# Petitioners Brief — Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0643%3A08

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 541 U.S. 246

## Text

FILED
‘ AUG 29 2003
No. 02-1343 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION AND
WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners,
V.

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

KENNETH S. GELLER JED R. MANDEL
ANDREW J. PINCUS Counsel of Record
JOHN J. SULLIVAN TIMOTHY A. FRENCH
CRAIG W. CANETTI Neal, Gerber &
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Eisenberg LLP

Maw LLP Two North LaSalle Street
1909 K Street, N.W. Suite 2200
Washington, DC 20006 Chicago, Illinois 60602
(202) 263-3000 (312) 269-8000
Counsel for Western States Counsel for Engine

Petroleum Association Manufacturers Association

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether local government regulations prohibiting the
purchase of new motor vehicles with specified emission
characteristics — which are otherwise approved for sale by
state and federal regulators — are preempted by Section 209(a)
of the Clean Air Act, which expressly preempts any state or
local “standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).

(L)

ll
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner Engine Manufacturers Association (“EMA”), a
not-for-profit trade association, was plaintiff and appellant
below. It has no corporate parents, subsidiaries or affiliates, and
no publicly traded company has a 10% or greater ownership
interest in EMA.

Petitioner Western States Pettoleum Association (“WSPA”)
intervened as a plaintiff and was an appellant in the court of
appeals. It is a trade association organized as a non-profit
corporation. WSPA has no corporate parents, subsidiaries or
affiliates, and no publicly traded company has a 10% or greater
ownership interest in WSPA.

Respondents South Coast Air Quality Management District,
its individual Board Members (William A. Burke, Norma J.
Glover, Michael D. Antonovich, Hal Bernson, Jane W. Carney,
Cynthia P. Coad, Beatrice J.S. Lapisto-Kirtley, Ronald O.
Loveridge, Jon D. Mikels, Leonard Paulitz, Cynthia Vedugo-
Peralta, and S. Roy Wilson), and its Executive Officer (Barry
S. Wallerstein) were defendants and appellees below. |

The Natural Resources Defense Council, Coalition for
Clean Air, Communities for a Better Environment, Inc.,
Planning & Conservation League, and Sierra Club intervened
as defendants and were appellees in the court of appeals.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Ee e J
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT .... ii
EE ee rare l
Nee ee see cceceuncaccene l
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

o fyy 6 De 3) l
i cee e cea bancocedteseaccccess 2
cect ec cenkemneGocece cn 3

B. The California Motor Vehicle Emission Regula-
EE eee 10
C. The Challenged Fleet Rules .................. 14
D. The Proceedings Below .................0065 18
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................ 19
eerie eek eeeceetesesesccescecces 20

I. SECTION 209(A) ENCOMPASSES RESTRICTIONS
ON PURCHASES OF NEW MOTOR VEHICLES
SUCH AS THE DISTRICT’S FLEET RULES ...... 21

A. The Plain Language Of Section 209(a) Estab-
lishes That A Rule Barring The Purchase Of
New Motor Vehicles Based On Their Emission
Characteristics Is A Preempted “Standard
Relating To The Control Of Emissions.” ........ 22

B. Other Provisions Of Section 209 Support A
Broad Reading Of “Any Standard Relating To
The Control Of Emissions” In Section 209(a) .... 28

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

C. The 1990 Amendments To The Clean Air Act

Confirm That Section 209(a) Preempts Purchas-
DEED od vccccustacancnscoesascens 29

D. The Fleet Rules Are Preempted By Section
PES o4dd0c0dsndcctressnudsenesneeusens 33

Il. THE FLEET RULES ARE NOT SAVED FROM
PREEMPTION BY ANY OTHER SECTIONS OF

ee ISS a cc ccnesecescecensercecs 36
OED Kacccccucsdctdescuevensaseni 36
ee Pe id66 6 snenskusaeetenseeend beets 39
ibd oy os ce edaneduseeeunentens 42
i

vehicles as an “[e}xception”™ to this approach); Washington, 406
U.S. at 115 (“{sJo far as factories, incinerators, and other
Stationary devices are implicated, the States have broad control

** ™.

To confirm the leading role for the States in controlling
non-mobile sources of air pollution, Congress enacted a general
savings clause in Title 1, 42 U.S.C. § 7416, preserving “the
right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or
enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of
air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or
abatement of air pollution.” Nevertheless, to confirm federal
authority over mobile sources of air pollution, Congress
expressly excepted the “standard{s] relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles” set forth in Section 209(a)
from that savings clause.

Congress has amended the Clean Air Act several times
since 1967, but it has not altered the basic scheme that estab-
lishes the federal government as preeminent with respect to the
regulation of pollution from new motor vehicles and motor
vehicle engines. To this day, only two sets of standards relating
to new motor vehicle emissions are permissible — those
adopted by the federal government and those adopted by the
State of California for which EPA has granted a waiver.

2. Congress in 1977 amended the motor vehicle provisions
of the Clean Air Act in two relevant respects. First, it allowed
certain States other than California — under conditions
“carefuily circumscribed to avoid placing an undue burden on
the automobile manufacturing industry” (MVMA, 17 F.3d at
527) — to adopt, in whole, California standards as to which the
federal government has waived preemption. Section 177 of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7507, excludes from the preemptive scope of
Section 209(a) “standards relating to control of emissions” and
“such other actions as are referred to in [Section 209(a)] if * * *
such standards are identical to the California standards for

which a waiver has been granted for such model year” and if
both California and the other State adopt the standards at least
two years before the commencement of the model year. Thus,
“(rjather than being faced with 51 different standards, as they
had feared, or with only one, as they had sought, manufacturers
must cope with two regulatory standards * * *.” Engine Mfrs.
Ass'n, 88 F.3d at 1080.

The 1977 amendments also revised the statutory test for
granting a request by California for a waiver of preemptioti.
The principal change was to require the federal government “to
consider California’s standards as a package, so that California
could seek a waiver from preemption if its standards ‘in the
aggregate’ protected public health at least as well as federal
standards.” MVMA, 17 F.3d at 525. In addition, Congress
directed the federal government in considering a waiver request
under Section 209(b) of the Act to accord deference to the
State’s judgment regarding the effect of its standards on the
public health and welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (Pub. L. No. 95-
95, § 207, 91 Stat. 755 (1977)).

3. Congress again revisited the Clean Air Act in 1990. It
added a second paragraph to Section 177 — the provision
authorizing other States to adopt California standards that
received a Section 209(b) preemption waiver — to emphasize
the strict limitations on the authority of such a State:

Nothing in this section or [in the title of the Act concerning
mobile source pollution] shall be construed as authorizing
any * * * State [that adopts California standards] to prohibit
or limit, directly or indirectly, the manufacture or sale of a
new motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine that is certified
in California as meeting California standards, or to take any
action of any kind to create, or have the effect of creating,
a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine different than a

motor vehicle or engine certified in California under

9

California standards (a “third vehicle”) or otherwise create
such a “third vehicle.”

Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 232, 104 Stat. 2529 (1990). This
language was added to “codifly], in effect, Congress's under-
standing of the authority originally [given] to states by Section
177 as expressed in the legislative history of Section 177 when
it was adopted in 1977.” Clean Air Conference Report (Oct. 27,
1990), A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

AMENDMENTS OF 1990 1001, 1021-1022 (1993); see also

Exhibit 1 (Oct. 27, 1990), id. at 790 (entered by Sen. Mitchell)
(describing the amendment to section 177 as “a mere clarifica-
tion of current law”).

Congress in 1990 also required some States that had failed
to reduce air pollution levels in accordance with national
ambient air quality standards to force operators of fleets of cars
and trucks to purchase specified percentages of vehicles that
“would be substantially cleaner than conventional vehicles.”
H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 337 (1990).
Each State must submit to EPA for approval an implementation
plan setting forth the emission limitations and other rules
adopted by the State — relating principally to the regulation of
stationary sources such as power plants and factories — that are
designed to produce compliance with the federal air quality
standards and other requirements of the Act. See generally
General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 533
(1990); Train, 421 U.S. at 79-80. :

The 1990 amendments provide that a State that has failed
to attain specified air quality levels must submit for EPA
approval a revised implementation plan that requires operators
of centrally fueled fleets of ten or more specified types of
vehicles to purchase a designated percentage of “clean-fuel
vehicles.” Section 246, 42 U.S.C. § 7586 (Pub. L. No. 101-549,
§ 229(a), 104 Stat. 2520). A “clean-fuel vehicle” is one that
meets the clean-fuel vehicle emission standards established

10

under the Act (Section 241(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7581(7) (Pub. L.
No. 101-549, § 229(a), 104 Stat. 2513)).

Significantly, the Clean Air Act's “clean-fuel fleet”
provisions state that “[t]he plan revision * * * shall provide that
the choice of clean-fuel vehicles and clean alternative fuels
shall be made by the covered fleet operators subject to the
requirements” of Section 246. Section 246(d), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7586(d). The provisions also broadly define “clean alternative
fuel” as “any fuel (including methanol, ethanol, or other
alcohols * * *, reformulated gasoline, diesel, natural gas,
liquefied petroleum gas, and hydrogen) or power source
(including electricity) used in a clean-fuel vehicle that com-
plies” with the standards established under the Act (Section
241(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7581(2)); and apply only to limited
percentages of a fleet operator’s covered fleet vehicles (Section
246(b)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7586(b)-(c)). Thus, the “clean-fuel
fleet” provisions do not authorize States (much less local
governments) to limit a fleet operators’ ability to choose among
the various types of clean-fuel vehicles that otherwise comply
with the applicable emission regulations.

Finally, Congress authorized the federal government to
excuse a State from its obligation to impose a “clean-fuel fleet”
purchasing requirement if the State proposed an alternative
approach that would achieve emission reductions equal to those
that would be achieved under a fleet purchasing rule. 42 U.S.C.

§ 751 la(c)(4)(B).
B. The California Motor Vehicle Emission Regulations.

California law designates the California Air Resources
Board (“CARB”) as “the air pollution control agency for all
set forth in federal law” (Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 39602) and vests CARB with authority to promulgate
regulations addressing air pollution resulting from motor
vehicles, including limitations on emissions from new motor
vehicles and new motor vehicle engines. See id §§ 39003,

ee

li

43013, 43018, 43100-43108. Three sets of CARB’s regulations
are relevant here.

1. CARB’s low-emission vehicle (“LEV”) program,
governing low-emission passenger cars and medium-duty
vehicles, was adopted in 1990 and 1991 and applies to 1994 to
2003 model-year vehicles. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1;
Pet. App. 13a; CARB, Low-Emission Vehicle Program, at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/levprog/evprog.htm (last up-
dated Oct. 2, 2002). In 1999, CARB adopted “LEV II” rules,
which are applicable to the 2004 and later model years. See
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960(a); CARB, Low-Emission
Vehicle Program, at http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/levprog/
levprog.htm (last updated Oct. 2, 2002). Although the numeri-
cal requirements differ, the basic structure of the two programs
is substantially similar. The rules establish different tiers of
emission regulation, which are, in order of increasing strin-
gency: Transitional Low-Emission Vehicles (“TLEVs”), which
include diesel-fueled vehicles; Low-Emission Vehicles
(“LEVs”); Ultra-Low-Emission Vehicles (“ULEVs”); Super-
Ultra-Low-Emission Vehicles (““SULEVs”); and Zero-Emission
Vehicles (“ZEVs”). Each tier has a set of emission limitations
for carbon monoxide, formaldehyde, non-methane organic
gases, oxides of nitrogen, and particulate matter. Cal. Code
Regs. tit. 13, §§1960.1(e)(3), (g), (h)(2), (p) (LEV 1); id
§ 1961(a) (LEV II). A vehicle may be sold in California only if
it qualifies under one of these categories. See Cal. Health &
Safety Code §§ 43009, 43016-43017, 43102, 43105.

The LEV program further requires that vehicles that a
single manufacturer delivers for sale in California must meet
overall fleet average emission requirements. These require-
ments are reduced over time, “requiring manufacturers to sell
progressively cleaner mixes of vehicles.” Pet. App. 14a; see
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1(g)(2) (LEV I); id. § 1961(b)
(LEV II). “Automobile manufacturers, under CARB’s regula-
tions, have the flexibility to decide how many vehicles of each

12
type they manufacture and sell in order to meet the fleet
average.” Pet. App. 14a. Additional flexibility is provided
through establishment of a marketable credit system: manufac-
turers may earn credits against the non-methane organic gas
emission standards by exceeding the fleet average require-
ments, and against the ZEV requirements by creating Partial
Zero-Emission Vehicles (“PZEVs”), reducing carbon dioxide
emissions, or increasing fuel efficiency. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13,
§ 1960.1(g)(2) (note 7 to appended table of fleet average
emission requirements) (non-methane organic gas credits); id.
§ 1961(c)(1) (same); id. § 1962(g) (ZEV credits).

In 1993, EPA granted California a waiver of federal
preemption under Section 209(b) for the LEV program applica-
ble to light-duty vehicles. 58 Fed. Reg. 4,166 (1993). Califor-
nia’s LEV program for medium-duty vehicles received preemp-
tion waivers from EPA in 1994 (59 Fed. Reg. 48,625 (1995 and
later model years)) and in 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 18,403 (1998 and
later model years)). In April 2003, EPA granted a preemption
waiver for California’s LEV II amendments as they apply to
light-duty and medium-duty vehicles — except with respect to
California’s ZEV program. 68 Fed. Reg. 19,811. CARB
initially sought but later withdrew its requests for EPA consid-
eration of California’s ZEV program. 67 Fed. Reg. 60,680
(2002).

In addition to granting California’s LEV program a waiver
from federal preemption, EPA also approved that program as
a substitute for the federal “clean-fuel fleet” program required
by Section 246 for “nonattainment” areas in the State. 64 Fed.
Reg. 46,849 (1999). But for EPA’s approval of California’s
LEV program as a substitute, six “nonattainment” areas in
California, including the South Coast Air Basin, would have
been required by Section 246 to adopt federal “clean-fuel fleet”
programs. 64 Fed. Reg. 46,850.

13
2. CARB promulgated an emission control program for -
heavy-duty urban transit buses (the “Urban Bus Program’’) in
February 2000. See CARB News Release, ARB Cuts Emissions
From Transit Buses (Feb. 24, 2000), at http://www.arb.ca.gov/
newsrel/n1022400.htm (viewed Aug. 18, 2003). One element of
the program establishes increasingly stringent emission
standards for new urban buses and bus engines. Cal. Code
Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.1(a)(6)-(12).

The Urban Bus Program also imposes a ceiling on the
average emission level of a bus fleet operated by a public
transit agency. CARB nonetheless respected fleet operators’
need “to determine their optimal fleet mix in consideration of
such factors as air quality benefits, service availability, cost,
efficiency, safety, and convenience.” Accordingly, CARB
established “two paths to compliance with this fleet rule * * *:
the alternative-fuel path and the diesel path.” Cal. Code Regs.
tit. 13, § 1956.2(a).

Operators choosing the diesel path are obligated to retrofit
a larger number of existing buses to reduce nitrogen oxide
emissions than those choosing the alternative-fuel path (see
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.2(f)(2)-(3)) and must purchase
a specified minimum number of zero emission buses (see id.
§ 1956.3(c)). The alternative-fuel path requires that at least
85% of new buses be capable of operating on alternative fuel,
which is defined as “natural gas, propane, ethanol, methanol,
electricity, fuel cells, or advanced technologies that do not rely
on diesel fuel” (id. § 1956.2(b)(1)); a lesser retrofit obligation
(see id. § 1956.2(f)(2)-(3)); and a deferred obligation to
purchase zero-emission buses (see id. § 1956.3(c)). All opera-
tors, regardless of the path selected, must retrofit existing buses
to reduce particulate emissions. /d. § 1956.2-1956.3; Pet. App.
15a.

' CARB Board Resolution 00-02 at 6 (Feb. 24, 2000), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/bus/res00-2.pdf (viewed Aug. 18, 2003),
(continued...)

14

3. CARB also has developed an emission control program
for heavy-duty vehicles (those over 14,000 pounds in gross
vehicle weight rating), including diesel-fueled trucks. Under
CARB’s Heavy-Duty Vehicle Program, emission limits are
established for oxides of nitrogen, non-methane hydrocarbons,
particulate matter, and carbon monoxide. Heavy-duty vehicles
that CARB certifies as meeting those emission limits may be
sold throughout the State. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, §§ 1956.8, er
seq. (2003); CARB, On-Road Heavy-Duty Vehicle Program, at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/onroadhd/onroadhd.htm (last
updated May 12, 2003).

Significantly, and in recognition of the need for regulatory
uniformity in the capital-intensive heavy-duty vehicle market,
CARB’s Heavy-Duty Vehicle Program standards are largely
identical to, and incorporate by reference, the standards EPA
has adopted for heavy-duty vehicles. Compare Cal. Code Regs.
tit. 13, §§ 1956.8, et seg. with 40 C.F.R. Part 86; see also J.A.
163, 165. As a result of these standards, “[heavy-duty] diesel
vehicles will [during 2007 to 2010] achieve gasoline-like
exhaust emission levels, in addition to their inherent advantages
over gasoline vehicles with respect to fuel economy, green-
house gas emissions, and lower evaporative hydrocarbon
emissions.” 66 Fed. Reg. 5,005 (2001).

C. The Challenged Fleet Rules.

The District is a political subdivision of the State of
California. It is a regional entity responsible for “imple-
ment[ing] a strategy for achieving and maintaining ambient air
quality standards within the South Coast Air Basin,” which
consists of parts of Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside and

'(..continued)

directed CARB’s Executive Officer to forward the details of the Urban Bus
Program to EPA and request “a waiver or confirmation that the regulations
are within the scope of an existing waiver” under Section 209(b). According
to EPA’s on-line docket, however, CARB’s waiver request for the Urban
Bus Program has not yet been submitted to EPA.

15

Orange Counties. Pet App. 4a-5a; see Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 39052.5, 40402, 40410-40412, 40440-40459. The
district court in this case stated that the South Coast Air Basin
“experiences the most serious air quality problems in the
nation, primarily due to motor vehicle pollution.” Pet. App. Sa.

The California legislature in 1987 authorized the District to
adopt regulations governing vehicle purchases by operators of
“public and commercial vehicle fleets” of 15 or more vehicles.
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40447.5. With some exceptions,
the District was permitted to require such operators “to pur-
chase vehicles which are capable of operating on methanol or
other equivalently clean burning alternative fuel and to require
that these vehicles be operated, to the maximum extent feasible,
on the alternative fuel when operating” in the District. Jbid.

In June, August and October 2000, the District promulgated
a series of six “Fleet Rules” regulating purchases or leases of
new vehicles by various private and public operators (including
federal, state, regional, county, and city departments and
agencies) of commercial fleets to “reduce air toxic and criteria
pollutant emissions.” J.A. 16. Each of the Rules addresses a
separate type of vehicle fleet, but all follow a common ap-
proach, prohibiting fleet operators from purchasing many types
of new vehicles — including some low-emission vehicles and
all diesel-fueled vehicles — that are certified by CARB for sale
within California.

For example, Rule 1194 (J.A. 58-65) applies “to all public
and private fleet operators of fifteen (15) or more vehicles
operated by the airport authority or any other public or private
fleet operators that transport passengers from commercial
airports located in the District.” Rule 1194(b) (J.A. 58). It
imposes separate restrictions on different types of transporta-
tion providers, as follows:

¢ For operators “providing limousine or transit shuttle
services out of commercial airport terminals to the public

16

through the collection of fares or fees, or [that] provide
courtesy pickup services out of commercial airport termi-
nals,” any new passenger car or medium-duty vehicle
purchase or lease “shall be a vehicle that has been certified
by CARB that meets the ULEV, SULEV, or ZEV emission
standards.” Rule 1194(d)(1) (J.A. 61-62). These operators
are barred from purchasing or leasing other vehicles that
also are certified by CARB and therefore permitted to be
sold in California — such as those meeting the TLEV and
LEV emissions standards. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13,
§ 1960.1(g)(2) (LEV I fleet average requirements permit-
ting sale of TLEVs and LEVs as part of manufacturers total
fleet of vehicles); id. § 1961(b) (same for LEV II).

* Operators of “shuttle van services that provide multi-
ple-party passenger transportation services to commercial
airport terminals and do not operate on fixed or scheduled
routes” were subjected to a phased-in requirement: from
July 1, 2001, through June 30, 2002, half of their purchases
or leases of new passenger cars or medium-duty vehicles
were required to be CARB-certified as meeting ULEV,
SULEV, or ZEV emission standards; beginning July 1,
2002, all purchases and leases had to meet this standard.
Rule 1194(d)(2) (J.A. 62). As noted above (at pages 11-12),
CARB’s rules permit the purchase and lease within Califor-
nia of new passenger cars and medium-duty vehicles that
do not meet these particular standards.

¢ For providers of “shuttle services to the public in and out
of airport terminals to airport parking lots, car rental lots, or
hotels/motels, all new heavy-duty transit vehicle purchases
or leases shall be alternative-fueled vehicles,” (Rule
1194(d)(3) (J.A. 62)), which the Rule defines as a “vehicle
or engine that is not powered by gasoline or diesel fuel,”
(Rule 1194(c)(2) (J.A. 59)). Under CARB’s rules,
heavy-duty transit vehicles powered by gasoline or diesel

17

fuel are CARB-certified and may be sold within California.
See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.1(a)(6)-(12).

¢ Finally, for fleet operators “providing taxicab pickup
services out of commercial airport terminals,” any new
purchase or lease of a passenger car or medium-duty
vehicle to perform such services “shall [only] be a vehicle
that has been certified by CARB that meets the ULEV,
SULEV, or ZEV emission standards” (Rule 1194(d)(4)
(J.A. 62-63)), despite the availability of other
CARB-certified vehicles, including diesel-powered vehicles
(see page 11, supra). The Rule provides for an exemption
for such operators if the District has failed to make avail-
able a subsidy to cover any amount in excess of $10,000
that the operator is required to pay for such a vehicle. Rule
1194(e)(3) (J.A. 63-64).

Rule 1194 contains exemptions for situations in which the
operator demonstrates to the District that the vehicle required
under the Rule is not available commercially or could not be
used; for vehicles converted to be wheelchair accessible; and
for buses “used for the express purpose of providing
long-distance service.” Rule 1194(e)(1)-(2), (4) (J.A. 63-64).

Each of the other Fleet Rules follows the same approach for
different types of fleets: public and private street-sweeper fleet
operators (Rule 1186.1 (J.A. 16-23)); public fleet operators of
passenger cars, light-duty trucks, or medium-duty vehicles
(Rule 1191 (J.A. 24-45)); public transit fleet operators (Rule
1192 (J.A. 46-51)); public and private solid waste collection
fleet operators (Rule 1193 (J.A. 52-57)); and public fleet
operators of heavy-duty vehicles (Rule 1196 (J.A. 66-74)). In
each instance, the purchase of certain low-emission vehicles
and all covered diesel-fuel vehicles is generally prohibited. See
Pet. App. 16a-19a.

- 18
D. The Proceedings Below.

Petitioner Engine Manufacturers Association commenced
this action against respondent SCAQMD in the United States.
District Court for the Central District of California asserting
that the Fleet Rules are preempted by Section 209(a) of the
Clean Air Act and seeking an injunction barring the District
from enforcing those Rules. Petitioner Western States Petro-
leum Association intervened as a plaintiff; and respondents
Natural Resources Defense Council, Coalition for Clean Air,
Communities for a Better Environment, Inc., Planning &
Conservation League, and Sierra Club intervened as defen-
dants. Pet. App. 19a-20a.

The district court granted respondents’ motion for summary
judgment (Pet. App. 3a-27a). The court recognized that the
First and Second Circuits had held that state-imposed require-
ments regarding the sales of motor vehicles constitute a
“standard relating to the control of emissions” preempted by
Section 209(a). Pet. App. 23a. Nonetheless, the district court
stated that “[i]t does not follow, however, that a rule regulating
the purchase of vehicles is such a standard.” /bid. (emphasis in
original). “Where a state regulation does not compel manufac-
turers to meet a new emissions limit, but rather affects the
purchase of vehicles, as the Fleet Rules do, that regulation is
not a standard. No restriction on the sale of vehicles is present
here. Plaintiffs may continue to sell any vehicle which is
otherwise certified in California.” /bid.

The district court also relied on Section 246’s requirement
that some States require fleet operators to purchase certain
low-emission vehicles. “It is not rational to conclude that the
[Clean Air Act] would authorize purchasing restrictions on the
one hand, and prohibit them, as a prohibited adoption of a
‘standard,’ on the other.” Pet. App. 23a.

Finally, the district court concluded that Section 177’s
requirement that a State adopt standards “identical” to Califor-

19

nia’s to be exempt from preemption was not applicable because
it referred only to “the non-California ‘opt-in’ states.” Pet. App.
26a. The court also determined that the District's Fleet Rules
did not impose a “third car” requirement in violation of Section
177 because “they require purchasers to choose from among a
subset of previously certified vehicles. Automobile manufactur-
ers will not be forced to do something more than they already
must.” Pet. App. 27a. “The Fleet Rules may lead to decreased
demand for some cars and trucks certified in California, but the
Rules do not require the manufacturers to build or sell any
particular model for this area.” /bid.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment “for the reasons
stated in” the district court’s “well-reasoned opinion.” Pet. App.
la-2a. The court of appeals subsequently denied rehearing. Pet.
App. 28a-29a.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act prohibits any “State or
any political subdivision thereof’ from “adopt{ing] or
attempt[ing] to enforce any standard relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines.” This provision sweeps broadly and encompasses the
emissions-based purchasing restrictions imposed on fleet
operators by the Fleet Rules at issue in this case.

The District’s Fleet Rules prohibit the purchase of certain
new motor vehicles — including all diesel-fueled vehicles —
based on the emission characteristics of those vehicles. As a
result, the Rules are “standard{s] relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles” preempted by Section
209(a). The distinction drawn by respondents and the courts
below between purchase prohibitions (which they contend are
not preempted) and sales restrictions (which they acknowledge
are preempted) finds no support in the text of Section 209(a) or
the Clean Air Act’s regulatory scheme. Indeed, the distinction

20

is illusory; every sale includes a purchase and every purchase
includes a sale.

The Fleet Rules also expressly refer to and incorporate a
subset of the emission standards adopted by CARB. That subset
includes only the most stringent and restrictive of the broader
range of CARB emission standards and phase-in provisions.
The Fleet Rules amount to a new and different set of standards
adopted for the undisputed purpose of controlling emissions. If
the District can adopt these standards, then other state and local
governments can as well. The congressional scheme for
regulating mobile sources of emissions would be gutted.

No provision of the Clean Air Act — not the preemption
waiver provision for California (Section 209(b)), the “opt-in”
provision allowing other States to adopt California emission
standards that have been approved by EPA (Section 177), nor
the clean-fue! fleet provisions (Section 246) — saves the Fleet
Rules from federal preemption. The District is not a State. The
Fleet Rules vary from the EPA-approved standards adopted by
the State of California. And the Fleet Rules have never been

approved by EPA.
ARGUMENT

The District’s Fleet Rules are “standard[s] relating to the
control of emissions from new motor vehicles” and are,
therefore, preempted by Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act.
The contrary holding of the courts below — based on the
conclusion that the Fleet Rules are beyond the reach of Section
209(a) because they proscribe purchases, not sales (see Pet.
App. 2a, 23a) — is untenable. It ignores the broad language of
Section 209(a), the entire regulatory scheme for controlling
motor vehicle emissions under the Clean Air Act, and the
purpose and effect of the Fleet Rules themselves.

If the Fleet Rules were not preempted emission standards,
then any state or local government could adopt rules permitting

21

or prohibiting any motor vehicle purchases (whether by fleet
operators or individuals) based on the emissions characteristics
of those vehicles. The balkanized regulatory scheme that
would result is the very sort of “chaotic situation” Congress
sought to avoid by preempting state and local regulation of

~ motor vehicle emission standards. See pages 4-7, supra. Such
localized variation will disrupt “interstate commerce in new
motor vehicles” and undermine the regulatory regime created
by Congress for mobile sources in Title II of the Act. H.R. Rep.
728, at 21.

I. SECTION 209(A) ENCOMPASSES RESTRICTIONS
ON PURCHASES OF NEW MOTOR VEHICLES
SUCH AS THE DISTRICT’S FLEET RULES -

Whether the Clean Air Act preempts the Fleet Rules is
determined by the text of Section 209(a). Where, as here, a
federal statute “contains an express pre-emption clause, [the]
task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on
the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the
best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002) (quoting CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

The courts below, and respondents, mistakenly relied on a
“presumption” against federal preemption of traditional state
“police powers” in seeking to narrow the scope of Section
209(a). Pet. App 2a, 9a. But such a presumption has no bearing
on this case, where “Congress has made clear its desire for
preemption.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 146 (2001).
Moreover, the presumption applies only when Congress
legislates “in a field which the States have traditionally occu-

> The statute preempts state and local standards applicable to both “new
motor vehicles” and “new motor vehicle engines.” For ease of reference, we
include both “new motor vehicles” and “new motor vehicle engines” in
referring to “motor vehicles.”

22

pied” (United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (quoting
Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))),
and not in a field “where there has been a history of significant
federal presence” (529 U.S. at 108). In this case, there is no
“tradition” of state regulation of motor vehicle emissions —
only a single State had adopted emission standards at the time
Congress enacted the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act.
See pages 5-6, supra. To the contrary, there have been decades
of a “significant federal presence” in the field. Locke, 529 U.S.
at 108.

The preemption inquiry in this case begins and ends with
the text of Section 209(a), which “provides a reliable indicium
of congressional intent with respect to state authority.”
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 209(a) plainly demonstrates Congress’s intent to
preempt regulations like the Fleet Rules.

A. The Plain Language Of Section 209(a) Establishes
That A Rule Barring The Purchase Of New Motor
Vehicles Based On Their Emission Characteristics Is
A Preempted “Standard Relating To The Control Of
Emissions.”

The first sentence of Section 209(a) is written in expansive
terms: “No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt
or attempt to enforce amy standard relating to the control of
emissions for new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines
subject to this part.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (emphasis added).
This language “largely preempt([s] the field with regard to
‘emissions from new motor vehicles.’” Washington, 406 U.S.
at 114; see also American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d
196, 198 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Under Section 209 of the Clean Air
Act, exclusive control over ‘standards relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles’ is vested in the federal
government, and the states are preempted from regulating in the
area.”); MVMA, 17 F.3d at 526 (the “cornerstone of Title II [of

23

the Clean Air Act] is Congress’ continued preemption of state
regulation of automobile emissions”).

Despite the provision’s broad language, the courts below
concluded that, although Section 209(a) has been properly
construed to preempt state laws regulating sales of new motor
vehicles based on the vehicles’ emission characteristics,’ “[i]t
does not follow * * * that a rule regulating the purchase of
vehicles is such a standard.” Pet. App. 23a (emphasis in
original). That construction of the statute cannot withstand even
casual scrutiny in light of the breadth of Section 209(a)’s
prohibition against “adopt[ing] or attempt[ing] to enforce any
standard relating to the control of emissions,” which is evident
from each element of the language Congress used in crafting
the provision.

First, the statute proscribes “any standard.” The term “any”
generally means a thing “selected without restriction or
limitation of choice,” and when used as a modifier — as in
Section 209(a) — “any” indicates “the maximum or whole of
a number or quantity.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (1986). Congress’s use of the word
“any” in a statute “undercuts a narrow construction” of the
provision. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605 (1986),
abrogated on other grounds by Central Green Co. v. United
States, 531 U.S. 425 (2001); see also Harrison v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588-589 (1980) (Congress’s use of the
“expansive” term “any” “offer[ed] no indication whatever that
Congress intended the limiting construction” of the statute
urged by the respondents); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251,
260 (1974) (interpreting Congress’s use of the word “any” to

* See Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Commissioner, 208 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir.
2000) (“a requirement that a particular percentage of vehicle sales be ZEVs
has no purpose other than to effect a general reduction in emissions” and
“must be considered ‘standards relating to the control of emissions” for
purposes of Section 209(a) (quoting Cahill, 152 F.3d at 200)).

24

indicate that there was “no limitation, apart from that of
reasonableness,” upon statute’s applicability).

Second, Congress described the object of the preemption
provision in broad terms: “any standard.” A “standard” is a
“criterion for measuring acceptability” (BLACK’s LAw DICTIO-
NARY 1412-1413 (7th ed. 1999)) and “something that is
established by authority, custom, or general consent as a model
or example to be followed,” ie., a “criterion” or “test”
(WEBSTER’S THIRD MEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2223 ).
The word “standard” includes not only the more limited terms
“law” and “regulation,” but also encompasses restrictions that
are the functional equivalents of standards as well. That is
confirmed by the inclusion by Congress of standards that a
State or local government either “adopt[s]” or “attempt(s] to
enforce;” an attempt to enforce a standard never formally
adopted is sufficient to trigger preemption.

Third, Section 209(a) preempts any standard “relating to
the control of emissions from motor vehicles,” and Congress’s
use of the term “relate to” in an express preemption clause
signals a “clearly expansive” preemptive intent. Egelhoff, 532
U.S. at 146; see also Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996) (“The word ‘relates’ is highly
general, and this Court has interpreted it broadly in other
pre-emption contexts.”); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (the phrase “relating to” in a preemp-
tion clause “express[es] a broad preemptive purpose”).

This Court has interpreted “related to” preemption clauses
to invalidate state laws that have a “reference to” or a “connec-
tion with” the preempted subject matter. See, e.g, Egelhoff, 532
U.S. at 147; California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement
v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997);
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223 (1995).
The “reference to” or “connection with” inquiry is based on
whether the state or local law at issue is expressly linked in

25

some fashion to the subject matter that has been reserved for
federal regulation. As the Court explained in Dillingham, a
“reference” sufficient to establish preemption will be found
“[wJhere a State’s law acts immediately or exclusively upon”
the preempted subject matter, or where the preempted subject
matter “is essential to the law’s operation.” 519 U.S. at 325.

To determine whether a state or local law has “the forbid-
den connection,” resort must be had to “the objectives of the
[federal statute] as a guide to the scope of the state law that
Congress understood would survive,” and “the nature of the
effect of the state law on [the preempted legislative area].”
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995)
(the Court looked to “the objectives of the [federal] statute as
a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive’’).

In light of these principles, the proscription against “any
standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles” must encompass purchase prohibitions. Whatever the
outer limits of Section 209(a)’s preemptive scope, it is plain
that a state or local rule that bars the purchase of some new
motor vehicles and permits the purchase of others on the basis
of the vehicles’ respective emission characteristics is well
within Section 209(a)’s prohibition. There are only a few ways
to regulate motor vehicle emissions. Manufacturers may be
barred from producing vehicles that do not meet specified
emissions criteria; or sales, purchases, or use of new motor
vehicles may be limited on the same basis. Given its expansive
language, Section 209(a) necessarily encompasses such direct
emission controls.

Certainly, any distinction between sale restrictions and
purchase restrictions is nonsensical. Every new vehicle transac-
tion involves the purchase of the vehicle by the purchaser and

(e)

63

has been certified by CARB that meets the ULEV,
SULEV, or ZEV emission standards when adding or
replacing a passenger car or medium-duty vehicle to
their fleet.

(5) Vehicles acquired pursuant to paragraph (d)(4)
must be operated within the South Coast Air Quality
Management District for a minimum of three years if
funding to offset the purchase cost, less $10,000 in ac-
cordance with paragraph (e)(3), was made available.

(6) Prior to January 1, 2002, airport fleet operators
voluntarily purchasing an alternative-fueled vehicle
meeting requirements of paragraph (d)(4) after adop-
tion of this rule, may apply for funding to offset the
purchase cost, less $10,000 in accordance with para-
graph (e)(3).

Exemptions

The provisions of this rule shall not apply to the following:

(1) Buses used for the express purpose of providing
long-distance service (out-of-District), that are gener-
ally equipped with luggage compartments, restrooms,
and overhead storage.

(2) Upon demonstration to the Executive Officer,
any vehicles as required pursuant to paragraph (d)
for which no alternative-fuel engine and chassis con-
figuration is available commercially or could be used.

(3) An airport fleet operator who provides taxicab
pickup services at commercial airport terminals may
purchase a light- or medium-duty vehicle that is not
certified by CARB as ULEV or cleaner if the SCAQMD
or its designated agent has not provided sufficient fund-
ing to fully offset the purchase cost of an alternative-
fueled vehicle that complies with paragraph (d)(4)

64

less $10,000 (paid by or on the behalf of the airport
fleet operator):

(A) within 10 working days after notification by
the airport fleet operator of the intent to pur-
chase such vehicle and the airport fleet operator
has provided documentation that the $10,000 is
immediately available for purchase of the rule
compliant vehicle, or

(B) within two working days after the airport
fleet operator has notified the SCAQMD or its
designated agent in the event that the taxicab
vehicle to be replaced is rendered inoperable due
to a roadside accident and would require imme-
diate replacement of the taxicab vehicle. In addi-
tion, the airport fleet operator must demonstrate
that the $10,000 to be provided by the airport
fleet operator is immediately available for pur-
chase of the rule compliant vehicle.

(C) Notwithstanding the provisions in para-
graphs (e)(3)(A) or (e)(3)(B), the airport fleet op-
erator shall be responsible to pay for the cost of
converting the new rule compliant vehicle to
meet applicable taxicab vehicle specifications
and all other incidental costs including but not
limited to, sales tax on the $10,000 provided by
the airport fleet operator, license, and registra-
tion fees.

(D) An airport fleet operator qualifying for a
non-rule compliant vehicle as provided in para-
graphs (e\3\A) or (e)(3)(B) shall purchase the
non-rule compliant vehicle within 10 working
days after being notified that such vehicle could
be purchased or reapply for co-funding pursuant
to paragraphs (e)(3)(A) or (eX 3)(B).

65

(4) Vehicles not certified by CARB as ULEV or
cleaner that are converted to be wheelchair accessible
(to meet regulations set by the Commercial Airport
Authority and all Americans with Disability Act of
1990 requirements, including door height overhead
clearance as well as ramp or lift design specifications)
for the purpose of providing taxicab pickup services at
commercial airport terminals.

(f) Compliance Auditing and Enforcement

(1) The fleet operator shall provide at the request of
the District any files and/or records created to comply
with subdivision (d) including fleet-specific purchase
information, such as a list of official DMV registra-
tions, and manufacturer, model-year, model, engine
family number, and fuel type of each fleet vehicle. The
fleet operator shall keep all required records for a
minimum of two years.

(2) Any fleet operator seeking an exemption under
subdivision (f) shall supply proof that their fleet is ex-
empted from this rule when requested by the District.

(g) Severability

If any provision of this rule is held by judicial order to be
invalid, or invalid or inapplicable to any person or circum-
stance, such order shall not affect the validity of the
remainder of this rule, or the validity or applicability of
such provision to other persons or circumstances. In the
- event any of the exceptions to this rule is held by judicial
order to be invalid, the persons or circumstances covered
by the exception shall instead be required to comply with
the remainder of this rule.

66

South Coast Air Quality Management District
(Adopted October 20, 2000)

RULE 1196. CLEAN ON-ROAD HEAVY-DUTY
PUBLIC FLEET VEHICLES

(a) Purpose

For public fleets of heavy-duty vehicles operating in the
South Coast Air Quality Management (District), this rule
requires public fleet operators to acquire alternative-fuel
heavy-duty vehicles when procuring or leasing these
vehicles to reduce air toxic and criteria pollutant emis-
sions.

(b) Applicability

This rule applies to all government agencies located in the
District, including federal, state, regional, county and city
government departments and agencies, and any special
districts such as water, air, sanitation, transit and school
districts, with 15 or more heavy-duty vehicles. This rule
shall not apply to vehicles or services pursuant to para-
graph (f) or vehicles subject to Rules 1192, 1193, [adopted
June 16, 2000], 1194 [adopted August 18, 2000], 1195
[proposal for school buses} or 1186.1 [adopted August 18,
2000).

(c) Definitions

For purposes of this rule, the following definitions shall
apply:

(1) ALTERNATIVE-FUEL HEAVY-DUTY EN-
GINE OR VEHICLE means a heavy-duty vehicle
or engine that uses compressed or liquefied natu-
ral gas, propane, methanol, electricity, fuel cells,
or other advanced technologies that do not rely

67

on diesel fuel, and has been certified by the Cali-
fornia Air Resources Board (CARB).

(2) APPROVED CONTROL DEVICE(S) is a
CARB-certified exhaust control device(s) that re-
duces particulate matter and possibly other pre-
cursor emissions. To be considered fitted with an
approved control device(s), all diesel exhaust
from the vehicle must be vented through such a
device(s) that has been fitted at the time of vehi-
cle purchase. The vehicle equipped with such a
control device must use diesel fuel with a sulfur
content no greater than 15 ppm.

(3) DUAL-FUEL HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLE
means a heavy-duty vehicle equipped with a die-
se] engine that uses an alternative fuel (such as
compressed or liquefied natural gas, liquefied pe-
troleum gas, methanol, or other advanced tech-
nologies) in combination with diesel fuel to
enable compression ignition. A dual-fuel engine
typically uses the alternative fuel to supply 85
percent of the total engine fuel requirement on a
BTU basis. A dual-fuel engine must be certified
by CARB to meet an applicable optional nitrogen
oxide exhaust emission standard and be fitted

68

(5) FLEET VEHICLE means any heavy-duty
on-road vehicle, owned or leased by a public fleet
operator that totals 15 or more heavy-duty vehi-
cles excluding vehicles exempt under paragraphs
(f)(1) and (f)(2).

(6) HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLE means any vehicle
having a gross vehicle weight of at least 14,000
pounds.

(7) PUBLIC FLEET OPERATOR is a person
who owns, leases, or operates heavy-duty fleet
vehicles in the District. A person is a federal,
state, county or city government department or
agency, or special! district.

(8) SPECIAL DISTRICT means any public
agency that provides public services such as, but
not limited to, sanitation, school, transit, air, and
water districts.

(9) VEHICLE means any self-propelled, motor-
ized device that is permitted to operate on public
roads through Department of Motor Vehicle reg-
istration or the federal government.

(d) Fleet Requirements

Beginning July 1, 2002, for public fleet operators with 15
or more heavy-duty vehicles, all new additions to an
existing fleet, or formation of a new fleet, of heavy-duty
vehicles shall be by purchase or lease of:

with a particulate matter aftertreatment control
device that achieves a particulate matter emis-
sions level no greater than the particulate matter
emissions level of the latest certified M-100
methanol engine certified by CARB prior to the

date of adoption of this rule.
(1) alternative-fuel heavy-duty engine or vehi-

(4) EMERGENCY OR RESCUE VEHICLE cles;

means any vehicle defined in Section 165 of the :
California Vehicle Code and is equipped with red (2) dual-fuel heavy-duty vehicles;
lights and sirens as defined in Sections 30, . . wv
25269, and 27002 of the California Vehicle Code. (3) dedicated gasstine heavy-duty vehicles; or

69

(4) Ifthe fleet operator has an approved Techni-
cal Infeasibility Certification for this purchase or
lease, as described in subdivision (), a diesel-
powered heavy-duty engine or vehicle with an
approved contro] device and maintain that ap-
proved control device per manufacturer’s specifi-
cations. The provisions of this section shall not
apply to subparagraph (e)(1)D) after June 30,
2004.

(e) Technical Infeasibility Certification Criteria
and Procedures ~—

(1) No less than 60 days prior to the date of
purchase or lease of a replacement or additional
heavy-duty engine or vehicle, any fleet operator
seeking to comply with paragraph (d)(4) shall
demonstrate the technical infeasibility of comply-
ing with paragraph (d)(1), d(2), or (d)(3) require-
ments by submitting a signed and dated
Technical Infeasibility Certification Request to
the Executive Officer and attest to the accuracy
of all statements therein, that shall include:

(A) The name and address of the pub-
lic fleet operator; and

(B) Current heavy-duty vehicle fleet
composition, including make, model;
and

(C) Demonstration that no engine and
chassis/body configuration that meets
the requirements of paragraphs (d)(1),
(dX2), or (d)(3) is commercially avail-
able from any manufacturer (only tech-
nical reasons for choosing a given
chassis/body configuration are accept-
able) or could be used in a specific ap-
plication.

70

(D) Demonstration that an alterna-
tive-fuel refueling station for alternative-
fueled or dual-fuel heavy-duty vehicles
that are commercially available from any
manufacturer is not available within five
miles of the vehicle storage or mainte-
nance yards, or at locations where vehi-
cles will be home-based for extended
periods of time and the refueling supply
is provided through mobile means.

(E) Demonstration that vehicles com-
plying with paragraphs (d)(1), (d2), or
(dX3) exceed the incremental cost-
effectiveness criteria established in ac-
cordance with the most recent require-
ments of the Carl Moyer Program or
the Mobile Source Emission Reduction
Review Committee Program, whichever

is greater.

(2) Within 45 calendar days of receipt of a com-
pleted Technical Infeasibility Certification Re-
quest submitted pursuant to paragraph (e)1),
the Executive Officer will either approve or dis-
approve the Request, in writing. The Executive
Officer shall disapprove the request if it does not
meet the requirements of paragraph (e)(1). If a
Technical Infe sibility Certification Request is
disapproved by the Executive Officer:

(A) The reasons for disapproval shall
be given to the applicant in writing.

(B) Upon receipt of a notice of a dis-
approved Technica! Infeasibility Certifi-
cation Request, the fleet operator shall
comply with paragraph (d\1), (d)(2), or
(dX3).

.

71

(C) The fleet operator may resubmit a
Technical Infeasibility Certification Re-
quest at any time after receiving a dis-
approval notification »- nay apply for a
variance with the “~*QMD Hearing
Board. (See SCAQMD Regulation V and
California Health and Safety Code Sec-
tions 42350 through 42372 for informa-
tion regarding variances.), but must
still comply with paragraph (d)1),
(dX2), or (dX3) until such time as the
Executive Officer approves a Technical
Infeasibility Certification Request un-
der paragraph (e)(1) or a variance is
given by the SCAQMD Hearing Board.

(3) A Technical Infeasibility Certification Re-
quest is subject to a plan filing and evaluation
fees as described in Rule 306.

(f) Exemptions
The provisions of this rule shall not apply to the following:

(1) Emergency or rescue vehicles operated by
local, state, and federal law enforcement agen-
cies, police and sheriffs department, fire depart-
ment, hospital, medical or paramedic facility, and
used for responding to situations where potential
threats to life or property exist, including but not
limited to fire, ambulance calls, or life-saving
calls.

(2) Privately owned or operated heavy-duty ve-
hicle fleets that provide contract services to a
public agency. Nevertheless, privately owned
or operated heavy-duty vehicle fleets may be
required to meet other SCAQMD rules such as
Rules 1192, 1193, 1194, or 1186.1.

72

(3) No more than ten evaluation/test vehicles
per fleet, provided by or operated by vehicle
manufacturer for testing or evaluation, exclu-
sively.

(4) Any vehicle added to or replacing a vehicle
in an existing fleet after the applicable imple-
mentation date of this rule, as specified in subdi-
vision (d), as long as the purchase contract for
acquisition of such vehicle is signed before the
date of adoption of this rule. This exemption does
not apply to the execution of options to acquire
vehicles where the option is executed after the
date of adoption of this rule and where vehicle
delivery does not occur until after the applicable
implementation date as specified in subdivision
(d).

(5) Military vehicles used for tactical opera-
tions.

(6) Heavy-duty vehicles used routinely to
transport materials in and out of the District.

(7) Heavy-duty vehicles operated and housed by
state agencies or special districts in the Riverside
County portion of the Mojave Desert Air Basin
and located within the District if the vehicles are
equipped with approved control devices.

(8) When the remainder of the fleet consists of
heavy-duty vehicles that meet the requirements
of paragraphs (d)(1) or (d2),

(a) For public fleets with greater than
15 but less than 100 heavy-duty vehi-
cles, no more than three (3) heavy-duty
vehicles that do not meet the require-
ments of Subdivision (d) of this rule
may be part of the fleet at any given

(g)

73

time. Such vehicles shal] be equipped
with approved control devices.

(b) For public fleets with 100 or more
heavy-duty vehicles, no more than
three (3) heavy-duty vehicles that do
not meet the requirements of Subdivi-
sion (d) of this rule may be part of the
fleet and are garaged, housed, parked,
stored at any single vehicle storage or
maintenance yard at any given time.
Such vehicles shall be equipped with
approved control devices. A public fleet
operator may deploy these vehicles and
place them at any one vehicle storage or
maintenance yard if the public fleet op-
erator submits a plan to the SCAQMD
demonstrating that a proportionate
number of such heavy-duty vehicles is
reduced at other facilities operated by
the public fleet operator.

(9) Heavy-duty vehicles leased for no more than
120 days in any 12-month period by the U.S.
Postal Service during the peak winter holiday
period.

(10) Heavy-duty vehicles owned or operated by
federal agencies, state agencies, county agencies,
or special districts whose jurisdiction include ar-
eas outside of the District and the heavy-duty
vehicles are garaged, housed, parked, stored or
operated within the District for no more than 180
days in any 12-month period.

Compliance Auditing and Enforcement

(1) The fleet operator shall provide at the re-
quest of the District any files and/or records cre-
ated to comply with subdivision (d) including

74

fleet-specific information, such as a list of official
DMV registrations, principal vehicle location,
and manufacturer, model-year, model, and fuel
type and usage, of each fleet vehicle. This provi-
sion shall not apply for records that have been in
existence for more than one year.

(2) Any fleet operator seeking an exemption
under subdivision (f) shall supply proof that their
vehicle or fleet is exempted from this rule when

requested by the District.
(h) Severability

If any provision of this rule is held by judicial order to be
invalid, or invalid or inapplicable to any person or circum-
stance, such order shall not affect the validity of the
remainder of this rule, or the validity or applicability of
such provision to other persons or circumstances. In the
event any of the exceptions to this rule is held by judicial
order to be invalid, the persons or circumstances covered
by the exception shall instead be required to comply with
the remainder of this rule.

75

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

Proposed Rule 1191 - Clean On-Road Light- and
Medium-Duty Public Fleet Vehicles

June 2000

Deputy Executive Officer
Planning, Rule Development and Area Sources
Jack P. Broadbent

Assistant Deputy Executive Officer
Planning, Rule Development and Area Sources
Elaine Chang, Dr. PH -

Planning and Rules Manager
Planning, Rule Development and Area Sources
Henry Hogo

AUTHORS:

Planning, Rule Development and Area Sources
David Coel — Program Supervisor

Larry Irwin —A.Q. Specialist

Vasken Yardemian — Transportation Specialist

REVIEWED BY:

District Counsel

Barbara Baird — District Counsel

Jeri Voge — Senior Deputy District Counsel

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
GOVERNING BOARD

Chair: WILLIAM A. BURKE, Ed.D.
Speaker of the Assembly Appointee

76

Vice Chair: NORMAJ. GLOVER
Councilmember, City of Newport Beach
Cities Representative, Orange County

MEMBERS:

MICHAEL D. ANTONOVICH

Supervisor, Fifth District

Los Angeles County Representative

HAL BERNSON

Councilmember, City of Los Angeles

Cities Representative, Los Angeles County,
Western Region

CYNTHIA COAD
Supervisor, Fourth District
Orange County Representative

JANE CARNEY
Senate Rules Committee Appointee

BEATRICE LAPISTO-KIRTLEY

Councilmember, City of Bradbury

Cities Representative, Los Angeles County,
Eastern Region

RONALD O. LOVERIDGE
Mayor, City of Riverside
Cities Representative, Riverside County

JON D. MIKELS

Supervisor, Second District

San Bernardino County Representative
LEONARD PAULITZ

Councilmember, City of Montclair
Cities Representative, San Bernardino County

CYNTHIA VERDUGO-PERALTA
Governor’s Appointee

40

some for both manufacturers (who would have to keep track of
what could be sold where) as well as purchasers (who would be
confused about offerings that could differ from town to town).
The District is not a State, and therefore cannot rely upon
Section 177.

Second, Section 177 applies only if a State adopts and
enforces standards that are “identical to the California standards
for which a waiver has been granted for such model year.” 42
U.S.C. § 7505(1). The District’s standards fail this test as well.
As noted above, the Fleet Rules were adopted by the District
precisely to achieve an impact different from the CARB rules,
which already applied within the geographic area under the
District’s jurisdiction. See pages 33-34, supra; J.A. 141, 152.
Far from seeking to mirror the CARB standards, the District’s
entire purpose was to adopt a different, more restrictive
regulatory regime, and it accomplished that goal. That is fatal
under Section 177.

For example, CARB’s LEV Program consists of two
interrelated elements — standards establishing permissible
emission levels for each of the four categories of low-emission
vehicles, and standards setting the progressively lower average
emission level that a manufacturers’ fleet (of vehicles sold in
the State each year) must meet over time. See Cal. Code Regs.
tit. 13, §§ 1960.1(g)(1)-(2), § 1961(a)-(b). When CARB sought
EPA approval of its LEV Program, it submitted the emission
levels and the implementation mechanism together as a single
interrelated program. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 4,166 (referring to
amendments to California’s “exhaust emission standards and
test procedures” as the “California LEV program,” and evaluat-
ing the disparate standards as one program for purposes of a
single waiver request); see also 68 Fed. Reg. at 19,812 (using
the same framework of analysis for LEV II amendments). EPA
based its approval on the effect of the entire program; it did not
review the emission levels alone. See generally 68 Fed. Reg. at
19,812; 58 Fed. Reg. at 4,166.

4]

The District’s Fleet Rules allow the purchase of only some
of the vehicles that are permitted to be sold under CARB’s
LEV program, in most cases adopting an immediate prohibition
of certain vehicles (typically diesel-fueled vehicles) instead of
allowing manufacturers to phase in a mix of vehicles based
upon yearly state-wide emission averages. The Fleet Rules also
prohibit the purchase of all of the diesel-fueled trucks certified
for sale under CARB’s Heavy-Duty Vehicle Program. Thus,
what the District has done is to take some, but not all, of the
CARB emission regulations and combine them with a com-
pletely different implementation mechanism.

It is plain that the Fleet Rules are not “identical to the
California standards for which a waiver has been granted for
such model year,”as Section 177 requires. EPA has granted a
waiver to both the emission standards for the year and the fleet
average emission standards that apply to the particular model
year. The District’s attempt to implement only a selected subset
of the California standards precludes it from relying upon
Section 177.

The district court emphasized that “[t]he Fleet Rules require
purchasers to choose from among a subset of previously
certified California vehicles.” Pet. App. 23a. Several simple
examples illustrate why this approach is not permissible under
Section 177.

A State could decide on a different selective adoption of
California’s standards, choosing the CARB emission regula-
tions but not the requirement of progressively lower fleet
averages, and defend its decision on the same basis as the
District — that it had adopted California standards.

Of course, the effect of such a rule would be quite different
from the rules promulgated by CARB. Without the pressure of
having to meet increasingly stringent emission levels, manufac-
turers would have no reason to produce and sell the cleaner
vehicles. They could focus all of their efforts on vehicles

42

satisfying the least restrictive emission standards. That would
have substantially different — and adverse — consequences for
pollution levels.

On the other hand, a State could choose to adopt only the
most restrictive of the CARB emission standards. Eliminating
the gradual phase-in period provided by the CARB standards
could create a situation in which manufacturers might not have
sufficient production to meet demand for vehicles in that State.

Not surprisingly, the lower courts that have considered this
question — other than the courts below — have concluded that
any deviation from the exact rules adopted by California makes
Section 177 inapplicable. See Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., 208
F.3d at 7-8 (ZEV sales mandates not identical to California
standards are preempted); American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n, 152
F.3d at 199-201 (same).

Under Section 177, a State may adopt standards that differ
- from the federal standards only if they “are identical to the
California standards.” 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (emphasis added).
Here, of course, the Fleet Rules are not identical to the Califor-
nia standards. As noted above, their very purpose is to be more
restrictive. Moreover, Section 177 expressly prohibits a State
that adopts the California standards from limiting — whether
directly or indirectly — the “sale of a new motor vehicle * * *
that is certified in California as meeting California standards.”
Ibid. But that is precisely the function of the Fleet Rules, which
limit the sale of various vehicles (including diesel-fueled
vehicles) that do meet the California standards.

C. Section 246.

As discussed above (at pages 31-33), Section 246 does not
generally authorize States to adopt purchasing restrictions;
rather, it preserves against Section 209(a) preemption any fleet
purchasing requirements that satisfy the procedural and

43

substantive standards set forth in Section 246. Because the Fleet
Rules do not comply with these standards, they are preempted.

The Fleet Rules were not submitted to EPA for approval as
part of California’s state implementation plan revision, as
required by Section 246. Indeed, California did not submit any
fleet purchasing program in its implementation plan revision.
California instead exercised its option under Section
182(c)(4)(B) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 751 1a(c)(4)(B), to submit
its LEV Program as a substitute in place of a Section 246 fleet
purchasing program, and EPA approved the substitution finding
that the LEV Program would achieve substantially greater
emission reductions. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,849, 46,851 (1999)
(Table 1) (forecasting LEV program emission benefits in excess
of those that would be achieved by the federal clean-fuel fleet
program). Because the Fleet Rules were not even submitted to
(let alone approved by) EPA, respondents cannot rely on
Section 246.

Moreover, the Fleet Rules could not otherwise be autho-
rized by Section 246 because the terms of the Fleet Rules are
squarely inconsistent with the plain language of Section 246(d),
which states that a plan revision establishing a fleet purchase
program “shall provide that the choice of clean-fuel vehicles
and clean alternative fuels shall be made by the covered fleet
operator * * *.” The Act defines “clean-fuel vehicle” as a
vehicle that “has been certified to meet * * * the clean-fuel
vehicle standards” applicable under the statute. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7581(7). Thus, federal law requires Section 246 fleet purchas-
ing programs to preserve the fleet operator’s freedom to choose
from among all of the low-emission and diesel-fueled vehicles
permitted to be sold. The Fleet Rules, however, do not allow a
fleet operator to choose to purchase vehicles from among all of
the low-emission vehicles permitted to be sold under California
law. Rather the Fleet Rules prohibit operators from purchasing
certain low-emission (and all diesel-fueled) vehicles that

comply with the applicable emission regulations and that are

offered for sale in California.

In sum, the Fleet Rules fail to comply with numerous
requirements of Section 246 and accordingly are not protected
against preemption under Section 209(a).

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH S. GELLER
ANDREW J. PINCUS
JOHN J. SULLIVAN
CRAIG W. CANETTI
Mayer, Brown, Rowe &
Maw LLP
1909 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 263-3000

Counsel for Western States
Petroleum Association

AUGUST 2003

JED R. MANDEL

Counsel of Record

TIMOTHY A. FRENCH

Neal, Gerber &
Eisenberg LLP

Two North LaSalle Street

Suite 2200

Chicego, Illinois 60602

(312) 269-8000

Counsel for Engine
Manufacturers Association

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0643%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
