# Amicus Curiae Brief — Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0631%3A30

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 543 U.S. 14

## Text

No. 02-1028

OFFICE OF THE €LERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner.
Vv.

JAMES N. KIRBY PTY LTD d/b/a KIRBY ENGINEERING,
MMI GENERAL INSURANCE, LTD.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE TRANSPORTATION
LOSS PREVENTION AND SECURITY ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY

JAMES ATTRIDGE *
SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT
& HANSON
601 Montgomery Street, Suite 325
San Francisco, CA 94111
* Counsel of Record (415) 986-2479
for Amicus Curiae

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a cargo owner that contracts with a freight
forwarder for transportation of goods to a destination in the
United States is bound by the contracts that the freight
forwarder makes with the carriers that actually transport the
owner’s goods.

2. Whether the phrase “person (including any independent
contractor) whose services have been used in order to
perform the contract” in a freight forwarder’s multimodal bill
of lading covers truckers that actually transport the goods to
their inland destination, regardless of whether the trucker is in
privity with the freight forwarder.

(i)

il
STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 29.6

Pursuant to Rule 29.6 the Transportation Loss Preven-
tion and Security Association states that it is a non-
profit corporation incorporated in New Jersey. Its shares are
not traded.

iil
STATEMENT OF CONSENT
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............c.ccccccsecescseseseeeseeees i
STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 29.6................ ii
STATEMENT OF CONSENT ............cccccccscssseseseseseeceees iii
iii ci iiiccciicititiins vi
RELEVANT FEDERAL STATUTES ...........cccccccceeeeees |
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS
EERE ae AREY S. eee e AI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..............ccccccsesesessseseseeees 3
EL AE REE SD 3

I. PUBLIC POLICY ENCOURAGES THE PRO-
LIFERATION OF SMALL, PRIVATELY
OWNED TRUCKING COMPANIES ................ 3 -

Il. PUBLIC POLICY HAS ALWAYS FAV-
ORED A RISK ALLOCATION REGIME
WHICH MAKES CARRIERS STRICTLY
LIABLE FOR COMMONPLACE LOSSES,

BUT SHIFTS THE BURDEN FOR EXTRA-
ORDINARY LOSSES TO _ SHIPPER’S
ED cccencecenssasonssenennsssnssssengpensnmmmemnmenensss 4

Ill. PUBLIC POLICY ENCOURAGES THE
PRESENCE OF TRANSPORTATION IN-
CIEE venceserccssssssseesenssrmmnsnmmemnemeuens 7

IV. THESE PUBLIC POLICY GOALS WILL
BE SEVERELY UNDERMINED IF THE
LOWER COURT'S RULING IS AFFIRMED... 7

COCR EIOS cnecsnsssncensenscsnsansssessensenanemenasmniannnesmasetin 9

(v)

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

United States Supreme Court Cases

Hart v. Pennsylvania Railway Co., 112 U.S. 331
SIT eisitapeeesintinninienenadiataabanaenaniicitadiataieiitindinantaaiiaiiieiuane
Kansas City Southern Railway v. Carl, 227 U.S.
Ue cinntiscnderinnssieiiesieitaaibiiidinitaeriuatatiiaialiegiimantinaas
Missouri, K&T.R. Co. v. Harriman Brothers, 227
Be Har CPTI soresitistenitnttninintenigmempasnsaineintndanaindens
Great Northern Railway v. O'Connor, 232 U.S.
PUI TIEN el aeshtssintttenndannnesmenaniiasinamianctnitiantecussaien
Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement
ig en SII icciicestinrenitantintrientindaiaiincnade

Federal District Court Cases

Cooperative Shippers, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway Company, 840 F.2d 447 (7th
ak See nrencsntreetnnememntnsiemnteiineennmnenens

Interstate Commerce Commission Cases

In Re: Bills of Lading, 52 1.C.C. 671 (1919).........
Released Rates Order No. MC 894, 353 LC.C.
EE CET Ul hcccsnenencensneircetentinininpeiitmanianasabniianmpiidniatn
Ex Parte No. MC-96 Entry Control of Brokers
a I Oe nciccntonetinnenseenseusinennmmenion

STATUTES
United States Code

46 U.S.C. app. §1300-1315 ...cccccccccsseesssseesesveeen
a
2 Se eae
Ce a
| | | 1,
EI

Page

vii
; TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
United States Code of Federal Regulations

es ST cactitinciiennntieinmeneamimeion
Public Laws

| Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.Law. 96-296 94

Stat. 793;- Trucking Industry Regulatory
Reform Act of 1994 Pub. Law. 103-311, 108
Bs RI nicciaiasrseiticiiaesiesiniaaiaseiatiiaineinianiiieniiasiis
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act of 1995, Pub.Law.. 104-88, 109 Stat. 903

PUBLICATIONS

1994 U.S. Code and Administrative News; 104
Cn
Thoms, William E.: “Rollin’ On...To A Free

Market. Motor Carrier Regulation 1935-
1980.” 13 Transportation Law Journal 43
ei ocsenesesseeensaecenempemmmeeeaeninnmgennnees
| U.S. Department of Transportation Cargo Lia-

bility Study, August 1998 00.00... cceeceeeeeeees
|

ee

Page
7

3, 4, 6

a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 02-1028

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY,
Petitioner,

V.

JAMES N. KirnBy PTY LTD d/b/a KIRBY ENGINEERING,
MMI GENERAL INSURANCE, LTD.,
- Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE ' TRANSPORTATION
LOSS PREVENTION AND SECURITY ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY

-_—-— —————

RELEVANT FEDERAL STATUTES

The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act,
49 U.S.C. 14706.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Transportation Loss Prevention and Security Asso-
ciation “TLPSA” is a non-profit corporation incorporated in
the State of New Jersey. It is comprised of over sixty-five
member organizations which are involved in the trans-

' No other person or organization made a monetary contribution to the
preparation of this brief

2

portation of freight by truck within the United States.
Members include trucking companies, large and small, some
with revenues upwards of $2.5 billion. Its mission as stated
in its bylaws is to:

(1) provide continuing professional education to cargo
claims professionals and their insurers, cargo security
professionals, and law enforcement; (2) facilitate practi-
cal and effective communications between carrier and
insurance personnel and law enforcement; (3) engage
in legal and legislative advocacy on behalf of the
membership.

A majority of its members transport freight to and from
domestic locales as a component of continuous through
movements in international transportation. As such, they
frequently transport freight subject to ocean bills of lading
which include Himalaya clauses as well as clauses Para-
mount. Consequently they are similarly situated to Norfolk
Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”). In fact, it
_ is merely an accident of circumstance that a railroad rather
than a trucker was retained to carry the freight in this
controversy. Had the freight been bound for a town not
served by a rail line, it would have been trucked. In addition,
Norfolk Southern was only dispatched to deliver the freight to
its rail ramp in Huntsville, Alabama. The ultimate destination
was Athens, Alabama, thirty miles west, to which the freight
would have eventually been short hauled by a trucker.

Constituents of TLPSA include small trucking companies,
which, unlike Petitioner Norfolk Southern do not have the
financial wherewithal to absorb a $1.5 million judgment.
Claims of such magnitude would force numerous truckers out
of business. It is the considered opinion of TLPSA not only
that the Eleventh Circuit decision is in error, but that if it
remains intact it will have a chilling effect upon the
willingness of trucking companies to accept import and
export freight, in contravention of established public policy.

3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Any decision affecting the effectiveness of limitations of
liability in an ocean carrier’s bill of lading insofar as it affects
the liability of railroads will necessarily have a similar impact
upon the liability exposure of the trucking industry; an
industry which constitutes a more significant component of
the national economic infrastructure than do railroads.

The ultimate outcome of the 11th Circuit’s decisions will
be to discourage truckers both large and small from accepting
imported freight. Any such outcome is counter to and
destructive of well settled public policy ensconced in the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 101, et seg. Specifically,
if the decision below is affirmed it will: (1) chill entre-
preneurship by impeding the viability of small trucking
companies; (2) subject this vital component of the infra-
structure to catastrophic liability exposure; and (3) discourage
the use of transportation intermediaries, essential to the
deregulated transportation environment.

ARGUMENT

I. PUBLIC POLICY ENCOURAGES THE PRO-
LIFERATION OF SMALL, PRIVATELY
OWNED TRUCKING COMPANIES

In 1935 Congress adopted the Motor Carrier Act which
placed the motor carrier industry under the heavy hand of the
erstwhile Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC” or “the
Commission”). Market entry was restricted, rates were
subject to regulatory review and competitor protest, and
routes were confined to those expressed within the carrier’s
operating authority issued by the Commission.

Prodded by the government as well as the general public,
the Commission began to unshackle the transportation
industry in the 1970’s. In 1980 Congress adopted a new
Motor Carrier Act mandating further deregulation.

4

During the period between 1980 and 1995, Congress
enacted a series of laws which completely overhauled the
regulatory scheme. These enactments were designed to
achieve various goals including: (1) to deregulate the trucking
industry and subject it to market-driven forces; (2) to further
integrate the national transportation network by eliminating
state government regulation of motor carriers; and (3) to
encourage entrepreneurship by making it easy for individual
truckers to own their own independent companies. This last
goal represented a deliberate policy decision not only to spur
entrepreneurship for its own sake, but also to encourage the
proliferation of minority-owned businesses, which could avail
themselves of federally-mandated set-aside programs.”

Passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 resulted in a
boom of small operators entering the field. Between 1980
and 1995, the number of federally-licensed motor carriers
swelled from 14,000 to over 55,000. (1994 U.S. Code and
Administrative News, p. 804; 104 Congr., Ist Sess. 1995.)

Il. PUBLIC POLICY HAS ALWAYS FAVORED A
RISK ALLOCATION REGIME WHICH MAKES
CARRIERS STRICTLY LIABLE FOR COM-
MONPLACE LOSSES, BUT SHIFTS THE
BURDEN FOR EXTRAORDINARY LOSSES TO
SHIPPERS’ INSURERS.

At common law, a carrier was strictly liable for the full
actual value of cargo damaged in its care. This principal was
codified by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §14706 (previously 49 U.S.C.
11707 and 49 U.S.C. 20(a).) However, a longstanding
exception to the full value rule has been found in what is

? See Thoms, William E.: “Rollin’ On... To A Free Market. Motor
Carrier Regulation 1935-1980.” 13 Transportation Law Journal 43, 72,
76, 84 (1983).

5

alternatively known as the declared value, or released rates
doctrine. As this Court stated long ago:

There is no justice in allowing a shipper to be paid a
large value for an article which he has induced the
carrier to take at a low rate of freight on the assertion
and agreement that its value is a lesser sum than that
claimed after loss. It is just to hold the shipper to his
agreement, fairly made, as to value, even where the loss
or injury has occurred through the negligence of the
carrier.

Hart v. Pennsylvania Railway Co., 112 U.S. 331, 340 (1884).

The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act, as modified by the Cummins Amendment of 1916,
specifically provided that carriers could offer a menu of
published discount rates provided that the shipper was willing
to accept a limited liquidated cap on the carrier’s liability.
The inherent equities of this arrangement have long been
lauded by this Court:

The underlying principle is that the carrier is entitled to
base rates upon value and that its compensation should
bear a reasonable relation to the risk and responsibility
assumed. The broad purpose of the federal act is to
compel the establishment of reasonable rates and to
provide for their uniform application.

Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299
U.S. 28, 29; 57 S.Ct. 73; 81 L.Ed. 20 (1936). Accord:
Missouri, K&T.R. Co. v. Harriman Brothers, 227 U.S.
657 (1913).

In 1919, the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribed
the Uniform Domestic Bill of Lading which featured a block
requiring shippers to declare the value of their freight when
the rate paid was based in part on the freight’s value. Jn
Re: Bills of Lading, 52 1.C.C. 671 (1919).

6

In 1977 the I.C.C. promulgated Released Rates Order No.
MC 894, 353 1.C.C. 661 (1977), which endorsed the practice
of carriers establishing by tariff rule that a shipper’s omission
to declare the value of its freight automatically resulted in the
freight being transported at the lowest rate along with the
concomitantly lower limitation of liability. The petitioner in
that proceeding was a major shipper, IBM, which was having
trouble distributing high-value mainframe computers because
Carriers were reluctant to haul such expensive merchandise.
That decision crystalized the overriding policy rationale
supporting the limited liability regime. In order to protect
motor carriers from catastrophic losses, and to allow shippers
the flexibility to manage their risk as they see fit, the I.C.C.
ordained a liability regime which shifted the burden for
extraordinary losses to private insurers whose premium pool
was far more widespread. Despite ample opportunities for
legislative reexamination °, limitations on carrier liability for
extraordinary losses remain the rule. This is consistent with
other modes of transportation in which limitations of liability
are ubiquitous.

The liability of ocean carriers is limited by statute to $500
per shipping unit. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C.
§1304(5). Limitations of liability in the volume transporta-
tion contracts of railroads are routinely upheld. Cooperative
Shippers, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
Company, 840 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1988). The liability of
international air carriers is limited by treaty to the sum of
$9.07 per pound. 49 U.S.C. §40105.

* Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.Law. 96-296 94 Stat. 793; Trucking
Industry Regulatory Reform Act of 1994 Pub. Law. 103-311, 108 Stat.
1683 (1994); Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995,
Pub.Law. 104-88, 109 Stat. 903 (1995).

7

Il. PUBLIC POLICY ENCOURAGES THE PRES-
ENCE OF TRANSPORTATION INTERME-
DIARIES

In the new deregulated environment matching freight with
a carrier suitably situated to haul it is a much more haphazard
and frenetic enterprise. Among the sidebar consequences of
this sea change is the massive proliferation of transportation
intermediaries who run the gamut from brokers who mix and
match shippers with carriers, sometimes with the benefit of
little more than a personal computer and a telephone, to third
party logistics providers which operate as outsourced traffic
departments for large companies.

The I.C.C. recognized and accommodated this shift in the
marketplace by promulgating Ex Parte No. MC-96 Entry

Control of Brokers 126 MCC 476 (1977), which loosened

entry restrictions on brokers.

Over the course of the past decade countless intermediaries
have entered the marketplace. The Transportation Inter-
mediaries Association, for instance, was nonexistent until
1996, and now boasts over eight hundred active members. In
1980, Congress repealed the prohibition against motor
carriers holding dual authority as both carriers and brokers. It
is now not only common for freight to be brokered, it is
downright common for freight to be rebrokered from entity to
entity until a suitable empty truck can be found in the vicinity
of the freight heading in the same direction in which the
freight is bound.

IV. THESE PUBLIC POLICY GOALS WILL BE
SEVERELY UNDERMINED IF THE LOWER
COURT?’S RULING IS AFFIRMED

Small truckers, who comprise an ever larger segment of the
trucking market are required by law only to carry cargo
insurance of $10,000 per occurrence. 49 C.F.R. 387.303(c).

8

This is consistent with the economic reality that ninety
percent (90%) of all freight that moves is worth less than $10
a pound. U.S. Department of Transportation Cargo Liability
Study, August 1998, p.26.

These small truckers have been advised by this Court since
Kansas City Southern Railway v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639 (1912),
that they can avail themselves of whatever limitation of
liability has been agreed to by an earlier, upstream carrier.
They have also been advised by this Court since Great
Northern Railway v. O'Connor, 232 U.S. 508 (1914), that
whatever limitation of liability is negotiated by an inter-
mediary is binding on the shipper. The Eleventh Circuit has
deviated from these lines of precedent which form the legal
pillar upon which carriers have always relied.

Asking truckers to accept any type of cargo without
availing themselves of the limitations of liability in place for
the prior carrier would essentially ask them to purchase a pig
in a poke. The freight on board could be anything from
abacuses to zippers, and without the prior limitations on
liability truckers would have to carry over $1,500,000 in
insurance coverage to protect themselves against catastrophic
losses like that here. No small transportation company has
that kind of coverage, in no small measure because they are
mindful of, and rely upon, the ocean carriers’ $500 per
package limitation of liability. If this Court affirms the
decision below, local draymen, regional carriers, and other
small truckers integral in completing the last leg of most
import transportation would simply refuse to carry freight,
and inbound commerce would grind to a halt.

It is also neither plausible nor possible to expect shippers
and carriers to negotiate freight rates and insurance coverage
every time someone needs a truck, especially when the cargo
originates overseas and arrangements are made by a third
party. The nature of freight distribution depends heavily on
the flexibility provided by the vast range of carriers and types

9

of service. Just-in-time shipping and expedited distribution
services require the interchangeability of equipment and
companies to meet whatever the current need may be.
Expecting the parties to stop all shipping operations every
time a substitute carrier is used, or every time there is a
change in a distribution plan, runs counter to the trans-
portation policy and will have a devastating effect on the
supply chain.

The National Transportation Policy, first enacted in 1940
and now codified at 49 U.S.C. §13101(a)(2), seeks to en-
courage reasonable rates, efficiency, service to small towns,
profitability, and further seeks to promote inter-modalism.
The Eleventh Circuit’s view will only promote higher freight
rates and service shortages.

This- policy will be completely undermined if the lower
Court’s decision is affirmed. The pool of transportation
providers will be severely reduced, and the field will be
limited only to large carriers with high risk reserves or small
carriers cavalier enough to transport loads too valuable for
them to assure against loss.

CONCLUSION

Amicus Curiae respectfully request that the decision of the
11th circuit be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES ATTRIDGE *
SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT
& HANSON
601 Montgomery Street, Suite 325
San Francisco, CA 94111
* Counsel of Record (415) 986-2479
for Amicus Curiae

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0631%3A30. Public record. Not legal advice.
