# Amicus Curiae Brief — Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0640%3A08

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 540 U.S. 736

## Text

Nos. 02-1290 ea —
IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, PETITIONER

v.

FLAMINGO INDUSTRIES (U.S.A.) LTD.
AND ARTHUR WAH

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE CENTER FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
CAPITALISM AS AMICUS CURIAE
SUPPORTING NEITHER PARTY

NICHOLAS M. FOBE

Counsel of Record

VERSTEGEN & FOBE

1776 Eye Street, N.W., Ste. 900
Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 887-4795

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

' TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS... sonal
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES a
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2
ARGUMENT | seas

I. The Postal Service, as presently structured, does not
carry out an essential sovereign function, and is not
entitled to treatment as a sovereign entity under the
Constitution. 3

a. The Postal Service’s organizational structure is

incompatible with the Constitution’s requirements for a
_ sovereign entity within the executive branch. ......5........4

b. The Postal Service’s non-mail services and activities
are not entitled to any sovereign status. 8

II. The alleged impact of subjecting the Postal Service to
antitrust suits is insufficient to warrant reversing the

decision below. 10

CONCLUSION 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Carlin v. McKean,

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Chisholm v. Georgia,

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Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,

BIS US. GES (BGT scovccesassnsssecnscsnsenesninstinsiitemmeenitanmaiiaa 7
Morrison v. Olson,

GBT UB. GEE (RGGI cxccessseescenssessssessnenssensienscansestitiaeaiaa 3,6
United States v. Cooper Corp.,

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Constitutional Provisions:

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US. Comet, at. Bi, @ 1, 66. Tcsccsssconsssoesssennsnnsteanieisamninaaanee 5
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2........... sosassessernnmnisissinienieidemenaaanl 5
os Ge FF SF | 5
Articles of Confederation, art. [X..........cccscsscesssssssssssssecesseseesseeees .)
Statutes:
Clayton Act, 15 USC. G12, 66 600). .ccmscusssesninetinmeiiaeameaaal 2
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375
BP USG.G. § BGG, 66 00G )rcensccessesssimmnaiiaaae passim
SO UB, & Doi cccccesessscnsssssrssesineneentstuiasammn 5
FP UBL. © Toi cccssecessomessnssssinaastenssssiam 2
FP UB, § TIED. .cccccoscccescssseressesenseniiniessanmae 7
FP USAG., § TENE -cccsccccescsssscsnsssenstmiiiemamasne 5,7
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Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, et $€q.......ccccscesererseeeensereseneneeeetees 2,12
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Be EE Ot rccrecncnscsszencescscsnmsncsececensccncssnsesesesesesscesssssseces 11
Administrative Materials
In the Matter of National Academy of Arbitrators,

FTC File No. 011-0242 (2003)...........cccossseseseseresneneneees 11,12
STITT crrtsnreresenssemnssensscssntecsessnseensnssnecscscsnessstesseees 5
TTT cecenrceseecsnnsconscenencsescnsnorsssscesvecessesosssooees 5
cr crsersnansusnsntassesseszancenseenersecsscoavessseses 5
Other Authorities:

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7% ed. 1999)..........ecssessesessesseeeneeseen 4

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES RELATED TO
GOVERNANCE OF THE POSTAL SERVICE, GAO Rept.

Bs SMD CIO Pccccenscceszsecccssenszsncnscsnsesscssssecssscessceseeeees 7,
GERALD CULLINAN, THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT (Fredrick
Pan FURIE TOG rece cscscccsccscccscccscccccccccsccsccccsccsncececccarecesoees 9

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.
POSTAL SERVICE'S INVOLVEMENT IN SPONSORSHIPS,
Audit Rept. No. OE-AR-03-003 (2003)....cc.--.sssossseese 9

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 02-1290
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, PETITIONER

v.

FLAMINGO INDUSTRIES (U.S.A.) LTD.
AND ARTHUR WAH

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE!

The Center for the Advancement of Capitalism (“CAC”)
is a District of Columbia corporation organized in 1998, and
exempt from income tax under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code. CAC’s mission is to present analyses to
policymakers, the judiciary, and the public to assist in the
identification and protection of the individual rights of the
American people. CAC applies Ayn Rand's philosophy of
Objectivism to contemporary public policy issues, and
the impact of legal and regulatory institutions upon the
rights of American citizens.

1 CAC files this brief with the consent of all parties. The letters granting
consent have been filed with the Court. No counsel for a party authored
this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or entity, other than CAC
or its counsel, make a monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of this brief.

2

CAC’s primary mission is to advance philosophical and
legal principles that promote limited government, individual
rights, and capitalism. This case directly relates to CAC’s
mission, and accordingly, this Court's ultimate decision
impacts the interests of CAC and its supporters. This case
presents the question of whether a government-created
monopoly may be sued under the antitrust laws? for
commercial activities unrelated to that monopoly.

CAC files this brief in support of neither party. While
we support affirming the judgment below, we do so for
reasons unrelated to the respondents’ underlying lawsuit,
and on principle, we oppose settling commercial disputes
through the use of the antitrust laws.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Ninth Circuit held that the Postal Service (the
“Service”) is a “person”? under the antitrust laws because of
the “sue-or-be-sued” language contained in 39 US.C. §
401(1). The Service argues this is erroneous because “ sue-or-
be-sued” constitutes only a waiver of sovereign immunity,
and since it possessed immunity in the first place, it is a
sovereign, not a person. Relying on United States v. Cooper
Corp.4, the Service claims that no entity which incorporates
the United States’ sovereign power can be sued under the
antitrust laws.

The Postal Service’s position is incorrect because the
Service itself is not a properly constituted “sovereign” entity
under the Constitution. Despite the definition of the Service
as an “independent establishment of the executive branch,”5
the Service’s organization is wholly incompatible with the

2 Throughout this brief, “antitrust laws” refer primarily to the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12, et seq.
3“Person” for antitrust purposes is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 7.

4312 US. 600 (1941).

539 US.C. § 201.

ee

3

requirements of Article I] for organization of sovereign
agencies. Indeed, if the Service were sovereign, this Court
would have to strike down portions of the Postal
Reorganization Act (“PRA”) as unconstitutional under
Morrison v. Olson’ and its antecedents. Rather than take this
step, the Court should recognize the Service’s current
structure as that of a non-sovereign government-sponsored
corporation that has the same potential to be sued under the
antitrust laws as any business corporation.

Moreover, the Postal Service is not entitled to sovereign
status because of its substantial non-postal activities;
activities that are irrelevant to the Service’s constitutional
objectives under the Post Office Clause. And despite the
Service’s argument that antitrust lawsuits would
compromise its congressional mandates with respect to the
mail, there is no valid public policy reason that warrants
reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision, nor is there reason to
infer a broad antitrust exemption for the Service based on
existing antitrust policy.

ARGUMENT

I. The Postal Service, as presently structured, does not
carry out an essential sovereign function, and is not
entitled to be treated as a sovereign entity under the
Constitution.

Sovereignty, Chief Justice Jay once wrote, is in the
people of the nation. Unlike the feudal principles that
underscore traditional European concepts of sovereignty,
American sovereignty is rooted in the principles of
individual rights and the equality of citizens before the law.
The Constitution animates these principles by protecting the
individual rights of every citizen through institutions that

6 Publ. L. 91-375 (39 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.) (1970).
7 487 US. 654 (1988).

8 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 US. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793) (seriatim opinion of
Jay, CJ.)

4

exercise the legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
These powers constitute the body of sovereign rights, that is,
the “unique right possessed by a state or its agencies that
enables it to carry out its official functions for the public
benefit.” These sovereign rights are simply an extension of
individual rights, and not a set of powers vested in some
higher being or a particular individual. These rights are also
“distinguished from certain proprietary rights that [the state]
may possess like any other private person” (italics added).'°
In this case, the Court must decide whether the Postal
Service exercises sovereign or proprietary rights for antitrust
enforcement purposes. CAC argues that the Service exercises
proprietary rights only when it engages in commerce
unrelated to its constitutional duty to provide mail services.
Therefore, the Service is entitled to no sovereign
classification that would exempt it from the antitrust laws.

a. The Postal Service’s organizational structure is
incompatible with the Constitution’s requirements
for a sovereign entity within the executive branch.

The Postal Reorganization Act defines the Postal Service
as an “independent establishment of the executive branch.”
This is not a clear definition. The Service is neither an
outright agency nor a traditional corporation. The question
is, on which side does the Se vice fall when determining
personhood under the antitrust laws? The Service argues
that it is constructed to perform an “essential” sovereign
function."! But the nature of the Service’s organization and
governing case law indicate just the opposite.

By its own reading of the PRA, the Postal Service
performs an “executive” function.” It does not perform
legislative or judicial functions, although the Service

9 BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (7% ed. 1999)
10 Id.

Pet. 4.

2 Pet. 4, 8.

5

possesses limited regulatory powers related to its mail
monopoly. Thus, for purposes of this case, the question is
limited to whether the Service is an executive agency.

If the Postal Service is correct in stating that it is a
“sovereign” entity under the executive branch, then the
Service’s current legal structure must be held
unconstitutional. The problem arises under 39 U.S.C. §
202(c), which requires that the Postmaster General be
appointed by the nine governors of the Postal Service. The
governors, who are appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, have the exclusive power
to hire and fire the Postmaster General at-will..4 Although
the Postmaster General is the chief executive officer of the
Service and enjoys final authority over administrative
matters'5, he is ultimately answerable only to the nine
appointed governors.'*

The constitutional problem is that the Postmaster
General, as the head of an organization claiming to be a
sovereign agency, should be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under the
Appointments Clause of Article II”, only “inferior” officers
of the United States may be hired outside the presidential-
nomination-and-Senate-confirmation process. “Superior”
officers—including all department heads—must be
appointed by the President, and be ultimately be
accountable to the President, who is the Nation’s chief
executive.'8

3 See, e.g., 39 US.C. § 401(9) (granting the Service eminent domain
powers), § 404(7) (authorizing the Service to investigate postal offenses).
4 See Carlin v. McKean, 823 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

5 See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 203, 39 C.F.R. §§ 3.5, 211.3 & 221.3(b).

16 See Carlin, 823 F.2d at 624.

7 U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.

#8 U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 1, cl. 1 (“the executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”); See also art. II, sec. 3 (the
President “shall Commission all the Officers of the United States”).

6

In the past, the Court held that the line dividing the
classification of superior and inferior officers is “far from
clear” by simply reading the Appointments Clause.'? At the
same time, the Court has established some basic, non-
exclusive criteria for drawing this line. In Morrison v. Olson,
the Court looked to three factors in determining whether an
Independent Counsel appointed by a federal court and
subject to dismissal by the Attorney General only “for cause”
was a superior officer. The Court ultimately concluded that
the Independent Counsel was in fact an inferior officer for
three reasons: First, the officer was “subject to removal by a
higher Executive Branch official”; second, the law provided
only “certain limited duties” for the Independent Counsel,
or put another way, the office did not “include any authority
to formulate policy for the Government or the Executive
Branch”; and finally, the office itself was “limited in
jurisdiction.”*° The Morrison Court read these factors
together in holding that the Independent Counsel was
unmistakably an inferior officer under the Appointments
Clause.?!

In this case, the Postmaster General easily falls on the
“superior” side of the line under all three of the Morrison
tests. The Postmaster General’s authority under the PRA is
extensive, not limited in duties or jurisdiction like the
Independent Counsel’s. More importantly, the Postmaster
General is not subject to removal by any higher Executive
Branch official. Neither the President nor any officer under
his direction may fire the Postmaster General. That power is
vested solely and irreversibly in the nine governors.

It could be argued that the Postmaster General is an
inferior officer because he is ultimately accountable to the
governors. Under this interpretation, the governors are the
“superior” officers within the Postal Service, not the

19 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 671.
2 Id. at 671-673.
21 Id. at 672.

7

Postmaster General. But this reasoning lacks credibility.
First, the governors are not directly accountable to the
President, since governors may be dismissed only “for
cause,” thus denying the President the ability to directly
influence the hiring or firing of a Postmaster General.
Second, the Board of Governors is composed of eleven
members—the nine appointed governors, the Postmaster
General, and the Deputy Postmaster General.” The latter
two are discretionary appointments made by the nine
governors, and although the Postmaster General cannot vote
on matters related to his own hiring and firing, he is
nonetheless a member of the body given ultimate power
over the Service, thus rendering him a superior officer.

The only other exception to the superior officer
requirements of the Appointments Clause is the rule first
enunciated by the Court in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States.4 In that case, the court held that Congress was
permitted to restrict the President’s power to remove officers
of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
Federal Trade Commission, since such agencies are not
wholly executive in nature.> This exception is inapplicable
to the Postal Service, its Board of Governors, and the
Postmaster General, since the Service, by its own admission,
carries out a purely executive function.

Finally, the PRA itself is vague in defining the Postal
Service’s legal status. Even Congress hasn’t clearly
determined what the Service is, as a 1997 report by the
legislature’s General Accounting Office declared the Service
to be a “corporation-like organization.” This report found

2 39 U.S.C. § 202(a).

3 39 U.S.C. § 202(c)-(d).

24 295 U.S. 602 (1935).

3 Id. at 624.

26 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE: ISSUES RELATED TO
GOVERNANCE OF THE POSTAL SERVICE, GAO Rept. No. 97-141, at 2 (August

1997).

8

that while the Service steadfastly maintains that it is not a
corporation, “it is frequently considered by others to be one
and has been previously included in major government
corporation studies done over the last several years.””” The
GAO also reported that former and current members of the
Board of Governors “believed that the current legal
definition of the Postal Service—an independent
establishment of the executive branch—is unclear and causes
uncertainties about how far the Postal Service can go in
competing with the private sector.”

These factors demonstrate that the Postal Service cannot
be treated as a sovereign entity under the Constitution. The
Court must either recognize this fact and hold that the
Service is not entitled to claim sovereign status under its
present structure, or declare the Service to be a sovereign
entity whose structure violates the Appointments Clause.

b. The Postal Service's non-mail functions and
activities are not entitled to sovereign status.

Even if the Postal Service’s structure were consistent
with Article II’s requirements for a sovereign entity, many of
the Service’s current functions and programs do not fall
within the scope of Article I’s Post Office Clause.2 The
Service des not simply deliver the mail; it also competes
with private businesses in numerous markets outside of the
Service’s First-Class mail monopoly.® A _ well-known

7 Id.

8 Td. at 21.

29 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 7.

30 The Post Office Clause does not require the government to maintain a
coercive mail monopoly. Compare this with the earlier Articles of
Confederation (1781), which granted Congress the “sole and exclusive”
. power to maintain an interstate postal system. Art. IX, cl. 4. It’s also
noteworthy that the British Crown's re-imposition of a postal monopoly
on the American colonies in 1711 led the Virginia House of Burgesses to
employ the Revolutionary phrase “no taxation without representation” in
response to the monopoly’s arbitrary postage rates. See GERALD CULLINAN,
THE Post OFFICE DEPARTMENT 7-10 (Fredrick A. Praeger 1968).

9

example is package and express document delivery, where
the Service competes with firms like Federal Express and
United Parcel Service.

Another example is the Postal Service’s recent
expansion into online payment products. The Service offers
various Internet-based products that enable customers to
pay their bills, send money to individuals, and remit
payment for online auctions. These product lines did not
originate with the Service but rather with private firms.
Indeed, these products are partially designed to bypass the
Service's First-Class mail monopoly by offering customers a
cheaper, more efficient means of making payments. At its
core, however, these products are a form of financial
services —not postal mail. While the Postal Service is legally
permitted to offer online payment products, such products
do not fall within the plain meaning of the powers assigned
to the Government under the Post Office Clause.5! The same
can be said for the other non-mail product lines maintained
by the Service.

It is also the case that the Postal Service’s non-mail
products distract the Service from providing its essential
mail services mission. Often the Service’s non-mail activities
yield no tangible public benefit while expending Service
funds. For example, earlier this year the Postal Service's
inspector general reported that nearly $48 million spent by
the Service on professional athletic sponsorships—most
notably the professional cycling team led by Lance
Armstrong—“lacked goals and objectives”32 and failed to
raise any verifiable revenue. The OIG questioned why the

%| The Postal Service provides its Internet-based services through its
website at www.usps.com. This itself is noteworthy because government
entities use Internet domains that end in “.gov”, while “.com” domains
are reserved for purely commercial usage.

32 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
POSTAL SERVICE'S INVOLVEMENT IN SPONSORSHIPS, Audit Rept. No. OE-AR-
03-003, at 4 (2003).

10

Service would sponsor a cycling team “whose major event is
the Tour de France when the primary job of the Postal
Service is to deliver mail domestically,”* a valid concern
given the Service’s loss of nearly $1.6 billion in 2001.

While the Postal Service’s spending habits are not
before this Court, the Service’s claim of sovereign status
must be viewed in light of its full complement of activities.
Recognizing the Service as a sovereign entity would grant
the Service—and the Government generally—unlimited
authority to engage in commercial competition without
being subject to the same rules as private competitors,
namely the antitrust laws. This is wholly inconsistent with
the American concept of sovereignty, because it is
unreasonable to assume that the sovereign—the people —
would create an entity that competes against private
business interests without having to adhere to the same
basic rules as those businesses. Furthermore, it is
unreasonable to assume the people would permit such an
entity to be substantially removed from the functions (and
structure) authorized by the Constitution itself.
Consequently, the Court should not create a sovereign
refuge for the Postal Service’s commercial, non-mail
activities.

II. The alleged ‘sapact of subjecting the Postal Service to
antitrust suits is insufficient to warrant reversal of the
decision below.

The Postal Service argues that subjecting it to current
and future antitrust litigation “could impose significant
expenses and delay on Postal Service operations that would
inevitably flow from having to defend against antitrust
claims.”35 The Service pleads with the Court to consider
“economic uncertainties” and other public policy factors in

33 Td. at 15.
4 Id. ay 14.
35 Pet. 18.

Ee gee

ae ee ee

11

reviewing the legality of the Ninth Circuit's decision.* But
while CAC concedes the potential costs of affirming the
decision below, this alone does not warrant granting the
Service a total judicial exemption from the antitrust laws.
The Service's effort to use unrelated policy arguments that
do not address the question presented in its petition is a red
herring, and should not be given any weight by the Court.

However, an interesting question arises from the Postal
Service’s public policy argument, i.e. whether the Service’s
legislative mandate under the PRA should be read as
outweighing the concurrent legislative mandate contained in
the antitrust laws. CAC takes no position on this issue, as we
question the constitutionality of both the existing Postal
Service and the antitrust laws, but we note that recent
precedent supports the use of antitrust to thwart the
congressional objectives of a government agency. Last year
the Federal Trade Commission concluded a consent order
with the National Academy of Arbitrators (“NAA”)*”, an
honorary society of labor-management neutrals that
maintains a professional ethics code in direct consultation
and coordination with the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (“FMCS”), an independent agency of
the Executive Branch. Despite FMCS’ participation in, and
active supervision of, NAA’s ethics code pursuant to the
agency’s legislative mandate, the FTC nevertheless asserted
jurisdiction to challenge portions of the ethics code under
the antitrust laws. NAA settled the case without challenging
the FTC’s claims, but FTC officials never consulted FMCS
about the NAA matter, despite FMCS’ longstanding
jurisdiction over NAA’s affairs.%9

% Pet. 19.

37 In the Matter of National Academy of Arbitrators, FTC File No. 011-0242
(Final Consent Order Dated Jan. 17, 2003).

3% 29 U.S.C. § 172, et seq.

3 See Comments of Citizens for Voluntary Trade at 3-7, FTC File No. 011-
0242 (Dec. 20, 2002) (comments on file with FTC).

12

While not precedental or conclusive, the NAA case
suggests that government antitrust officials see no ordinary
conflict between a broad legislative mandate and the broad
objectives of antitrust enforcement. CAC does not endorse
this expansive view of antitrust policy, but acknowledges
contemporary antitrust policy for what it is, especially in
light of the Postal Service’s argument that subjecting it to
antitrust liability would compromise congressional intent:

In addition, respondents’ position [favoring
the Ninth Circuit's judgment] would permit
courts, rather than Congress, to determine
when and whether the Postal Service's
operations are anti-competitive, and if so,
whether its operations were not sufficiently
authorized by Congress such that the Postal
Service should be liable for the severe
sanctions imposed by the antitrust laws.”

This is a reversal of traditional antitrust theory. While it
would be nice if every American business could know under
what circumstances their actions are “anticompetitive,” the
reality is that antitrust laws are enforced according to a set of
judicially- and executive-created doctrines that define the
precise scope of the antitrust laws, which themselves are
nothing more than a set of vague policy pronouncements.
Antitrust law has never been well-defined by Congress, and
the Postal Service is entitled to no greater degree of certainty
than the average American business in this respect.

Finally, the Postal Service’s central thesis in this case —
that the antitrust laws were never meant to be applied to
entities like the Service—cannot be accepted as a defirutive
view of congressional intent, because the Service, as
currently structured, did not come into existence until some
80 years following the passage of the first antitrust law, the
Sherman Act. Indeed, the antitrust laws precede the concept

Pet. Reply Brief at 9.

13

of a hybrid government-corporate entity with the Service's
broad commercial scope. Furthermore, there is no evidence
in the legislative history of the PRA which demonstrates that
Congress considered potential policy conflicts between the
PRA and the antitrust laws. It would be reasonable to afford
the lower courts an opportunity to develop more substantive
case law on this issue before this Court forecloses any future
antitrust actions against the Service. And in any case,
Congress remains free to grant the Postal Service an express
antitrust exemption along the lines the Service seeks in this
case. But in the absence of clear statutory language, this
Court should not infer an antitrust exemption of any kind
for the Service with respect to non-mail services.

14

CONCLUSION

The Postal Service pres<::"s no compelling or persuasive
argument for reversing the .olding of the Ninth Circuit.
Even if the “sue-or-be-sued” language of 39 U.S.C. § 1001 is
insufficient to subject the Service to the antitrust laws, the
numerous independent grounds discussed above provide an
adequate basis to find the Service is a “person” for purposes
of the antitrust laws. Therefore the judgment should be
affirmed.

Respectfully Submitted,

NICHOLAS M. FOBE
Counsel of Record
VERSTEGEN & FOBE

1776 Eye Street, N.W., Ste. 900

Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 887-4795

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Dated: July 11, 2003.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0640%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.