# Amicus Curiae Brief — Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2002
- **Citation:** 537 U.S. 999

## Text

No. 02-271

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, MONSANTO COMPANY, et ai.,
Petitioners,
v
DANIEL RAYMOND STEPHENSON, ef ai.,

Respondents.

On Wait oF CERTIORARI TO THE
Unirep States Court OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Brier Awict Curiae oF THE AMERICAN LEGION, VETERANS OF FOREIGN
Wars or THE Unitep States, DisaBLeD AMERICAN VETERANS,
VIETNAM VETERANS OF America, Catuotic War Veterans, USA,
Inc., Minitary Orper oF THE Purpte HEART, AMERICAN Ex-
PRISONERS OF War, BLINDED VETERANS ASSOCIATION, PARALYZED
VETERANS OF AMERICA, ITALIAN AMERICAN WAR VETERANS OF THE
U.S.A., AMERICAN War Moruers, LEGION OF VALOR OF THE UNITED
States oF America, INc., THe Micirary Orricers ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, FLEET RESERVE ASSOCIATION, NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION, ENLISTED ASSOCIATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE
Unitep States, THE VETERANS OF THE VIETNAM War, INc., MILITARY
CHAPLAINS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MiLiTary Wipows,
New JERSEY AGENT ORANGE COMMISSION, OKLAHOMA AGENT ORANGE
FOUNDATION, AND AGENT ORANGE Victims AND Wipows
Support NETWORK IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

P.B. ONDERDONK, JR. WILLIAM A. RossBACH

NaTIONAL JUDGE ADVOCATE Counsel of Record

THE AMERICAN LEGION ROSSBACH BRENNAN P.C.
P.O. Box 1055 401 North Washington
Indianapolis, IN 46206 Missoula, MT 59802

(406) 543-5156

Attorneys for Amici Curiae
(Additional Counsel for Amici Curiae listed on inside cover)

Tuomas A. O'CONNOR

O’Connor, MacDonaLcp & Maza

FOR VETERANS OF THE VIETNAM Wak, INC.
61 North Washington Street
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18703

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table Of Cited Authorities ....................

Statement Of Interest ....................005.

Nee aces

Class Certification And The Settlement Class ..

The State Of Medical Knowledge ............

Chemical Company Knowledge Of Agent Orange

Pt Mirth eeedukbeceseebeseeesec

EE

EEE ES

Il.

Because Petirioners Knew At Tue Time OF
SETTLEMENT THaT IT Was UNPRECEDENTED AND
SEVERELY FLAwepD, Tuat It VioLaTeD THE
Due Process RiGuts Or ABSENT, FuTURE
CLAIMANTS, AND FaiLep To Satisrty THE
REQUIREMENTS OF Rute 23, PETITIONERS
Cannot Now Ciaim Tuat Tuey Hap A RIGHT
To Rety On Tuat SettLement AND Expect
Finaity AND No CoLLaTEeRAL Review WHEN
VETERANS Mape C aims For Diseases THaT
Devetopeo Arter 1994 .................

Petitioners Hap Tue Ricut ANnp Duty To
Attempt To Cure Tue Derects THEY KNew
FLAWED THis SETTLEMENT ................

15

17

17

22

ul

Contents
Page

Ill. Amcuem AND Ortiz Dip Not CHANGE THE
Wet Setttep Due Process PRINCIPLES
UNDERLYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF RuLe 23
Wuicu Have Atways Requirep THat CLass
REPRESENTATIVES S*'s .¢ IDENTICAL INTERESTS
With Assent CLass Mempers Berore THE
ABSENT MemBers Can Be Bounp ......... 24

IV. Any UNFAIRNESS THAT WouLpD Resutt To
PETITIONERS By AFFIRMING THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Paces In ComParRiISON TO THE UNFAIRNESS TO
RESPONDENT VETERANS IF THis Court SHOULD
Reverse More THAN 50 Years Or SetTLep
Crass ACTION PRECEDENT AND DENY
THem THeir Day IN Court ............... 28

a ae ae ee eae 30

il
TABLE OF CITEDAUTHORITIES
Cases: Page

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)
phwbe bebbhbeeeeeesnanenuce es 9, 18, 24, 25, 26, 28

Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500

Di tectkeen snadedteesesddéstkeakasnesueds 10, 15
Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) ........ 27
Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S.

PD cab babuddddssvadebhidsddesuseeus 19
Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d

DL dtuccactheusedehedebueesaeeinnes 18
East Texas Motor Freight System v Rodriguez, 431

DD cekudhonkenddesuekeutndeewas 26
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)

jidaéeweeeenens (dean tibendetddnidanesnee
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (quoting

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)) ....... 21
General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457

i D

In later litigation, plaintiffs Ivy and Hartman’s injuries,
although not present at the time of settlement, were manifest
before 1994. Both therefore were entitled to compensation from
settlement funds that were still available. vy v. Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co. (In re Agent Orange Products Liability
Litigation), 996 F.2d 1425, 1433-34 (2d Cir. 1993).

Again it is critical to note that before the class was certified,
lawyers for Petitioners expressed clearly and unequivocally their
position that certification of the class was improper because the
class representatives had not even been chosen. The lawyer for
Diamond Shamrock argued that without the identity of the class
representatives, there could be no determination whether the
adequacy and typicality requirements of Rule 23 had been met.
JA 78. He argued that the class could not be certified because
the court did not have enough information to make such a
determination: “[W]Je should ascertain a full profile of each of
the representative claimants and find out if there are complaints
outstanding, or which indicates there is an area not being
represented.” Jd.

At the same hearing on class certification, the lawyer for
Hercules argued that there was a great problem of class
certification without first identifying the class representatives
because without that information there could be no
determination “as to whether they are representative.” JA 81.
He insisted that “there is no way it should proceed as a class
action until the determinations have been made that they are
representative.” JA 82.

Despite their knowledge that Rule 23’s requirements of
adequacy of representation had not been met when the class
was certified, and despite their knowledge that there was no
class representative that was identically situated as Stephenson
and Isaacson were then, without manifest injuries, lawyers for
Petitioners went ahead and worked together with plaintiffs’
lawyers to broadly define a settlement class to include future
claimants and gave any future claimant no opportunity to opt
out, even if he or she knew they were included in the newly
defined settlement class. Petitioners demanded a provision that

8

allowed them to walk away from the settlement if too many
veterans opted out. P. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial 153-154
(1987); JA 96. Veterans with claims were not afforded a similar
opportunity to abandon the settlement, nor an option for a back-
end opt out, nor an option for a renewed opt out. /d. Petitioners
sought to have the class as inclusive as possible, including
unborn children. /d.

Any question why these plaintiff lawyers would collude
with Petitioners and their counsel to broaden the class definition
on the eve of trial to take away the rights of future claimants,
who they did not represent, is answered by the record below.
These lawyers were in desperate financial condition, JA 148-
160, facing a trial before a judge that thought their case was
weak against well heeled chemical companies. See id. And, as
later revealed, they had entered a spurious financial arrangement
that produced great incentive to settle to provide a nuisance
value amount to their clients with present injuries. /n re Agent
Orange Products Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 145, 156-57
(2d Cir. 1987).

Not only did newly included future claimants have no right
to opt out of the settlement, if they had received notice they
would have been told that the only issue that was to be decided
at any future hearing was the “fairness” of the settlement.
Nothing in the notice told them they could object to the adequacy
of representation. JA 109. However, although the settlement
notice told persons who received it that there was a settlement,
it provided no information whatsoever about what money would
be paid to whom, and for what injuries. The settlement notice
only provided for claim forms to be submitted by persons who
“currently” have health effects. It did promise, however, that
some funds may go to claimants with future injuries after the
numbers of persons with current claims was known and
reviewed. JA 112. Thus, anyone receiving this notice who did
not have any current known health effects would not have any
way to submit a claim or have any knowledge of what the
settlement would provide to him or her in the future.

9

For veterans such as Stephenson or Isaacson, even if they
had notice of the settlement and understood that it included them,
to take any legal action at that time to object or otherwise try to
contest the settlement would have required an expenditure of
time, effort and money to hire an attorney to investigate and
prepare a response to the court on their behalf. Without any
health problems at the time related to Agent Orange and no
evidence or reason to expect that they would eventually get
cancer associated with Agent Orange exposure, Stephenson and
Isaacson would have had no incentive to suffer the expense of
contesting the settlement. This Court has recognized this
predicament for potential class members. See Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997). (“Even if they fully
appreciate the significance of the class notice, those without
current afflictions may not have the information or foresight
needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out.”’)

It is apparent from the record of the proceedings below
that even if Stephenson and Isaacson had come forward and
had suffered the expenses of appearing and objecting to the
settlement, it would not have done them any good. The only
opt out period had passed, before they were even in the class.
And, in the face of overwhelming objection to the settlement
from veterans, the District Court approved the settlement.’ Agent
Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 761.

It is also apparent from the record that when one lawyer
objected to the propriety of including future claimants in the
settlement class, the District Court deemed the lawyer making
the argument had no standing to object to the settlement on
behalf of absent future claimants because his clients had injury
claims, had received notice, and most had decided to accept.
JA 189-190* Moreover, the District Court believed that under

3. See, e.g. JA 134-136; see also Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 761.
4. The Court: Are you representing those members of the class
who are not your clients in this argument? That is the question that I am

putting to you [7].
(Cont'd)

10

the settlement veterans who manifested injury later “would
be entitled to compensation in the future.” JA 129. The court
stated that allocation under the distribution plan would have
to “take of care” of the future claimants. JA 129.

When the final distribution plan was developed,
submitted to the court and approved, it failed to meet the
promises made by the court during hearings on the settlement.
The distribution plan did not provide any money at all for
veterans who might contract cancer after 1994, even though
the court knew that latency periods for cancers from toxic
exposure might be as long as 40 years. See Agent Orange,
597 F. Supp. at 795 (“[i]t took almost forty years for solid
tissue cancers to develop in victims of atomic bombing in
Japan”). 7

Nevertheless, the District Court characterized the case
against the chemical companies as weak at the time of the
settlement due to lack of evidence of causation and fraught
with difficulty due the government contractor defense.
The court could not have known what the chemical
companies knew about the true toxicity of their products and
apparently did not fully appreciate that the science and
medicine of Agent Orange was progressing rapidly and that
before the settlement and distribution plan was terminated,
the government contractor defenses that concerned the court
would be restricted by the Supreme Court. See Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).

(Cont'd)
Mr. Taylor: I do not believe that I can do that. I’m only
representing my clients who are members of the class.
The Court: And did you send each one of them written
notice in time to opt out?
Mr. Taylor: That is correct.
The Court: With a suggestion that they do opt out?
Mr. Taylor: That is correct, your Honor.
The Court: I see.

JA 190-191.

11

The State Of Medical Knowledge

Because of the well known long latency periods for many
diseases, and particularly cancers, from toxic exposures, the
incidence of diseases and cancers in agricultural workers and
in veterans exposed during their service to Agent Orange was
beginning to increase rapidly, making case reports and statistical
studies of these diseases more common and more likely to show
an association between exposure and a particular disease or
cancer. Because the chemical companies had many scientists
and health care professionals on their staff, they were very aware
of this growing association between these chemicals and cancer.
They had to know when they settled the pending Agent Orange
litigation in 1984 that the body of medical evidence of this
association was increasing. See generally JA 137-44, Welch
Affidavit, JA 294-99. That gave them great incentive to push
the settlement to include, and preclude, claims of future victims.

The first public knowledge of the herbicide-cancer linkage
came from Sweden with clinical reports in the late 70’s by
Hardell and others. Ericksson, Hardell, ef a/.: “Case Control
Study on Malignant Mesenchymal Tumors of the Soft Tissue
and Exposure to Chemical Substance” Lakartidningen, 76:3872-
75 (1979). Dow in particular was very aware of this work. These
were followed with epidemiological studies by the same author
and his group. Hardell: “Case Control Study: Soft Tissue
Carcinoma and Exposure to Phenoxyacetic Acids or
Chlorophenols” Br. J. Cancer, 39:711-717 (1979). In the United
States, the Journal of the American Medical Association
published in September 1986 a report of a study of Kansas
farmers exposed to herbicides. The study found that there was a
statistically significant dose response relationship between the
number of days sprayed and an elevated cancer risk. The risk of
Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma — the same disease Joe Isaacson
suffers — greatly increased for those who reported exposures
for more than 20 days per year. Hoar, et al., “Agricultural
Herbicide Use and Risk of Lymphoma and Soft-Tissue Sarcoma”
J. AMA, 256:9, 1141-47 (1986).

12

By 1992 there was a consensus that there was a positive -
association between herbicide exposure and Non-Hodgkin's
Lymphoma. Morrison, et al., “Review: Herbicides and Cancer”
J. Nat. Cancer Inst., Vol. 84, p. 1866 (Dec. 16, 1992).

Finally, as a result of intense political activity by these amici
and others, including individual veterans, Congress mandated
the Department of Veterans Affairs retain the National Academy
of Sciences to study the association of Agent Orange exposure.
That study, entitled Vererans AND AGENT ORANGE: Health Effects
of Herbicides Used in Vietnam, Institute of Medicine, (National
Academy Press, 1994), on the basis of three years of study of
all available literature and research, concluded in its seminal
report that the evidence was sufficient “to conclude that there is
a positive association between exposure to herbicides 2,4-D,
2,4,5-T and its contaminant TCDD [dioxin] ... and non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma.” /d. at 548. It also found that the evidence
was suggestive that there was an association with multiple
myeloma.

Chemical Company Knowledge Of Agent Orange Toxicity

The chemical companies had every reason in 1984 to
anticipate that, as time passed, there would be replication of the
early findings of Hardell and other associations would be
increasingly likely as the latency periods of these diseases were
being reached. Moreover, they also knew that their own internal
information showed how toxic these herbicides really were.

After the Agent Orange settlement was approved, in other
litigation against the same chemical companies for injuries
alleged to be caused by exposures to 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D,
documents have been produced which show that Dow and other
manufacturers were engaged in a cover-up to keep their
knowledge of the severe toxicity of these phenoxy herbicides a
secret from the government and the public, and particularly to
hide their knowledge of the contamination of these products
with dioxin. See, e.g., Sternhagen v. Dow Co., CV-88-158-GF-
PGH (D. Mont.).

13

Dow documents show that Dow had knowledge of serious
health risks posed by chlorinated hydrocarbons long before it
sold Agent Orange to the government to use in Vietnam. Dow
had knowledge since the 1940s that chlorinated herbicides were
toxic to humans and animals.’ Internal memoranda describe
Dow’s history of toxic problems with its chemical herbicides
acknowledging numerous chloracne ovtireaks in various
herbicide production facilities over the years. Report
from Widger to Coulter, Midland Division Research and
Development, 4/25/67. Most notably, that report also made clear
that the problem was more than a simple skin rash: “... we
must keep in mind that chloracne is cosmetic evidence of the
attack and serious liver damage is an invisible effect of the
attack.” Jd.

An internal Dow 1965 report found that “The materials
known to cause chloracne in humans are usually chlorinated
complex organic molecules.” Larry Silverstein, “The Chloracne
Problem — Biochem’s Contribution.” Bates No. 0001 112 (March
10, 1965). Dow’s scientists specifically stated that one of the
chemicals apparently causing chloracne was an impurity in its
herbicides, namely dioxin. The report stated: “This compound
(dioxin) and others which have been shown to cause chloracne
have also been shown by animal tests and some human
experience in other companies to produce liver damage if the
exposure is more extensive.” Ja.

Dioxin was not then unknown to Dow and other chemical
companies. In 1957, the German chemical company, Boehringer,
had written to Dow offering information about the “very,
very toxic” chemical dioxin, about chloracne, and about the
preparation of trichlorophenol. Letter from Dr. Wey, C. H.
Boehringer Sohn, to Dow Chemical Company, Attn: Leonard
Rivkin (Feb. 11, 1957); See also Silverstein, Biochem’s
Contribution.

5. One of the head toxicologists for Dow for 50 years, V.K. Rowe, ~

has admitted in a deposition in other litigation, Keister v. Dow, 723
F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Ark. 1989), that Dow conducted research in the early
1940s on animals to determine the toxicity of certain of these compounds.

14

During the 1960s while having trouble with chloracne
outbreaks, Dow decided to conduct a series of meetings “to
share our findings” with other herbicide producers about the
toxicity and impurity problems with its chlorinated herbicides.
In a letter to the technical and medical people at Monsanto,
Hooker Chemical, Diamond Alkali and Hercules, V.K. Rowe
from Dow invited them “to come to Midland to discuss the
toxicological problems caused by the presence of certain highly
toxic impurities in certain samples of 2,4,5-T and related
materials.” Letter of V.K. Rowe, Dow Chemical Co., to
Monsanto, Hooker Chemical, Diamond Alkali and Hercules,
(Mar. 19, 1965). At a meeting in Midland on March 24, 1965,
Dow shared with other producers “the medical side of the Dow
experience.” At the meeting Dow showed slides from animal
tests. Its scientists shared techniques for doing chemical analysis
for dioxin and other impurities and discussed industrial hygiene
measures. V.K. Rowe, Dow Chemical Co., “Report on the
Chloracne Problem Meeting on 3/24/65” (Mar. 29, 1965).

During this same time, Dow was sharing samples of its
products with other producers and testing and analyzing other
producers’ products. For example, in a letter to Paul Hoffman
from Dr. R. Emmet Kelly (medical director at Monsanto
Chemical Company), dated March 17, 1965, Kelly described
receiving a sample of dioxin from Dow which was described
as “the most toxic compound they have ever experienced.”
Letter of Dr. R. Emmet Kelly, Monsanto, to Dr. Paul Hoffman
(Mar. 17, 1965).

While sharing chemistry and toxicological information with
its American counterparts, Dow was also working with European
herbicide producers to learn how to reduce the impurities in its
chemical production. Internal Dow documents indicate that in
late 1964, Dow had an agreement to obtain from Boehringer a
secret report about chloracne active substances in chlorinated
herbicide production as well as operating procedures to reduce
them. Letter from Dr. Kudszus and Dr. Merz, C. H. Boehringer
Sohn, to Dow Chemical Co. (Dec. 15, 1964).

15

Although the focus of Dow’s research in the 1960s was on
2,4,5-T, Dow documents show that since the 1940s it has known
that 2,4-D was also highly toxic and that 2,4-D and other
dichlorophenols were associated with chloracne. Chloracne was
not just associated with the trichlorophenols. A 1945 report on
the handling hazards of 2,4,5-T compared it to 2,4-D and in
some regards found 2,4-D to be even more toxic. Dow Chemical
Co., “Toxicity of 2,4,5-Trichlorophenoxy Acetic Acid”
(Aug. 8, 1945). Other reports from Dow Biochemical Research
concerning the chloracne problem at the Dow plant in Fort
Saskatchewan, Doe researcher Larry Silverstein found that 2,
4-dichlorophenol salts showed slight to moderate chloracnegenic
activity and that laboratory studies on decomposition of
chlorinated phenols indicated “definite possibility of an acne
hazard from overheated or decomposed materials.” Larry
Silverstein, Dow Chemical Co., “Chloracne Problem at Fort
Saskatchewan Plant, Dow Chemical Canada” at Dow Bates
No. 746402 (Mar. 21, 1969).°

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Agent Orange settlement was legally and factually
unprecedented then and remains so today. For veterans such as
Dan Stephenson and Joe Isaacson who were healthy, and without
any injury at the time, this class action settlement purported to
bind them, without adequate representation, without any right
to opt out and without payment of any compensation because
their injuries became manifest after the settlement funds had
been disbursed. Petitioners knew full well that trying to reach
so far in binding absent parties, who did not yet even have causes
of action, was not supported by any precedent or other authority
and violated the constitutional requirements of Due Process and
standing. Nevertheless, in the face of the known, overwhelming
flaws in their purported settlement, Petitioners went ahead and
entered an agreement with lawyers for plaintiffs who were
desperate and had strong financial incentives to settle.

6. These Dow internal documents suffice to defeat any government
contractor defense. See Boyle, 487 U.S. 500.

16

When they entered that settlement Petitioners knew also
that medical evidence was likely to increase as the latency
periods for cancers and other diseases were being reached from
exposures to their toxic chemical products. They knew from
their own internal studies that the herbicides used in Agent
Orange were highly toxic and were contaminated with one of
the most toxic materials then known, dioxin. .

Despite entering this settlement with full knowledge of its
legal and factual flaws and full knowledge that it was likely
that there would be many future provable claims, Petitioners
assert that it would be unfair to permit review of this settlement
now. But the passage of time and the payment of nuisance value
money to veterans who had claims then does not, and cannot,
alleviate the severe Due Process violations to Respondents who
have claims now. Petitioners’ pleas for fairness ring hollow in
the light of their knowing violation of the rights of future
claimants such as Respondents.

The Second Circuit decision is based on well settled
principles of class action jurisprudence and merely followed
the guidance of this Court from Amchem and Ortiz. Those
decisions, too, broke no new legal ground, despite Petitioners
suggestions to the contrary. The dominant Due Process concern
of this Court in reviewing class actions has always been to protect
the rights of absent class members to ensure that they are not
unfairly bound to judgements or settlements by class
representatives with interests that are not aligned with theirs.
Adequacy of representation is the cornerstone of these Due
Process principles in this context. It cannot seriously be disputed
that these veterans who had no cognizable claim at the time,
who could not opt out, and who could receive no compensation
when their injuries became manifest; did not have adequate
representation of their interests. As such, the decision of the
Second Circuit must be affirmed and Respondent veterans be
permitted to proceed with their claims.

17

ARGUMENT
I. Because Petitioners KNew At THE Time OF SETTLEMENT

TuHat It Was UNPRECEDENTED AND SEVERELY FLAWED,

Tuat It Vio_atep Tue Due Process RiGuts Or ABSENT,

FuTURE CLAIMANTS, AND FaiLtep To SatisFy THE

REQUIREMENTS OF RuLe 23, Petitioners CANNoT Now

Ciaim TuHat Tey Hap A Ricut To ReEty On Tuat

SETTLEMENT AND Expect Finatity AND No COLLATERAL

Review WHEN VETERANS Mape C.iaims For Diseases

Tuat DEVELOPED AFTER 1994

The 1984 Agent Orange settlement which purported to
include future claimants such as Respondents did not meet the
requirements of Rule 23 violated Due Process because veterans
like Stephenson and Isaacson, who had no manifest injury, were
not adequately represented by someone with interests identical
to theirs, had no notice of the settlement, and had no right to opt
out. They were purportedly bound to a settlement and precluded
from pursuing their rights to their claims in the future, but no
compensation was provided.

It is axiomatic that before one can plead for fairness and
equity, one must come to the bar with clean hands. Petitioners
do not have the “clean hands” that would give them a right to
claim that it would be unfair to them now to affirm the Second
Circuit and allow Respondents their day in court.

The record of the litigation leading up to the Agent Orange
settlement shows that until they jumped at the chance to settle
all present claims for nuisance value and to bind and preclude
all future claims for little or no compensation, Petitioners,
through their counsel, had vigorously — and properly —
objected to inclusion in the class litigation of people without
present injuries or manifest symptoms. They knew that veterans
who were exposed to Agent Orange, but who did not have any
manifest injuries could not have brought a claim to begin with.
Persons without injury would have had no standing under Article
Ill of the United States Constitution to bring a claim at all.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) this —
Court established an “irreducible constitutional minimum of

18

standing” which requires that “the plaintiff must have suffered
an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally-protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” (Citing Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) and others).

Without injuries and standing to bring a claim, any claims
would have been dismissed. Petitioners knew that the they were
getting more from the settlement than they had any night to
expect. They were settling claims that could not have been
brought in the first place. As Judge Friendly said in Dincher v.
Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952):

Except in topsy-turvy land, you can’t die before you
are conceived, or be divorced before ever you marry,
or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a house
never built, or miss a train running on a nonexistent
railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has
always heretofore been accepted as a sort of logical
axiom that a statute of limitations does not begin to
run against a cause of action before that cause of
action exists.
It is only in that same topsy-turvy land that your claims can be
settled by others, without your knowledge, for no compensation,
before your cause of action exists.

Petitioners knew the settlement of future claims under these
circumstances was unprecedented. They had to know that such
a settlement was at risk due to the many problems it had in
meeting those requirements of Rule 23 which are intended to
protect the due process rights of absent class members.
See, generally, Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-629.

This Court has previously held that “[a]n elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950). In a class action for money

19

damages, rights to receive notice and the subsequent ability
to opt out of the class cannot be abridged: “[WJe hold that
due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff
be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the
class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for
exclusion’ form to the court.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).’

Settlement classes, in any setting, present serious
potential for abuse. See, e.g., Manual for Complex Litigation,
Second, supra, § 30.41, at 236 (“As a practical matter, the
dynamics of class action settlement may lead the negotiating
parties — even those with the best of intentions — to regard
the interests of the class members too lightly.”). Indeed, all
participants in class action settlement negotiations have
extraordinary incentive to settle. From the perspective of
defendants, settlement is an opporiunity to cap risk. From
the perspective of the courts, settlement may be an

7. Indeed, few activities are subject to more extensive record
keeping than military service; if the rights of future claimants can be
abolished in this context without individualized notice, then the
implications are unlimited. By contrast, in an early decision regarding
Rule 23 requirements, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974), this Court demonstrated the full extent to which the rights of
individual class members must be safeguarded. Eisen raised the issue of
adequate notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) antitrust and securities class action
with millions of members and a class representative with only a $70
stake. Despite the size of the individual claims, this Court held that the
class could proceed only with individual notice to more than two million
class members whose names and addresses could be identified with
reasonable effort, holding that “[i}ndividual notice to identifiable class
members is not a discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular
case. It is, rather, an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23.” Significantly,
the Court in Eisen stated that such notice was required so that each
individual class member “may request exclusion from the action and
thereby preserve his opportunity to press his claim separately. .. .”
Id. at 176. See also Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S.
345, 351 (1983) (“Eisen'’s notice requirement was intended to inform
the class member that he could ‘preserve his opportunity to press his
claim separately’ by opting out of the class.” (emphasis in original)).

20

opportunity to clear court calendars of tens of thousands of
cases. And, not least of all, from the perspective of class
counsel, the economic rewards of settlement sooner rather
than later can be extraordinarily enticing — regardless of
the inchoate needs of absent class members or future
claimants. For these reasons, adequate representation of
absent claimants has become one of the cornerstones of due
process guarantees in class actions, requiring, among other
things, that class representatives and their counsel are aligned
identically with the interests of absent class members.
As this Court emphasized in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
45 (1940):

[S]election of representatives for purposes of

litigation, whose substantial interests are not

necessarily or even probably the same as those

_ whom they are deemed to represent, does not

afford that protection to absent parties which due
process requires.

The record of the litigation leading to the purported class
action settlement of future claims demonstrates the risk of
conflict and collusion which arises when both sides no longer
are adversaries but both now want the settlement to proceed.
That is precisely when adequacy of representation becomes
crucial and all members of the settlement class must have
their day in court. As this Court has stated:

Procedural due process is not intended to promote
efficiency ... it is intended to protect the
particular interests of the person whose
possessions are about to be taken.... ‘[T]he
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the
Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were designed
to prot.ct the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy that may characterize

21

praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.’
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) (quoting Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).*

Petitioners knew that when the class was certified there
was no analysis of the adequacy of the class representatives.
Class representatives had not even been named. Petitioners
knew, too, when the class action was settled that there were no
class representatives to represent persons without any manifest
injury — like Stephenson and Isaacson — who had been added
to the broadly re-defined class after the opt out deadline passed.

Petitioners knew it was dangerous to change the class
definition after certification and the opt out period had passed.
Despite their misleading representations to the Court in their
brief, Pet. Br. 35, they knew that persons like Respondents
here, with future claims, never had a chance to opt out at all.
They knew that even though the class definition had been
broadened after the opt out time had passed, the methods of
distribution of the notice would reach much fewer veterans.

Each of the Petitioner chemical companies also had their
own staff of scientists and toxicologists and internal documents
show Petitioners were well aware of the toxicity of the herbicides
used in Agent Orange. Documents of public record in later
herbicide litigation show a many year pattern of cover-up about
their knowledge of the toxicity of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D and the
presence of toxic impurities and contaminants such as dioxin
in their herbicide products.

They had to know of the long latency periods often required
for development of cancer and other fatal diseases from
exposures to toxic chemicals. Even the District Court was aware
of that. Thus, with the passage of time since the first agricultural
and production uses of these herbicides, Petitioners had to know
that it was likely there would be increasing incidence of disease

8. See also In re: General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange
Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106, 1133 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.

870 (1979) (“convenience and expediency cannot justify disregard of
the individual rights of even a fraction of the class”).

22

and increasing knowledge of the potential association with their

herbicides.

Thus, while the plaintiffs’ lawyers had limited resources
and great incentive to settle, the chemical companies knew that
they needed this protection because they knew they had a ticking
time bomb of medical and other documentary evidence that
would be generated, or come out of their files, to establish
causality by the time that future victim’s medical conditions
associated with Agent Orange exposure developed.

They therefore took a risk. They took the risk that for
payment of a sum of money to provide nuisance value
settlements to persons with present claims, that they could also
buy the rights of unsuspecting future victims to have their day
in court, if and when an Agent Orange associated disease became
manifest.

They cry that they bought their peace, but they should have
known then that it was a defective peace. They cannot have a
legitimate expectation of peace when they knew how utterly
flawed the settlement was and how unprecedented it was to
impose a mandatory class on future claimants that provided no
compensation at all if the claimant had the misfortune of having
his or her disease manifest after 1994.

Petitioners knew that they had no legal bases to take those
rights from the unsuspecting future victims of their wrongdoing.
Nevertheless, they did so and had nearly 20 years of peace.
But they were not bona fide purchasers of these rights.
They can have no legitimate claim to have bought a peace when
they knew that the peace was flawed.

II. Petitioners Hap Tue Ricut ANnp Duty To Attempt To
Cure Tue Derects THEY KNew FLAweD Tuis SETTLEMENT
Amici doubt that there is any way consistent with Due

Process and Rule 23 to cure defects in a class action settlement

that includes future claimants without any present injury, who

have no right to opt out, who have no notice or opportunity to
object and who receive no compensation. Petitioners conceded
in court, several years before the settlement was reached, that
they, along with the court and plaintiffs’ counsel had an

23

obligation to ensure that any class action was fair to the absent
class members. JA 50-60. Contemporaneous case law confirms
that Petitioners had standing to ensure that the class action
complied with the rules and due process. See Shutts, 472 U.S.
at 798.

Despite their vigorous — and well taken — objections to
the broad and pervasive class that the plaintiffs in the Agent
Orange litigation sought to have certified, and despite their
obvious knowledge of other deficiencies in the settlement,
Petitioners did nothing to correct these flaws. Petitioners could
have protected themselves against the prospect of collateral
attack of the settlement by maximizing the protections for absent
class members. They could have insisted that better notice to
the broader class be given. They could have ensured that there
was adequate representation for each new subclass of persons
that had been brought into the class by the re-definition for
settlement. They could have provided funds to pay the cost of
separate representation for this subclass, or at least required that
a small fraction of the $180 million be designated for that
purpose. -

When Judge Weinstein indicated that he did not want to
water down the available money by paying for multiple counsel,
Petitioners could have volunteered to pay more if they wanted
protection. They could have paid for more notice or sought to
have it come out of the settlement proceeds.

Most importantly they could have made sure that there was
another opportunity for opt out provided for future claimants
after their injuries became manifest. Because they failed to do
anything then to satisfy the requirements of Due Process and
Rule 23 for their settlement, Petitioners are complicit in its fatal
flaws. They had a chance to do what was necessary to try to
protect the settlement, but they did nothing and should not now
be heard to complain that it is subject to collateral review.

24

Ill. Amcuem AND Ortiz Dip Not Cuance THe WELL
SetTLep Due Process PrincipLes UNDERLYING THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RuLe 23 Wuich Have ALways
REQuiReD THaT CLASS REPRESENTATIVES SHARE IDENTICAL
Interests With Assent CLass Memsers Berore THE
ABSENT Members Can Be Bounpb

Petitioners charge it would be unfair to apply a new standard
of review to their 1984 Agent Orange settlement based on what
they claim is a major change in the law of class actions after the
settlement was approved in 1985. They contend that Amchem
and Ortiz changed the law and thus should not be applied
retroactively. That characterization of Amchem and Ortiz is
simply wrong. Indeed, what Petitioners are doing is trying to
excuse their own complicity in the failures of the 1984
settlement. Petitioners knew in 1984 that the settlement for future
claimants failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23 and Due
Process. Those requirements were well known to them then and
they argued for them at the time during the certification hearings.
However, now that they are trying to defend this flawed
settlement they want this Court to believe that somehow Amchem
and Ortiz added some new requirements for approval of class
settlements that should not be applied with hindsight.

Review of those cases shows clearly that both decisions
were grounded on prior precedent that had been well settled for
years before 1985. The only new aspect of either case was that
for the first time the Court was asked to apply these well settled
Due Process principles to a class action where lawyers for
plaintiffs and defendants had agreed to settle both present and
future claims as a part of a single class action. Nearly 50 years
before the Agent Orange settlement was made and approved,
this Court set forth clear guidance about the Due Process
principles applicable to class actions. In Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 40 (1940), the Court stated at the outset that before
prior litigation will be deemed to have res judicata effect on
later suits the Court must perform a collateral review of both
cases to ascertain whether the litigant has been afforded such

25

notice and opportunity to be heard as are requisite to the due
process clause. (Citing Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235
U.S. 261, 273 (1914)).

This Court then explained that class actions suits were an
exception to the general rule “in Anglo American jurisprudence
that one in is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation
in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not
been made a party by service of process.” Jd. Class actions were
developed in equity as an exception to that rule where the number
of parties is so great that joinder is impracticable. However,
Hansberry set forth very clearly that for this exception to be
constitutionally valid, the procedures for creating and litigating
the class claims must ensure that the interests of the absent
members and the class representatives are the same so that the
latter fairly represents the former. Due Process has not been
met when the procedures adopted do not ensure protection of
the absent parties interests. /d. at 42.

Adequate representation is at the core of these constitutional
concerns. Absent parties would be bound only if “the named
parties adequately represented the absent class and the
prosecution of the litigation was within the common interest.”
Id. at 41. Conflicting interests among class representatives and
absent class members “does not afford that protection to absent
parties which due process requires.” Jd. at 45. Indeed, more
than 50 years ago now, this Court expressed its strong concern
that where there were such conflicting interests: “It would afford
fraudulent and collusive sacrifice of rights of absent parties.”
Id.

Subsequently the Rules Committee adopted the numerous
specific requirements of Rule 23. In both Amchem and Ortiz
this Court showed that those requirements were bottomed on
these same due process concerns. The principles articulated in
Hansberry have thus been repeatedly re-affirmed both before
1985 and after.

In Amchem, the inquiry into the propriety of a future class
began by looking at the historical roots of class actions under
Rule 23. This Court found that the drafters of Rule 23 “had

26

dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the nights of groups of people
who individually would be without effective strength to bring
their opponents into court at all.’” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617
(quoting Kaplan, Prefatory Note 497). This Court cited with
approval language from a recent Seventh Circuit opinion:
The policy at the very core of the class action
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or
her nghts. A class action solves this problem by
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries
into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor.
Id. (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344
(1997)).

In Amchem, this Court affirmed that in evaluating the
propriety of any class action the dominant concern is that there
must be sufficient unity so that absent members of class will be
bound by representatives decision. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.
The Rule 23 predominance requirement is not satisfied by simply
shared exposure or by common interest in compensation without
trial. Jd. at 624-25. Focus must instead be on questions that are
actually at issue and which create a genuine controversy. /d.
Class representatives are not adequate under Rule 23 and due
process when there are real or potential conflicts of interest. Jd.

In affirming these well settled principles, this Court relied
on case precedent that largely antedated the approval in 1985 of
the Agent Orange settlement. The Court pointed out that the
adequacy inquiry serves to uncover conflicts of interest. General
Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58,
n.13 (1982). The inquiry focuses on whether the injuries of the
class representatives and the absent class members are the same
or diverse. See also East Texas Motor Freight System v
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (“[A] class representative
must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and
suffer the same injury’ as the class members.”’)

27

In General Telephone this Court found that “[t}he class-
action device was designed as ‘an exception to the usual rule
that litigations is conducted by and on behalf of the individual
named parties only.’” 457 U.S. at 155 (quoting Califano v.
Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701 (1979). When issues are
common and result turns on questions that are applicable in the
same manner to each member of the class, then class action
saves resources and permits economical litigation. /d

In Ortiz the Court pointed out that Hansberry had articulated
a core constitutional requirement that “the named plaintiff at
all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class
members.” (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (citing, in turn,
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42-43, 45)).

Similarly, in Shutts, the Court relied extensively on
Hansberry, finding that in 1985 the same constitutional
principles were applicable and the same practical bases for class
actions remained: class actions are proper where there are too
many plaintiffs for proper joinder and class actions permit “the
plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate
individually.” 472 U.S. at 809. The Court, based on Hansberry,
held that Due Process requires that the named plaintiff at all
times adequately represent the interests of the absent class
members. /d. at 809-10.

Class action litigation developed as an exception to general
rules requiring individual standing and litigation to provide a
means for individuals with small claims to join together, when
joinder was impractical, to make pursuit of justice economically
feasible. It was not developed, as Petitioners suggest, simply to
provide defendants in litigation “utility,” Pet. Br. 17, as a device
to resolve masses of claims at one time, thereby binding many
absent class members at the same time. While binding absent
class members to a settlement or judgment is a necessary
corollary to allowing persons with sufficiently similar claims
to aggregate them in a class, it was not the reason that class
actions developed. In fact, it is this binding of absent members
which has consistently troubled this Court for many years from
a constitutional and Due Process perspective. Consistent with

28

the Due Process elements in the determination of adequacy under

Rule 23, class representatives can only bind absent class

members when their interests in the real issues in controversy

are sufficiently identical to permit the conclusion that those
representatives will aggressively advocate for the absent class
members, without conflict.

In all the above cases decided during or before 1985, the
Supreme Court rejected class action certification or settlement
because the class representative’s interests were not sufficiently
aligned with absent class members. Thus, it is entirely
disingenuous to suggest that Amchem worked some sea change
in class action law. With the highest quality lawyers representing
them in 1985, Petitioners had to know that there were fatal
adequacy and due process problems with a settlement of future
claims, with no opt out right, and no class representative or
counsel in court who could adequately represent their interests:
someone who was without conflict of interest and whose interest
and injuries were identical. Petitioner had to know in 1985 that
it was a well settled and fundamental principle of class action
law that the absent parties cannot be bound by such a class action
settlement. It is not Amchem and Ortiz which worked a change
in the law, it is Petitioners’ unprecedented settlement which, if
upheld to bind Stephenson and Isaacson, would radically alter
this Court’s prior class action jurisprudence.

IV. Any UNnFairnNess THAT WouLD REsuLt To Petitioners By
AFFIRMING THE SECOND Circuit Paces In Comparison To
THe UNFAIRNESS TO RESPONDENT VETERANS IF THis Court
SHOULD Reverse More Tuan 50 Years Of Sett_ep Cass
ACTION PRECEDENT AND Deny THEM THEIR Day IN Court
Veterans of the armed services of the United States who

served in Vietnam dedicated-their-hearts, minds, and bodies to

protect the rights of all citizens of this country, to uphold the
way of life of this country and the constitution of the United

States. No group of citizens has a greater right to expect that in

return for their dedication to preserving these rights, they would

be able to enjoy for themselves the full protection of the laws of
this country. Veterans have a right to rely on the judicial system

29

of our democratic and constitutional government and, in
particular, their right to their day in court to have wrongs done
to them while on active duty addressed fairly and fully, with
zealous advocates fighting for them and them alone. What
veteran would have expected that he or she could lose all rights
to their day in court, without any compensation, as a result of
a long ago class action settlement about which he or she had no
knowledge or notice and no opportunity to opt out.

In Ortiz this Court took note of the tension between class
actions, which can usurp the rights of absent class members to
a trial by jury and “our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court.’” Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (quotation omitted). “Although
‘we have recognized an exception to the general rule when, in
certain limited circumstances, a person, although not a party,
has his interests adequately represented by someone with the
same interests who is a party,’ ... the burden of justification
rests on the exception.” /d. Petitioners have not met that burden.

In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall asked:
“If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws
of his country afford him a remedy?,” Marbury v. Madison, |
Cranch 137, 162, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall’s
response was clear: “The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection.” /d. at 163,

2L. Ed. 60.

Petitioners lament the “pernicious” effects that will result
to the “utility” of the class action device if this Court affirms
the Second Circuit. They claim that no class action settlement
will ever be safe from attack, and finality and resolution of claims
will never be achieved. This view of class actions that underlies
Petitioners’ argument turns class action law on its head. The
class action “device” was not developed to protect wrongdoers
who could, with one collusive settlement, sweep away all past
and future liability.

30

Petitioner chemical companies plead that it would be unfair
to them now after they have paid their money in reliance on
an expectation of finality to allow Stephenson and Isaacson
to proceed on their claims. These pleas for fairness ring hollow
in the light of Petitioners knowledge of the fatal constitutional
and Rule 23 flaws in that settlement and their knowledge of
the toxic properties of their products that were sprayed
indiscriminately and in massive quantities during the Vietnam war.

In contrast, veterans like Stephenson and Isaacson who
survived the bullets and bombs of the enemy, are now suffering
life threatening diseases, or are dying, without any chance
of redress, even though they had no injuries at the time of the
settlement and no basis therefore for making a claim then.
How fair is it to these veterans that Petitioners want them to
lose all right to have their day in court without compensation
when they had no right to opt out of the expanded class for
settlement and received no notice of the class settlement at
all? How fair could it be, even if they had received notice, to
require these veterans to intelligently evaluate the prospects
of litigating the case for their injuries when their injuries had
not yet manifested? How fair is it to require veterans without
then a vested claim — a concrete injury in fact— to bear the
expense in time, effort and money to investigate and litigate
the propriety of a settlement which may never apply to him?

Given this expense there would be no reason that a then
totally healthy veteran would choose to bear that expense on
the speculative possibility that at some future time he might get
some sickness from a long before exposure. While finality is
certainly a proper goal of class action litigation that must be
respected, it must not come as a result of violations of Due Process.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully pray
this Court affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

WiLuiaM A. RossBACH
Counsel of Record
ROsSBACH BRENNAN P.C.
401 North Washington
Missoula, MT 59802
(406) 543-5156

P.B. ONDERDONK, Jr.
NATIONAL JUDGE ADVOCATE
THE AMERICAN LEGION
P.O. Box 1055
Indianapolis, IN 46206

THomas A. O’ CONNOR
O’Connor, MacDona_Lp & Maza
FOR VETERANS OF THE

VIETNAM Wak, INC.

61 North Washington Street
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18703

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0593%3A16. Public record. Not legal advice.
