# Amicus Curiae Brief — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0664%3A37

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 539 U.S. 938

## Text

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No. 02-1674 & Consolidated Cases

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States

|
MITCH MCCONNELL, e7 al., a
Appellant

OFFICE OF

Vv.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ef al..,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE LEAGUE
OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES

LLOYD LEONARD DANIEL R. ORTIZ
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS Counsel of Record

OF THE UNITED STATES UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
1730 M Street, N.W. SCHOOL OF LAW
Suite 1000 580 Massie Rd.
Washington, DC 20036 Charlottesville, VA 22903
(202) 229-1965 (434) 924-3127

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

[ Sasseme Ca
ty] i

AUG 5 -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURITAE...........scccssssssesseeeeeees
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............ccscssscssseseceeseees
FITTS ccscnssenssnmssciesnstanrennsnnnnsnnteseenuiienininnsnaaiano

I.

BCRA’S REGULATION OF ELECTION-
EERING COMMUNICATIONS, UNLIKE
REGULATION UNDER THE PRIOR
“MAGIC WORDS” TEST, PREVENTS
CORRUPTION AND THE APPEARANCE
OF CORRUPTION WITHOUT IMPER-
MISSIBLY BURDENING SPEECH ................

A. Disclosing Election Spending and Stop-
ping Corporations and Unions from
Spending From Their General Treasures to
Influence Federal Elections Represent Two
Central Safeguards Against Corruption and
the Appearance of Corruption in Federal
SID a cccnsscscnsesensnensmnnnsonnnieniebienianasdansiien

B. Identifying Advertisements Designed to
Influence Federal Elections Through
“Magic Words” Undermines These Two
Central Safeguards Against Corruption.......

THE BUYING TIME STUDIES ON WHICH
A MAJORITY OF THE DISTRICT COURT
RELIED IN UPHOLDING SEVERAL OF
BCRA’S CENTRAL PROVISIONS ARE
RELIABLE AND STRONGLY SUPPORT
BCRA’S PRIMARY DEFINITION OF
ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS ....

(i)

18

. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page CASES Page
A. A Majority of the District Court Clearly Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) v..cccscessesesseeeee 4, 6,8
Rejected the Plaintiffs’ Attacks on the Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U.S. |
Buying Time Studie ......s..-cssseeeseessneeeeeneee IB RE 6
B. Plaintiffs Are Wrong in Claiming that the FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (2003) ............. 7,8
Authors of the Buying Time Studies First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
Improperly Recoded Data ...........:ssssessseeesses 23 765 Ee 8
! United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567
C. The Buying Time Studies Strongly | _ e 7
Support BCRA’s Primary Definition of
Electioneering Communications...............++. 26 STATUTES
ica icdinniteeainteieernnsesconceensnsnnee 29 Act of Jan. 26, 1907 (Tillman Act), ch. 420, 34
IE TITIT bassiciesesicibasditennnnnnanneniaenaneueenanemainnsensnseesn 7
Act of June 25th, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822........ 6
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
IIT inctsenssictuiiedienidinusidiidninetnsennninessensenncasssonesadsin 3
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, ch. 368, tit.
Ba i Sy HI cncecncncssscccencnsassesosessconss 6
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971,
PUD Ee. POD, FS- 22S, BG BAM, S ncccccccrccsccscescosccssess 6
OTHER AUTHORITIES
148 Cong. Rec. $2116 (daily ed. March 20,
STI ibihibihidehnethmactbaninsscesituiinieniianimeieminienmnnnnenpassese 9
' 148 Cong. Rec. $2117 (daily ed. March 20,
IIIT iidenntiaisiesdneebinienaniiedisepnedennctsnemnaieemnesteseneese 9
148 Cong. Rec. $2141 (daily ed. March 20,
ITI heitsiicsiadensebiseniinseinsidadencenitsacnsansnsaneeessestnsseenseceoce 9

Annenberg Public Policy Center, /ssue
Advertising in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle
I aidhinstiesiniestaieieestemiencieneanntenmninenneneantasseninscanen 21,22

Deborah Beck, et. al., Annenberg Public Policy
Center, /ssue Advertising During the 1996
SI TIT iii icisenidiandnsiniihansinethinnsinensonedens | 2

iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Erika Falk, Annenberg Public Policy Center,
Legislative Issue Advertising in the 107th
Congress (2003) ....cccsscrsesesesseesecesseosecescvsosssssoeues

Jonathan S. Krasno & Daniel E. Seltz, Brennan
Center for Justice, Buying Time: Television
Advertising in the 1998 Congressional
Bic titns Ce ccnctesecissenscsniinennsntenmencnasin

Leslie Wayne, A Back Door for the Conservative
Donor, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1997, at B10.......

Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money
(National Home Library Foundation Ed.
DOI cccacececensccnsesctscdvessensinvatsimennmennnsmnensemestntnteitn

Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, /nves-
tigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in

_ Connection with 1996 Federal Election Cam-
paigns, S. Rep. No. 105-177 (1998) ........seeeeeeee

Page

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 02-1674 & Consolidated Cases

MITCH MCCONNELL, et ai.,
Appellants,
Vv.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et ai.,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE LEAGUE
OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

The League of Women Voters of the United States (the
“League”) is a nonpartisan, community-based organization
that encourages informed and active participation of citizens
in government and seeks to influence public policy through
education and advocacy. The League is organized in more
than a thousand communities in every state and has more than
125,000 members and supporters nationwide. The League

' The Department of Justice has consented to the filing of this brief in a
letter which accompanies this filing. All other parties have filed written
consents to the filing of amicus briefs with the Court. No counsel for any
party authored this brief in whole or in part and no person or entity other
than the amicus curiae, its members, or counsel made any monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission.

2

was organized in 1919 as an outgrowth of the 72-year
struggle to win voting rights for women in the United States.

One of the League’s primary goals is to promote an open
governmental system that is representative, accountable, and
responsive, that protects individual liberties established by the
Constitution, and that assures opportunities for citizen
participation in government decision making. To further this
goal, the League has been a leader in seeking campaign
finance reform at the state, local, and federal levels for more
than two decades. The League thus has a strong and direct
interest in this case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In late October of 1996, the following television adver-
tisement ran repeatedly in Arkansas:

Senate candidate Winston Bryant’s budget as Attor-
ney General increased seventy-one percent. Bryant has
taken taxpayer funded junkets to the Virgin Islands,
Alaska, and Arizona. And spent about $100,000 on new
furniture. Unfortunately, as the state’s top law enforce-
ment official, he’s never opposed the parole of any
convicted murderers. And almost 4,000 Arkansas pris-
oners have been sent back to prison for crimes com-
mitted while they were out on parole. Winston Bryant:
government waste, political junkets, soft on crime.

Deborah Beck, et. al., Annenberg Public Policy Center, /ssue
Advocacy During the 1996 Campaign 24 (1997). Winston
Bryant was running for an open seat in the United States
Senate. The tax-exempt organization that sponsored the ad,
Citizens for the Republic Education Fund, spent more than
$300,000 on a last-minute television blitz of Little Rock and
Jonesboro. Bryant lost. /d. Such advertisements come as
little surprise, of course. They are a powerful part of many
campaign strategies.

3

What is surprising is that until the enactment of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002), such advertisements were not
treated as electioneering speech under federal law. Despite
their appearance on the eve of the election, their unmistakable
mention of a particular federal candidate, their targeting of
the candidate’s electorate, and their appearance on television,
the courts would have treated such ads as “issue” advocacy.
By avoiding the use of “magic words”—express terms like
“vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “vote against,” “defeat,” and
“reject” —they fell outside of coverage. Even if they were
designed to promote a particular candidate, continuously
featured that candidate, swayed voters to the candidate’s
favor, and did not even mention a traditional issue, they were
treated as simple “issue” ads.

7” «66 7” «66

“Issue” advocacy thus became a peculiar term of legal art.
It indicated nothing about what an advertisement said or
concerned. It signified only that a few particular words were
missing. An ad could educate on a burning social issue or
shamelessly shill for a candidate. But whatever its content, so
long as no magic words appeared, it was completely immune
from the sort of reasonable source and disclosure rules that
have long applied to campaign advocacy.

By making the absence of a few particular words all that
mattered, the “magic words” approach undermined two of the
longest-standing and most central architectural features of
American campaign finance regulation: the disclosure of
political spending and the bar against direct corporate and
union spending to influence federal elections. By omitting a
few particular words, individuals and entities could spend
unlimited amounts to campaign for federal candidates without
ever having to disclose their activities. In the Bryant blitz, for
example, the citizens of Arkansas did not know the tax-
exempt sponsor’s identity, let alone the individuals or
corporations or unions that may have funded the tax-exempt’s

4

political activities. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, A Back Door for
the Conservative Donor, N.Y. Times, May 22 1997 at B10.
Only after much research by the press did the identity of the
tax-exempt itself become clear. No research, however, was
able to uncover the identity of any individuals, corporations,
or unions that may have donated money to the tax-exempt for
these particular advertisements. As this Court has repeatedly
observed: “Publicity is justly commended as the remedy for
social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best
of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting L. Brandeis,
Other People’s Money 62 (Nat'l! Home Library Found. ed.
1933)). But the absence of “magic words” bars all disclosure.

Without “magic words,” moreover, corporations and
unions could have used the tax-exempt as a conduit to run
this ad throughout the campaign season, or, indeed, have paid
for it themselves. So long as they did not use “magic words”
nothing stopped them from spending whatever they wanted to
advocate the election or defeat of particular federal candi-
dates. The addition of two words—‘vote against”—at the
end of the Bryant ad would have made all the difference. The
“magic words” test would certainly have prevented a corpo-
ration or union from funding that. But that is of little concern
to the corporate or union sponsor. If anything, using such
words makes ads less effective.

Understanding this history—indeed, documenting it in a
detailed factual record—Congress enacted BCRA, which
sought to return campaign finance regulation to steadier
footing. By applying an objective test which looked at
whether a clearly identified federal candidate was mentioned,
the medium, the targeting, and the timing of the commu-
nication, BCRA aimed to reach “issue” ads that looked the
same as—and presumably were as effective as—the ads that
candidates ran on their own behalf. This represented modest
change. It merely sought to subject to longstanding dis-

5

closure and source requirements those advertisements that
looked like the campaign ads candidates themselves run.
Such a small and sensible step would prevent circumvention
of this country’s basic safeguards against corruption and the
appearance of corruption.

A majority of judges on the district court found that sev-
eral empirical studies supported this modest step. Of these
studies, Plaintiffs challenge two: the Buying Time studies.
These particular studies surveyed political television adver-
tising from the 1998 and 2000 election cycles and concluded
that very few issue ads would have been mistakenly caught
by BCRA’s primary definition of “electioneering commu-
nication.” After carefully considering Plaintiffs’ general
claims that the Buying Time studies were biased and
untrustworthy, a majority of the judges properly rejected
those claims. Plaintiffs’ more detailed methodological claims
also fail. They complain first that some of the data under-
lying the Buying Time studies was improperly recoded. The
recoding they complain of, however, was approved by their
own expert and nothing suggests that the recoding they
themselves propose and on which they base many of their -
own numbers more accurately reflects the actual judgments of
the original coders, let alone the content of the ads
themselves. The contrary, in fact, is more likely true. Their
second complaint goes to the choice of metric employed by
one of the studies. Although they assert it is unhelpful to
overbreadth analysis, the opposite is the case. It strongly
demonstrates the care and caution Congress took in entering
this sensitive area.

6
ARGUMENT

I. BCRA’S REGULATION OF ELECTIONEER-
ING COMMUNICATIONS, UNLIKE REGULA-
TION UNDER THE PRIOR “MAGIC WORDS”
TEST, PREVENTS CORRUPTION AND THE
APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION WITHOUT
IMPERMISSIBLY BURDENING SPEECH.

A. Disclosing Election Spending and Stopping
Corporations and Unions from Spending from
Their General Treasuries to Influence Federal
Elections Represent Two Central Safeguards
Against Corruption and the Appearance of
Corruption in Federal Elections.

Congress first required the disclosure of certain campaign
contributions in 1910, and has since expanded this require-
ment to a much wider range of campaign spending.” This
Court has recognized that such disclosure serves three
important interests that underpin the “free functioning of our
national institutions.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66
(1976) (quoting Communist Party v. Control Board, 367
U.S. 1, 97 (1961)). First, disclosure provides voters with
information about where money comes from and how it is
spent. Such information helps voters better evaluate
candidates and determine where they stand. /d. at 66-67.
Second, disclosure prevents actual corruption and the
appearance of corruption. By giving voters information about
the ties of elected officials to their financial supporters, it
deters contributions made with an eye to special favors and,
should any be made, allows voters more easily to detect them.
Id. at 67. Third, disclosure is “an essential means of

? See e.g., Act of June 25th, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822; Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, ch. 368, tit. 3, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070-79;
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub L. No. 92-225, 86
Stat. 3.

7

gathering the data necessary to detect violations of .. .
contribution limitations,” id. at 68, which are independently
necessary to prevent corruption. In short, disclosure repre-
sents one of the most important means of securing the public
legitimacy of our political institutions because it provides
voters important political information, because it directly
deters corruption, and because it allows for the enforcement
of independent safeguards, like contribution limits.

Source requirements preventing business corporations and
unions from spending money from their general treasuries to
influence federal elections are even longer-standing. Since-
1907, Congress has carefully regulated corporate political
activity. In that year, Congress passed the Tillman Act,
which made it “unlawful for any national bank, or any
corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress,
to make a money contribution in connection with any election
to any political office.” Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420 34 Stat.
864. Over the years, this rule was extended to cover both
contributions and independent expenditures by both business
corporations and unions. See, e.g., United States vy. Auto.
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570-84 (1957) (recounting history).
From the beginning, the law has focused on the “special
characteristics of the corporate structure that threaten the
integrity of the political process.” FEC v. Beaumont, 123
S.Ct. 2200, 2206 (2003) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). Because “[s]tate law grants corporations
special advantages . . . that enhance their ability to attract
capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize
the return on their shareholders’ investments . . . corporations
. .. [Can] use resources amassed in the economic marketplace
to obtain an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As this
Court has long recognized, “barring corporate earnings from
conversion into political war chests . . . prevent[s] corruption
or the appearance of corruption,” id. (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted), the importance of which “has never

8

been doubted,” First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978). Barring corporate contributions
and expenditures also helps prevent the use of corporations
“as conduits for circumvention of valid contribution limits.”
Beaumont, 123 S.Ct. at 2207 (internal citations, brackets, and
quotation marks omitted). Together the disclosure and source
requirements barring corporate and union spending to
influence federal elections are two of the primary bulwarks
against corruption.

B. Identifying Advertisements Designed to Influ-
ence Federal Elections Through “Magic
Words” Undermines These Two Central Safe-
guards Against Corruption.

In Buckley, this Court considered the statutory meaning of
“expenditures . . . advocating the election or defeat of [a
clearly identified] candidate.” 434 U.S. at 41-51. In order to
avoid possible void-for-vagueness difficulties (in the case of
spenders other than candidates and political committees,
including political parties), this Court “limited [the term] to
communications that include explicit words of advocacy of
election or defeat of a candidate,” id. at 43, and in a footnote
“restrict{ed its] application . . . to communications containing
express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote
for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for
Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”” Jd. at 44 n.52.
Nowhere did this Court indicate that such “magic words”
were constitutionally required for Congress ever to impose
disclosure and source requirements. Rather, this Court
narrowly held that given the uncertain reach of this particular
term, it had to be given more objective contours. Otherwise,
speakers would not know ahead of time what they could and
could not say. They would always be at the mercy of their
audience, for no matter how carefully they crafted their
speech to avoid advocacy, their audience could interpret it
differently. /d. at 42-44. The lesson of Buckley, in other

——

oe

9

words, is not that the First Amendment requires the use of
“magic words,” but rather that covered spending must be
defined objectively—just as BCRA’s primary definition of
“electioneering communications” does. Definitions that rely
largely on subjective audience understanding or speaker
intent are constitutionally problematic.

After carefully surveying the landscape of political
advertising, Congress found that the “magic words” test did
not work.” First, few modern campaign ads use any “magic
words.” Uncontroverted evidence before the district court*
showed that only 11.4 percent of the 433,811 advertisements
aired by candidates during the 2000 federal election met the
express advocacy test laid down in Buckley. Supp. App. at
659sa, 763sa-764sa (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Second, candidates
and political consultants have found it very easy to evade
magic words in their advertising. In 1996, for example, the
Republican National Committee (“RNC”) ran the following
ad, called “The Story,” on television before the election:

Audio of We have a moral obligation to give our

Bob Dole: children an America with the opportunity and
values of the nation we grew up in.

Voice Over: — Bob Dole grew up in Russell, Kansas. From

his parents he learned the value of hard work,
honesty and responsibility. So when his

* See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. $2116 (daily ed. March 20, 2002) (state-
ment of Sen. Levin) (“magic words . . . are not a complete test of what
constitutes electioneering ads”); id. at $2117 (statement of Sen. Jeffords)
(“the ‘magic words’ standard . . . has been made useless”); id. at $2141
(statement of Sen. McCain) (“even a casual observer would concede that
‘magic words’ is a dramatically underinclusive test’).

* The filing of a Joint Appendix in this case has been deferred. Cita-
tions to the original record are made where necessary pursuant to this
Court's Rule 26.4(b). The opinions of the district court are reprinted in
the Joint Supplemental Appendix to Jurisdictional Statements, cited herein
as Supp. App. at Isa-1382sa.

10

country called . . . he answered. He was
seriously wounded in combat. Paralyzed, he
underwent nine operations.

Audio of I went around looking for a miracle that

Bob Dole: would make me whole again.

Voice Over: | The doctors said he’d never walk again. But
after 39 months, he proved them wrong.

Audio of He persevered, he never gave up. He fought

Elizabeth his way back from total paralysis.

Dole:

Voice Over: Like many Americans, his life experience
and values were as a strong moral compass.
The principle of work to replace welfare.
The principle of accountability to strengthen

_ our criminal justice system. The principle of

discipline to end wasteful Washington
spending.

Voice of It all comes down to values. What you

Bob Dole: believe in. What you sacrifice for. And what

you stand for.

Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, /nvestigation of
Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996
Federal Election Campaigns, S. Rep. No. 105-177, at 4014
(1998). “The Story” focused entirely on the personality traits
and affect of Bob Dole, not on any issues. Although the
RNC’s political director thought that it “need[ed] to be run,”
he worried that “[mJaking this spot pass the issue advocacy
test may take some doing.” /d. at 4015. He need not have
worried. As Bob Dole himself explained to Ted Koppel
when asked why such an ad would be considered “generic,”
i.e., issue advocacy, “It doesn’t say ‘Bob Dole for president.’
. . . [I]t talks about the Bob Dole story. It also talks about
issues. It never mentions the word that I’m—it never says

—™

—_— oe

that I’m running for president, though I hope that it’s fairly
obvious, since I’m the only one in the picture!” /d. at 4154.
The audience laughed. The absence of four little words made
all the difference.

Third, “magic words” make advertisements, if anything,
less effective. The uncontroverted testimony of political
consultants in the district court was that “magic words” were
clumsy and weakened political advertisements. Republican —
political consultant Douglas L. Bailey, for example, testified
that “[iJn the modern world of 30 second political adver-
tisements, it is rarely advisable to use such clumsy words as
‘vote for’ or ‘vote against.’ .. . . All advertising professionals
understand that the most effective advertising leads the
viewer to his or her own conclusion without forcing it down
their throat.” Supp. App. at 660sa (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
Likewise, Democratic political consultant Raymond Strother
testified that

media consultants prefer putting across electioneering
messages without using words such as ‘vote for.’ Good
media consultants never tell people to vote for Senator
X; rather you make your case and let the voters come to
their own conclusions. In my experience, it actually
proves less effective to instruct viewers what you want
them to do.

Id. at 662sa. In this respect, political advertising is just like
commercial advertising. As two experts pointed out,

the practices of political advertisers are not dissimilar
from those of commercial advertisers. Car ads rarely
exhort viewers to “buy” a Chevrolet, nor do soft drink
ads urge people to “drink” their product. . . . This
atmospheric approach to commercial advertising—
where the product is presented in various tableaus—has
become increasingly popular. It serves the general
strategy of advertisers to present viewers with a variety
of reasons to choose their product, hoping that they will
latch onto one. Too heavy-handed an approach might

12

interfere with this process by raising viewers’ defenses.
Political ads seem to follow the same strategy, hoping
that citizens will grow to prefer a candidate without
being told to troop to the polls.

Id. at 663-64sa (quoting Krasno and Soraf Expert Report at
54). Like any good advertiser, those advertising candidates
avoid “magic words” because they want to make their pitch
as effective as possible.

The “magic words” test, then, ironically identifies as cam-
paign advertising those ineffective ads that candidates
themselves seldom use. It classifies as pure issue advocacy,
by contrast, exactly the kinds of effective campaign adver-
tising the candidates themselves do use. It gets the real world
backwards. In a sense, the “magic words” test works only to
protect political advertisers from making stupid decisions.
Because it compels disclosure of and keeps corporations and
unions from using treasury funds to engage in the least
effective forms of candidate advocacy, it encourages more
effective forms. Can that be the purpose of the First
Amendment?

By classifying nearly all campaign advocacy by indepen-
dent spenders as issue advocacy, the “magic words” test
clearly undermines ordinary disclosure requirements, which
give voters important information and prevent corruption. In
three 2000 Republican primaries, for example, an organi-
zation called “Republicans for Clean Air’ sponsored ads
praising then-Governor Bush and criticizing Senator McCain.
After the first of these primaries, reporters discovered that
“Republicans for Clean Air” consisted of two brothers,
Charles and Sam Wyly, who were long-term friends of
Governor Bush. One was, in fact, an authorized fundraiser
for the Bush campaign. According to the press, the Wylys
spent $2.5 million on the ads. When their identities were
uncovered in a later primary, much bad publicity ensued and
the Bush campaign felt compelled to distance itself from
them. In short, the “magic words” test allowed this major

13

advertising campaign to be conducted in secrecy and the
eventual public reaction shows how greatly the identity of
the sponsors mattered to voters. See Supp. App. at 97-99sa
(per curiam).

As political consultant Raymond Strother stated,

one of the biggest problems that a candidate’s media
consultant now faces is the lack of disclosure associated
with third parties running these ads. A few years ago,
Jill Docking ran for the United States Senate against
Sam Brownback in Kansas. . . . In the last two weeks of
a very tight election, an unidentifiable group came in and
poured a million dollars into the race. They ran [ads]
throughout Kansas telling voters that Jill wasn’t a
Christian, and all we could find was a fax machine. We
had no idea where the money came from. I have had
similar experiences in other races as well. Without
knowing who is funding the groups that run these ads,
we are often unable to correct the distortions.

Id. at 93sa-94sa. Without disclosure, voters cannot evaluate
candidates by seeing who supports them, cannot easily recog-
nize corruption in any special favors given to the funders of
these ads, and cannot tell whether the spending effectively
represents a circumvention of the contribution limitations.

Similarly, the “magic words” test allows corporations and
unions to evade the prohibitions against spending directly
from their general treasuries to influence federal elec-
tions. By carefully avoiding “magic words,” for example,
the National Rifle Association (“NRA”), a § 501(c)(4) tax-
exempt entity, successfully evaded the campaign finance
law’s source requirements. It sponsored much advertising to
influence the 2000 federal elections. Executive Vice Presi-
dent of the NRA, Wayne LaPierre, stated in a fundraising
letter that he “spent what it took [in 2000] to defeat Al Gore,
which amounted to millions more than we had on hand.”
Supp. App. at 693sa-694sa (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). He later
testified that “[w]Je took some money out of the reserves to

14

cover the deficit . . . . [The Gore advertising] was probably ...
the main contributing factor.” /d. The NRA ran several
different Gore ads—some funded out of its general treasury
funds and some funded by the NRA Political Victory Fund,
its affiliated political action committee. The small differ-
ences between some of the ads run by the NRA and those run
by its PAC show what little difference there is between
advertisements that do and do not use “magic words.” The
ads were virtually identical, The ones paid for from
the corporation’s general treasury simply omitted a few
express terms:

NRA PAC Advertisement NRA Direct (Non-PAC)

Advertisement

HESTON: Other issues
may come and go, but no
issue is aS important as our
freedom. And the day of
reckoning is at hand.

HESTON:

Did you know that right
now in federal court, Al
Gore’s Justice Department
is arguing that the Second
Amendment gives you no
right to own any firearm?
No handgun, no rifle, no
shotgun.

Did you know that right
now in federal court, Al
Gore’s Justice Department
is arguing that the Second
Amendment gives you no
right to own any firearm?
No handgun, no rifle, no
shotgun.

And when Al Gore’s top
government lawyers make it
to the U.S. Supreme Court
to argue their point, they
can have three new judges
handpicked by Al Gore if
he wins this election.

And when Al Gore’s top
government lawyers make it
to the U.S. Supreme Court
to argue their point, they
can have three new judges
handpicked by Al Gore if
he wins this election.

Imagine . . . what would
Supreme Court Justices
Hillary Clinton, Charlie

Schumer, and Dianne Fein-
stein do to your gun rights?

And what you _ think
wouldn’t matter any more.
Because the Supreme Court
has the final say on what
the Constitution means.

When Al Gore’s Su-
preme Court agrees with Al
Gore’s Justice Depart-
ment and bans private
ownership of firearms,
that’s the end of your Sec-
ond Amendment rights.

Please, vote freedom
first. Vote George W.
Bush for President.

ANNCR: Paid for by
the NRA Political
Victory Fund and not
authorized by any
candidate or candidate’s
committee.

15

Imagine . . . what would-
Supreme Court Justices
Hillary Clinton, Charlie

Schumer, and Dianne Fein-
stein do to your gun rights?

And what you _ think
wouldn’t matter any more.
Because the Supreme Court
has the final say on what
the Constitution means.

When Al Gore’s Su-
preme Court agrees with Al
Gore’s Justice Depart-
ment and _ bans private
ownership of _ firearms,
that’s the end of your
Second Amendment rights.

ANNCR: Paid for by the
National Rifle Association.

Id. at 695sa-696sa. (differences between ads bolded). NRA
Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierce described the two
scripts as “exactly the same” because, he admitted, the
reference to “the day of reckoning . . . at hand” in the NRA ad
was to the day of the 2000 election. /d. at 697sa.

16

Uncontroverted testimony in the district court showed,
moreover, that candidates track these advertisements and who
funds them. Lobbyist Wright Andrews testified that

[s]ophisticated political donors—particularly lobbyists,
PAC directors, and other political insiders acting on
behalf of specific interest groups—are not in the
business of dispensing their money purely on ideological
or charitable grounds. Rather, these political donors
typically are trying to wisely invest their resources to
maximize political return. . . . [Issue ads] are noticed by
the elected officials on whose behalf, or against whom,
[they] are run. An effective advertising campaign may
have far more effect on a member than a direct campaign
contribution or even a large soft money donation to his
or her political party that is used for political purposes in
his or her district or state.
Id. at 709sa-710sa. So helpful are these ads, in fact, that
politicians who benefit from this type of corporate and union
general treasury fund spending often raise money for these
organizations. /d. at 712sa. Congressman Ric Keller, for
example, for whose 2000 campaign the Club for Growth had
funded advertising, signed a Club for Growth fundraising
letter which stated: “The Club for Growth selected my race as
one of its top priorities. .... Since the Club targets the most
competitive races in the country, your membership in the
Club will help Republicans keep control of Congress.” Id.
(emphasis in original).

_ Although the number of entities funding these advertise-

ments has grown, only a handful account for most of the
influence. In the 1999-2000 election cycle, for example, the
Republican and Democratic parties accounted for 31 percent
of this spending; Citizens for Better Medicare, 13 percent; the
Coalition to Protect America’s Health Care, 6 percent; the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 5 percent; AFL-CIO, 4 percent;
NRA, 4 percent; and U.S. Term Limits, 4 percent. /d. at
655sa. Just the six leading nonparty entities accounted for 36

17

percent of the spending—more than the parties themselves
(31 percent) and more than all other organizations combined
(33 percent). Two of these six entities, in fact, represented
the same type of special interest. Far from being “a grass-
roots generated group of citizens,” Citizens for Better
Medicare was “an arm of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers Association” and the ‘Coalition to Protect
America’s Health Care worked under the umbrella of the
American Hospital Association, Erika Falk, Annenberg
Public Policy Center, Legislative Issue Advertising in the
107th Congress 62, 64 (2003) (internal citations omitted). As
these figures show, far from broadening the spectrum of
political debate, the ability to spend from general treasury
funds constricts it. It concentrates the threat of corruption.

The “magic words” test, then, has undermined two of the
central protections against corruption and the appearance of
corruption—the disclosure of campaign spending and the bar
against funding electioneering activity from general union
and corporate treasuries—that FECA was intended to support.
The test paradoxically allows corporations and unions to use
their treasuries to fund only the kinds of advertisements that
candidates now usually employ to promote their own
candidacy—those without “magic words.” And it dis-
courages only the kinds of advertisements that candidates
themselves now seldom use because they think them
ineffective—those with “magic words.” The test, in short
allows corporate earnings and union dues to be easily
converted into political “war chests,” the influence of which
is often invisible to voters.

18

Il. THE BUYING TIME STUDIES ON WHICH A
MAJORITY OF THE DISTRICT COURT
RELIED IN UPHOLDING SEVERAL OF
BCRA’S CENTRAL PROVISIONS ARE RELI-
ABLE AND STRONGLY SUPPORT BCRA’S
PRIMARY DEFINITION OF ELECTIONEER-
ING COMMUNICTATIONS.

A. A Majority of the District Court Clearly
Rejected the Plaintiffs’ Attacks on the Buying
Time Studies.

Plaintiffs rest much of their attack on BCRA’s handling of
“electioneering communications” on the supposed unreli-
ability of parts of two particular reports. These reports, the
Buying Time studies, surveyed television ads from the 1998
and 2000 election cycles and concluded that very few issue
ads would be affected by BCRA’s primary definition.
BCRA’s primary definition would, in the view of these
studies, leave the vast majority of actual issue ads untouched.
The 1998 study, for example, concluded, in part, that only 7%
percent of all issue ads televised that year met BCRA’s
primary definition. Jonathan S. Krasno & Daniel E. Seltz,
Brennan Center for Justice, Buying Time: Television Adver-
tising in the 1998 Congressional Elections, 109 (2000); see
also Supp. App. at 1348sa n.213 (Leon, J.) (noting that Dr.
Krasno’s current estimate is 6.1%).

Plaintiffs understandably attack these studies because they
stand so powerfully against them. Among other things,
Plaintiffs claim that “the district court, after detailed and
laborious consideration, unanimously rejected the conclusions
of the Buying Time reports,” McConnell Br. at 53, that “the
Buying Time reports were entirely and irredeemably biased,
id. at 53 n.18, and that “the reports’ conclusions about
BCRA’s insignificant effect on so-called ‘genuine’ issue ads
are insupportable,” id. at 55. Nothing could be further from
the truth.

19

In their individual opinions, two of the three judges on the
district court strongly rejected Plaintiffs’ broad-brushed
attacks. As Judge Leon put it, “I find that although the
Buying Time studies contain some flaws and shortcomings,
... those shortcomings do not detract from the studies’
credibility and reliability.” Supp. App. at 1335sa. Judge
Kollar-Kotelly went even further. She described Plaintiffs’
expert's attempts to discredit the studies as “a pifiata party: if
one hits the pifiata enough, it will eventually crack apart.” /d.
at 764sa. In the Plaintiffs’ case, however, the expert clearly
failed to crack the pifiata. Like Judge Leon, Judge Kollar-
Kotelly extensively relied on the studies’ central findings.
She also thought the Plaintiffs’ failure to do any independent
studies or even to try to replicate the study they criticized
highly significant:

Although some of [the pifiata] “hits” have merit, . . .
neither Plaintiffs nor Dr. Gibson[, their expert,] have
attempted to conduct their own similar study, or even
replicate a discrete portion of the Buying Time studies,
despite the fact that the underlying materials were
provided to them by Defendants. Presenting the Court
with contradictory results from such a study would have
been far more persuasive than the recalculations of
incorrect versions of the Buying Time data sets and the

often conjectural and speculative criticism proffered by
Plaintiffs and Dr. Gibson.

Id. In fact, the Plaintiffs’ complete failure to offer their own
studies puts them in an awkward position. Although they
continually attack the Buying Time reports, they find them-
selves having to rely extensively on the underlying data—
quarrelling with it in some places, changing it in others, but
all the time using it to support their own arguments on
overbreadth. See, e.g., McConnell Br. at 56 (massaging data
to argue that “64% of ads mentioning a candidate in the 60
days before the 1998 general election were coded . . . as

20
genuine”). Their own extensive reliance on the studies
undermines their broadside attacks.

A majority of the judges on the district court also strongly
rejected any claim of bias. Judge Leon, for example, found
that “while . . . the primary purpose of the Buying Time
studies was to further campaign finance reform, I do not find
that this fact has skewed the results of the study.” Supp. App.
at 1335sa. Judge Kollar-Kotelly was even more forceful. “I
would not,” she found, “discount the [Buying Time] studies
because they were approached with a particular result in
mind. The testimony shows that policy perspectives and
effective scientific research are not mutually exclusive.” /d. at
764sa. And, as to the particular actions which Dr. Gibson
pointed to as evidence of bias—the “cleaning” of data and
recoding—Judge Kollar-Kotelly correctly noted that “(t]he
‘cleaning’ of the data that Dr. Gibson finds suspicious
appears . . . to be a necessary function for databases of the
size produced for the Buying Time reports and not a function
of bias. Fixing miscodings and resolving the ‘cookie cutter’
issues required such actions.” /d. at 764sa-765sa. Judges
Leon and Kollar-Kotelly both noted, moreover, that one of
Dr. Gibson’s major complaints with the studies, his inability
to reproduce their conclusions from the underlying data sets,
resulted from his own use of the wrong data set. /d. at 1336sa
(Leon, J.) (“[W]hile Dr. Gibson maintains that his inability to
replicate the Buying Time . . . results ‘undermines . . . any
confidence one should place in the findings,’ his inability
seems attributable to his using the incorrect data set.”); id. at
765sa (Kollar-Kotelly. J.) (“confusion . . . as to the correct
database to use to analyze the studies’ findings decreases the
utility of Dr. Gibson’s Expert Report”) (internal citations
omitted). Judge Kollar-Kotelly, in fact, found that this
confusion also “undermines the notion that the Buying Time
authors manipulated the data in order to achieve their desired
results.” Jd. at 765sa. The charge of bias is simply empty
of merit.

2)

As a majority of judges pointed out, moreover, even if the
Plaintiffs’ attacks were all credible, they would leave many of
the conclusions of the Buying Time studies untouched. See
Supp. App. at 1333sa-1334sa (Leon, J.); id. at 765sa (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.). First, as Dr. Gibson himself admitted, “Entirely
objective characteristics of the ads . . . present few threats to
reliability.” Gibson Expert Report at 11. These include such
central findings as (1) that “magic words” are rarely used in
political advertising, (2) that group-sponsored ads that men-
tion candidates tend to be concentrated before an election,
and (3) that advertisements sponsored by parties and interest
groups comprise a significant and increasing portion of
political advertising broadcast in federal races. Supp. App. at
1 333sa-1334sa (Leon, J.).

Second, Plaintiffs failed to challenge the validity of other
authoritative studies, particularly the Annenberg studies,
which support the central findings of the Buying Time reports.
Id. at 763sa (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“The Annenberg studies . . .
have not been challenged by anyone.”). Even if Plaintiffs did
manage to discount the Buying Time studies, these others
would support many of the same conclusions. In particular,
the Annenberg studies concluded that in the 1999-2000
election cycle, candidate campaign ads virtually dominated
all types of issue ads in the last two months of the election:

The type of issue ad that dominated depended greatly
on how close we were to the general election. .. .
Though candidate-centered issue ads always made up a
majority of issue ads, as the election approached, the
percent [of] candidate-centered spots increased and the
percent of legislative and image ads decreased, such that
by the last two months before the election almost all
televised issue spots made a case for or against a
candidate.

Annenberg Public Policy Center, /ssue Advertising in the
1999-2000 Election Cycle 14 (2001), quoted and emphasis
added in Supp. App. at 654sa (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). The

22

Annenberg studies, in fact, produced a bottom line for the
2000 election remarkably close to the one the Buying Time
reports produced for the 1998 election: “Fully 94% of issue
ads aired in after August[, 2000] made a case for or against a
candidate. Just 3.1% were legislative [issue] ads, and 2.3%
were general image ads.” /d., quoted in Supp. App. at 726sa
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.).

The findings of the uncontroverted Annenberg studies not
only bolster the conclusions of the Buying Time reports, but
also underscore the perversity of the “magic words” test.
Among the conclusions of the Annenberg studies were ( I) the
amount of money spent on “issue advocacy” is rising rapidly;
(2) instead of creating the number of voices Buckley v. Valeo
had hoped, issue advocacy allow[s] groups such as the
parties. business and labor to use soft money or general
treasury “war chests” to gain a louder voice; (3) the
distinction between issue advocacy and express advocacy Is a
fiction; and (4) “issue” advocacy, as practiced in recent
elections, masks the identity of some key players and so
deprives citizens of information about source of messages
which research tells us is a vital part of assessing message
credibility. /d. at 2, quoted in Supp. App. at 657sa (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.). In addition, the unrebutted findings of Dr.
Goldstein about the 2000 election showed that (1) interest
group advertising that mentioned candidates was highly
concentrated in battleground states; (2) no more than 12% of
candidate-sponsored advertisements in 2000 used “magic
words”; and (3) interest group advertisements that identified a
candidate in 2000 tended to be broadcast within the final 60
days of the election campaign, whereas those that did not
identify a candidate were spread more evenly throughout the
year. See Supp. App. 763sa-764sa (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). The
authoritative studies Plaintiffs did not challenge, then, support
BCRA’s overall approach to electioneering communications
just as strongly as do the studies they do attack. Even Judge
Henderson, who criticized the Buying Time studies, relied on

ee ee

23

these other studies in her opinion. See Supp. App. at 230sa-
231sa, 233sa.

B. Plaintiffs Are Wrong in Claiming that the

Authors of the Buying Time Studies Improperly
Recoded Data.

In the district court, Plaintiffs made one central challenge
to the integrity of the 1998 Buying Time study. They claimed
that the authors had improperly recoded data to recharacterize
eight “genuine” issue ads as campaign ads. They still do. See
McConnell Br. at 56. Judge Leon, however, who of the three
judges considered the Buying Time studies most closely,
found no problem here. See Supp. App. at 1344sa. He
rightly saw that “the changes [made] in the database reflect
the gradual filling in of missing data and the discovery of
internal contradictions.” /d. What happened was that the
original coders who had reviewed these eight ads had filled
out their coding sheets in a way that was_ internally
contradictory. Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Gibson acknowledged as
much. Gibson dep. at 116-21. Since it was impossible from
the original coding sheets to tell how the coders would have
properly classified these ads, they were recoded. Dr. Gibson
agreed that that was the proper course. In fact, when asked
what he would have done under the circumstances, he
answered directly “I probably would have fired [the coder]
and had the cases re-coded,” id. at 121, which—apart from
the firing—is what the authors of the 1998 study did. When
asked to review several of these internally contradictory
coding sheets along with the ads they coded, Dr. Gibson
himself indicated that it was “highly probable” that the
original coders intended to categorize the ads as campaign
advertising, not as issue ads. /d. at 112. Dr. Gibson, then,
unlike the Plaintiffs themselves, did not believe that these
eight ads should be counted as issue ads, an assumption upon
which one of the most dramatic and misleading arguments of
the Plaintiffs rest: “that 64% of ads mentioning a candidate in

24

the 60 days before the 1998 general election were coded by
the students as ‘genuine. McConnell Br. at 56. That
number cannot stand in the face of the record and Plaintiffs’
own expert's testimony.

Plaintiffs also attack the coding of the data underlying the
Buying Time 2000 study. They incorrectly claim that 17%,
not 2.3%, of the television ads appearing within 60 days of
the general election were actual issue ads. To get there, they
must recode six of seven basically identical ads that were
widely broadcast in the 2000 campaign. This is improper. In
his expert report analyzing the Buying Time 2000 study's
methodology and use of data, Defendants’ expert Professor
Goldstein explained that one of these seven ads was
originally coded by the students_as an issue ad and the
remaining six essentially identical ads were coded by them as
campaign ads. See Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 16-17.
Although the original Buying Time 2000 investigators had
then recoded the one ad to match the six others, Professor
Goldstein had followed the original inconsistent coding in his
analysis. But the Plaintiffs argued in district court that the six
should be made to conform to the one. See Pls.’ D. Ct. Reply
Br. at 37. The Defendants and Intervenors, on the other hand,
believed it more sensible to reclassify the one outlier rather
than the large majority of advertisements. They did not
object, however, to Dr. Goldstein’s adhering to the original
inconsistent coding, the approach that led to the figure of
2.3%. Although in deposition Plaintiffs pressed Professor
Goldstein to reclassify the majority of ads, he agreed only
that under the Plaintiffs’ version of “the most conservative
estimate” the six should be made to conform to the outlier.”

* Protessor Goldstein's deposition testimony proceeded as follows:

Q: [I}f you believe [the six ads] are virtually indistinguishable
{from the one other], then wouldn't it have been fairer to
include them in your analysis, your quote ‘conservative
analysis’ in undertaking to prepare your expert report?

25

He nowhere stated that recoding six ads to conform to one
would better reflect the ads’ content or his own “conservative
estimate.” He merely confirmed that under “the most
conservative estimate” any doubt—no matter how small—
would place the ads in the genuine issue category. And it
is this “most conservative estimate” that produces the figure
of 17%. Supp. App. at 1353sa-1354sa, 1361sa (Leon, J.).

If anything, controversies over recoding reflect bias in the
Plaintiffs’ challenges to the Buying Time studies, not in the
studies themselves. At one point in his report Dr. Gibson
relied on a modified version of the 2000 database in which 30
ads had been selected for recoding from campaign ads to
issue ads by Plaintiffs’ counsel. See Gibson Expert Report
62-63. Based on that recoding, Plaintiffs argued that the
actual number of issue ads BCRA’s primary definition would
have covered “would have increased by . . . 23%.” Pls.’
Omnibus Op. Br. (McConnell Pls.) at 69 n.34. But Dr.
Gibson himself never understood why those ads should be
recoded. He received no explanation from counsel and he
could not see any reason himself.° Indeed, Dr. Gibson never

A: In retrospect, knowing that these [six] ads were originally
coded as genuine issue ads [—a counterfactual assumption—}
they should have been included in the most conservative
estimate .. . . Having said that, . . . | don’t know what they
were originally coded as.

Goldstein dep. at 160 (emphasis added).
* His deposition testimony makes this clear:
Q: Now, you refer... to this mysterious group of 30 ads and
[your report] says, “[t)his list was provided to me by counsel.”

What I wanjt] to know is how were these ads selected by
counsel for you?

A: Idon’'t know.
** *

26

even looked at the storyboards for the recoded ads. /d. at
181. He simply followed the directions of counsel.

C. The Buying Time Studies Strongly Support
BCRA’s Primary Definition of Electioneering

Communications.

Because of a slight change of focus, the 1998 and 2000
Buying Time studies employ somewhat different measures to
quantify BCRA’s fit. The studies compare a single number,
the numerator, to two other numbers, the different denom-
inators. The common numerator consists of the number of
pure issue ads mischaracterized as campaign advocacy under
BCRA’s primary definition of electioneering communica-
tions. The 1998 study compares this numerator to the overall
number of issue ads televised in that year and thus offers up a
ratio of how many “false positives” using BCRA’s primary
definition would create. For example, if BCRA’s primary
definition mistakenly tagged four issue ads as campaign ads
out of 100 issue ads televised that year, the measure would
produce 4/100 or four percent. For 1998, this measure
produces a result of 6.1% false positives, Supp. App. at
1348sa n.213 (Leon, J.); for 2000, it produces a result of

| Were] these ads ... selected to illustrate that changing the . . .
coding on relatively few ads can produce a relatively large
swing in the percentages?

Pebvcds

I take it you didn’t make any determination that these 30 ads
should have been coded as genuine issue ads; is that correct?
That's correct.

Do you know now (sic) the Plaintiffs’ lawyers went about
selecting the ads .. .?

No, I don’t.

Did you have any understanding of the way in which the 30
ads were selected?

A: No.

Gibson dep. at 179-81.

©

QF 22 LC

27

3.1%, id. at 1360sa. These numbers are uncontested by
Plaintiffs, who rest their arguments on the other measure.

The 2000 study takes a somewhat different approach. It
compares this same numerator to the total number of ads
covered by BCRA’s primary definition. This approach
provides a measure of the proportion of ads BCRA’s primary
definition classifies as campaign ads that are actually pure
issue ads. It measures not “false positives” but rather the
inaccuracy of BCRA’s primary definition just within the
relatively small universe of ads it tags. Although both
measures use the same numerator—the number of issue ads
mischaracterized as campaign advocacy by BCRA’s primary
definition—they employ quite different denominators and
thus lead to different results.’

Contrary to Plaintiffs, this denominator issue is no
“problem” at all. These two different measures answer two

’ For 1998, the Defendants and Judge Leon believe that this second
measure produces a result of 14.7%, while Plaintiffs, because they would
recode eight campaign widely televised ads as issue ads for this year,
believe it would produce a result of 64%. Compare Supp. App. at 1157sa
with McConnell Br. at 56. As discussed earlier, however, their argument
is specious. Supra at 23-24. When asked to review several of these ads
and their internally contradictory coding sheets, Dr. Gibson, Plaintiffs’
own expert, indicated that it was “highly probable” that the coder
intended to categorize the ads as candidate campaign advertising. Gibson
dep. at 112.

For 2000, the Defendants believe this same measure produces a result
of 2.3%, while Plaintiffs and Judge Leon believe it produces a result of
17%. Supp App. at 1157sa. As discussed earlier, however, this higher
figure takes seven essentially—identical ads, six of which the original
coders characterized as campaign advocacy and one of which they
characterized as issue advocacy, and characterizes all seven as issue
advocacy. Supra at 24-25. At best the 17% figure can serve only as an
upper limit. Accepting the original inconsistent coding, which itself errs
on the side of caution, produces the figure Defendants tendered: 2.3%.
The more reasonable approach of reclassifying the one outlier to conform
to the other six ads would, of course, produce a still lower figure.

28

different questions about BCRA's effect. The original, 1998
measure compares the number of issue ads covered by BCRA
to all issue ads televised in that year and so measures the
impact of BCRA on issue advertising generally. The later
measure compares the number of issue ads covered by BCRA
to all ads covered by BCRA and so measures the inaccuracy
of the primary definition within the restricted domain of those
ads it captures. Unlike the first measure, it says nothing at all
about the accuracy of the primary definition in the total
domain of political advertising.

Of these two measures, only the first bears on what
proportion of total issue advocacy is mistakenly caught by
BCRA’s primary definition. On any view, that is a very
small number—6.1 percent for 1998 and 3.1 percent for 2000.
This ratio, however, actually overstates the impact of BCRA
on issue ads for several reasons. First, the coders were given
a stark all-or-nothing choice—the ads had to be classified
simply as issue or candidate ads, not some mixture of both.
Hybrid ads touting or attacking candidates on particular
issues could thus have been coded as pure issue ads even if a
major purpose was electioneering. Second, the coders had no
context for the ads. An ad that appears on its surface to be
about issues can assume a quite different role in the context
of an actual election. An ad attacking trial lawyers, for
example, might not have coded as a candidate ad even if in a
particular race that ad had been aimed at one candidate
prominently identified with that profession. Third, the study
did not consider print ads and mass mailings, which BCRA’s
primary definition excludes from coverage. Had they been
included in the overall analysis, however, the proportion of
issue advocacy covered by BCRA’s primary definition would
have fallen greatly. The same number of televised issue ads
would have been coded as falling under BCRA’s primary
definition, of course, but they would have been among the
much larger universe of televised, print, and mass mailing
issue ads. For these reasons, then, the already low figures

29
that the 1998 measure produces for mischar-
acterized issue advocacy are upper limits. The actual
numbers would be much lower. As the Buying Time studies
show, BCRA’s primary definition in no way impermissibly
burdens speech.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold
BCRA’s primary definition of electioneering commu-
nications.

Respectfully submitted,

LLOYD LEONARD DANIEL R. ORTIZ

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS Counsel of Record

OF THE UNITED STATES UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
1730 M Street, N.W. SCHOOL OF LAW
Suite 1000 580 Massie Rd.
Washington, DC 20036 Charlottesville, VA 22903

(202) 229-1965 (434) 924-3127

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0664%3A37. Public record. Not legal advice.
