# Amicus Curiae Brief — Nike, Inc. v. Kasky

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0611%3A10

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 539 U.S. 654

## Text

— ee

Supreme Court, U.S.
| FILED
(4)
No. 02-575 | Nw 15 2
In the CLERK |

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Nike, INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

Marc Kasky,
Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Or CERTIORARI
ToTue Supreme Court Or CALIFORNIA

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE CIVIL
JUSTICE ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

WILLIAM L. STERN Frep J. HresTANpD
SEVERSON & WERSON Counsel of Record

1 EMBARCADERO CENTER 1121 L Street

Surre 2600 Surre 404

SAN Francisco, CA 94111 SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
(415) 398-3344 (916) 448-5100

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.,
CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

{ Wr 5

MOTION TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Respondent has refused to consent to the filing of an
amicus curiae brief by the Civil Justice Association of
California (CJAC). Accordingly, CJAC hereby moves,
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2(b), for leave to file an
amicus curiae brief in support of Nike Inc., et al.’s Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari. The brief immediately follows this
motion.

Amicus is a _ twenty-five year old non-profit
organization whose membership is made up of hundreds of
businesses, professional associations and local governments.
Our principal purpose is to educate the public about ways to
improve the state’s civil liability laws in terms of fairness,
efficiency, economy and certainty. Toward these ends, CJAC
regularly petitions the government - the judiciary, the
legislature and, through the initiative process, the people
themselves - for redress of laws concerning who pays, how
much, and to whom when wrongful conduct is charged.

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) figures
prominently in CJAC’s efforts to restore some semblance of
fairness and sanity to the scope and application of liability
laws. It has become, for reasons we explain, a major source
of unfairness to those caught within its prohibitory sweep
against “business practices” deemed “unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent . . . [or] unfair, untrue or misleading advertising.”
(Cal. B & P Code § 17200.)

CJAC participated as amicus curiae in support of
petitioner Nike, Inc. in the California Supreme Court because
we feared that if appellant ultimately prevailed in his
argument there will be no realistic opportunity for those who
wish to publicly defend themselves against what they perceive
as unfair attacks on their business practices without paying

dearly for that defense. We argued that when, as here, it
comes to publicly uttered statements by a company in its own
defense against charges that its overseas subcontractors are
violating the laws of the countries in which they operate, the
constitutional guarantee to freedom of expression should
trump the ban of the UCL against false or misleading
advertising. We seek to participate here for the same reason,

and with the purpose of informing the Court about various -

anomalies of the UCL in comparison with analogous laws of
other states that make this case suitable for a grant of
certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Fred J. Hiestand
Counsel of Record

1121 L Street, Suite 404
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 448-5100

Table of Contents

Summary of Reasons For Granting the Writ

Reasons for Granting the Writ

I.

Il.

Conclusion

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Scope of Speech and Conduct

Proscribed by the UCL Is Overbroad .. .

The UCL Is Unique in Comparison to
Analogous Laws of Other States in
That Anyone May Sue under it
Regardless of Whether That Person
Has Been Harmed or Misled by the
Challenged Conduct ..............

a

._ *- = © © © © © © © © © © © ee ee ee eo hh ehlhmrehlhrhlUrhlhlUrhlUehle

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co..,
203 Cal.App.3d 432 (1988) .............. 5

American Philatelic Soc. v. Claibourne,
ee -) ence kee ee ee ee es 5

Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn..,
FG DO GFED occ ccccceces 10, 11, 14, 16

Burks v. Poppy Construction Co.,
Pe GPE cK ceneseeaseasecnes 6

Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles
Cellular Telephone Co..,

a a a ee ng 13
Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v.
General Foods Corp., |

oe hk | | = rere 12, 14

Grand Ventures, Inc. v. Whaley,
Gee Pe es EESED cccccccccceceses 15

Green v. United States, 312 A.2d 788 (D.C. 1973) ... 16
Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224 (Co. 1998) (en banc)... . 18
Himes v. Brown & Secs. Corp.,

518 So. 2d 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
SPEED sc ccivceccccvccosesneeees 18

Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp..,

54 Cal.App.4th 499 (1997) .............. 13
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) ............ 9
In re Sade, 13 Cal.4th 952 (1996) ............... 14
Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,

7 Cal.4th 1057 (1994) .................. 14
May Dept. Stores Co. v. State,

863 P.2d 967 (Co. 1993) (enbanc) ......... 18
Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v.

Westwood Investors,

221 Cal.App.3d 1337 (1990) ............. 19
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,

BOGS. Ce. FEBS CISID nw cc ccc ccc cc cces 15
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,

Ne eke ekenea 6
Olson v. Breeze, Inc., 48 Cal.App.4th 608 (1996) .... 13
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 ...... 6
People v. McKale, 25 Cal.3d 626 (1979) ....... 11, 12

People v. E.W.A.P., 106 Cal.App.3d 315 (1980) .. 11, 12
People v. Sakai, 56 Cal.App.3d 531 (1976) ........ 14

Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) . 5

Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co..,
ee as SD « wccececcescceceres 5

Saunders v. Superior Court,
27 Cal. App. 4th 832 (1994) ............. 13

Stockton v. Frisbie & Latta, 93 Cal.App. 277 (1928) .. 10

Stop Youth Addiction v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
17 Cal4th 553 (1998) ........ 2, 14, 15, 16, 17

United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) ....... 19

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

ee ee ee are 3, 5,6
STATUTES

Alaska Stat. § 45.50.501(b) ................... 18
Cal. B&P Code § 17200 .................. passim
Se EEE ono cccceucceusennes 3, 16
Se, Gre GPR occ ccccccccsesccvese 9, 10
GGL aévsesseeeucesesesses 5
ee Ges Gs OU, HE wccccesaccenccesss 3
Se PEE sc ccacececesusesssess 12
OS Ee 12

iv

So Cee vc oceneeeeseeeeeeeeséen
Be. Gate Ba, SEGESS cc ccccccvcccesecses
OE. ©. GO cvcccnccccsscccscecss
Fla. Code Ann. §§ 817.41, 501.204 .............
ff Fe bf Frere rrrrrrrre
. | fs } | f PP rrrrrrerreririrre
Ben Ge B FOG BEeD oc wc cece ce cseeseceeses
eS PPT TTSTTTT TTT
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.07(F) .............
OTHER AUTHORITY

McCall, Sturdevant, Kaplan & Hillebrand,

Greater Representation for California Consumers—
Fluid Recovery, Consumer Trust Funds, and
Representative Actions,

) Fee |) Pere

Monte Morin, Lawyers Who Sue to Settle,
LoS ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002 ..............

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

The Civil Justice Association of California (“CJAC”
or “amicus”) is a twenty-five year old non-profit organization
whose membership is made up of hundreds of businesses
professional associations and local governments. Our
principal purpose is to educate the public about ways to
improve the state’s civil liability laws in terms of fairness,
efficiency, economy and certainty. Toward these ends, CJAC
regularly petitions the government - the judiciary, the
legislature and, through the initiative process, the people
themselves - for redress of laws concerning who pays, how
much, and to whom when wrOngful conduct is charged.

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) figures
prominently in CJAC’s efforts to restore some semblance of
fairness and sanity to the scope and application of liability
laws. It has become, for reasons we explain, a major source
of unfairness to those caught within its prohibitory sweep
against “business practices” deemed “unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent . . . [or] unfair, untrue or misleading advertising.”
(Cal. B & P Code § 17200.)

CJAC participated as amicus curiae in support of
petitioner Nike, Inc. in the California Supreme Court because
we feared that if appellant ultimately prevailed in his
argument there will be no realistic opportunity for those who
wish to publicly defend themselves against what they perceive
as unfair attacks on their business practices without paying
dearly for that defense. We argued that when, as here, it
comes to publicly uttered statements by a company in its own
defense against charges that its overseas subcontractors are

' This brief was written in whole by CJAC’s counsel, and not at all by
Nike, Inc. Further, CJAC made the only monetary contributions in the

preparation of this brief.

violating the laws of the countries in which they operate, the
constitutional guarantee to freedom of expression should
trump the ban of the UCL against false or misleading
advertising. We seek to participate here for the same reason,
and with the purpose of informing the Court about various
anomalies of the UCL in comparison with analogous laws of
other states that make this case suitable for a grant of
certiorari.

INTRODUCTION

The UCL is unlike any other unfair trade practice or
false advertising law - state or federal - in this country. It
bars anyone from engaging in “unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent” activity, or “unfair, untrue or misleading
advertising,” terms broad enough to sweep within their ambit
just about anything imaginable that gives offense to someone.
No one need actually suffer injury from, or be deceived by,
the conduct complained about in order to sue under the UCL.
A defendant stung by it, however, can take no solace from a
judgment rendered that the matter is concluded because there
is no finality to UCL litigation. It just keeps on keeping on.
A new and different plaintiff may, acting on behalf of the
general public, sue the same defendant for the exact same
complained of activity that was just resolved in an earlier
UCL suit. (Stop Youth Addiction v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (17
Cal4th 553, 583 (1998)).) While damages are not
recoverable, injunctive relief and restitution are; and a
defendant ordered to pay back money under the restitution
remedy can be forgiven for not fathoming how this differs
from being socked with a damage award. On top of all this,
a successful plaintiff can often obtain court-awarded
attorney’s fees for prosecuting the UCL claim as a self-
appointed representative of the amorphous “public,” an
extraordinary “bounty hunter” feature from another law that,

brigaded with the UCL, makes it almost self-executing. (Cal.
C. of Civ. Proc. § 1021.5.)

The UCL did not start out this way, overreaching laws
rarely do. It instead grew from a modest codification of the
‘common law of unfair competition into today’s virtual
omnibus law by the process of accretion combined with
occasional “leaps” of legislative and judicial gloss placed on
it. Understanding how that growth occurred makes clear
why, unless this Court acts now, the UCL will remain
uncabined and unconfined, an omnivorous statute that impairs
legitimate business activities, chills free expression and treads
on the public interest.

STATEMENT

. This case presents a constitutional issue of immense
importance—viz., are statements that a company makes in
press releases and news conferences defending itself against
charges that it subcontracts with foreign businesses who
engage in unfair or unlawful practices, subject to liability
under the UCL? notwithstanding the protections of the First
Amendment; and, if so, can the company be ordered to
undertake a court-approved public information campaign to
remedy its alleged “false advertising”? The trial and
intermediate state appellate court said “No,” but a bare
majority of the California Supreme Court disagreed.

By “false advertising” respondent Marc Kasky, a self-
appointed member of the public on whose behalf he brings
suit,’ refers entirely to statements made by “just do it”

* Cal. B & PC § 17200 et. seq.

* Cal. B & PC § 17204, which specifies who can bring UCL suits, “has
been interpreted by the . . . Court to authorize standing for any person or
organization to sue to enjoin an unfair practice, regardless of whether the
person or organization has suffered injury as a result of the practice.”
McCall, Sturdevant, Kaplan & Hillebrand, Greater Representation for

3

athletic shoe maker, Nike. These statements were made in
press releases, letters to the editor and the like, wherein Nike
defended itself against charges by its critics concerning the
wages, hours, and working conditions in its subcontracted
Asian footwear factories. The gravamen of the complaint is
that “Nike’s athletic shoes are made in [overseas]
sweatshops,” but there is no attempt in this UCL action to get
directly at those “sweatshops” in the countries where they
operate. Neither does respondent claim that the UCL
prohibits Nike from contracting with overseas companies who
are in violation of their own country’s laws on wages and
working conditions. He has not, so far at least, attempted to
“bootstrap” the violation of applicable foreign law by a Nike
subcontractor onto the “unlawful” or “unfair” prongs of the
UCL and thereby get at Nike in California, an approach
which, if successful, would convert California courts applying
the UCL into international ombudsmen, and jettison long
established principles of national sovereignty and international
law.

What respondent cannot accomplish directly by getting
at the conduct to which he objects, however, he has achieved
indirectly by getting at the “speech” given in defense or
denial of that conduct. This “indirection” is in terms of the
law used (the UCL rather than the laws of the foreign
countries where the subcontractors operate) and the target (not
the subcontractors themselves, but the domestic U.S.
company with whom they contract to make shoes, Nike). By
categorizing Nike’s statements in defense of its business
dealings with its overseas subcontractors as “commercial
speech,” respondent claims, and a majority of the state’s
highest court agrees, that expression is subject to regulation

California Consumers—Fluid Recovery, Consumer Trust Funds, and
Representative Actions (1995) 46 HAST. L.J. 797, 814-815 and authorities
therein cited. (Italics added.)

under the UCL, specifically the prohibition against
“fraudulent business practices.” This is an especially
draconian provision, as judicial gloss on it makes actionable

“speech” that does not involve advertising and even practices
that involve no untrue statements.* All a plaintiff need show
to prevail under this prong of the UCL is the likelihood of
public deception, not that any member of the public was
actually deceived.

Now, it has long been a cornerstone of First
Amendment jurisprudence that just because government can
abolish an activity does not mean that it can suppress

“speech” concerning that activity.” While creation of the

“commercial speech” category has resulted in occasional
backsliding from this principle,” respondent and California’s
high court have reduced it to a new nadir by standing it on its
head—i.e., while state law can do nothing directly about the
objected to conduct of foreign “sweatshops,” the UCL
prohibits any speech in defense of that alleged conduct which
is “misleading or false” by anyone who has business dealings
with the subcontractors. If this seems a bit of overstatement,
it is not. The UCL does not define what is a “business
practice,” but it is clear that it can be a single past act and is
likely as broad as the business practices that come within the
sweep of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. C. §51:
“{e]verything about which one can be employed,” and

See Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d
432 and American Philatelic Soc. v. Claibourne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 689,
696-699.

> See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 391 U.S. 563
(though school board may terminate from employment a non-tenured
teacher for no reason whatsoever, it cannot fire her for writing a letter to
the editor of which it disapproved.).

See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. (1986) 478
U.S. 328, 345.

“synonymous with calling, occupation, or trade engaged in
for the purpose of making a livelihood or gain.””

Carried to the limits of its logic, respondent’s position,
sanctioned by the state supreme court, permits maintenance of
a UCL action against a newspaper that “falsely” or
“misleadingly” defends the labor practices of Nike’s Asian
subcontractors. After all, publication of the “false” or
“misleading” article, editorial or advertisement would be done
in the course of the newspaper’s business practice. It would
undoubtedly be in furtherance of a “commercial transaction,”
i.e., selling the newspaper to readers and the advertisement to
those who pay to run it. Curiously, a boycott of Nike goods
by appellant and those who wish to bring pressure on Nike to
improve its foreign subcontracting business is protected by the
First Amendment; but if respondent has his way, a rebuttal to
that boycott must be monitored by the court under the UCL
for its truthfulness. (NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
(1982) 458 U.S. 886 (economic boycott by civil rights
organization protected by First Amendment).)

Respondent and the narrowest majority possible of the
California Supreme Court would, in other words, have the
government instead of the public act as arbiter of what is
“true” and “false” in public debate over compliance by
foreign subcontractors with the laws of the countries where
they do business. This is not, to say the least, a role the
federal or state constitutions favor for government.
“(Authoritative] interpretations of the First Amendment
guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception
for any test of truth - whether administered by judges, juries,
or administrative officials - and especially one that puts the
burden of proving truth on the speaker.”*® Nonetheless,

’ Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 468.
8 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 270-271.

6

unless this Court reverses the decision below, those who do
business in California will be subject to government
regulation through liability laws for publicly defending their
business practices. It is an in terrorem means of regulation
because the UCL is unprecedented in the breadth of its scope,
its absence of any standing requirements and the lack of
finality in its application.

SUMMARY OF REASONS F
GRANTING THE WRIT -

The UCL was, like Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein,
created with good intentions that have now, as this case
shows, plainly gone awry. Its creators are two co-equal and
co-ordinate branches of state government - the legislature and
the courts. Each added a dimension or attribute to the UCL
during its growth over the past three decades, some seemingly
minor at the time and others of greater moment albeit, when
viewed in isolation, not especially worrisome. Now that the
UCL has, as this case again illustrates, morphed into a
malignancy in terms of its scope and application, neither
creator is realistically able to do the radical surgery necessary
to make it function fairly and efficiently. Each branch of
government points the finger of responsibility for the UCL’s
current incarnation to the other; and each claims that the other
branch, by acquiescing to whatever latest wrinkle its co-
ordinate last placed on the UCL, obviously approves of that
construction.

In the course of this “buck-passing” metamorphosis of
the UCL, vested interests have, not surprisingly, cropped up
to defend its most recent and expansive iteration. As the
UCL’s elastic reach has extrapolated, so have those who
benefit from that reach grown in size and influence sufficient
to thwart state legislative or judicial reform of the UCL, what
they describe as “turning back the clock” to the previous case
that expanded the UCL before the last one. Thus the

7

direction of the UCL’s movement has been consistent -
outward and expansionist, enveloping an ever greater array of
proscribed conduct, and upward, making it easier and more
attractive for more people to go after that conduct.

This peculiar historical development of the UCL yields
a statute different from that of all other states who have
analogous laws codifying common law prohibitions on unfair
competition, most modeled on the Federal Trade Commission
Act enacted at the turn of the 20" century. In these other
states, either the legislatures, the courts or both have imposed
limits on standing or who can assert the UCL, the scope of its
prohibited conduct and the relief available under it that are not
found in California’s unfair competition law. These
differences, while impacting most obviously and severely
upon those doing business in California, ironically also
effectively immunize cases brought in California state courts
from being brought in or removed to federal courts.
California’s UCL, then (as interpreted by its state courts)
effectively sets the standards for all the other states regarding
allowable business practices since no business is an island, but
a ship sailing in a stream of interstate commerce. Businesses
who want, then, to do what businesses do in California, will
conform their practices to what California, the state with the
most onerous unfair competition law, requires. Accordingly,
if the UCL is ever to become a fair law of reasonable scope
and sensible application, this case presents that rare and
essential opportunity.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE SCOPE OF SPEECH AND CONDUCT
PROSCRIBED BY THE UCL IS OVERBROAD.

It is difficult to imagine a statute more overly broad in
its sweep of protected as well as unprotected speech or
conduct than the UCL. Only by arbitrarily categorizing the

a ee

“speech” by Nike in this case as “commercial” and thus
entitled to lesser protection than “non-commercial” speech,
could the California Supreme Court majority shut its eyes to
the reality that this application of the UCL inhibits, at the
very least, a substantial amount of protected speech. (Houston
v. Hill (1987) 482 U.S. 451, 458.) Given the consistently
expansionist judicial gloss placed on the UCL over the past

quarter century, however, its resulting overbreadth was
predictable.

The precursor to today’s UCL was former Civil Code
section 3369, which originally read: “Neither specific nor
preventive relief can be granted to enforce a penal law, except
in a case of nuisance, nor to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in
any case.” In 1933, the Legislature created the modern UCL
by expanding section 3369's exception for nuisance cases to
include unfair competition cases. The 1933 amendment to the
Statute provided injunctive relief from unfair competition and
defined “unfair competition” to include “unfair or fraudulent
business practice” as well as false advertising.

In 1963, the Legislature further broadened section
3369 by adding in the disjunctive the word “unlawful” to the
types of wrongful business conduct that could be enjoined as
unfair competition. According to the author of this legislative
change, its purpose was “to clarify the statutory definition of
unfair competition. ”? The one page “Report on Assembly

* Letter of Assemblyman Philip L. Soto to Governor Edmund G. Brown
re: Assembly Bill 2929, dated July 10, 1963 and enclosing memorandum
of Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General re: AB 2929. The two
page memorandum from Charles A. James, dated June 14, 1963 and
written on Department of Justice letterhead, states, in relevant part:

{T}he word “unlawful” is inserted in the definition to

clarify the statutory definition of “unfair competition”

to concur with judicial trends.

-

Bill 2929” from the Legislative Counsel dated July 1, 1963
merely states that the bill “[a]dds to the definition of the term
‘unfair competition’ for purposes of granting specific or
preventive relief, ‘unlawful’ as well as unfair or fraudulent
business practice and unfair, untrue or misleading
advertising.” Thus it appears from all available legislative
history that the purpose of this amendment was to provide an
injunctive remedy for the common law prohibition again::
“unfair competition” that was not necessarily “fraudulent,”
but did injure law abiding competitors (i.e., funeral homes
that obeyed zoning ordinances).

Despite this modest beginning, a series of judicial
interpretations have given a broader meaning to the 1963
amendment than it legislative history suggests was intended.
The first opinion to do this was Barquis v. Merchants
Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, a case that came before

The case of Stockton v. Frisbie & Latta (1928)
93 Cal.App. 277, enunciated the principle that an
unlawful act (here a violation of the zoning ordinance)
is a proper subject of injunction. Although the courts
have consistently held that the Attorney General has the
authority to enjoin unlawful acts [citations] it is clear
that the legislature intended the control of unfair
competition by the procedure set forth in section 3369.
It is not altogether clear that an individual acting in his
own interest can find the relief ostensibly afforded him
by the provisions of the section unless he shows the act
of unfair competition to be fraudulent... . Inasmuch
as the Legislature has seen fit to extent (sic) remedies to
all persons who wish to correct acts of unfair
competition, such acts should be clearly defined in the
statute so that individuals as well as the Attorney
General can be assured of prompt and effective remedy
against unlawful acts which may not fall within the
definition of fraudulent practices.

10

the state supreme court on a demurrer sustained to a UCL
complaint against a collection agency for filing small claims
court actions in improper counties to impair its adversaries’
ability to defend themselves. In a unanimous opinion, the
court acknowledged that as “originally enacted” in 1933 the
UCL defined “unfair competition” only in terms of “unfair or
fraudulent business practices”; and conceded that court
opinions had interpreted the “essence” of the UCL “as the
protection from any conduct likely to deceive the consumer.”
(/d. at 111.) Barquis stated that the 1963 amendment, about
which it felt the legislative history was “not particularly
instructive” (id. at 112) and which it did not discuss, intended
by the “sweeping language” of “unlawful, unfair or deceptive
business practice” to “permit tribunals to enjoin on-going
wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity
might occur.” (Id. at 111.)

Barquis was followed by People v. McKale (1979) 25
Cal.3d 626, where a district attorney sued a mobile home park
under the UCL. The complaint alleged that the UCL had
been violated because the Mobilehome Parks Act and various
other sections of the Administrative Code made the particular
business procedures adopted by the mobile home park
unlawful. In opposition, the mobile home park argued that
the Commission on Housing and Community Development,
an administrative agency, was the only entity authorized to
enforce the Mobilehome Parks Act and the other related
sections of the Administrative Code; thus, precluding
prosecution by the district attorney. The Court disagreed and
held that the district attorney had authority to bring suit under
the UCL because “an unlawful business practice includes
anything that can properly be called a business practice and
that is at the same time forbidden by law.” (/d. at 632.)

Then came People v. E.W.A.P. (1980) 106
Cal.App.3d 315, which extended the reach of unlawful

11

business practices to include a violation of a penal statute.
The defendant in E. W.A.P. was a California corporation with
its principal place of business in Chatsworth. It was alleged
by the district attorney that defendant E.W.A.P. had been
engaged in commercially distributing and possessing for
commercial distribution “obscene” materials in violation of
Penal Code §311.2.'° The appellate court held that the
district attorney could maintain an action under the UCL for
violations of the Penal Code because the activity was
“unlawful.” (/d. at 318-319.) Furthermore, the court found
that defendant E.W.A.P.’s activities were “business
practices” because they were engaged in “commercial”
distribution or possession for “commercial” distribution of
obscene matter over a period of approximately a year. (/d.)

While McKale and E. W.A.P. were public enforcement
actions by district attorneys of, respectively , an administrative
regulation and a penal statute, they paved the way for yet
another expansion of the UCL: a private enforcement action
based upon a violation of state law. Committee on Children’s
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197
involved a challenge by consumers to the marketing and
advertising of sugared breakfast cereals that the plaintiffs
contended were not really “cereals” but sugar products.
Besides the UCL, plaintiffs’ complaint referred to a cause of
action based upon the state’s Sherman Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Law, which provided that “[iJt is unlawful for any
person to disseminate any false advertising of any food, drug,
device, or cosmetic.” (Cal. H & S C § 26460.) The
defendant challenged plaintiffs’ right to bring a private
enforcement action under the Sherman Food, Drug and

as Apparently, the district attorney prosecuted E.W.A.P. civilly under
the UCL, as opposed to criminally under Penal Code §311.2, because of

the remedies offered by the UCL. Specifically, injunctive relief and

12

Cosmetic Act, which the court conceded did “not expressly
provide for private enforcement.” (/d. at 210.) Yet the court
said that the question “whether a private right of action should
be implied under this statute . . . is immaterial since any
unlawful business practice . . . may be redressed by a private
action charging unfair competition in violation of [the UCL].”
(Id. at 210-211.)

Not surprisingly, the disjunctive nature of the terms
“unfair” or “unlawful” in the UCL eventually led to the
judicial conclusion that a practice could be /awful, but still
proscribed because it was “unfair.” (Cel-Tech
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163.) Thus there are two major
independent prongs to the UCL - “unfair” or “unlawful” - to
which a multitude of other laws can be “bootstrapped” and
become the predicate for UCL enforcement. Under the
“unlawful” prong it is now permissible for almost any other
law - “be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal,
statutory regulatory, or court-made”'' - to secure a “toehold”
and be enforced through the remedies available under the
UCL. Even violation of a court order has been enforced by
the UCL’s injunctive remedy, permitting the plaintiff to
bypass contempt proceedings. (Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski
Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499, 533.)

The “unfairness” prong offers even more creative
possibilities. Thus far it has been interpreted to mean
“conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust
law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws,” ”
and to also prohibit the insertion of “unconsionable”
provisions in contracts (Olson v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48

“" Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 838-839.
'2 Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone
Co., supra, 20 Cal.4th at 187.

13

Cal.App.4th 608.) But why not equate “unfair” with, or
“bootstrap” to that prong, the “due process” guarantee of the
Constitution, which is often itself viewed as synonymous with
“fundamental fairness”? (See Jn re Sade (1996) 13 Cal.4th
952, 966.) This way a lawyer cum social engineer can
incorporate and make applicable to private persons the Bill of
Rights without paying homage to the necessity of “state
action.” This is not far fetched, but a logical consequence of
the seemingly inexorable expansion of the UCL by the courts.

Over the years the variety of activities swept within
the UCL’s proscriptive prongs has grown to include the sale
of whale meat contrary to the Penal Code,'* the filing of
small claims court lawsuits by a collection agency in improper
counties,'* the use of the “Joe Camel” caricature in the
advertising of cigarettes because of its likely influence on
minors,’> the sale by convenience stores of cigarettes to
minors in violation of the Penal Code,'® and the marketing
and advertising of sugared cereals which, while labeled

“cereals,” were allegedly “sugar products or candies.” 7 Is
it any wonder that from this amorphous collection of ho!dings
a court would cobble together the instant case: a business
found facially liable under the UCL because it publicly
defends itself against what it feels are unfounded attacks on its
overseas operations? At this pace it will not take long, unless
this Court acts to tether the UCL to some “bright line”
parameters, before we see various provisions of the
Constitution enforced against private parties absent any “state

'* People v. Sakai (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 531.

” Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., supra, 7 Cal.3d 94.

'S Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057.

'© Stop Youth Addiction v. Lucky Stores, Inc., supra. 17 Cal.4th 553.
'7 Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods
Corporation, supra, 35 Cal.3d 197.

14

action,” which is just another way of warning that Big
Brother, in the form of the UCL, is knocking on our doors.

Significantly, when the California Supreme Court was
recently presented with yet another opportunity to retreat from
the expansive gloss it had placed on the sweep of the UCL by
deciding that a private enforcement action should not be
permitted of a penal statute, it declined to do so, stating that
“had the Legislature at any time desired to change the UCL
SO as to restrict its application . . . [after judicial opinions
expanded it], it undeniably has had ample time to do so.”
(Stop Youth Addiction v. Lucky Stores, Inc., supra, 17 Cal4th
at 563.) The dissenting opinion remarked about this that
“[o]ne need only read the daily newspapers to see how much
easier it is to stall legislation than to enact it; how much
simpler to expand what exists than to contract it. Courts can
take advantage of this political infirmity by calling it
‘acquiescence.’” (/d. at 598, dissenting opn. of Brown, J.)

No other state has vested its unfair competition laws
with the stellar reach of California’s UCL. They have, in
fact, avoided California’s extrapolation to the stars when it
comes to defining the reach of their laws prohibiting unfair
competition. Delaware, for example, has codified the
common law of unfair competition for which it provides an
extensive list of proscribed practices, focusing on
unreasonable or unfair interference with the “horizontal”
relationships between various business interests. (See 6 Del.
C. §§ 2531-2536; Grand Ventures, Inc. v. Whaley (Del.
1993) 632 A.2d 63.) Illinois is similar. (815 ILCS 510/1 et.
seq.; 720 ILCS 295 et. seq.) The District of Columbia’s

*’ “Careful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area
of individual freedom by limiting the reach of . . . law and avoids the
imposition of responsibility on a state for conduct it could not control.”
(Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia (1996) 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1220.)

15

statute against false or deceptive advertising prohibits any
false advertisement that is made, in contrast to California's
strict liability approach, with the intent to sell goods, to
induce any person to purchase property, or to induce any
person to employ another’s services for a valuable
consideration. (D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1511; Green v. United
States (D.C. 1973) 312 A.2d 788, 789-90.) Indeed, a
comprehensive review of all the states with laws against unfair
competition and false advertising, reveal none as far reaching
as California’s UCL. When some facially appear to cover,
like the UCL, the gamut of all possible human activities,
brakes have been placed on them through restrictions on
standing or who may prosecute actions under them, something
the UCL totally lacks.

Il. THE UCL IS UNIQUE IN COMPARISON TO
ANALOGOUS LAWS OF OTHER STATES IN
THAT ANYONE MAY SUE UNDER IT
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THAT PERSON
HAS BEEN HARMED OR MISLED BY THE
CHALLENGED CONDUCT.

When Barquis expanded the ambit of conduct that
came within the UCL’s proscription, it also relaxed any
“standing” requirements under it, effectively enlarging the
universe of those who could prosecute a UCL action to
anyone with a gripe. That opinion concluded that Business
and Professions Code section 17204 authorized prosecutions
by “the Attorney General [and other public attorneys] . . . or
by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or
the general public.” (Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d at 109, italics
added.) It reached this conclusion, which it felt “clear,” from
the plain language of the statute. '9 ‘The dissent in Stop Youth

19" Section 17204 provides: “Actions for any relief pursuant to this
chapter shall be prosecuted exclusively in a court of competent

16

Addiction pointed out that this reading of the statutory
language runs “afoul of significant grammatical
impediments,” including making “the main clause superfluous
and fail{ing] to account for other language in the statute — ‘in
the name of the people of the State of California,’ ‘upon the
complaint of,’ and ‘exclusively.’” (Stop Youth Addiction v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., supra, 17 Cal.4th at 586-587, dissenting
opn. of Brown, J.) Taking account of those grammatical
considerations in parsing the meaning of the statute would
produce “a narrower reading” - “one that channels UCL
litigation through. government prosecutors who file actions in
the name of the people [and] . . . would explain why the
drafters failed to insert any qualification on standing. Indeed,
this ‘gatekeeper’ construction of the text is the only one
consistent with rudimentary notions of procedural fairness.”
(Id. at 587.)

Other states have confined their unfair competition and
unfair trade practice laws, or at least some of the remedies
available under those laws, to enforcement by public
prosecutors, or at least give public prosecutors the first
chance to consider whether to challenge the complained of
conduct. This furthers a more uniform and balanced

jurisdiction by the Attorney General or any district attorney or by any
county counsel authorized by agreement with the district attorney in
actions involving violation of a county ordinance, or any city attorney of
a city, or city and county, having a population in excess of 750,000, and,
with the consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor in any city
having a full-time city prosecutor or, with the consent of the district
attorney, by a city attorney in any city and county in the name of the
people of the State of California upon their own complaint or upon the
complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation or association or by
any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general
public.”

17

enforcement approach of the law because the prosecutorial
discretion of public lawyers, in contrast to the unfettered and
unchecked appetites of too many fee motivated private
counsel, are “curbed by established notions of ethical
responsibility” and “political accountability.” (/d. at 592.)
Thus numerous states require proof of individualized harm or
reliance for private enforcement actions under their unfair
competition or false advertising laws, but relax that
requirement when suit is brought by a public prosecutor.”
Some states, of course, restrict enforcement of their unfair
trade practices laws to public prosecutors.”! Still others limit
restitutionary relief under their laws to suits brought by the
Attorney General.”

Nonetheless, California’s high court holds in favor of
universal standing and emphasizes that “any unlawful
business practice . . . may be redressed by a private action”
under the UCL. (/d. at 561-563.) This effectively means the
UCL is completely disconnected from any notion, not only of
competitive harm, but any injury at all. Omission of the
requirement that a plaintiff show actual harm from the
conduct challenged invites litigation that is not genuine and
should not be filed. The requirement that a litigant show

™ See, e.g., Colo. Code § 6-1-113, Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 235
(Co. 1998) (en banc), May Dept. Stores Co. v. State, 863 P.2d 967, 972-
73 (Co. 1993) (en banc); Fla. Code Ann. §§ 817.41, 501.204, Himes v.
Brown & Secs. Corp., 518 So. 2d 937, 938 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (per curiam). These features and others showing how the UCL
differs from analogous laws of other states are found in the chart attached
hereto as an Appendix.

2! Iowa Code § 714.16(7); Minn. Stat. §325F.67 ( “The duty of a strict
observance and enforcement of this law and prosecution for any violation
thereof is hereby expressly imposed upon the attorney general.”).

2 E.g, Alaska Stat. § 45.50.501(b); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.07(F)
(Attorney General expressly authorized to seek restitution.).

18

actual, individualized injury “prevents the judicial process
from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of
the value interests of concerned bystanders” ; “pleadings must
be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable.” (United States v. SCRAP (1973) 412 U.S. 669,
687, 688.)

The UCL not only omits any requirement of standing
to prosecute conduct under it, it goes further and effectively
strips away whatever standing requirements apply to the
predicate statutes that are bootstrapped to the UCL for
enforcement. Thus in Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing
v. Westwood Investors (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1337 a citizens
group sued for housing discrimination under specific statutes
prohibiting discrimination and the UCL. When the plaintiff
organization could not demonstrate that any one member had
been refused housing at defendant’s apartments or even
wanted to live there, the appellate court held that they lacked
standing under the pertinent housing discrimination statutes,
but avoided that problem by attaching and enforcing them
through the UCL, which has no standing requirement. (/d. at
1393.)

The elimination of any requirement that a plaintiff
prosecuting under the UCL demonstrate tangible injury is
unique to California. The overwhelming majority of other
state laws on unfair competition and false ad’ertising require
actual injury, monetary damage, causation or something
specific besides the mere denunciation of defendant’s conduct,
somewhere, somehow, by someone, as “unlawful” or
“unfair.” These standing requirements, of course, serve to
distinguish a genuine lawsuit from a contrived or frivolous
one.~ They also allow, as Petitioner points out, for the

See Appendix herein of state laws analogous to the UCL showing why
respondent would be unable to prosecute his claim in each of those states.

19

removal of suits asserting these rights to federal court,
something that cannot be done when, as here, plaintiff
disavows any injury essential to make a claim cognizable in
federal court. Elimination of the “actual injury”
requirement under a law as expansive in its reach as the UCL
not only encourages social reformers without real clients to
misuse the courts and bypass the more representative and
political branches of government to get what they want, it
invites litigation primarily to collect attorney fees.~ This
does not further the public interest, but subverts it for the
benefit of a few.

CONCLUSION

For all the aforementioned reasons, as well as the
reasons articulated by petitioner, certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
William L. Stern Fred J. Hiestand
Severson & Werson Counsel of Record
1 Embarcadero Center 1121 L Street, Suite 404
Suite 2600 Sacramento, CA 95814

San Francisco, CA 94111 (916) 448-5100
(415) 398-3344

Petition, p. 29.

>> A recent news article accurately described the inevitable consequence
of marrying the omnivorous UCL with ambitious lawyers desirous of
reaching out and touching someone with a lawsuit to obtain an attorney
fee. “They blanket the business world with hundreds of lawsuits at a
time, often making claims that appear fanciful, even absurd. Most of the
cases never get to trial. The lawyers make their money on settlements
paid by defendants who just want to make the suits go away. The
amounts typically are modest - from $2,000 to $50,000 - but they add
up.” (Monte Morin, Lawyers Who Sue to Settle, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2002, Pt. 1, p. 1.)

20

APPENDIX A

Unfair Trade Practice Laws
and
False Advertising Laws

(IZp-1-O1§ apes
feUIWID) WOT}IE JO asned azeatid ON

“(,'Joujed aanountar
si wonses sip sopun popiaoid Apoulos 10S, au)
(€861) 061 PZ'a'S ZIE ‘C07 “ddy “BD 691 “9D 401I0W
pio “A Dun] ‘osjD aag ‘py :Apoules Ayuo st uonounfuy
“ELE-1-O1§ .Portnbos jou st SAlasep 0} JIU JO ‘sujosd
JO ssoj ‘o3eurep Asejououl jo joolg “™ Ht ysurese vornounfut
ue poyuesd oq Aeul sampour jo soncesd apen aandasop & Aq
poSewrep 9q 01 Ajay] uossad y, ‘Aanfay Jo pooyyeyt] ON

8131005)

(Lb-Oh LIS§ “UY “IIS “B14 2poo
(eUTUNID) UOTIIE JO asned ayeatid ON

(Z)11Z 10S$
‘UUY “IRIS “ELJ , UONRIOIA & JO INSOI & SB SSO] B PoJajyns
sey oym uosied e Aq 1y3n0I1q, 3q ISN UONIe :Asnfur ON

epuol

(906§ “UY 2POD [Pq - 2Pe?
feUTWIID) UOT}IV JO asned ayeatid ON

(e)eEsz§ “UUY IPod Pd 9
api “wns 3u1sq ued soNdeId ape sandasop e Aq podewep

2q 01 Ajay, wossod Ajuo :Asnfuy Jo pooyrpext] ON

ae MEI

TV aesedos ON

(8)3Q1 1-ZP§ “IIS “aH “uUOD “Auedui0s
amp JO ,2oncesd JO 398 JI JO INSOI © Se Aysadoid 30 Aguoul
jO SSO] 21QeUTeL20Se Jojjns ISN, uosiod ‘Ainfur ON

ynonsouUo.

(10€-S-81§ - 2po9o
jeUTUTID) UOT}IE JO asned ayeatid ON

(8)(DETI-1-9§ “IIS WH “JOD ,2onoe1d apen sandaoep
yons JO ynsoz & se pounfur si pue Ayiadoid 10 ‘SadAsos
‘spood s juepusjop st) JO JowNsUOD jenuajod 10 yenjse ue
s] :oym wossad Aue 0} a]qeiTeae aq [JeYs UONSeS stp Jopun
yon UY, :J2UMsUOD [eIVUI7;0d /jeN}Ie UE OU ‘Aunfar ON

Opesojor

TWA aeredas ON

()ETI-88-p § “UY 29POD “PV
_sa9j s,Aousone ajqeuoseas pue ‘ayeudosdde 31 ‘sadewep
jenjoe JOA0001 0} UOHIe JO ssne> & sey sndeyd sip
Ul POULJop SE WONLIOIA JO ISUDJJO UE JO NSal & Se Aanfur
10 o8eurep yenoe ssayjns oym uosiod Auy, ‘Aanfuy ON

(1) 1 8p 1-pr§ - HNposd o~p
JO uonejuasoidosstu SuIpes[stul seul

jsnut) aouasajor yonposd ON “(9861
‘ddy 1D) ‘1IZ “ZV ZSI “OD “SUI
puny S,ueuloLy “A prem “99S “18hl
-pp§) worse jo asned ayeatid ON

‘py “Asnfur syeurrxoid
pue yuonbosuos syynureyd ou (7) pue uoneussoidoJstu
e (1) aaoid ysnw yynureyjd om ‘ulejD & Yons 318s
OL ‘]eM se jarjor sanounfur soy Ajay] snIp pue ‘(€861
‘ddy “1 “ZUy) L8 ‘€8 PZ'd 999 “247 ‘DWD Auauir
‘a dvpjung ‘sa8eurep santund pue Asoyesusduios JO} UONse
jo 1431 ayeaud poyjdun ue sapraosd euozuy :Aanfur ON

TWA aesedas ON

(e)ces os Sr
‘yeIS BYseyy , UoNouNful Ue UTEIGO 0} UOTE Ue Suuiq Aew
‘soSeurep yemse posayyns uossod amp jou JO Jompoym “198
[TYMETUN sy JO WHA sy) Sem OYM uosiod Aue, :(janes
aarjounfy 105 poambes) ,umo1a, & JON “(&)IES OS SHS
japun sosewep 1900901 0} pasinbas st (saseurep Asejououl
jenjoe }0U jNq) ULE} ‘(sadeurep 410) posmbe.s) Aanfur on

ad

(Zr-6VEl
§ - ayes & jo uonowoid ap iM
UONIOUUOD Ul IPEU! Iq ISNUI JUSUIIIEIS
Zuipesjstur JO asye} sy) sdUdIAJo1
yonpoid ou ‘uonoe azeatid ON

(gg61 “ddy “Ald “BI¥) 8L8 PZ “OS 87S “OD “Wind
ployjers ZW WY “A sUOTTIg “s9g “sUOTIR S$ JUBPUsjop
oy) jo ynsor & se sodewep Arzejououl Aue poJajyjyns
yynureyd someym uo spuedap uonse jo ws = ayeAud
- pasmnber st JaumMsuod 0} adeurep Are}QUOW ‘Aanfur ON

eurege|y

MB] SUISILIDAPY IS|BY

MB] 2IV1g Berl WesUH)

3781S

aqeig aatnedsay YDeg Ul [eA PINOA UNTEID sAysey AY AA SUOSeaY aq) SuISSaSSY =] MEY

TV areredas ON

(®)60P1:1¢ “S'U “&1 § , sodeurep
jemoe J9A0002 0) Ayioedes sanewosoidos & WI OU
Inq Ajfenpiarpul uoNse ue BuLUQ Aew ~poqeu aandacep 40
veyun ue “ jo yNso2 & se “Aywadosd ajqeaoul 10 Asuoul jo
SSO] J]qQeuTeyIOse Aue sJajjns oym UosJod Auy, :pemore
you Ayoede>s aanejueseidas ‘Ainfay jepueuy oN

(O€O' LISS UU “Ig “Ady “AY aPod
[eUTWIID) BORNE JO asned azeatid ON

O77 LOES§ “Wuy “Ig “Ady “AY ,“UONSe ue
Sug Avul ~~ [ryMETUN porejIep sondeId JO We ‘pompoul &
jo ™ ynsau & se ~~ Ayiadoid 10 Aauoul jo sso] a[qeuTeL30se
Aue siajyns Aqosoy; pue “ soo1asos 10 spood ~ saseyoind
oym uossod Auy, :20ueqe. ou faseqound ou ‘Ainfur on

Ayomuay

TV aesedas on

(®)pE9-0S§ “UU “IeIg “URY ,“UOnse
ue Surg Aew 198 sty JO UONEOIA pose ue Aq poasud3e
soumsuos e ‘Aymbo wt 30 Mme] ye Apouos ayenbope ue
SBY IIMIZIO JO SOBeWEP 0} POPNUS SI JO Syoos JoUMsSUOD
e JoeYM, - Wns Buq ued eR sANda09=p ,podaiye
ue Aq poasu33e, st oym sJoumnsuos e Ajuo :Aimful on

IV aeredas ON

((ST)9T PIL§ 9pOD
emoy) OY Aq poooyus st 198 fuOTO8 JO asned apeatid ON

(€-S-€b-SE DI Apo
[PUTLUTID) UOTJIe JO asned azeatid ON

“(®)E-S'0-S-HZ§ DI. aandacep amp
JO yJNsas & Se JOWINSUOD B Se polajyyns Ajyengoe sosewrep op
JO} UONIe ue BuLIQ Aew 198 SANdaoep s]qQeINOUI JO pomnoun
ue uodn Sutdjor uossod y, ‘Ammfay oN ‘aoueyes ON

(®/1S678 SOT OZL Apo
[PUTUITID) WORD JO asned ajzeatid ON

"BOT /SOS § STI S18 . 49dosd
suisep NOD sy) YOM joss Jomo Aue Jo sosewep
onm0U0sS yenjoe preme Abul UuONsIIsSIp si wt ‘UNOS
ayy “uossod yons jsureSe uonse ue Buq Aew uosiod
somo Aue Aq ponmunmos Wy SIT JO UONETOIA & JO INSOI
e se aSewep yenjoe ssajyns oym uossod Auy, ‘Aanfur oy

TVA aesedes ON

‘(1809-8 § 2POD oYeP] ,"sadeuep jemIe J9A090I
0} uoNse ue Bulg Aew ‘SAeUIOITe Sq WI ‘JO JIQeEpIOA
se Oj2J0y) Woploul yuouIseISe Aue jean Avw ‘198 sip
Aq [njmequn pozejsop s0ncesd 30 198 ‘pomoul e jo uosiod
sammoue Aq yuouAojdw2 30 asn stp JO ysl & se ‘TeuOsJod
30 yeas ‘Ayodoid 30 Aouowl jo sso] ajqeureysose Aue
siajjns Aqoiay) pue ssd1AJos JO spood sasea] Jo saseyound
oym uosiod Auy, :Aanfar ajqeureziz0se ou ‘aseqound on

‘TL8-80L§ “UUYy “IeIg “MEH ,27eS op
jo uonowod ay TIM UORNIOUTOD UI FI
Zursnsoape asyej, faouesajas yonposd
ON (1L8-80L§$ “UUY “IRIS “MBH Bpod
feuTUTID) SuoTjDe JO asned ayeatid ON

“S2IPSUIIJ $,WEMEH{ JO ISeyUBApe axe) Ue (Q)ET-O8b §
‘p? ,[Ajanfun, saqpo Sursayyns 40 ‘(e)ogp § ‘p? ,‘Auadoud 40
ssoutsng [194 JO sty] ut pornful, ajdood Ajuo :jusumpusure
SIP DAIAINS soipowiss aeAd Buryses uO sun] SuIpueis
ap ing = *(9)7-08> § “WUYy ‘IIS “MEH, UONNeduUIOD
jO spompoul sreyun uo paseq uoNse ue BuLIq [01] Uosiad
Aufe], moje o} sung wl aimeis soonoeid sandosop si
popusure tremey :aqqepeae uornounfur Ajuo ‘Amfur ou jy

WwemeH

(I-€7-L6§ “WUY “9poD “ssIW apoo

(I)S1-b2-S2§
‘UUYy “9poD ‘ssip , Auadoid yons jo sso ay) 10) sasewep
40 AJUOUI JO SSO] YONS 192A0993 0} ~* UONDSe Ue SuUq Aew
S-P7-SL Wondseg Aq ponqryosd sonseid 10 We ‘pomou ke
jo ™ ynsaz & se ~ ‘Ayiadoid 10 Aauoul Jo ssoy ajqeuTeysose
Aue siayyns Aqoioy) puke “ Sao1Ajas 30 spood saseay

[EUIWIID) WORIB JO asnVd ayeatid ON | 10 saseysund oym uosiod Auy, ‘Anfuy ou ‘aseyqoind oy iddississt;w
(, postnbas
10U SI SAIZOOP 0} JWI JO ‘sword JO ssoj ‘adewep
Areyououl jO joOOlg ‘2]QeUOSeaz sJapIsSuOD yNOD mM
yey susa} uO pue Ayinba jo saydioutd ap Jopun 31 ysuTese
L9°ASTES “WIS “UNI | UONSUNfuT Ue poyUeIs 9q Aew s9tMOUR Jo aondeId open
~ ,fe49ua3 Aowone amp uodn pasodun | aandasop e Aq poSeurep aq 01 AJayt] Uossad y,) cp'asze$
Ajssaudxa Aqaioy st joosayp vONeIOIA | “WeIg “UU PUR (1007 “uUTW) tT PU MN 179 ‘uy
Aue 10} wonnsasoid pue mel sip | ‘susopy dymyg ‘A suvjg ynvazy dnosy :225 «(uonounfar
JO WOUIIDIOJUS PUB IOUBAIISGO IIS | 40y pastnbes st Ainfur jo pooyysyy ‘seseurep Suryaes
& JO ANP 24L, *OV 24) Aq paosoyug | Uaqa posmbes st Aanfun) Canfuy yo pooyyayy /Amfur on RIOSUUI |
(Z)09€ Spr§
‘Wy “WIS “YOU ,Sedeuep jenjoe
19A0991 0} UONIE SsepD B JO TENPIAIpul
ue Suriq Aeul ~ 198 SI) JO UONEIOIA (D6 Shr§ “uy “Weg “YI .soseurep
B JO JNSal B SB SSO] SJajjNS OYM | JeNIde J9A0991 O} UONSe Ue SuLIQ AeUI 19e SIP JO VONRTOIA
uosiod 8, a0ueye1 ou ‘Asnfur ON | & JO WNSOZ & Se sso] sIaJyns OYM UOSIad FB, ‘Aanfur on uesiqoIw
(168
TOW V£6 .“Uonounfuy ue SuIpnyour ‘ya1ja1 a]qeymbo yons
pue sadewep 10} “nod soWadns amp UI UONIe ue SuLIq
Avur |rymefun 2q 0} posesep aonseid Jo We ‘pomour
(168 TOW 997 2poo | Aue jo yauskojduie so asn s,uosiod somoue Aq pomfur
[EUTWTID) UOT}IB JO asned ayealid ON | UI9q sey OYM ~ UOSJed AUY :uONESNeD ou { o~p J] (¢)
(ILI°LOZS “WU “IRIg “AZY “APN 2POo | “pney J9UMSUOS JO UNDA B st OYM UOsIed Aue Aq 1yBNOIq
[eUIUID) WONIe JO asned azeaLid ON | 9q ABW UONSe UY , :Jaes aquymbe ou ‘uN & ON EPeADN

‘(1007 “9°N °C) “pLZhl SIXAT

‘sid “S'N 1007 ‘-- Pz “ddng “4 -- “dio spreuoqoy “A
UIUTY ,[¥ 29S “Pposea0de] 9q JOUUeD saseuep AsuOUI ‘Oy
ssoncelg apeiy saandacaq wuoyTu, eM Jopun sqeiTeae
St Jaujar ajquimbe ATU “6091-6 § UUY “WIS “AZY “GON
. oq 10 ‘uy Aq poureisns soseusep fenjoe sq) J9A001 0}
(OLPI-SZ§ WUY “IIS “AZY “GON 2Pod | ‘suONETOIA JoMTY UTOfUd 0} LIND JOLNSIP stp Ul UONIE [LATO
[eUIUNID) UOKNIe Jo asned ayeatid ON | & 3uq Aew ~ posnfur st oym uosied Auy, :Asnfuy ON BYSCIQON
(EET -PI-0E$

‘WEIS “I, ,"UONTE ssepo & JOU INq JeNplAIpul Ue Jug Aew
€OI-p1-O€ Aq [NYMeTUN pose]SIpP 2oNIeId JO “}9B ‘poypoul B
“* Jo ynsau & se ~ ‘Aysadoid Jo Aauoul JO sso] ajqeuTey2ose
Aue siayyns Aqosom pue sasodind pjoyssnoy 10
(LIE-9-SPS§ “WIS “YW 2poo | ‘Ajrumey ‘peuossad Joy Apreumd sadtasas JO SPpOos sase2} JO

jeUILID) UOKIe Jo asned azeaLid ON | soseyoind oym uosiod Auy, ssoyAmfuy ou ‘aseyoind ON BUEIUOW
(I)SZ0"LOb § “WIS “ASY “OW

, SOdeuEp feNgde J9A090I 0} “* UONIE PAID aeaud & SuLIG
Kew ‘0Z0°'LOp woRses Aq jryMeTUN pore|sep 20nNIeId 40
oe ‘pompoul e jo “ yNsau e se ~Ayadoid 10 Aauoul jo sso]
(O9TOLSS “IS “ADY “OW 2Pod | a]qeurews20se ue ssayyns AqaJayp pue ~ ISIPUBYDIIU SIsed|
[eUIUNLID) UOIKJIe JO asned ayeatid ON | JO saseyound oym uosiod Auy, ‘Aanful ou ‘aseyoind oN UnOSsI;W

— ———_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_——

TW aesedas ON

(1M®)€0' SOI PS “Uy Ipod
‘AIY O1YO ,"Jot]al SaNouNful JO} UONIE [IAD B JOUSUTUIOD
Kew “* aonoeid open sandocop e& sium0s oym uosiod
e Aq podeurep 9q 0) Ajay] st Oym uosiod y, sajquiyeae
st joyeas aayounfar Ajuo ‘Ainfuy jo pooyyeyxy ON

oro

‘(sadeurep I9A0001
0} uonoe ue Buuq Aew (g0-ZI
“1S ‘10-ZI-1S§) saimeis Sursmspe
asjey om jo uonejora e Aq poinfur
2U0) (6861 “G°N) £89 PZ MN
bhp ‘uousauu0D Suuvy YP day
S,uaMoy Wi “A ‘2uy ““84Q YyIvaH
Suauoy o8iny 205 ‘Aanfur ON

‘(quo apraoid Ayssoidxa 0} asnyrey S,asmge[st3a] oq
UIAIS SUOTEIOIA 10} SadeUTEpP JO} UOTE JO 14S azeatid
@ urejUOS JOU S20P (OT-1S§) dLN eS 24L) (1007) LOL
PZ AA'N 829 “OTT GIN 1007 “*9Uy ‘*sup aazq Aimq pony
‘A ‘DTT ‘180d N, apvll, 295 20198 JO asned azeatid ON

Boxed “N

(LIT
“PI§ “WIS “UID “DN 9poo [eUTUTLD)
uose jo asned ajealid ON

9I'SL§ “WIS “UID “D'N . 2U0P
Ainfut yons jo yunoooe uO UONDe JO YSU & SABY [TeYS
poinfa os uoresodsoo 30 wy ‘uosiod yons ‘iajdeyD simp
JO suotstaoid amp JO UONeIOIA WI sUOp BuTIp JO ye Aue
jo uoseos Aq ™ poinfur 9q jyeys uosisod Aue jy, ‘Aamfay On

BuTjore) “N

(07°0618
sng U9 STD AN 2poo [eurumlid)
vuole jo asned azeatid ON

(Wé6re$
sng U9) SID AN , W0q JO ‘sadeurep pence sty 19A0901 0}
uonoe ue 201;9e1d JO 198 [NYMETUN Yons uIOfus oO} JUTeU UMO
siy UI UONDe Ue BuIIq Ae UONDES sItP JO UOTJeTOIA Aue jo
uoseas Aq poinfur useq sey oym uosiod Auy, ‘Aanfuy On

yJO MON

(Z7-S1-LS§ “UuYy “38S “W'N)
‘uOIUIW JONpO!d OU ‘[eLIZzEUI ON

(Q)OI-ZI-LS § “UUY “IRIS
‘W'N ,’Sodeurep yemoe Joa0001 0} uoNoe ue Bulg Av
Oy ssonoelg Ieyus, om Aq jnymepun porepsep sonovsd
Jo oe ‘pomow e jo uossod sopoue Aq jwourhojdus
Aue jo yjnsoi & se ‘feuosiod 310 yeas ‘Aysodoid 10 Aauoul jo
ssoy Aue siayjns oym uosied Auy, ‘(sedeurep 10) posmbe.s
ssoj) ssoy Arejouour ON *(8)01-ZI-LS§ . posinboz jou
st uosiod Aue jo a8ejueApe JtejuN dye) JO SAIIIOP 0} JUIIUT
10 syyoid jo ssoy ‘adewep ArejoUOU! JO JOOId “a]qeuOseas
SJ9PISUOD LINOD stp Jey sua) UO pue Aynbo jo sajdioutd
ou) Jopun yt ysuteZe uoNounful ue poyuesd oq Aews Jotoue
jo aonoevid apen ajqeuorssuooun ue Aq 410 aonoeld open
aandesep 30 seyun ue Aq poseurep 2q 0} Ajaxt] wossod
y, :uonsunfar 07) pay jones aiqeymbe ‘(aonsunfay
10} pasinbas wey Jo pooyyayt) Aanfur yo pooyryayt] ON

OXI MON

(Ol
“Ip 7Z§ SME] PIyIPOD “q's apoo
[PUIWUIID) UOTIB JO asned ajeatid ou
‘(,98tpueyoiow Sutpse$o1, oq ysnw
JUSUIDILIS) 99U9I9J9II JONpoId ON

TE-bZ-LES SME] poyIpoD “q's ,"20ndeId JO 19e
Yons JO I[NSod & se pasayyns saseurep yenjoe yo A19A0901 ay
JO} UONE [AID B Sug 0} panruuad aq |TeYs 9-p~7-7¢ § Aq
IMYMETUN 9q 0} Pare[Iep sondeId & JO 19e Aue Aq pardayye
AjasJOApe Ud9Q PAeY 0} sUTTe]D OYM UOSIad Auy, ‘sedewep
fenjoe UwYy) 494j}0 aquyeae Apouias ou ‘Ainfuy on

roe *s

TVA aesedas on

(®)OpI1-S-6€§ “UU apop
‘O'S .Sedeurep yenjoe 1900901 0) ‘Ayoedeo aaneuasoidal
® Wf jou Inq ‘Aljenprarpur uonse ue Suuq ew
07-S-6£ § Aq [nymerun porejsop sonsesd Jo y9e ‘pomoul
aandacep JO Mejun ue “ JO ynsor & se ‘jeuosiod 40
fear ‘Aysadosd 30 Aauour Jo ssoy apqeureyacse Aue SJajjns
oym uosiod Auy, Ayoedes aanejuasesdes ou ‘Amfar on

BUTIOIE ‘S$

(OI-81
“1T§ “WIS “AMY “JO poo yeurum9)
HoN;e §=jO asned ayeauid oN

(®)Z'S-1'€1-9
TIS “AY “AO ,"Uonse ue Zutsq Aew “ pnymezun porejsep
sonoeid JO ‘joe ‘pompoul & “ Jo yNsal & se ‘feuosiod 10
fear ‘Aysadoid 10 Aauour jo ssoy ajqeureuiacse ue siajjns
Aqoiay) ~pue soasodind ployssnoy Jo ‘Ajrurey ‘feuossod
Joy Apireunid sao1asas JO spoos sasea] 10 Soseyoind oym
uosiod Auy, :Aanfuy ou ‘sawojsn> @ youyaseyoind on

pues] spoyy

TVA aeredas on

(®)7°6-10Z§ ,"Soseurep pense
J9A0901 0} UONe aeAUd & Sug Aew * pnymepun pore|sop
sonseid 10 398 ‘pomoul & JO “ Jo y]NSOZ & se ‘jeuosiod 10
jear ‘Awadoid 10 Aguoul jo sso} a[qeurevisose Aue siajjns
Aqaiay) pue sasodind pjoyasnoy 40 Ajrurey ‘jeuosiad
Joy Ajireurid sadiasas 10 spoo8 saseay 10 saseyoind oym
uosiod Auy, :Aanfur ou ‘samojsno & yousaseyoind on

eruea|Asuuadg

TVA aeredas ON

(T)8€9°9K9§
«unos aedoidde ue wt uoNse [enpiaipur ue Surg

Aewl “ [nymeyun. parejsop sonsed 10 39" ‘pomoul & ~ jo
ynsai & se ~ Ayadoid 10 Aauoul Jo ssoj a1qeuteyisose Aue
SJajjns OyM uosiod Auy, :ssoy a1qeureji99se/Ainfuy on

u03210

(ZOSTS IS THO 17 poo yeurumts9)
uorRIe «jo asned azeatuid on

(Z007) (W)¥s
§ "IS "FIO 82 “wosiad ay Aq poureisns soSeurep jennoe
OF IWEPUZJop I} WOIy J9A0I91 0} PoPNUS 9q [TENS ‘Jorjor
eanounful Oy UONIppe ut ‘yynuTeId a~p ‘porosd pre poSarye
axe saseuep uonse yons ul jy “posmber 90 jou lreys
JUIIUT JO syyosd Jo ssoy ‘saseurep Areyouow pemse JO joolg
‘soncesd apen aandasep yons mofua J0 urensal ‘yusAoid
0) UoNsIpstnf ajqeinba yo ynos Aue ui uoNse ue Ure}UTeU
Aeut saoue jo sonced apen aandasep e Aq poseurep
2q © Ajax] 10 po8ewrep uosiod Auy, suorounfar 03
PoyUay] Jat]a4 aqeymba ‘(uonsunfuy 403 pasmbes ajyeatid ON | Ou ‘a0ueges Ou ‘sadeurep/Amfuy ou ‘s9UmMSUOD © JON Surwi0k

(ZXQ)11 810018
‘TIS SIM ,"SISOO UPA Jomeso) ‘sso, Aserunsed yons
1940001 Yeys pue ~ wnoo Aue wi ons Aew uosied 1omo
Aue Aq u0nses styp JO UONRIOIA & JO asneI0q ssoj Aretunsed
‘TVA esedes oN | Susans uosiad Auy, :ssoyAmfuy spuOUOI2 ON UISUOIST

‘(1)901-9-V9r § ,"Wonse ue Surg Avw

‘gore sip jo suotstaosd ay Aq prymefun aq 0} pose[sep
JO ponqryoid sonoesd 30 198 ‘pomou & jo uosied J9IPOUE
kq wouXojduss 10 osn oy) JO yNsol & se ‘feuosied 10
jeoi ‘Aysadoid so Aauoul jo ssoj a[qeureyisose Aue siajyns
Aqasaq puke SI1AJas JO spoo3 saseaj 10 saseyoind oym
‘Tv [esaua8 ayesedas oN | uosiod Auy, :ssoyAsnfuy ajqvuyezsz0se ou ‘aseqound on erUIs A AA
‘(sased pnesy Joumsuos Asoyngeis ut joosd poziyenprarpul
Joy poou om Bunou) (sueq ua) (1007 “HSeM) 6SE
‘ISE PU'd SE ‘'Iuy ‘SamoIsay-aur] “My puDTOH] “A N94
aag :hanfuy squou0s2 ON “(198 S,juepuajep Aq posned
sem Asnfur sjynureyd (p) ‘isos syqnd ap uo joedun
ue sey 198 om (¢) ‘S0JOUMUIOD JO SpeN jo jonpUuoD oy WI
po1nsc0 198 amp (7) ‘108 aandasep JO ITeyuUN Ue poNTUNWIOS
yuepuajap (1) :278 dL 9M JO UoNeoIA & aA03d oO} posnbos
swusuIa}2 IY) (9661 “USeM “A'M) Evel “ddng “4 176
‘uy ““Sasag pooipay yng “A Jul ‘saiBawsg IsamyLioN

OSTe 395 (060°98°61§ “USEM 2POD “APY) . MOG JO “Jaq JO
uny Aq pourejsns soseusep fence aq) J9A0001 0} ‘SUOTIE/OIA
soyury wiofus 0) NOES JOUadNs sy UI UONTe [AID & 3uLIq

(o10'r0'6S | Aew ~ [41M 241] JO BoneToIA e 4q Auadosd 10 ssaursnq
‘YSeM 2POD “AIY 2poo jpeurumsd) | 494 JO sty ut posnfin st OyM UOsIed AuYy, :j398 aandasep
worse jo asned ajeaud on | pue Amfar usemjoq uoyseuu0D jesnes ou ‘Aanfuy ON uolZuTyse A

€°89-1 6s§ uuy
(91Z-7°818 | 3POD “eA “Sadeulep JoA0002 OF GONTe [eNpIAIpUl

‘uUy 2p0D “eA 2pod jeuruMId) | ue Suq o popnue oq Heys [dL] JO Bouejo1A & jo
28 jo ayeauid = ON | 2]NSAI Jp se ssoy sJayyns oyM Uossed Auy, :ssoy/Asnfuy ON erg A
(Q)19bZ § “V'S'A 6 «39894 a1qeunbo

ayetidoidde soy ans Aew “ ‘apt si JO ESPZ UONSeS
kq peuqryoid saonceid 10 suonejuasesdas yuoynpnesy 410
asyey Aue jo ynsou e'se Aunfur 10 sadeulep sureisns Oym 40
™ €¢pz uoNdas Aq panqryoid saonoeid 10 suoneuasosdas

(cooz7S WSA €]1 2poo yeurumsd) | yuaynpney JO asfey uodn souRT]aI UI SadtAles 40 spood
worse jo asned ajeatid OK | 10} s}OeNUOD OYM JouMNsUOD Auy,, Asnful OU S99IUBTIs ON JUOULID A,

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0611%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.