# Reply Brief — Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0643%3A04

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 541 U.S. 246

## Text

Len
| APR 29 omg
No. 02-1343 Chupe
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION AND
WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners,
Vv.

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, ef al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

JOHN J. SULLIVAN PHIL C. NEAL

GREGORY R. MCCLINTOCK Counsel of Record

MAYER, BROWN, ROWE & MAW JED R. MANDEL

1909 K Street, N.W. TIMOTHY A. FRENCH ,

Washington, D.C. 20006 NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG

(202) 263-3000 Two North LaSalle Street
Suite 2200

Counsel for Petitioner Western Chicago, Illinois 60602

States Petroleum Association (312) 269-8000

Counsel for Petitioner Engine
Manufacturers Association

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAs GF RAT TRIN Bite cccsccseccensestcencsececsecceseneess
NN IE isiniesninsicesihasiindanineiitniatsnetinnntentemencennees

I. THE CONFLICT WITH THE FIRST AND
SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS IS REAL..

Il. THE DECISION BELOW FAILS TO FOLLOW
THE COURT’S ADMONITIONS THAT
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS MUST FOCUS ON
“THE PLAIN WORDING” OF AN EXPRESS
PURINE BULIES CR PUIIED cccercccerosieccossesccesconsvcorases

III. THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS AT ISSUE
DO PRESENT AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL
___,______«_ Cnn ene wane

TT sctsciestnunnnncateneneecennevenannaniininntemmes

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:
American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196

v le 8 ee 2,3,4
Association of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Commissioner,

Massachusetts Dep't of Envtl. Protection, .

208 F.2d 1 (Ast Cir. 2000) ............ ce ceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 2,3,4
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.

Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316 (1997).....cccccccceeeereenees 5
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,

Ag | 4
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,

__ US. _, 123 S. Ct. $18 (2002)...........0..0000+ 4
Statutory Provisions:
GB UB... 9 TBGD cececccececesesevcesseessecsessessnnnnabensebesssene passim
43 UBC. 6 FOF cxcereesscccscesssnsseerssenvemnicisnenmmmnanan 2,3
43 UBC. © TSB cececccsssvessnsesscccisnssessevevienmnnenmnmnes 6

Petitioners’ Rule 29.6 Statement appears at Pet. 11.

(11)

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 02-1343

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION AND
WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners,
Vv.

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, ef al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners Engine Manufacturers Association and the
Western States Petroleum Association hereby respectfully
submit this Reply Brief in support of the pending petition for
a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.

I. THE CONFLICT WITH THE FIRST AND
SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS IS REAL.

Respondent’s brief in opposition attempts to obscure the
conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case and
the decisions in the First and Second Circuits by disregarding
the major premise of both of the latter decisions. Respondent

2

describes the cases as though the sole question in each was
whether the challenged state regulations qualified for the
“opt-in” waiver of preemption granted by Section 177 of the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7507). See Opp. Br. 9, 10. That
is an incorrect account of the decisions. Before reaching the
Section 177 question, the court in each case determined that
the regulations were covered by the preemption language of
Section 209(a) (42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)). That determination
was essential to the decision reached in each case, because if
the regulations were not covered by Section 209(a) in the
first place, they would have been permissible despite their
failure to comply with Section 177.

The Second Circuit’s opinion said, “We first address the
question left open in MVMA III, 17 F.3d at 536, namely,
whether the ZEV requirement is a ‘standard relating to the
control of emissions’ and therefore within Section 209’s
preemptive scope.” American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n vy. Cahill,
152 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1998). The court’s holding on
this point was: “We agree with the Manufacturers that the
ZEV sales requirement is a ‘standard relating to the control
of emissions’ and is therefore preempted by Section 209 of
the Clean Air Act.” /d. at 197.

Similarly, the First Circuit’s opinion first considered, as a
distinct point, whether the Massachusetts regulations were
standards within the meaning of Section 209 (and the identi-
cal language of Section 177) and said, “We share the opinion
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that ‘the ZEV
sales requirement must be considered a standard ‘relating to
the control of emissions.’” Association of Int'l Auto. Mfrs.
v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
208 F.3d 1, 6 (Ist Cir. 2000).

The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the preemption
language of Section 209 was clear and simple: “We view
‘standards relating to the control of emissions’ as describing
regulatory measures intended to lower the level of auto

3

emissions.” 152 F.3d at 200. It held the ZEV regulations
preempted because “a requirement that a particular percent-
age of vehicle sales be ZEVs has no purpose other than to
effect a general reduction in emissions.” Jbid. The First
Circuit echoed the test: “[T]he very purpose and effect of the
ZEV mandates is to effect a quantitative reduction in emis-
sions. * * * As such, they fall squarely within the language
of §§ 209 and 177.” 208 F.3d at 7.

The language from the Second Circuit opinion quoted by
Respondent at pp. 9-10 of its brief was used by the Second
Circuit, not in defining the scope of Section 209, but in
explaining why compliance with the opt-in provisions of
Section 177 necessitates strict identity with the “California
standards.” 152 F.3d at 201. Those observations did not
limit or qualify the court’s broad view of the preemption
provision.

Nor did the First Circuit suggest that only a “production”
requirement is preempted by Section 209, as Respondent
attempts to suggest. See Opp. Br. 11. To the contrary, the
EPA letter quoted by the court as supporting its conclusion
correctly noted that a production requirement must be
considered part of the “standard-setting process,” not that a
“production requirement” is the only kind of regulation that
falls within the preemptive reach of Section 209.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case cannot be recon-
ciled with the interpretation of Section 209 adopted by the
First and Second Circuits. The cases are “distinguishable”
only in the sense that any two cases with any different facts
are said by lawyers to be “distinguishable.” There is no
sensible reasoning that will harmonize the rationale and
result of the Ninth Circuit decision with the rationale and
result of the other two decisions.

There can be no doubt that the “very purpose and effect” of
the Fleet Rules is to “effect a quantitative reduction in
emissions” within the District. The District Court opinion

4

adopted by the Ninth Circuit did not deny (and could not
have denied) that the Fleet Rules have such a purpose and
effect. Instead, the court adopted a mechanistic test for
deciding whether regulations are “standards relating to the
control of emissions”—namely, if the regulations take the
form of restrictions on “purchases” rather than on “sales” or
“manufacture” there is no preemption. This means that if
New York or Massachusetts, instead of requiring the sale of a
certain percentage of ZEV vehicles, had forbidden the
purchase of any vehicles other than LEV vehicles, their
regulations would not be preempted. It cannot reasonably be
doubted, however, that any such regulations would be held to
be preempted under the Cahill and Commissioner decisions.

The scope of Section 209’s preemption may or may not be
adequately delimited by the First and Second Circuit opin-
ions, but there is certainly a genuine conflict between those
cases and the decision of the Ninth Circuit. The divergence
is so striking that it calls strongly for resolution by this Court.
As long as the Ninth Circuit decision stands, it is an invita-
tion to other States, and to local government entities every-
where, to adopt whatever emission-control standards they
choose, provided they take the form of restrictions on the
types of vehicles and vehicle engines that may be purchased.

II. THE DECISION BELOW FAILS TO FOLLOW
THIS COURT’S ADMONITIONS THAT
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS MUST FOCUS
FIRST ON “THE PLAIN WORDING” OF AN
EXPRESS PREEMPTION CLAUSE.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that when a federal
statute contains an express preemption clause, interpretation
“must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the
clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easter-
wood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993); Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, _—*US. __, 123 S. Ct. 518, 526 (2002). The

ae--

5

opinion below disregards that principle by failing to give any
effect to the phrase “relating to the control of emissions” in
the express preemption clause that governs this case. In
effect the court has said that the Fleet Rules are not pre-
empted because they do not constitute an “emission stan-
dard.” But if Congress had meant to limit the preemption
solely to “emission standards,” it would no doubt have said
simply that no state shall adopt “emission standards.”
Instead it said that no state shall adopt any standard “relating
to the control of emissions,” by which it could only have
meant to preempt some types of emission-control regulations
that are not themselves “emission standards.” The opinion
below fails to acknowledge this “plain wording” of the
preemption clause or to offer any explanation why that
language does not encompass the Fleet Rules.

Respondent seems to suggest that the phrase “relating to”
should be ignored. But this Court’s decisions do not permit
reading the phrase out of the statute. They acknowledge that
the phrase, if taken literally, could extend without limit, but
they do not say it means nothing. In the Dillingham case, on
which Respondent relies, the Court reiterated its long line of
cases recognizing that the preemption clause of ERISA is
“clearly expansive,” has “a broad scope” and “an expansive
sweep,” and is “conspicuous for its breadth.” California Div.
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham, 519 U.S.
316, 324 (1997). The Court then restated the narrowing
construction that previous decisions had placed on the
“expansive sweep” of the clause’s language, and applied it to
the specific case beiore the Court. Nor did Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion suggest that the preemption clause was to
be read as though the language “relating to” had been left out
of the clause; rather, the language preceded by “relating to”
was to be taken as identifying the field in which ordinary
preemption operates. See 519 U.S. at 336. The opinion of
the Ninth Circuit in this case comports with neither the

6

majority nor the concurring opinion’s approach in the Dil-
lingham case.

Respondent also repeats the District Court’s erroneous
reliance on Section 246 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7586, as limiting the scope of the preemption clause of
Section 209(a). See Opp. Br. 16. The significance of Section
246 is just the opposite. By imposing a federal requirement
of fleet-purchase regulations, conforming to all the specifica-
tions of Section 246 and subject to approval by federal
authority, Congress clearly showed that it regarded such
regulations as within the scope of the kinds of emission
control reserved for determination on a national basis.
Indeed, the requirements prescribed by Congress in Section
246 included the requirement that such a fleet-purchase plan
must leave the choice of clean-fuel vehicles to the fleet
operator, a requirement that is squarely violated by the Fleet
Rules at issue in this case. See 42 U.S.C. § 7586(d). Thus, it
is undisputed that the Fleet Rules of the SCAQMD cannot be
supported under Section 246. Aside from the fact that they
do not conform to the requirements of Section 246, the State
of California affirmatively opted out of Section 246, as it was
permitted to do with the permission of the federal EPA,
which was given. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46849 (Aug. 27, 1999).
The District Court’s fallacious use of Section 246 only
illustrates further the extent of its departure from a faithful
construction of the preemption clause at issue in this case.

iil. THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS DO
PRESENT AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL
IMPORTANCE.

Conflicts on questions of preemption are intrinsically im-
portant because they deal with difficult questions of alloca-
tion of authority between the national and state governments
and thus of respect for the Supremacy Clause. The impor-
tance of such questions is indicated by the frequency with
which this Court has addressed them in recent years. In this

7

case, however, the intrinsic importance of a preemption issue
is heightened by the fact that it affects the division of author-
ity over a major national industry whose operations in
interstate commerce constitute a vital part of the economy.

Restrictions on the purchase of particular types of vehicles
alter the demand conditions manufacturers face. Changes in
demand necessitate changes in production and alter the
volume of output for the different types of vehicles and
engines a manufacturer produces. Changes in volume affect
costs, and therefore prices. It is gross oversimplification to
suggest, as the courts below have done, that restrictions on
purchasers impose no requirements on manufacturers.

The question raised by this case is whether the broad reser-
vation by Congress of national authority to determine the
constraints under which manufacturers must operate for the
purpose of controlling emissions may be whittled away by
restrictions on “purchases” when similar restrictions on
“sales” would undoubtedly be forbidden. That is an impor-
tant question.

8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for those in the petition, the
petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN J. SULLIVAN PHIL C. NEAL

GREGORY R. MCCLINTOCK Counsel of Record

MAYER, BROWN, ROWE & MAW ss JED R. MANDEL

1909 K Street, N.W. TIMOTHY A. FRENCH

Washington, D.C. 20006 NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG

(202) 263-3000 Two North LaSalle Street
Suite 2200

Counsel for Petitioner Western Chicago, Illinois 60602

States Petroleum Association (312) 269-8000

Counsel for Petitioner Engine
Manufacturers Association

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0643%3A04. Public record. Not legal advice.
