# Joint Appendix — Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Joint Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 543 U.S. 157

## Text

-_

No. 02-1192

Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner

V.

AVIALL SERVICES, INC., Respondent

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

JOINT APPENDIX

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS
Counsel of Record

LISA K. HSIAO

HOWREY, SIMON, ARNOLD

& WHITE, L.L.P.

1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 783-0800

(202 383-6610 (fax)

DALE E. STEPHENSON
SQUIRE, SANDERS &
D=MPSEY L.L.P.

4900 Key Tower

127 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1304
(216) 479-8500

(216) 479-8776

Attorneys for Petitioner
Cooper Industries, Inc.

RICHARD O. FAULK
Counsel of Record

CYNTHIA J. BISHOP

JEFFREY M. GABA

STACY OBENHAUS

GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL LLP

3000 Thanksgiving Tower

1601 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75201-4761

(214) 999-3000

(214) 999-4667

Attorneys for Respondent

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2003
CERTIORARI GRANTED JANUARY 9, 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents Included in Petition Appendix 2A
Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries

US District Court wal

US Court of Appeals 6A
Complaint BA
First Amended Complaint 27A
Second Amended Complaint 48A
Transcript of Oral Argument (N.D. Tex.) 69A

-2A- SA «
CONTENTS INCLUDED IN PETITION APPENDIX CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT
DOCKET ENTRIES
The following opinions, decisions, judgments, and
orders have been omitted in printing this joint appendix U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas
because they appear on the following pages in the appendix Division

to the Petition for Certiorari:

8/7/1997 Complaint filed by Aviall Services, Inc.

Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc., (“Aviall”) in U.S. District Court for
No. 00-10197 (Sth Cir. Nov. 14, 2002) (en banc Northern District of Texas (Dallas) (Dkt.
EE SEE SESE eee 9a 1)
Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.., 9/23/1997 | Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim
No. 00-10197 (Sth Cir. Dec. 19, 2001) filed by Cooper Industries, Inc.
(granting rehearing en DANC) ......c.c.cscsscssesesesseseseseeeseeee 46a (“Cooper”) (Dkt. )
Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc., 1/26/1998 | Answer by Aviall to Cooper's
No. 00-10197 (Sth Cir. Aug. 14, 2001) counterclaim (Dkt. 9)
EP IIIT sctinstcsienisesenantednstnssensnenenmesesnecosssevecssnseenes 47a
| 1/12/1999 | First Amended Complaint filed by Aviall
Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc., (Dkt. 35)
No. 3:97-CV-1926-D (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2000) :
(istrict COUT OPINION)...............cscesseeeseeeeeersseeseseeeeesees 90a 2/1/1999 Answer to First Amended Complaint and

Counterclaim by Cooper (Dkt. 37)

4/16/1999 | Motion for Summary Judgment by
Cooper and Memorandum in support
thereof (Dkt. 51-52)

5/12/1999 | Response by Aviall to Cooper's Motion
for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 57)

5/28/1999 | Reply by Cooper to Aviall’s Response to
Cooper’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. 63)

11/29/1999 | Second Amended Complaint by Aviall
(Dkt. 78)

- 4A -

-5A-

12/22/1999

Answer by Cooper to Second Amended
Complaint and Continued Counterclaim
(Dkt. 79)

Certiorari (Dkt. 94)

1/5/2000

Oral argument on Cooper's Motion for
Summary Judgment before Judge Sidney
Fitzwater (Dkt. 80)

1022/2003

Order directing Administrative Closure
(Dkt. 95)

1/13/2000

Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Cooper’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, dismissing Aviall’s Section
113(f)(1) contribution claim and
remaining causes of action, and Cooper's
counterclaim, without prejudice, and
Judgment entered (Dkt. 82-83)

1/24/2000

Motion by Aviall for reconsideration of
judgment and Memorandum in support of
same (Dkt. 85-86)

1/25/2000

Order denying Aviall’s motion for
reconsideration (Dkt. 87)

2/16/2000

Notice of Appeal by Aviall (Dkt. 88)

12/10/2002

Opinion of Fifth Circuit reversing and
remanding District Court judgment (Dkt.
90-91)

12/13/2002

Order reopening case (Dkt. 92)

1/21/2003

Joint Motion by Cooper and Aviall to stay
proceedings pending resolution of
Cooper’s Petition for Certiorari in the
U.S. Supreme Court (Dkt. 93)

1/22/2003

Agreed Order granting joint motion to
Stay pending resolution of Petition for

- 6A -

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

-9A-

3/28/2002

Supplemental Brief filed by Cooper

1/24/2001

Supplemental Authorities filed by Aviall

5/20/2002

Oral Argument heard en banc

2/5/2001

Supplemental Authorities filed by Cooper

2/24/2000

Notice of Appeal filed by Aviall and case
docketed

6/19/2002

Amicus Curiae brief filed by Amicus Curiae
United States

5/22/2000

Appellant's Brief filed by Aviall

7/3/2002

Second Supplemental Brief filed by Cooper in
response to brief by Amicus Curiae United
States

5/22/2000

Record Excerpts filed by Aviall

7/25/2000

Appellee’s Brief filed by Cooper

7/3/2002

Second Supplemental Brief filed by Aviall in
response to brief by Amicus Curiae United
States

8/21/2000

Reply Brief filed by Aviall

2/7/2001

Oral Argument to Panel of Judges Wiener,
Barksdale, and Garza

8/14/2001

Opinion filed and Judgment entered Affirming
District Court Judgment (Judge Wiener,
dissenting)

11/14/2002

En Banc Opinion filed and Judgment entered,
reversing panel decision, reversing District
Court judgment, remanding case to District
Court (Judges Garza, Smith, and Barksdale,
dissenting)

2/24/2003

Notice from U.S. Supreme Court of filing of
Petition for Certiorari by Cooper

9/4/2001

Petition for Rehearing En Banc by Aviall

12/10/2001

Response/ Opposition filed by Cooper to
Aviall’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc

12/19/2001

Order granting Petition for Rehearing En Banc
and case reopened

2/18/2002

Supplemental Brief filed by Aviall

2/28/2002

Amicus Curiae Brief filed by by Amicus Curiae
American Petroleum Institute, Amicus Curiae
American Chemistry Counsel, and Amicus
Curiae Texas Oil and Gas Association

--

- 8A -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

AVIALL SERVICES
INCORPORATED

Plaintiff, -
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. ___

COOPER INDUSTRIES.
INC.

Sr Lr IR Ln Lr LH IH IH TH

COMPLAINT

NJ
«

Sr Le

Defendant
COMPLAINT

Aviall Services, Incorporated (“Aviall”), for its
Complaint against Defendant Cooper Industries, Inc.
(“Cooper”), alleges as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

l. This is a civil action, under Section 107 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seq., as amended
(hereafter “CERCLA”) and under the Texas Solid Waste
Disposal Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
Chapter 361 (“SWDA”) seeking (1) reimbursement of certain
investigation and remediation costs incurred by Aviall in
response to the release or threat of release of hazardous
substances and petroleum hydrocarbons on, under and about
the properties known as the Forest Park Facility, Love Field
Facility, Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter Field Facility
(collectively identified herein as the “Facilities”); and (2)
declaratory judgment under Section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as to

- 9A -

Defendant’s liability for further response costs incurred and
to be incurred by Aviall at the Facilities.

2. This action is also instituted under the
statutory and common laws of the State of Texas seeking
abatement, damages to property value, cost of repair and
such other relief as just and proper.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of this action under Section 113(b) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. -§ 9613(b). This Court has federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for this civil
action arising under the laws of the United States. Venue is
proper in this District pursuant to Section 113(b), 42 U.S.C. §
9613(b) because the Facilities are located within this District
and the release of hazardous substances and petroleum
hydrocarbons occurred within this District.

4. The SWDA, negligence, negligence per se, gross
negligence, trespass, nuisance, public nuisance and breach
of contract claims are so related to the claims within the
original jurisdiction of this Court that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. This Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over the SWDA, negl*gence, negligence per se,
gross negligence, trespass, nuisance, public nuisance and
breach of contract claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and
the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Aviall is a Delaware corporation and has its
principal place of business in the State of Texas.

6. Defendant Cooper Industries, Inc., is a [sic] Ohio
corporation doing business in the State of Texas. Defendant
may be served with citation by delivering a copy of the

- 10A -

citation and this Complaint to its registered agent, CT
Corporation System, 801 Dallas Avenue, Houston, Texas
77002.

BACKGROUND

7. The subject of this action concerns costs, fees and
damages arising out of releases and threatened releases of
hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at four
facilities known individually as the Forest Park Facility,
Love Field Facility, Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter
Field Facility at which Cooper and its predecessors
conducted aircraft engine overhaul and maintenance
operations. All four facilities are located either in Dallas,
Texas near Love Field or in Fort Worth in the vicinity of the
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.

Forest Park Facility

8. The Forest Park Facility is located at 6114 Forest
Park Road, Dallas, Texas. Beginning in the late 1940's,
Texas Aircraft & Engine Company (“TA&EC”) and Texas
Metal & Manufacturing Company (“TM&MC”) conducted
engine rebuilding and metal fabricating operations at that
location.

9. In 1949, Cooper’s predecessor, Aviation Activities
Company (“AAC”), acquired TA&EC and TM&MC. On
information and belief, AAC merged AAC, TA&EC and
TM&MC and formed a new company known as Dallas
Airmotive.

10. Dallas Airmotive, also Cooper's predecessor,
continued the engine rebuilding and metal fabricating
operations at the Forest Park Facility. These operations
consisted, in part, of cleaning engines; painting, stripping
and plating engine parts; assembling engines; testing
engines; maintaining and operating underground storage

-11A-

tanks and tank farms; and using, receiving and storing
hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

11. During the course of their operations, Cooper's
predecessors disposed of and released hazardous materials
and petroleum hydrocarbons at the Forest Park Facility.
Without limitation, Cooper’s predecessors buried drums of
waste containing hydrochloric acid; dumped spent
trichloroethylene (“TCE”) used in their plating operations
onto the bare ground; released into the environment TCE
used to wash engines located in test cells; allowed
petroleum storage tanks to overflow their contents onto the
ground; buried silver plating sludges in soils; and corroded
drains with acids while releasing into the drains metals,
plating solutions and solvents.

Carter Field Facility

12. In 1955, Cooper’s predecessor, Southwest Airmotive
Company (“Southwest Airmotive’’), began aircraft engine
maintenance operations at Carter Field located at 15225
F.A.A. Boulevard, Forth Worth, Texas.

13. At the Carter Field Facility, Cooper's predecessor
assembled, disassembled and tested aircraft engines and
used, received and stored hazardous materials and
petroleum hydrocarbons.

14. During the course of such operations, Cooper's
predecessor released and disposed of hazardous substances
and petroleum hydrocarbons into the environment. Such
releases and disposals include, but are not limited to,
overfilling of storage tanks with jet fuel, releasing of
hazardous substances into drains, and periodic overflowing
an oil/water separator with hazardous materials and
petroleum hydrocarbons.

-12A-
Love Field Facility

15. Beginning in 1931, Cooper's predecessor, Edwin F.
Booth, Inc. began piston engine maintenance operations at
the Love Field Facility located at 9311 Reeves Street, Dallas,
Texas.

16. Southwest Airmotive was subsequently formed from
the successor corporation to Edwin F. Booth, Inc., Booth-
Herring, Inc. Southwest Airmotive continued aircraft engine
overhaul operations at the Love Field Facility and eventually
added 3300 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas to the Love
Field Facility.

17. The aircraft engine operations conducted by Cooper’s
predecessors at Love Field include, but are not limited to,
overhauling aircraft engines, which involved cleaning aircraft
engines; painting, stripping and plating engine parts;
assembling engines; testing engines; refueling of aircraft;
maintaining and operating underground storage tanks and
tank farms; and using, receiving, and storing hazardous
materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

18. During the course of such operations, Cooper’s
predecessors overfilled jet fuel storage tanks and disposed of
jet fuel onto bare ground, allowed tanks and related piping to
leak petroleum hydrocarbons into the surrounding
environment, and caused barrels containing chemicals to
accumulate and deteriorate on bare ground, leaking their
contents into soils and groundwater. Further, Cooper’s
predecessors overfilled sumps in the plating shop with
solvents and plating waste, draining such chemicals into the
ground.

Lemmon Terminal Facility

19. The Lemmon Terminal Facility is located at 7511 and
7515 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas. Beginning in the

-13A-

1950's, Cooper's predecessor, Southwest Airmotive,
conducted engine maintenance fueling and storage at that
location.

20. In connection with such operations, Cooper’s
predecessor overfilled fuel tanks, allowed dripping and
spilling of petroleum hydrocarbons onto soils, spilled
petroleum hydrocarbons onto the ground in its weed control
activities, and allowed tanks and piping to deteriorate,
thereby releasing petroleum hydrocarbons into soils and
potentially groundwater. In addition, Cooper's predecessors
released non-halogenated solvents into soils.

Cooper’s Acquisition of the Facilities

21. In 1970, Dallas Airmotive merged with Cooper, and
Cooper assumed all liabilities of Dallas Airmotive in the
merger, including the liabilities related to the Forest Park
Facility.

22. After the merger, Cooper continued the operations of
Dallas Airmotive at the Forest Park Facility and continued to
release and dispose of hazardous materials and petroleum
hydrocarbons into the environment.

23. Asa result of the acts and omissions of Cooper and
its predecessors, hazardous materials and petroleum
hydrocarbons released by Cooper and its predecessors at the
Forest Park Facility have been detected in groundwater and
soil at the facility including, but not limited to, phase
separated hydrocarbons, chlorobenzenes, cis-1,2-
dichloroethene (cis-1,2-DCE), perchloroethene, TCE, 1,1-
dichloroethene (1,1-DCE), vinyl chloride, and hexavalent
chromium. Certain hazardous materials released at the
Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its predecessors have
migrated through groundwater off of the Forest Park
Facility property.

- 14A -
24. In 1973, Cooper acquired Southwest Airmotive
pursuant to a merger in which Cooper assumed the
obligations and liabilities of Southwest Airmotive at the
Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon Terminal Facilities.

25. Further, Cooper continued the operations of its
predecessor, Southwest Airmotive, at the Carter Field, Love
Field and Lemmon Terminal Facilities and continued to
dispose of and release hazardous materials and petroleum
hydrocarbons into the soils and groundwater at the
Facilities.

26. As a result of the operations of Cooper and its
predecessors at the Carter Field Facility, elevated
concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons, benzene,
toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes were identified in soils
at the Carter Field Facility. Further, groundwater
monitoring wells have identified the on-site presence of
1,1,DCE, vinyl chloride, phase-separated hydrocarbons and
halogenated solvents at the Carter Field Facility.

27. As a result of the operations of Cooper and its
predecessors at the Love Field Facility, unsaturated
halocarbons including 1,1-DCE, cis-1,2-DCE,
perchloroethene, TCE, petroleum hydrocarbons and vinyl

chloride have been detected in soils. Certain unsaturated
halocarbons have also been detected in groundwater at the
Love Field Facility. Further, four hydrocarbon plumes exist
in the groundwater at the Love Field Facility.

28. Asa result of the acts and omissions of Cooper and
its predecessor at the Lemmon Terminal Facility, gasoline,
jet fuel, acetone, and non-halogenated solvent
methylethylketone have been detected in soils in and around
the on-site sewer catch basins and/or tank farm, among
other areas.

- ISA -

29. The contamination caused by Cooper and its
predecessors at the Facilities constituted unauthorized
discharges prohibited by Texas Water Code Section 26.121
and Fort Worth City Code, Chapter 49 and/or Dallas City
Codes, Chapter 7A.

Aviall’s Acquisition of the Facilities

30. In 1981, Aviall purchased the assets of Cooper,
including the Forest Park, Love Field, Lemmon Terminal and
Carter Field Facilities.

31. Aviall and Cooper entered a written Asset Purchase
Agreement, dated December 10, 1981 (“Agreement’’) which
set forth the terms and conditions of the sale. Pursuant to the
Agreement, Cooper assumed all liabilities arising out of pre-
closing environmental contamination.

32. Cooper has refused to honor and follow the
Agreement and its obligations under Texas and federal laws
by failing to undertake any environmental responsibilities
associated with pre-closing disposals and releases of
hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

33 In 1995 and 1996, Aviall entered two separate sales
through which it sold all of its interests in the Facilities.
Under the terms and conditions of such sales, Aviall has
retained environmental obligations with respect to the
Facilities.

34. Aviall has cooperated with the State of Texas to
investigate and clean up the aforementioned contamination.
Thus far, Aviall has incurred over $5,000,000 in costs to
respond to, investigate, and remediate contamination at the
Facilities. Aviall anticipates that such costs will eventually
total approximately $21,000,000. Further, Aviall has
suffered diminution in value of the Facilities and the risk of
liability to off-site landowners.

- 16A -

35. — Aviall has incurred response costs consistent with the
National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) pursuant to CERCLA
and will incur further response costs consistent with the NCP
pursuant to CERCLA in the future.

36. The response, investigation and remediation costs
incurred by Aviall were also reasonable, necessary and
required by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (“TNRCC”’), or its predecessors.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(CERCLA Cost Recovery)

37. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-36
as if set out verbatim.

38. — Aviall is entitled to recover from Cooper, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 9607, response costs incurred or to be incurred
by Aviall under CERCLA in connection with the Facilities.

ao. and “release” and/or threatened release
of “hazardous substances” has occurred at the Facilities as
defined by Sections 101(14), (22), and (29) of CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), (22), and (29) of CERCLA.

40. Cooper is a responsible party under Section 107(a),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA as a past owner and
operator of the Facilities at the time of disposal of hazardous
substances and as an arranger for disposal of hazardous
substances at the Facilities.

41. Each of the Facilities constitutes a “facility” as
required by Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), of
CERCLA because hazardous substances have come to be
located at the Facilities.

42. _ Aviall has incurred recoverable response costs in
responding to the contamination at the Facilities that are
consistent with the NCP, 40 C.F.R. Part 300.

-17A-

43. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §
9613(g)(2), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and Tex. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.004, to a declaratory
judgment as to Cooper's liability for response and remedial
action costs and other liabilities in connection with the
Facilities, along with related relief as is requested herein.
Also, Aviall seeks recovery of costs and reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees pursuant to TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.009.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(CERCLA Contribution)

44. —_ Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-
43 as if set out verbatim.

45. Pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1),
Aviall is entitled to seek contribution from Cooper, as a
person liable or potentially liable under CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a), for any response costs and other liability
Aviall. has incurred or may incur under CERCLA in
connection with the Facilities.

46. Aviall is entitled to contribution for all such
response costs and other liability on the basis of equitable
factors, including, but not limited to:

A. For over thirty years, Cooper and its predecessors
owned and operated the Facilities during which time
they managed and controlled waste handling and
disposal practices at the Facilities and generated
contamination at and from the Facilities.

B. In contrast to Cooper, Aviall has cooperated with
government efforts regarding investigation and
cleanup of the Facilities.

- 18A -

.. If Aviall bore the response costs for which Cooper is
directly responsible, Cooper would obtain a windfall
at Aviall’s expense.

D. Cooper and Aviall agreed pursuant to the Agreement
that Cooper would bear all liabilities as between
them for response and remedial action costs arising
out of Cooper’s pre-closing operation and ownership
of the Facilities.

47. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §
9613(g)(2), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and TEx. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.004, to a declaratory
judgment as to Cooper's liability for response and remedial
action costs and other liabilities in connection with the
Facilities, along with related relief as is requested herein.
Also, Aviall seeks recovery of costs and reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees pursuant to TEX. Civ. PRAc. &
REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.009.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(SWDA Contribution)

48. _—_ Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-
47 as if set out verbatim.

49. Pursuant to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
Section 361.344(a), as amended, Aviall is entitled to
recover from Cooper the costs of the removal or remedial
actions conducted by Aviall in connection with its former
Facilities.

50. Such removal and remedial actions were approved
by the TNRCC and were reasonable and necessary to
address a release or threatened release of a solid waste as
defined by the SWDA.

51. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-
2202 and Tex. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. Section

- 19A -

37.004, to a declaratory judgment as to Cooper's liability
for response and remedial action costs and other liabilities
in connection with the Facilities, along with related relief as
is requested herein. Also, Aviall seeks recovery of costs
and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees pursuant to
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. Section 361.344(a) and
Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.009.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Negligence and Negligence Per Se)

52. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-
51 as if set out verbatim.

53. The actions and omissions of Cooper and its
essors in connection with their operations at the
former Aviall Facilities were negligent.

54. Cooper owes Aviall a duty to exercise ordinary care
in the conduct of its and its predecessors’ operations at the
Facilities and has a duty to conduct such operations in a
reasonable and prudent manner so that soils and
groundwater are not polluted by petroleum hydrocarbons,
solvents and other substances.

55. Cooper's conduct and that of its predecessors’
constitutes a breach and continuing breach of these duties,
giving rise to negligence and negligence per se.

56. Such negligence is a proximate cause of Aviall’s
injuries. Cooper’s wrongful acts include, without
limitation, the following:

A. Failure to properly dispose of hazardous materials
and drums containing hazardous materials,

B. Failure to adequately inspect underground storage
tank systems, waste lines, and storage facilities;

- 20A -

od Failure to timely repair leaks and other equipment
failures;

D. Failure to timely report and/or notify the TNRCC or
its predecessors of known and suspected leaks;
disposals or spills;

E.. Failure to comply with applicable environmental laws
including, but not limited to, TEXAS WATER CODE
Section 26.121, which prohibits pollution of the
waters of Texas except as authorized by the TNRCC;

,. Failure to notify and/or warn Aviall of conditions
causing and potentially causing contamination;

G. Failure to operate in accordance with prudent
operating standards in the industry;

H. Failure to adequately protect the natural resources of
the State of Texas, including its groundwater;

I, Failure to adequately train and supervise personnel
with respect to proper waste disposal practices;

J. Failure to adequately train and supervise personnel to
conduct operations in accordance with the laws,
orders and rules of the State of Texas and the codes of
the Cities of Dallas and Fort Worth; and

K. Failure to investigate, remediate, and take affirmative
actions to investigate, respond to, abate and eliminate
the contamination and hazardous conditions existing
at the Facilities.

57. | Cooper knew or should have known that such failures
as described in Paragraph 56 above would cause pollution of
the soil and groundwater at the Facilities.

-21A-

58. The negligent or grossly negligent actions and
omissions of Caoper have caused damage to Aviall. As a
proximate result of Cooper’s negligent acts and omissions,
as set forth herein, Aviall has suffered and in the future will
suffer injuries related to the contamination.

59. | Cooper’s actions and inactions allowing pollutants
and hazardous materials to enter surface and subsurface
soils and groundwater are direct violations of Texas rules
and regulations and Dallas and Fort Worth codes designed
to prevent pollution and injury to entities like” Aviall,
amounting to negligence per se.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Gross Negligence)

60. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-
59 as if set out verbatim.

61. Cooper’s operations at the Facilities have been
managed and performed with such lack of care and such
reckless disregard for the protection of the surface and
subsurface of the Facilities that such conduct amounts to
gross negligence or willful misconduct as a matter of law.
Coopers’ wrongful conduct, acts and omissions constituting
gross negligence consist of, but are not limited to, the
following:

a. Cooper's conscious business decision to engage in
illegal waste disposal methods and the resulting
contamination problems caused thereby; and

b. The knowledge of and conscious indifference to the
risks involved and consequences of ignoring the
threat to groundwater, the environment and public
health and safety posed by Cooper's failure to
comply with Dallas and Fort Worth codes and Texas
laws, rules, orders and regulations and failure to take

- 22A-

any steps to prevent injury to Aviall and the public as
a result of Cooper’s acts and omissions.

62. Cooper's conduct constitutes a breach and continuing
breach of the duties giving rise to this gross negligence
count.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER _

(Trespass)

EE

63. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs 1-62
as if set out verbatim.

64. —__In the course of engaging in the acts and omissions
described herein, Cooper has caused and allowed the release,
escape and migration of hazardous materials and petroleum
products into the soils and groundwater underlying Aviall’s
former property.

65. Cooper caused or allowed the entry of petroleum
hydrocarbons, solvents and other substances upon and under
Aviall’s former property without Aviall’s permission or
invitation. Aviall was, at the time of its previous occupation
of the Facilities, lawfully entitled to possession of the real
estate at issue.

66. Cooper intentionally conducted operations in such a
manner as to either not guard against, or to purposefully
allow or cause, pollutants and other hazardous materials to
migrate into and contaminate the surface and subsurface soil
and groundwater in violation of Aviall’s former vested
— property rights. This constituted an intentional invasion of
Aviall’s former property, thus constituting an intentional
trespass and continuing trespass as those terms are defined
and understood under the laws and statutes of the State of
Texas. Such intentional trespass was also a legal or
contributing cause to Aviall’s damages as herein alleged.

- 23A-

67. Cooper’s intentional trespass constitutes the
proximate cause of injury, damage and loss to Aviall.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Private Nuisance)

68. — Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-67
as if set out verbatim.

69. Cooper knew to a reasonable certainty, or in the
exercise of ordinary care should have known, that its acts and
omissions would cause material harm to Avial! as well as
substantial costs to clean up contamination. Cooper has
voluntarily, intentionally, or negligently interfered with the
use and enjoyment of Aviall’s former property. Cooper's acts
and omissions have caused and continue to cause pollutants
and other hazardous substances to enter the Facilities
amounting to a present and continuing nuisance.

70. Further, the acts and omissions of Cooper were an
intentional invasion of Aviall’s former interest in the
Facilities, including the surface, subsurface and groundwater
beneath the land, or in the alternative, a negligent invasion of
Aviall’s former property interests in the surface, subsurface
and groundwater beneath the Facilities. This invasion of
Aviall’s former property interests has interfered and is
continuing to interfere with the use and enjoyment of the
Facilities and the normal and expected use and enjoyment of
the Facilities and groundwater. These acts committed by
Cooper constitute a nuisance. Such nuisance is also a legal
and contributing cause of injury to the Facilities.

71. The pollution caused by Cooper is continuing, exists
today and will, in all likelihood, continue into the future, thus
constituting a continuing tort. Cooper has violated its
common-law obligations to abate and correct the continuing
nuisance it created. As alleged above, Cooper’s actions are

- 24A -

and were intentional or reckless, such that the harm to
Aviall’s interests were substantially certain to follow.

72. The presence of petroleum hydrocarbons, solvents
and other hazardous materials in groundwater and soil is
offensive, inconvenient and annoying to persons with
normal sensibilities in the surrounding community.

73. The nuisances created by Cooper subvert the welfare’

of the environment and public and constitute an obstruction
of public rights with respect to Aviall and landowners
surrounding the Facilities.

74. Asaresult of the nuisance created by Cooper and its
offensive and injurious effects, Aviall has been forced to
incur response and remediation costs and other costs
associated with damage to the Facilities.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Public Nuisance)

75. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs 1-
74 as if set out verbatim.

76. Cooper’s acts and omissions remain a source of
continuing pollution for which Cooper has refused to accept
responsibility. Cooper’s acts and omissions have caused
and continue to cause pollutants and other hazardous
materials to emanate from certain Facilities amounting to a
present and continuing public nuisance.

77. In committing these acts and omissions, Cooper has
created, maintained and refused to abate a public nuisance,
contrary to the laws of the State of Texas. Further, Cooper
willfully and intentionally, and in utter disregard of these
laws, damaged and continues to damage the Facilities.
Cooper’s actions resulting in the contamination of soils and
groundwater have subverted and are subverting the public
order and have constituted and are constituting an

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obstruction of the public’s rights. Aviall has suffered
damages in the form of response costs, remediation costs,
diminution to real property value and repair costs.

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Breach of Contract by Cooper)

78. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-
77 as if set out verbatim.

79. — As between Aviall and Cooper, under the December
10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper retained all risk of costs,
damages and liabilities arising out of pre-closing disposals
of hazardous materials and contamination.

80. Cooper agreed to retain all liabilities or obligations
not expressly assumed by Aviall under the Agreement,
those liabilities and obligations covered by Cooper's
insurance, and/or all liabilities or obligations constituting a
violation of federal, state or local law or requirement of any
governmental authority.

81. Aviall has incurred costs and liabilities related to
Cooper's violation of applicable law and governmental
authority governing Cooper’s acts at the Facilities. Such
costs and liabilities arise out of Cooper’s acts and omissions
resulting in the contamination of soils and groundwater at
the Facilities. Moreover, Aviall itself never agreed to
assume such costs and liabilities under the Agreement.

82. Aviall has requested that Cooper undertake its
obligations and liabilities under the Agreement, and Cooper
breached its duties under the Agreement by refusing to
assume and satisfy such obligations and liabilities.

83. Aviall has incurred and continues to incur
substantial damages as a result of Cooper’s breaches of the
Agreement.

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WHEREFORE, Aviall prays for the relief requested above,
for costs, attorneys fees, interest as allowed by law and for
general relief.

DATED: August 7, 1997
Respectfully submitted,

GARDERE & WYNNE, L.L.P
ls/_
Douglas S. Lang, Esq.

Bar No.1 1895500

1601 Elm Street

3000 Thanksgiving Tower
Dallas, Texas 75210-4761

(214) 999-3000 Telephone
(214) 999-4274 Facsimile

By permission
/s/ Joan Krajewski

ee eee

~~ ame

-27A-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION
AVIALL SERVICES §
INCORPORATED §
§
PLAINTIFF, §
§
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-
§ 97CV1926-D
§
COOPER INDUSTRIES. §
INC. § FIRST AMENDED
§ COMPLAINT
DEFENDANT. §
S
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Aviall Services, Incorporated (“Aviall’’), for its First
Amended Complaint against Defendant Cooper Industries,
Inc. (“Cooper”), alleges as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5. This is a civil action, under Sections 107 and
113 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seq.,
as amended (hereafter “CERCLA”), under the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
Chapter 361 (“SWDA”), and the Texas Water Code §
26.3513 seeking (1) reimbursement of certain investigation
and remediation costs incurred by Aviall in response to the
release or threat of release of hazardous substances and
petroleum hydrocarbons on, under and about the properties
known as the Forest Park Facility, Love Field Facility,
Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter Field Facility
(collectively identified herein as the “Facilities”); and (2)

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declaratory judgment under Section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA.
42 US.C. § 9613(g2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. as to
Defendant's liability for further response costs incurred and
to be incurred by Aviall at the Facilities.

2. This action is also instituted under the
common laws of the State of Texas for breach of contract,
breach of warranty and contractual indemnity arising from a
written Asset Purchase Agreement, dated December 10, 1981
(“Agreement”), seeking abatement, damages to property
value, cost of repair and such other relief as just and proper.
An alternative claim in quantum meruit to preclude Cooper
from being unjustly enriched by~Aviall’s remediation
activities is also asserted herein.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of this action under Section 113(b) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b). This Court has federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for this civil
action arising under the laws of the United States. Venue is
proper in this District pursuant to Section 1 13(b), 42 U.S.C. §
9613(b) because the Facilities are located within this District
and the release of hazardous substances and petroleum
hydrocarbons occurred within this District. The amount in
controversy exceeds the amount required for adjudication by
this Court.

4. The SWDA, Texas Water Code, breach of
contract, breach of warranty, and contractual indemnity and
quantum meruit claims are so related to the claims within the
original jurisdiction of this Court that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article II] of the United
States Constitution. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction
over the SWDA, negligence, negligence per se, gross
negligence, trespass, nuisance, public nuisance and breach of

- 29A -

contract claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Aviall is a Delaware corporation and
has its principal place of business in the State of Texas.

6. Defendant Cooper Industries, Inc., is a [sic]
Ohio corporation doing business in the State of Texas.
Defendant may be served with citation by delivering a copy
of the citation and this Complaint to its registered agent, CT
Corporation System, 801 Dallas Avenue, Houston, Texas
77002.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

7. The subject of this action concerns costs, fees
and damages arising out of releases and threatened releases
of hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at four
facilities known individually as the Forest Park Facility,
Love Field Facility, Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter
Field Facility. At those facilities, Cooper and its
predecessors conducted aircraft engine overhaul and/or
maintenance operations. All four facilities are located either
in Dallas, Texas near Love Field Airport or in Fort Worth in
the vicinity of the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.
The factual background for each facility and the conduct of
the parties is alleged below.

Forest Park Facility

8. The Forest Park Facility is located at 6114
Forest Park Road, Dallas, Texas. Beginning in the late
1940’s, Texas Aircraft & Engine Company (“TA&EC”) and
Texas Metal & Manufacturing Company (“TM&MC”)
conducted engine rebuilding and metal fabricating operations
at that location.

- 30A -

9. In 1949, Cooper's predecessor, Aviation
Activities Company (“AAC”), acquired TA&EC and
TM&MC. On information and belief. AAC merged AAC,
TA&EC and TM&MC and formed a new company known as
Dallas Airmotive.

10. Dallas Airmotive, also Cooper's predecessor,
continued the engine rebuilding and metal fabricating
operations at the Forest Park Facility. These operations
consisted, in part, of cleaning engines; painting, stripping and
plating engine parts; assembling engines; testing engines;
maintaining and operating underground storage tanks and
tank farms; and using, receiving and storing hazardous
materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

11. During the course of their operations,
Cooper's predecessors disposed of and released hazardous
materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at the Forest Park
Facility. Without limitation, Cooper's predecessors buried
drums of waste containing hydrochloric acid; dumped spent
trichloroethylene (“TCE”) used in their plating operations
onto the bare ground; released into the environment TCE
used to wash engines located in test cells; allowed petroleum
storage tanks to overflow their contents onto the ground;
buried silver plating sludges in soils; and corroded drains
with acids while releasing into the drains metals, plating
solutions and solvents.

Carter Field Facility

12. In 1955, Cooper's predecessor, Southwest
Airmotive Company (“Southwest Airmotive™), began aircraft
engine maintenance operations at Carter Field located at
15225 F.A.A. Boulevard, Forth Worth, Texas.

13. At the Carter Field Facility, Cooper's
predecessor assembled, disassembled and tested aircraft

-31A-

engines and used, received and stored hazardous materials
and petroleum hydrocarbons.

14. During the course of such operations,
Cooper's predecessor released and disposed of hazardous
substances and petroleum hydrocarbons into _ the
environment. Such releases and disposals include, but are
not limited to, overfilling of storage tanks with jet fuel,
releasing of hazardous substances into drains, and periodic
overflowing of an oil/water separator with hazardous
materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

Love Field Facility

1S. Beginning in 1931, Cooper's predecessor,
Edwin F. Booth, Inc. began piston engine maintenance
operations at the Love Field Facility located at 9311 Reeves
Street, Dallas, Texas.

16. Southwest Airmotive was subsequently
formed from the successor corporation to Edwin F. Booth,
Inc., Booth-Herring, Inc. Southwest Airmotive continued
aircraft engine overhaul operations at the Love Field Facility
and eventually added 3300 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas
to the Love Field Facility.

17. The aircraft engine operations conducted by
Cooper's predecessors at Love Field include, but are not
limited to, overhauling aircraft engines, which involved
cleaning aircraft engines; painting, stripping and plating
engine parts; assembling engines; testing engines; refueling
of aircraft; maintaining and operating underground storage
tanks and tank farms; and using, receiving, and storing
hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

18. During the course of - such operations,
Cooper's predecessors overfilled jet fuel storage tanks and
disposed of jet fuel onto bare ground, allowed tanks and
related piping to leak petroleum hydrocarbons into the

-32A-

surrounding environment, and caused barrels containing
chemicals to accumulate and deteriorate on bare ground,
leaking their contents into soils and groundwater. Further,
Cooper's predecessors overfilled sumps in the plating shop
with solvents and plating waste, draining such chemicals into
the ground.

Lemmon Terminal Facility

19. The Lemmon Terminal Facility is located at
7511 and 7515 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas. Beginning
in the 1950°s, Cooper's predecessor, Southwest Airmotive,
conducted aircraft maintenance, fueling and storage at that
location.

20. _—_ In connection with such operations, Cooper's
predecessor overfilled fuel tanks, allowed dripping and
spilling of petroleum hydrocarbons onto soils, spilled
petroleum hydrocarbons onto the ground in its fueling and
weed control activities, and allowed tanks and piping to
deteriorate, thereby releasing petroleum hydrocarbons into
soils and potentially groundwater. In addition, Cooper's
predecessors released non-halogenated solvents into soils.

Cooper's Acquisition of the Forest Park Facility

21. In 1970, Cooper purchased Dallas Airmotive
and merged Dallas Airmotive into Cooper. As a result of this
merger, Cooper assumed all obligations of and belongings to
Dallas Airmotive, including the environmental liabilities
relating to the Forest Park Facility.

22. After the merger, Cooper continued
operations and purchased additional, adjacent property at the
Forest Park Facility and continued to release and dispose of
hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons into the
environment.

-33A-
Pollution at the Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its [sic]
Predecessors
23. As a result of the acts and omissions of

Cooper and its predecessors, hazardous materials and
petroleum hydrocarbons released by Cooper and its
predecessors at the Forest Park Facility have been detected in
groundwater and soil at the facility including, but not limited
to, phase separated hydrocarbons, chlorobenzenes, cis-!,2-
dichloroethene (cis-!,2-DCE), perchloroethene, TCE, 1,1-
dichloroethene (1,1-DCE), vinyl chloride, and hexavalent
chromium. Certain hazardous materials released at the
Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its predecessors have
migrated through groundwater off of the Forest Park Facility

property.

Cooper's Acquisition of the Carter Field, Love Field and
Lemmon Terminal Facilities

24. In 1973, Cooper purchased the stock of
Southwest Airmotive, Inc. As a result of the stock purchase,
Cooper assumed the obligations and liabilities of Southwest
Airmotive at the Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon
Terminal Facilities.

Cooper's Pollution of the Carter Field, Love Field and
Lemmon Terminal Facilities

25. Further, Cooper continued the operations at
the Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon Terminal Facilities
and continued to dispose of and release hazardous materials
and petroleum hydrocarbons into the soils and groundwater

at the Facilities.

26. Asa result of the operations of Cooper and its
predecessors at the Carter Field Facility, elevated
concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons, benzene,
toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes were identified in soils at

- 34A -

the Carter Field Facility. Further, groundwater monitoring
wells have identified the on-site presence of 1,1-DCE, viny!
chloride, dissolved-phase hydrocarbons and halogenated
solvents at the Carter Field Facility.

27. Asa result of the operations of Cooper and its
predecessors at the Love Field Facility, unsaturated
halocarbons including 1,1-DCE, cis- 1 ,2-DCE,
perchloroethene, TCE, petroleum hydrocarbons and vinyl
chloride have been detected in soils. Certain unsaturated
halocarbons and dissolved-phase hydrocarbons have also
been detected in groundwater at the Love Field Facility.
Further, four hydrocarbon plumes exist in the soil and
groundwater at the Love Field Facility.

28 As a result of the acts and omissions of
Cooper and its predecessor at the Lemmon Terminal Facility,
gasoline, jet fuel, acetone, and non-halogenated solvent
methylethylketone have been detected in soils in and around
the on-site sewer catch basins and/or tank farm, among other
areas.

29. The contamination caused by Cooper and its
predecessors at the Facilities constituted unauthorized
discharges prohibited by applicable law, the Texas Water
Code Section 26.121 and Fort Worth City Code, Chapter 49
and/or Dallas City Codes, Chapter 7A.

Aviall’s Acquisition of the Facilities from Cooper - The Asset
Purchase Agreement

30. In 1981, Aviall (through Aviall’s predecessor,
Aviation Power Supply, Inc.) purchased certain assets of
Cooper, including the operations at the Forest Park, Love
Field, Lemmon Terminal and Carter Field Facilities.

31. Aviall and Cooper entered a written Asset
Purchase Agreement, dated December 10, 1981

- 35A -

(“Agreement”) which set forth the terms and conditions of
the sale. Pursuant to the Agreement, Cooper retained all
liabilities arising out of pre-closing environmental
contamination.

32. Additionally, Cooper represented, in
consideration for the Agreement, that Cooper was not in
violation of any law, regulation or requirement relating to the
Facilities, including without limitation applicable
environmental protection laws and regulations. This
representation was false. In fact, at the time of closing the
Agreement, Cooper was in violation of environmental
protection laws and regulations.

33. In consideration for the Agreement, Cooper
entered into an “affirmative covenant” that, prior to closing,
Cooper would comply with all legal requirements and
contractual obligations applicable to the purchased assets. In
fact, Cooper did not comply with all legal requirements and
contractual obligations prior to the closing date.

34. ‘In the Agreement, Cooper agreed to promptly
inform Aviall in writing of all material variances from the
representations and warranties contained in Article 4 of the
Agreement. In fact, Cooper failed to inform Aviall of
material variances in environmental compliance from the
representations made in Section 4.09(f) of the Agreement.

35. | Cooper has refused to honor and follow the
Agreement and its obligations under Texas and federal laws
by failing to recognize, accept and undertake any
environmental responsibilities associated with pre-closing
disposals and releases of hazardous materials and petroleum
hydrocarbons at the Facilities.

Aviall’s Sales of the Facilities and Standing to Sue

36. In 1995 and 1996, Aviall entered two separate
sales through which it sold all of its interests in the Facilities.

- 36A -
Under the terms and conditions of such sales, Aviall has
retained pre-closing environmental obligations with respect
to the Facilities. Accordingly Aviall has standing to
prosecute this action.

Aviall’s Costs

37. Aviall has cooperated with the State of Texas

to investigate and clean up the aforementioned

contamination. Thus far, Aviall has incurred over
$5,000,000 in costs to respond to, investigate, and remediate
contamination at the Facilities. Aviall anticipates that such
costs could exceed $21,000,000. Further, Aviall has suffered
diminution in value of the Facilities through the 1995 and
1996 sales and the risk of liability to off-site landowners.

38. Aviall has incurred response costs consistent
with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) pursuant to
CERCLA and will incur further response costs consistent
with the NCP pursuant to CERCLA in the future, as well as
costs reimbursable under the laws of the State of Texas.

39. The response, investigation and remediation
costs incurred by Aviall were also reasonable, necessary and
required by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (“TNRCC’”) or its predecessors.

40. A “disposal” and “release” and/or threatened
release of “hazardous substances” and or “hazardous waste”
has occurred at the Facilities as defined by Sections 101(14),
(22), and (29) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), (22), and
(29) of CERCLA and by TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. Sec. 361.003.

41. | Cooper is a person who is a responsible party
under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA as a
past owner and operator of the Facilities at the time of
disposal of hazardous substances and as an arranger for
disposal of hazardous substances at the Facilities.

-37A -

42. Forest Park, Love Field and Carter Field each
constitute a “facility” as required by Section 107(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA. Hazardous substances have
come to be located at the Facilities.

43. Aviall has incurred recoverable response costs
in responding to the contamination at the Facilities that are
consistent with the NCP, 40 C.F.R. Part 300.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Breach of Contract by Cooper)

44. Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-43 as if set out verbatim.

45. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the
December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper retained all risk of
costs, damages and liabilities arising out of pre-closing
disposals of hazardous materials and contamination.

46. Cooper agreed to retain all liabilities or
obligations (i) not expressly assumed by Aviall under the
Agreement, (ii) those liabilities and obligations covered by
Cooper’s insurance, and/or (iii) all liabilities or obligations
constituting a violation of federal, state or local law or
requirement of any governmental authority. Additionally, in
the Agreement, Cooper falsely represented that it was not in
violation of any law, regulation or requirement relating to the
Facilities, including, without limitation, applicable
environmental protection laws and regulations. Moreover,
Cooper agreed to promptly inform Aviall in writing of all
material variances from the representations and warranties
contained in Article 4 of the Agreement. Notwithstanding
this Agreement, Cooper entirely failed to inform Aviall of
the material variances from its representations and warranties
of environmental compliance.

47. Aviall has incurred costs and liabilities related
to Cooper’s violation of applicable law and governmental

- 38A -

authorities’ requirements governing Cooper's acts at the
Facilities. Such costs and liabilities arise out of Cooper's
acts and omissions resulting in the contamination of soils and
groundwater at the Facilities. Moreover, Aviall itself never
agreed to assume such costs and liabilities under the
Agreement.

48. — Aviall has requested that Cooper undertake its
obligations and liabilities under the Agreement. Cooper has
breached its duties under the Agreement by refusing to
assume and satisfy such obligations and _ liabilities.
Moreover, by refusing to honor its obligations, Cooper has
engaged in an anticipatory breach of the Agreement, thereby
entitling Aviall to recover damages for costs to be incurred in
the future as a proximate result of Cooper’s anticipatory
breach.

49. Aviall has incurred and continues to incur
substantial damages proximately caused as a result of
Cooper’s breaches of the Agreement. In _ reasonable
probability, Aviall will incur substantial damages in the
future as a result of Cooper’s anticipatory breach of the
Agreement.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Breach of Warranty)

50. Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-49 as if set out verbatim.

51. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the
December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper expressly warranted
that it was not in violation of any applicable law, regulation
or requirement relating to the operation of the Facilities,
including applicable environmental laws and regulations.

52. By _ releasing petroleum and _ hazardous
substances into the ground and groundwater at the Facilities,

- 39A -

Cooper violated applicable environmental laws and
regulations.

53. Accordingly, Cooper breached the warranty
set forth in the Agreement regarding compliance with
applicable environmental laws and regulations. Moreover,
although Cooper agreed to notify Aviall about any material
variances from the warranties regarding environmental
compliance, Cooper has never notified Aviall of regarding its
non-compliance. As a result, Aviall has incurred and will
continue to incur substantial damages proximately caused as
a result of this breach of warranty. :

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Contractual Indemnification) °

54. Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-53 as if set out verbatim.

55. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the
December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper agreed to indemnify
Aviall against any loss, liability, damage or expense that
Aviall may incur as a result of a breach by Cooper of any
representation, warranty, covenant or agreement contained in
the Agreement.

56. By refusing to honor its retained
environmental liabilities resulting from Cooper’s pre-closing
activities, and by the other breaches, acts and omissions
alleged herein, Cooper breached representations, warranties,
covenants and agreements set forth in the Agreement.

57. Accordingly, Cooper is required under the
Agreement to indemnify Aviall for all past and future losses,
damages and expenses incurred as a proximate result of
Cooper’s breach of those representations, warranties,
covenants and agreements.

- 40A -
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Declaratory Judgment)

58. Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-57 as if set out verbatim.

59. This claim is for declaratory judgment
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 9613 for the
purpose of determining a question of actual controversy
between and among the parties.

60. An actual controversy has arisen and now
exists between Aviall and Cooper in that Aviall contends and
Cooper will deny or will likely deny:

(A)that, as between the parties,
responsibility for certain releases
or threatened releases of hazardous
substances at or from the Facilities
has been retained by Cooper; and

(B) that as a result, Cooper is obligated
to indemnify Aviall for any sums
that it has paid or may be
compelled to pay as a result of
such release or threatened release
of hazardous substances and/or
hazardous and solid wastes at or
from the Facilities;

(C)that Cooper is liable for certain
response costs incurred by Aviall,
or damages sustained by Aviall
under CERCLA, SWDA and the
Texas Water Code;

(D)that Cooper is liable for certain
response costs incurred by Aviall,
or damages sustained by Aviall in

-41A -

the future under CERCLA, SWDA
and the Texas Water Code;

(E)that Aviall is entitled to a
declaratory judgment of future
liability at the Facilities that will
be binding on any subsequent
actions to recover response costs
incurred at the Facilities in the
future.

64. _—Aviall therefore requests that this Court enter
a declaratory judgment declaring that Cooper is liable for all
or part of the costs, plus interest, of past, present and future
actions taken by Aviall, or any other person or entity, to
responses to releases or threatened releases of hazardous
substances and solid and hazardous wastes at or proximately
caused by conditions that existed before December 10, 1981
in connection with the Facilities for any past or future
response costs incurred or damages sustained that arise from
activities at the Facilities.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Liability under CERCLA)

65. Aviall incorporates the averments of
paragraphs 1-64 above as if set forth verbatim.

66. Pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1),
Aviall is entitled to seek contribution from Cooper, as a
person liable or potentially liable under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a), for any response costs and other liability Aviall
has incurred or may incur under CERCLA in connection with
the Facilities.

67. — Aviall is entitled to contribution for all such
response costs and other liability on the basis of equitable
factors, including, but not limited to:

-42A -

(A)for over thirty years, Cooper and
its predecessors owned and
operated the Facilities during
which time they managed and
controlled waste handling and

_ disposal practices at the Facilities
and generated contamination at
and from the Facilities;

(B)in contrast to Cooper, Aviall has
cooperated with government
efforts regarding investigation and
cleanup of the Facilities;

(C)if Aviall bore the response costs
for which Cooper is directly
responsible, Cooper would be
unjustly enriched and obtain a
windfall at Aviall’s expense;

(D)Cooper and Aviall agreed pursuant
to the Agreement that Cooper
would bear all liabilities as
between them for response and
remedial action costs arising out of
Cooper’s pre-closing operation and
ownership of the Facilities.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Contribution Under the Texas
Solid Waste Disposal Act)

68. Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-67 as if set out verbatim.

69. Pursuant to Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
Section 361.344(a), as amended, Aviall is entitled to recover

- 43A -

from Cooper the costs of the removal or remedial actions
conducted by Aviall in connection with its former Facilities.

70. Such removal and remedial actions were
approved by the TNRCC and were reasonable and necessary
to address a release or threatened release of a solid waste as
defined by the SWDA. Aviall is entitled to apportionment of
costs as provided b [sic] the SWDA.

71. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
2201-2202 and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Relv1l. Code Ann. Section
37.004, to a declaratory judgment as to Cooper’s liability for
response and remedial action costs and other liabilities in
connection with the Facilities, along with related relief as is
requested herein. Also, Aviall seeks recovery of costs and
reasonable and necessary attorney's fees pursuant to Tex.
Health & Safety Code Ann. Section 361.344(a) and Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Relv1. Code Ann. Section 37.009. aa

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Contribution Under the Texas Water Code)

72. _ Aviall =incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-71 as if set out verbatim.

73. | Cooper, while owner and operator of the
Facilities, placed, used and maintained storage tanks at the
Facilities. As a result of its actions, regulated hazardous, —
toxic or otherwise harmful substances, including without
limitation, jet fuel, diesel, gasoline, solid and hazardous
waste and hazardous substances, were released, causing or
threatening to cause serious groundwater and other
contamination. The release and threatened releases present
substantial danger to the public health, welfare, or the
environment.

74. Cooper failed to take corrective action at the
Facilities. Aviall has incurred reasonable and necessary

. 44A -

response costs by taking corrective action in response to
releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances
and/or hazardous and solid wastes. Aviall will continue to
incur such costs in eliminating releases and threatened
releases.

75. An actual and judicial controversy exists
between the parties concerning liability for costs incurred by
Aviall, including attorneys’ fees and interest, which Aviall
contend are due it from Cooper pursuant to the Texas Water
Code § 26.3513, and Aviall seeks contribution against
Cooper, as the former owner and operator of the Facilities for
the corrective action costs incurred. Pursuant to Texas law,
Aviall is entitled to judgment in its favor and against Cooper
for contribution, adjudging and deeming that Cooper is liable
for the amounts expended by Aviall in response to the
releases or threatened releases, plus attorneys’ fees, court
costs, and interest therein, plus any future costs incurred by
Plaintiffs.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Quantum Meruit)

76. ~—Aviall = incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-75 as if set out verbatim.

77. Aviall has furnished and is _ furnishing
valuable services and materials to Cooper by cleaning up the
Facilities, an obligation for which Cooper is partially liable.

78. Theses [sic] services and materials were
performed and are performed to the benefit of Cooper and
enjoyed by Cooper.

79.“ Aviall notified Cooper of the services and
materials and expected to be paid by Cooper for such
services.

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80. Accordingly, as an alternative to the other
above-mentioned claims, Aviall is entitled to all costs and
expenses it has incurred under the theory of quantum meruit.

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Attorneys’ Fees)

81. Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-80 as if set out verbatim.

82. Aviall has repeatedly demanded that Cooper
comply with the Agreement and pay Aviall for Cooper's
share of its response costs incurred to clean up the Facilities.

83. Because Cooper repeatedly refused to honor
its commitments, Aviall retained the undersigned counsel to
pursue this litigation on its behalf.

84. Aviall has paid or agreed to pay the
undersigned counsel reasonable and necessary fees and
expenses incurred in connection with this action.

85. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. sections 37.009 and 38.002,
section 7.02(a) of the Agreement, and Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. Section 361.344, as well as under the SWDA and
the Texas Water Code, to a judgment against Cooper for all
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in association with these
claims.

WHEREFORE, Aviall prays for the relief requested
above, for costs, attorneys’ fees, interest as allowed by law
and for general relief.

DATED: January 12, 1999.

Respectfully submitted,

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OF COUNSEL:

José A. Berlanga

State Bar No. 02203400

John S. Gray

State Bar No. 00793850
GARDERE WYNNE
SEWELL & RIGGS, L.L.P.
Three Allen Center

333 Clay Avenue, Suite 800
Houston, Texas 77002-4086

Richard O. Faulk

State Bar No. 06854300
GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL
& RIGGS, L.L.P.

Three Allen Center

333 Clay Avenue, Suite 800
Houston, Texas 77002-4086

‘i clephone: (713) 308-5500
Facsimile: (713) 308-5555

Douglas S. Lang

State Bar No. 11895500
GARDERE & WYNNE, L.L.P.
3000 Thanksgiving Tower

1601 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

Phone (214) 999-3000

FAX (214) 999-4667

Cynthia J. Bishop

State Bar No. 00790309
GARDERE & WYNNE,
L.L.P.

3000 Thanksgiving Tower
1601 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

(Certificate of Service
omitted in printing)

-47A-

- 48A -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

AVIALL SERVICES §
INCORPORATED §
§
PLAINTIFF. §
§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-

§ 97CV1926-D
§
COOPER INDUSTRIES. §
INC. §
N
DEFENDANT. s
§
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Aviall Services, Incorporated (“Aviall”), for its
Second Amended Complaint against Defendant Cooper
Industries, Inc. (“Cooper”), alleges as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

l. This is a civil action, under Sections 107 and
113. of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seg..
as amended (hereafter “CERCLA”), under the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
Chapter 361 (“SWDA”), and the Texas Water Code §
26.3513, seeking (1) reimbursement of certain investigation
and remediation costs incurred by Aviall in response to the
release or threat of release of hazardous substances and

petroleum hydrocarbons on, under and about the properties
known as the Forest Park Facility, Love Field Facility,

-49A-

Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter Field Facility
(collectively identified herein as the “Facilities”); and (2)
declaratory judgment under Section 113(g)2) of CERCLA,
42 US.C. § 9613(g2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as to
Defendant's liability for further response costs incurred and
to be incurred by Aviall at the Facilities.

2. This action is also instituted under the
common laws of the State of Texas for breach of contract,
breach of warranty and contractual indemnity arising from a
written Asset Purchase Agreement, dated December 10, 1981
(“Agreement”), seeking abatement, damages to property
value, cost of repair and such other relief as just and proper.
An alternative claim in quantum meruit to preclude Cooper
from being unjustly enriched by Aviall’s remediation
activities is also asserted herein.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of this action under Section 113(b) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b). This Court has federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for this civil
action arising under the laws of the United States. Venue is
proper in this District pursuant to Section 1 13(b), 42 U.S.C. §
9613(b) because the Facilities are located within this District
and the release of hazardous substances and petroleum
hydrocarbons occurred within this District. The amount in
controversy exceeds the amount required for adjudication by
this Court.

+ The SWDA, Texas Water Code, breach of
contract, breach of warranty, and contractual indemnity and
quantum meruit claims are so related to the claims within the
original jurisdiction of this Court that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction

- SOA -

over the SWDA, negligence, negligence per se, gross
negligence, trespass, nuisance, public nuisance and breach of
contract claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Aviall is a Delaware corporation and
has its principal place of business in the State of Texas.

6. Defendant Cooper Industries, Inc., is a [sic]
Ohio corporation doing business in the State of Texas.
Defendant may be served with citation by delivering a
copy of the citation and this Complaint to its registered
agent, CT Corporation System, 801 Dallas Avenue,
Houston, Texas 77002.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

7. The subject of this action concerns costs, fees
and damages arising out of releases and threatened releases
of hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at four
facilities known individually as the Forest Park Facility,
Love Field Facility, Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter
Field Facility. At those facilities, Cooper and its predecessors
conducted aircraft engine overhaul and/or maintenance
operations. All four facilities are located either in Dallas,
Texas near Love Field Airport or in Fort Worth in the
vicinity of the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. The
factual background for each facility and the conduct of the
parties is alleged below.

Forest Park Facility

8. The Forest Park Facility is located at 6114
Forest Park Road, Dallas, Texas. Beginning in the late
1940's, Texas Aircraft & Engine Company (“TA&EC”) and
Texas Metal & Manufacturing Company (“TM&MC”)

-SIA-

a~

conducted engine rebuilding and metal fabricating operations
at that location.

9. In 1949, Cooper's predecessor, Aviation _
Activities Company (“AAC”), acquired TA&EC and
TM&MC. On information and belief, AAC merged AAC,
TA&EC and TM&MC and formed a new company known
as Dallas Airmotive.

10. Dallas Airmotive, also Cooper's predecessor,
continued the engine rebuilding and metal fabricating
operations at the Forest Park Facility. These operations
consisted, in part, of cleaning engines; painting, stripping
and plating engine parts; assembling engines; testing
engines; maintaining and operating underground storage
tanks and tank farms; and using, receiving and storing
hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

11. During the course of their operations,
Cooper's predecessors disposed of and released hazardous
materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at the Forest Park
Facility. Without limitation, Cooper’s predecessors buried
drums of waste containing hydrochloric acid; dumped spent
trichloroethylene (“TCE”) used in their plating operations
onto the bare ground; released into the environment TCE
used to wash engines located in test cells; allowed
petroleum storage tanks to overflow their contents onto the
ground; buried silver plating sludges in soils; and corroded
drains with acids while releasing into the drains metals,
plating solutions and solvents.

Carter Field Facility

12. In 1955, Cooper’s predecessor, Southwest
Airmotive Company (“Southwest Airmotive”), began aircraft
engine maintenance operations at Carter Field located at
15225 F.A.A. Boulevard, Forth Worth, Texas.

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13. At the Carter Field Facility, Cooper's
predecessor assembled, disassembled and tested aircraft
engines and used, received and stored hazardous materials
and petroleum hydrocarbons.

14. During the course of such operations,
Cooper’s predecessor released and disposed of hazardous
substances and petroleum hydrocarbons into the
environment. Such releases and disposals include, but are
not limited to, overfilling of storage tanks with jet fuel,
releasing of hazardous substances into drains, and periodic
overflowing of an oil/water separator with hazardous
materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

Love Field Facility

15. Beginning in 1931, Cooper’s predecessor,
Edwin F. Booth, Inc. began piston engine maintenance
operations at the Love Field Facility located at 9311 Reeves
Street, Dallas, Texas.

16. Southwest Airmotive was _ subsequently
formed from the successor corporation to Edwin F. Booth,
Inc., Booth-Herring, Inc. Southwest Airmotive continued
aircraft engine overhaul operations at the Love Field
Facility and eventually added 3300 Lemmon Avenue,
Dallas, Texas to the Love Field Facility.

17. The aircraft engine operations conducted by
Cooper’s predecessors at Love Field include, but are not
limited to, overhauling aircraft engines, which involved
cleaning aircraft engines; painting, stripping and plating
engine parts; assembling engines; testing engines; refueling
of aircraft; maintaining and operating underground storage
tanks and tank farms; and using, receiving, and storing
hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

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18. During the course of such operations,
Cooper’s predecessors overfilled jet fuel storage tanks and
disposed of jet fuel onto bare ground, allowed tanks and
related piping to leak petroleum hydrocarbons into the
surrounding environment, and caused barrels containing
chemicals to accumulate and deteriorate on bare ground,
leaking their contents into soils and groundwater. Further,
Cooper’s predecessors overfilled sumps in the plating shop
with solvents and plating waste, draining such chemicals
into the ground.

Lemmon Terminal Facility

19. The Lemmon Terminal Facility is located at
7511 and 7515 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas. Beginning
in the 1950's, Cooper’s predecessor, Southwest Airmotive,
conducted aircraft maintenance, fueling and storage at, that
location.

20. _—_In connection with such operations, Cooper’s
predecessor overfilled fuel tanks, allowed dripping and
spilling of petroleum hydrocarbons onto soils, spilled
petroleum hydrocarbons onto the ground in its fueling and
weed control activities, and allowed tanks and piping to
deteriorate, thereby releasing petroleum hydrocarbons into
soils and potentially groundwater. In addition, Cooper’s
predecessors released non-halogenated solvents into soils.

Cooper’s Acquisition of the Forest Park Facility

21. In 1970, Cooper purchased Dallas Airmotive
and merged Dallas Airmotive into Cooper. As a result of this
merger, Cooper assumed all obligations of and belongings to
Dallas Airmotive, including the environmental liabilities
relating to the Forest Park Facility.

22. After the merger, Cooper continued
operations and purchased additional, adjacent property at the

- 54A -

Forest Park Facility and continued to release and dispose of
hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons into the
environment.

Pollution at the Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its [sic]
Predecessors

23. As a result of the acts and omissions of'

Cooper and its predecessors, hazardous materials and
petroleum hydrocarbons released by Cooper and _ its
predecessors at the Forest Park Facility have been detected in
groundwater and soil at the facility including, but not limited
to, phase separated hydrocarbons, chlorobenzenes, cis-1.2-
dichloroethene (cis-1,2-DCE), perchloroethene, TCE, 1,1-
dichloroethene (1,1-DCE), vinyl chloride, and hexavalent
chromium. Certain hazardous materials released at the
Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its predecessors have
migrated through groundwater off of the Forest Park
Facility property.

| Cooper’s Acquisition of the Carter Field, Love Field and
Lemmon Terminal Facilities

24. In 1973, Cooper purchased the stock of
Southwest Airmotive, Inc. As a result of the stock purchase,
Cooper assumed the obligations and liabilities of Southwest
Airmotive at the Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon
Terminal Facilities.

Cooper's Pollution of the Carter Field, Love Field and
Lemmon Terminal Facilities

25. Further, Cooper continued the operations at
the Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon Terminal Facilities
and continued to dispose of and release hazardous materials
and petroleum hydrocarbons into the soils and groundwater
at the Facilities.

- 55A -

26. Asaresult of the operations of Cooper and its
predecessors at the Carter Field Facility, elevated
concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons, benzene,
toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes were identified in soils at
the Carter Field Facility. Further, groundwater monitoring
wells have identified the on-site presence of 1,l-DCE, vinyl
chloride, dissolved-phase hydrocarbons and halogenated
solvents at the Carter Field Facility.

27. Asa result of the operations of Cooper and
its predecessors at the Love Field Facility, unsaturated
halocarbons including 1,1-DCE, cis-1,2-DCE,
perchloroethene, TCE, petroleum hydrocarbons and viny]|
chloride have been detected in soils. Certain unsaturated
halocarbons and dissolved-phase hydrocarbons have also
been detected in groundwater at the Love Field Facility.
Further, four hydrocarbon plumes exist in the soil and
groundwater at the Love Field Facility.

28. As a result of the acts and omissions of
Cooper and its predecessor at the Lemmon Terminal
Facility, gasoline, jet fuel, acetone, and non-halogenated
solvent methylethylketone have been detected in soils in
and around the on-site sewer catch basins and/or tank farm,
among other areas.

29. The contamination caused by Cooper and its
predecessors at the Facilities constituted unauthorized
discharges prohibited by applicable law, the Texas Water
Code Section 26.121 and Fort Worth City Code, Chapter 49
and/or Dallas City Codes, Chapter 7A.

Aviall’s Acquisition of the Facilities from Cooper - The Asset
Purchase Agreement

30. In 1981, Aviall (through Aviall’s predecessor,
Aviation Power Supply, Inc.) purchased certain assets of

- 56A -

Cooper, including the operations at the Forest Park, Love
Field, Lemmon Terminal and Carter Field Facilities.

31. | Aviall and Cooper entered a written Asset
Purchase Agreement, dated December 10, 1981
(“Agreement”) which set forth the terms and conditions of
the sale. Pursuant to the Agreement, Cooper retained all
liabilities arising out of pre-closing environmental
contamination.

32. Additionally, Cooper represented, in
consideration for the Agreement, that Cooper was not in
violation of any law, regulation or requirement relating to
_the Facilities, including without limitation applicable
environmental protection laws and regulations. This
representation was false. In fact, at the time of closing the
Agreement, Cooper was in violation of environmental
protection laws and regulations.

33. In consideration for the Agreement, Cooper
entered into an “affirmative covenant” that, prior to closing,
Cooper would comply with all legal requirements and
contractual obligations applicable to the purchased assets.
In fact, Cooper did not comply with all legal requirements
and contractual obligations prior to the closing date.

34. In the Agreement, Cooper agreed to promptly
inform Aviall in writing of all material variances from the
representations and warranties contained in Article 4 of the
Agreement. In fact, Cooper failed to inform Aviall of
material variances in environmental compliance from the
representations made in Section 4.09(f) of the Agreement.

35. | Cooper has refused to honor and follow the
Agreement and its obligations under Texas and federal laws
by failing to recognize, accept and undertake any
environmental responsibilities associated with pre-closing

- 57A -

disposals and releases of hazardous materials and petroleum
hydrocarbons at the Facilities.

Aviall’s Sales of the Facilities and Standing to Sue

36. In 1995 and 1996, Aviall entered two separate
sales through which it sold all of its interests in the Facilities.
Under the terms and conditions of such sales, Aviall has
retained pre-closing environmental obligations with respect
to the Facilities. Accordingly Aviall has standing to
prosecute this action.

Aviall’s Costs

37. — Aviall has cooperated with the State of Texas
to investigate and clean up the aforementioned
contamination. Thus far, Aviall has incurred over
$5,000,000 in costs to respond to, investigate, and remediate
contamination at the Facilities. Aviall anticipates that such
costs could exceed $21,000,000. Further, Aviall has suffered
diminution in value of the Facilities through the 1995 and
1996 sales and the risk of liability to off-site landowners.

38. Aviall has incurred response costs consistent
with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) pursuant to
CERCLA and will incur further response costs consistent
with the NCP pursuant to CERCLA in the future, as well as
costs reimbursable under the laws of the State of Texas.

39. The response, investigation and remediation
costs incurred by Aviall were also reasonable, necessary
and required by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (“TNRCC’”) or its predecessors.

40. A “disposal” and “release” and/or threatened
release of “hazardous substances” and or “hazardous waste”
has occurred at the Facilities as defined by Sections
101(14), (22), and (29) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§

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9601(14), (22), and (29) of CERCLA and by TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. Sec. 361.003.

41. | Cooper is a person who is a responsible party
under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA as
a past owner and operator of the Facilities at the time of
disposal of hazardous substances and as an arranger for
disposal of hazardous substances at the Facilities.

42. Forest Park, Love Field and Carter Field each
constitute a “facility” as required by Section 107(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA. Hazardous substances have
come to be located at the Facilities.

43. Aviall has incurred recoverable response
costs in responding to the contamination at the Facilities
that are consistent with the NCP, 40 C.F.R. Part 300.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Breach of Contract by Cooper)

44. Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-43 as if set out verbatim.

45. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the
December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper retained all risk of
costs, damages and liabilities arising out of pre-closing
disposals of hazardous materials and contamination.

46. Cooper agreed to retain all liabilities or
obligations (i) not expressly assumed by Aviall under the
Agreement, (ii) those liabilities and obligations covered by
Cooper’s insurance, and/or (iii) all liabilities or obligations
constituting a violation of federal, state or local law or
requirement of any governmental authority. Additionally, in
the Agreement, Cooper falsely represented that it was not in
violation of any law, regulation or requirement relating to the
Facilities, including, without limitation, applicable

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environmental protection laws and regulations. Moreover,
Cooper agreed to promptly inform Aviall in writing of all
material variances from the representations and warranties
contained in Article 4 of the Agreement. Notwithstanding
this Agreement, Cooper entirely failed to inform Aviall of
the material variances from its representations and warranties
of environmental compliance.

47. Aviall has incurred costs and liabilities related
to Cooper's violation of applicable law and governmental
authorities’ requirements governing Cooper's acts at the
Facilities. Such costs and liabilities arise out of Cooper's
acts and omissions resulting in the contamination of soils and
groundwater at the Facilities. Moreover, Aviall itself never
agreed to assume such costs and liabilities under the

. Agreement.

48. Aviall has requested that Cooper undertake its
obligations and liabilities under the Agreement. Cooper has
breached its duties under the Agreement by refusing to
assume and satisfy such obligations and liabilities.
Moreover, by refusing to honor its obligations, Cooper has
engaged in an anticipatory breach of the Agreement, thereby
entitling Aviall to recover damages for costs to be incurred in
the future as a proximate result of Cooper's anticipatory
breach.

49. _Aviall has incurred and continues to incur
substantial damages proximately caused as a result of
Cooper’s breaches of the Agreement. In _ reasonable
probability, Aviall will incur substantial damages in the
future as a result of Cooper's anticipatory breach of the
Agreement.

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(Breach of Warranty)

50. Aviall incorporates the averments of
paragraphs 1-49 as if set out verbatim.

51. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the
December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper expressly warranted
that it was not in violation of any applicable law, regulation
or requirement relating to the operation of the Facilities,
including applicable environmental laws and regulations.

52. By releasing petroleum and hazardous
substances into the ground and groundwater at the Facilities,
Cooper violated applicable environmental laws and
regulations.

53. Accordingly, Cooper breached the warranty
set forth in the Agreement regarding compliance with
applicable environmental laws and regulations. Moreover,
although Cooper agreed to notify Aviall about any material
variances from the warranties regarding environmental
compliance, Cooper has never notified Aviall of regarding its
non-compliance. As a result, Aviall has incurred and will
continue to incur substantial damages proximately caused as
a result of this breach of warranty.

(Contractual Indemnification)

54. Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-53 as if set out verbatim.

55. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the
December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper agreed to indemnify
Aviall against any loss, liability, damage or expense that
Aviall may incur as a result of a breach by Cooper of any

-61A-

representation, warranty, covenant or agreement contained in
the Agreement.

56. By refusing to honor its _ retained
environmental liabilities resulting from Cooper's pre-closing
activities, and by the other breaches, acts and omissions
alleged herein, Cooper breached representations, warranties,
covenants and agreements set forth in the Agreement.

57. Accordingly, Cooper is required under the
Agreement to indemnify Aviall for all past and future losses,
damages and expenses incurred as a proximate result of
Cooper's breach of those representations, warranties,
covenants and agreements.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Declaratory Judgment)

58. Aviall incorporates the averments of

‘Paragraphs 1-57 as if set out verbatim.

59. This claim is for declaratory judgment
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 9613 for the

purpose of determining a question of actual controversy
between and among the parties. |

60. An actual controversy has arisen and now
exists between Aviall and Cooper in that Aviall contends and
Cooper will deny or will likely deny:

(A) that, as between the parties, responsibility for
certain releases or threatened releases of
hazardous substances at or from the Facilities
has been retained by Cooper; and

(B) that as a result, Cooper is obligated to
indemnify Aviall for any sums that it has paid
or may be compelled to pay as a result of such

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release or threatened release of hazardous
substances and/or hazardous and solid wastes
at or from the Facilities;

(C) that Cooper is liable for certain response costs
incurred by Aviall, or damages sustained by
Aviall under CERCLA, SWDA and the Texas
Water Code;

(D) that Cooper is liable for certain response costs
incurred by Aviall, or damages sustained by
Aviall in the future under CERCLA, SWDA
and the Texas Water Code;

(E) that Aviall is entitled to a declaratory
judgment of future liability at the Facilities
that will be binding on any subsequent actions
to recover response costs incurred at the
Facilities in the future.

61. Aviall therefore requests that this Court enter
a declaratory judgment declaring that Cooper is liable for all
or part of the costs, plus interest, of past, present and future
actions taken by Aviall, or any other person or entity, to
responses to releases or threatened releases of hazardous
substances and solid and hazardous wastes at or proximately
caused by conditions that existed before December 10, 1981
in connection with the Facilities for any past or future
response costs incurred or damages sustained that arise from
activities at the Facilities.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Liability under CERCLA)

62. Aviall incorporates the averments of
paragraphs 1-61 above as if set forth verbatim.

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63. Pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1),
Aviall is entitled to seek contribution from Cooper, as a
person liable or potentially liable under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a), for any response costs and other liability Aviall
has incurred or may incur under CERCLA in connection with
the Facilities.

64. —_Aviall is entitled to contribution for all such
response costs and other liability on the basis of equitable
factors, including, but not limited to:

(A) for over thirty years, Cooper and its

owned and operated the

Facilities during which time they managed

and controlled waste handling and disposal

practices at the Facilities and generated
contamination at and from the Facilities;

(B) in contrast to Cooper, Aviall has cooperated
with government’ efforts regarding
investigation and cleanup of the Facilities;

(C) if Aviall bore the response costs for which
Cooper is directly responsible, Cooper would
be unjustly enriched and obtain a windfall at
Aviall’s expense;

(D) Cooper and Aviall agreed pursuant to the
Agreement that Cooper would bear all
liabilities as between them for response and
remedial action costs arising out of Cooper's
pre-closing operation and ownership of the
Facilities.

65. Both the Attorney General of the United
States and the Administrator of the environmental [sic]
Protection Agency have been notified of the action and

- 64A -

provided with a copy of the Original Complaint and First
Amended Complaint.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Contribution Under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act)

66. Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-66 as if set out verbatim.

67. Pursuant to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. Section 361.344(a), as amended, Aviall is entitled to
recover from Cooper the costs of the removal or remedial
. tions conducted by Aviall in connection with its former
Facilities.

68. Such removal and remedial actions were
approved by the TNRCC and were reasonable and
necessary to address a release or threatened release of a
solid waste as defined by the SWDA. Aviall is entitled to
apportionment of costs as provided b [sic] the SWDA.

69. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
2201-2202 and Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
Section 37.004, to a declaratory judgment as to Cooper’s
liability for response and remedial action costs and other
liabilities in connection with the Facilities, along with
related relief as is requested herein. Alsc. Aviall seeks
recovery of costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s
fees pursuant to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. Section
361.344(a) and Tex. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
Section 37.009.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Contribution Under the Texas Water Code)

70. ~~ Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-71 as if set out verbatim.

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71. ~ Cooper, while owner and operator of the
Facilities, placed, used and maintained storage tanks at the
Facilities. As a result of its actions, regulated hazardous,
toxic or otherwise harmful substances, including without
limitation, jet fuel, diesel, gasoline, solid and hazardous
waste and hazardous substances, were released, causing or
threatening to cause serious groundwater and other
contamination. The release and threatened releases present
substantial danger to the public health, welfare, or the
environment.

72. | Cooper failed to take corrective action at the
Facilities. Aviall has incurred reasonable and necessary
response costs by taking corrective action in response to
releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances
and/or hazardous and solid wastes. Aviall will continue to
incur such costs in eliminating releases and threatened
releases.

73. An actual and judicial controversy exists
between the parties concerning liability for costs incurred by
Aviall, including attorneys’ fees and interest, which Aviall
contend are due it from Cooper pursuant to the Texas Water
Code § 26.3513, and Aviall seeks contribution against
Cooper, as the former owner and operator of the Facilities for
the corrective action costs incurred. Pursuant to Texas law,
Aviall is entitled to judgment in its favor and against Cooper
for contribution, adjudging and deeming that Cooper is liable
for the amounts expended by Aviall in response to the
releases or threatened releases, plus attorneys’ fees, court
costs, and interest therein, plus any future costs incurred
by Plaintiffs.

- 66A -

(Quantum Meruit)

74. ~+Aviall incorporates the averments of
Paragraphs 1-73 as if set out verbatim.

75. + Aviall has furnished and is _ furnishing
valuable services and materials to Cooper by cleaning up
the Facilities, an obligation for which Cooper is partially
liable.

76. Theses [sic] services and materials were
performed and are performed to the benefit of Cooper and
enjoyed by Cooper.

77. Aviall notified Cooper of the services and
materials and expected to be paid by Cooper for such
services.

78. Accordingly, as an alternative to the other above-
mentioned claims, Aviall is entitled to ali costs and
expenses it has incurred under the theory of quantum
meruit.

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER
(Attorneys’ Fees)

79. Aviall incorporates _ the averments of
Paragraphs 1-78 as if set out verbatim.

80. Aviall has repeatedly demanded that Cooper
comply with the Agreement and pay Aviall for Cooper’s
share of its response costs incurred to clean up the
Facilities.

81. Because Cooper repeatedly refused to honor
its commitments, Aviall retained the undersigned counsel
to pursue this litigation on its behalf.

- 67A -

82. Aviall has paid or agreed to pay the
undersigned counsel reasonable and necessary fees and
expenses incurred in connection with this action.

83. ~~ Aviall is entitled, pursuant to CERCLA, 42°
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, TEX. Clv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. sections 37.009 and 38.002,
section 7.02(a) of the Agreement, and TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. Section 361.344, as well as under the
SWDA and the Texas Water Code, to a judgment against
Cooper for all attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in
association with these claims.

WHEREFORE, Aviall prays for the relief requested
above, for costs, attorneys’ fees, interest as allowed by law
and for general relief.

DATED: June __, 1999.

Respectfully submitted,

ls/
Richard O. Faulk

State Bar No. 06854300
GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL &
RIGGS, L.L.P.

Wells Fargo Plaza

1000 Louisiana, Suite 3400
Houston, Texas 77002-5007
Telephone: (713) 276-5500
Facsimile: (713) 276-5555

Douglas S. Lang

State Bar No. 11895500
GARDERE & WYNNE, L.L.P.
3000 Thanksgiving Tower

1601 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

- 68A -

Phone (214) 999-3000
FAX (214) 999-4667
OF COUNSEL:

José A. Berlanga

State Bar No. 02203400

John S. Gray

State Bar No. 00793850
GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL &
RIGGS, L.L.P.

Wells Fargo Plaza

1000 Louisiana, Suite 3400
Houston, Texas 77002-5007

Cynthia J. Bishop
State Bar No. 00790309
3000 Thanksgiving Tower
Dallas, Texas 75201

- 69A -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

AVIALL SERVICES, CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
INCORPORATED
3:97-CV-1926-D
VERSUS
January 5, 2000
COOPER INDUSTRIES,
INC.

Nee eee ee ee

TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL
ARGUMENT BEFORE THE
HONORABLE SIDNEY A. FITZWATER,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff; DALE E. STEPHENSON
SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY,
L.L.P.
6250 Texas Commerce Tower
600 Travis Street
Houston, Texas 77002
713/546-5858

For the Defendant: RICHARD O. FAULK and
JOSE BERLANGE
GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL &
RIGGS, L.L.P.
1000 Louisiana, #3400
Houston, Texas 77002-5007
713/276-5651

Court Reporter: PAMELA J. WILSON, CSR
1100 Commerce Room 15A3
214/415-1884

- 70A -

THE LAW CLERK: All rise.

The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas is now in session, the Honorable Judge
Sidney A. Fitzwater presiding.

Let us pray. God save the United States and this
Honorable Court.

THE COURT: Be seated, please.
This is Aviall Services versus Cooper Industries.
We'll begin with Mr. Stephenson.

MR. STEPHENSON: May it please the court.
Plaintiff Aviall and defendant Cooper Industries, Inc. have
filed cross motions for summary judgment addressing many
of the same issues. Aviall seeks partial summary judgment
only with respect to five of the nine claims asserted in the
first amended complaint: Breach of contract based on alleged
retaining liabilities; contractual indemnification under the
written contract; contribution under Section 113 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act; and contribution under state law claims for the
Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Texas Water Code.
The statutory environmental claims are all based on strict
liability provisions. Aviall does not seek summary judgment
with respect to the other four causes of action asserted in its
amended complaint: Breach of warrant, declaratory

[2]

-71A-
judgment, quantum meruit and attorneys fees.

In constrast, Cooper seeks summary judgment on its
favor in all the claims asserted in the amended complaint.

THE COURT: Mr. Stephenson, what’s the
basis for the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in this
case?

MR. STEPHENSON: Subject matter
jurisdiction arises under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act, Section 113.

THE COURT: All right. So it’s federal
question jurisdiction?

MR. STEPHENSON: That’s correct.

THE COURT: And if you are correct that
there is not a viable CERCLA claim, does the court have
discretion to dismiss the balance of the case without
prejudice?

MR. STEPHENSON: Absolutely, under
UMW V. Gibbs, I believe.

THE COURT: And what do you understand
the declaratory judgment claim of the plaintiff to be?

MR. STEPHENSON: The declaratory
judgment claim is for future costs to be expended at the
property. It’s based on a provision in Section 113(g) of
CERCLA which relates solely to private party direct causes
of action under Section 107. Since their remaining claim is
under Section 113 and there is no parallel provision for
declaratory judgment under CERCLA, that section is

inapposite.

-72A -

(3)

THE COURT: Now, when you say there is no
declaratory judgment provision under CERCLA, as | read
that provision there is a remedy of declaratory judgment
that’s available, but you contend that that is tied to a 107
claim; is that correct?

MR. STEPHENSON: It is a section that
relates solely to direct causes of action under Section 107(a).
Immediately following -- it is limited to this subsection.
Immediately following the subsection which refers to
statutory of limitations and other things for contribution
actions under Section 113(f) does not have an equivalent
provision.

THE COURT: What do you understand this
combined 107/113 claim to be that Aviall brings?

MR. STEPHENSON: The combined -- I don’t
think there -- there is a -- is a combined claim. I think the law
is well established that to pursue a direct cause of action
under Section 107 you have to be either an innocent party or
the United States Government, and we don’t have that -- or
an innocent -- or an innocent party, and we don’t have that in
this case. In fact, Aviall dropped its Section 107 complaint
in the original complaint. It was originally count | of the
complaint.

THE COURT: Aviall continues to refer to 107
in connection with the 113 claim. I used the word
“combined,”

(4)

-73A-
another way might be hybrid or something else.

MR. STEPHENSON: Sure. I think that under the
cases cited that you have to have a threshold activity that gets
a party to assert a contribution claim: That is, you have to
have either an enforcement action against a party for their
own direct liability for which they can then seek
contribution; you can have an administrative enforcement
action by the United States; you can have a lawsuit by
another party, an innocent, private party that -- pursuing an
act under 107, and then the defendant in that action can have
a right to contribution under Section 113. None of those
circumstances exist in the present case. This is solely a
private party taking action on its own property and seeking to
manufacture the CERCLA claim.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. STEPHENSON: Thank you.

Aviall doesn’t dispute at all that it polluted thése
properties, and that’s why it can’t have its own direct private
party claim as an innocent party.

18 years ago Aviall purchased the properties and
koew exactly what it was purchasing. It was an industrial
property of 50 underground storage tanks, industrial
operations for plating, handling solvents and other materials.
Indeed the president of Cooper went over to become the
president of Aviall on the purchase. They knew

[5]

- 74A -

exactly what they were purchasing and operating. As the
environmental laws emerged over time, particularly with
respect to underground storage tanks in the late 1980s, some
seven or eight years after the purchase, Aviall systematically,
methodically rer xoved underground storage tanks, cleaned up
contaminated soil from the leaks in the aging tanks during its
watch and incurred those costs in the ordinary course of
business.

The comprehensive written contracts negotiated
between the two parties in this case are really the heart of the
issue. Indeed, Aviall agrees that this is primarily a contract
case, and so we'll focus on those issues initially. The
contracts may be complex but they aren't ambiguous. Aviall
argues that Cooper is trying to avoid its legal obligations, but
the thrust of Aviall’s argument makes clear that it’s trying to
rewrite the terms of the agreements.

THE COURT: Let me tum if I might to
Section 103.(b), Roman Numeral X.

MR. STEPHENSON: Yes.

THE COURT: You've made an argument in
your brief where you attempt to draw a distinction between
retained versus not assumed. And I think you criticized
Cooper’s brief — Aviall’s brief, excuse me, for repeatedly
referring to retained liabilities when you contend the word
retained is not in the agreement.

- 175A -

Would you explain to me what you mean by that
distinction? Because the other side of that is if you don’t
assume it, the other party kept it.

MR. STEPHENSON: What Cooper kept was
obligations for a specific period of time under the indemnity
provision of the agreement. Anything that was not an
assumed liability falls over to be handled under Section 7.02
of the purchase agreement. And matters which were other
than assumed liabilities had a five year from the time -- date
of closing window in which to assert a claim. That would
have expired in 1986. It went away along before Cooper --
Aviall ever contacted Cooper a decade later.

So what I mean is that retained -- retained only has
the concept of the indemnity that is woven into the
agreement. It doesn’t have a standalone implied breach of
contract connotation that swallows the carefully crafted terms
for recovery.

THE COURT: And you would say that the
obligation to indemnify is the same; is that right?

Because they attempt to distinguish between an
obligation to indemnify and a retained liability as I
understand it.

MR. STEPHENSON: That’s correct. Well,

it’s one of two things. If the claim comes under section --
subsection (x) that you're referring to, that’s an other

- 176A -

than assumed liability. Those -- those had an express five
year window for bringing a claim for that. If it's something
other than -- other than those enumerated things in
subsection B, then the comprehensive release that the
parties negotiated in 1982, October of 1982, was a complete
release and forgiveness of all agreements or other terms in
the contract. So it’s one or the other.

THE COURT: And they say there is
language in the release that says you acknowledge and will
continue to honor liabilities that you retain.

MR. STEPHENSON: And the = second
sentence of the release says “subject to the applicable time
limits.” I mean, it’s express in the release that anything that
is left under the non-assumed liabilities is subject to the
applicable time limits, in this -- in this context five years.

This court recently took a look at the vendor property
obligations in a slightly different context. It involved leaking
underground storage tanks in the Owens versus the Estate of
Irwin matter. In recognizing the general rules, a grantor of
real property isn’t liable for dangerous or defective
conditions on land once the grantee has taken possession of
the property, unless the grantor knew of dangerous
conditions at the time of the transfer or acted to conceal or
failed to disclose it. We don’t have that

circumstance in this case. There is no allegation of
misrepresentation. There is no allegation of fraud. A similar
result was reached in Jones versus Texaco in the Southern

- TTA -

District of Texas in 1996, 945 F. Sup 1037 and Hicks versus
Humble Oil in the Texas appellate court, 970 S.W.2d 90.

The analogy here is Aviall bought property with
specific contract rights for recovery if something went wrong
for one year or for five years or was released. If Aviall in
doing construction on its property discovered a pot of gold
on the property, I don’t think they would be giving it back to
Cooper because it was a windfall to them. Likewise, if a
homeowner buys a house and later the roof leaks, it doesn’t
undo the deal.

The real question here: Does the contract unwind the
general rule that a person buys what they get?

We think it is clear that application of the contract on
its face requires -- means that there is no -- no contractual
recovery for Aviall.

THE COURT: Let me jump back to
something you just said, the general rule that somebody gets
what they buy.

MR. STEPHENSON: Correct.

THE COURT: Their argument though under
Texas corporate law is that a successor corporation doesn’t
assume certain liabilities; so is that analogy really correct?

[9]

MR. STEPHENSON: I think it is, because the
liability that they got was the property that they bought.

- 718A -

Their liability under CERCLA arises not only
because they contaminated the property themselves but
because they owned it. CERCLA is a strict liability statute
that creates liabilities for owners. And they got that as part
of the evolving time period.

There hasn’t been a CERCLA claim brought against
Cooper in this case. There hasn’t been a CERCLA claim
brought against Aviall in this case. They simply did
something with their own property. They got what they got.
They fixed it up over time. They complied with emerging
rules for underground storage tanks and other things. And
finally they sold their properties in 1995/°96. And the only
reason they're continuing to do anything with those
properties is because they contractually agreed with the
buyers to do that. They cut the deal, and now they're trying
to make somebody else pay for any cost differences that they
encountered. They did this work normally and
systematically for more than a decade before they ever
contacted Cooper. It was the ordinary course of business as
far as they were concerned.

We note in the briefs there is a single environmental
provision in the contract which relates to the representation
for compliance with environmental safety laws

and regulations, and that expired under the one year statute of
limitations in Section 7.02(a) of the contract.

THE COURT: And they say that
they're not suing you based on that provision.

-79A -

MR. STEPHENSON: Well, the complaint on
its face alleges that.

THE COURT: I’m trying to remember which
brief it was I read, but in one of the briefs they say --

MR. STEPHENSON: They say they no longer
believe we misrepresented that in the summary judgment
brief, that’s correct.

THE COURT: And I think the reason they do
that is to bolster the argument that the time limits don’t

apply.
MR. STEPHENSON: That’s certainly true.

But the key time limit, here again, is the other than
assumed liability five year time limit.

Coupling that with the release, “All representations,
warrants, covenants, agreements --- “

THE COURT: Slow down a little when you
read for the reporter.

MR. STEPHENSON: Yeah. “-- contained in
the asset agreement are deemed to be fully satisfied forever.
Aviall releases Cooper from any and all allegations or claims
to indemnify Aviall for any breach of any representation,
warranty, covenant or agreement of Cooper contained in or

[11]

related to the asset agreement.”

- 80A -

Even if the express term limits in the contract did not
apply, the general statute of limitations would be four years
in the State of Texas, triggering from the time the injury was
caused to the property, again, expiring in 1985. We raised in
the brief also the issue of the express strict liability doctrine
in the State of Texas applicable to these. We do need to
advise the court that yesterday the Fifth Circuit reversed the
decision in Fina versus Arco.

THE COURT: Yeah, I saw that. That was
Judge Wiener, | think.

MR. STEPHENSON: That’s correct. That's
correct. Aviall had argued that here the contract did not
specifically mention CERCLA liability nor under the
authorities must it do so, citing Fina versus Arco. The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that general contractual language in
two purchase agreements did not cover strict liability under
CERCLA pursuant to, one contract, Delaware’s clear and
unequivocal standard, and in the other contract, Texas’s more

stringent express strict liability standard. That follows the:

Houston Lighting and Power decision from the Texas
Supreme Court in 1994, refusing to enforce a strict liability
claim on indemnity provision expressly -that expressly
covered negligence claims.

THE COURT: Let me go back to
CERCLA for a minute.

[12]

You make the argument that the failure to
give notice deprived the court -- and deprives the court of
subject matter jurisdiction.

-81A-
MR. STEPHENSON: Right.

THE COURT: Would you explain the basis
for that argument and address whether those subject matter
jurisdiction cases are distinguishable because they deal with
different types of statutes?

MR. STEPHENSON: They are certainly -- the
holdings are different in that they are citizen suit provisions
under the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and other
Statutes that allow a private party to stand in as a private
Attorney General. But the exact provision that we’re talking
about here in Section 1 13(1) of CERCLA is incorporated into
the citizen suit provision of CERCLA in Section 310 and it is
held to be a concurrent requirement by USEPA.

Here, in the CERCLA context, the agency and the
Attorney General responsible for overseeing this statute
didn’t know about the claims being made here for 21 months,
until it was brought to their attention after we brought it to
Aviall’s attention. Similarly, the lack of public participation
on the site kept all of the public shielded from what was
going on here.

My guess is that the United States, administrator of

[13]

EPA, and the Attorney General don’t know that there is a
second amended complaint in this case alleging that notice
21 months late is okay. I haven’t seen any indication that
Aviall has served that complaint on the United States.

-82A -

The idea behind provisions like this is to give the
government a chance to do something. The only case that
Aviall cited with respect to this was a -- where individual
plaintiffs brought a claim in the Green matter in Kansas.
And in that case, the court allowed -- or directed the parties
to go back and depose EPA -- an EPA official to see if they
cared about the site or not. That was the relief granted in that
case.

Here you can look at analogous statutes that aren't
citizen suit provisions. We looked at one maritime --

THE CLERK: Three minutes.
MR. STEPHENSON: Thank you.

We looked at one maritime matter where less than
120 days was found to be too long.

And I would like to reserve the remaining 10 minutes,
r if you had a follow-up question

THE COURT: You may reserve up to ten
minutes under the court’s order.

MR. STEPHENSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr.
Faulk.

[14]

MR. FAULK: Thank you, Your Honor.

- 83A-

If the court please, I -- it appears the court is familiar
with the contract provisions, but we’ve prepared a short
excerpt of contract highlighted sections that we would like to
tender to the court.

Your Honor, I -- I think as has during the course of
the questioning of this contract are things that are of the case.
And we believe that it redundant perhaps, to look at the
specific interpretation that Aviall places on these contract
provisions and then show how those contract provisions
support the positions we have taken.

Clearly in Section 1.03(b), Aviall did not assume
certain responsibilities under the contract. And there were
three different types of liabilities that weren’t assumed under
that particular type of -- part of the contract. And the catchall
one is, as the court properly noted, Section which states that
we're not responsible for any liability of the seller unless it is
expressly assumed by the buyer.

There is also a provision, Section 4, that deals with
liabilities of the seller arising as a result of preclosing
conduct and also with respect to insured liabilities under
Section 3 of the contract.

[15]

The interesting thing about those obligations, we
believe that there’s no other place in the contract where
environmental liabilities are discussed with any particularity
at all. And the only place that that in fact does come in,
arguably from Mr. Stephenson’s client, is in the phrase
“ordinary course of business” under the assumed liabilities
section, Section 1.03(a).

- 84A -

For several good reasons, Your Honor, the question
of ordinary course of business does not apply in this
situation. The most critical point is Section 4.05(c) of the
contract, in which the parties define what ordinary course of
business is. And in that provision, ordinary course of
business specifically excludes breach of contract claims,
torts, claims or lawsuits, or such extraordinary liabilities as
you would find under that particular definition. So the
contract itself says that this is not the sort of thing -- a
liability arising in the ordinary course of business.

The ordinary course of business distinction also
covers -- only deals with balance sheet liabilities, as the
contract specifically says. And no such nondisclosed and at
the time nonexisting environmental liability such as this
would ever be disclosed on a balance sheet as the parties
anticipated.

Now, the contracts definition excluding extraordinary

[16]

liabilities is very consistent with the Mudgett case and the
Tuscarosa cases from Texas which specifically hold that
torts, for example, are not things that are in the ordinary
course of business under these sorts of situations. Even
getting down to a dictionary definition, the transaction of
business seems to be the focus here, and this sort of waste
disposal activity doesn’t really apply as a transaction of
business with third parties or a profit-generating activity
which would be subject to it. So we submit for those reasons
that environmental liabilities are not specifically allocated in
this contract.

- 85A -

Therefore, we have to construe the contract according
to what Aviall and the parties intended. And they intended
that Aviall assume only those liabilities which were
expressly assumed, and that was clearly not.

The court asked a question about whether or not
retaining the liabilities means the same thing as not assuming
them. Let me point out that the release that they executed, as
the court noted, definitely says that Cooper continues to
acknowledge its obligations under those provisions for
liabilities not assumed by Aviall. And the course of dealing
between the parties, for five separate times after this contract
was executed, when Aviall tendered environmental claims to
Cooper, they accepted those using the words that these are
retained liabilities which were not

[17]

assumed by Cooper. So it’s not a word or a play on words,
Your Honor, that this is something we have conjured up here.
We’re using words that were first used by Cooper both in the
release and in the correspondence regarding these other
environmental claims that came up.

If I may, Your Honor, let me talk about the indemnity
provision specifically. There has been some discussion by
Mr. Stephenson that the claim made in the indemnity
language here is a claim that is regulated by either a one or a
five year plan.

In the handout that I have given you, on the 21st page
is the section involving indemnity. And our claim is not
based, Your Honor, on either of the provisions that are
regulated by those time periods.

- 86A -

Our claim is based ’-- under indemnity is based under
7.02(a), and there is a small subsection 2 in that section
which says we can sue them, “as a result of the breach by
seller of any representation, warranty, covenant or agreement
contained in this agreement.”

We're not suing them under little Section 1, which as
the court will see below in 17.02(b)(a)(1) provides a one year
limitations period contractually, and in Section (c), Section
(a)(3) provides a five year statute. But under Section 2 there
is no contractual time limitation stated in the contract.

[18}

Now, I’ve done some thinking about this to the point
of saying where do the parties’ minds meet here. Is there a
way to say why that particular provision doesn’t have a
specific limitation. And the answer is very lucid, and it’s
down in Section 7.02(e). And if the court will take a look at
that, the court will see that in that provision, with the
exception of Section 5 of the contract, which doesn’t apply in
this situation, that Aviall is obliged to indemnify Cooper for
the same conduct, the same language. I t is a mirror image of
the provision in Section 2 above, and there is no time
limitation set on that.

What does that mean?

To me, Your Honor, I think it’s reasonable to say that
under those circumstances that indicates that with respect to
claims that were unknown at the time of closing, with respect
to actions that might arise in the future as a result of pre-
closing conduct, that the parties did not intend to be bound
by contractual time limitations on that particular type of

-87A -

activity. And to me that is one of the clearest -- that mirror
image is one of the clearest examples of the parties having
equal rights to come back and assert actions notwithstanding
the passage of these one and five year limitations.

THE COURT: Let me jump over for a
moment to the four year statute of limitations under Texas
law and ask

[19]

that you address Cooper’s argument.

MR. FAULK: Well, Cooper’s argument is based
upon the fact that according to them Aviall incurred a legal
injury at the time the injury occurred or at the time the
contamination was occurring or in fact discovered. That is
the general rule, Your Honor, under tort law, and I'm not
going to argue with that. But for a breach of contract claim,
the Texas law, number one, says that a cause of action occurs
on breach of the contract.

And the cases from Texas, the Permian case, as well
as the Fifth Circuit case that we have cited say that when
you're dealing with a contract the cause of action does not
accrue upon the time that you sustain damage, it doesn’t
accrue when you first suffer a loss or when you first suffer
some sort of contamination; it occurs upon presentment of
the claim for enforcement of the contract and upon refusal of
the other side to perform.

And within those parameters, we made these
presentations to Cooper well within the four year period prior

- 88A -

to the time this lawsuit was filed, by letters in 1995, in 1996.
They clearly refused in 1996. This lawsuit was filed in 1997.

THE COURT: Well, they, as I understand it,
at least advance three arguments in that connection: One is
they distinguish these cases that you rely on; two, they

characterize your argument as somewhat circular; and three, |
think they call it bootstrapping. And when they say you
could let these claims go on for eternity, you say, well, no,
there’s no eternity because there’s a limit of four years under
the Texas statute.

Now, why isn’t there a potential for eternity in that
you just let the claims become stale, relevant witnesses die,
and then decide at some future point that you will make the
demand?

I mean, under your argument aren’t you allowed to

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0635%3A06. Public record. Not legal advice.
