20))). For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term ‘provided directly by individuals’ does not include funds the source of which is an entity described in subsection (a) of this section. “(3) SPECIAL OPERATING RULES. — “(A) DEFINITION UNDER PARAGRAPH (1). — An electioneering communication shall be treated as made by an entity described in subsection (a) if an entity described in subsection (a) directly or indirectly disburses any amount for any of the costs of the communication. “(B) EXCEPTION UNDER PARAGRAPH (2). — A section 501(c)4) organization that derives amounts from business activities or receives funds from any entity described in subsection (a) shall be considered to have paid for any communication out of such amounts unless such organization paid for the communication out of a segregated account to which only individuals can contribut., as described in section 304(f(2)(E). 26a “(4) DEFINITIONS AND RULES. — For purposes of this subsection — “(A) the term ‘section 501(c)(4) organization’ means — “(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code; or “(i1) an organization which has submitted an application to the Internal Revenue Service for determination of its status as an organization described in clause (i); and “(B) a person shall be treated as having made a disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the disbursement. “(S) COORDINATION WITH INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. — Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authonze an organization exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to carry out any activity which is prohibited under such Code.” SEC. 204. RULES RELATING TO CERTAIN TARGETED ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS. Section 316(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b), as added by section 203, is amended by adding at the end the following: “(6) SPECIAL RULES FOR TARGETED COMMUNICATIONS. — “(A) EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY. — Paragraph (2) shall not apply in the case of a targeted communication that is made by an organization described in such paragraph. “(B) TARGETED COMMUNICATION. — For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ‘targeted communication’ means an electioneering communication (as defined in section 304(f)(3)) that is distributed from a television or radio broadcast station or provider of cable or satellite television service and, in 27a the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. “(C) DEFINITION. — For purposes of this paragraph, a communication is ‘targeted to the relevant electorate’ if it meets the requirements described in section 304(f)(3)(C).” Subtitle B — Independent and Coordinated Expenditures SEC. 211. DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE. Section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (2 U.S.C. 431) is amended by striking paragraph (17) and inserting the following: “(17) INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE. — The term ‘independent expenditure’ means an expenditure by a person — “(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and “(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” SEC. 212. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES. (a) IN GENERAL. — Section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434) (as amended by section 201) is amended — (1) in subsection (c)(2), by striking the undesignated matter after subparagraph (C); and (2) by adding at the end the following: “(g) TIME FOR REPORTING’ CERTAIN EXPENDITURES. — “(1) EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $1,000. — 28a “(A) INITIAL REPORT. — A person (including a political committee) that makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating $1,000 or more after the 20th day, but more than 24 hours, before tie date of an election shall file a report describing the expenditures within 24 hours. “(B) ADDITIONAL REPORTS. — After a person files a report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an additional report within 24 hours after each time the person makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating an additional $1,000 with respect to the same election as that to which the initial report relates. “(2) EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $10,000. — “(A) INITIAL REPORT. — A person (including a political committee) that makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating $10,000 or more at any time up to and including the 20th day before the date of an election shall file a report describing the expenditures within 48 hours. “(B) ADDITIONAL REPORTS. — After a person files a report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an additional report within 48 hours after each time the person makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating an additional $10,000 with respect to the same election as that to which the initial report relates. “(3) PLACE OF FILING; CONTENTS. — A report under this subsection — “(A) shall be filed with the Commission; and “(B) shall contain the information required by subsection (b\(6\B)iii), including the name of each candidate whom an expenditure is intended to support or oppose.” (b) TIME OF FILING OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS. — (1) IN GENERAL. — Section 304(g) of such Act, as added by subsection (a), is amended by adding at the end the following: 29a “(4) TIME OF FILING FOR EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $1,000. — Notwithstanding subsection (a)(S), the time at which the statement under paragraph (1) is received by the Commission or any other recipient to whom the notification is required to be sent shall be considered the time of filing of the statement with the recipient.” (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. — (A) Section 304(a)(5) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(S)) is amended by striking “the second sentence of subsection (c)(2)” and inserting “subsection (g)(1)”. (B) Section 304(d)(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434(d)(1)) is amended by inserting “or (g)” after “subsection (c)”. SEC. 213. INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED EXPENDITURES BY PARTY. Section 315(d) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441 a(d)) is amended — (1) in paragraph (1), by striking “and (3)” and inserting “, (3), and (4)”; and (2) by adding at the end the following: “(4) INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED EXPENDITURES BY PARTY. — “(A) IN GENERAL. — On or after the date on which a political party nominates a candidate, no committee of the political party may make — “(i) any cocvdinated expenditure under this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any independent expenditure (as defined in section 301(17)) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle; or “(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section 301(17)) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any coordinated expenditure under 30a this subsection with respect to .. > candidate during the election cycle. “(B) APPLICATION. — For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and maintained by a national political party (including all congressional campaign committees) and all political committees established and maintained by a State political party (including any subordinate committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee. “(C) TRANSFERS. — A committee of a political party that makes coordinated expenditures under this subsection with respect to a candidate shall not, during an election cycle, transfer any funds to, assign authority to make coordinated expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of funds from, a committee of the political party that has made or intends to make an independent expenditure with respect to the candidate.” SEC. 214. COORDINATION WITH CANDIDATES OR POLITICAL PARTIES. (a) IN GENERAL. — Section 315(a)(7)(B) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 44Ja(a)(7)(B)) is amended — (1) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and (2) by inserting after clause (i) the following new clause: “(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a candidate or candidate’ s authorized committee) in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political party, shall be considered to be contributions made to such party committee; and”. (b) REPEAL OF CURRENT REGULATIONS. — The regulations on coordinated communications paid for by persons other than candidates, authorized committees of candidates, and 3la party committees adopted by the Federal Election Commission and published in the Federal Register at page 76138 of volume 65, Federal Register, on December 6, 2000, are repealed as of the date by which the Commission is required to promulgate new regulations under subsection (c) (as described in section 402(c)(1)). (c) REGULATIONS BY THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION. — The Federal Election Commission shall promulgate new regulations on coordinated communications paid for by persons other than candidates, authorized committees of candidates, and party committees. The regulations shall not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination. In addition to any subject determined by the Commission, the regulations shall address — (1) payments for the republication of campaign materials; (2) payments for the use of a common vendor; (3) payments for communications directed or made by persons who previously served as an employee of a candidate or a political party; and (4) payments for communications made by a person after substantial discussion about the communication with a candidate or a political party. (d) MEANING OF CONTRIBUTION OR EXPENDITURE FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 316. — _ Section 316(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is amended by striking “shall include” and inserting “includes a contribution or expenditure, as those terms are defined in section 301, and also includes”. 32a TITLE Ill — MISCELLANEOUS SEC. 301. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES. Title III of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by striking section 313 and inserting the following: “SEC. 313. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES. “(a) PERMITTED USES. — A contribution accepted by a candidate, and any other donation received by an individual as support for activities of the individual as a holder of Federal office, may be used by the candidate or individual — “(1) for otherwise authorized expenditures in connection with the campaign for Federal office of the candidate or individuai; “(2) for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in connection with duties of the individual as a holder of Federal office; “(3) for contributions to an organization described in section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or “(4) for transfers, without limitation, to a national, State, or local committee of a political party. “(b) PROHIBITED USE. — “(1) IN GENERAL. — A contribution or donation described in subsection (a) shall not be converted by any person to personal use. “(2) CONVERSION. — For the purposes of paragraph (1), a contribution or donation shall be considered to be converted to personal use if the contribution or amount is used to fulfill any commitment, obligation, or expense of a person that would exist irrespective of the candidate’s election campaign or individual’s duties as a holder of Federal office, including — 33a “(A) a home mortgage, rent, or utility payment; “(B) a clothing purchase; “(C) a noncampaign-related automobile expense, “(D) a country club membership; “(E) a vacation or other noncampaign-related tnp, “(F) a household food item; “(G) a tuition payment; “(H) admission to a sporting event, concert, theater, or other form of entertainment not associated with an election campaign, and “(I) dues, fees, and other payments to a health club or recreational facility.” SEC. 302. PROHIBITION OF FUNDRAISING ON FEDERAL PROPERTY. Section 607 of title 18, United States Code, is amended — (1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following: “(a) PROHIBITION. — “(1) IN GENERAL. — It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive a donation of money or other thing of value in connection with a Federal, State, or local election from a person who is located in a room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by an officer or employee of the United States. It shall be unlawful for an individual who is an officer or employee of the Federal Government, including the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress, to solicit or receive a donation of money or other thing of value in connection with a Federal, State, or local election, while in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by an officer or employee of the United States, from any person. 34a “(2) PENALTY. — A person who violates this section shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.’; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting “or Executive Office of the President” after “Congress”. SEC. 303. STRENGTHENING FOREIGN MONEY BAN. Section 319 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 44le) is amended — (1) by striking the heading and inserting the following: “CONTRIBUTIONS AND DONATIONS BY FOREIGN NATIONALS”; and (2) by stnking subsection (a) and inserting the following: “(a) PROHIBITION. — It shall be unlawful for — “(1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make — (A) a contnbution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contnbution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election; “(B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party, or “(C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 304(f(3)); or “(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or donation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) from a foreign national.” weer 35a SEC. 304. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS IN RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. (a) INCREASED LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS. — Section 315 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a) is amended — (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking “No person” and inserting “Except as provided in subsection (i), no person”; and (2) by adding at the end the following: “(i) INCREASED LIMIT TO ALLOW RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. —- “(1) INCREASE. — “(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to paragraph (2), if the opposition personal funds amount with respect to a candidate for election to the office of Senator exceeds the threshold amount, the limit under subsection (a) 1) A) (in this subsection referred to as the ‘applicable limit’) with respect to that candidate shall be the increased limit. “(B) THRESHOLD AMOUNT. — “(i) STATE-BY-STATE COMPETITIVE AND FAIR CAMPAIGN FORMULA. — In this subsection, the threshold amount with respect to an election cycle of a candidate described in subparagraph (A) is an amount equal to the sum of “(1) $150,000; and “(IT) $0.04 multiplied by the voting age population. “(ii) VOTING AGE POPULATION. — In this subparagraph, the term ‘voting age population’ means in the case of a candidate for the office of Senator, the voting age population of the State of the candidate (as certified under section 31 5(e)). 36a “(C) INCREASED LIMIT. — Except as provided in clause (ii), for purposes of subparagraph (A), if the opposition personal funds amount is over — “(i) 2 times the threshold amount, but not over 4 times that amount — “(I) the increased limit shall be 3 times the applicable limit; and “(II) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply with respect to any contribution made with respect to a candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate may accept such a contribution; “(ii) 4 times the threshold amount, but not over 10 times that amount — “(1) the increased limit shall be 6 times the applicable limit; and “(I1) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply with respect to any contribution made with respect to a candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate may accept such a contribution; and “(iii) 10 times the threshold amount — “(1) the increased limit shall be 6 times the applicable limit; “(I1) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply with respect to any contribution made with respect to a candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate may accept such a contribution; and “(II1) the limits under subsection (d) with respect to any expenditure by a State or national committee of a political party shall not apply. 37a “(D) OPPOSITION PERSONAL FUNDS AMOUNT. — The opposition personal funds amount is an amount equal to the excess (if any) of — “(i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds (as defined in section 304(a)(6)(B)) that an opposing candidate in the same election makes; over “(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds made by the candidate with respect to the election. “(2) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER INCREASED LIMIT. — “(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subparagraph (B), a candidate and the candidate’s authorized committee shall not accept any contribution, and a party committee shall not make any expenditure, under the increased limit under paragraph (1) “(i) until the candidate has received notification of the opposition personal funds amount under section 304(a(6)B); and “(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to the aggregate amount of contributions previously accepted and under this subsection for the election cycle, exceeds 1 10 percent of the opposition personal funds amount. “(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING CANDIDATE. — A candidate and a candidate's authorized committee shall not accept any contribution and a party shall date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be a candidate to the extent that the amount of such increased limit is attributable to such an opposing candidate. “(3) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. — “(A) IN GENERAL. — The aggregate amount of contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s 38a authorized committee under the increased limit under paragraph (1) and not otherwise expended in connection with the election with respect to which such contributions relate shall, not later than 50 days after the date of such election, be used in the manner described in subparagraph (B). “(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. — A candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee shall return the excess contribution to the person who made the contribution. “(j) LIMITATION ON REPAYMENT OF PERSONAL LOANS. — Any candidate who incurs personal loans made after the effective date of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 in connection with the candidate’s campaign for election shall not repay (directly or indirectly), to the extent such loans exceed $250,000, such loans from any contributions made to such candidate or any authorized committee of such candidate after the date of such election.” (b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. — Section 304(a)(6) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(6)) is amended — (1) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (E), and (2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following: “(B) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. — “(i) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. — In this subparagraph, the term ‘expenditure from personal funds’ means — “(I) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal funds; and “(II) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the candidate’s authorized committee. 39a “(ii) DECLARATION OF INTENT. — Not later than the date that is 15 days after the date on which an individual becomes a candidate for the office of Senator, the candidate shall file a declaration stating the total amount of expenditures from personal funds that the candidate intends to make, or to obligate to make, with respect to the election that will exceed the State-by-State competitive and fair campaign formula with “(1) the Commission; and “(I1) each candidate in the same election. “(iii) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. — Not later than 24 hours after a candidate described in clause (ii) makes or obligates to make an aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds in excess of 2 times the threshold amount in connection with any election, the candidate shall file a notification with — “(1) the Commission; and “(IT) each candidate in the same-election. “(iv) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. — After a candidate files an initial notification under clause (iii), the candidate shall file an additional notification each time expenditures from personal funds are made or obligated to be made in an aggregate amount that exceed $10,000 with — “(1) the Commission; and “(I1) each candidate in the same election. Such notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours after the expenditure is made. “(v) CONTENTS. — A notification under clause (iii) or (iv) shall include — “(I) the name of the candidate and the office sought by the candidate; “(I1) the date and amount of each expenditure; and 40a “(IIL the total amount of expenditures from personal funds that the candidate has made, or obligated to make, with respect to an election as of the date of the expenditure that is the subject of the notification. “(C) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. — In the next regularly scheduled report after the date of the election for which a candidate seeks nomination for election to, or election to, Federal office, the candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee shall submit to the Commission a report indicating the source and amount of any excess contributions (as determined under paragraph (1) of section 315(i)) and the manner in which the candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee used such funds. “(D) ENFORCEMENT. — For provisions providing for the enforcement of the reporting requirements under this paragraph, see section 309.” (c) DEFINITIONS. — Section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431), as amended by section 101(b), is further amended by adding at the end the following: “(25) ELECTION CYCLE. — For purposes of sections 315(i) and 315A and paragraph (26), the term ‘election cycle’ means the period beginning on the day after the date of the most recent election for the specific office or seat that a candidate is seeking and ending on the date of the next election for that office or seat. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a primary election and a general election shall be considered to be separate elections. “(26) PERSONAL FUNDS. — The term ‘personal funds’ means an amount that is derived from — (A) any asset that, under applicable State law, at the time the individual became a candidate, the candidate had legal nght of access to or control over, and with respect to which the candidate had — 4la “(i) legal and rightful title; or “(ii) an equitable interest; “(B) income received during the current election cycle of the candidate, including — “(i) a salary and other earned income from bona fide employment; “(ii) dividends and proceeds from the sale of the candidate’s stocks or other investments; “(iii) bequests to the candidate; “(iv) income from trusts established before the beginning of the election cycle; “(v) income from trusts established by bequest after the beginning of the election cycle of which the candidate is the beneficiary; “(vi) gifts of a personal nature that had been customarily received by the candidate prior to the beginning of the election cycle; and “(vii) proceeds from lotteries and similar legal games of chance; and “(C) a portion of assets that a [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0671%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.