# Appendix — Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 537 U.S. 371

## Text

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS,
Vv.
GUARDIANSHIP ESTATE OF DANNY KEFFELER,
By WANDA PIERCE, GUARDIAN,

AND OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

RESPONDENTS.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FORA
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE
Attorney General

William Berggren Collins
Sr. Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record

1125 Washington Street SE

Olympia, WA 98504-0100

360-753-6245

Counsel for Petitioners

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Guardianship Estate of Keffeler ............cccccsccecseeseeseeseeeserees |
145 Wash. 2d 1, 32 P.3d 267 (2001)
Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration....................- 40
SII sulietinsdetadedepalancineddscndtdcdninbadescanansidbisamicnnmememmeensitl 42
Ee a 43
Court’s Findings Of Fact On Order Of
Remand From Supreme Coutt ...............:ccccccssesseeeseeeeeeees 46
Plaintiff's Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion
iB EE 112
BN II cnctencnnncsitivenibasicensensmsnnesaneenneneccoreess 122
Order Allowing Amendment Of Complaint.................... 131
Order Granting Amendment Of Order
SE 133

Order Certifying Case To Proceed As A Class
Action, Defining The Class And Denying

Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss..................s:ssseseesseeee 136
| ES a a 141
ET a 142
Letter From Ronald Carpenter to Counsel................:0:+++: 143

(stay motion denied)

A eR OC a A oe ae 145
| A Ta aa a a 205
a I iicstaitilieaisdisindiiadlibichntithinndibdeseedicadaeorestcesnete 245

we

A-!l

Supreme Court of Washington,
En Banc.

GUARDIANSHIP ESTATE OF Danny KEFFELER, by
Wanda Pierce, Guardian, and
other persons similarly situated, Respondents,

Vv.

STATE of Washington DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
AND HEALTH SERVICES;
Lyle Quasim, Director of the Department of Social and
Health Services; and
Michael R. Hobbs, Program Manager for the Department of
Social and Health Services,

Appellants.

No. 67680-1.

Argued Nov. 8, 2000.
Decided Oct. 11, 2001.

SANDERS, J. The plaintiff class asks us to hold
the Washington State Department of Social and Health
Services (DSHS) violated that provision of the Social
Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) which forbids
creditor access to Social Security benefits. Here DSHS acts
as a representative payee under 42 U.S.C. § 405(j) for
foster children and then applies the Social Security benefits
to reimburse the state budget for payments made to foster
parents for the basic needs of those children. We are also
asked if DSHS’s actions deprived the foster children of
their property absent due process and abridged their right to
equal protection of the laws. Lastly the plaintiff class
asserts entitlement to an award of reasonable attorney fees.

We hold DSHS as a representative payee violates §
407(a) of the Act when it applies Social Security benefits to
the current maintenance needs of foster children for whom
it acts as representative payee. Given this disposition we
find it unnecessary to consider the due process and equal
protection claims. We remand for further proceedings,
including further consideration of the reasonable attorney
fee award.

ISSUES

1. Does DSHS violate § 407(a) of the Social
Security Act when, as a representative payee under § 405(j)
of the Act, it uses Social Security benefits to pay current
maintenance costs of children in foster care?

2. Is the class entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney fees?

FACTS

Foster care in Washington is provided by an
amalgam of federal, state, and private funds, although the
program is largely state-funded. In fiscal year 2000, for
example, the total foster care budget was $37.4 million in
state funds, plus approximately $12.9 million in federal
funds. To be eligible for federal funding under the Social
Security Act, a state must provide foster care services under
a plan approved by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. 42 U.S.C. § 670.' RCW 74.13.0317 authorizes

' The Act authorizes federal assistance for state foster care
services:
For the purpose of enabling each State to provide, in
appropriate cases, foster care and transitional independent

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DSHS to provide foster care services to children in
Washington.

Foster care is generally provided in Washington to
children who have been abused or neglected or have
become the responsibility of the state through our juvenile

living programs for children who otherwise would be eligible
for assistance under the State’s plan approved under part A of
this subchapter [as such plan was in effect on June 1, 1995)
and adoption assistance for children with special needs, there
are authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year
(commencing with the fiscal year which begins October |,
1980) such sums as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this part. The sums made available under this
section shall be used for making payments to States which
have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State
plans under this part.

42 U.S.C. § 670.

? RCW 74.13.031 provides, in pertinent part:

The department shall have the duty to provide child welfare
services and shall:

(1) Develop, administer, supervise, and monitor a
strengthens services for the protection and care of runaway,
dependent, or neglected children.

(2) Within available resources, recruit an adequate
number of prospective adoptive and foster homes, both regular
and specialized, i.e. homes for children of ethnic minority,
including Indian homes for Indian children, sibling groups,
handicapped and emotionally disturbed, teens, pregnant and
parenting teens, and annually report to the governor and the
legislature concerning the department’s success im: (a)
Meeting the need for adoptive and foster home placements;
(b) reducing the foster parent turnover rate; (c) completing
home studies for legally free children; and (d) implementing
and operating the passport program required by RCW
74.13.285.

A-4

justice laws, Title 13 RCW.’ On behalf of these children,
the state pays a schedule of monthly allotments to foster
parents who in turn pay for the basic necessities such as
food, shelter, and clothing for the children in their charge.
As of September 1999, there were 10,578 foster children
under DSHS’s supervision. An additional 2,352 children
were in the custody of tribal authorities or child care
agencies for whom DSHS paid support. Five hundred
sixty-seven additional children received support through
DSHS’s Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD).

Although DSHS provides foster care for children
who need it, it is Washington public policy to attempt to
recover the costs of foster care from the parents of children
in foster care who are primarily liable for the costs of that
care:

It is declared to be the public policy of this state that
this chapter be construed and administered to the
end that children shall be maintained from the
resources of responsible parents, thereby relieving,
at least in part, the burden presently borne by the
general citizenry through welfare programs.

RCW 74.20A.010 (support of dependent children act). See
also In re Welfare of Feldman, 94 Wash.2d 244, 250, 615
P.2d 1290 (1980) (“It is true that parents bear the primary
responsibility for the support of their children.”).

In the context of foster care, DSHS implemented
the Legislature’s cost recovery policy by regulation:

> See, e.g, RCW 13.34.210 (if a child has no parent with
parental rights, court may commit child to DSHS’s custody; DSHS in
turn may seek adoption for child or place the child in foster care or
other suitable placement).

Parents of children in foster care paid by the
department satisfy their legal obligation to support
their children when there is a superior court order
for support by paying the amounts specified in the
order or in the absence of a superior court order, by
paying the amount determined under RCW

74.20A.055 and regulations promulgated in chapter
388-11 WAC.

Former WAC 388-70-075(1) (1976), repealed by St. Reg.
01-08-047 (Apr. 30, 2001).

If parents of a foster child are unavailable or
unwilling to reimburse DSHS for the costs of foster care,
DSHS may reimburse itself using “moneys and other
funds” that come into its possession while the child is in its
custody. RCW 74.13.060 provides, in pertinent part:

The secretary [of the Department] or his
designees or delegatees shall be the custodian
without compensation of such moneys and other
funds of any person which may come into the
possession of the secretary during the period such
person is placed with the department of social and
health services pursuant to chapter 74.13 RCW. As
such custodian, the secretary shall have authority to
disburse moneys from the person’s funds for the
following purposes only and subject to the
following limitations:

(1) The secretary may disburse any of the
funds belonging to such person for such personal
needs of such person as the secretary may deem
proper and necessary.

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(2) The secretary may apply such funds
against the amount of public assistance otherwise
payable to such person. This includes applying, as
reimbursement, any benefits, payments, funds, or
accrual paid to or on behalf of said person from any
source against the amount of public assistance
expended on behalf of said person during the period
for which the benefits, payments, funds or accruals
were paid.

DSHS implemented RCW 74.13.060 with the following
regulation:

(1) If a child in foster care is entitled to
financial benefits the income received shall be used
on behalf of the child to help pay for the cost of the
foster care received, except for resources held in
trust for an American Indian child according to
provisions in WAC 388-28-650.

(a) Income includes SSI [Supplemental
Security Income], RSDI [retirement survivors
disability insurance], veteran’s benefits, railroad
retirement benefits, inheritances, or any other
payments for which the child is eligible, unless
specifically exempted by the terms and
conditions of the receipt of the income.

____(b) Receipt of other income as described
above shall not relieve the child’s responsible
parent(s) of the liability for payment of child
support in accordance with WAC 388-70-075
through 388-70-084.

(2) Any person, agency, or court which
receives any payments on behalf of a child in foster

A-7

care shall remit such payments to the office of
support enforcement, in accordance with WAC 388-
70-082.

(3) Resources in the control of a child in
foster care shall be treated in accordance with WAC
388-28-400 through 388-28-455.

Former WAC 388-70-069 (1983), repealed by St. Reg. 01-
08-047 (Apr. 30, 2001).

Where a child is eligible for Social Security
benefits,’ federal law provides a process by which a
“representative payee” may be appointed to administer the
funds on behalf of the child. Section 405(j)° of the Act
authorizes the Social Security Administration
(Administration or SSA) to appoint such a “representative
payee” for the child beneficiary:

If the [Administration] determines that the
interest of any individual under this subchapter
would be served thereby, certification of payment of
such individual’s benefit under this subchapter may
be made, regardless of the legal competency or
incompetency of the individual, either for direct
payment to the individual, or for his or her use and
benefit, to another individual, or an organization,

* Children are eligible to receive either Title II Social Security
Administration (SSA) benefits (based on the death or disability of a
parent), or Title XVI Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits
(based on the child’s own disability), or both.

* Section 405(j) authorizes the appoinument of a representative
payee to receive SSA benefits under Title I]. The appointment of a
representative payee to receive SSI benefits under Title XVI is also
authorized. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(aX2\AYii).

A-8

with respect to whom [certain] requirements ... have
been met (hereinafter in this subsection referred to
as the individual’s “representative payee”).

42 U.S.C. § 405G)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § §
404.2001(b), 416.601(b). Generally, a representative
payee is appointed whenever a beneficiary is under 18
years of age. The Administration has an order of
preference for representative payees for such children,
generally favoring the appointment of parents or relatives
of the child; it will appoint an authorized agency only if no
parent or guardian is available. The appointment of a state
agency like DSHS is the last on that priority list.° 42
U.S.C. § § 405(j(3)(B), 405G)(2C\iii)MID; 42 U.S.C. §
1383(aX(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. § § 404.2021, 416.621.

The Code of Federal Regulations explains the
function of representative payees:

A representative payee may be either a person or an
organization selected by us [the Social Security
Administration] to receive benefits on behalf of a
beneficiary. A representative payee will be selected
if we believe that the interest of a beneficiary will
be served by representative payment rather than
direct payment of benefits. Generally, we appoint a
representative payee if we have determined that the
beneficiary is not able to manage or direct the
management of benefit payments in his or her
interest.

® The Act prohibits the appointment of a creditor as
representative payee except, inter alia, where the creditor is a relative or
legal guardian of the beneficiary, or the creditor is a licensed state
facility. 42 USC. § 405G\2KCKIXID; 42 USC. §
1383(a)(2)(B\iii).

20 C.F.R. § 404.2001 (a).

The appointment of a representative payee such as
DSHS may be challenged. The Administration must notify
the beneficiary or legal guardian of the appointment of a
representative payee and must advise that the beneficiary
has the right to a hearing before the Commissioner and
judicial review to challenge any appointment. 42 U.S.C. §
405(j(2)E)(i), (ii); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(2)(B)(xi), (xii).

_ Representative payees, including state agencies,
must use Social Security benefits for the beneficiary, and in
the beneficiary’s best interest, under guidelines set forth in
the Administration’s regulations. 20 C.F.R. § §
404.2035(a), 416.635(a). The regulations specifically
authorize representative payees to use benefits to defray the
cost of the beneficiary’s “current maintenance,” including
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal items.
The regulations state, in relevant part:

We will consider that payments we certify to a
representative payee have been used for the use and
benefit of the beneficiary if they are used for the
beneficiary's current maintenance. Current
maintenance includes cost incurred in obtaining
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal
comfort items.

20 C.F.R. § § 404.2040(a)(1), 416.640(a). The regulations
also specify that the cost of institutionalized care is an
authorized expense. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.2040(b), 416.640(b).

When monthly SSA and/or SSI benefits exceed the
amount needed for current maintenance, the representative
payee is required to conserve and invest the remaining

A-10

benefits in trust for the benefit of the benefici

ciary. 20
C.F.R. § § 404.2045(a), (c), 416.645(a), (c). Large
amounts of retroactive benefits must be placed in a
separate, dedicated account and may be used only for
certain, enumerated expenditures. 20 C.F.R. § 416.640(e).

If 2 representative payee misuses benefits, the
representative payee may be removed by the
Admini tration. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1(A); 42 U.S.C. §
1383(a)(2)(A)(iii). Moreover, a representative payee’s
misuse of the beneficiary’s funds is a felony. 42 U.S.C. §
408(a)(S). Given the criminal penalty for misuse of funds
some courts have inferred a fiduciary relationship between
beneficiary and representative payee, although the statute
and implementing regulations do not say as much. See,
e.g., Garvey v. Worcester Housing Auth., 629 F.2d 691 (Ist
Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925, 101 S.Ct. 1379. 67
L.Ed.2d 356 (1981); Bradley v. Austin, 841 F.2d 1288 (6th
Cir.1988); C.G.A. v. State, 824 P.2d 1364 (Alaska 1992):
In re Estate of Merritt, 272 Ul.App.3d 1017, 209 Ill.Dec.
502, 651 N.E.2d 680 (1995); Rice v. Perales, 156 Misc.2d

631, 594 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup.Ct.), afd 193 A.D2
599 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1993). - aie

In September 1999, of the thousands of foster
children in the custody of DSHS pursuant to Title 13 and
chapter 74.13 RCW, 1,480 foster care children were
receiving Social Security benefits. Nine hundred twenty-
three children were receiving SSI benefits, 469 were
receiving SSA benefits, and 88 children were receiving

both. DSHS acted as a representative
children in foster care and in DDD. 2 Na aa

Two units within DSHS perform the actual function
of representative payee for the Social Security benefits of
class members. The Children’s Administration

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(Children’s) provides services to all foster children
regardless of whether the children also receive Social
Security benefits. These services include monitoring the
child’s needs, determining special needs, and developing an
individual service plan for each child. The Trust Fund Unit
accounts for Social Security benefits received by DSHS as

representative payee.

When a child is placed in foster care, Children’s
identifies those children who may be eligible for Social
Security benefits and makes an application on their behalf.
If Children’s believes a denial of benefits is erroneous,
Children’s will appeal for the child. In each case, DSHS
also applies to the Administration to become the
representative payee for the child (except for
developmentally disabled children).

When DSHS receives Social Security benefits as
representative payee for a foster child the funds are
deposited in a Foster Care Trust Fund Account at the Office
of the State Treasurer. Although the funds are in a single
account, the Trust Fund Unit maintains an individual
“subsidiary account” for each child for whom benefits are

received.’

Children’s is responsible for providing the current
maintenance needed by a child in foster care. However,

”? The only exception to this practice occurs when DSHS
receives a lump sum payment of SSI benefits of over six times the
monthly benefit amount. Since October 1996, these lump sum
payments have been deposited by the Administration directly into a
dedicated account at a local bank. These funds cannot be used for basic
foster care expenses, and can be expended only for special needs,
primarily related to a child's impairment. Prior to October 1996, these
funds were used to reimburse Children’s for past foster care expenses.

A-12

Children’s does not normally purchase a child’s food,
shelter, clothing, and other items directly. Rather, such
items are purchased and provided by the child’s foster
parent. Children’s pays the foster parent a fixed amount
based on a schedule. Where a special item or expenditure
is needed, the Trust Fund Unit will issue a check to either
the foster parent or directly to a store or service provider.
Such expenditures are authorized by DSHS in its discretion
as the representative payee.

The Trust Fund Unit typically uses a child’s Social
Security benefits to pay for a child’s basic foster care
expenses. Every month, Children’s generates a report
showing the amount of money paid by Children’s to a care
provider for each child in foster care. The Trust Fund Unit
uses this report to determine how much of a child’s SSI and
SSA funds it will direct the state treasurer to pay to
Children’s. In general, if the amount in the trust fund
account is adequate to reimburse the entire cost of foster
care, as claimed by Children’s, the entire claimed amount is
paid. If the funds in the trust fund account are not adequate
to reimburse the entire cost of foster care, the Trust Fund
Unit uses up to the amount available in the trust fund
account. The amount to be paid for foster care is
transferred from the Foster Care Trust Fund Account to
Children’s.

As representative payee, DSHS has the discretion to
expend a child’s SSA or SSI funds on items other than
current basic foster care expenses. Children’s staff may
request that a child’s benefits be used for extra items or
special needs, such as computers, educational expenses,
summer camps, counseling, toys, clothing, athletic
equipment and orthodontics. When in doubt, the Trust
Fund Unit consults with the Administration to determine
whether a particular expenditure is authorized.

Children in foster care for whom a person or entity
other than DSHS serves as representative payee still receive
state-supported foster care. Foster children who do not
receive any Social Security benefits are eligible for state
funding for extra items and special needs if funds are
available in the state foster care budget.

DSHS is also authorized to conserve and invest
Social Security benefits for foster children. Funds not used
for basic foster care or special needs are deposited into a
single interest-bearing account. The interest earned on this
account is credited to the child’s individual subsidiary
account. These funds are ultimately forwarded to a
successor representative payee or paid directly to the child
upon emancipation.

There is a $2,000 resource limit on any child
receiving SSI benefits (although funds deposited to the
dedicated account are not subject to this limit). DSHS
monitors each child’s subsidiary account to ensure the
balance remains below the limit. When a balance is

ing the resource limit, the Trust Fund Unit notifies
Children’s of the need to spend down the account balance.
Children’s determines what special needs might be met
using the excess funds and requests disbursements from the
Trust Fund Unit. DSHS uses reimbursements to Children’s
for current expenses as a means of not exceeding the
$2,000 limit.*

* Prior to October 1996, some dedicated accounts as well as
subsidiary accounts were spent down by reimbursing Children’s for
previous basic care expenditures. In addition, the practice of “account
sweeping” sometimes results in DSHS’s taking all of a child’s Social
Security funds and applying those funds ‘o accumulated (past)
reimbursable foster care expenses.

Federal law forbids creditor access to Social
Security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) provides:

The right of any person to any future payment under
this subchapter shall not be transferable or
assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the
moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this
subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or

to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency
law.

Commonly referred to as an antialienation provision, this
statute evinces Congress’s intent to remove Social Security
benefits from the reach of creditors employing legal
process. Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1355 (ist
Cir.1985). The statute also prohibits the voluntary transfer
or assignment of Social Security benefits by the
beneficiary. Gardner v. Ewing, 88 F.Supp. 315 (S.D.Ohio),
aff'd, 185 F.2d 781 (6th Cir.1950), rev'd on other grounds,
341 U.S. 321, 71 S.Ct. 684, 95 L.Ed. 968 (1951); accord
Hurd v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.Supp. 125 (N.D.II11.1955),
aff'd, 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 918,
77 S.Ct. 216, 1 L.Ed.2d 124 (1956). As the United States
Supreme Court noted in Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395,
397, 108 S.Ct. 1204, 99 L.Ed.2d 455 (1988), any state law
contrary to § 407(a) runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause.
Accord Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th
Cir.1995).

The present case arose from DSHS’s treatment of
class representative Danny Keffeler. Apparently, an
overzealous Department employee sought to have Danny's
grandmother and guardian removed as representative
payee. DSHS now asserts this was the only time it has ever

A-15

tried to remove a private representative payee. After four
years of , tigation involving just Danny, his guardian filed a
class action lawsuit in the Okanogan County Superior
Court on Danny’s behalf and on behalf of others “similarly
situated.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 1-15. According to the
amended complaint, DSHS has now abandoned its efforts
to become the representative payee for Danny.

The trial court certified the class, and later amended
the certification to include children receiving both SSA and
SSI benefits. The class now consists of “All foster children
within the State of Washington, past, present, and future in
foster care that receive [either SSA or SSI benefits) for
whom the State of Washington acts or has sought to act as
‘representative payee.” “ CP at 574.”

The gravamen of the class action is that DSHS’s
actions violate the antialienation provision of 42 U.S.C. §
407(a) where DSHS, as representative payee, uses a foster
child’s Social Security benefits to reimburse the state for
the costs of foster care. The class also presents several
constitutional causes of action. First, the class alleges
DSHS has acted irrationally, invidiously, and arbitrarily
and capriciously in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second,
the class alleges DSHS’s actions violate the due process
clauses of the Washington Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Third, the class alleges the state discriminates
against the class members “by subjecting them to a lower

* The actual number of class members cannot be determined
from records available to DSHS. Based on available records there are
7,798 class members dating back to July of 1991. According to the
trial court, “the claims of the class extend back 18 years plus one year
for a total of 19 years back from the filing of the plaintiffs’ action, i.e.
to 1979.” Court’s Findings of © +t on Order of Remand from Supreme
Court at 18.

A- 16

standard of living than children who are not so situated.”
Finally, the class alleges the state “maliciously, recklessly
and wantonly is invading federally protected funds for its
own improper advantage, to the detriment of Plaintiff and
all other foster children’s financial and emotional well-
being.” CP at 13-14.

In its prayer for relief, the class seeks (i) a
permanent injunction enjoining DSHS from using Social
Security payments to offset the cost of foster care; (ii)
reimbursement to class members of all Social Security
payments used by DSHS for reimbursement; and (iii) an
award of attorney’s fees.

DSHS moved to dismiss the action, i

. . 7 . . arguing the
Administration was an indispensable party that cannot be
sued in state court. In response, the class argued it was not
claiming the Administration has done anything wrongful,
only that DSHS is unlawfully taking Social Security
pert pen pry eee ~eeahcereor hegre
certifying the class. sorties

On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial
court filed a memorandum opinion and entered judgment in
favor of the class. The trial court held DSHS’s use of
Social Security benefits to reimburse the cost of foster care
violates 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), and DSHS violates procedural
due process by failing to provide notice, beyond that
required by federal law and regulation, of the “intended
result” of the appointment of DSHS as representative
payee. The trial court did not address the class’ remaining
constitutional arguments, nor did it specifically conclude
— rights violations under 42 U.S.C.

A-17

The trial court’s judgment provided the following
relief:

1. An injunction preventing DSHS from
ing action to replace any private representative
payee.

2. An injunction preventing DSHS from
requiring any private representative payee to repay
DSHS for the cost of maintaining a child in foster
care from Social Security benefit payments.

3. An injunction requiring DSHS to provide
written notice containing certain information to a
child’s parent(s) or legal guardian whenever DSHS
applies to become a representative payee for the
child.

4. An injunction preventing DSHS from
using Social Security payments to reimburse the
costs of foster care.

5. An order requiring DSHS to produce an
accounting of Social Security fund disbursements
for all children that had been in the custody of
DSHS for the purpose of receiving foster care.

6. An order of restitution of Social Security
funds used to reimburse DSHS for foster care

expenses.

7. An award of attorney's fees, with the
amount to be determined in the future.

DSHS appealed the trial court’s judgment to
Division Three of the Court of Appeals, although no error

A-18

was assigned to items | or 2 referenced above. Because of
the importance of the issues in this case, the Court of
Appeals certified the case to us and we granted the
certification. After the first oral argument of the case, we
remanded the matter to the trial court pursuant to RAP
9.11. The parties have supplemented the record and the
trial court has made findings of fact.

ANALYSIS

A. DSHS’s actions as representative payee violated
42 U.S.C. § 407(a).

Simply put, if DSHS is appointed representative
payee for a foster child it will confiscate the child’s SSI
money to benefit the state. However, if anyone else is
appointed, the state will bear the cost of foster care, and the
child’s SSI will be available to benefit the child in addition
to the state- funded foster care program. The issue is
whether this confiscation violates federal law. For the
reasons which follow we believe it does.

DSHS admits it would probably not even apply to
be a representative payee if it could not rely on the child’s
SSI benefits to reimburse the cost of care. By the same
token, DSHS admittedly cannot actively seek
reimbursement from benefits paid to private representative
payees because Congress specifically protects Social
Security benefits from transfer, assignment, execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process under
42 U.S.C. § 407(a).'° [FN10] Thus, DSHS receives

'° The federal code provides, in pertinent part,

The right of any person to any future payment under this
subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in
equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights

A-19

reimbursement for foster care only if it serves as a
representative payee, and it only serves as representative
payee so it can confiscate the child’s money. ''

This schemé stands in stark contrast to 20 C.F.R. §
404.2021 which expressly provides, “Our primary concern
is to select the payee who will best serve the beneficiary's
interest.” (Emphasis added.) Obviously the child is better
off with any payee other than the state because DSHS must
provide foster care under state law regardless of whether it
receives a reimbursement.’ DSHS’s self-prioritization is
extremely disquieting in the face of a regulatory mandate
that we consider these disenfranchised children before
enriching government coffers.

1. DSHS as a creditor
Whether DSHS acts as a creditor when it

reimburses itself for foster care costs out of the foster
children’s Social Security Administration (SSA)

existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the
operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.

42 U.S.C. § 407(a). This section was made applicable to Title
XVI benefits by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d\(1).

'! The trial court found “/fJor the sole purpose of obtaining
reimbursement for foster care costs, DSHS applies to the Social
Security Administration to be appointed representative payee for all
children in foster care who are eligible for social security benefits.”
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 623 (Trial Court’s Mem. Op. (Sept. 29, 1998) at
3) (emphasis added).

'2 DSHS forecasted it would receive $6.733 million from such
reimbursement, or fully 18 percent of the state’s contribution to the
foster care budget of $37 million, for fiscal year 2000. CP at 1899,
1911 (Trial Court’s Findings of Fact on Order of Remand, Exs. B, F).

A-20

entitlements is the crucial question. If DSHS’s
reimbursement scheme is that of a creditor, the
antiattachment provisions of § 407(a) apply and DSHS’s
cost recovery policy runs afoul of a federal statute which
preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

The facial logic of DSHS’s reimbursement scheme
demonstrates a creditor relationship, a_ relationship
involving creditor-type acts, vis-a-vis foster children and
their SSA benefits. Further, while no federal case
addresses the peculiar set of facts involved here, the course
of federal precedent in similar situations arising under §
407(a) undercuts the claim that DSHS complies with
federal law.

In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S.
413, 93 S.Ct. 590, 34 L.Ed.2d 608 (1973), the United States
Supreme Court described the broad protection § 407
affords Social Security benefits. Philpott declared that §
407 barred New Jersey’s attempt to reach federal Social
Security disability benefits in order to reimburse the state
for public assistance expenditures made on behalf of the
petitioners. State welfare recipients were made to execute
an agreement, as a condition precedent to receiving welfare
benefits, to reimburse the county welfare board with any
funds that came into their possession. When Philpott
refused to turn his SSA disability benefits over to the
welfare board the latter sued to enforce the agreement. The
Supreme Court held § 407 on its face prohibited New
Jersey from reaching the petitioner’s federal disability
payments, explaining, “We see no reason why a State,
performing its statutory duty to take care of the needy,
should be in a preferred position as compared with any
other creditor.” Philpott, 409 U.S. at 416, 93 S.Ct. 590.

A-2l

Responding to the argument New Jersey may not be
a creditor with respect to the SSA benefits, the Court
continued: “§ 407 does not refer to any ‘claim of
creditors’; it imposes a broad bar against the use of any
legal process to reach all social security benefits. That is
broad enough to include all claimants, including a State.”
409 U.S. at 417, 93 S.Ct. 590. This language evinces a
federal policy with respect to SSA benefits--the “broad
bar”--which controls this case.

The Supreme Court again took up § 407(a) in
Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 108 S.Ct. 1204, 99
L.Ed.2d 455 (1988), where Arkansas attempted to attach
certain federal benefits paid to individuals incarcerated in
Arkansas prisons to reimburse the state for maintaining a
prison system. Arkansas argued an “implied exception” to
the broad bar of § 407(a) (as here) where the state is
providing public money for the care and maintenance of the
SSA beneficiary. The Court found no such “care and
maintenance” exception for states “given the express
language of § 407(a) and the clear intent of Congress that
Social Security benefits not be attachable.” Bennett, 485
U.S. at 397-98, 108 S.Ct. 1204. DSHS in the instant case
attempts to evade § 407(a) by arguing that it simply
provides the “care and maintenance” intended by the SSA.
We find that argument as unavailing, notwithstanding some
factual dissimilarities, as did the Supreme Court.

Closer to home, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Brinkman
v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263 (9th Cir.1989) DSHS may not
deduct SSA benefits as reimbursement for the costs of care
and maintenance, paid out of public funds, for involuntarily
committed mental health patients in state hospitals. The
court noted, “The state collects this debt from the appellees
by withdrawing [Old Age Survivor’s and Disability
Insurance] funds from appellees’ accounts at the state

A-22

hospital accounting offices,” finding § 407 i

preempts this
procedure. Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264. There Sie a
significant enough difference between DSHS’s methods in
Brinkman and its methods of reaching the foster children’s
SSA benefits in this case’ to justify a different result.

The Ninth Circuit again addressed the issue in
Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.1995) where,
under California law, patients committed to state
psychiatric hospitals were held responsible for the costs of
their own incarceration. California accordingly required all
funds and income, including SSA benefits, to which the
patient was entitled to be placed in a hospital trust account
from which the state could deduct as reimbursement the
costs of care and maintenance expended on the patient.
porter er dimer: Am: carp Spent dn pre
authorized deduction. Holding § 407 preem this
procedure, the Ninth Circuit held: ae

'? DSHS’s actual practice, as described by its Office Chief for
the Office of Federal Funding in the Division of Program and Policy
for the Children’s Administration, is:

to apply to the Social Security Administration (SSA) to be the

Representative Payee for social security monies whenever a

child is placed in foster care. If SSA chooses to make DCFS

[Division of Children and Family Services] the Representative

Payee, the actual checks are sent to the Department's Office of

Financial Recovery and the money is then transferred to a

suspense account in the Department’s Office of Accounting

Services. This money is used to reimburse the Department for

monthly foster care expenses, including food, clothing, shelter

and other personal or medical expenses as governed by the

Code of Federal Regulations. Excess money is placed in trust

ane SSD NaS SPN SS Se SUNN SIRENS,

CP at 120 (Aff. of Richard Anderson) (emphasis added).

A-23

Our conclusion, that “other legal process” includes
the procedure that California uses to deduct Social
Security benefits, is consistent with the purpose of §
407. The nonassignment provision was not
designed to preclude use of only the judicial process
to obtain Social Security benefits. Rather, § 407(a)
is designed “to protect social security beneficiaries
and their dependents from the claims of creditors.”
The cramped reading of § 407 California urges
would enable the state to obtain Social Security
benefits through procedures that afford less
protection than judicial process affords.

Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166 (citations omitted).

These cases evince an expansive interpretation of
the protections of § 407. The thrust of the case law is that
Social Security benefits are, for all intents and purposes,
beyond the reach of the state, however clever or subtle its
attempt to seize them. Philpott and the cases in its line,
including Crawford, are on point and persuasive.

The state claims King v. Schafer, 940 F.2d 1182
(8th Cir.1991) justifies DSHS’s position, particularly
because DSHS acts as a representative payee under 42
U.S.C. § 405(j) for the foster children in this case. In King
the State of Missouri, as representative payee, received
SSA benefits due involuntarily committed mental patients
and reimbursed itself for the care and maintenance costs
expended out of public funds for the patients. The patients
argued the state’s application to become the patient's
representative payee to accept the patients’ SSA benefits
violated the “other legal process” provision of § 407(a).
However the King court disagreed, noting the illogic of
presuming § 407(a) would outlaw a procedure (applying to
become representative payee) expressly authorized by §

A-24

405(j). “We cannot agree with the plaintiffs,” wrote the
King court, “that the Department’s participation in the
administrative proceeding to become a representative payee
is the kind of coercive legal process envisioned by §
407(a).” King, 940 F.2d at 1185.

In light of King, and the fact that DSHS enjoys the
status of representative payee (for most) of the foster
children under § 405(j) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.2001(a), the
significance of the state’s representative payee status
requires further discussion. '

The King plaintiffs challenged the state’s procedure —

for applying to become representative payee, arguing that
procedure (incident to which the state seized the mental
health patient’s SSA benefits) violated § 407(a) as “other
legal process.” However here it is not DSHS’s procedure
to apply to become the foster children’s representative
payée that is under attack; rather it is DSHS’s practice of
reimbursing itself from the foster children’s SSA benefits
once it becomes representative payee.

'* Apparently DSHS is not the representative payee for Danny
Keffeler, the class representative. Keffeler’s grandmother apparently
remained his representative payee, despite DSHS’s zealous efforts to
remove her. Br. of Appellants at 1-4. This fact is of some interest in
light of King, because the King court found that with respect to those
mental health patients for whom the state was not the representative
payee, the state’s attempts to reach the SSA benefits did constitute
“other legal process” and was preempted by § 407(a). King v. Schafer,
940 F.2d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir.1991). We doubt the King court’s
distinction is internally consistent but refrain from entertaining those
doubts, as it does not further the analysis on this point.

A-25

The difference is subtle, but the distinction is
crucial. There is nothing ipso facto wrong with DSHS
applying to become the representative payee for certain
foster children, as § 405(j) and the SSA’s accompanying
regulations explicitly contemplate. We may even agree the
representative payee application is not “other legal
process.” But it is equally clear the reimbursement process
is “other legal process,” given the definition of that phrase
furnished by Philpott, Brinkman, Bennett, and Crawford.
Accordingly, King must be distinguished, as Judge
Burchard below correctly concluded, “[T]here is no legal
basis for giving foster children less protection for their
social security benefits than adult welfare recipients, state
prisoners or involuntarily committed mental patients
receive.” CP at 627 (Trial Court’s Mem. Op. (Sept. 29,
1998) at 7).

The state also claims C.G.A., 824 P.2d 1364
supports its position. But C.G.A. only said the state may
apply to become a representative payee. C.G.A., 824 P.2d
at 1366. The court did not hold the state could reimburse
itself but deferred that determination to the Social Security
agency under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. /d at
1370. Like King, C.G.A. stands for no more than the
uncontested proposition DSHS may apply to become a

representative payee.

DSHS reimbursement is barred by § 407(a) because
despite DSHS’s status as representative payee it performs
the role of creditor when it takes the foster child’s SSA
entitlement to reimburse itself for moneys spent on the
child. A representative payee may not be a “creditor of
such individual who provides such individual with goods
and services for consideration.” 42 USC. §
405(j(2(C)G)CID.

A -26

However to claim DSHS does not provide goods
and services for consideration is only to say that DSHS is
not the kind of creditor which § 405(j) excludes from
representative payee status. It is not to say the definition of
a creditor “who provides such individual with goods and
services for consideration,” id, is an exhaustive definition
of other creditors who do not, nor is it to say DSHS cannot
become a creditor or act like a creditor despite the fact it is
a representative payee. If DSHS is allowed under § 405(j)
to become a representative payee for the foster children,
that fact does not establish the legality of taking the child's
money.

Furthermore, the bare logic of reimbursement also
implies a creditor-debtor relationship. Common sense and
dictionary definition of “reimburse” is “[t]o pay back, to
make restoration, to repay that expended; to indemnify, or
make whole.” Black's Law Dictionary 1287 (6th ed.1990).
In common parlance one need not make a payback unless
something “loaned” was “owed” by the recipient back to
the payee. In fact the public policy of our state to recover
the costs expended from public funds on foster children
implies exactly this sort of debtor-creditor relationship. '*

'* That policy finds its statutory expression in RCW
74.13.060:

The secretary [of DSHS] or his designees or
delegatees shall be the custodian without compensation of
such moneys and other funds of any person which may come
into the possession of the secretary during the period such
person is placed with the department of social and health
services pursuant to chapter 74.13 RCW. As such custodian,
the secretary shall have authority to disburse moneys from the
person's funds for the following purposes only and subject to
the following limitations:

(1) The secretary may disburse any of the funds
belonging to such person for such personal needs of such

A-27

As DSHS presently conceptualizes the matter, RCW
74.13.060 (and its implementing regulation, former WAC
388-70-069)'° requires it to reimburse itself for the public
assistance it has meted out to foster children from money,
including SSA entitlements, that come into the children’s
possession. If the Legislature and DSHS did not hold the
costs of foster care were somehow “owed” back to the
taxpayers, it would not claim the right of DSHS to
“reimburse” itself on the taxpayer’s behalf.

person as the secretary may deem proper and necessary.

(2) The secretary may apply such funds against the
amount of public assistance otherwise payable to such person.
This includes applying, as reimbursement, any benefits,
payments, funds, or accrual paid to or on behalf of said person
from any source against the amount of public assistance
expended on behalf of said person during the period for which
the benefits, payments, funds or accruals were paid.

'® The code states, in pertinent part, that:

(1) If a child in foster care is entitled to financial
benefits the income received shall be used on behalf of the
child to help pay for the cost of the foster care received...

(a) Income includes SSI, RSDI, veteran's
benefits, railroad retirement benefits, inheritances, or
any other payments for which the child is eligible,
unless specifically exempted by the terms and
conditions of the receipt of the income....

(2) Any person, agency, or court which receives any
payments on behalf of a child in foster care shall remit such
payments to the office of support enforcement, in accordance
with WAC 388-70-082.

Former WAC 388-70-069( 1 (a), (2).

A-28

DSHS’s_ representative payee status further
undercuts the legality of its reimbursement process because
a representative payee is charged under SSA regulation, 20
C.F.R. § 404.2035, with the responsibility to “[u]se the
payments he or she receives only for the use and benefit of
the beneficiary in a manner and for the purposes he or she
determines, under the guidelines in this subpart, to be in the
best interests of the beneficiary.” Id § 404.2035(a)
(emphasis added). We seriously doubt using the SSA
benefits to reimburse the state for its public assistance
expenditure is in all cases, or even some, “in the best
interests of the beneficiary.”

Using this money for the care and maintenance of
the beneficiary, as required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035(a),
would indeed be in the best interest of the beneficiary, but
that is significantly different from using the money to
reimburse the state for payments it made for the care and
maintenance of the foster child--especially when that
payment to the state cannot be legally compelled and,
moreover, could be used or conserved for other special
needs of the child.

As the state concedes, DSHS takes on a fiduciary or
quasi-fiduciary role when it acts as representative payee.
Br. of Appellants at 3. DSHS’s reimbursement procedure
hence constitutes a conflict of interest precisely because
DSHS uses the SSA benefits it receives as representative
payee in a manner inconsistent with the best interests of the
foster children entitled to the money. However worthy cost
recovery might be, DSHS cannot violate federal law at the
expense of foster children to accomplish it.

Accordingly we hold each instance of
reimbursement makes DSHS a creditor, or, if not a creditor,
then at least committed to a creditor-type action that is

A-29

preempted by the “broad bar” of § 407(a). DSHS’s
application under § 405(j) to become a foster child’s
representative payee is at best immaterial to the analysis
pertaining to its use of SSA benefits as reimbursement, or
is at worst incompatible with that use of the benefits, as
discussed above. Given our view that the state’s actions
violate the Supremacy Clause we find it unnecessary to
consider other alleged constitutional infirmities such as
deprivation of property without due process or denial of the
equal protection of the law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

B. The trial court award of attorney fees is not
sufficiently specific.

The summary judgment which we review provided:

It is hereby ordered that plaintiff should be
awarded attorney fees, the amount of which, and the
theory under which awarded, shall abide future
ruling of this court.

Pl.’s Order Granting Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., CP at
666. The quoted language does not clarify the scope or
basis of the attorney fee award and therefore must be
revisited on remand.

Under the American Rule for attorney fees,
compensation may be awarded only if authorized by
contract, statute, or a recognized ground in equity. Bowles
v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 121 Wash.2d 52, 70, 847 P.2d 440
(1993) (citing Painting & Decorating Contractors of Am.
Inc. v. Ellensburg Sch. Dist., 96 Wash.2d 806, 815, 638
P.2d 1220 (1982); Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wash.2d
476, 540, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)). A_ well-established

A-30

equitable ground for awarding attorney fees is the common
fund doctrine. See Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wash.2d
874, 891, 905 P.2d 324 (1995); Bowles, 121 Wash.2d at 70,
847 P.2d 440; Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 90 Wash.2d at 542-45,
585 P.2d 71. It applies when a litigant preserves or creates
a common fund for the benefit of an ascertainable category
of persons. Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash.2d 307,
339, 678 P.2d 803 (1984) (quoting Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of
Snohomish County v. Kottsick, 86 Wash.2d 388, 390-91,
545 P.2d 1 (1976)). The doctrine serves important public
functions, and, in light of the purpose of the American Rule
for attorney fees, should be applied only when such
functions are met. Accord Covell, 127 Wash.2d at 892, 905
P.2d 324 (awarding attorney fees based on the common
fund doctrine because the policy reasons “clearly are
supported”). If properly applied, it provides greater access
to those who otherwise may be unable to afford the services
of an attorney. Bowles, 121 Wash.2d at 71, 847 P.2d 440.

Although the common fund doctrine provides an
avenue whereby attorneys may be reimbursed from the
fund created, other equitable and/or statutory grounds may
allow an affirmative recovery against the nonprevailing
party. 42 U.S.C. § 1988, for example, may provide an
arguable basis for such an award; however, neither the trial
court nor the parties have adequately articulated the
equitable or statutory basis to impose liability against the
state for reasonable attorney fees and expenses of litigation
in the context of this case. This issue therefore must be
considered further on remand.

CONCLUSION
We therefore hold DSHS violated § 407(a) of the

Act when acting as the representative payee under § 405(j)
of the Act by reimbursing itself for foster care payments,

A-3l

contrary to the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. We therefore affirm the trial court’s result,
with this opinion. The class shall recover its statutory costs
on appeal without prejudice to a further award of
reasonable attorney fees to be determined on remand.

ALEXANDER, C.J., and SMITH, JOHNSON and
MADSEN, JJ., concur.

BRIDGE, J. (concurring in part/dissenting in part). |
agree with the majority that the Washington State
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS)
impermissibly used social security funds to reimburse itself
for past due foster care payments. However, the majority
goes too far in concluding that any use of social security
funds by DSHS violates the antiattachment rule. Under a fair
reading of the controlling federal statute and regulatory
authority, DSHS is entitled to use the funds to pay for current
maintenance costs, provided that special
children are satisfied first. = eo

The federal law governing the appointment of
representative payees and the use to which funds received on
behalf of beneficiaries can be put is 42 U.S.C. § 405(j).
RCW 74.13.060 allows DSHS to become the custodian (i.e.
representative payee) “without compensation” of social
security funds’ payable to foster children:

The secretary or his designees or delegatees shall be
the custodian without compensation of such moneys
and other funds of any person which may come into
the possession of the secretary during the period such
person is placed with the department of social and
health services pursuant to chapter 74.13 RCW.

Tracking federal law, state law provides that once DSHS
becomes the custodian (“representative payee”) of the funds,
DSHS is permitted to spend these funds only for the child’s
“personal needs” or to reimburse the state for “the amount of
public assistance otherwise payable to” the child during the
period for which the benefits were paid. RCW 74.13.060(1),

Social Security (SSA) and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) benefits.

A-33

(2). Former WAC 388-70-069 (1983), repealed by 01-08-
047 (Apr. 30, 2001), specifically allowed the social security
funds to be used on behalf of the child to help defray the
state’s cost for foster care:

(1) If a child in foster care is entitled to
financial benefits the income received shall be used
on behalf of the child to help pay for the cost of the
foster care received, except for resources held in trust
for an American Indian child according to provisions
in WAC 388-28-650.

(a) Income includes SSI, RSDI [retirement
survivors disability insurance], veteran’s benefits,
railroad retirement benefits, inheritances, or any
other payments for which the child is eligible,
unless specifically exempted by the terms and
conditions of the receipt of the income.

The majority concludes that “If DSHS’s
reimbursement scheme is that of a creditor, the
antiattachment provisions of § 407(a) [of the Social Security
Act] apply and DSHS’s cost recovery policy runs afoul of a
federal statute which preempts state law.” Majority at 275.
This statement is misleading in its scope. The Social
Security Act, chapter 7, 42 U.S.C., does not rule out
appointment of a creditor as representative payee in all
situations. One of the exceptions to the antiattachment
provisions of the act allows the appointment of “an
individual who is determined by the Commissioner ... to be
acceptable to serve.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)ili)(V). Thus,
even if DSHS is characterized as a creditor, the
commissioner of social security may find, and here has
found, DSHS acceptable to serve as a representative payee

A-34

for these children in foster care.” The determination of the
Social Security Act should control. The real issue, in my
view, is the conflict of interest that arises when DSHS serves
both as a representative payee and as a creditor for the same
funds (which funds belong to the eligible child, the
beneficiary) and the permissible uses of such funds.

Federal regulations not only govern the selection of a
representative payee, but also define the lawful uses to which
a representative payee may put the social security funds
entrusted to its care. Specifically, a representative payee has
a responsibility to “[uJse the payments he or she receives
only for the use and benefit of the beneficiary in a manner
and for the purposes he or she determines, under the
guidelines in this subpart, to be in the best interests of the
beneficiary.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.635(a). Current maintenance,
including the cost of food, shelter, clothing, medical care,
and personal-comfort items is deemed to be for the use and
benefit of the beneficiary. 20 C.F.R. § 416.640(a).

An example in the regulations clarifies the definition
of “use and benefit” inthe context of payments to an
institution for current maintenance of the beneficiary and
indicates a clear intent that special needs of the beneficiary
should take precedence over general maintenance or
reimbursement for care.’ The example states that the

? If the commissioner may find an individual acceptable to serve,
he may presumably find an entity acceptable to serve. This interpretation
is reinforced by the fact that the commissioner routinely appoints entities
such as DSHS to serve as representative payees.

> Example: An institutionalized beneficiary is entitled to a
monthly Social Security benefit of $320. The institution charges
$700 a month for room and board. The beneficiary's brother,
who is the payee, learns the beneficiary needs new shoes and
does not have any funds to purchase miscellaneous items at the
institution's canteen.

A-35

representative payee should deduct the cost of special needs
items from the amount paid to the institution, and also makes
clear that any remaining money may be used for current

maintenance

The majority relies on four federal cases to assert that
DSHS may not use social security funds for current
maintenance: Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S.
413, 93 S.Ct. 590, 34 L.Ed.2d 608 (1973) (holding that New
Jersey may not attach social security benefits to reimburse
itself for welfare benefits); Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S.
395, 108 S.Ct. 1204, 99 L.Ed'2d 455 (1988) (holding that
Arkansas may not attach federal benefits for care and
maintenance of prisoners); Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263
(9th Cir.1989) (forbidding Washington State from attaching
federal benefits for the care of involuntarily comumitted
mental health patients); and Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d
1162 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that California may not deduct
the costs of caring for psychiatric inpatiemts from # trust
account to which social security payments were deposited).

These cases are readily distinguished from the DSHS
practice at issue here. Critically, none of the cited federal

The payee takes his brother to town and buys him a pair
of shoes for $29. He also takes the beneficiary to see @ movie
which costs $3. When they return to the institution, the payee
gives his brother $3 to be used at the canteen.

Although the payee normally withholds only $25 a
month from Social Security benefit for the beneficiary's

personal needs, this month the payee deducted the above
expenditures and paid the institution $10 less than he usually

pays.
The above expenditures represent what we would
consider to be proper expenditures for current maintenance.

20 C.F.R. § 404,2040(2\(b).

A-36

cases involve the expendiwre of social security benefits by a
state that was designated as a representative payee. In fact,
the class certified in Brinkman specifically excluded patients
for whom the state served as representative payee.
Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264. As explained above, under
federal regulations a representative payee has considerable
authority to spend the funds entrusted to its control, provided
the expenditures are for the best interests of the beneficiary.
20 C.F.R. § 416.635(a).

Thus, the issue as I see it is not whether DSHS may
spend the funds for current maintenance, provided it gives
priority to special needs of the foster children, but whether it
may use those funds to reimburse itself for past maintenance
or for its own administrative services, such as mileage
reimbursements for social workers. The fact that DSHS in
the context of reimbursing itself for past care of the
beneficiary puts its need for reimbursement ahead of the
needs of the foster children further demonstrates the
fundamental conflict between its roles as representative
payee and creditor.

The federal mandate to give priority to the special
needs of the beneficiary directly conflicts with the express
policy of DSHS to conserve the expenditure of public
assistance funds on foster care and thereby lighten the burden
on the taxpayer. See chapter 74.20 RCW (Support of
Dependent Children):

It is the responsibility of the state of Washington
through the state department of social and health
services to conserve the expenditure of public
assistance funds, whenever possible, in order that
such funds shall not be expended if there are private
funds available or which can be made available by
judicial process or otherwise to partially or

A-37

completely meet the financial needs of the children of
this state.

RCW 74.20.010. The state aggressively pursues this

‘ recovery policy, not only seeking money for current

maintenance but also sweeping lump sum payments into the
treasury to prevent a child’s account from exceeding the
$2,000 resource limit imposed by the SSA.

In order to provide states with an incentive to provide
financial assistance to needy individuals awaiting disposition
of their SSI applications, Congress provided that back
payments made at the time the secretary makes the first
payment would be exempt from the general antiattachment
rule. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g)(2). However, a recent case held
that a retroactive payment after a period of denial is not the
same as an initial payment and therefore does not fall under
the exemption to the antiattachment rule that is found in 42
U.S.C. § 1383(g)(2). Catarine v. Wing, 710 N.Y.S.2d 569,
274 A.D.2d 310 (2000). Accord Conaway v. Soc. Servs.
Admin., 298 Md. 639, 471 A.2d 1058 (1984) (holding that
the use of conserved social security benefits to reimburse the
cost of past foster care is prohibited). Thus, the lump sums
that DSHS “sweeps” into the treasury to reimburse the state
for past foster care expenses cannot fall under the initial
payment exception. There is no other exception which would
validate DSHS’s action.

This sweeping of lump sums not only is unauthorized
under any exception to § 407(a), but also often constitutes
double reimbursement. The sums “swept” to the treasury
frequently reimburse the state for amounts already paid by
the federal government under Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families or paid by parental support. DSHS
apparently keeps no accurate record to allow tracing of the
“swept” sums.

Under § 407(a), rights to future payments are not
transferable or assignable.

The right of any person to any future payment
under this subchapter shall not be transferable or
assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the
moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this
subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to
the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.

42 U.S.C. § 407(a). DSHS receives the payments not on its
own behalf, but on behalf of the beneficiaries, and is not
permitted to assign pending (i.e., future) payments to the
reimbursement of its expenditures on behalf of the foster
children. Where an agency puts reimbursement to itself
ahead of the best interests of the child, ignoring the policy
expressed in the federal regulations to prioritize the child’s
special needs, it effectively transfers the payments to its own
use. This transfer from the state in its role as representative
payee to the state in its role as guardian of the public purse is
contrary to § 407(a). Where the agency pursues that policy
to the extent of double reimbursement, the conflict of interest
is egregious.

To the extent that RCW 74.20A.010 encourages the
State to “sweep” a child’s benefits into the treasury to repay
past-due foster care, | agree with the majority that the statute
is incompatible with § 405(j), which forbids any “substantial
conflict of interest” between the payee. U.S.C. §
405G2KCiv\MIl). See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1A)
(mandating removal of a representative payee if the
commissioner or a court of competent jurisdiction later
determines that it has misused any individual’s benefit.) It is
also incompatible with § 407(a), which prevents transfer of

A-39

the benefits. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, federal law takes precedence. Thus, any
use of social security funds for purposes other than current
care and maintenance is unlawful, as is giving priority to
maintenance over the children’s special needs.

Remedies

I agree with the majority that in relying on RCW
74.20A.010, DSHS has given preference to the interests of
the taxpayer over the special needs of foster children and has
acted as creditor by reimbursing itself for past payment of
foster care, directly contrary to § § 405(j) and 407(a) of the
Social Security Act. But for reasons already set forth in this
opinion, I would remand this matter to the trial court with
directions to modify the injunction to prevent DSHS from
using social security payments to reimburse the costs of past
due foster care or other expenses not directly related to
current maintenance, and to require DSHS give special
needs a higher priority than current maintenance. On
remand, the trial court should order DSHS to produce an
accounting of social security fund disbursements for all
children that had been in the custody of DSHS for the
purpose of receiving foster care, establish restitution of social
security funds used to reimburse DSHS for past due foster
care expenses, other expenses not directly related to current
maintenance, and unmet special needs, and determine
appropriate attorney fees.

I thus respectfully concur in part and dissent in part
from the majority opinion.

IRELAND, J., and GUY, J.P.T., concur.

A-40

THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

GUARDIANSHIP ESTATE OF
DANNY KEFFELER, BY WANDA
PIERCE, Guardian, and other No. 67680-1
persons similarly situated,
ORDER DENYING
Respondents, MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Vv.

STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICES, LYLE
QUASIM, Director of the
Department of Social and Health
Services, et al.,

Appellants.

The Court having considered the Appellants’ Motion
for Reconsideration;

Now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED:

That the Appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration is
denied.

DATED at Olympia, Washington this 14th day of
December 2001.

//s/I
Chief Justice Gerry L. Alexander

cc:

A-4l

I have affixed the seal of the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington and
filed this Mandate this 14th day of
December 2001

//s//
C.J. MERRITT

Clerk of the Supreme Court, State of
Washington |

Debra Casparian
Lawrence Lockwood
Rodney Reinbold
Deborah Kant
Colette Matzzie
William Collins
Richard Price
Eugene Studer
William Kanter
Reporter of Decisions

A-42

THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

GUARDIANSHIP ESTATE OF

DANNY KEFFELER, BY WANDA
PIERCE, Guardian, and other MANDATE
persons similarly situated,

Respondents,
V. Okanogan County No.

STATE OF WASHINGTON —
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICES, LYLE
QUASIM, Director of the
Department of Social and Health
Services, et al.,

NO. 67680-1

Appellants.

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON TO: The Superior Court
of the State of Washington in and for Okanogan County.

This is to certify that the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington filed on October 11, 2001,
became the decision terminating review of this Court in the
above entitled cause on December 14, 2001. This cause is
mandated to the superior court from which the appeal was
taken for further proceedings in accordance with the attached
true copy of the opinion.

Pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 14.3, costs
are taxed as follows: No cost bills having been timely filed
costs are deemed waived. Order Denying Motion for
Reconsideration was entered here in [sic] on December 14,
2001. Copy attached.

A-43

THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

GUARDIANSHIP ESTATE OF
DANNY KEFFELER,

No. 67680-1
Respondent,

by WANDA PIERCE, Guardian, and
other persons similarly situated,

ORDER ON REMAND

Vv.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICES, et al.,

Appellants.

Oral argument was heard in the above reference case on
June 24, 1999. The Court having considered the above case:

Now, therefore, it is
ORDERED:

The case is remanded pursuant to RAP 9.11 to the trial
court for the record to be supplemented as follows:

1. The State should submit the August 1998 audit by the
Social Security Administration of the Department of Social
and Health Services referred to at page seven of the amicus
curiae brief of the Commissioner of the United States Social
Security Administration.

2. The parties should submit the following information
and the trial court make findings of fact on the following:

The current number of foster care children in the
State’s custody pursuant to chapter 74.13 RCW.

. The number of such children who are also

beneficiaries of any Social Security payments,
identifying the specific program under which the
payments are made.

. The number of children identified in paragraph b for

whom the State is the representative payee pursuant
to the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(j) (1998).

. A detailed explanation of how the State processes and
uses Social Security payments it receives as the
representative payee of foster care children, to include
the following information:

for foster care children;

ii. How the State administers those accounts with
respect to the $2,000 limit on accumulation of

Title XVI Social Security payments;

iii. Whether and how Social Security payments to the
State receives as representative payee are “passed
through” to the foster parents of the beneficiary
children.

. A detailed explanation of the services the State
performs on behalf of foster care children in its

capacity as representative payee.

. The number of class members and how far back in

time their claims extend.

A-45

submit additional evidence to assist the trial court in its
, See
; The trial court is directed to expedite the hearing of
this matter and return its findings of fact to this Court as soon
as practical.

DATED at Olympia, Washington this 2nd day of
December, 1999.

//s// [Richard P. Guy]
CHIEF JUSTICE

A-46

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF OKANOGAN

GUARDIANSHIP ESTATE OF
DANNY KEFFELER, by WANDA | No. 96-2-00157-2
PIERCE, Guardian, and other
persons similarly situated, SUPREME COURT

NO. 67680-1
Plaintiffs,
COURT’S FINDINGS

v. OF FACT ON
ORDER OF

STATE OF WASHINGTON REMAND FROM
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND | SUPREME COURT
HEALTH SERVICES,

Defendant,
And

LYLE QUASIM, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
AND HEALTH SERVICES; AND
MICHAEL R. HOBBS,
PROGRAM MANAGER FOR
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICE,

THIS matter came before this court pursuant to the Order
on Remand issued by the Supreme Court pursuant to RAP
9.11 on December 2, 1999. The order on Remand directs this
court to make findings of fact on the following:

a. The current number of foster care children in

the State's custody pursuant to chapter 74.13.
RCW.

b. The number of such children who are also
beneficiaries of any Social Security Payments,
Identifying the specific program under which the
payments are made.

c. The number of children identified in paragraph
b for whom the State is the representative payee
pursuant to provisions of 42 USCA § 405(j)
(1998).

d. A detailed explanation of how the State

processes and uses social security payments it
receives as the representative payee of foster

children, to include the following information

i. Whether the State maintains individual
accounts for foster care _ children;

ii. How the State administers those accounts
with respect to the $2,000 limit on
accumulation of title XVI Social Security

Payments;

iii. Whether and how Social Security
Payments the State receives as representative
payee are “passed through” to the foster
parents of the beneficiary children.

(e) A detailed explanation of the services the State
performs on behalf of foster care children in its
capacity as representative payee.

(f) The number of class members and how far
back in time their claims extend.

After reviewing the affidavits, depositions, and the
exhibits filed herein and having considered counsel’s
arguments, the court makes the following findings of fact in
response to the questions posed in the Order on Remand.

Paragraph 1 «* the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand.

1. The 1998 audit conducted by the Social Security
Administration of the Department of Social and Health
Services referred to at p. 7 of the Amicus Curiae Brief of the
Commissioner of the United States Social Security
Administration is attached hereto as Exhibit A and herein
incorporated as if fully set forth.

Paragraph 2(a) of the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand.

2. The Department has historically observed a time lag
when extracting this type of data from the Children’s
Administration’s automated information system (Case
Management Information System or CAMIS). The
Department believes monthly data more accurately reflects
the number of children in the custody of DSHS in out-of-
home placement than either a specific date or a yearly
average. Thus, the Department reported the number of foster
children in the state’s custody in September 1999 as the most
recent reliable data available as of January 15", when the
information was provided to the trial court. Affidavit of
Tamara Erickson, p. 3, para. 5.

A-49

3. In September 1999, there were 10,578 foster children
in the state’s custody pursuant to RCW 74.13. Affidavit of
Tamara Erickson, p. 3, para. 4.

4. In September 1999, there were an additional 2,352
foster children for whom the Children’s Administration may
be responsible for providing the funding for maintenance and
care but who were in the custody of a private child-placing
agency, tribe or tribal child-placing agency, or other
organization. Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p. 3, para. 4.

5. Additionally, another 567 individuals under the age of
21 receive services from the Department of Social and Health
Services (DSHS), Division of Developmental Disabilities,
under RCW 74.13.350. Of these individuals, 303 of them
receive either SSA or SSI. These individuals are in the legal
custody of their birth/adoptive parents, have a guardian, or
may be emancipated. Affidavit of Linda Gil, p. 2, para. 3;
Linda Gil Deposition, p. 50, Il. 5-7.

Paragraph 2(b) of the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand.

6. In September 1999, there were approximately 1,480
children in foster care who were receiving social security
benefits. Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p. 4, para. 6.

7. Approximately 923 of the 1,480 children in foster care
in September 1999 received SSI benefits under Title XVI of
the Social Security Act. Approximately 469 received SSA
benefits under Title I] of the Social Security Act, and
approximately 88 received both SSA and SSI benefits
concurrently. Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p. 4, para. 6.

A - 50

Paragraph 2(c) of the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand.

8. In September 1999, the number of children in the
State’s custody pursuant to chapter 74.13 RCW, and for
whom the Secretary of DSHS is the representative payee
pursuant to provisions of 42 USCA § 405(j) (1998) was
1,411. Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 2, para. 3.

9. Of these 1,411 children for whom DSHS serves as
representative payee, approximately 1,325 of them are in
foster care with the Children’s Administration. The
remaining 86 children are placed by the Division of
Developmental Disabilities (DDD). Affidavit of Karen
Kegley Justinen, p. 2, para. 3.

10. At the present time, the Cash Accounting Unit
receives $700,000 to $800,000 a month in SSI and SSA
funds. Approximately $505 per child and $520 per child is
received for two different SSI payments and approximately
$250 per child, on the average, is received in SSA payments.
Karen Kegley Justinen Deposition, p. 70, ll. 13-25; p. 71, Il.
1-8.

11. DSHS has forecasted receipt of $6,733,000 in
SSI/SSA revenue for the year 2000 for children in foster
care. See the Budget Forecasting Document from the
Tamara Erickson Deposition, attached hereto as Exhibit B.

Paragraph 2(d) of the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand.

12. Whenever a child in State foster care is entitled to
receive SSI or SSA benefit payments, the State applies to the
Social Security Administration to become the representative

A-51

payee except for developmentally disabled children since
July 1988. Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, pp. 4-5, para. 8.

13. Title XVI (SSI) benefits are based on a child’s
disability. Title II (SSA) benefits are based on a death or
disability of a parent who contributed to the Social Security
program. Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 2, para. 4.

14. The accounting for the way in which the state
processes and uses social security payments received by the
Secretary of DSHS on behalf of foster children in the custody
of DSHS, when the Secretary is their representative payee, is
done by the DSHS, Office of Accounting Services, Trust
Fund Unit. The Trust Fund Unit is also responsible for the
accounting of other monies received on behalf of children in
the care of DSHS, including Veterans Administration and
Railroad Retirement benefits, and Excess Child Support
Payments. Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 2, para. 2.

15. The Trust Fund Unit is not part of the DSHS
Children’s Administration, which is responsible for child
protective, child welfare, family reconciliation and licensing
services in Washington State. Karen Kegley Justinen
Deposition, p. 8. The Children’s Administration is
responsible for foster care services for those children who
cannot remain in their own home as a result of abuse or
neglect. Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p. 2, para. 1.

16. Karen Kegley Justinen oversees the Trust Fund Unit,
which records Title II (SSA) and Title XVI (SSI) benefit
payments received by the Cash Accounting Unit, on behalf of
the foster children, and maintains an individual “subsidiary
account” for each child receiving these benefits. Affidavit of
Karen Kegley Justinen, pp. 2-3, paras. 4-5.

A- 52

17. Every month, the Department receives SSI and SSA
payments on behalf of foster children in the custody of
DSHS, and for whom the Secretary is their representative
payee, and except for “retroactive SSI payments,” deposits
these funds in a Foster Care Trust Fund Account at the State
Treasurer’s Office. Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 3,
para. 4. Karen Justinen Deposition, p. 9, ll. 6-15.

18. Retroactive SSI payments are lump sum payments of
over six times the monthly benefit amount. Since October of
1996, these lump sum retroactive SSI payments have been
subject to different rules and are accounted for differently.
They are deposited by the Social Security Administration
directly to a dedicated interest-bearing account at a local
bank. Payments deposited to this dedicated account, and the
interest earned, are credited to the individual child’s indi-
vidual subsidiary account maintained by the Trust Fund Unit.
Since October of 1996, regulations prohibit use of funds from
the dedicated accounts to provide for basic foster care
services. The funds can only be used for permitted expen-
ditures of special needs, primarily related to the child’s im-
pairment. Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 3, para. 6.

18.1 The Department has not established how many
children have dedicated accounts. It is possible this
information was not requested or ordered produced by the
court. The record does not show how many dedicated
accounts there are, however, the Department has produced
samples of two such dedicated accounts. None of the 50
random accountings include dedicated accounts. This
information is not included in the accounting provided.

18.2 Prior to October of 1996, a different procedure
regarding SSI lump sum payments appears to have been
followed. An example of this is provided in the accounting
for Jasmine Cotton, where it appears that a lump sum

A-53

payment of the amount of $11,676 was received on May 8,
1996 and on June 2, 1996 the Children’s Administration was
reimbursed a total amount of $11,696.00 for past foster care
expenses from April of 1994 through April of 1996. There
is no evidence to contradict the finding that this was the
ordinary procedure followed prior to October of 1996.

19. The Trust Fund Unit has provided a summary page
for each of the 50 children’s accounts provided comine to

court order. The summary page lists six separate categories
as follows:

“Payments Received” Amount of SSI/SSA or both received.

“Interest Earned” Interest earned from money held in
trust.

“Payments Returned” Amount of Money Returned to the
Social Security Administration

“Account

Disbursements” SSA and or SSI Monies Spent Directly
for the Benefit of the Child for Items
Other Than Basic Foster Maintenance
Such as Clothing, Toys, Computers,
Summer Camps, Medical/Dental
Expenses, Educational Expenses, etc.
(See Summary Social Security
Accounting Cover Pages for Thomas
Bakkon and Danetta Hutchinson,
copies of which are attached hereto
and herein incorporated as if fully set

forth as Appendix “7”)

“Foster Care

Reimbursements” § Amount authorized by Trust Fund Unit
to be paid from the Children’s
Administration Trust Fund Account.

“Balance” Balance in the child’s trust fund
account.

(See Summary Social Security Accounting Cover Pages for
Thomas Bakkon and Danetta Hutchinson, copies of which
are attached hereto and herein incorporated as if fully set
forth in Exhibit “G”.)

Paragraph 2(d)(i) of the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand. (Individual Accounts)

20. The DSHS Office of Accounting Services, Trust
Fund Unit, maintains an individual “subsidiary” account for
each of the 1,411 children in the State’s custody pursuant to
chapter 74.13 RCW, and for whom the Secretary of DSHS is
the representative payee pursuant to provisions of 42 USCA
§ 405(j) (1998). Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 3,

paras. 4-5.

Paragraph 2(d)(iii) of the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand. (Pass Through)

(Note, paragraph 2d(iii) of the Order on Remand is
addressed prior to paragraph 2d(ii) for better continuity.)

21 The source of the funds available to the Children’s
Administration for foster care includes Federal and State
match Title IV-E funds, TANF, SSI, SSA monies, and
parental child support.

A-55

22. In developing the amount of the State’s funds needed
to make up the balance of the total foster care budget the
State includes as part of its revenue resources, SSA and SSI
payments anticipated to be received by DSHS as
representative payee. Tamara Erickson Deposition, p. 41, Il.
14-25, p. 42, p. 43, 1. 4. See the Budget Forecasting
Document from the Tamara Erickson Deposition, attached
hereto as Exhibit B.

23. The State’s inclusion of anticipated SSA and SSI
children benefit payments in the State budget reduces the
amount of money that the legislature is required to
appropriate to meet the State’s foster care expenditure
responsibilities. Tamara Erickson Deposition, p. 42, ll. 18-
25, p. 43, ll. 1-4.

24. The term “pass through” in the context of SSI and
SSA benefits is not one that is used by the DSHS Trust Fund
Unit. Karen Kegley Justinen Deposition, p 17, 1. 25; p. 18,
ll. 1-8. :

25. The Children’s Administration does not normally
directly purchase the food, clothing and shelter that a child in
foster care needs. Rather, such items are generally purchased
and provided to a foster child by a foster parent. The
Children’s Administration pays foster parents a base amount
from a pre-existing schedule. See the Family Foster Care
Rates schedule, attached as Exhibit C and by this reference is
incorporated herein. The special needs and exceptional costs
may be provided if funds are available.

26. Where a special need or extra item is authorized, the
Trust Fund Unit will issue a check drawn from a child’s
subsidiary account where SSI and SSA benefits were
deposited to issue a payment directly to a foster parent, store,
or other service provider. Such expenditures are authorized

A -56

under the discretion of the representative payee who
considers the extent that it benefits the client among other
considerations.

27. The Trust Fund Unit typically uses a child’s social
security payments to. pay for a child’s basic foster care
expenses. Every month the Children’s Administration
generates a report that shows for each child in foster care the
amount of money paid by the Children’s Administration to
the care provider for the cost of that care. The Trust Fund
Unit reviews the report and compares it to the child’s trust
fund account to determine the amount to be reimbursed for
the child’s foster care. Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen,

p. 4, para. 8.

28. Each month the Trust Fund Unit accesses Children’s
Administration’s computer generated list of “reimbursable
foster care expenses” in order to determine how much of the
children’s SSI and SSA funds it will direct the State
Treasurer to pay to Children’s Administration.

29. In general, if the amount in the trust fund account is
adequate to reimburse the entire cost of the foster care, as
claimed by Children’s Administration, the entire claimed
amount is paid. If the funds in the trust fund account are not
adequate to reimburse the entire cost of the foster care, the
Trust Fund Unit uses up to the amount available in the trust
fund account. The amount to be paid for foster care is
transferred from the Trust Fund Unit’s Foster Care Trust
Fund Account to the Children’s Administration. Affidavit of

Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 4, para. 8.

30. The representative payee has the option to authorize
expenditure ci all of the SSA and or SSI benefit payments it
receives on items other than current foster care maintenance.

A-57

Karen Kegley Justinen Deposition, p. 76, ll. 14-25, p. 77,
ll. 1-4.

31. The Trust Fund Unit has the authority to disburse
from a child’s trust fund account monies for “extra items and
special needs” for the “direct benefit” of the child. Affidavit
of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 4, para. 9; Trust Fund
Handbook Section 3, Account Disbursements.

32. This discretion goes so far as to allow all of the
child’s trust funds to be expended for extra items and special
needs with nothing to be paid to Children’s Administration
for “reimbursement.” Karen Kegley Justinen Deposition, p.
18, ll. 9-25, p. 26, Il. 3-25, p. 27, ll. 1-2, p. 39, Il. 11-17, p.
76, ll. 14-25, p. 77, ll. 1-4.

33. “Direct benefit” is the standard by which the
representative payee is to judge approval of any disbursement
requests. Karen Kegley Justinen Deposition, p.. 76, ll. 14-15.

34. Children’s Administration staff can request that a
child’s Social Security payment(s) be used for the child’s
extra items or special needs instead of for basic foster care
costs. Children’s Administration staff can also request that a
child’s Social Security payments be conserved. Conservation
can be employed for a time period prior to their emancipation
to allow a child to have funds available when they transition
to living independently, or for further education or other
approved purposes for the direct benefit of the child.
Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, pp. 4- 5, paras. 9-10.

35. Upon request from the Children’s Administration
worker, funds may be disbursed from a child’s trust fund
account for both extra items and special needs of the child,
subject to Trust Fund Unit approval. Examples of the most
common disbursements are for computers, educational

A-58

expenses, summer camp, counseling, toys, clothing, athletic
equipment, orthodontics, etc. Affidavit of Karen Kegley
Justinen, pp. 4-5, paras. 9-10.

36. Examples of extra items or special needs which the
Trust Fund Unit recognized as appropriate expenditure of SSI
and SSA funds are computers, educational expenses, summer
camp, counseling, toys, clothing, athletic equipment,
orthodontics, etc. Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 4,
para. 9.

37. The Department of Social and Health Services,
Office of Accounting Services, Trust Fund Handbook,
Section 3 provides, in part, as follows:

USE OF FUNDS: Funds can be used for any goods or

E ion hnatindin
clothing, toys, computer, summer camp, medical/dental
expenses (not covered by medical coupons), educational
expenses, etc. (our emphasis) (Trust Fund Handbook
Section 3.) (Karen Kegley Justinen Deposition, Exhibit 5,
Section 3.)

38. The Secretary of DSHS is the representative payee.
The record does not establish that the Secretary or anyone
else has issued separate written instructions or guidelines
establishing when and if special needs, extra items and
savings should be requested or approved. Affidavit of Karen
Kegley Justinen, p. 2, paras. 1-2; Karen Kegley Justinen
Deposition, p. 48, ll. 12-25; p. 49, ll. 1-11.

39. The head of the Trust Fund Unit is unaware of what
the caseworkers in the field are told or what information they
are provided regarding when to request special items. Karen
Kegley Justinen Deposition, p. 80, ll. 9-25, p. 81, ll. 1-4.

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40. There is no evidence that the child or the foster care
provider are provided information about the availability of
the SSI and SSA payments to be expended, in their entirety if
deemed in the best interest of the child, for extra items and
special needs directly benefiting the child. As a result, some
eligible children probably fail to request extra items for
special needs.

41. There is no evidence that the representative payee
makes any regular, systematic or uniform attempt, on a
monthly basis or otherwise, to determine what “extra items”
and/or “special needs” would directly benefit the children in
State foster care before applying the SSA and SSI funds, in
his control, to reimburse Children’s Administration. Karen
Kegley Justinen Deposition, p. 75, li. 24-25, p. 76, ll. 1-11.

42. Of the 48 randomly selected individual trust fund
accounts reviewed by plaintiffs counsel, 35 (or 73%)
received SSI benefit payments, 11 (or 23%) received SSA
benefit payments and 2 or 4% received both SSA and SSI.

43. Of the 35 children entitled to SSI benefits, the total
amount cf money received by the State was $596,378. The
total amount used by the Trust Fund Unit to fund the State’s
foster care budget was $501,556 (or 84%). The total amount
spent to directly benefit the child for extra items and special
needs “account disbursements”, was $19,534 (or 3%). See
Plaintiff's Summary of Payments for 48 Random Cases,
attached as Exhibit D.

44. Of the 11 children entitled to SSA benefits, the total
amount of money received by the State was $98.152. The
total amount used by the Trust Fund Unit to fund the State’s
foster care budget was $73,755 (or 75%). The total amount
spent to directly benefit the child for extra items and special
needs, “account disbursements,” was $4,180 (or 5%).

45. Of the two children entitled to combined SSA and
SSI benefits, the total amount of money received by the State
was $91,422. The total amount used by the Trust Fund Unit
to fund the State’s foster care budget was $87,586 (or 95%).
The total amount spent to directly benefit the child for extra
items and special needs, “account disbursements,” was $0
(0%).

46. Of all 48 accounts combined, the State received
$785,952 in SSA and or SSI benefit funds on behalf of the

children. To fund the State’s foster care budget, the State
reimbursed itself $662,897 (or 84%) from these same funds.

47. Of the 48 children for whom accounts were
randomly selected, ten received “extra items and or special
need” expenditures. This amounted to $23,714 (or 3%) of
the total $785,952 in benefit payments received by the State.

48. The 48 random accounts show 3 of the 30 males
received “account disbursements.” Eleven of 18 females
received $35,659 in “account disbursements.”

49. The record does not fully explain why special
benefits by way of “account disbursements” are not sought
for some children.

50. Children in state foster care whose SSA and SSI
benefits are paid to a representative payee other than the
Secretary of DSHS can still receive state supported foster
care maintenance. Tamara Erickson Deposition, p. 36, p. 37,
ll. 1-8.

51. Foster children who do not receive any SSI or SSA
benefits may qualify for extra items and special needs from

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the total Foster Care Budget if funds are available. Tamara
Erickson Deposition, p. 51, ll. 3-19.

52. The record does not establish the extent to which
foster children who were not on SSI or SSA receive special

need payments or extra item payments.

53. The Department’s process for making a disbursement
from SSI or SSA benefits for extra items or special needs
starts when a Foster Parent and/or Children’s Administration
staff determine a child needs extra items or has any special
needs. If so, Children’s Administration staff submit a request
for disbursement of funds to the Trust Fund Unit. Trust Fund
staff review the request and if approved and the child has
available funds, the Trust Fund Unit disburses the funds.
Usually, a warrant is sent to the foster care provider made
payable to a store or other service provider. However,
occasionally warrants for extra items or special services are
sent directly to the store or other service provider. If the staff
is uncertain whether the request is an appropriate use of
social security funds, the staff will consult with the Social
Security Administration for approval. Affidavit of Karen
Kegley Justinen, pp. 4-5, paras. 9-10. The record does not
establish the existence of specific standards which direct
foster parents or caseworkers when to apply for special needs
or extra items.

54. Reimbursement is used by the Department to mean
that it must expend the money up-front. The Department
cannot claim federal funds back until the expenditure has
already been made. In that sense, it is a reimbursement
process, but only in the accounting sense.

55. Social Security Funds that are accounted for by the
Trust Fund Unit and are not used for basic foster care costs,
extra items, or special needs, are deposited into a collective

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interest bearing savings account at a local bank. It is the
policy of the Trust Fund Unit that the interest earned from
this collective account is to be credited to each child's
individual trust fund account on a monthly basis. These
funds are ultimately forwarded to the child’s successor
payee, or paid directly to the child if emancipated. Affidavit
of Karen Kegley Justinen, pp. 6-7, paras. 13-17.

Paragraph 2(d)(ii) of the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand. ($2000. Limit)

56. A child receiving SSI benefits cannot have available
resources over $2,000 and remain eligible for the monthly
SSI benefit. (Funds deposited to the Dedicated Account are
exempt from the $2,000 resource limit. The Children’s
Administration maintains that it is its policy to ensure a
child’s trust fund account balance remains below the resource
limit by reviewing every SSI account each month by Trust
Fund staff to determine if the balance is approaching the
resource limit. If the balance is nearing the resource limit,
the Trust Fund Unit contacts Children’s Administration staff
notifying them of the need to spend down the child’s account
balance. The Children’s Administration staff assess what
special needs of the child could be met using the excess
funds and request disbursement of funds from the Trust Fund
Unit. If the request is an appropriate use of the child’s Social
Security benefits, the Trust Fund Unit disburses the funds.
Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 5, para. 12; Affidavit
of Tamara Erickson, p. 5, para. 10. Prior to October 1996,
some accounts were spent down by reimbursing Children’s
Administration for previous basic care expenditures. None
of the 48 randomly selected accounts demonstrated the
spending down procedure after October 1996.

57. The State pays SSI payments to reimburse the
Children’s Administration as reimbursement for

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reimbursable foster care expenses as a means of not
exceeding the $2000 accumulation ceiling. Karen Kegley
Justinen Deposition, p. 41, ll. 20-25; p. 42, ll. 1-18.

58. “Account sweeping” sometimes results in taking all
the Social Security funds, which have accumulated to that
date, and applying them to all of the State's accumulated
reimbursable foster care expenses. For examples of “account
sweeping” see accoun's of Nacole Blimka, Case No. 4; Clark
Casey, Case No. 9; Jasmine Cotton, Case No. 11; Jennifer
Filbeck, Case No. 15; Clayton Gemoyla, Case No. 17;
Rachel Hernandez, Case No. 21; Christopher Mulkins, Case
No. 34; and others discussed in Plaintiffs’ Narrative
Summary of 48 Random Accounts. See Plaintiff's Narrative
Summary of 48 Random Cases, attached as Exhibit E.

Paragraph 2(e) of the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand.

59. Prior to applying to the Social Security
Administration to serve as representative payee, the
Children’s Administration identifies all children in the foster
care system who may have a significant mental or physical
impairment that would make them eligible for SSI benefits.
The Children’s Administration also must apply on behalf of
any child who is eligible for SSA benefits as required by 20
CFR 416.210. If Children’s Administration staff believe the
child may be eligible for SSI, the staff submits an application
to the Social Security Administration. If Children’s
Administration staff believe a denial of eligibility is
erroneous, they will appeal on behalf of the child. Affidavit
of Tamara Erickson, pp. 4 and 5, para. 8.

60. The Children’s Administration provides a number of
services to all foster children regardless of whether they
receive Social Security. Children’s Administration staff are

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responsible for monitoring a child’s service needs, including
food, clothing, shelter, therapy, child care (specialized or
regular), special dietary needs, any special equipment the
foster parent may need to care for the child, or any other
special needs the child has through the child’s case plan.
Children’s Administration is required to do an Individual
Service and Safety plan for each child in foster care. This
plan addresses the child’s needs and where the child shoul’
live. This plan also addresses the child’s permanent
placement (either returning home to their parents
(reunification) or another plan such as adoption or
guardianship if reunification is not possible) and what the
parents must do in order to achieve reunification. Affidavit
of Tamara Erickson, p. 5, para. 9.

61. Children’s Administration staff, along with Trust
Fund Unit staff, are also responsible for maintaining the
child’s eligibility for SSI benefits by monitoring the amount
of benefits available on a child’s behalf. If resources are
available beyond the monthly cost of foster care, staff may
identify additional service needs and will purchase those
services for the child. Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p. 5,
para. 10; Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 5, para. 12.

62. If the child’s social worker identifies additional
services or needs beyond basic food, clothing, and shelter,
the social worker may recommend that the child’s monthly
social security benefits be used to pay for those needs or
services in addition to, or instead of, basic foster care
mainteaance. The DSHS will give priority to the special
needs when it is consistent with the social security
regulations and when it is in the child’s best interest.
Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p. 5, para. 11.

63. SSI financial redeterminations are completed by
Children’s Administration staff who interview the social

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worker, child, foster parent, and/or guardian. Financial
redeterminations are required by the Social Security
Administration to determine continued income eligibility.
There are several different types of redetermination forms
used by the Social Security Administration depending on
whether or not the child is flagged by the Social Security
Administration as likely to have changes to their record, such
as frequent moves and wages or other sources of income.
Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, pp. 5 and 6, para. 12.

64. Children who receive SSI benefits are required by
the Social Security Administration to have completed
Continuing Disability Reviews (CDR). Children’s
Administration staff complete CDRs approximately every
three years and then again just before the child turns 18. Ifa
CDR is not completed, the child’s SSI benefits are terminated
by the Social Security Administration. Affidavit of Tamara
Erickson, p. 6, para. 13.

65. Children’s Administration staff report to the Social
Security Administration any changes to the child’s income
that will affect the SSI payment amount or continuing SSI
eligibility (i.e., wages, child support payments, etc.). For
example, Children’s Administration receives a list from the
DSHS, Division of Child Support, which match children
receiving an SSI benefit with those for whom the Division of
Child Support received a child support payment. The
Children’s Administration has the obligation to report these
child support collections to the Social Security
Administration as income, which could lower the child’s SSI
benefits (not dollar for dollar). In the past, Children’s
Administration has not filed such reports. Staff also notify
the Social Security Administration regarding changes in the
circumstances of the child (change of address, change in
custody, on the run, etc.).

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66. Children’s Administration staff complete the reports
and forms required by the Social Security Administration for
SSA benefits. For example, staff prepare Beneficiary
Recontact Reports which track beneficiaries’ marital status,
and student statement forms which track school attendance
for continued eligibility. Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p. 6,

para. 15.

67. Children’s Administration staff also complete
Disabled Adult Child (DAC) claims for those children
receiving both SSA and SSI benefits or children receiving
SSA who may be eligible for SSI. The Disabled Adult Child
program allows a child, under certain circumstances, to
receive benefits under SSA beyond their 18” birthday.
Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p. 6, para. 16.

68. Children’s Administration staff assist 18-year-olds,

parents, adoptive parents, foster parents, and/or guardians in
accessing dedicated account funds. Affidavit of Tamara

Erickson, p. 7, para. 17.
69. Children’s Administration staff make necessary

arrangements with the new custodian or the 18-year-old to”

facilitate reunification or emancipation. Some children
would be unable to return home or live independently
without a source of income. With proper planning between
staff and the child or custodian, SSI eligibility may be
preserved with benefits available after the child leaves foster
care. If the child is eligible for SSA, staff advises the new
custodian or the 18-year-old on how to apply to the Social
Security Administration to become the new representative
payee. Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p. 7, para. 18.

70. Children’s Administration staff also complete
adoption support screenings for SSI eligible children.
Children who are eligible for SSI are also eligible for medical

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benefits under COBRA (Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act). This service is provided because
families outside of Washington State adopt some children, or
the adoptive family may move to another state. COBRA
allows reciprocal medical coverage in other states that may
not be available otherwise. Affidavit of Tamara Erickson, p.

7, para. 19.

71. The Trust Fund Unit also monitors the amount of
monthly payment received for the child to ensure the correct
benefit amount is received from the Social Security
Administration, and monitors the amount of dedicated
installment payments deposited by the Social Security
Administration directly into the child’s dedicated account, to
ensure the correct retroactive benefit amount is received.
Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 6, para. 13.

72. Trust Fund Unit staff also communicate with the
Social Security Administration to resolve any discrepancies
regarding benefits due, overpayment amounts, etc. The Trust
Fund Unit will refund, to the Social Security Administration,
benefits for which the child is not entitled to. Affidavit of
Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 6, para. 14.

73. The Trust Fund Unit staff also comply with strict
reporting and accounting requirements. The Trust Fund Unit
reports to the Social Security Administration if balances
exceed the SSI resource limit of $2000; submits annual
accountings for each child to the Social Security
Administration (reporting on benefits received, used, and
conserved); and submits additional account information to
the Social Security Administration (interest earned, account
balances, etc.) as requested. The Trust Fund Unit maintains
complete and individual records of each child’s account for
auditing purposes. Affidavit of Karen Kegley Jusiinen, p. 6,
para. 15.

74. The Trust Fund Unit forwards a child’s remaining
balance or unused benefits to either the Social Security
Administration or the new payee when the Social Security
Administration appoints a new representative payee.
Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p. 6, para. 16.

Paragraph 2(f) of the Supreme Court’s Order on
Remand.

75. The actual number of class members is not
determinable from records available to DSHS. Based on
records available, there are up to 7,798 class members dating
back to July of 1991. Affidavit of Karen Kegley Justinen, p.

7, para. 19.

76. According to the Trust Fund Handbook, there are
approximately 2,000 children in State care with a trust fund
account. The State claims its records are available back to
1991. Karen Kegley Justinen Deposition, Exhibit “5” Trust
Fund Handbook, Sec. 1.

The claims of the class extend back 18 years plus one
year for a total of 19 years back from the date of the filing of
plaintiffs’ action, i.e., to 1979.

Additional Findings of Fact to Assist the Court

77. The Department of Social and Health Services
admits that its divisions fail to communicate adequately with
regard to the accounting for and crediting of child support
payments made on behalf of foster children who are also
receiving SSA/SSI benefits. Karen Kegley Justinen
Deposition, Su, ll. 23-25; p. 51, Il. 1-4; p. 54, Il. 20-25,
Exhibit 3; p. 55, ll. 1-9.

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78. When child support is collected, the portion
denominated as “current support” is used to offset “current
reimbursable foster care expenses.” Child support identified
as “Back Support” is used to repay accumulated reimbursable
foster care expenses. The excess of current support over
reimbursable foster care expenses is sent to the Trust Fund
Unit as excess child support. Affidavit of Alan Rhoten, p. 3,

para. 5.

79. The State’s system does not report to the Foster Care
Trust Fund Unit that it has used parental support to pay for
all or a part of “current reimbursable foster care expenses.”
Alan Rhoten Deposition, p. 38, Il. 5-21.

80. In those months when child support is received from
a parent of a child in state foster care who is also receiving
SSA and or SSI benefit payments, the child’s’ trust account
is not credited to the child’s subsidiary” trust accounting
record. Karen Kegley Justinen Deposition, p. 55, Il. 9-25; p.
57; p. 58, Il. 1-19.

81. The head of the Trust Fund Unit has known, since at
least 1994, because of the failure of the Trust Fund Unit to
communicate with the Division of Children’s Services, that it
potentially reimburses itself twice for the same months foster
care expenses, once through use of the foster child’s SSA and
SSI money and once from parental support payments. Karen
Kegley Justinen Deposition, p. 16; p. 17, ll. 1-19, Exhibit 3.

82. The State may experience a double payment when it
“sweeps” the children’s trust fund account to repay
reimbursable foster care expenses which have accumulated
from prior months where child support has already been paid.
For examples of such sweeping, see accounts of Nacole
Blimka, Case No. 4; Clark Casey, Case No. 9; Jasmine
Cotton, Case No. 11; Jennifer Filbeck, Case No. 15; Clayton

A-70

Gemoyla, Case No. 17; Rachel Hernandez, Case No. 21;

Christopher Mulkins, Case No. 34; and others discussed in -

Plaintiffs’ Narrative Summary of 48 Random Accounts.

83. To date, the State’s system has not been corrected to
eliminate this potential problem for double payment.. Karen
Kegley Justinen Deposition, p. 17, ll. 20-24, Exhibit 3.

84. The potential significance of this problem is
highlighted by the fact that the State forecasts collecting
approximately $3.25 million for FY2000 in child support for
children in foster care. See the Budget Forecasting
Document from the Tamara Erickson Deposition, attached
hereto as Exhibit B.

85. The source of funds for the Children’s
Administration’s total foster care budget for FY2000 is
$37,407,045 State Only, $9,317,124 Title IV-E, $3,579,000
TANF, and $3,579 Title XIX. See Source of Funds for
Foster Care Budget, attached as Exhibit F.

86. Most children in foster care qualify for Title IV-E
and/or TANF funding while awaiting a determination of
SSI/SSA benefits.

87. Following a determination of Social Security
eligibility, the State representative payee will receive a lump
sum payment for prior months’ eligibility.

88. Under the TANF Program, federal funding is
provided directly to the State to reimburse 100% of its
reimbursable foster care costs. Affidavit of Tamara
Erickson, pp. 31-33. Federal funding is also provided under
Title IV-E to reimburse a percentage of foster care costs.
Applications were made in some of the 48 random cases
under both programs for children in foster care receiving SSI

’ A-7i

and SSA. Eligibility requirements and funding availability
are such that the state does not apply for federal funding for
all children, neither does the state apply for federal funding
for all of a child’s costs. The State argues that its accounting
system is such that overpayments do not occur since the
federal share of foster care costs, collected from the foster
child’s trust fund account are passed through to the federal
government. The record does not establish this point or rule
it out.

89. Currently there are 567 Developmentally Disabled
children or qualifying young adults in Foster Care. Three
hundred three of them are entitled to receive Social Security
benefits. Linda Gil Deposition, p. 13, ll. 7-12.

90. The children with developmental disabilities were
transferred from the regular Foster Care Program,
administered by Children’s Services, into the Developmental
Disabilities Foster Care Program, administered by the
Department of Developmental Disabilities in July of 1998.
Affidavit of Linda Gil, p. 2, para. 5.

91. The transfer involved an Interagency Agreement,
which agreement contains a provision of unresolved issues
by a committee, identified in the agreement. Among the
unresolved issues were the responsibilities of the DSHS Trust
Fund Unit.

92. _ DSHS served as renresentative payee for the
Developmentally Disabled cuildren until July 1999.
Affidavit of Linda Gil, p. 2, para. 4. The Developmentally
Disabled Foster Care children were thus a part of the plaintiff
class when the Court entered its Order on January 5, 1996.

93. The Secretary of Washington State DSHS no longer
serves as representative payee for foster children with

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Developmental Disabilities. Instead, various private agencies
such as the ARC of King County and the ARC of Spokane
now serve as representative payee. Linda Gil Deposition, p.
30, ll. 11-13.

94. The aforesaid institutional Private Representative
payees administer the Social Security benefits of the
developmentally disabled foster care children by re7rng the
benefits directly to the foster home. The State then p ys any
difference between the cost of foster care and the Social
Security benefit. Affidavit of Linda Gil, p. 4, paras. 9-10.

95. In this way, the State’s foster care payment for
Developmentally Disabled Foster Children is reduced by the
amount of their Social Security Benefit.

96. The State relies on the representative payee to pay all
SSI payments directly to the foster home. The record does
not establish that the State controls the decisions made by
representative payees in disposition of SSI/SSA funds. Linda
Gil Deposition, p. 32, ll. 16-20.

97. The Parents of the Developmentally Disabled Foster
Children are Required to Sign a Voluntary Placement
Agreement (VPA) which Provides in Part:

Parent/Guardian Agrees:

I voluntarily agree that the above named child be placed
in the care and under the supervision of DSHS. I!
authorize DSHS to carry out the duties and
responsibilities as described later in this agreement.
DSHS is further authorized to apply as a Representative
Payee for any benefits the child is eligible to receive, and
to use the fund to cover the cost of care and services
provided to the child. (Our emphasis)

L.SCOTT LOCKWOOD

98. It appears that developmentally disabled children do
not have SSI or SSA funds available for “special needs”,
“extra items” or savings.

DATED this 30th day of May, 2000.

: //s//

JUDGE JACK BURCHARD
Approved as to form only:

CHIRISTINE O. GREGOIRE
Attorney General

//s//

WSBA No. 19248

RODNEY M. REINBOLD
WSBA No. 4656
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs

RICHARD B. PRICE
WSBA No. 3203
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs

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Exhibit A

[ATTORNEY GENERAL LETTERHEAD]
December 29, 1900

The Honorable Jack Burchard
Okanogan County Superior Court
149 Third N.

P.O. Box 112

Okanogan, WA 98840-0112

RE: i
Superior Court Cause No. 92-2-00157-2
Supreme Court Cause No. 67680-1

Dear Judge Burchard:

I represent the Department of Social and Health
Services in the above matter. As the court ordered in its
Scheduling Order on Proceedings on Remand from Supreme
Court, enclosed please find a copy of the August 1998 audit
by the Social Security Administration of the Department of
Social and Health Services referred to at page 7 of the amicus
curiae brief of the Commissioner of the United States Social
will be submitting a declaration in support of this audit report
by January 15, 2000.

Should you have any questions, please feel free to
contact me at (360) 459-6949.

Sincerely,

//s//
Debra E. Casparian

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Exhibit A
Social & Health Services Division
(360) 459-6949

DEC:lan

Enc.

cc: Deborah Kant, Appellate Staff, Department of Justice
Victoria Blais, General Counsel, Social Security
Rodney Reinbold, Attorney at Law
Richard Price, Attorney at Law

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Exhibit A

DECLARATION OF KEVIN MCCAHILL
1, Kevin McCahill, declare as follows:

1. I am an employee of the Social Security Administration,
Office of Program Benefits, Division of Representative
Payment and Evaluation (DRPE).

2. I traveled with Ed Fotheringill and other DRPE central
office staff members to Seattle the week of August 24,
1998 to August 28, 1998 to conduct onsite reviews of the
Washington State Department of Social and Health
Services (DSHS) and other organizational payees.

3. Mr. Fotheringill prepared the attached trip report on
September 28, 1998.

4. Mr. Fotheringill is no longer employed at the Social
Security Administration.

5. I have read Mr. Fotheringill’s trip report and believe that
it accurately depicts DRPE’s onsite review of DSHS and
the opinions DRPE formed about DSHS during the onsite

review.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of
perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

//s//

Kevin McCahill

Senior Policy Analyst

Office Program Benefits

Division of Representative
Payment and Evaluation

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Exhibit A

DRPE TRIP REPORT — SEATTLE 1998

DRPE Central Office Staff traveled to Seattle the week of
8/24-8/28/98 to conduct onsite reviews of three different
types of organizational payees: (1) a State mental facility
(Western State Hospital); (2) the Department of Social and
Health Services (DSHS); and (3) a _ fee-for-service
organization (Safety Net Services).

The fundamental purpose of the onsite reviews was three-
fold: (1) to gain a better understanding of how different
kinds of organizational payees operate; (2) to determine the
organizations’ strengths and weaknesses in the context of
payee performance; and (3) to encourage an open, responsive
line of communication between the organizations and the
parallel field offices.

DRPE staff was represented by Kevin McCahill, Pat Gregus,
Ray Hairston, and Ed Fotheringill. Seattle RO staff was
represented by Ila Andrews.

It is not the intention of this report to document, in detail, all
that transpired during the field reviews. Rather, the intention
is to give an over-view of some of the more noteworthy
insights gained from our discussions. Detailed information
will be made available upon any verbal de-briefing deemed
necessary.

Wednesday 8/26

Onsite Review of The Department of Social and Health
Services (DSHS), Olympia, WA:

The review methodology was four-fold:

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Exhibit A

1. A discussion with DSHS administrators and staff on rep
payee duties and responsibilities;

2. A review of a sample of accounting records;
3. A discussion with case workers and SS] facilitaters;

4. A close-out session to discuss findings and make
recommendations for corrective action. r

The DSHS for the State of Washington is a model agency

that could stand as a prototype for effective organizational
payeeship. There is excellent communication both within

and between each DSHS component, as well as between the
DSHS and the parallel FO.

The foster care section provides a broad range of care and
maintenance, including emergency placements, family
conflict issues, child welfare services, psychological services
for both children and their parents, alcohol and drug
rehabilitation, etc. The key to the practical functioning of the
foster care section lies in the in-tandem work process
involving SSI facilitators (social workers who take the SSI
applications and handle all paperwork, money transactions,
and interaction with the FO) and case workers (social
workers who do all of the hands-on management of foster
care situations in the field). The SSI facilitators and case
workers are in constant communication and actually provide
a kind of check-and-balance function that is extremely
effective.

The accounting system is two dimensional: (1) there is an
automated record reflecting monies coming in and going out,

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Exhibit A

and (2) a paper file, held by the case worker, showing the
entire paper tail for the case, including documentation of
expenditures. The separation of automated and paper records
makes an audit quite cumbersome, but when the files are
brought together with the automated records, the system
reflects accurate and responsible accounting. The only
recommendation for corrective action involved the posting of
interest to a few cases that had gone unrecognized.

The DSHS brought to our attention one issue that they
believe impedes inter-agency work effectiveness: FO
management is constantly rotating staff assignments and
responsibilities, making it difficult for DSHS and SSA to
have 4 liaison that can gain any momentum. As soon as the
the [sic] interagency relationship becomes comfortable and
effective, the FO manager rotates a new (and inexperienced)
person into the job. The current SSA Claims Rep wants to
Stay in the liaison position, but is scheduled to rotate out
shortly. We basically left this in Ila’s hands.

Brief meeting with Colleen St. Louis at the RO at Columbia
Tower:

Ed briefed Colleen on all that transpired at DSHS. Colleen
---unreadable--- (and relieved) that the inter-agency work . . .

A-80

Exhibit B

Forecast 11/98 for 99-01 budget [handwritten]

Recoveries Model Values

—— Recoveries Expenditures Actual
———— Recoveries Expenditures Forecast

Date Recoveries Date Recoveries
Jul-97 ~$742,357 Jul-99 -$755,835
Aug-97 -$734,409 Aug-99 -$755,164
Sep-97 -$724,047 Sep-99 -$754,493
Oct-97 -$728,563 Oct-99 -$753,822
Nov-97 -$740,867 Nov-99 -$753,152
Dec-97 -$738,170 - Dec-99 -$752,481
Jan-98 -$749,654 Jan-00 -

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0556%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
