# Amicus Curiae Brief — Smigelski v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0551%3A19 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2011 - **Citation:** 565 U.S. 818 ## Text No. 01-1368 IN THE ? > Supreme Court of the United States ©_ See also Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Rel. and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 99th Cong. 101 n.2 (1986) (“/986 Hearings”) (statement of Women's Legal Defense Fund) (“[Bjecause of sex discrimination against men, some working fathers may find it more difficult than their female counterparts to be permitted to accommodate family responsibilities without suffering adverse employment consequences.”), Family Med- ical Leave Act of 1987: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor- Memt. Rel. and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 235 (1987) (testi- mony of Donna Lenhoff) (employment policies “continue to operate as if women’s role is to stay at home and care for the family and men’s role is to work outside the home”). - 1988) (compilation of Yale Bush Center survey results). The Yale Bush Center survey found that before passage of the FMLA, parental leave policies in the states, where they existed, overwhelmingly restricted the availability of leave to female employees. See Kathleen Makuen, “Pub- lic Servants, Private Parents: Parental Leave Policies in the Public Sector,” in The Parental Leave Crisis 202-03. According to this 1985 state survey, 30 states reported offering some form of infant care leave to state employ- ees, but nearly two-thirds of these states (19), including Nevada, reported restricting such leave to female employ- ees. Id. The study thus documents discrimination on the basis of sex in state leave policies. Seven of the states that restricted parental leave to female employees also refused to provide job protection during some or all of the leave period. Jd. By refusing to guarantee female leave-takers a job upon return, these States further undermined women's position in the work- place. Lack of job protection for women after maternity leave was one form of sex discrimination targeted by the FMLA. In addition to evidence of discriminatory leave policies in the public sector, the legislative history incorporates several private sector studies that document extensive sex discrimination in employer leave policies. See, e.g., 1986 Hearings at 151-228 (reproducing Catalyst, Report on a National Study of Parental Leaves (1986);* S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 14-15 (1993) (1989 Bureau of Labor Statistics survey found that 37% of large employers offered mater- nity leave while only 18% offered paternity leave); 138 Cong. Rec. $12,096 (1992) (1990 Bureau of Labor Statis- tics study found same). While Congress did not rely * — The Catalyst Report was cited favorably throughout the leg- islative record. See, e.g., 1986 Hearings at 101 n.2; H.R. Rep. No. 100-51 1(II) at 24 (1988); H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(1), at 28. 8 exclusively on private sector evidence, it was aware that private sector leave policies reflect the same problems as those in the public sector, as the legislative record reflects. See, e.g., 1986 Hearings at 30 (statement of Mery! Frank, Yale Bush Center) (“public sector leaves don’t vary much from private sector leaves”); id. at 147 (statement of Washington Council of Lawyers) (refer- encing discriminatory treatment in both public and private sector leave policies). The Ninth Circuit correctly determined, after reviewing evidence of sex discrimination in public and private poli- cies and evidence that these policies are substantially sim- ilar—all recorded in the legislative history—that “[t]aken together [these studies] constitute substantial evidence of unconstitutional state-sponsored gender discrimination in leave policies for state employees.” Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 859. Equally important, state laws themselves—which Con- gress examined in the legislative record, see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(1), at 32-33, 74-84—confirm that states discriminated based on sex in their family leave laws by explicitly restricting leave to women or by defining fam- ily leave in relation to pregnancy and related disabilities so as effectively to restrict leave to women.° As of 1993, nine states and Puerto Rico offered “family leave” to female employees only, restricting such leave to preg- nancy, disabilities related to pregnancy, and maternity leave. See Women’s Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, State Maternity/Family Leave Law (1993). These statutes were 5 Ohio required employers to provide leave for “childbearing” for “a reasonable amount of time.” Ohio Admin. Code § 4112-5- 02(G)(6) (1989). lowa provided leave for “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” for women only. lowa Code § 216:6:2 (1993). Montana made it unlawful for an employer to “refuse to grant the employee a reasonable leave of absence for . . . pregnancy.” Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-310, 311 (1987). 9 narrowly drafted so that only female employees would be eligible for leave. For instance, the Massachusetts statute was captioned “Entitlement of female employees; rights and benefits,” and provided for reinstatement of a “female employee” absent for up to eight weeks of “maternity leave.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 105D (1993).° The analogous Tennessee law was simply entitled “Maternity leave” and provided for leave “for a period not to exceed four (4) months for pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing the infant, where applicable (such period to be hereinafter ' referred to as ‘maternity leave’).” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 4- 21-408 (1993). As originally passed, the Tennessee statute provided female employees with leave “for the purpose of bonding” with a new child, but did not permit fathers leave to “bond.” See Wendy S. Strimling, The Constitu- tionality of State Laws Providing Employment Leave for Pregnancy: Rethinking Geduldig After Cal Fed, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 171, 176-77 (1989). After the act’s passage, the Ten- nessee attorney general's office issued an opinion sug- gesting that it might violate the equal protection clause. Rather than expand the statute to include fathers, the Ten- nessee legislature simply manufactured a different pur- pose—“for pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing the infant, where applicable”—to achieve the same result. Jd. In addition to statewide laws, discriminatory leave poli- cies were also implemented by individual state agencies. For instance, prior to the FMLA, a number of state univer- sities had discriminatory policies that provided infant care leave to female employees only or otherwise unlawfully ® — See also The Family Medical Leave Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs & Alcoholism of the Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 102d Cong., ist Sess. 34 (1991) (remarks of Dr. T. Berry Brazelton) (recounting how Mas- sachusetts parental leave bill was modified and limited to maternal leave only); id. (remarks of Sen. Dodd) (responding by referencing evolving notions of fathers’ role in family care). 10 differentiated between men and women.’ State employers’ collective bargaining agreements similarly restricted par- enting leave to women only. See Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 249 Before the Sub- comm. on Children, Family, Drugs & Alcoholism of the Comm. On Labor & Human Res., 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 385 (1987) (testimony of Gerald McEntee). State family leave policies that provide leave only to women amount to “widespread intentional gender dis- crimination by the states.” Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 859.* Such state laws rely on and reinforce the gender-role stereo- types of women as caregivers and men as breadwinners. This Court has found that “[l]egislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gen- der carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women and their need for special protection.” Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). The FMLA is intended to ensure that there is no discrimina- tion based on assumptions of the “proper place” of men and women. ? — From 1971-88, the University of Colorado provided up to two semesters of maternity leave unrelated to pregnancy disability to female faculty members only. Indiana State Univer-ity, the University of Maryland, and the University of New Orleans also permitted only female employees to take infant care leave unrelated to pregnancy dis- ability. The University of Minnesota’s parental leave policy in the early 1990s provided six weeks leave to both women and men, but paid women for all six weeks and men for only four. See State uni- versity policies (on file with Amer. Ass'n of Univ. Professors). 8 _ Local provisions have likewise been struck down. See, ¢.g., Schafer v. Board of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 1990) (pro- vision granting childrearing leave unrelated to physical disability to mothers but not fathers violates Title VII); Chavkin v. Santaella, 81 A.D.2d 153, 157-58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (city department permit- ted only female employees to use sick leave to extend infant care leave regardless of physical disability). 11 B. States Applied Discretionary Leave Policies Dif- ferently For Women And Men Before passage of the FMLA and state laws based thereon, state leave policies were more often than not dis- cretionary and applied in a discriminatory manner based on traditional gender-role stereotypes even in instances where the laws themselves were facially neutral. Of the 30 states in the Yale Bush Center survey that reported offering parental leave, “[i]n nearly all cases, extended leave was granted at the discretion of the supervisor.” Makuen at 200. Congress recognized, and studies con- firm, that where parental leave is granted at the discretion of the employer, whether in the public or private sector, male employees are less likely to be granted leave than their female counterparts. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 103- 8(II), at 11 (citing study of federal civil service finding that supervisory discretion to grant leave results in “dif- ferences between how men and women are treated”). This finding was consistently reported to Congress in family leave act hearings. See, e.g., 1986 Hearings at 147 (state- ment of Washington Council of Lawyers) (“Parental leave for fathers. . .israre. . . . Where child-care leave poli- cies do exist, men. both in the public and private sectors, receive notoriously discriminatory treatment in their requests for such leave.”).° ° See also 1987 Hearings at 536 (statement of Professor Susan Deller Ross) (“[T]here are a number of studies . . . in which it’s shown that employers in this country that are giving family leaves to their workers are not giving it non-discriminatorily, they are, by and large, giving it only to women, not to men. It’s fairly flagrant dis- crimination.”); Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1047, 1078 (1994) (“Catalyst found that sixty-three percent of large employers considered it unreasonable for a man to take any parental leave, and another seventeen percent considered parental leave reasonable only if limited to two weeks or less. Even among large employers providing parental leave, an amazing forty-one percent considered it unreasonable for a man to actually use it.”); 12 Case law confirms that state employers applied dis- cretionary leave policies in a discriminatory fashion. In Knussman v. State of Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001), for instance, a Maryland state police officer and new father challenged the application of a facially neutral state statute that “permitted ‘primary care givers’ to ‘use, without certification of illness or disability, up to 30 days of accrued sick leave to care for [a] child. . . immedi- ately following. . . the birth of the employee’s child.’ ” Id. at 628 (quoting Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. © § 7-508(a)(1) (1994)). Plaintiff’s request for “primary care giver” status was denied by a state supervisor who informed plaintiff that his wife would have to be “in a coma or dead” for him to qualify as the primary care giver under the statute. Jd. at 629-30 (internal quotations omit- ted). The Fourth Circuit held that the state actor “applied a facially neutral statute unequally solely on the basis of a gender stereotype in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Jd. at 634-35. The state actor’s decision, the court found, “was a by-product of traditional ideas about a woman’s role in rearing a child.” Jd. at 639. In addition to restricting family leave to women, state employers acting in a discretionary fashion have applied sex role stereotypes to deny women employment oppor- tunities. For instance, one state employer refused to con- sider a female employee for a promotion because of the employer’s belief that the employee should stay at home to care for her family. Moore v. Alabama State Univ., 980 F. Supp. 426 (M.D. Ala. 1997). The district court con- Garrett v. Board of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999) (Cook, J., dissenting in part) (“Congress found that, due to societal perceptions regarding family roles, employers who offered leave time to women discriminated against men with regard to that employment benefit, either by not offering it, granting a shorter amount than was made available to women, or discouraging men from taking it.”), rev'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 13 cluded that the state official had unlawfully discriminated, based on evidence that he told the plaintiff “that he could not promote her because she was pregnant” and “that she could not be considered for the promotion because she was a married mother.” Jd. at 434. When leave is discre- tionary and therefore de facto limited to women, employ- ers, including states, are also likely to discriminate against women because they have taken or are likely to take leave. See Arkin v. Oregon, No. 6:96CV6327 (D. Or., filed Dec. 19, 1996) (female allegedly denied tenure at state university because she had taken maternity leave); Gar- rett, 193 F.3d at 1229 (Cook, J., dissenting in part) (“Congress also found that women experienced discrim- ination. . . in that employers’ perceptions that women served as caretakers and therefore were more likely to ask for leave time contributed to a decreased willingness to hire women in the first instance or promote them.”). The FMLA places the decision as to whether to take -family leave in the hands of the employee, and takes dis- cretionary decisionmaking out of the hands of the state (or private) employer, thereby eliminating the risk of dis- criminatory treatment based on sex. C. States Provided No Family Leave 1. States Had Not Enacted Family Leave Policies Before Introduction of the FMLA Petitioner argues that the FMLA cannot be justified as a remedy for unconstitutional sex discrimination because at the time the FMLA was passed, most states provided employees with a remedy in the form of state family leave laws. Pet. Br. at 4, 24, 32. Petitioner’s argument is belied by the facts and by the FMLA’s legislative history. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 78 (“The debate on fam- ily and medical leave suggests that many States have already passed such leave benefits as are contained in H.R. 2. Yet that is not the case.”). When family leave leg- 14 islation was initially proposed in Congress in 1985, not a single state had a family leave law on its books enabling employees to care for sick family members. That is the environment in which Congress first considered the FMLA. Congress heard testimony that the absence of leave policies leads to sex discrimination in employment. See, e.g., 1987 Hearings at 172 (“lack of uniform parental and medical leave policies in the work place has created an environment where discrimination is rampant”).'® Numerous commentators agree."' Far from being leaders in the area of family leave leg- islation as the revisionist history of Petitioner and Amici Alabama et al. suggests, every state that has passed a fam- ily leave law has done so with awareness of and in response to federal legislative activity. This fact is con- firmed by the timing and substance of state leave laws, as well as by the congressional record. Amici Alabama et al. concede that state family leave laws were “essentially modified versions of the FMLA legislation pending in 10 Congress also recognized that failure to afford family leave negatively affects women’s position in the workplace because “the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (noting that “such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of men”); S. Rep. No. 102-68, at 28 (1991) (absence of family leave has “adverse impact on women’s earnings”). While the Constitution may not prohibit state conduct that has a disparate impact on women, intentional state actions in the form of unconstitutionally discrimi- natory laws perpetuated women’s roles as family caretakers. See Part Ill, infra. as See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 372 (2001); Donna R. Lenhoff & Sylvia M. Becker, Family and Medical Leave Legislation in the States: Toward a Comprehensive Approach, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 403, 405-06 (1989); Lucinda M. Finley, Tran- scending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Work- place Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1132 (1986). 15 Congress” or “targeted one or another of the leave issues addressed in the FMLA.” Br. of Amici Alabama et al. at 11. In the FMLA’s legislative history, Congress likewise noted that federal legislative efforts were the catalyst for State proposals, observing that “[s]ince Federal family leave legislation was first introduced, numerous States have begun to consider similar family leave initiatives.” See S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 20-21 (emphasis added).'” The introduction of the Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, supra, and a similar bill in 1986, H.R. 4300, 100th Cong. (1986), preceded the initiation of legislative activity in the states. In fact, not a single state had passed a bill providing for leave to care for ill family members before 1987, after federal leave legislation had twice been introduced. See, e.g., Steven K. Wisensale & Michael D. Allison, An Analysis of 1987 State Family Leave Legis- lation: Implications for Caregivers of the Elderly, 28 The Gerontologist 779, 780 (Dec. 1988); Ira B. Sprotzer, Parental and Family Leave Laws: A Review and Analysis, in 15-4 Employee Benefits J. 12 (Dec. 1990); Family Leave Activity Shifts to the States, 11-10 Employee Ben- efit Notes 1-3 (Oct. 1990); see generally Appendix B (summary of pre-FMLA state family leave laws). By 1987, only a handful of states enacted leave laws, and these laws were limited in scope compared to the FMLA. Only Connecticut had a statute permitting leave to care 12 See also H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(1), at 32-33; 1987 Hearings at 390 (“[I)}t is important for the federal government again to take the lead on. . . family leave [because] States tend to follow the lead . . Of the federal government, and if this example is held up by the federal government and standards are set, then | really think Ken- tucky, as other states, will fall in line and adopt parental leave poli- cies.”) (remarks of Debra Spotts Merchant); id. at 339 (“[O]Jne of the things that I have seen historically take place is that when a statute or when a law emanates from the federal level that states generally fol- low suit, . . . once it is initiated at the federal level it will trickle down.”) (remarks of Martin Luther King, III). 16 for ill family members other than children, id., making it the only state with a statute covering the leave available under FMLA § 2612(a)(1)(C). At the time the FMLA was passed in 1993, 22 states, including Nevada, had not enacted any form of parental or family leave legislation. See Appendix B; State Mater- nity/Family Leave Law; H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 32-33. In states that had passed some form of family leave law by 1993, the scope of the laws varied widely, and many fell short of the protections provided by the FMLA. Seven states, in their family leave and maternity disability laws, granted leave to female employees only, either explicitly or effectively, for birth and adoption. Nearly half of these laws failed to extend leave to care for sick family mem- bers, as provided in FMLA § 2612(a)(1)(C). Eleven of these laws covered only leave for births or adoptions. At the time Congress passed the FMLA, then, only one-third of the states had enacted non-discriminatory family leave laws approaching the scope of the FMLA. 2. State Sick Leave Policies Did Not Provide FMLA-Equivalent Family Leave Contrary to the argument advanced by Amici Alabama et al., states that permitted employees to use sick leave to care for ill family members still could not be said to have had “family leave” policies in place prior to the intro- duction of the FMLA. Sick leave policies were not designed to, nor did they, offer the range of benefits pro- vided for in the FMLA. These policies fell short of the FMLA in several respects. First, the availability of sick leave was almost always at the discretion of the supervisor. In some instances, supervisory discretion was written into the policy. For instance, the use of sick leave was permitted in Georgia and Nevada only with a supervisor’s approval. See Michele Lord & Margaret King, The State Reference 17 Guide to Work-Family Programs for State Employees 107, 115 (1991). In other cases, supervisory discretion resulted from the intentionally vague language of the operative provision. /d. at 33 (“By leaving the language vague, the actual interpretations and decision-making responsibility for allowing the use of sick leave in family situations lies with [supervisors]. Supervisors’ sensitivity to the needs of employees will ultimately determine the use and help- fulness of these sick leave coverage policies.”). One of the primary purposes of the FMLA is to avoid such dis- cretionary decision-making concerning family leave, which often results in discriminatory treatment based on sex. Even after the introduction of the FMLA, a number of states did not permit their employees to use sick leave to care for ill family members. As of 1990, seven states restricted the use of sick leave to employee illness only, id. at 31-32, and none of these states had enacted family leave laws between 1987 and 1990. As a result, as of 1990, employees of these seven states_did not have any type of leave available to tend to ill family members. Among those states that permitted employees to use sick leave to care for ill family members, the scope of coverage varied widely based on the definition of family member. Jd. at 32. As of 1990, the majority of such states (25) limited the use of sick leave to care for “dependents,” defined as children or by the state’s tax code. Jd. One State permitted the use of sick leave only to care for the employee's “household members” or those for whom the employee had “custodial responsibility.” Jd. at 32, 104-25. Another four states restricted the use of sick leave to care for “immediate family members.” Jd. Nine states simply used the term “family member” to define the scope of coverage, thereby requiring supervisors and others to interpret the precise scope. /d. As of 1990, then, employ- ees of fewer than half the states could use their sick leave to care for ill family members other than children, and in 18 many cases access to leave depended on a supervisor's interpretation of state policy. Almost half of the states explicitly imposed short time restrictions on the use of sick leave to care for ill family members. Jd. (from 2 to 24 days, but most under 5 days). Some states limited the number of sick days or hours per year an employee could us« «© tend to ill family members. For instance, state employees were eligible to take only 4 days per year in Arizona and Pennsylvania, and 40 hours per year in lowa, North Dakota, and West Virginia. /d. at 105, 117, 119, 123. Other states limited the number of sick days on a per occurrence basis, such as California and Washington, where employees could take only 5 days per illness. Jd. at 105, 119. The FMLA, on the other hand, makes available up to twelve weeks of leave in the event of a serious illness in the family. Ill. A LONG HISTORY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATE-SPONSORED SEX DISCRIMINATION ENFORCED SEX ROLE STEREOTYPES In addition to discriminatory leave policies, various forms of unconstitutional state laws—including manda- tory maternity leave laws, protective wage and hour laws, discriminatory death and incapacity benefit laws, unem- ployment insurance laws, and jury eligibility laws—have reinforced sex role divisions and have thus created the need for the FMLA. These forms of blatant state-spon- sored sex discrimination have been overturned by court after court, but the limitations they created and perpetu- ated have had lasting effects, confining women to the role of family caretakers and hindering men from sharing fam- ily care responsibilities. Discriminatory state laws accom- plished this result not only by reinforcing stereotypes but also by excluding women outright from certain forms of employment; requiring certain women to play the role of family caretakers; making it more expensive or difficult 19 for employers to hire women than men; and creating incentives for women to undertake, and for men to abstain from, family caretaking. These state laws required state, local government, and private entities to discriminate based on sex and have had a lasting impact on economic realities and on attitudes about who should be at home and at the workplace—both of which are redressed by the FMLA. This Court has long condemned discriminatory state laws as unconstitutional and acknowledged that they per- petuate gender role stereotypes. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684. Just as limiting admissions to state-supported nursing schools based on the “old view that women, not men, should become nurses” makes that assumption “a self-fulfilling prophecy,” Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730, so do state laws based on the-old assumption that women should be caretakers perpetuate that reality. By enabling both men and women to balance work and family care, the FMLA remedies some of the damage created by these dis- criminatory state laws which “serve([d] to ratify and per- petuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes,” J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 131 (1994), about the roles of women and men. A. States Excluded Women From Jobs, Assuming that Women Should Be Family Caretakers Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, states used a variety of discriminatory laws to limit the professions in which women could work. States prohibited women’s employment in law, mining, jobs involving moving machinery, establishments serving alcohol,'? and other ‘3 See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan law); Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971). 20 jobs.'* See generally 3 Lex K. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 44.01 (2d ed. 2002); Edith L. Fisch & Mortimer D. Schwartz, State Laws on the Employment of Women 21-22 (1953). States kept a number of these pro- hibitions in effect until recently. For instance, as of 1970, ten states still forbade women from working in estab- lishments serving alcohol; Alaska, Ohio and Pennsylva- _ nia retained these prohibitions as late as 1980. 3 Larson § 44.01 n.24. Also as of 1970, fourteen states still pro- hibited women from working in mines. Those laws remained enforceable in four states as of 1980, id. § 44.01 n.29, and Arkansas’ law is still on the books. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-7-318 (Michie 2001). While state laws barring women from certain occupa- tions persisted until recently, they were based on cen- turies-old stereotypes about the role of women, including the assumption that women should be in the home caring for their families rather than at work. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., con- curring) (upholding Illinois law excluding women from practice of law because “the domestic sphere” is “that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood”); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875) (justi- fying women’s exclusion from practice of law because “(t]he law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the world”). The states’ conviction that women’s place was in the home was so entrenched that in the 1930s, Massachusetts even attempted to pass a law to exclude or remove all married women from public service. In re Opinion of the Justices, 22 N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1939) (finding proposed bills uncon- 4 See, e.g., Ridinger v. Gen’! Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (Ohio law prohibiting women from working as sec- tion hands, crossing watchmen, express drivers, and metal moulders), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972). 21 stitutional, though not because they discriminated on the basis of sex). Thus, female state employees were not immune from the stereotypes that limited women’s employment generally.'* State laws excluding women from certain occupations obviously limit women’s employment opportunities and are plainly unconstitutional. This Court has long recog- nized that “[n]Jo longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.” Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975). But the attitudes fos- tered by these discriminatory state laws continue to affect behavior; indeed, these attitudes also underlay state dis- crimination in family leave. B. States Enacted Discriminatory Protective Laws Limiting Women’s Employment Opportunities and Confining Them to the Role of Caretakers | Until less than thirty years ago, state laws further lim- ited women’s employment opportunities by imposing a variety of restrictions on the employment of women but not men. States regulated the hours and times women could work, imposing maximum hour and overtime restrictions not applicable to men;'* the wages women could earn, imposing minimum wage requirements not 'S States also unconstitutionally restricted women's employment prospects by excluding them from institutions of higher learning. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993); Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970). 16 See, e.g., Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Riley v. Commonwealth of Mass., 232 U.S. 671 (1914); Kane v. Egan, 14 Conn. Supp. 485 (1947); Ass'n Indus. of Okla. v. Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 90 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1939); State v. Ehr, 221 N.W. 883 (N.D. 1928); State v. Collins, 198 N.W. 557 (S.D. 1924); State v. Dominion Hotel, 151 P. 958 (Ariz. 1915), aff'd, 249 U.S. 265 (1919); State v. Charles Schweinler Press, 108 22 applicable to men;'’ the weights women could lift, impos- ing limits not applicable to men;'* and mandated days of rest, meal and rest periods, and seating facilities not required for men. See generally 3 Larson § 44.01. These discriminatory state laws were extremely com- mon and remained in effect well into the 1970s. The law reporters teem with 1970s cases invalidating protective laws for women under Title VII.'® In 1975, four states and Puerto Rico still prohibited or regulated night work by women; eight states still mandated meal periods for women; and five states still mandated rest periods for women. See Women’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bul- letin 297, 1975 Handbook On Women Workers, at 338-39 (1975) (hereinafter “1975 Handbook”). At that time, fif- N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1915); Stettler v. O'Hara, 139 P. 743 (Ore. 1914), aff'd, 243 U.S. 629 (1917); W. C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 91 NE. 695 (Ill. 1910). 17 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); New Jersey Rest. Ass'n v. Holderman, 131 A.2d 773 (N.J. 1957); Vissering Mercantile Co. v. Annunzio, 115 N.E.2d 306 (Ill. 1953); Young v. Willis, 203 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1947); Strain v. Southerton, 62 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio App. 1945); McGrew v. Indus. Comm'n, 85 P.2d 608 (Utah 1938); Larsen v. Rice, 171 P. 1037 (Wash. 1918); see gen- erally Topeka Laundry Co. v. Court of Indus. Relns., 237 P. 1041, 1046 (Kan. 1925) (listing statutes). 18 See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (Sth Cir. 1969); Manning v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12108 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (collecting cases), aff'd, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972). 19 See, e.g., Stryker v. Register Publ’g Co., 423 F. Supp. 476 (D. Conn. 1976); Homemakers, Inc. v. Div. of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1228 (Sth Cir. 1972); Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1971); Kober v. Westing- house Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 23 teen states still had maximum hours laws for women. /d. New Hampshire’s night work law was not repealed until 1989, and Pennsylvania’s until 1988. 3 Larson § 44.01 n.11. In 1964, 40 states regulated women’s hours in one or more industries. 1975 Handbook at 329. Similarly, as of 1970, 41 states still limited work for women in one or more industries; 45 states still required “appropriate seat- ing” for women in certain jobs; and ten states and Puerto Rico still imposed weight-lifting restrictions applicable only to women. 3 Larson § 44.01. In 1953, 23 states had women-only minimum wage laws in effect. Fisch & Schwartz 24. Those laws were still enforced in Colorado, Utah and Wisconsin in 1975. 1975 Handbook at 316. These state protective laws were based in large part on the old stereotype that women’s participation in the work- force was secondary to their role as family caretakers. For example, in upholding a women’s hours law, the Supreme Court of California said that women had “household or other domestic duties” that would occupy their time. Ex Parte Miller, 124 P. 427, 429 (Cal. 1912), aff'd, 236 U.S. 373 (1915). As the Court explained almost a century ago, there was “a widespread belief” that protective legislation was justified based in large part on women’s “maternal functions,” “the rearing and education of the children,” and “the maintenance of the home.” Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419-20 (1908). Countless state courts relied on similar discriminatory reasoning to uphold laws imposing restrictions on women’s employment.” 20 ‘See, ¢.g., State v. Ehr, 221 N.W. 883, 884 (N.D. 1928); State v. Charles Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639, 640 (N.Y. 1915); State v. Elerding, 98 N.E. 982, 984 (Ill. 1912); W.C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 91 N.E. 695, 697 (Ill. 1910); State v. Williams, 51 Misc. 383, 389 (N.Y. City Ct.), aff'd, 116 A.D. 379 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1906), aff'd, 81 N.E. 778 (N.Y. 1907); Wenham v. State, 91 N.W. 421 (Neb. 1902) (upholding women’s hours law to ensure women’s ability to “bear[ | their share of the burdens of the family and the home”); Strate v. Buchanan, 70 P. 52, 54 (Wash. 1902); see generally Judith A. Baer, 24 These discriminatory state laws made the sex role stereotypes on which they were based self-enforcing. This Court has recognized, for example, that “prescribing of minimum wages for women alone would unreasonably restrain them in competition with men and tend arbitrar- ily to deprive them of employment and a fair chance to find work.” Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). Similarly, maximum hour laws may cause “an employer [to] refuse to hire a potential employee, solely because of her sex, if, for example, he requires his employees to work longer hours or periods than are specified in” the law. Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 281 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ohio 1972). These laws limited women’s employment opportunities and caused employ- ers to view them as less desirable employees.”' As courts have recognized, protective laws also had an adverse effect on women’s wages”’ and prevented women from receiving promotions.”* “By denying that women were The Chains of Protection: The Judicial Response to Women's Labor Legislation 23-29 (1978). a See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (employer refused to hire woman based on California women’s hours and weight lifting laws); State v. Fairfield Cmtys. Land Co., 538 S.W.2d 698 (Ark. 1976) (because of limitations on the overtime women were allowed to work in Arkansas, “[i]t is fair to assume that an employer might therefore decide to hire a man rather than a woman, both being qualified”); 3 Larson § 44.01 n.34 (citing 1967 survey of 78 companies that “showed that state protective leg- islation was the reason in 18 percent of the instances in which females were rejected for employment”). 22s“ See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 191-94 (1974) (situation in which state laws restricting women’s night work had continuing effect on women’s wages after repealed). * 23s See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304, 1306 (S.D. Ill. 1970) (“[f]Jemale employees . . . [weJre not receiving their share of overtime hours and [we]re not receiving assignments or promotions to jobs normally requiring the performance » - 1 : : : 25 full-fledged, equal wage earners, [protective] legislation institutionalized social reproduction as women’s primary role.” Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States 212 (1982). Conversely, these laws also cemented men’s role in the workplace rather than the home, by, for example, “impos[ing] primarily upon the male employees the bur- dens of [certain forms of] work.” Caterpillar Tractor, 317 F. Supp. at 1306. These laws thus made it more difficult for men to share the burdens of family care. In short, for over two centuries, states enacted and enforced laws that are plainly unconstitutional under current standards and perpetuated the stereotype that women are primarily fam- ily caretakers and men primarily breadwinners. C. States Enacted Other Discriminatory Laws That Reinforced Gender-Role Stereotypes and Encour- aged Women to Remain Family Caretakers 1. Benefits for Male Workers Only Until the 1980s, state laws continued to discriminate against women workers on the assumption that their employment was secondary. For example, state laws pro- viding that widows, but not widowers, would automati- cally receive workers’ compensation or other benefits at the death of a spouse unconstitutionally presumed that women were dependent on their husbands’ incomes. Most of these statutes were not struck down until the 1980s,” even though for several decades prior, “more often than of work for overtime hours in excess of those permitted by” Illinois law); see also 3 Larson § 44.01 (state protective laws “tended to ban women from a disproportionate number of these more lucrative jobs”). 24 See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (Missouri law); Portman v. Steveco, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Swafford v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 862 (Ark. App. 1981); Hess v. Wims, 613 S.W.2d 85 (Ark. 1981). 26 not a family’s standard of living depend[ed] upon the financial contributions of both marital partners.” Arp v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 405 (Cal. 1977) (internal citations omitted). 7 Based on archaic assumptions of “female economic dis- ablement,” Tomarchio v. Greenwich Township, 379 A.2d 848, 853 (N.J. 1977), these laws were justified on the grounds that it was more efficient to presume dependency in the case of women but not men.” As a result, female employees received fewer benefits than males, making it more economically rational for men to become the pri- mary breadwinners in the family.** This Court has rec- ognized that “this kind of discrimination against working women” is unconstitutional and perpetuates the stereotype that men are the primary breadwinners in the family. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 148; see also Weinberger v. Wiesen- feld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 2. Presumption in Unemployment Insurance Law that Women are Caretakers Until recently, states enacted and enforced unemploy- ment compensation laws that discriminated against women by automatically presuming that pregnant women or women who had recently given birth could not work.”’ Notably, 25 See, e.g., Arp, 19 Cal. 3d at 404 (noting that “widow's con- clusive presumption of total dependency has survived essentially unchanged since the enactment of the first detailed set of workers’ compensation statutes”). 26 _—«sIn other words, state laws also hindered men from becoming family caretakers. Another way in which state laws accomplished this is through presumptions that unwed fathers are unfit to raise their children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (Illinois law). 27 ‘See, e.g., Turner v. Dep't of Empl. Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam) (Utah law making pregnant women ineligible for unem- ployment benefits for 12 weeks before and 6 weeks after child birth); 27 many of these statutes assumed that women were unable to work for a period of time after childbirth, presumably because they had to care for their children. For example, based on an assumption that women were unable or unwilling to work for an indefinite period after childbirth, a Colorado statute made women ineligible for unem- ployment insurance after the conclusion of their preg- nancies unless, after giving birth, they spent thirteen weeks in full-time employment. See Sylvara v. Indus. Comm'n, 550 P.2d 868, 869 (Colo. 1976) (finding statute unconstitutional). Based on those assumptions, women were routinely held ineligible for unemployment benefits when they were willing and able to work despite the fact that similarly sit- uated men were eligible. These laws thus created eco- nomic incentives for women and not men to undertake family care responsibilities because in the event the pri- mary breadwinner lost his or her job, only the man could receive unemployment benefits. This Court has repeatedly criticized state laws based on a preference for “an allo- cation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role,” Orr, 440 U.S. at 279 n.9, and has held unconstitutional conclusive presumptions of women’s UAW v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1982) (Indiana statute pre- suming women are unable to work 13 weeks before and 4 weeks after child birth); Gonzales v. Texas Empl. Comm'n, 486 F. Supp. 278 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (Texas policy denying benefits to women in last trimester of pregnancy and for 6 weeks after delivery), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1295 (Sth Cir. 1980); Conn. Nat’l Org. for Women v. Peraro, No. N77-477, 1980 WL 212, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 1980) (consent decree forbid- ding state agencies from declaring, inter alia, women with young chil- dren not yet in childcare as unable to work); Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-S(h)(1) (1974) (amended 1976) (women disqualified from unemployment benefits during 18-week period before and after child- birth); cf. Boren v. Dep't of Empl. Dev., 59 Cal. App. 3d 250 (1976) (law denying unemployment compensation to workers who left their job for “domestic reasons”). 28 inability to work before and after pregnancy. Turner, 423 U.S. 44 (1975). 3. Mandatory Maternity Leave for Women Only State laws also kept women out of the workplace and in the home by requiring women to take maternity leave dur- ing and after pregnancy, often without job security. As of 1953, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, and Vermont had statutes outright prohibiting the employ- ment of women before and after childbirth. Fisch & Schwartz 22. Vermont’s law was not repealed until 1969, and Massachusetts’ until 1974. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 444 (1947) (repealed 1969); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 345 (1911) (repealed 1974). To this day, New York has a mandatory maternity leave law on the books. N.Y. Lab. Law § 206-b (McKinney 1973) (forbidding employment of women in factories or mercantile establishments within four weeks of childbearing). In addition to state manda- tory maternity leave laws, state agencies had mandatory maternity leave policies for their female employees. See, e.g., Schattman v. Texas Empl. Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32, 40- 41 (Sth Cir. 1972) (upholding mandatory maternity leave policy of Texas state agency and noting that other Texas agencies have similar policies). This Court has held unconstitutional mandatory mater- nity leave policies similar to those adopted by the states. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Not only do such policies limit the workforce participa- tion, including in state employment, of childbearing women, but they also make all women vulnerable to workplace discrimination. Congress recognized that “the assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor market is at the core of the sex stereotyping resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace.” S. Rep. No. 331, at 3 (1977). 29 4. Jury Service for Men Only Until recently, state laws systematically excluded or exempted women from jury service largely because of an assumption that women had to care for their families. In 1961, less than half of the states considered women for jury selection on the same basis as men. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 63 & nn.5-8 (1961) (listing state statutes); see generally J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131-34 (dis- cussing history of women’s exclusion from jury service). Many of these state laws explicitly exempted women but not men who had to care for sick family members. For example, Connecticut’s jury service statute excused any woman who was “nursing a sick member of her family, or who has care of one or more children under the age of six- teen years.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-218 (1953) (repealed 1975). Similar provisions existed in other states.”* As late as 1980, 21 states still exempted women but not men for family responsibilities, see Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women's Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference ?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1115, 1138 (1994), despite the fact that this Court held that such laws violate the Sixth Amendment in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The states’ discriminatory jury service laws were based in large part on the belief that women were “the center of home and family life” and therefore had “special respon- sibilities.” Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61-62. Numerous state courts relied on similar stereotypes to uphold such laws. For instance, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the state 28 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. ch. 40.01(1) (1967) (amended 1979) (exempting mothers with children under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234 § 1 (1949) (amended 1973) (exempting mothers of and women with custody of children under 16); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-19 (1951) (repealed 1967) (exempting women who care for children under 12 or ill family members); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2135 (1964) (repealed 1985) (excluding women with custody of children under 16). 30 had “a substantial interest in the care of children and per- sons with mental or physical impairments, and the statutes reflect a reasonable recognition by the legislature that women are usually the persons who perform such ser- vice.” Archer v. Mayes, 194 S.E.2d 707, 710 (Va. 1973). The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a law “established, obviously, to foster and encourage woman’s role as mother and the mainstay of family life.” State v. Wash- ington, 272 So. 2d 355, 357 (La. 1973). As this Court acknowledged, stereotypes like those in the jury laws “are likely to stigmatize as well as to per- petuate historical patterns of discrimination.” J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 n.11. These state laws not only kept women from participating in an area of public life based on the assumption that women should care for their families, they also precluded men from assuming greater family caretaking responsibilities by not excusing them on the same basis. In other words, they perpetuated the notion that women should serve as family caretakers and that men need not. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Amici Curiae respectfully urge that this Court affirm the decision below. 29 See also State v. Parker, 462 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Mo. 1971); Dekosenko v. Brandt, 313 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 318 N.Y.S.2d 915 (App. Div. 1971); State v. Comeaux, 211 So. 2d 620, 622 (La. 1968); Scott v. State, 207 So. 2d 493, 496 (Fla. 1968); State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 861, 868 (Miss.), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 98 (1966); cf Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Respectfully submitted, CONRAD K. HARPER ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER WILLIAM T. RUSSELL, Jr. Counsel of Record ELAINE M. DIVELBLISS JENNIFER K. BROWN AMANDA T. PEREZ SIMPSON THACHER WENDY R. WEISER NOW LEGAL DEFENSE & BARTLETT AND EDUCATION FUND 425 Lexington Avenue 395 Hudson Street New York, New York 10017 New York, New York 10014 (212) 455-2000 (212) 925-6635 Counsel for Amici Curiae October 25, 2002 APPENDIX A A-l AMICI CURIAE Alice Kessier-Harris is the R. Gordon Hoxie Professor of American History at Columbia University. Professor Kessler-Harris has written extensively on the history of women in the American labor force. Her publications include Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States (Oxford 1982); A Woman's Wage: Historical Meanings and Social Consequences (Ken- tucky 1990); Women Have Always Worked: A Historical Overview (Feminist Press 1981); and most recently, Jn Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men and the Quest for Eco- nomic Citizenship in the United States (Oxford 2002), which won the Bancroft Prize and the Herbert Hoover Presidential Book Award. Linda K. Kerber is the May Brodbeck Professor of Liberal Arts and Professor of History at the University of lowa. Professor Kerber is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences as well as the Society of American Historians, and has served as president of the Organization of American Historians (1997) and the American Studies Association (1988). She has written extensively on women’s rights and women’s roles in American history, and her publications include No Con- stitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obliga- tions of Citizenship (Hill & Wang 1998), which was the winner of the Littleton Griswold Prize for best book in American legal history and the Joan Kelley Prize for the best book in women’s history, both awarded by the American Historical Association. Mimi Abramovitz is a professor of Social Policy at the Hunter College School of Social Work, City University of New York, and the University Graduate Center, City University of New York. Professor Abramovitz has pub- A-2 lished numerous works on the topic of women and pub- lic policy, including Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy From Colonial Times to the Pre- sent (South End Press 2d ed. 1996) and Under Attack, Fighting Back: Women and Welfare in the United States (Monthly Review Press 2d ed. 2000). Eileen Boris is the Hull Professor of Women’s Studies at the University of California—Santa Barbara. Professor Boris is the Director of the Center for Research on Women and Social Justice at the University of Califor- nia, Santa Barbara and the co-principal investigator of “Women Working for Economic Justice: A Collaborative Project.” Among Professor Boris’s published works on the history of women in the American workplace are Home to Work: Motherhood and the Politics of Industrial Homework in the United States, which won the Philip Taft Prize in Labor History in 1995; “Social Citizenship and Women’s Right to Work in Post-War America,” in Women’s Rights and Human Rights: International His- torical Perspectives (Patricia Grimshaw, Katie Holmes & Marilyn Lake eds., Palgrave 2001) (co-written with Sonya Michel); and “The Right to Work is the Right to Live! The Rights Discourse of Fair Employment,” Two Cultures of Right: The Quest for Inclusion and Partici- pation in Modern America and Germany (Manifred Berg & Martin Geyser eds., German Historical Institute & Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). Ardis Cameron is an associate professor of American and New England Studies at the University of Southern Maine. Professor Cameron is a member of the American Studies Committee on Women, a 2002 recipient of a John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship and a 2001 recip- ient of a National Endowment for Humanities Senior Research fellowship. Her publications include Radicals A-3 of the Worst Sort: Laboring Women in Lawrence, Mas- sachusetts (Univ. of Illinois Press 1993) and Looking for America: The Visual Making and Remaking of Nation and People. Darlene Clark Hine is the John A. Hannah Professor of History at Michigan State University. Professor Hine is Past-President of the Organization of American His- torians and President-Elect of the Southern Historical Association. Her publications include: Black Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2003) (editor),.Black Women in White: Racial Conflict and Cooperation in the Nursing Pro- fession, 1890-1950 (Indiana Univ. Press 1989), and Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the White Primary in Texas (Univ. of Missouri Press 2d ed. forthcoming 2003). Patricia A. Cooper is an associate professor of History and Women’s Studies at the University of Kentucky. She is on the Board of Directors of the Labor and Working Class History Association. Professor Cooper has written extensively on issues regarding race and gender in the workplace. Her publications include Once a Cigar Maker: Men, Women and Work Culture in American Cigar Factories; “ ‘Masculinist Vision of Useful Labor’: Popular Thinking on Women and Work in the United States, 1830-1940;” and “The Faces of Gender: Work and Work Relations at Philco., 1928-1938” in Work Engendered, Toward a New History of American Labor (Ava Baron ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1991). Jane Sherron DeHart is a professor of History at the University of California-Santa Barbara. Professor DeHart will be publishing a book tentatively entitled Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Struggle for Equality (forthcoming 2004), which discusses the Equal Protec- A-4 tion Clause as a tool to eradicate sex-based discrimina- tion. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall is Julia Cherry Spruill Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Among Professor Hall’s publications in the area of gender and racial discrimination are Revolt Against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the Women’s Cam- paign Against Lynching (1979) and “ ‘The Mind That Burns in Each Body’: Women, Rape, and Racial Vio- lence,” in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality (Ann Snitow et al. eds. 1983). Ellen Carol DuBois is a professor of History at the University of California-Los Angeles. Professor DuBois is the author of numerous books on the history of Amer- ican Women, including Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1869 (Cornell Univ. Press 1978) and Harriot Stanton Blatch and the Winning of Woman Suffrage (Yale Univ. Press 1997). Anne Firor Scott is the W.K. Boyd Professor of His- tory Emerita at Duke University. She is the former pres- ident of both the Organization of American Historians and the Southern Historical Association. Professor Scott has written extensively on the history of American women, and particularly on the parallel lives of black and white women. Her writings include Making the Invisible Woman Visible (Univ. of Illinois Press 1984); Natural Allies: Women’s Associations in American His- tory (Univ. of Illinois Press 1992); and Unheard Voices: The First Historians of Southern Women (Univ. Press of Virginia 1993). Estelle Freedman is the Edgar E. Robinson Professor of United States History at Stanford University. Pro- A-5 fessor Freedman’s research and teaching focuses on United States women’s history. She is the author of No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future of Women (Ballantine Books 2002), among numerous other books and articles. Joanne L. Goodwin is an associate professor of His- tory at the University of Nevada—Las Vegas. Professor Goodwin chaired the Advisory Board to the Nevada Women’s Archives, directs the Las Vegas Women’s Oral History Project, and directs the Women’s Research Insti- tute of Nevada. She has authored a number of books and articles, including Gender and the Politics of Welfare Reform (Univ. of Chicago Press 1997). Linda Gordon is a professor of History at New York University. Professor Gordon is the award-winning author of numerous books on the history of social and family policy, including Woman’s Body, Woman's Right: A History of Birth Control (3d ed. forthcoming 2002); Heroes of Their Own Lives: The History and Politics of Family Violence (1988 & 2002); and Pitied But Not Enti- tled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare (1994). Her most recent book, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction (1999), won the Bancroft prize for best book in U.S. history and the Beveridge prize for best book on the history of all the Americas. Michael C. Grossberg is a professor of History and Law at Indiana University-Bloomington. Professor Grossberg has won numerous awards for his teaching and writings in the area of American history. Among his publications are Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth Century America (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1985) and “Giving the Present a Past? Family Law in t!e United States, 1950-2000,” in Cross Currents: Anglo-American Family Law, 1950-2000 (San- A-6 ford N. Katz, John M. Eekleaar & Macis McLead eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2001). Nancy A. Hewitt is a professor of History and Women’s Studies at Rutgers University. She has served as president of the Coordinating Council for Women His- torians, and currently chairs the Committee on Women for the Southern Historical Association and is vice-pres- ident of the International Federation for Research on Women’s History. Professor Hewitt has written exten- sively on social reform in the 19th and 20th century and the effects of government policy on women in local com- munities. Her writings include Women’s Activism and Social Change: Rochester, New York, 1822-1872 (Cor- nell Univ. Press 1984) and Southern Discomfort: Women’s Activism in Tampa, Florida, 1880s-1920s (Univ. of Illinois Press 2001). Kathryn Kish Sklar is a Distinguished Professor of History at the State University of New York—Bingham- ton. Professor Sklar is co-director of the Center for the Historical Study of Women and Gender and co-director for the Center for the Teaching of American History. Her writings on women in social movements include Women’s Rights Emerges Within the Anti-Slavery Move- ment: A Short History with Documents, 1830-1870 (Bed- ford Books, St. Martin’s Press 2000) and Social Justice Feminists in the United States and Germany: A Dialogue in Documents, 1885-1933 (Cornell Univ. Press 1998) (co-editor). Gerda Lerner is the Robinson-Edwards Professor of History, Emerita, at the University of Wisconsin—Madi- son. Professor Lerner served as the President of the Organization of American Historians. She has written extensively on women’s history. Her works include The Female Experience: An American Documentary (Bobbs- A-7 Merril 1976) and The Majority Finds its Past: Placing Women in History (Oxford Univ. Press 1980). Sonya Michel is a professor of American Studies and History at the University of Maryland. Professor Michel’s numerous publications on gender, race and social policy in the United States include Child Care at the Crossroads: Gender and Welfare State Restructuring, co-edited with Rianne Mahon (Routledge 2002) and Children’s Interests/Mother’s Rights: The Shaping of America’s Child Care Policy (Yale Univ. Press 1999). Alice O’Connor is an associate professor of History at the University of California—Santa Barbara. Professor O’Connor’s published works include Poverty Knowl- edge: Social Science, Social Policy and the Poor in — U.S. History (Princeton Univ. Press Peggy Pascoe is an associate professor and Beekman Chair of Pacific and Northwest History at the University of Oregon. She served as President on the Coordinating Council for Women in History. Professor Pascoe has written numerous articles on race and gender, including “Democracy, Citizenship, and Race: The U.S. West in the 20th Century,” in Perspectives on Modern America: Making Sense of the Twentieth Century (Harvard Sitkoff ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2001). Elisabeth I. Perry is John Francis Bannon Professor of History at Saint Louis University. Professor Perry has written extensively on the topic of discrimination against women in American politics and law, including We Have Come to Stay: American Women and Political Parties, 1880-1960, co-edited with Kristie Miller and Melanie Gustafson (Univ. of New Mexico Press 1999), and “Cul- ture, Strategy, and Politics in the New York Campaign A-8 for Women’s Jury Service, 1917-1975,” in New York His- tory (Winter 2001). Susan Porter Benson is an associate professor of His- tory at the University of Connecticut. Professor Benson is the Secretary of the Labor and Working-Class History Association. Her publications on gender issues include “Living on the Margin: Working Class Marriage and Family Survival Strategies in the U.S., 1919-1941,” in The Sex of Things: Essays on Gender and Consumption (Victoria de Grazia, ed. with Ellen Furlough, Univ. of California Press 1996). Mary P. Ryan is the John Martin Vincent Chair in American History at The Johns Hopkins University. Pro- fessor Ryan has written numerous books and articles on women’s history in the United States, including Empire of the Mother: American Writing About Domesticity, 1830-1860 (Haworth Press 1982) and Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825-1880 (Johns Hop- kins Univ. Press 1990). Susan M. Reverby is a professor of Women’s Studies at Wellesley College. Professor Reverby is a historian of American women and has written and edited extensively on the subject of women’s history. In addition to prize- winning books and articles, she co-edited America’s Working Women: A Documentary History (Random House/Vintage Ist ed. 1976). APPENDIX B ‘P219A09 JOU Ssoujy! soAO}dWIA ‘poiiod se9A-0mM) JOAO SYJUOUW p 0} Poy] “oyNgRys DAvd] Ajiwiey ON ‘Ajuo uondopesyyig possA0D ‘SSaUp}1 Buisaaod ajnjyjs aavaj Ajiwuv{ oN ‘Ajuo sooAojdwia 3}BIS POISAOD ‘ssouty! Apres JO0y pouisd 1edA-OM} JOAO S¥99M QI] O} POPU] ‘ayNjeys Sava] Ajrwey ON VINA OL GHAVIWOD MVT ALV.LS 40 AdOOS NI SAIONAIDLaAG VINA AHL 40 ADVSSVd AHL OL NOMd GALIVNGA SMV’ AAVAT ATINVA ALVLS B-3 B-2 ‘pouiad 1e34-0M} JOAO S¥IOM (| 0} POU] “1661 JO Sy “‘potad 1e3X-omy J9AO SYSOM YO} PHU] “YZG] JO sy h i suON aNIVA ‘OyNgeIs Ava] Ajrwey ON QUON dUON dUON VYNVISINO' ‘paryioods JOU JUDUII}B}SUIDI QOe */ Jopun pyIys JO uondope 40} sy2aM g 0} pout] ‘SSauj]! Butéaaod ajnjyjs aavay Ajnuv{ on IN IN / AMONLNAY ‘ayNyeys DAvd] Ajrwiey ON QUON sUON QUON SVSNVM “SINgeIS DAB] AyrUe} ON | sUON ouON ouON VMO] ‘ayngeys Sava] Ajuey ON sUON sUON sUON VNVIGN] —— “BMNgeYS Avo] AjruEy ON QUON QUON dUON SIONITI] “OINjeYS Davo] Ajiwey ON | sUON dUON QUON OHV] ‘Ajuo sooXojduis 2383s possao0d ‘yduax9 ssahojduls OQ] UU) Jomaj yum sishojduiy “pasda0d OU ssouyy! sohojduiy “se9A & SY¥9OM p 0} POUT] IN sUON oUON lIiVMAVH ‘Ajuo saoAojduls 2384s possa0d IN sUON sUON vinuoay ‘Ajuo saoXojduis 3383s P213A02 “P3J9A0d JOU SsouT! soAO;dwIy \ 2UON QUON vanio14 ‘AjUO saoAo0jduia a3e}s passao0d “‘uordope Joy Ajuo syaom g 0} pouty "SSaUup]1 Bursaaod ajnjojs aavay Apiuvf on IN IN I aUuvVAV1ag ‘Ajuo saaXojduia 3383s pos9a0d Ajjeniuy IN IN sUON LADLLOANNOD ‘uondope/yuig Joy aAva] sues poyueID ‘ssaup]! Bursaaod ajnjojs aavay Apiuvf oN IN dUON dUuON odvuo10) B-5 B-4 ‘NYeIs Ava] AjIWey ON sUON 2UON oUON OOIXaW MAN ‘P2J9A09 j0U ssoul! soAOjdwiq ‘poiod JB3K-OM} JZAO SYIOM Z|] 0} POW] IN \ QUON Aasdaft MAN ‘ynjgeys Savoy] Ajiwiey ON sUON QUON oUON auIHSdWVH MAN ‘aynjgeRys Savoy Ajrwey ON QUON dUON oUON VaVAaN “ayTgRys SAvo] Ajrwiey ON oUON oUON 2UON VNSVUGaN “ayngeys Savoy Ajrwiey ON oUON sUON QUON VNVLNOW ‘Ajuo saoXojduis 3383s possao0D “yg JO} se UOKNdOpeE JO} Ava] QWs poyUBIDH “SSaUuj]1 Bu1saaod ajnjojs aavaj Apiup{ oN IN QUON sUON NOSSsIFC ‘aynjgeys Davo] Ajiwiey ON QUON QUON QUON IddISSISSI| ‘UONdope/YypIG J0J SYIOM XIS 0} POUT ‘SSaUuj]1 Suisaaod ajynjyjs aavaj Apiump{ ON h IN oUON V.LOSANNIW ‘aynjeys Davo] AjIWey ON sUON QUON _ SUON NVSIKOIW ‘¢ Jopun PIHys Jo UoNdope/yig 24) JOJ 9ABd] Syoom g 0} dn AjUO USWIOM SOPIAOlg ‘S$saUuj]! Bu1s4aaod ajnjyjs aavay Aprup{ ON IN IN \ SLLASNHOVSSVWW “Ajuo SIdAO[AUID 338}S PIISAOD “~P3JdA0d Ou ssouy! soAojdwiq “Areuonjs10sigq IN sUON QUON GNVIAUVA B-7 B-6 ‘a0A0j dua Jo yuored ‘asnods Jo ssaujj! 1909 0) papuedxo Jaye] “AjUO pytyd qj! Ajsnouas jo ase9 Jo ‘uondope ‘yyIg 410} potiod se9h-omy B JBAO SYBIM €] O} PAU] ‘7 86] JO SY 3UON GNV'1S] 4GOHY ‘Ajuo saoXojdurs 238)8 posaao0d “wuordope Joy syaom 9 0} popu] ‘SSaUuj}1 Butdaaod aynyvjs aavay Ajnup{ on QUON VINVA'TASNNGd ‘oABa} Ajiwey SuLinp Buiniooe poddoys S}JaUsgq ‘poliod 1e94-Om} JOAO Sy¥DOM CI 0} pay ssouyyt Ajrurey 10y ava] «, 2489 JUBSUOD,, SuIsINbol asnods JO yuared “pyiyd & 10} 9189 0} JO ,.a1e9 awioy,, Surinbar pjiyo & 30 ssauyyt oy) 0} PALI] P2I9INSAI ‘766 ] JO Sy ‘uoNdope /Yutq AUO passaod ‘1 g6] JO sy 2UON ‘Ajuo S3dAO[ AUIS 338}S PIIZAOD “P3JOA0d JOU sao] duis jo ssouj] ,,3jnpe yuapuadap,, JO Pjiyo |]! Ajjeurustay 10 Ajpeoni9 0} P9}911}S9I SSOUI]I JO} SABO] Ajiwey IN IS sUON VWOHVTAO ‘ayNjeYs Savoy] Ajiwey ON sUON sUON * QUON O1HO ‘AjUO saoXojduia 9383s P219A0D) “PoJ9A09 j0U Ssoulj! saAO;duiq \ IN aUON VLOAVG HLYON ‘aynjeys Savoy] Aj1wiey ON sUON sUON sUON VNITOUVD HLUON “quiq JOj se UOIdope 10 SAL] DWES pajUBIH ‘SSAUj]1 Buj4aaod ajnjvjs aavay Apiuvf oN IN sUON dUON MuOA MAN B-8 ‘suotstaoid Ayiyiqesip Ajiusojyeu Jo ‘suoisiaoid oavoy YoIs pred ‘sojns 9aijesjsiulMpe apnjou! you Soop j] “SoyNjeIs DAL] Aji1wWey pue jeyUsIed KjUO sopnjour xipuodde siyy ‘U19J9Y) PI9U9I9j94 SOINIeIS 9)8)8 puL (2avo] YOIs pue Ayyiqesip Aoueufaid SOpnjou!) (€66]) MB] Ave] Ajrwe.j/Ayusayep 2381g ‘s0qQe’] JO 1,doq ‘g'f ‘neoing s,uowom ‘(1661) LOI saakojdugy aiwig sof swvs8org Kpruvg “Y4OM O1 APIND aouasafoy aiwig ays “Bury yosedsey I Ps0’] 22491 W “(0661 30) OI-TT “1OA ‘SION 1yQUDg sekojdwuiq “Samwig ays 01 Sifiygs Ananay aava7] Kjuvy ‘(0661 °29Q) ZI ‘f SusoUeg eeXAojduIq p-c] uw ‘sis