# Supplemental Appendix — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0664%3A62

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Supplemental Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 539 U.S. 938

## Text

7 E

No. 02-1674 et al.

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

MITCH MCCONNELL et ai.,
Appellants,
V.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et ai.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States
District Court For The District of Columbia

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTS
VOLUME IV

FLOYD ABRAMS KENNETH W. STARR
SUSAN BUCKLEY _ Counsel of Record
BRIAN MARKLEY EDWARD W. WARREN
CAHILL GORDON & KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
REINDEL LLP KIRKLAND & ELLIS
80 Pine Street 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
New York, NY 10005 Washington, DC 20005
(212) 701-3000 (202) 879-5000

(additional counsel on inside cover) RECEIVED

June 2003 ~ 2004
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTONC# ie @QGR1y, 1. CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
(650) 725-9875

JAN WITOLD BARAN

THOMAS W. KIRBY

LEE E. GOODMAN

WILEY, REIN & FIELDING LLP
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 719-7000

VALLE SIMMS DUTCHER
L. LYNN HOGUE

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.

3340 Peachtree Road, N.E.
Suite 3515

Atlanta, GA 30326

(404) 365-8500

G. HUNTER BATES
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(502) 473-7557

Counsel in No. 02-1674

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume I
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Opinion of Judge Henderson...............ccccccsesesssesseseseeees 160sa
Volume II
Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly..............ccccccceccsssesenees 479sa
Volume III
Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly (continued) .............. 776sa
Volume IV
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SPR URI jiccicscnsuchiousiienstantinnonicdttadninieitiiidiiiaiaiaion a 1381sa

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1082sa
MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEON, District J.

The passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (“BCRA”),’ as the record amply indicates, was a
considerable legislative achievement that many thought
would never come to pass. Indeed, the law constitutes the
most comprehensive reform of our national campaign finance
system in the past twenty-eight years. As such, it is the latest
chapter in the history of a longstanding and recurring problem
that our government has been wrestling with since the
administration of Theodore Roosevelt.

Titles I and Il of BCRA focus principally on a major
campaign finance development that has dramatically unfolded
over the past decade: the use of corporaie and union treasury
funds, either directly or through soft money donations to
political parties, to finance electioneering communications
masquerading, predominantly, as “issue ads.” In an attempt to
prevent actual and apparent corruption arising from the
funding of such sham issue advertisements, Congress enacted
a sweeping set of reforms that effectively: alters the
methodology of our national, state, and local parties and
transforms their relationship with each other; limits the ability
of corporations, unions, individuais, and interest groups to
engage in communications on public policy; and diminishes
the role of federal officeholders in fundraising for political
parties and nonprofit interest groups.

For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, I find
that the defendants have more than adequately demonstrated
the constitutionally necessary basis for Congress: (1) to
restrict the use of soft money donations by national, state, and
local parties to fund certain types of campaign
communications (particularly candidate-advocacy “issue”

' Pub.L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).

— = | | —

| 1083sa
advertisements) which are designed to, and which do, directly

affect federal elections; and (2) to restrict the airing of
corporate and union electioneering communications which

promote, oppose, attack, or support specific candidates for the —

office which they seek.

Notwithstanding this coficlusion, however, I do not find
that the defendants have demonstrated a_ sufficient
constitutional basis to support Congress’s decision: (1) to ban
the solicitation, receipt, and use of soft money by national
parties for purposes that do not directly affect federal
elections; (2) to ban state and local parties from using soft
money to fund a variety of election activities that do not
directly affect federal elections; (3) to ban the use of
corporate and union treasury monies to fund genuine issue
advertisements that are aired during a particular time period
preceding election even though they do not directly advocate
the election or defeat of a federal candidate; (4) to ban
national parties from donating to and soliciting soft money
for certain Section 501(c) and Section 527 organizations
under the Internal Revenue Code; (5) to prohibit federal
officeholders from raising soft money for their national
parties; and (6) to require broadcast licensees to collect and
disclose certain records in connection with requests to
purchase broadcast time. To the contrary, I find that in trying
to do so Congress has unconstitutionally infringed upon the
First Amendment rights of the various political actors and
their supporters.

In short, the defendants, in my judgment, have been able to
establish in some respects, but not in others, a sufficient basis
for Congress’s intervention in dealing with these problems.
As to those where they succeeded, I believe it would make a
mockery of existing Supreme Court precedent and the
regulatory scheme that it has heretofore blessed, to hold
otherwise. As to those where they have not, the protections

1084sa

accorded the plaintiffs under the First Amendment more than
adequately warrant their undoing.

The following is a brief outline of my opinion, which has
been organized on a title by title basis. With respect to the
opinion itself, to the extent I have agreed with both the
judgment and reasoning of either of my colleagues (or both),
I have so noted and refrained from writing. As to those
sections where I have agreed only in the judgment of one or
more of my colleagues, I have limited the discussion of my
reasoning to that necessary to explain how I reached my
holding. To the greatest extent possible I have tried to
acknowledge and address any disagreements we have had
factually. However, in-light of the importance and enormity
of the record, I have included in my opinion a complete set of
my Findings of Fact which I relied upon in reaching my
judgments.

I. Title I: Restrictions on Nonfederal Funds New FECA

Sections 323(a), 323(b), 301(20)(a), 323(d), 323(e),
and 323(f)

A. New FECA Section 323(a): Nonfederal Fund
Restrictions on National Parties

I agree with Judge Henderson’s conclusion, although for
different reasons, that Congress, in essence, is constitutionally
prohibited from regulating a national party’s ability to solicit,
receive, or use nonfederal funds (i.e., soft money) for
nonfederal and mixed purposes. To the extent that Section
323(a) seeks to regulate donations to national parties that are
used for purposes that at the most indirectly affect federal
elections (i.e., nonfederal or mixed purposes), the defendants
have failed to demonstrate that Section 323(a) serves an

1085sa

important government interest, or even if they had, that it is
sufficiently tailored to serve that interest.

However, I find that Congress can restrict a national
party’s use of nonfederal money to directly affect federal
elections through communications that support or oppose
specifically identified federal candidates. Therefore, like
Judge Kollar-Kotelly, I find constitutional Congress's ban on
the use of nonfederal funds by national parties for Section
301(20)(A)(iii) communications. As a result, I concur in part
in, and dissent in part from, Judge Henderson’s judgment and
reasoning regarding Section 323(a).

1. Standard of Review for _Restrictions on
Donations to Political Parties

The right to freedom of political association under the First
Amendment is a fundamental right of donors to political
parties, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976),” and
arguably of the political parties themselves, see FEC v.
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. ( “Colorado
Il”), 533 U.S. 431, 448 n.10 (2001). Our national political
structure is firmly anchored by our two major parties. The

? In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court declared that
“{ajn individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously
protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed. 468
U.S. 609, 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) (citing Citizens
Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 294, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981)).

* See FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (“Colorado
I”), 518 U.S. 604, 618, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 = (noting
litical ies play an “important and legitimate ro‘e . . . in
ath decions" ‘aot v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45, 106
S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(“There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-
party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and
effective government .”); see also Findings of Fact (“Findings”) 20-26.

1086sa_s-

role those national parties play in defining wide- -ranging
political agendas and bringing together individuals (and their
financial resources) on behalf of those political agendas is
critical to the stability our political system has enjoyed over
the past 200 years.*

Upon giving money to a political party, or to any political
organization for that matter, a donor hopes that the
organization will amplify his political perspective or
candidate preference.” Any number of activities by a political
party can amplify the donor’s political voice. Some activities,
like direct contributions to state candidates, are for a
nonfederal purpose because they have no effect on a federal
election. Others, like public communications that advocate
the election or defeat of a particular federal candidate, are for
a federal purpose because they directly affect federal
elections. And still others, like Seneric voter registration and
genuine issue advertisements,° are for “mixed purposes”
because they indirectly affect both state and federal elections.
Regardless of the purpose served, all of these party activities,
paid for with aggregated donations, express loudly, and often
effectively, the donor’s political position.’ For this reason, an

* See Caiifornia Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574, 120
S.Ct. 2402, 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000) (“Representative democracy in any
populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the ability of
citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates
who espouse their political views. The formation of national political
parties was almost concurrent with the formation of the Republic itself.”
(citing Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republican Party, in |

History of U.S. Political Parties 239, 241 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed.,
1973))).

* See, e.g., Findings 14-19.

* For a discussion of the distinction between genuine issue adver-
tisements and “sham” issue ads designed to directly affect a federal
candidate’s election, see Findings 288-89 and infra Parts I.A.3 & 1.B.2.

” See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 453 (“{A] party combines its members’
power to speak by aggregating contributions and broadcasting messages

1087sa

individual’s donation to a political party is an act of political
association protected by the First Amendment. But as
important as this right is, it is not absolute.

The Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo and ensuing
campaign finance cases, has recognized Congress’s power
through FECA * to regulate, in effect, the source and amount
of contributions to political parties and candidates that donors
could make for the purpose of influencing federal elections.

more widely than individual contributors generally could afford to do.”);
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (“MCFL” ), 479 U.S. 238, 261,
107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (“[I}ndividuals contribute to a
political organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a
more effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their
own personal direction.”); Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294
(“{Bly collective effort individuals can make their views known, when,
individually, their voices -would be faint or lost.”); id. at 296 (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65-66); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15, 22. Alexis de
Toqueville observed:

As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have
conceived a sentiment or an idea that they want to produce in the
world, they seek each other out; and when they have found each
other, they unite. From then on, they are no longer isolated men, but
a power one sees from afar, whose actions serve as an example; a
power that speaks, and to which one listens.

2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 492 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., 2000).

* Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), Pub.L. No. 92-
225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971 provisions) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431 ef seq.)

* See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35 (upholding contribution limitations to
candidates and their political committees); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390-98, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000)
(same); see also California Medical Ass'n v. FEC (“California
Medical” ), 453 U.S. 182, 197-99, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981)
(upholding contribution limitations to PACs). The Supreme Court has
never explicitly addressed limitations on contributions to political parties.
The $20,000, now $25,000, limit on contributions to national parties was
not even added to FECA until the post-Buckley 1976 amendments. See

ero ee ee .

1088sa

In enacting such contribution limitations Congress had to
demonstrate that it was doing so in furtherance of the
important government interest of preventing actual or
apparent corruption of either the officeholder or the federal
electoral system. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see, e.g., Citizens
Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1981); Nixon vy. Shrink
Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000).'° Indeed,
in addressing contribution limitations, preventing actual or
apparent corruption is the only government interest the
Supreme Court has found sufficient to interfere with
associational rights. FEC v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm. (“NCPAC” ), 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985). In
Buckley, the Supreme Court explained:

To the extent that large contributions are given to secure
a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our sysicm of representative
democracy is undermined . . . . Of almost equal concern
as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the
impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from

Pub.L. No. 94-283 § 320, 90 Stat. 475 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1)(B)); see also California Medical, 453 U .S. at 194 n. 15:
BCRA § 307(a)(2) (raising amount individuals can contribute to national
parties from $20,000 to $25,000); BCRA § 102 (raising amount
individuals can donate to state parties from $5,000 to $10,000); FECA
§ 315(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(D). Contribution limitations to parties,
however, have-been upheld indirectly, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38
(upholding FECA’s $25,000 limitation on total contributions, which
included “huge contributions to the candidate’s political party”), and in
dictum, see Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 617 (recognizing $20,000
contribution limit to political parties and citing 2 U.S.C. § 44 1a(a)).

’ If a contribution limitation survives a claim that it infringes
associational rights, then it also survives a speech challenge. See Shrink
Missouri, 528 U.S. at 388. Note also that the challenge based on the
donor’s associational right is “correlative” to an overbreadth challenge.
See id. at 388 n. 3.

1089sa

public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent
in a regime of large individual financial contributions.
424 U.S. at 26-27. In each case where the Supreme
Court upheld contribution limitations, see supra note 9,
the Court reviewed those limits under Buckley's “closely
drawn” scrutiny, a standard of review somewhat less
rigorous than strict scrutiny, by which “[elven a
significant interference with protected rights of political
association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a
sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of
associational freedoms.” Buckley, 420 U.S. at 25
(internal quotations omitted); see also California
Medical Ass'n v. FEC (“California Medical” ), 453 U.S.
182, 196, 196 n.16 (1981).

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argue, and Judge Henderson
agrees, that any limitation on a national party’s ability to raise
and use nonfederal money must pass muster under the strict-
scrutiny standard of review that the Supreme Court has
traditionally applied to analyze expenditures. See, @.g.,
Republican National Committee (“RNC”) Opening Br. at 51-
53. I disagree.

While I agree that Section 323(a)’s prohibitions on
soliciting, receiving, and using nonfederal funds restricts a
party’s ability to spend nonfederal money, their principal
effect is to limit the ability of future donors through their
contributions to use the national parties to amplify their
voices.'' Therefore, in determining to what extent Congress

' That is, Section 323(a) limits an individual, wishing to express his
political agenda, to donations of hard money up to $25,000, the limitation
on contributions to parties under FECA. 2 U.S.C. § 44 1a(a)(1)(B); see
also BCRA § 307(a)(2) (raising how much individuals can contribute to
national parties from $20,000 to $25,000).

1090sa

can limit donations to national and state parties,'? this Court
Should review the limitations using the closely-drawn
standard of review applied to contribution limitations in
Buckley, 420 U.S. at 25, and ensuing campaign finance
cases,'* in which the Court specifically acknowledged “that
restrictions on contributions require less compelling
justification than restrictions on independent spending.” FEC
v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL” ), 479 U.S.
238, 259-60 (1986); see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at
387. The Supreme Court lowered the hurdle for contributions,
see Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 387-88, because restrictions
on contributions, in its judgment, impact associationalrights
less by leaving “the contributor free to become a member of
any political association and to assist personally in the
association’s efforts on behalf of candidates,” id. at 387
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22) (internal quotations
omitted), and by not preventing “political committees from
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy,”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. Surely, these reasons for applying a
lower standard of scrutiny for donations to candidates and
their political committees are no less persuasive for analyzing
contributions to political parties.

The plaintiffs, nevertheless, maintain that in Citizens
Against Rent Control, which involved limitations on
contributions to political committees with the purpose of
Supporting or opposing ballot measures, 454 U.S. at 291, the

" This standard of review applies to all donation restrictions under
Title l of BCRA.

'* Since the practical effect is that any restriction on solicitation is
subsumed within the restriction on receipt of donations, which I maintain
should be reviewed under closely-drawn scrutiny, there is no reason to
apply a different standard of review for the solicitation restriction. In the
end, if the political parties are restricted from receiving nonfederal
donations for federal purposes, then they are restricted from soliciting
funds for those purposes as well.

1091sa

Supreme Court settled on_ strict-scrutiny review for
contribution limitations to political organizations.'* This
conclusion is not based on a close enough reading of the case.
While the plurality does suggest the undefined standard of
“exacting judicial scrutiny,” Citizens Against Rent Control,
454 U.S. at 294, 298, the three concurring justices either
specifically applied closely-drawn scrutiny, id. at 301
(Marshall, J., concurring), > or equated the plurality’s
“exacting scrutiny” with Buckley's closely-drawn scrutiny, id.
at 302 (Blackmun, J., & O’Connor, J., concurring). '° Thus, if

'4 See McConnell Opp’n Br. at 17; see also J. Henderson Op. at Part
IV.D.1.a.

'S Justice Marshall observed:

[T}his Court has always drawn a distinction between restrictions on
contributions, and direct limitations on the amount an individual can
expend for his own speech. . . . Because the Court’s opinion is silent
on the standard of review it is applying to this contributions
limitations, I must assume that the Court is following our consistent
position that this type of government action is subjected to less
rigorous scrutiny than a direct restriction on expenditures.

Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring).

'© Although “exacting judicial scrutiny” is oft-cited, its parameters are
loosely defined in other cases as well. The Supreme Court, for example,
employed the phrase “exacting scrutiny” when reviewing FECA’s
disclosure requirements in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, explaining that the
government interest must be “sufficiently important,” id. at 66, and
“substantial,” id. at 80. To give another example: in First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court applied “exacting scrutiny” to
contribution and expenditures limitations on corporations; it stated that the
government must show a “compelling” interest, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 98
S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960)), and that the
interest must be “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment,”
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). In any event,
since it is uncontroverted that preventing actual and apparent corruption is
a “compelling” government interest, see, e.g., NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-
97, the only remaining dispute is whether any donation restriction need be
“narrowly tailored” or “closcly drawn” to serve the compelling

1092sa

anything, Citizens Against Rent Control suggests that closely-
drawn scrutiny should apply, even if the political organization
is established exclusively for a purpose unrelated to federal
campaigns. Restrictions on national political parties, which
engage in both candidate-specific and _ issue-oriented
activities, do not deserve to be treated with greater vigilance.
Indeed, considering the standard of review adopted by the
Supreme Court in Citizens Against Rent Control and the fact
that contribution regulations are less jarring of associational
rights than are expenditure restrictions, restrictions on
donations to political parties should be similarly regulable if
they are closely drawn to serve the compelling government
interest of preventing corruption and its appearance.

2. Donations Used to Directly Affect Federal
Elections are Regulable by Congress

Section 323(a) of BCRA seeks to expand Congress’s
authority to regulate donations that by definition did not
appear to be regulable under FECA because, ostensibly, they
were not | given for the purpose of influencing federal
elections." It does so in sweeping fashion: national parties
“may not solicit, receive, .. . direct . . . transfer, or spend any
funds that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and
reporting requirements of this Act.” BCRA § 101; FECA
§ 323(a); 2 US.C. § 441i(b)(1). Congress seeks this
expansion, principally, because the national parties have
increasingly, over the past decade, exploited a so-called

government interest in combating corruption. And Buckley, coupled with
the various opinions in Citizens Against Rent Control, seemingly
foreclose that question in favor of Buckley’ s closely-drawn scrutiny.

“— they had been intended by the donor to influence federal elections,
they should have been treated, at the time they were received, as federal
money. As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has, in effect, upheld
limitations on contributions to political parties, see supra note 9, and a
“contribution,” as defined by FECA, is a donation “for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i).

1093sa

“loophole” '* in FECA that fails to regulate the use of these
nonfederal. funds for various types of electioneering
communications that advocate the election or defeat of a
specifically identified candidate.”

The defendants contend that Congress, in its attempt to
close this “loophole,” can limit any donation to a national
party, regardless of the purpose for which it is used thereafter.
See Intervenors Opp’n Br. at 26. I disagree. The plaintiffs, on
the other hand, contend that Congress can only limit
donations that are funneled thereafter through the party as
coordinated expenditures, direct contributions to candidates,
or uncoordinated expenditures for express advocacy as
defined by the “magic words.” See, e.g., McConnell Opening
Br. at 36; McConnell Opp’n Br. at 25-26; see also Buckley,
424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (providing examples of “express words of
advocacy”). With that I disagree, as well. Both contentions
are calculatingly indifferent to what reason, and precedent,
have shown to be the only constitutionally viable antidote to
corruption or its appearance: restrictions on donations to
political parties based upon their use to directly affect federal
elections.” In this sense, from my perspective, the issue

'* This so-called “loophole” was created through Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”) advisory opinions. See McCain Dep. at 63 (stating
that BCRA will “close certain loopholes that have been opened by the
FEC, not through acts of Congress”); FEC Advisory Op.1995-25; FEC
Advisory Op.1979- 17; FEC Advisory Op.1978-10.

fs See, e.g., McCain Dep. at 192-93 (explaining that grassroots
activities are “the fundamentals of a democratic process” and that “it’s the
broadcast television and radio ads that we believe are what is the
problem”); Meehan Dep. at 218-19 (explaining that voter mobilization
efforts are “good for the system” and distinguishing those efforts from
candidate advocacy).

” Even the plaintiffs acknowledged that “[i]f BCRA limited only party
activities directly related to federal candidates, Defendants might have the
better argument.” California Democratic Party (“CDP)/California
Republican Party (“CRP”) Reply Br. at 9.

1094sa

before the Court is not whether Congress can limit donations
to political parties,” but to what extent it can do so.

In Shrink Missouri, the Supreme Court made it clear that
the amount of evidence needed to satisfy judicial scrutiny of
restrictions on associational rights depends on the “novelty
and plausibility of the justification raised.” 528 U.S. at 391.
Here, Congress relies upon the government interest of
preventing actual and apparent corruption to justify the
restrictions on nonfederal funds. When nonfederal funds are
being used by national parties for nonfederal or mixed
purposes, the government’s interest in preventing corruption
or its appearance to justify this restraint is so novel, and
implausible, that it requires a substantial amount of evidence
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, when
nonfederal funds are being used by national parties for the
federal purpose of directly benefitting the election of
candidates * through either express advocacy or “issue”
advocacy of the type defined in Section 301(20)(A)(iii),”’ the
government's use of that interest to justify congressional
intervention is neither novel, nor implausible, because the risk
of corruption, see infra Part 1.B.2, naturally flows from

”! See supra note 9.

” There is no disagreement that political parties use donations for
federal purposes. See Findings 30-52; see also Colorado II, 533 U.S. at
449 (“Parties are . . . necessarily the instruments of some contributors
whose object is . . . to support a specific candidate for the sake of a
position on one, narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will
be obliged to the contributors.”). Political parties, inter alia, provide direct
contributions to candidates, see 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (setting contri-
bution limit by political committees to candidates at $5,000); Buckley, 424
U.S. at 35-36, make expenditures in coordination with a federal candidate,
see § 441a(d) (setting party expenditure limits); Colorado II, 533 U.S. at
464 (upholding § 441a(d) only as applied to coordinated expenditures),
and spend money on uncoordinated candidate advocacy, both express and
nonexpress.

*’ See infra Part 1.B.2.

1095sa

circumstances where a donor’s contribution to a party is used
thereafter to directly benefit a candidate’s campaign. Indeed,
as I discuss at length in the later in relation to Section
301(20)(A)(iii), id., the record overwhelmingly demonstrates
that candidates are aware of who makes the large soft money
donations, and in many instafices, participate in raising
money from them. Furthermore, the record clearly establishes
that the public perceives that those large soft money donors
receive special access to the legislators and have special
influence on the legislative process. /d.

The notion that using donations for a federal purpose can
implicate corruption is consistent with Congress’s definition
of “contribution” in FECA: “any gift, subscription, loan,
advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by
any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
This definition of contribution was part of FECA when the
Supreme Court upheld contribution limitations in Buckley,
stating that a donation is regulable (that is, a “contribution )
because “it is connected with a candidate or his campaign,”
thus having “a sufficiently close relationship” to the
government interest in preventing actual or apparent
corruption. 424 U.S. at 78. Additionally, the contention that a
party’s use of a donation to influence a federal election is
conducive to-corruption, or its appearance, is also supported
by the widely accepted premise that Congress can restrict
donations used for party express advocacy as defined by the
so-called “magic words” requirement of Buckley. Indeed, the
plaintiffs concede as much,” and this is perfectly consistent

4 See, e.g., RNC Opp’n Br. at 37 (conceding that Buckley and its
progeny indicate that contributions to a party may be regulated and
subjected to a federal contribution limit “only to the extent the entity uses
the contributions for regulable activity,” which includes “independent
expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of federal

~ candidates”); id. (stating that money political parties receive for express
advocacy “may constitutionally be subjected to a federal contribution

1096sa

with the regulatory scheme that was propagated by the FEC.”
Surely, if donations used for express advocacy can be limited
to prevent corruption, then donations used for candidate
advocacy that is tantamount to express advocacy—assuming
some minimal “quantum of empirical evidence” of corruption
or its appearance, see Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391—
should be regulable for the same reason.

The notion that Congress may limit donations based on
their use for certain purposes is also consistent with Supreme
Court precedent which intimates that donations closely
connected to a candidate’s campaign—even if they are not
direct contributions or coordinated expenditures—raise, at a
minimum, the specter of corruption. In First Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, the Court rejected a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting corporations from making contributions or
expenditures to influence the vote on referendum proposals.
435 U.S. 765, 787- 95 (1978). In rejecting the statute, the
Court explained that the interests in preventing corruption and
thus preserving the integrity of the electoral process were not
served by limiting contributions and expenditures that
affected referendum discussion. /d. at 789-92. The Court
stated: “Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for
public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases
involving candidate elections simply is not present in a

limit”); McConnell Opening Br. at 36, 37-38 (admitting that a
contribution to be used for activities that exclusively serve to get a
candidate elected, like express advocacy, can be corrupting).

*> See FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25 (not allowing use of nonfederal funds
to pay for any portion of party express advocacy). One of the reasons that
parties should not be able to fund uncoordinated express advocacy with
nonfederal funds is that if such a restriction did not exist, corporations and
labor unions could simply evade the limitations on their use of their
geneyal-treasury funds for express advocacy by funneling those funds
through the parties. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b; MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-64
(upholding prohibition against using corporate treasuries to fund
uncoordinated expenditures for express advocacy).

1097sa

popular vote on a public issue.” /d. at 790. Alternatively, one
can infer that perceived corruption is likely to be present in
cases involving candidate elections.

The extent to which certain uses of donations create the
risk of corruption was also at issue in both California
Medical, 453 U.S. at 193-201, and Citizens Against Rent
Control, 454 U.S. at 292-300, where the Court considered
donations to organizations, not candidates. It is difficult to
reconcile these two cases without drawing the conclusion that
the Court was primarily concerned with the purpose for
which the organizations were using the donations.” In
California Medical, the Court held that Congress can restrict
the amount of donations to multicandidate political
committees “which advocate[] the views and candidacies of a
number of candidates.” 453 U.S. at 197. Multicandidate
political committees assuredly spend some of their funds on
“independent expenditures,” as the Court in California
Medical concedes, id. at 195-96, but the Court seemingly
concluded that those uncoordinated expenditures, by a
“multicandidate” political committee, are made on behalf of
candidates, whether direct contributions or uncoordinated
expenditures. See 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(4) (defining multi-
candidate political committee as a political committee “which
has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and. .
. has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal
office.”). The Court said as much when it dismissed the
ACLU’s concerns that donation restrictions would hinder the

© Not surprisingly, the defendants rely on California Medical for the
proposition that Congress can regulate ali donations to political
organizations, see, e.g., RNC Opp’n Br. at 36; the plaintiffs equally rely
on Citizens Against Rent Control for their contention that Congress
cannot regulate any donations to such organizations, see, e.g., Gov't
Opening Br. at 65-66. Again, both positions sweep too far and cannot be
reconciled without parsing the Supreme Court’s rationales in the two
cases.

1098sa

PAC’s efforts to collectively express political views.
California Medical, 455 U.S. at 197 n.17. Restricting
contributions to committees like the one at issue in California
Medical, the Court maintained, is different than efforts to
regulate groups expressing common political views. /d. In
this sense, the nature of the organization—that it is
established solely to benefit federal candidates—was enough
to conclude that most, if not all, of its contributions and
expenditures were for the purpose, and had the effect, of
benefitting a federal candidate. Conversely, in Citizens
Against Rent Control, where the Court found that the City of
Berkeley could not restsict donations to political committees
that support or oppose ballot propositions, 454 U.S. at 295-
300, the organization was established exclusively to advocate
on behalf of a public issue, id. at 291 (explaining that the
issue before the Court was whether donations to associations
“formed to support or oppose ballot measures” could be
regulated). That the association was formed only to oppose a
public issue and that its speech was unrelated to candidates in
any way, id. at 296-98, led the Court to find that the
restriction “does not advance a legitimate governmental
interest significant enough to justify its infringement of First
Amendment rights,” id. at 299.

Of course, political parties are unique; they are neither
super multicandidate political committces formed entirely to
support candidates for federal office nor political associations
completely uninvolved_in candidate advocacy. Justice
Kennedy described political parties this way:

Political parties have a unique role in serving [the
principle of open, robust debate on public issues]; they
exist to advance their members’ shared political beliefs.

. A political party has its own traditions and
principles that transcend the interests of individual
candidates and campaigns; but in the context of

1099sa
particular elections, candidates are necessary to make the
party’s message known and effective, and vice versa.

Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 628 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).”’ With
such varying purposes, national political parties merit a
hybrid treatment in regulating the funds donated to them.

Further, Colorado I and Colorado Il do not preclude
Congress from regulating donations that directly affect
federal elections, even if the parties use those funds
independently of the candidates ** and even if there is no
coordination between the donor and the candidate. In
Colorado I, the Supreme Court merely found that Congress
could not limit uncoordinated party expenditures. 518 U.S.
617. Indecc, the Court even reiterated that Congress has
every power to limit the amount of donations to parties that
are “used for independent party expenditures for the benefit
of a particular candidate.” 518 U.S. at 617. Thus, if anything,
Colorado I serves to bolster the proposition that Congress can
regulate donations used “for the benefit of a particular
candidate” because that is where “the greatest danger of

*” One Republican National Committee (“RNC”) official explained his
party this way:
The RNC achieves [its core principles} through three primary
means: (1) promoting an issue agenda advocating Republican
_ positions on issues of local, state, regional, national, and
international importance; (2) electing candidates who espouse these
views to local, state and national offices; and (3) governing in
accord with these views. . . . [T]he RNC often seeks to promote
Republican positions on important issues, even in contexts outside
elections.
Josefiak Decl. ¥ 22.

78 See J. Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.1.c (arguing that “Congress
cannot constitutionally regulate non-federal donations to political parties
if the funds are then spent independently of a candidate”).

1100sa

corruption” arises. /d.7” Reading Colorado | together with
Buckley, Bellotti, Citizens Against Rent Control, and
California Medical \eaves one with a clear impression:
donations used directly for the purpose of uncoordinated
federal activity, like express advocacy, can engender
corruption, or the appearance thereof,' and are therefore
regulable.” Finally, Colorado II, in which the Supreme
Court determined that Congress could limit the amount of
coordinated party expenditures, 533 U.S. at 440-65, is
relevant because it stands for the proposition that a
contribution by the party to the candidate, even absent
coordination between the donor and candidate, can be
regulated. Thus, donations to political parties used thereafter
for purposes that directly affect federal elections, such as
candidate “issue ads,” even if there is no coordination
between the donor and the candidates in advance of the

? The Supreme Court also noted that the opportunity for corruption
posed by nonfederal contributions to a party for certain activities, such as
supporting state candidates or voter mobilizations efforts, is “at best,
attenuated” because “[u]nregulated ‘soft money’ contributions may not be
used to influence a federal campaign.” Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 616. That
observation implies that if soft money were being used “to influence a
federal campaign,” the opportunities for corruption would be less
attenuated, perhaps even palpable. Also, note that the Supreme Court’s
observation that “[ujnregulated ‘soft money’ contributions may not be
used to influence a federal campaign,” id., preceded the 1996 explosion of
party candidate advocacy financed with nonfederal funds. See Mann
Expert Report at 17-21. From 1996 unti! the enactment of BCRA, the
parties used nonfederal funds for the exact purpose that the Supreme
Court stated those funds cannot be used for: “to influence a federal
campaign.” Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 616.

” See Jacobus v. Alaska, 182 F.Supp.2d 881, 889 (D.Alaska 2001)
(explaining that there is no appearance of corruption from political party
“donations of time, money and services ... not being made for nominating
and electing candidates” and holding that “donations to political parties
for purposes other than nominating or electing purposes (e.g., issue
advocacy, voter registration) may not constitutionally be considered
contributions subject to regulation . . . .”)

1101sa

donations to the party, should likewise be regulable. Common
sense and the evidence introduced by the defendants support
that conclusion. See infra Part 1.B.2. And, until such time as
Buckley and its progeny are overruled, allowing such
donations to occur without regulation is an affront to a
regulatory system that has been blessed by the Supreme Court
and in place since the adoption of the 1974 amendments
to FECA.

3. New FECA § Section 323(a) Uncon-
stitutionally Regulates the Use of Nonfederal
Funds for Nonfederal and Mixed Purposes

As sure as the evidence, legal precedent, and common
sense support Congress’s power to regulate the use of
nonfederal funds for federal purposes, they do not support
Congress’s effort to regulate nonfederal funds used for
nonfederal and mixed purposes. National parties need to raise
and use nonfederal funds for a variety of purposes.
Sometimes they raise and use nonfederal funds for the
nonfederal purpose of contributing to state and local
candidates in “off-year” elections when there are no federal
candidates on the ballot.*' Other times they need to raise and

* As one RNC official testified: “The RNC’s national focus should not
be misunderstood as a federal focus. Rather, given the RNC’s state- based
structure, it is not surprising that the RNC actually focuses many of its
resources on purely state and local election activity.” Josefiak Decl. ¢ 19. I
agree. In 1999 and 2001, the RNC contributed over $9.5 million dollars,
using nonfederal funds, directly to state and local candidates. Banning
Decl. 28(a); see also Findings 57-59 (explaining, inter alia, that five
states hold elections in odd-numbered years). For example, the RNC
contributed approximately $500,000 to the 1999 Republican gubernatorial
candidate in Virginia. La Raja Decl. ¢ 14. In the last two off-year
elections, the RNC also transferred over $10 million to state parties and
made over $1 million dollars in direct expenditures, bringing the total to
$21 million dollars, not including administrative overhead, spent on the
two elections where no federal candidates appeared on the ballot. Banning
Decl. § 28(a). In 2001 alone, the RNC spent $15.6 million on nonfederal

1102sa

use funds for mixed purposes that only indirectly affect the
election of federal candidates, such as generic voter
mobilization efforts and genuine issue advertisements.” The

activities (contributions to state and local candidates, transfers to state
parties, and direct spending). That $15.6 million dollars represented 30
percent of all nonfederal money raised that year by the RNC. See Hearing
Tr. (Dec. 4, 2002) at 43 (statement of Burchfield). Thus for elections in
which there is no federal candidate on the ballot, the RNC contributes
directly to state and local candidates, trains state and local candidates, and
funds communications calling for election or defeat of state and local
candidates. See id.; Josefiak Decl. 4 4 19, 41-59; La Raja Decl. 4 14; see
also Bok-.Cross Exam. at 34-35. Even defendants’ expert Thomas E.
Mann agreed that donations to a gubernatorial candidate in an odd-
numbered year is not something that is intended to affect a federal
election. Cross Exam. of Def. Expert Mann et 71.

Of course, the RNC made direct contributions to state and local
candidates during even-numbered years as well, see Josefiak Decl. 4 61,
and “sometimes devote[d] significant resources toward states with
competitive gubernatorial races even though the races for federal offices
[were] less competitive,” Josefiak Decl. ¥ 62.

* Portions of RNC transfers to state and local parties were used for
voter mobilization efforts. One RNC official testified that “RNC transfers
of non-federal funds to the state parties play a critical role in subsidizing
the activities of the state parties. The state parties depend on these funds to
pay for everything from their own administrative overhead to voter
mobilization, grass roots organizing, and media.” Banning Decl. 31; see
also Duncan Decl. {4 11-12. In 2000, for example, the RNC transferred
approximately $25 million in nonfederal funds to the Republican's
Victory Plans, which were plans tailored to each state’s needs and
designed to mobilize voters on behalf of all the candidates on the ticket.
Josefiak Decl. #4 2. 40. Money for the Victory Plans was not spent on
federal candidate “issue ads,” Josefiak Decl. ¢ 31, and was used primarily
to benefit state and local candidates, see Peschong Decl. 4{ 4, 8-9 (stating
that “the RNC typically provides a very substantial share of the funding of

State victory programs,” which are “programs designed to support the

entire Republican ticket, and frequently place more emphasis on high
profile state-wide races than on federal races, especially when no federal
candidate is running state-wide”). Other examples of mixed activities
include party newsletters, administrative overhead, training seminars on

1103sa

defendants do not deny that the national parties use
nonfederal funds for both nonfederal and mixed purposes that
at the most indirectly affect federal elections. They contend,
nonetheless, that nonfederal donations to national parties—
regardless of their use—create actual or apparent corruption.
See Intervenors Opp’n Br. at 26. To support that expansion of
Congress’s power in contravention of the First Amendment
rights of the donors and national parties, the defendants
would have to demonstiate that using nonfederal funds for
either nonfederal or mixed purposes gives rise to either
corruption or an appearance of corruption, such that the
blanket restriction on nonfederal funds is not overbroad. For
the following reasons, they have not done so.

First, the suggestion that the appearance of corruption, let
alone actual corruption, exists regardless of any perceived, or
actual, benefit to a federal candidate does not comport with
the conventional legal understanding of corruption and
apparent corruption. The Supreme Court has defined
corruption as something more than a quid pro quo
arrangement in which a legislator sells his vote for one or
more contributions to his campaign, see, e.g., Colorado Il,
533 U.S. at 440-41, as well as “improper influence” or
conduct by a donor that results in a legislator who is “too
compliant” with the donor, Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 389.
Of course, the Supreme Court has also recognized that

get-out-the-vote activities, and fundraising assistance to state and local
parties. See Findings 71-99.

Considering the national parties’ extensive involvement in so many
nonfederal and mixed activities, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court has recognized that political parties do not use all of their donations
to affect federal elections, explaining in Colorado | that FECA permits
unregulated ‘soft money’ contributions for certain nonfederal and mixed
purposes. 518 U.S. at 616 (“We also recognize that FECA permits
unregulated “soft money” contributions to a party for certain activities,
such as electing candidates for state office, or for voter registration and
“get out the vote” drives.”) (internal citations omitted).

1104sa

Congress has an equally compelling government interest in
preventing the appearance of corruption in the public’s mind.
Id. at 390; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. The reason for this is
simple: like corruption itself, the appearance of corruption
undermines the public’s confidence in our system of
government and frustrates participation in the political
process by causing the public to believe elected
representatives are not acting independently of the
individuals, corporations, and unions who contribute to
representatives’ campaigns and parties. Shrink Missouri, 528
U.S. at 390. Indeed, contribution limits to federal candidates
and parties were enacted, and have been upheld by the
Supreme Court, to prevent this very perception in the mind of
the public. /d.; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23- 35. And it has been
Congress’s province to set the dollar limit above which this
perception starts to ferment. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30;
Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397. Thus, whether the
corruption is actual or perceived, every traditional and
accepted definition to date depends on the donor conferring,
or being perceived as having conferred, a benefit on the
candidate in return for something.”? In NCPAC, for example,

* See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497; see also
Black's Law Dictionary 1261 (7th ed.1999) (translating quid pro quo as
“something for something”). Defense expert Donald P. Green explained
that corruption, whether quid pro quo or otherwise, “redound[s] to the
personal benefit of the candidate seeking to win election.” Green Expert
Report at 20. ;

Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s belief that, notwithstanding my statements to
the contrary, I am narrowly construing the definition of corruption as
“something akin to bribery” is, in my judgment, an inaccurate reading of
my opinion. See J. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at Part ITIL11.B.2.a.i. That said,
regardless of how you describe the acts by an officeholder that are
“contrary to their obligations of office,” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497; see,
e.g., Intervenors Opening Br. at 43 (“legislative effort”) (quoting Green
Expert Report at 23-24); Gov't Reply Br. at 15-16 (“access”); Shrink
Missouri, 528 U.S. at 389 (“politicians too compliant with the wishes of
large contributors”), the more telling portion of the corruption equation

1105sa

the Supreme Court defined corruption in the following way:
“Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected
officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of
office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or
infusions of money into their campaigns.” 470 U.S. at 497.
Without financial gain to themselves or money into their
campaigns, why would candidates elect to act contrary to
their obligations? In short, since donations cannot logically
foster corruption, or its appearance, unless the candidate
benefits or appears to benefit in some way, donations to a
party with no prospect that they will be used to directly affect
the candidate’s election, cannot, absent substantial evidence

to the contrary, give rise to either actual or apparent
corruption.

Second, the defendants’ contention, in essence, that
Congress can regulate the use of soft money donations by
national parties for either nonfederal, or mixed, purposes is
equally unsupportable by the record and common sense. If a
national party uses nonfederal funds to support generic voter
registration, or to conduct training seminars for state parties
on get-out-the vote activities, the benefit to the federal
candidate, assuming his election is even being contested, is
attenuated at best, Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 616, because it is
generic in nature and diluted among a far greater number of
state and local candidates. See infra Part I.B.1. No credible
evidence has been submitted by the defendants that
demonstrates that federal candidates either are, or are
perceived to be, indebted to donors as a result of such mixed-

for the purpose of understanding my opinion is the Supreme Court’s
description of the prospective benefit to the officeholder that supposedly
influences him to act: “the prospect of financial gain to themselves or
infusions of money into their campaign.” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497. Only
an actual or potential benefit of the kind described by the Supreme Court
can lure an officeholder into conduct sufficiently corrupting to warrant
Congress's regulation.

1106sa

purpose party activities.* Moreover, donations used for
generic issue advertisements that may be helpful to both state
and federal candidates, another example of a mixed-purpose
activity by a party that indirectly affects federal elections in a
way unlinked to any particular candidate’s election or re-
election, also do not foster actual or apparent corruption.
Political parties, like many other political organizations,
engage in noncandidate-related speech (i.e., genuine or pure
issue ads) to influence public opinion on issues of the day.”

“ Judge Kollar-Kotelly references in her opinion an identical statement
by officials of the four national party congressional committees describing
as “significant” the effect “that voter identification, voter registration and
get out the vote efforts” have on the election of federal candidates. See J.
Kollar-Kotelly Op. at Part III.11.B.2.b.ii. That “combined” statement is not
in my judgment proof per se that such efforts (either individually or
collectively) directly affect federal elections. Indeed, there is no
quantitative evidence in the record demonstrating the extent to which
voter registration, voter identification, and get-out-the-vote efforts assist
federal candidates, as opposed to the far greater number of state and local
candidates that appear on the ballot. Determining that, of course, is
exacerbated by the practical reality that congressional races in many states
are either noncompetitive, or uncontested. Simply stated, there is no way
of knowing the election impact value of what is considered “significant”
in the eyes of these party officials. Moreover, because these officials do
not specify which, if any, of these were “generic” efforts, there is no way
of knowing whether the activities to which they are referring were crafted
in a way to specifically turn out voters for particular federal candidates.
Of course, if they had been, they would not be permissible under this
Court’s ruling today. See supra Part 1.A.2 & infra Part I.B.2. As a result, I
accord limited probative value to these identical statements on this point.

5 See Josefiak Decl. 4 91(e) (“The RNC seeks to educate the public
about the positions for which the Republican Party stands .”); La Raja
Decl. 4 16 (“Political parties use nonfederal funds to develop and
disseminate political messages.”); Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 616
(recognizing that “a political party's independent expression . . . reflects
its members’ views about the philosophical and governmental matters that
bind them together”); id. at 629 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that political parties “exist to advance their
members’ shared political beliefs”)

1107sa

Just recently, for example, the RNC funded a generic issue
advertisement on the radio that touted the Republican’s
education proposal. It broadcasted the following:

Male: Every child can learn .. .

Female: . . . and deserves a quality education in a safe
school.

Male: But some people say some children can’t learn. . .
Female: . . . so just shuffle them through.

Male: That’s not fair.

Female: That’s not right.

Male: Things are changing. A new federal law says
every child deserves to learn.

Female: It says test every child to make sure they’re
learning and give them extra help if they’re not.

Male: Hold schools accountable. Because no child
should be in a school that will not teach and will not
change.

Female: The law says every child must be taught to read
by the 3rd grade. Because reading is a new civil right.
Male: President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Law.
Female: The biggest education reform and biggest
increase in education funding in 25 years.

Male: Republicans are working for better, safer schools

Female: . . . so no child is left behind.

Male: That’s right . . . Republicans.

Anncr: Learn how Republican education reforms can
help your children. Call .... Help President Bush and
leave No Child Behind.

Josefiak Decl. | 91(e) & Exhibit X. While pure issue
advocacy, like the above advertisement, can indirectly affect
a federal election,”® it is unlikely, and there is no evidence to

* See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42-43, 43 n.50 (“Public discussion of public
issues . . . tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on voting

1108sa

the contrary, that candidates will feel indebted to those who
helped fund such advertisements. Moreover, the fact that state
and local parties would still be able to use nonfederal money
to engage in genuine issue advocacy *” serves to undermine
Section 323(a)’s complete ban on national parties being able
to do the same.” Lastly, if the above analysis is true with
regard to the inability to demonstrate even an appearance of
corruption when nonfederal funds are being used for mixed
purposes that indirectly affect a federal election, it is even
more true when the purpose is nonfederal and has no effect
on any federal candidate’s election or re-election. In short, the

at elections.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 875 (D.C. Cir.
1975))).

*” BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(b); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1); BCRA § 101;
FECA § 301(20)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A). The state and local parties
could also presumably use nonfederal funds for all other mixed activities
not included within Section 301(20)(A)’s definition of “federal election
activity.”

** In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU” ),
513 U.S. 454, 473-75, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995), the
Supreme Court rejected a complete ban on honoraria for government
employees because, in part, Congress exempted certain speeches that had
no nexus to the government employment, explaining that the exemption
“cast serious doubt on the Government’s submission” that the honoraria
was so “threatening ... as to render the ban a reasonable response to the
threat.” /d. at 473. The Court thus found that Congress’s exemption
undermined application of the ban to speeches without a connection to
government employment: “[a]bsent such a nexus, no corrupt bargain or
even appearance of impropriety appears likely.” /d. at 474; see also City
of Ladue v. Giileo, 512 U.S. 43, 52, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36
(1994) (observing that exemptions “may diminish the credibility of the
government's rationale for restricting speech in the first place”).

Further, Congress's decision to only restrict state and local parties from
using nonfederal funds for candidate advocacy, see BCRA § 101; FECA
§ 301(20) A) iii); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)A)(iii), reinforces the premise that
actual or apparent corruption manifests only when there is a nexus to a
federal candidate.

1109sa

defendants have provided no legal basis to restrict a national
party's use of nonfederal funds for nonfederal purposes.

Third and finally, the defendants’ contention that
candidates, who raise soft money donations for their national
parties, regardless of their subsequent use, are indebted to the
donors due to “internal party benefits” they subsequently
receive for raising the nonfederal donations,” is equally
tenuous from both a theoretical and an evidentiary standpoint,
and, in any event, Section 323(a) remains insufficiently
tailored based on that justification to pass constitutional
muster. The defendants’ contention is theoretically flawed
because it proceeds from the premise that the corruption, or
appearance of corruption, necessary to warrant congressional
intervention can be satisfied by a federal candidate receiving
a benefit other than personal financial gain or direct
assistance, monetary or otherwise, to his election effort. The
Supreme Court has never defined corruption, or its
appearance, in those terms. As stated previously, the only
benefit the Supreme Court has based a finding on is “the
prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusiGns of
money into their campaigns.” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497.”
Even if the Court did, however, bless the notion that a
nonmonetary benefit from someone other than the donor
could, under the right circumstances, give rise to an

® See Intervenors Opp’n Br. at 26-27 (explaining that “without regard
to how soft money is ultimately spent, . . . the parties reward [federal
candidates and officeholders] for raising it” and that “success in the party
reinforces stature in the government because federal officeholders attain
leadership positions in Congress partly as a result of their success as
fundraisers” (citing Bumpers Decl. ¢§ 7-9)).

” Cf. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-
Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First
Amendment After All, 94 Colum. L.Rev. 1281, 1313 (1994) (“If
candidates did not stand to gain much for their own campaigns from the
money so raised, one doubts that party loyalties (or pressure) would lead
to excessive diversion of candidate time to [soft money] fund-raising.”’).

1110sa

indebtedness that the public could perceive as “corrupting”’ its
legislator’s independence, there is no evidence on this record
that such corruption has either occurred or is perceived by the
public to exist. The evidence relating to the appearance of
corruption, such as it is, only establishes that the public
believes there is a connection between large donations to
national parties and the influence and access the pubic
believes the donors receive. See infra Part I.B. It does not,
however, establish that this connection exists independent of
how the parties use the funds. If anything, the public’s regular
exposure to so-called “issue ads” sponsored by the parties and
crafted to help their candidates,*' combined with its lack of
knowledge of the difference between soft and hard money
and its lack of knowledge of the campaign finance regulations
(both of which have been demonstrated,’ should lead this
Court to reasonably infer that the public believes that these
donations are used in whole, on in part, by the parties to
directly help their candidates. It is that perceived benefit, in
my judgment, that gives rise to the public’s view that
officeholders, either out of gratitude, or in hope of similar
future contributions, provide increased access and influence
to those donors. And in light of the utter absence of evidence
on the record establishing -any other reason that the public
believes accounts for federal officeholders granting increased
influence and access to those who give large donations to
their party, this Court should infer the same. In any event, the
defendants’ argument is flawed because their supposed
internal-party-benefit rationale was not even relied upon by
Congress to limit the national parties use of nonfederal funds.
If it had been, Congress would have only restricted

*' These advertisements clearly show who funds the advertisements,
Stating in no uncertain terms at the end of each advertisement: “Paid for
by the Republican National Committee” or “Paid for by Republican Party
of Florida.” See, e.g., Findings 45 & 46.

* See Findings 264-67.

lllisa

nonfederal funds that federal candidates themselves solicited.
Thus, Section 323(a)’s sweeping restriction, even if
acceptable theoretically and factually based on the internal-
party-benefit rationale, is not sufficiently tailored to “alleviate
[the] harm in a direct and material way.” Turner

Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC (“Turner I”), 512 U.S. 622,
664 (1994).4

In sum, conduct which only indirectly affects a federal
election requires a greater degree of evidence of corruption,
Or appez.atice thereof, to warrant congressional regulation.
Thus, in vic absence of sufficient proof to warrant expanding
FECA in this direction, Congress may only prohibit the
national parties from using nonfederal money for federal
purposes such as those defined in Section 301(20)(A)(iii),
which are clearly designed to directly affect federal elections.
The use of nonfederal funds for nonfederal or mixed
purposes, which at the most indirectly affect federal elections,
is simply not regulable by Congress because it does not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. Thus
Section 323(a)’s complete ban on the use of nonfederal funds
is not closely drawn to serve the designated government
interest.

4. Severability of New FECA Section 323(a)

Because Section 323(a) prohibits all uses of nonfederal
funds by national parties, and because I only uphold
Congress’s power to prohibit the use of nonfederal funds for
federal purposes (as defined in Section 301(20)(A)(iii)), see

** It has also been suggested by one of the defendants’ witnesses that
Members of Congress raising soft money donations receive the additional
benefit of helping their parties retain control of Congress. See Hickmott
Decl. Exhibit A 4 18. Even assuming, arguendo, that this benefit is not too
attenuated to establish a sense of indebtedness to the large party donors, it
is severely undercut if the parties cannot, as we have held, use large
nonfederal donations to directly assist the election and re-election of their
members. See supra Part 1.A.2 & infra Part 1.B.2.

1112sa

infra Part 1.B.2, a considerable issue is presented as to
whether we can isolate and uphold that prohibition from the
remaining undefined, unconstitutional prohibitions in Section
323(a) in a manner consistent with both the severance clause
and Supreme Court precedent. For the following reasons, |
believe we can and should.

It is a “cardinal principle” of statutory construction to save
as much of a statute as possible. See NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (Hughes, C.J. ye
Indeed, Congress itself in Section 401 of BCRA provided us
with a severability clause which directed us to do as much.”
In attempting to save a statute, however, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that a court must take great pains to avoid

“ See also Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d
645 (1988) (“([E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order
to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” (quoting Harper v. California,
155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895))); Regan v. Time,
Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) (“[A]
court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is
necessary.”); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 242, 116
S.Ct. 1186, 134 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
that a court is required to find a “limiting construction or partial
invalidation” that will “remove the seeming threat or deterrence to
constitutionally protected expression” (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973))); see also
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 86
L.Ed.2d 394 (1985) (observing that a statute should be “declared invalid
to the extent it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact’).

*S The severability clause states: “If any provision of this Act or
amendment made by this Act, or the application of a provision or
amendment to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional,
the remainder of this Act and the amendments made by this Act, and the
application of the provisions and amendment to any person or
circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.” BCRA § 401.

1113sa

“rewriting” the statute.“ Thus, a severability clause, due in
part to separation of powers concerns, is merely an “aid,” not
a “command,” to the judiciary. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has frequently found statutory provisions uncon-
Stitutional (or constitutional) as to particular applications
without invalidating (or validating) the entire provision.*’ In
the campaign finance arena, the Supreme Court in Colorado |
and Colorado II did not object to severing applications of
Section 441a(d), a FECA provision that caps how much

“ See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464, 111 S.Ct. 1919,
114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“The canon of construction
that a court should strive to interpret a statute in a way that will avoid an
unconstitutional construction is useful in close cases, but it is ‘not a
license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.’”

(quoting U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105-

L.Ed.2d 512 (1989))); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’ n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 841, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (“Although this
Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against
constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of
perverting the purpose of statute . . . or judicially rewriting it.” (quoting
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12
L.Ed.2d 992 (1964) (internal quotations omitted))); United States vy.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985)
(explaining any attempt “to rewrite language enacted by the legislature . . .
while purporting to be an exercise of judicial restraint, would trench upon
the legislative powers vested in Congress by Article I, § 1, of the
Constitution” (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741-42, 104 S.Ct.
1387, 79 L.Ed.2d 646 (1984))); In re Espy, 800 F.3d 501, 505
(D.C.Cir. 1996).

” See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123
L.Ed.2d 543 (1993) (rejecting a broad ban on solicitation only as applied
to the business context); Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502-07, 504 (partially
invalidating moral nuisance law “only insofar as the word ‘lust’ is to be
understood as reaching protected materials”); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 175, 183, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (invalidating
prohibition of speech activities on Supreme Court grounds “as applied to
the public sidewalks”); see also NTEU, 513 U.S. at 487 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing
examples).

1114sa

political parties can spend.” In Colorado I, the Supreme
Court invalidated Section 44la(d) as applied to
uncoordinated, or independent, expenditures. 518 U.S. at 613-
20. It then remanded the question of whether Section
441a(d)’s application to coordinated expenditures was
constitutional, directing the lower. courts to determine
“whether or not Congress would have wanted [Section
441a(d)’s] limitations to stand were they to apply only to
coordinated, and not to independent, expenditures.” /d. at
625-26. On remand the district court found that Section
441a(d)’s application to coordinated expenditures was
severable from its application to uncoordinated expenditures.
41 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206- 07 (D. Co. 1999). The district
court found the two applications severable because of the
“strong” severability provision, which is almost identical to
the provision at issue here, and because there was “no
evidence” that Congress would not have rejected Section
441a(d) as applied to coordinated party expenditures. Id. at
1207. Both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court, noting
that the severability argument was not renewed upon appeal,
let the district court’s decision stand. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at
440 n.5; FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 213 F.3d 1221, 1225 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000). In the end,
though the language in Section 441a(d) makes no reference to.
coordinated or uncoordinated expenditures, the Supreme
Court upheld certain applications of the provision
(coordinated party expenditures) but invalidated other
applications (uncoordinated party expenditures).

“ Specifically, Section 441a(d) states that political parties “may not
make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of
a candidate in Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party
which exceeds” $10,000 in a House campaign and, in a senatorial
campaign, the greater of $20,000 or “2 cents multiplied by the voting age
population of the State.” 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3).

1115sa

Typically the Supreme Court invalidates specific
applications, while letting others stand, when it can
confidently discern congressional intent. In one recent case
where the Supreme Court refused to limit the application of a
statute which banned all honoraria to government employees,
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
(“NTEU” ), 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995), it did so because it was
faced with considerable uncertainty as to how Congress
would have defined the honoraria restriction if it had known
the complete ban on honoraria would have been rejected as
unconstitutional. /d.*” For a number of reasons, we do not
have that problem here.

* The Court in NTEU shied away from a limiting construction, in part,
because it could not be sure that it “would correctly identify the nexus
Congress would have adopted in a more limited honoraria ban.” 513 U.S.
at 479. “[Djrawing one or more lines between categories of speech
covered by an overly broad statute, when Congress has sent inconsistent
signals as to where the new line or lines should be drawn, involves a far
more serious invasion of the legislative domain.” /d. at 479 n. 26. The
Court echoed this concern in Reno v. ACLU, where it refused to apply a
tailoring construction to provisions seeking to protect minors from
“indecent” and “patently offensive” internet communications. 521 U.S.
844, 883-88, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997). It found that, in a
facial chailenge, a court “may impose a limiting construction on a statute
only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such a construction.” Jd. at 884
(quoting Virginia v. American Bookseller's Ass'n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383,
397, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988)). The Supreme Court
Suggested that a statute is “readily susceptible” for a limiting construction
when the statute provides “guidance ... for limiting its coverage” and “the
text or other source of congressional intent identified a clear line that this
Court could draw.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 884.

Justice O’Connor, in her dissent in NTEU, lamented that “a court
should not [ | throw up its hands and despair of delineating the area of
unconstitutionality” and that it is “inconsistent with congressional intent
to strike a greater portion of the statute than is necessary to remedy the
problem at hand.” 513 U.S. at 486-89 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 501-03 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s remedy as an “O. Henry
ending”).

1116sa

First, with regard to Title I, Congress’s intent, based on
both the severability clause and the text of the statute, is
unambiguous. The clause itself, of course, directs that the
Court save “the application of the provisions ... to any person
or circumstance.” BCRA § 401. However, as_ stated
previously, such a clause only creates a presumption of
severability.~ It does not relieve this Court of its obligation to
determine if the limiting construction of Section 323(a) can
stand alone, and if Congress would have enacted such a
construction knowing that its broader position would be held
unconstitutional.°' With regard to both the former and the
latter, Congress, by defining “federal election activity” in
Section 301(20)(A)(iii) to include certain communications
which directly affect federal elections and by constitutionally
prohibiting state parties from engaging in such activity in
Section 323(b), has unequivocally indicated its intent that
such activity—as defined—would be among the undefined
uses of nonfederal funds that national parties were similarly
being prohibited from engaging in under Section 323(a). To
conclude otherwise would be to turn a blind eye to an obvious

” See Reno, 521 U.S. at 884 n. 49 (explaining that “[iJn part because of
separation-of-powers concerns, we have held that a severability clause is
‘an aid merely; not an inexorable command’” (quoting Dorchy v. Kansas,
264 U.S. 286, 290, 44 S.Ct. 323, 68 L.Ed. 686 (1924))); Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987);
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1394
(D.C.Cir.1990) (agreeing that “‘the ultimate determination of severability
will rarely turn on the presence or absence” of a severability clause
(quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n. 27, 88 S.Ct. 1209,
20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968))).

*! See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.
172, 191, 119 S.Ct. 1187, 143 L.Ed.2d 270 (1999) (“Unless it is evident
that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may
be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.” (quoting Champlin
Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234, 52 _
S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932))); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108-09 (same).

1117sa

reason why Sections 323(b) and 301(20)(A) were written in
the first place: to prohibit donors (especially corporations and
unions) and the national parties from circumventing Section
323(a) by funneling soft money through state and local
parties for Section 301(20)(A) purposes. By limiting the
prohibited uses of nonfederal funds by national parties in
Section 323(a) to communications of the kind defined by
Congress in its own words in 301(20)(A)(iii), I am neither
employing a saving construction that “rewrites” Section
323(a), nor ignoring Congress’s clear intention to save an
implicit feature of that section consistent with BCRA’s
severance clause admonition.

Finally, by applying Section 301(20)(A)(iii), which I hold
to be constitutionally acceptable for Section 323(b), see infra
Pari 1.B.2, to define the prohibited conduct in Section 323(a),
I avoid the Supreme Court’s additional concern of creating a

* See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. $2138 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
McCain) (“Closing the [state and local party] loophole is crucial to
prevent evasion of the new federal rules.”); 147 Cong. Rec. $2928 (Mar.
27, 2001) (Sen.Schumer) (“[R Jegulating soft money without dealing with
the soft money that goes to State parties is like the person who drinks a
Diet Coke with his double cheeseburger and fries: It does not quite get the
job done.”); 145 Cong Rec. H8275 (Sept. 14, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Kaptur) (stating that banning nonfederal funds for national parties but
allowing it for state parties is “like bolting the front door to protect
yourself from burglars while hanging a neon sign on the back door that
says, ‘Come on in” *); 144 Cong. Rec. H7323 (Aug. 6, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Roukema) (stating that allowing state parties to use federal funds
creates a “loophole large enough to drive an armored car stuffed with
campaign cash through.”); Brock Decl. ¢ 8; Rudman Decl. ¢ 19; see also
Gov't Opening Br. at 53 (“Section 323 contains several interrelated
provisions designed to eliminate solicitation, contribution, and use of
unregulated soft money by federal candidates, federal officeholders, and
national political parties.”); Gov't Opening Br. at 103 (“Any successful
attempt to limit national party soft money activity must perforce prevent
easy evasion through surrogates such as state and local parties.”) (citing
Mann Expert Report at 31).

¢ 1118sa

definition the constitutionality of which has not been
decided.** Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, I find
that Section 323(a)’s implicit prohibition on national parties
to use nonfederal money to fund communications of the kind
defined in Section 301(20)(A)(iii) is constitutionally
severable from its remaining unconstitutional applications.

B. New FECA Sections 323(b) and 301(20)(A):
Restrictions on Nonfederal Funds for “Federal
Election Activities”

Unlike Section 323(a)’s total ban on the use of nonfederal
funds by national parties, Section 323(b) only prohibits state
parties from using nonfederal funds for certain “federal
election activities,” BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(b); 2 U.S.C.
§ 441i(b)(1), which it defines in Section 301(20)(A). BCRA
§ 101; FECA § 301(20)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A). Thus, in
order to assess the constitutionality of the restraint on the
state parties in Section 323(b), we have to simultaneously
assess the constitutionality of Section 301(20)(A)’s definition
of federal election activity.

Section 301(20)(A) defines federal election activity to
include: (1) voter registration activity during the period 120
days before a regularly scheduled federal election; (2) “voter
identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or generic campaign
activity conducted in connection with an election in which a
candidate for Federal office appears on the baliot”; (3) “a
public communication that refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office . . . and that promotes or supports

* See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 479 (refusing to adopt a limiting con-
struction, in part, because its judicial obligation was to avoid
“independent constitutional concerns”); see also Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 346-47, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (“The Court will not
‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.” (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v.
Emigration Comm’ rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1885))).

1119sa

a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate
for that office (regardless of whether the communication
expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate)”; and
(4) services provided by a state or local party committee
employee who spends more than twenty-five percent of that
individual’s compensated time “on activities in connection
with a Federal election.” BCRA § 101; FECA § 301(20)(A);:
2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A).

Only Section 301(20)(A)(iii), however, describes conduct
which is targeted exclusively at federal elections and which
directly affects federal elections. Accordingly, for the reasons
set forth below, I find that Section 323(b) and Sections
301(20)(A)(i), (ii), and (iv) are substantially overbroad in that
they seek to restrain state parties from using nonfederal funds
for election activities, which only indirectly affect federal
elections, and thus do not give rise to the appearance of
corruption necessary to warrant congressional intervention.
As to Section 301(20)(A)(iii), however, I find that it is
constitutionally permissible because, by contrast, it focuses
on election activities that directly affect federal elections and
as such, give rise to the appearance of corruption necessary to
warrant Congress’s restraint on the First Amendment rights of
the donors.

1. New FECA Sections 323(b) and
301(20)(A)(i), (ii), and (iv)

Section 323(b) is premised, in part, on the congressional
belief that certain mixed-purpose activities by state parties,
when funded with nonfederal funds, sufficiently affect federal
elections that they give rise to an appearance of corruption
between the donors and the candidates whose campaign
receives the benefit of these activities. 1 disagree. Setting
aside the considerable issue of whether the Elections Clause,

1120sa

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 & n.16,*

be fairly read to allow Congress to regulate state party
activities such as those defined in Sections 301(20)(A)(i), (ii),
and (iv), see CDP/CRP Opening Br. at 20-27, the justification
and evidence submitted here fail to establish that those
provisions serve a sufficient government interest to justify an
infringement on First Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court pointed out in Colorado | that “the
opportunity for corruption posed by” nonfederal funds for
mixed-purpose activities like voter registration and get-out-
the-vote “is, at best, attenuated.” 518 U.S. at 616. Though
dictum it may be, it is particularly telling. See Central Green
Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 431 (2001) (“dicta ‘may
be followed if sufficiently persuasive’ but are not binding”
(quoting Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 627 (1935))). One can infer from the Supreme Court’s
plain statement that the opportunity for corruption is less
because there is no clear link between donations used for
these predominantly generic activities and whatever benefit
accrues to the candidate.

When nonfederal funds go to political parties, not
candidates, and are spent for purposes that do not directly
affect federal elections, there is less concern about donors
having quid pro quo arrangements with candidates. Indeed,
given that Section 301(20)(A)(iii) prevents communications
that promote federal candidates, the activities defined in
Sections 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) are necessarily “generic” or
specific only to a nonfederal candidate: that is, these activities
are not directed at a specific federal candidate.*° Conversely,

“4 Because 1 find these sections and Section 323(a) (aside from
nonfederal funds used for federal activities) unconstitutional based on the
First Amendment, I need not reach either the federalism or equal-
protection claims.

‘5 Under the pre-BCRA regime, political parties could not use any
nonfederal funds if the voter mobilization effort supported or opposed “a

1121sa

such activities potentially assist a considerably larger number
of state and local candidates that greatly outnumber the one,
or possibly two, federal candidates on the ballot,” many of
whom invariably run unopposed or in clearly noncompetitive
races. There is also evidence that state and local parties
undertake voter mobilization efforts principally for state and
local candidates,”’ mostly from nonfederal money they raised

specific candidate.” See 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(a)(2)iv). And in BCRA,
generic campaign activity is defined as “a public communication that
promotes or opposes a political party and does not promote or oppose a
clearly identified Federal candidate or a non-Federal candidate,” BCRA
§ 101(b); 2 U.S.C. 431(21); 11 C.F.R. § 100.25 (67 Fed.Reg. 49,111 VJuly
29, 2002)), and “get-out-the-vote” is defined as “contacting registered
voters . . . to assist them in engaging in the act of voting,” regardless of a
reference to a federal candidate. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(3). In any
event, get-out-the-vote or voter registration activities employing a “public
communication,” which is defined broadly to include everything from
telephone banks to mass mailings, see BCRA § 101(b); 2 U.S.C. 431(22);
11 C.F.R. § 100.26, that promotes or attacks a clearly identified federal
candidate, see BCRA § 101; FECA § 301(20,A iii); 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(20)A)iii), would not be allowed if Section 301(20)A)(iii) is
upheld. See also Bowler Decl. { 20(b) (noting that California Democratic
Party’s (“CDP’s”) direct mail programs typically do not mention federal
candidates); Erwin Aff. ¢ 9 (explaining that “(t]he overwhelming amount
of [voter registration] activity is ‘generic’ voter registration activity urging

9

potential registrants to ‘Register Republican’”).

* See Bowler Decl. 44 13, 15 (explaining that in the 2002 cycle, where
the only federal office on the California ballots was a congressional race,
administrative expenses were required to be allocated 12.5 percent federal
and 87.5 percent nonfederal based on the ballot composition formula).
California holds elections for 120 legislative officers, eight statewide-
elected officers, and four members of the State Board of Equalization. It
also holds elections for judicial offices, local offices, and ballot measures
at both the state and local levels. See id. ¢ 13; Erwin Aff. ¢ 5.

*’ See Findings 113-37, 150-54. The CDP spent more money for voter
registration in 1998, a year with eight statewide elections, than in 2000, a
presidential election year. Bowler Decl. ¢ 20.2: see also Erwin Aff. { 14.
(stating that “voter registration activities are primarily driven by the desire
to affect State and local races”).

1122sa

on their own,>* and in elections where the federal candidates
are practically uncontested.”

In light of this focus on state and local candidates, there is
every reason for this Court to doubt whether the federal
candidates themselves would view such generic activities by
state and local parties as sufficiently helpful to their
campaigns as to warrant even a token sense of indebtedness
to the soft money donors to the political parties. The
evidence, such as it is, regarding Sections 301(20)(A)(i) and
(ii) activities fails to demonstrate either the degree of effect
such activities have on the federal candidate’s re-election, or
the existence of a public perception that donations used to
fund such efforts create a sense of indebtedness between the
federal candidate and those who make large donations to the
party. That there is no evidence that the public perceives
corruption in these circumstances is not surprising. Since the
public would expect state parties to engage in such voter
mobilization efforts for the benefit of all of its candidates, we
can, and should, reasonably infer that the public would

™ See also Bowler Rebuttal Decl. {¥ 3-4 (explaining that the CDP pays
for much of its voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities with
money raised by the state party); Bowler Decl. § 12 (explaining that in the
1999-2000 election cycle, the CDP raised $15,617,002 in nonfederal
funds, which it used to fund state and local activities). The amount of
nonfederal money the California Republican Party (“CRP”) and CDP

_ raised themselves is much more than the nonfederal funds they received

from national-party transfers. CDP/CRP 1171 (in the 1999-2000 election
cycle, which was a presidential election cycle, only 19.1 percent of all
CRP nonfederal money was from national-party transfers); CDP/CRP 35,
37, 39 (in 2000, only 36 percent of all CDP nonfederal money was from
national-party transfers). While the state and local parties may spend most
of their nonfederal national-party transfers on candidate advocacy, they
spend very little of their overall nonfederal funds on such activities.

® For example, the CDP actively registered over 300,000 Democratic
voters throughout California during 2002 even though there was only one
competitive congressional race out of 52 races. See Bowler Decl. § 20.a:
Torres Decl. ¢ 8.

1123sa

correspondingly view a federal candidate’s sense of
indebtedness, if any, to be diluted among the numerous state
and local candidates who equally benefit from these
activities. See Feingold Dep. at 126- 27 ¢acknowledging that
soft money being used for generic campaign activity is less
likely to create an appearance of corruption). Such
uncertainties are hardly a sufficient basis from which to
allege that precluding state and local parties from using
nonfederal funds for mixed-purpose activities serves the
government interest in preventing corruption, or its
appearance. Thus, in the absence of a substantial evidentiary
showing to the contrary, it is “mere conjecture,” Shrink
Missouri, 528 U.S. at 392, by the defendants that an
appearance of corruption arises from donations to state
parties, or transfers from national parties, that are used for
these generic or noncandidate-specific activities set forth in
Sections 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii).

Finally, even if the defendants had demonstrated that some
mixed-purpose activities do somehow create an appearance of
corruption, Sections 301(20)(A)(i), (ii), and (iv) are not
sufficiently tailored to be constitutionally acceptable. By
limiting donations for so many unmistakably noncorrupting
activities, like donations for voter registration on behalf of
state candidates, these sections extend too far. It is simply not
enough to claim that just because the use of a donation has
some effect on a federal election, it must be completely
funded with federal funds.” To reach such a conclusion
would inevitably sweep in too many activities that deserve
First Amendment protection. Section 301(20)(A)(iv)’s

“ Cf. Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First
Amendment, 77 Tex. L.Rev. 1837, 1842 (1999) (“It is surely the case that
election speech affects elections, but so does all public discourse. If all
that were necessary to bring speech within the authority of a managerial
domain were that the speech produce effects on the domain, nothing much
would be left of public discourse.”).

1124sa

percentage based definition of the amount of time a party
official must spend in connection with a federal election,
BCRA § 101; FECA § 301(20)(A)(iv); 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(20)(A)(iv), provides the starkest example of this
insufficient tailoring. If a state party employee spends 26
percent of his compensated time “in connection with a
Federal election,” then his entire salary must be paid using
federal funds. Clearly, 74 percent of the employee's
compensated time, which has no relation whatsoever to a
federal election, is being regulated. There is no adequate basis
in the record before us to determine whether the nature of his
conduct sufficiently impacts the election to give rise to an
appearance of corruption between the donors who may be
funding his efforts through the state party and the candidate
receiving the benefit of his services. Thus, even if Sections
301(20)(A)(i), (ii), and (iv) served to prevent some
appearance of corruption, they are not drawn closely enough
to survive scrutiny.

2. New FECA Section 301(20)(A)(iii)

As I indicated previously, Congress has the power to
require both national and state parties to use only federal
money for election activities that directly affect federal
elections.°' Section 301(20)(A)(iii) focuses on one such type
of activity: “a public communication that refers to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office . . . and that promotes
or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes
a candidate for that office.’ BCRA § 101; FECA

"This analysis of Section 301(20)A)(iii) is equally applicable to
national, state, and local parties. Considering the coordination and
financial transfers between the various party levels and that parties at all
levels work on behalf of national, state, and local candidates, it is
unrealistic to view the parties differently simply based on the fact that one
is labeled “national” and another “state.” It is the nature of the activities
they undertake rather than they label they assume that defires the type of
allowable regulations.

1125sa

§ 301(20)A)iii); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (emphasis
added). Judge Henderson concludes in her opinion that the
Supreme Court in Buckley required certain “magic words”
that specifically advocate the election or defeat of a candidate
in order for a communication to be the type of advocacy
regulable by Congress. All other communications, even if
they directly affect a federal election, from her perspective,
are not regulable.”” I disagree. For the same reasons, in part,

set forth by Judge Kollar-Kotelly in her opinion on Title II, I -

believe that Buckley did not set forth a “bright-line test.” See
J. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at Part IIL.LC.1. But, even if the
Supreme Court did set forth a bright-line test for Congress's
regulation of expenditures by nonparties in Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 39-51, that rationale is not necessarily applicable to, and
binding on, Congress’s power to regulate donations to
political parties under BCRA.

Therefore, the question before this Court is not so much
whether Congress can regulate the use of nonfederal funds for
uncoordinated, nonexpress advocacy that directly affects
federal elections, but whether Congress has defined such
nonexpress advocacy in Section 301(20)(A)(iii) in a way that
will withstand constitutional scrutiny. For the following
reasons, I have concluded that Congress.not only can regulate
uncoordinated, nonexpress advocacy which directly affects
federal elections, but has defined that nonexpress advocacy in
Section 301(20)(A)(iii) in a way that is sufficiently tailored to
serve the government interest of preventing actual or apparent

® See, e.g., J. Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.l.a & Part IV.D.1.b
(referring repeatedly to “protected issue advocacy”). I do not believe we
should assume that just because the party advertisements are currently
funded with nonfederal money that they, by definition, have a nonfederal
purpose. See J. Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.1.c.

1126sa

corruption, and in a way that is not unconstitutionally
vague.”

In defining “candidate advocacy” as it did, Congress chose
to couple two concepts together in order for communications
to qualify as regulable: (1) the identification of a candidate
for a federal office; and (2) words that promote, oppose,
attack, or support that candidate for that office. BCRA § 101;
FECA § 301(20)(A)(iii); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)A)(iii).
Therefore, unlike genuine issue advocacy, which both
national and state parties have every right to participate in
with nonfederal funds, and which help all party candidates in
a generic sense, Congress in this definition was seeking to
focus on parties using nonfederal funds for communications
intended to directly help a specific federal candidate. Because
such assistance is focused ona specific candidate,” it is

** Any attempt to regulate communications that directly affect federal
elections, like those regulated in Section 301(20)(A)(iii), does not exceed
Congress's authority to regulate federal elections under the Elections
Clause, see U.S. Const. art I., § 4. For this reason, I do not need to address
further the plaintiffs’ federalism claims in relation to Section
301(20)(A)(iii). I also reiect the plaintiffs’ equal-protection challenge
because political partie’ « e unique actors in the political system, see
supra note 27 and accompaying text, such that Congress is warranted in
treating contributions to them differently. See California Medical, 453
U.S. at 200-01 (rejecting equal-protection challenge to contribution limits
for multicandidate political committees, stating that “(t]he differing
restrictions placed on [different entities] reflect a judgment by Congress
that these entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they
therefore may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the
integrity of the electoral process”). Finally, I concur with Judge
Henderson’s discussion of the Thompson Plaintiffs’ equal- protection
claim. See J. Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.4.

“ See, e.g., Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 458 (“I understood that when I
raised funds for the [Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
(“DSCC”) }, the donors expected that I would receive the amount of their
donations multiplied by a certain number that the DSCC had determined
in advance, assuming the DSCC has raised other funds.” (quoting Senator
Timothy Wirth)); Simpson Decl. ¢ 7 (“Members know that if they assist

1127sa

natural for that candidate to feel indebted towards those
whose donations funded the communication, even if he does
not know exactly which soft money donors’ funds actually
made it possible. Concomitantly, it is natural for the public to
perceive that those whose large soft money donations funded
the national and state parties’ communications are not only
known by the parties’ staffs, but by the federal candidates
who directly benefitted from the donations.

The evidence submitted by the defendants overwhelmingly
corroborates these common sense conclusions. The record is
clear that many, if not most, of the party so-called “issue ads”
refer to a specific federal candidate.” And the evidence also
demonstrates that the advertisements are designed to, and do,
support or oppose those candidates for that office. To
illustrate one extreme of this genre: in 1996, the Republican
National Committee (“RNC”) ran a supposed “issue ad”
called “The Story” which requires only a quick reading to
discern its true purpose and effect.

Audio of Bob Dole: We have a moral obligation to
give our children an America with the opportunity and
values of the nation we grew up in. Voice Over: Bob
Dole grew up in Russell, Kansas. From his parents he

the party with fundraising, be it hard or soft money, the party will later
assist their campaign. . . . Although soft money cannot be given directly to
federal candidates, everyone knows that it is fairly easy to push the money
through our tortured system to benefit specific candidates Ys McCain
Decl. § 7 (“{Plarties encourage Members of Congress to raise large
amounts of soft money to benefit their own and others’ re-election.”); see
also Findings 31-35.

5 In the 1998 election, $24.6 out of $25.6 million spent by political
parties on advertisements were spent on advertisements that referred to a
federal candidate. Out of 44,485 advertisements, 42,599 advertisements
referred to a specific candidate. See Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report at
tbl. 1.

” See Findings 36-52.

1128sa
learned the value of hard work, honesty and responsi-
bility. So when his country called . . . he answered. He

was seriously wounded in combat. Paralyzed, he
underwent nine operations.

Audio of Bob Dole: I went around looking for a
miracle that would make me whole again.

Voice Over: The doctors said he’d never walk again.
But after 39 months, he proved them wrong.

Audio of Elizabeth Dole: He persevered, he never
gave up. He fought his way back from total paralysis.

Voice Over: Like many Americans, his life experience
and values serve as a strong moral compass. The
principle of work to replace welfare. The principle of
accountability to strengthen our criminal justice system.
The principle of discipline to end wasteful Washington
spending.

Voice of Bob Dole: It all comes down to values. What

you believe in. What you sacrifice for. And what you
stand for.

Fabrizio Dep. Exhibit 2; McCain Decl. § 15; Huyck Decl. 4
3; Fabrizio Dep. at 49-55. Though this advertisement
transparently was intended to assist Senator Dole’s campaign,
it was funded in part with nonfederal funds. It is hard to
disagree with Senator Levin, who described the advertisement
this way: “It’s not an ad about welfare or wasteful spending;

it is an ad about why should we elect that particular
nominee.” °’

Another and more typical form of sham_ issue
advertisement run by parties is a candidate-centered ad that
focuses on the positions, past actions, or general character

*" 145 Cong. Rec. $12747 (Oct. 18, 1999) (Sen.Levin); see also
Memorandum from Charlie Nave to Haley Barbour (May 28, 1996)
(explaining that the Dole advertisement was tested to see its effect on
Senator Dole’s election).

1129sa

traits of a given federal candidate; contrasts them to the
party’s view of the proper outlook on those issues; and
encourages the viewers to contact the candidate to ostensibly
inquire why he/she is taking those positions or actions. See
Findings 45 & 46. In the 2000 election, for example, the
National Republican Congressional Committee and the
Florida Republican Party ran television advertisements
criticizing Linda Chapin, the Democratic candidate for
Congress:

Announcer: Linda Chapin. Hard on taxpayers. Soft on
convicts. Chapin raised taxes on your utilities, pushed to
raise the county sales tax and even tried raising your
property tax. Meanwhile, hard time in the county jail
turned into “Chapin time.” Where convicts received
cable tv and lounged on padded furniture in carpeted
cells. Chapin’s County Commission ran this soft jail ... a
jail she called a “national model.” Ask Chapin why she’s
hard on taxpayers and soft on convicts.

Chapin Decl. Exhibit 2; Chapin Decl. 4 10; Beckett Decl.
4 10; Pennington Decl. ¥ 14.% This type of electioneering
advertisement, and many others like it, were run by the state
party, which used mostly nonfederal funds to pay for it. It
takes little convincing to find that these advertisements can,
and do, directly influence the outcome of a federal election”

“ Another example of negative candidate advocacy funded by parties:
“We expect our public officials to be responsible, do their jobs and obey
the law. But Corrine Brown missed an astonishing 187 votes in Congress.
... Apparently, Corrine Brown thinks she’s above the law. A government
audit found extensive violations of federal law during her 1992 campaign.
Call Corrine Brown . . . . Tell her public officials should act responsibly,
do their job and obey the law.” ODP0041-1024. For more examples, see
Findings 41, 45, 46.

” See Findings 36-52, 138-47. The parties were clearly not using such
advertisements for party building purposes since 92 percent of the
advertisements did not even mention the name of the party in the body of
the advertisement. Buying Time 2000 at 64 (stating that in the 2000

1130sa

and that parties engaging in them are “electioneering in the
guise of issue advocacy.”- Mann Expert Report at 26.
Moreover, because the amount of money used for candidate
advocacy is substantial,” the candidates are likely to feel
even more indebted to the donors whose contributions to the
political parties made possible this form of campaign
assistance.’' Not surprisingly, the use of nonfederal funds for
this type of candidate advocacy was, to all appearances,
Congress’s primary concern in deciding to enact BCRA
Sections 323(a) and 323(b).”

The record further demonstrates that congressional
candidates know who the major soft money donors are.”* In

election, almost 92 percent of party advertisements never even identified
the name of a political party in the body of the advertisement, let alone
encouraged voters to register with or support the party or to volunteer
with the local party organization).

” See Oliver Dep. at 148-49 (estimating that the RNC spent around
$56-61 million dollars on “issue ads” during the 2000 campaign);
Marshall Decl. { 3 (stating that the largest portion of Democratic National
Committee (“DNC”) budget during the 2000 election cycle was used for
“issue ads”). In 2000, the RNC raised $254 million, a majority of which
was transferred down to the state parties mostly for “issue
advertisements.” Josefiak Dep. at 76; Vogel Decl. § 63; McGahn Decl.
q 5S.

” The donors themselves are not blind to the fact that donations to the
parties are used to benefit the federal candidates. See, e.g., Rozen Decl.
{ 12 (“Donors to the national parties understand that if a federal
officeholder is raising soft money—supposedly ‘non-federal’ money—
they are raising it for federal uses, namely to help that Member or other
federal candidates in their elections.”).

” See supra note 19.
” One donor, and former political fundraiser, observed the following:

Information about what soft money donors have given travels
among the Members in different ways. Obviously the Member who
solicited the money knows. Members also know who is involved
with the various major donor events which they attend, such as
retreats, meetings and conference calls. And there is communication

1131sa

some cases, they actively assist in helping the party to raise
such contributions.’* And as to those candidates who do not,
the parties and the donors keep many of them apprised of
who made the large donations. For example, Robert
Hickmott, lobbyist and former DNC official, advised donors
in the following manner:

[W]hen one of my clients is going to make a donation to
a federal candidate or party, hard or soft money, I advise
them on the manner in which they should do that. I tell
them not to just send the check to the party committee,
for example, to the young staff member who is
collecting the checks. Instead I tell my clients that they
should personally give the money to a Member of
Congress who then can give the money to the Chair of
the party committee, who will in turn make sure that the

among Members about who has made soft money donations and at
what level they have given, and this is widely known and
understood by the Members and their staff. .

Randlett Decl. ¢ 10; see also Bumpers Dect. ¢§ 18, 20 (testifying that
“some Members even keep lists of big donors in their offices” and that
“you cannot be a good Democratic or a good Republican Member and not
be aware of who gave money to the party. If someane in Arkansas gave
$50,000 to the DNC, for example, I would certainly know that.”); Wirth
Decl. Exhibit A § 17 (“[CJandidates were generally aware of the sources
of the funds that enabled the party committee to support their
campaigns.”).

™ See Findings 169, 170, 172-79; Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 458 (“[Y Jou
are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my campaign,” but
“you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican
Party.” (quoting then-Congressman Wayne Allard)); see also Letter from
Senator Mitch McConnell to Potential Donor at the Microsoft Corporation
(August 17, 1998) (asking potential donor for an “immediate
commitment” in support of the National Republican Senatorial
Committee’s (“NRSC’s”) issue advocacy campaign); see also Letter
Senators Mitch McConnell and Bill Frist to Donor at Steel Service Center
Institute (February 25, 1998) (thanking donor for a “nonfederal
contribution of $25,000” to the NRSC).

1132sa

check reaches the young staff member. That way the
donor, with one check, gets “chits” with multiple
Members of Congress.

Hickmott Decl. § 9.”°

Finally, while there is no evidence in the record of actual
quid pro quo corruption,” the record does establish that the
public not only appreciates that there are many donors giving
large sums of money (mostly corporations and unions) to the
political parties,’’ but believes and expects that the donors—
in return—receive privileged access to ‘he legislators and
special influence in the legislative process.” It is of little

” See Findings 176, 208; see, e.g., McCain Decl. 4 6 (“Legislators of
both parties often know who the large soft money contributors to their
party are, particularly those legislators who have solicited soft money,”
and “[dJjonors or their lobbyists often inform a particular Senator that they
have made a large donation.”); Simpson Decl. §¢ 5 (“Even if some
Members did not attend these events, they all still knew which donors
gave the large donations, as the party publicizes who gives what.”); Boren
Decl. ¢ 6 (“Each Senator knows who the biggest donors to his party are”
because “[djonors often prefer to hand their [soft money contribution]
checks to the Senator personally, or their lobbyist informs the Senator that
a large donation was just made.”).

”® See Findings 201-06, 209-10. Although it is possible—though not
established—that the appearance of increased access alone is synonymous
in the public’s mind with increased influence, there is no evidence in the
record that increased access necessarily results in actual influence. Since
the Supreme Court has never found that access in and of itself constitutes
corruption, I believe there is no evidence of actual corruption.

” See Buying Time 2000 at 62. In 2000, thirty-five of the top 50
nonfederal donors were corporations, and they gave a total of $29,447,350
to the Republican national committees in the 2000 election cycle which
was 11.4 percent of all nonfederal money received by that national party.
See Mann Expert Report at tbl. 6. Most of the other donors in the top 50
were unions and plaintiff attorneys. /d.

”’ Thus the Court reviews the evidence of actual or apparent corruption
against the background of a plausible justification, and, as explained

1133sa

surprise that Congress was particularly concerned with the
consequences of the public’s perception of a correlation
between large donations to parties and the special access and
influence that the public believes are accorded to these
donors.” There is ample evidence, including polls’ and press

earlier, the more plausible the argument, the less evidence the defendants
must marshal. See Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391-95.

”’ Whether because of the endless examples of donors receiving access
in return for donations to parties, see Findings 211-43, the many press
reports that made public such exchanges, see infra note 81, or constituent
complaints about them, see Finding 269, members of Congress were
understandably troubled with the appearance of corruption created by
large nonfederal donations to parties. See, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec. $2446
(Mar. 19, 2001) (Sen.Feingold) (“The appearance of corruption is rampant
in our system, and it touches virtually every issue that comes before
use.”); 147 Cong. Rec. $3248-49 (April 2, 2001) (Sen.Levin) (“[Pler-
mitting the appearance of corruption undermines the very foundation of
our democracy—the trust of the people in the system.”).

” See Findings 251-68; see, e.g., Mark Mellman & Richard Wirthlin,
Research Findings of a Telephone Study Among 1300 Adult Americans 7
(Sept. 23, 2002) (poll result finding that 71 percent of Americans think
that members of Congress sometimes decide how to vote on an issue
based on what big contributors to their political party want, even if it is
not what most people in the district want, or even if it is not what they
think is best for the country); Robert Y. Shapiro, Public Opinion &
Campaign Finance 13-14 (Sept. 18, 2002) (poll results showing that the
public has been troubled by large donations to political parties).

Evidence, like these two reports, need not have been before Congress
when it made its predictive judgment. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 667
(explaining that to ensure that Congress drew “reasonable inferences,” the
Supreme Court needed “substantial elaboration in the District Court of the
predictive or historical evidence upon which Congress relied, or the
introduction of some additional evidence.” (emphasis added)); Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC (“Turner Il”), 520 U.S. 180, 185, 187,
117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997); cf. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
529 U.S. 277, 310-17, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating a remand for
development of the judicial record).

1134sa

reports,’ to support Congress’s judgment that the special
access and perceived special influence accorded to those large
donors have undermined the public’s confidence in the
independence of its elected representatives from those donors,
and thereby giving rise to an appearance of corruption. The
record clearly establishes that those large donations are used
in large part by the parties to bombard the public with
candidate advocacy of the type defined by Section
301(20)(A)(iii). See Findings 36-52, 138-47. Because the
advertisements are recognizably sponsored by the parties, see
supra note 41, it takes little for the public to conclude that
candidates are directly benefitting from large donations to the
parties. Moreover, the fact that the public neither
distinguishes between “soft money” and “hard money,” nor is
knowledgeable of the restrictions on contributions,"’ does
nothing to deter the inference that the special access and
influence it perceives are accorded to the donors is in return
for the plainly visible assistance the parties provide to
candidates’ campaigns. Given the high plausibility that
federal candidates feel indebted to donors who fund, through
the parties, Section 301(20)(A)(iii) communications of which
they are the beneficiary, and the equally high plausibility that

*! Senator Rudman observed:

Almost every day, the press reports on important public issues that
are being considered in Congress. Inevitably, the press draws a
connection between an outcome and the amount that interested
companies have given in soft money. . . . Even if a senator is
supporting a position that helps an industry for reasons other than_
that the industry gave millions to his party, it does not appear that
way in the public eye.
Rudman Decl. ¢ 11 (emphasis added); see Finding 270; see, e.g., Dan
Morgan and Juliet Eilperin, Campaign Gifts, Lobbying Built Enron's
Power in Washington, Wash. Post, December 25, 2001, at AO1; R.G.
Ratcliffe and Alan Bernstein, Political Donors Have the Money, and Get
the Time, Houston Chron., May 23, 1999, at 1.

* See Findings 264-67.

1135sa

the public perceives that the special access and influence it
believes are accorded to these donors is in gratitude for that
assistance, the evidentiary documentation more than
adequately convinces me that an appearance of corruption has
arisen from such arrangements. Simply stated, Congress has
drawn a reasonable inference of the same based on substantial
evidence.”

Moreover, any fear that Section 301(20)(A)iii) is
overbroad is cured by the accumulated effects of three
circumstances. First, Section 301(20)(A)(iii) only regulates
communications that are candidate specific, not issue
specific, such that most genuine issue communications should
not be subject to regulation. See Hearing Tr. (Dec. 4, 2002)
at 17. Second, though there are some genuine issue
advertisements that do specifically mention candidates, the
fact that the Section 301(20)(A)(iii) definition requires the
communication to have language that “promotes or supports a
candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for
that office” eviscerates any remaining overbreadth by

** Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666 (explaining that a court’s role is to “assure
that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence”). Though courts must “accord
substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress,” Turner /,
512 U.S. at 665, it does not “ ‘foreclose our independent judgment of the
facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law,” * id. at 666 (quoting Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129, 109 S.Ct. 2829,
106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989)).

“For example, genuine issue advertisements include: (1) adver-
tisements that support oppose officeholder-named legislation, like the
MecCain-Feingold bill, which is the common label for the legislation at
issue here; (2) advertisements supporting or opposing legislation that
simply ends with a call-to-action line asking the viewers to contact their
congressional members to vote against or for a particular bill; or (3) even
advertisements that criticize a certain political personality in order to
energize the party’s base on a particular issue, so long as those
advertisements are not broadcast within the identified candidate’s district
or state.

1136sa
focusing on advertisements that directly influence “a
candidate for that office.” Finally, the fact that the “speaker”
running this type of advertisement is a national or state party
also supports the defendants’ contention that most of the
advertisements, referring to a candidate in this manner, will
be intended to promote or attack that particular candidate.” A
political party, as opposed to corporations and other
nonp

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0664%3A62. Public record. Not legal advice.
