# Respondents Brief — Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 538 U.S. 135

## Text

Supreme Court of the United States

.
NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

FREEMAN AYERS, et al.,

Respondents.
*

On Writ Of Certiorari To
The Circuit Court Of Kanawha County,

West Virginia

¢

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
+

SEAN DONAHUE RICHARD J. LAZARUS*
WASHINGTON & LEE UNIV. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL or LAW LAW CENTER

Lexington, VA 24450 600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001
Jamas H. RION, JR. (202) 662-9129

NESS MOTLEY
28 Bridgeside Blvd. JAMES A. MCKOWEN

Mt. Pleasant, SC 29465 JAMES F. HUMPHREYS &
ASSOCIATES, L.C.

LAWRENCE M. MANN 500 Virginia Street, East
ALPER & MANN, P.C.

Charleston, WV 25301
1667 K Street, N.W. (304) 347-5050

Eleventh Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006 *Counsel of Record

Counsel for Respondents

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51,
provides that a railroad is liable in damages for injuries to
railroad employees “resulting in whole or in part” from the
railroad’s negligence. Respondents prevailed in a jury trial
brought pursuant to FELA against petitioner based on injuries
resulting from petitioner's negligence in exposing respondents
to asbestos at the workplace. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the trial judge properly instructed the jury that a
plaintiff railroad employee who has a reasonable fear of cancer
because he is suffering from a physical disease caused by the
defendant railroad employer's negligently exposing the
plaintiff to asbestos is entitled to be compensated for that
mental injury under FELA.

2. Whether the trial judge properly declined to instruct the
jury in a FELA lawsuit to apportion damages between the
defendant railroad employer and absent third parties where the
plaintiff railroad employees were suffering from indivisible
injuries caused by the railroad’s negligence.

(i)

LIST OF ALL PARTIES
In addition to the parties listed in the caption, the following
were plaintiffs below and are respondents in this case:
Carl Butler
Doyle Johnson
John Shirley
James Spangler

Clifford Vance

(ii)

—

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Nee ce cececee i
eee reed eeeedeeneecesesccecesecsees ii
ST MERUEGUNGUAURGONGHeSececeescececccccesccecs 1
I. Background: Asbestos, Asbestosis, and Cancer ....... 1
le cctcdencocccsccassecccscscees 4
Introduction and Summary of Argument ................ 9

Argument:

I. The Trial Judge Properly Instructed The Jury That A
Plaintiff Who Has A Reasonable Fear Of Cancer
Because He Is Suffering From A Physical Disease
Caused By The Defendant's Negligence Is Entitled To
Recover For That Mental Injury As Part Of His Overall
PR RGRRGUESSS GEES Uncesocccecececccccecces 13

A. Under Settled Tort Law, A Defendant Who
Negligently Causes Physical Injury To The Person
Of Another Is Liable For The Resulting Physical
And Mental Harms, Including Reasonable
Apprehension Of Future Physical Consequences

B. A Plaintiff Who Reasonably Fears Cancer Because
He Has Asbestosis May Recover Damages for that
Fear From A Defendant Who Negligently Caused
PE SOU GNGRECHenecesecscccccesceccee 17

(iii)

Il.

Conclusion

None Of Petitioner's Various Arguments Is
Relevant To The Question Whether A Railroad
Employee Suffering From Asbestosis May Recover
Under FELA For Fear of Cancer Based On Such

pe PPPPPPPPTTTTTTETTITITTT TTT TTL

The Trial Court Properly Declined To Instruct The
Jury To Apportion Respondents’ Damages Between
Petitioner And Absent Third Parties ...........-.

FELA Provides That A Railroad Employee Can
Recover In Full From The Railroad For Injuries
Caused “In Whole Or In Part” By The Railroad's

Negligence .........sececeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees

Traditional And Settled Common Law Liability
Rules Also Support The Trial Judge’s Refusal To
Instruct The Jury To Apportion Damages In This
Case Between The Railroad And Absent Third

. . cuccocceceneseeedeceseecenesegeesee

(iv)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Ala. Great S. R.R. v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry., 493 F.2d

EE 0 4cstccinddddutetebdbeenannesciae 36
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994) ...... 49
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557

SD Kcbeendsceccddedstwdeeesensdceedscccocces 14, 33
Ayers v. Macoughtry, 29 Okla. 399 (1911) ............244. 16
Beeman v. Manville Corp., 496 N.W.2d 247 (lowa,

BEND S6Sb6sddndbddedanceswancacedbscacesescoss 22, 24
Bernadsky v. Erie R. Co., 76 N.J.L. 580 (1908) ............. 17
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076

gE oe RL OE nore 43
Buck v. Brady, 110 Md. 568 (1909) ...............0 eens 16
Burd v. Sinn, 486 Pa. 146 (1979)... 02... e ees 27

Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1994) .. 24
Chem Nuclear System v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254 (D.C. Cir.

PE 456d Seeb ckdEndasadedetbneeadusdeceeesesees 47, 48
Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113

gg RR RE ree eere 38, 49
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532

SD sb60bONGdens0cekdbaceuunl Risedenciovceeess passim
Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1949) ........... 34
Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902) ................ 41
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433

Ps CUED SOS dwbevdadducantcddcuenbadbecceeseceees 27
Dale v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 552 A.2d 1037 (Pa.

Be hokehnsebdancssecaddcandaneceksssdvasonss 36-37
Denton v. Southern Railway Co., 854 S.W. 2d 885 (Tenn.

SG ED ebdddcheccanocncwncedaseedaceecesces 24

Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556 (1985) .. 22
Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist.

PME Ksacddteadenddesushbcsdddetsecens 22, 24
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S.
PT NG6d:4 Kesdaddadeddnbbdedeneduaeennenses passim
Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 349 (9" Cir. 1989) ........ 36
The Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) ........ 39
(v)

Cases -- Continued:

Engvall v. Soo Line R.R., 632 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 2001) .... 36
Fort Worth & Denver Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307

(FS Cig. 1955)... cc cece ccccccccccccccccccccccccess 36
Freeman v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., Inc., 714 So. 2d 832

(La. App. 1998) ....... 0c cece cece cence eee ceeeeeenees 36
Gaines v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 23 F.3d 1170 (7 Cir.

PPPPPPITTTITTTTTTTTTT TTT tt 36
Gallick v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963) ....... 25
Gamer v. Winchester, 110 S.W. 2d 1190 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1937) .......cc ccc eee cece neceeceeeeneceneeeees 17
Gaulden v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 654 P.2d 383

(D.Kam. 1963) .......cccccccccccccsccccccnssesecees 34
Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251 (1880) ........ 6c cece eee wees 16
Griffin v. Keene Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7424, slip op. 4

(N.D. TH. 1990)... cccccccccccccccccccccsceces 22, 24
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 98

N.E.2d 783 (TEL. 1961) .......cccccncccccccccccccccces 36
Heintz v. Caldwell, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 412 (1898) ........... 16
Hoerner v. ANCO Insulations, Inc., 812 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct.

App. 2002) ..... cece cece cece eee ene eetneeeeeees 24
In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889 (5" Cir. 1993) ....... 48
In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563

(D. Haw. 1990) ....ccccccccccccccccccccccccveces 29-30
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394

get | PPPPPPOTTTITITT TT TTT 24
Joia v. Jo-Ja Service Corp., 817 F.2d 908 (1" Cir. 1983) ....... 49
Jones v. CSX Transportation, 287 F.3d 1341 (11" Cir.

BED ccncccceccccccccsccceseccocesvaccccsesocceces 27
Kennedy v. Penn. R. Co., 282 F. 2d 705 (3d Cir. 1960) ...... 36
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958) ...... 49

Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 30 Ohio
Misc. 2d 11 (Ct. Common Pleas, Cayahoga Cty. 1987) . . . 23

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 US. 645 (1946) ......0000eeeeeeees 31
Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398 (1974) ..........02000eee 27
Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947) ....... 2.0000 ee ees 35
The Lord Derby, 17 F. 265 (E.D. La. 1883) ...........00005 17

McAdams v. Eli Lilly, 638 F Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1986) .... 28

(vi)

Cases -- Continued:
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994) ....... 38, 49
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424

PD ceesbdsdtanbseacdadsctensastetestoneeess passim

Middlesex Co. v. City of Lowell, 21 N.E. 872 (Mass. 1889) ... 41
Mills v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 276 F.3d 322 (6" Cir.

ME OG SNN RS Ven daddenhNScdedecncnenesnceeecessoons 36
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916

DE SbdCbNCERdSKESHAKEddoCREsbOREeeeEreeesoeecee 27
Moore v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1061

| EE ESD ee eee 47
Murray v. Lovejoy, 3 Wall. 19 (1863) ...............2005 40
O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1" Cir. 1989) .............. 47
Owens Corning Fiberglass v. Parrish, 58 S.W. 3d 467

DME ShcGcbeedckenneccssedondsddéinecenscees 43
Patterson v. Penn. R. Co., 197 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1952) ...... 36
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876) ........... 40
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133

PEED SOdbeDeNbudeEeeKesececeseisbscedcsooeseccoones 4
Reynolds v. Southern R. Co., 320 F. Supp. 1141

eS DEEN Soe ONSdebdnddecducedecsocecocedcsses 36
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) ...... passim
Seabord Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Prot., 143 So.

PE ED 6.656 004.5 ane KdeKnndedhascnsedecsesscs 36
Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Vo., 832 F.2d 1540

gg RES ar eee ere 49
Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107

SED SENUKSHRdObb6sddRREdK SH eKEKROSRDSCCceseceves 35
Serio v. American Brewing, 141 La. 290 (1917) ............ 16
Sinkler v. Missouri P.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326 (1958) .......... 40
Smith v. Hines, 2 Sumn. 348 (Me. 1863) ................. 40
Southern R. Co. v. Foote Mineral Co., 384 F.2d 224

DP s+iiddtheidethesetetiiieennaunsanhiens 36
Spielman v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co.,

OGe &. WU. GEE GE EAIL.U. BOUED ccccccccccccccccccces 36

St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915) ... 14,31
Stephens v. S. Pac. Transp. Col., 991 F. Supp. 618
eee SE SUED Seccceccccecesvevevesesesoccencncass 36

Cases -- Continued:

Still v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 368 U.S. 35 (1961) .....-+++++- 33
Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, 400 So. 2d 369

CVE U.) } 27
Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R. Co., 321 U.S. 29 (1944) ......... 31
Tracy v. Cottrell, 206 W. Va. 363 (1999) .....--+seeee renee 44

Tucker v. Reading Co., 335 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ... 36
U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.

1992) nc cccvcvccvcccvccccccvssscesesesessscesesess 47
U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.

WOT) on cvcccvccccccccccccccvcvccccccevescesscesces 47
U.S. v. Brighton, 153 F. 3d 307 (6" Cir. 1998) .........0+5: 47
U.S. v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ..... 47
U.S. v. Hercules, 247 F.3d 706 (8" Cir. 2001) ........... 47, 48
U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4" Cir. 1988) ...........+. 47
Urie v. Thompson, 37 U.S. 163 (1949) .......eeeeeees 35, 39
Versland v. Caron Transport, 206 Mont. 313 (1983) ........ 27
Walter v. Dow Chemical Co., 195 N.W. 2d 323

(Mich. App. 1972) ........ 66 ec cece eee eees peevcceces 36
Warner v. Chamberlain, 12 Del. 18 (1884) ...........+005 16
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111

(D.C. Cir. 1982) 0... . cece cceeeeeeeeeeeceseereeeens 21
Winfree v. Northern P.R. Co., 227 U.S. 296 (1913) ......-++> 48
Statutes and regulation:

The Act of June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232 «2... 6. cece renee 39
The Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat.65 .........00005: vee 39
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq. ........-200+ 47
Federal Employer's Liability Act, |

| a PP POrrrrrrTrrTrir TT tt itis. passim

GU BL. GID nccccccccaccccccccvccccccccvccesccces 37
The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688 .... 6... cece eee eeee 49
29 C.F.R. §1910.1001 2.0... ce ccccccccvccvevecccvevess 46

(viii)

Miscellaneous:

American Insurance Association Amicus Brief
in Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, -
Se ED dbudddeeseusddsaddedaseecenss 23, 24
American Thoracic Society Guidelines concerning
the Diagnosis of Nonmalignant Diseases Related to
NL bib esuinntedieendddbdededeedonewes 3,6
American Thoracic Society Guidelines concerning
the Evaluation of Impairment Disability Secondary
to Respiratory Disorder (1986) ...............00ceeeees 6
Annot., Right of Railroad Charged with Liability of Injury
to or Death of Employee Under Federal Employers Liability
Act to Claim Indemnity of Contribution from Other
Tortfeasors, 19 A.L.R. 3d 923 (1968) ...........0 cece eee 36
Francis H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting
from Negligence Without impact, 50 Am. L. Rev. (1902) ... 15
Francis H. Bohlen, I Cases on the Law of Torts (1915) ...... 15
Kevin Browne, Is Asbestos ov Asbestosis the Cause of
the Increased Risk of Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers?,

43 Brit. J. Ind. Med. 145 (1986) ................0008. 4, 30
Andrew Churg & Francis Green, Pathology of Occupational

ts cvneninnaseesnésevessensees 4, 30
42 Cong. Rec. (1908)

PP SNAAGHONASNEDKAvenesabdadeeseceeddeseeeecs 40

PGE Sho cbeckevkdncnccncneccdeccocecocsecacs 39
145 Cong. Rec. $3510 (March 25, 1999) .............. 32-33
T. Coolev, Treatise on the Law of Torts (3d ed. 1906) ....... 41
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2000) .............. passim

Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999, Hearing
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciarv, 106" Cong.,

bh ibiddd tides adeuccuauncenecesies 32-33
Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal

Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497 (1921) ..........6..00005 14
H. Corwin Hinshaw & John F. Murray, Diseases of the

ST MED ctciidcwonscnecenederssesecuéscoce 22
SEE cnccédccccdsectedessseeseues 19
59 Fed. Reg. (1994)

GPE v8 cceccovecccssccececscsvesecscccosecoseess 46

Miscellaneous - Continued:

59 Fed. Reg. (1994)
P. 40,970 occ ccccccccccccereeeeeseeceueeseseesens 46
P. 40,992 on. rcccccccccecccesececncceusesseeeeees 46
Fowler V. Harper, Readings in Torts (1941) ..........545. if
H.R. 1283, Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of
1999, 106 Cong., 1" Sess. (1999) ..... eee ee ee eens 32
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos
Litigation Gone Made: Exposure-Based Recovery for Incrased
Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring ........... 32
Johns-Manville, Inc., Johns-Manville Service to Railroads
(RGTD nn cccccccccccccccevececsecevescccencesesccces 1
Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in
the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936) ........... 15
David Minneman, Annot., Future Disease or Condition,
or Anxiety Relating Thereto, As Element of Recovery,
SR ALB SWE ccc csccsvevcccscessacevececes: 16
Oral Argument Transcript in Metro-North Commuter R.R.
Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) 2.0... ccc cece eee eees 30
Petitioner's Brief in Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v.
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997)... 2... cece cee eee eee eee 24
Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Metro-North Commuter R.R.
Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) 2.0... cc cece eee ees 23
Jerome H. Nates, Damages in Tort Actions (1993 &
WOOT Gea.) nnn cccccccccccicccccvccecececesesacece 38
Wil’ am L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts
GIDE cccccccccccescesesncseucecceveessecesesce 14, 26
Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5 ed. 1984) ...... 0... c cece ees 41
Restatement (First) of Torts (1939)
DEE oi ccccccccccvncescccesncsvsscenessencessacees 43
_ , PRPPPETUCTTTETETTTTTTLT TTT TTT TTT TTT ieee 42, 43
i... cece eenesneneweeeeeesnsceene 42,43
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965 & 1979)
Chapter 2, Introductory note, D. 23) «2.6... cece eee ee 26
DED ccccncecccsccenccecenstnsccussceesscceuscscesas 22
BED secccccccscccscvesccccntevescevencnaccuece 22, 28
DEE ccccnccesceccoucccccseseseccousesssaecusess 22, 28
SAL COMMMMIMBE cc ccccccccccscgescccccccessececesess 28
(x)

Miscellaneous - Continued:

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965 & 1979)

UT VEGND EA ddebenecaadeadedednddacedsuceednansesss 28
saa iNOAANeEANOKOR ER eeedAnsshnceececeencescess 28
PED Chddkuenshandvapandesesenacesacdanceceaes 28
EE SadGUNCinhSeenehenseedatakenseneecncs The chest x-rays of each respondent reveal asbestosis of the lung. JA
178-81, 184, 193, 198, 199, 202, 204, 205-06. For respondent Spangler, the
asbestosis has already progressed to an even more advanced stage, but the
disease is likely to worsen for all respondents over time. JA 206; see id. at
171, 186, 195, 198, 203. Five respondents also suffered from diffusion
impairment consistent with asbestosis. JA 169-70, 193-94, 200, 202, 206.
Physical examination of the lungs, using a stethoscope, revealed rale
sounds in the chests of several respondents, including the one whose
diffusion capacity appeared normal, which further corroborated
asbestosis. JA 168-69, 184, 193. At trial, a medical expert testified that
some respondents also exhibited lung damage from smoking, but that the
evidence of asbestosis — especially the chest x-rays and diffusion
impairment -- was physically distinct for diagnostic purposes from that
caused by either smoking or pleural plaques. JA 171, 185, 189, 202, 208-09.
Petitioner improperly now tries to relitigate the facts and in doing so
misstates the trial evidence. Respondents’ expert did not “concede[] the
absence of ATS-recommended criteria” for respondent Ayers. Pet. Br. 7 &
n.6. The expert found those criteria met. JA 201-03. Petitioner's reference
to “corrected” diffusing capacity is misleading because, as established at
trial, this so-called correction does not measure for asbestosis impairment,
which is why it is not used by the ATS guidelines for measuring
respiratory impairment Petitioner's own expert conceded just that. JA
165-66, 477-78, 483, 522-23. Petitioner is likewise mistaken in now
contending (Br. 4 n.3) that a lung profusion reading of 1/1 is required to
support a diagnosis of asbestosis. The evidence at trial established that a
1/0 reading is sufficient evidence of abnormality to support an asbestosis
diagnosis according to the author of the ATS guidelines and to both
petitioner's and respondents’ medical experts. JA 199, 240, 432, 460.

7

get the mail and back, after which he has to sit down and rest.
JA 206, 356. The impact on another respondent's lung is so
severe that “no matter what I do, I could just be talking and I'll
run plum out of breath.” JA 294-95.

At trial, respondents established the seriousness of the mental
injuries caused by their asbestosis. In addition to the obvious
trauma from their growing physical incapacity to engage in
normal life activities, there was testimony about the emotional
trauma directly linked to shortness of breath. Respondent
Spangler described how his worsening condition was causing
him emotional distress. JA 357. Respondent Shirley stated it
was making “a nervous wreck out of me” and he “gfojt
depressed sometimes.” JA 298.

Respondents also proved at trial both their fear of getting
either lung cancer or mesothelioma and the reasonableness of
that fear based on their asbestosis. There was trial testimony
regarding the significantly enhanced risk of those cancers for
those with asbestosis (see pp. 3-4, supra), as well as the mental
injury caused by the knowledge of those risks. There was also
testimony that respondents were the kind of individuals who
understated their fears. JA 116, 255, 277, 299, 331, 354.

2. During jury selection, the trial judge granted respondents’
motion that petitioner not be allowed either to refer in voir dire
or to introduce at trial evidence of other lawsuits or settlements
that respondents may have filed against or entered into with
other parties relating to their asbestos-related injuries. Trial Tr.
32-38, 148-49 (April 13, 1998); JA 66-73. In considering the
motion, the trial judge repeatedly questioned whether
petitioner was planning to introduce evidence of the negligence
of other tortfeasors in support of apportionment of fault and, if
not, what did petitioner suggest the jury was “going to
apportion with?.” JA 69. Petitioner denied intent to introduce
evidence with respect to manufacturers and mentioned only the
possibility of “apportionment” based on the fact that several
respondents were smokers. JA 68-71. The trial court’s order
pertained only to evidence of the filing of other lawsuits and
settlements, and it did not preclude petitioner from introducing
evidence of the culpability of manufacturers or nonrailroad
employers. See JA 126 (“evidence that [respondents] have sued

the manufacturers and might have received settlement’).° |
3. Petitioner also requested two jury instructions that the trial
judge denied. Petitioner requested an instruction that there
could be no award of “damages to plaintiff for fear of cancer”
unless the jury found both that (1) “he has an actual likelihood
of developing cancer” and (2) “he has experienced Physical
manifestations caused by fear of developing cancer.” JA 348.
Petitioner did not contend (as it does now) that physical
manifestations would suffice for recovery or that mental injury
must be “severe.” The trial judge instead instructed the jury
that “any plaintiff who has demonstrated that he has developed
a reasonable fear of cancer that is related to proven physical
injury from asbestos is entitled to be compensated for that fear
as a part of the damages you award for pain and suffering” for
that physical injury. JA 573. The judge further instructed that
because “none of the plaintiffs have offered evidence that he
actually has cancer or that he will, with reasonable certainty
develop cancer in the future. *** [YJou cannot award damages
to plaintiffs for cancer or for increased risk of cancer. Id.
The trial judge also denied petitioner's apportionment’
instruction. Petitioner requested that the jury be instructed that
if it finds that the “plaintiff in this case has a condition or
disease which was caused by his employment with employers
other than the railroad, plaintiff's recovery must be limited to
only such damages as result from his railroad employment and
he cannot recover damages which have been or will be caused
by his non-railroad employment.” JA 539. Petitioner further

* Other evidence related to manufacturers denied admission by the trial
judge was certain evidence concerning when manufacturers warned
petitioner of asbestos hazards. Petitioner, however, sought to argue that
the manufacturers were nonnegligent in lacking knowledge of asbestos
hazards and, based on that alleged factual premise, hoping to persuade
the jury that petitioner was likewise nonnegligent. See JA 127 (“The
purported evidence would be that [the manufacturers] didn’t warn
because the general state-of-the-art was such that nobody knew enough
to do anything.). In denying petitioner the freedom to suggest that the
manufacturers were nonnegligent, the judge did not limit petitioner's
ability to introduce evidence of manufacturer negligence, which both
respondents and the court agreed was in bountiful supply. See JA 126-37.

9

proposed a verdict form that would have allowed the jury to
allocate percentages of damages to petitioner, each respondent
(based on smoking), and “Other Employment.” JA 550-60
The trial judge instead instructed the jury that plaintiff's
recovery should be “reduced” and “not * * * barred” if the jury
found that “a plaintiff was negligent and that plaintiff's
negligence caused in whole or in part, the plaintiff's lung
impairment or injury.” The verdict forms provided by the
judge accordingly allowed the jury to determine the
“percentage of negligence” attributable to “each of the parties”
in the event that the jury first found any of them contributorily
negligent. JA 578-79, 582-83, 586-87. The court further
instructed the jury that it was no defense to petitioner's liability
that there “may be more than one cause to any injury.” JA 568.
4. The jury reached verdicts in favor of respondents, but
reduced damages for three respondents based on their
comparative negligence by smoking. The reductions were 37,
31, and 14 percent, amounting to a $776,954.44 overall decrease.
The judge further reduced the verdicts to account for
settlements that respondents had entered into with other non-
FELA entities. The damages ultimately awarded in the final
judgments totaled $4,891,603.20. See JA 590-613; Order
Modifying Judgment (9/22/99). The judge subsequently
denied petitioner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. Pet. App. 3a-4a.

5. The West Virginia Supreme Court denied discretionary
review. Pet. App. 1la-2a.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioner sets forth two claims. Petitioner's first claim is that
the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award any damages
based on fear of cancer. Petitioner’s second claim is that the
trial court erred in holding petitioner liable for all of
respondents’ injuries rather than instructing the jury to
apportion damages between petitioner and other non-party
tortfeasors who may also have contributed to those injuries.
Neither of these contentions has any merit. Both are premised
ona misreading of settled tort doctrine, which supports the jury

10

instructions in all respects. Both also run afoul of the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA), which Congress enacted in
order to expand a plaintiff's ability to recover for injuries
caused by a railroad’s negligence. — Finally, petitioner
misapprehends this Court's role in reviewing trial ee
and jury verdicts by repeatedly questioning the sufficiency 0

the evidence at trial and by introducing new evidence and new
arguments not presented at trial. The judgment of the trial
court should, accordingly, be affirmed, or the Court may wish
to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

1. Petitioner's first contention contravenes settled tort
doctrine that permits recovery of damages for reasonably-
incurred mental injuries where, as in this case, the basis of those
injuries is a physical injury caused by the defendants
negligence. Contrary to petitioner's repeated insistence, this
case, unlike Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 US.
424 (1997), does not involve a stand-alone tort claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Respondents are not
relying on mere “asbestos exposure” in support of their claim
for recovery of mental injuries. Nor are they asserting those
mental injuries as what establishes their tort cause of action in

irst instance.

"hanaken alleged and proved at trial that they each suffer
from a serious, debilitating — yor —eonora .
used itioner’s negligent conduct, an oner :
oan > i adainnat’| (Br. 2) the jury’s finding of asbestosis.
Respondents further established at trial the reasonableness of
their fear, arising from their asbestosis, that they may suffer in
the future from two painful and potentially fatal forms of
cancer: mesothelioma and lung cancer. The evidence was
uncontradicted at trial that those who, like respondents, suffer
from asbestosis are significantly more likely to develop these
cancers than those who do not, including those who have been
only exposed to asbestos. Pursuant to the trial judge’s
instruction, the jury concluded that respondents fear of cancer
was in fact reasonably related to their asbestosis and the
sufficiency of that evidence can no longer be fairly questioned.
Based on traditional and longstanding tort doctrine, recovery
for such mental injuries is permissible under FELA. Once a

ll

plaintiff establishes that the defendant's conduct has caused a
physical injury, such as a serious physical disease from asbestos
exposure, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all reasonably
foreseeable physical and mental injuries proximately resulting
from the same “conduct which cause[d]” the initial injury. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 456 (1965). The physical disease
in that circumstance satisfies the “injury” element necessary for
the tort cause of action, and the mental injuries are merely an
aspect of damages for an otherwise established tort.

Nor is there anything about the jury verdict to suggest that
respondents’ asbestosis was merely a pretext for a damage
award based mostly on respondents’ fear of cancer. Wholly
apart from fear of cancer, the evidence at trial established the
seriousness of respondents’ asbestosis and its debilitating and
progressively worsening impact on their daily lives. Indeed,
none of the respondents sought to prove that their fear of cancer
was their most substantial injury, and at least one even
expressly denied just that. Because, moreover, petitioner failed
to seek or obtain a jury verdict that reveals how much was
awarded for fear of cancer, petitioner cannot now presume that
the jury awarded too much on that one ground.

2. FELA’s plain terms and settled tort law also contradict
petitioner's second claim that the trial court erred by not
instructing the jury to apportion damages between petitioner
and absent third parties who may have contributed to the
injuries of two respondents. FELA and tort law permit a
plaintiff to recover his entire damages from a defendant whose
negligence jointly causes indivisible personal injuries, such as
a physical disease, while allowing the defendant to seek

contribution from other tortfeasors.

FELA expressly imposes liability on petitioner so long as its
negligence caused respondents’ injuries “in part.” 45 U.S.C. §
51. As repeatedly stressed by this Court, this statutory standard
is met when the “employer negligence played any part, even
the slightest, in producing the injury ** *. It does not matter
that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on
grounds of probability, attribute the result to other causes ** *.”
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1957). In
contrast to FELA’s adoption of comparative negligence, FELA

12

does not provide that a plaintiff's recovery must be reduced
because other nonrailroad sources contributed to the plaintiff's
indivisible injuries. Neither the common law in existence at the
time of FELA’s enactment nor the weight of common law
authorities today dictate otherwise. Respondents’ personal
injuries resulting from asbestosis are classic “indivisible”
injuries for which apportionment is not compelled.

Even if, contrary to our submission, FELA’s plain language
and applicable common law doctrine do not preclude
apportionment for the type of indivisible physical and
reasonable mental injuries resulting from asbestosis, petitioner
cannot prevail by now claiming that a reasonable basis for
apportionment exists. The burden of establishing any such
“reasonable basis” necessarily falls on petitioner as the
defendant. Here, however, petitioner made no such showing
at trial, notwithstanding multiple opportunities to do so.

3. Although petitioner pays nominal lip-service to the
irrefutable notion that, before this Court, petitioner may neither
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the jury nor
present new evidence not introduced at trial, petitioner’s brief
is riddled with efforts to dojust that. Petitioner never accounts
for the fact that all reasonable evidentiary inferences must now
be made in respondents’ favor as the prevailing parties at trial.

With regard to the first question presented, petitioner (1)
questions whether respondents in fact suffer from asbestosis by
repeatedly stressing the possibility of its misdiagnosis; (2) offers
new evidence that asbestosis is not a serious debilitating
disease; and (3) presents new evidence that respondents’ fear of
cancer is not reasonable. Petitioner's arguments on the
apportionment issue are similarly infected by illegitimate
factual allegations. Petitioner relies on fact evidence that could
have been (but was not) introduced at trial to support a finding
that a reasonable basis for apportionment of liability exists.

Petitioner is not entitled to a new trial based on its
hypothetical notions of what it should have done at trial.
Undoubtedly, there is room for “Brandeis Brief” presentations
in cases raising legal issues where such historical facts may be
legally relevant. Here, however, the Court has decided to
review the propriety of a jury verdict and jury instructions that

13

were based on the evidence actually presented at trial. A party
cannot introduce new evidence to impeach that verdict or those
instructions or invite this Court to review the sufficiency of the
evidence. For this reason, the Court may wish to consider
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY THAT A PLAINTIFF WHO HAS A
REASONABLE FEAR OF CANCER BECAUSE HE IS
SUFFERING FROM A PHYSICAL DISEASE CAUSED
BY THE DEFENDANT’S NEGLIGENCE IS ENTITLED
TO RECOVER FOR THAT MENTAL INJURY AS PART
OF HIS OVERALL DAMAGES

; The trial judge in this case properly instructed the jury that
any plaintiff who has demonstrated a reasonable fear of cancer
that is related to proven physical injury from asbestosis is
entitled to be compensated for that fear as a part of the darr.ages
you may award for pain and suffering.” JA 573. The trial
judge’s instructions were valid in all respects. It is
longstanding, settled tort law that where, as in this case, a
plaintiff has established that defendant's negligence has
resulted in a physical injury, the plaintiff can recover for all
physical and reasonable mental harms proximately related to
that initial physical injury. For this reason, petitioner’ s claim of
jury instruction error is little more than the very kind of
dressed-up sufficiency of the evidence challenge that this Court
has consistently declared inappropriate for plenary review.

A. Under Settled Tort Law, A Defendant Who

Negligently Causes Physical Injury To The Person Of
Another Is Liable For The Resulting Physical And

Mental Harms, Including Reasonable Apprehension
Future Physical Consequences

1. FELA “invests the injured employee with a right to such
damages as will compensate him for his personal loss and

os

suffering.” St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 656
(1915). In construing the precise scope of damages recoverable
under FELA, this Court considers, first, “FELA itself, its
purposes and background,” and, second, “because ‘FELA
jurisprudence gleans guidance from common-law
developments,’ * * * the common law treatment of the right of
recovery asserted by respondents.” Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1994), quoting Atchison, T. & S.
F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 (1987). Although FELA
does not itself answer the question of the scope of physical and
mental injuries for which a negligent defendant is liable, settled
common law principles readily do.

Under settled tort law, where, as in this case, a defendant
negligently causes a physical injury to another person, the
defendant's liability is not confined to the physical injuries that
immediately result. The initial physical injury satisfies the
“injury” element necessary to establish a prima facie case of
negligence, consisting of “breach of duty, injury and causation”
(Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 550-551). But the defendant is liable for
all physical and mental harms that proximately result from the
threshold physical injury.

The scope of proximate mental injuries that may be recovered
includes “ pain and suffering” in the narrowest sense: pain that
arises in the immediate aftermath of a physical wounding. But,
contrary to petitioner's claim (Br. 15-16), it is not strictly
confined to such immediate, direct pain. “In connection with
proved physical injury, wrongfully caused [emotional
disturbance] has long been an element in recovery, not merely
where undistinguishable from ‘physical pain,’ but in further
removed situations.” | Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional

Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 509 (1921).

As described by Dean Prosser in the very first edition of his
Handbook of Torts, “[w]ith a cause of action established by the
physical harm, ‘parasitic’ damages are awarded, and it is
considered that there is sufficient assurance that the mental
injury is not being feigned.” William L. Prosser, Handbook of the
Law of Torts, 213 (1941). Hence, mental injuries that would not,
standing alone, be sufficient to create liability, are recoverable
as “parasitic damages” when they are the result of a physical

15

impact that produces a physical injury because the latter
satisfies the “injury” element necessary to establish the tort
cause of action. The essential correctness of this proposition
both at the time of FELA’s enactment and since, cannot be
seriously questioned.’ As set forth in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, § 456 (1965): “If the actor’s negligent conduct has so
caused any bodily harm to another as to make him liable for it
the actor is also subject to liability for * * * fright, shock, or other
emotional disturbance resulting from the bodily harm or the
conduct which causes it * * *” (emphasis supplied).

2. Nor can it be gainsaid that it is has long been settled tort
law that such recoverable mental injuries extend to the
reasonable apprehension of future physical consequences.
“[E]ven if the plaintiff cannot prove that a disease will result in
the future, courts have permitted recovery for reasonable fears
that the impact will inflict some future disease. * * * Such cases
fit the pattern of parasitic damages - emotional harm results
from an initial injury and is recovered as one element of
damages for that injury.” Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 844
(2000); Thomas G. Shearman & Amasa A. Redfield, III A Treatise
on the Law of Negligence § 761 (6" ed. 1913) (“The mental
suffering which may be allowed for includes such as arises
from the plaintiff's reflections upon what he personally has to
endure.”). There is simply no merit, therefore, to petitioner's
contention (Br. 15-16) that mental injury based on fear of future
consequences such as cancer are recoverable only as “stand-
alone negligently inflicted emotional distress.”

Cases involving fear of cancer based on asbestosis did not
exist at the time of FELA’s enactment, but there are plenty of
historical and contemporary analogues in the case law. See

’ See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1048-49 (1936); Archibald Robinson Watson
A Treatise on the Law of Damages for Personal Injuries, 500-01 (1901); Francis
H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without
Impact, 50 Am. L. Rev. 141, 142 (1902); Thomas A. Street, I The Foundations
. a oe - bere and Principles of Tort, 460 (1906); Francis H.

en, | Cases on t of To
in Gabaseien f Torts 215 (1915); Fowler V. Harper, Readings

16

David Minneman, Annot, Future Disease or Condition, or Anxiety
Relating Thereto, As Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R. 4" 13 (1986).
Perhaps most directly analogous are the legion of dog bite and
blood poisoning cases during the late 19" and early 20
centuries in which plaintiffs recovered damages both for the
physical wounding of the immediate bite and for the fear of
future disease (rabies, lockjaw) caused by the possibility that
harmful germs were injected into the victim’s bloodstream. The
courts routinely allowed for recovery of mental injury based on
fear of future disease, wholly apart from the physical harm (and
immediate mental harm) caused by the initial wounding itself.
In Ayers v. Macoughtry, 29 Okla. 399 (1911), for instance, the
plaintiff stated simply at trial that he was “in fear of acquiring
[rabies]” and, because of that fear, “there was a good deal of
anxiety, and I experienced it.” Id. at 402. Based on that
testimony, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the trial
court’s instruction to the jury that in determining the amount of
damages, “you may take into consideration the apprehension
of poisoning from the bite of said dog and the fear of evil
results therefrom.” Id. at 404.° In Buck v. Brady, 110 Md. 568
(1909), another dog bite case, the defendant objected to the
plaintiff's being allowed to testify in response to the question
“Have you any fear now” of rabies, “Yes, sir; I still worry about
it.” The Maryland Supreme Court held that there was no error
in allowing this testimony, relying on an earlier decision of the
Vermont Supreme Court: “’The apprehension of poison from
the bite of the dog, and the fear and solicitude as to evil results
therefrom -- all pain, anguish, solicitude, occasioned by the bite
-- were proper matters for the jury in estimating the damages.
Id. at 573, quoting Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251 (1880); Warner v.
Chamberlain, 12 Del. 18, 21 (1884) (“fear and apprehension of
hydrophobia”); Serio v. American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 299
(1917) (“compensate the mental suffering resulting from the
knowledge that he had been bitten by a mad dog”).

8 See Heintz v. Caldwell, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 412 (1898) (“we hold that the
court also erred in not permitting the plaintiff to testify to the mental
suffering consequent upon her apprehensions of hydrophobia and lockjaw
resulting from the dogs biting her”).

17

The courts in these cases carefully distinguished between a
plaintiff's right to recover for reasonable apprehensions of
future consequences and the right to recover for the future
consequences themselves. The courts specifically upheld the
legitimacy of recovery for the mental injury based on such
apprehensions even when the consequence were themselves too
uncertain to be recoverable. See Bernadsky v. Erie R. Co., 76
N.J.L. 580 (1908). The courts also endorsed the reasonableness
of fears based on microscopic bodily invasions notwithstanding
their potentially lengthy duration: “The ghost of hydrophobia
is raised, not to down during the life-time of the victim.” The
Lord Derby, 17 F. 265, 267 (E.D. La 1883); Gamer v. Winchester,
110 S.W. 2d 1190, 1193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1737) (“these mental
fears may be considered by the jury”).

3. Innone of the longstanding tort law precedent allowing for
recovery of mental injuries related to a physical impact or injury
was there a further requirement that the mental injuries be
“physically manifested.” The mental injuries needed only to be
related to a physical injury, reasonable, and, like injuries of any
kind, supported by evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict.
For that same reason, of course, we do not doubt that a jury is
entitled to consider the absence of physical manifestations as
evidence that a mental injury is less severe and therefore less
deserving of a significant award. In this case, moreover,
petitioner made just such a closing argument to the jury. See JA
576. But the jury’s fair cbnsideration of that argument is all that
tort law requires.

B. A Plaintiff Who Reasonably Fears Cancer Because He

Has Asbestosis May Recover Damages for that Fear From
A Defendant Who Negligently Caused the Asbestosis

1. In Metro-North , this Court ruled that a victim of asbestos
exposure could not recover for mental injuries based on fear of
cancer because exposure to asbestos, alone, did not amount to
the threshold “ physical impact” necessary for such recovery. In
the instant case, however, respondents are not the victims of
mere exposure to asbestos. The evidence at trial established
that petitioner’s negligence in exposing respondents to asbestos

18

has resulted in their suffering from asbestosis, which is a
serious, debilitating pulmonary lung disease that progressively
worsens over time. Accordingly, under longstanding tort law,
petitioner can prevail only either if (1) asbestosis does not
supply the requisite physical injury or (2) if respondents’ fear
of cancer is not sufficiently related to asbestosis to be a
legitimate additional aspect of damages.

Revealingly, almost none of the lengthy briefs filed by
petitioner and its supporting amici discuss at any length these
essential, threshold legal and factual issues. On the significance
of asbestosis, petitioner can at most muster only a footnote (Br.
21 n.13) that declares, without any elaboration, that this Court
in Metro-North “did not decide that asbestosis, or any specific
asbestos-related disease, would in fact qualify a plaintiff” for
recovery of related mental injury. At least one of petitioner's
amicus seeks to fill the analytical gap in petitioner's position,
albeit no more convincingly. According to amicus American
Insurance Association (Br. 17-18), the asbestosis diagnosis does
not change the result because “asbestosis is merely a proxy for
exposure to asbestos.” “[T]he presence of asbestosis - the only
asserted factual difference between this case and Buckley - adds
nothing to the legal analysis.” Id.

Such propositions are simply untenable. The legitimacy and
legal sig cance of respondents’ asbestosis diagnosis is
incontrovertible. Notwithstanding petitioner’s repeated (and
improper) efforts to cast doubt on the validity and seriousness
of that medical diagnosis,’ the evidence was more than ample
to sustain the jury’s verdict. There was substantial evidence of
respondents’ significant asbestos exposure at petitioner's
employment. See p. 5, supra. A Board-certified medical expert
applied the consensus American Thoracic Society guidelines in
support of that diagnosis, which even petitioner acknowledges
as “authoritative” (Br. 3) and which carefully distinguishes

> See, e.g., Pet. Br. 7 (“accounts of railroad exposure were riddled with
vagueness and imprecision”); id. at 2 (“minimal proof of disease”); id. at
3 (“misdiagnosis is thus common”); id. at 5 (“commonly diagnose those
who manifest even the slightest lung scarring as asbestotic”); id. at 6
(“scant evidence of asbestosis”); id. at 30 (“benign disease”).

19

between lung impairments caused by asbestos and smoking.
See note 1, supra. Contrary to petitioner's intimation (Br. 6, 8),
respondents’ asbestosis is not a mere, incidental inconvenience
based on the “slightest lung scarring.” As shown at trial, at
least one-third of the lung must be scarred before asbestosis is
even revealed by an x-ray, its restriction on lung inspiration
capacity causes shortness of breath that significantly restricts
the ability to engage in daily life activities, it worsens over time,
and it is potentially fatal. See pp. 2-3, supra.”

No more subject to dispute before this Court is the jury’s
assessment pursuant to the jury instruction of the relationship
of respondents’ fear of cancer to their asbestosis. The
sufficiency of that evidence is not a proper matter for this
Court's review. But, in all events, the United States is simply
wrong in asserting (Br. 5, 13) that “any increased risk of cancer
or associated fear is not related to the physical injury that
permits respondents to sue.” The relationship is substantial
and doubly-layered. Asbestosis is what makes respondents’
fear of cancer reasonable. Indeed, petitioner's amicus, the
American Insurance Association, correctly acknowledges (Br.
22) that asbestosis is “logically related” to the reasonableness of
the fear of cancer because “a present injury of asbestosis makes

'° Petitioner's description of asbestosis -- a “benign disease” lacking
“any severe impairment” and causing “only” shortness of breath (Br. 8,
30) -- sharply contrasts with the description of the disease set forth by the
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration:

[I]ndividuals with asbestosis experience a relatively long and

debilitating period of morbidity. Dr. Holstein, a pulmonary physician,

described a typical case:
The main symptom of asbestosis is progressive shortness of breath.
When this has its onset in its typically insidious and gradual manner,
the individual thinks that he is just getting older or getting a little
overweight, can't run as fast as he used to, or gets out of breath more
easily than he used to; and attributes it to factors such as the ones |
mentioned. A little later on, the person begins to notice that in fact, he
or she can't do the things that many other people the same age can do."
** Eventually, in the very severe cases, a person's life consists of
sitting in an armchair on the ground floor with an oxygen tank, and

disconnecting it just long enough to get up and go to the bathroom.
51 Fed. Reg. 22612, 22622 (1986).

20

it more likely than it otherwise would be that a particular
plaintiff who has been exposed to asbestos will eventually
develop cancer.” .

Nor i that logical relationship insubstantial. As previously
described (pp. 3-4, supra), 10 percent of individuals with
asbestosis contract mesothelioma (cancer of the lining of the
lung); 39 percent of those with asbestosis who also smoke
contract fatal lung cancer, while the rate for nonsmokers with
asbestosis is 2-5 percent, which is still a substantial risk.
Significantly, as petitioner's own expert agreed at trial, it isa
widely held view that the increased risk of lung cancer applies
only to those who have asbestosis. JA 470; p.4 & note 2, supra.
The asbestosis confirms the degree of lung infiltration —- the
highest kinds of exposures” (JA 95) — as well as a person's
particular adverse biologic reaction to the fibers. .

The second layer of the relationship binding together
respondents’ asbestosis and their fear of cancer is likewise
significant. It derives from the essential fact that asbestosis and
the fear of cancer are both caused by petitioner's same negligent
conduct, commencing with the infiltration of the respondents
lungs with asbestos fibers and extending to asbestosis.
Respondents’ fear of cancer is, precisely as contemplated by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, “an emotional disturbance
resulting from * * * the conduct which causes [asbestosis]. See
§ 456. Just as with the cases of dog bites and rabies more than
a century ago, both asbestosis and cancer are caused by the

same negligent conduct and respondents seek recovery only for
damages based on fear and not for the cancer itself.

"! Significantly, the relationship between asbestosis and fear of cancer
clearly satisfies even petitioner's own test of the necessary corroboration
of mental injury, as described in the petition for a writ of certiorari. As set
forth in the “Questions Presented” of its petition, petitioner did not
present the issue as whether emotional injury based on fear of cancer must
be proved by physical manifestations. The petition was instead carefully
written in the disjunctive, expressly allowing for the possibility of other
corroboration of injury related to their alleged fear of cancer. Pet. i (emphasis
supplied). Proof of asbestosis, however, supplies just that corroboration
which petitioner acknowledged would be sufficient. It is undeniably both
“injury” and it is “related” to the “fear of cancer.” The evidence of

21

~

2. Petitioner and its amici are also mistaken that reasonable
fear of cancer is not recoverable because “asbestosis and cancer
are separate diseases.” Pet. Br. 15-16; U.S. Amicus Br. 5, 11-13.
Respondents did not seek and the trial judge did not permit the
jury to award any damages based on cancer itself. See JA 573.
The “’separate disease’ rule cited by the United States (Br. 12)
is therefore neither implicated in this case nor inconsistent with
the recovery of damages based on fear of cancer.

The “separate disease” rule originated in cases in which tort
defendants, relying on “the well-established rule that a claim or
cause of action may not be split,” were arguing for “a
judge-made rule that upon manifestation of any harm, the
injured party must then, if ever, sue for all harms the same
exposure may (or may not) occasion some time in the future.”
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 117, 119
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Ginsburg, J.). As proposed by the tort
defendants in those earlier cases, a victim of asbestosis would
have to sue for both asbestosis and for unrealized cancer at the
same (earlier) time and would be able to obtain relief for the
latter only if he could prove that he was then “reasonably

certain” to get cancer. Id. at 120. The unfairness of requiring a
plaintiff to bring a suit, if ever, when the evidence would
invariably be insufficient is what prompted many courts to
adopt the “separate disease” rule, which allows for the statute
of limitations to run for each disease separately. Id. at 120-21.

In this case, however, respondents are not claiming damages
for cancer. JA 573. They are instead seeking damages not for

asbestosis, furthermore, is itself corroborated by the very type of
“objective medical evidence” upon which petitioner insists: a detailed
expert medical diagnosis. Perhaps that is why petitioner sought, upon
further reflection, to rewrite the question presented in its subsequent brief
on the merits. Compare Pet. i with Pet. Br. i. Such a rewrite would seem to
implicate the Court's rules, which allow for the “Question Presented” to
be reworded, but do not allow the petitioner to “change the substance of
the questions already presented.” S.Ct Rule 24.1(a). But, in all events,
petitioner's effort to revise the question presented is strikingly revealing
of the fundamental weakness of its legal position. The judge’s instruction
to the jury in this case is entirely consistent with petitioner's . riginal
question. Compare JA 573 with Pet. i.

22

a future physical injury, but for their present mental injury,
which exists whether or not that future physical injury occurs.
The United States is correct that FELA’s “text clearly focuses on
present injuries” (Br. 15), but equal wrong in characterizing
respondents’ mental injury as not “present.” Respondent's
“fear is happening now.” Beeman v. Manville Corp., 496
N.W.2d 247, 252 (lowa 1993). a .
Unlike either petitioner or the United States, the trial judge in
this case correctly distinguished between the reasonable
apprehension of future consequences and the consequences
themselves, allowing recovery only for the former. JA 573. Itis
the same distinction evidentin the rabies cases discussed above.
It is also, of course, the same distinction that defines the
essential difference between the independent torts of assault
(apprehension of a harmful contact) and battery (harmful
contact). Restatement (Second) Torts, §§ 13, 18, 21. . ;
No inconsistency is presented between the “separate disease
rule and distinguishing between present and future injury.
Many of the jurisdictions adopting that rule have also allowed
plaintiffs with asbestosis to recover damages for fear of cancer
in their asbestosis claims. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox,
481 So. 2d 517, 521, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Devlin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 563, 567 (1985);
Griffin v. Keene Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7424, slip op. 4
(N.D. Ill. 1990). Those courts all recognize that the present
injury based on reasonable fear is distinct from the future
consequences of cancer and presents no more a problem of
double recovery than does recovery for both assault and
battery. These judicial rulings also avoid the unfairness that
would otherwise result because many current victims of
asbestosis would be unlikely ever to be made whole for their
present mental injuries, such as those victims who die of
asbestosis or other causes before cancer occurs or a lawsuit can
be brought. Most persons die of mesothelioma within 12
months of its diagnosis. See H. Corwin Hinshaw & John F.
Murray, Diseases of the Chest 731-32 (4" ed. 1980).
3. Although this Court did not rule in Metro-North on the
precise question, the Court's opinion left little doubt that a

23

plaintiff with asbestosis could recover damages for reasonable
fear of cancer under FELA. The Court held that FELA “permits
‘recovery of emotional injury’ by ‘those plaintiffs who sustain
a physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent
conduct.” 521 U.S. at 430, quoting, Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547-48.
The Court also made clear that under settled tort doctrine, a
disease such as asbestosis would satisfy the threshold physical
injury requirement. The Court both described how “[c]ommon
law courts do permit a plaintiff who suffers from a disease to
recover for negligently caused emotional distress” (521 U.S. at
432 (emphasis supplied)) and affirmatively ruled thata railroad
employee “cannot recover unless, and until, he manifests
symptoms of a disease” (id. at 436 (emphasis supplied)). The
Metro-North opinion even cites favorably to the lower court's
ruling in Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 30 Ohio Misc.
2d 11 (Ct. Common Pleas, Cayahoga Cty. 1987), which this
Court described as allowing recovery for fear of cancer because
the “emotional distress damages [were] sought by an asbestosis-
afflicted plaintiff.” 521 U.S. at 437 (emphasis supplied).

Indeed, unlike in this case, the railroad petitioner in Metro-
North and the same amici who support petitioner in this case,
made quite clear in the legal briefs that they filed in Metro-North
that an asbestosis-afflicted plaintiff would be able to recover for
reasonable fear of cancer as part of his overall damages."* The
American Insurance Association (AIA), amicus both in Metro-
North and here, made explicit its promise to future asbestosis-
inflicted plaintiffs. The AIA declared in its Metro North amicus
brief (Metro North AIA Amicus Br. 14) that “[t]he question here
is not whether respondent can sue, but when. There is no doubt
that if respondent does, in fact, suffer a physical injury from
exposure to asbestos, he will be able to bring a cause of action
to recover not only for his physical injuries, but also for any
emotional injury” (emphasis in original and supplied).

"2 See, e.g., Metro-North Pet. Rep. Br. 18 (“Indeed, if plaintiff's medical
records contained any objectively verifiable functional impairment, he
would have an old-fashioned personal injury claim, and there would be
no need to talk about a zone of danger test, physical impact, or the like.”).

'° In strikingly similar language and identical emphasis, the United

24

Such acknowledgments were hardly surprising in Metro-
North because of the clarity of settled tort law. What is
surprising is how the petitioner railroad in this case and the
same amicus now claim otherwise. As correctly described by
the petitioner railroad in its Metro-North brief (Br. 20 & n.12),
the “better rule in asbestos cases” is the one “adopted by the
overwhelming majority of courts, namely to restrict recovery
for emotional distress to plaintiffs with actual physical injury
caused by asbestos exposure.” The lower courts have, in fact,
routinely upheld jury instructions that allow a jury to include
damages based on reasonable fear of cancer where, as in this
case, “the exposure to asbestos * * * has already actually
resulted in some physical harm” suchas asbestosis. Dobbs, The
Law Of Torts, supra, 844 & n. 5, citing Eagle-Picher Industries v.
Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see, e.g., Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413-415 (5™ Cir.1986)
(en banc); Griffin v. Keene Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7424, slip
op. 4 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Beeman v. Manville Corp., 496 N.W.2d
247, 251-53 (lowa 1993); Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873
S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ky. 1994); Hoerner v. ANCO Insulations, Inc.,
812 So.2d 45, 77 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Denton v. Southern
Railway Co., 854 S.W. 2d 885, 888-89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

4. Finally, there is nothing about the jury verdict in this case
to support the Chamber of Commerce's suggestion (Br. 3) that
respondents’ asbestosis was merely a pretext for a damage
award almost exclusively based on fear of cancer. There is
instead every reason to presume the opposite. The trial
evidence established the serious impairments caused by
respondents’ asbestosis, ranging from their major physical
impact on daily life activities - walking short distances, talking,
singing - to the sheer terror caused by being unable to breath
because of progressively worsening shortness of breath. See,

States asserts in this case that “the question is not whether damages for fear
of cancer may be recovered, but when.” U.S. Amicus Br. 5 (emphasis in
original). The answer to that question, however, is provided in the Metro-
North brief from which the question apparently originated: when “the
respondent does, in fact suffer a physical injury from exposure to
asbestos.” AIA Metro-North Br. 14.

———

25

e.g.,JA 114 (“shortness of breath” means “just can’t breath[e]”);
pp. 6-7, supra. No one testified, nor did their trial counsel argue
to the jury, that fear of cancer was the most significant of their
injuries. One respondent stated that his greatest source of
anxiety was not cancer but his worsening “shortness of breath”
by causing him to “clos[e] out more and more every day. ** *
The only thing I know is pray * * *.” JA 299.

Because, moreover, petitioner neither sought nor obtained a
special jury verdict that separated out the damages attributable
to fear of cancer from respondents’ other injuries, there is no
way of knowing whether any respondent received significant,
or even any, damages on that ground. Nor can petitioner now
fairly pierce the verdict and presume otherwise. A general jury
verdict on appellate review is entitled to a virtually irrebutable
presumption of regularity as to how the jury allocated damages
between a plaintiff's various injuries. A defendant cannot
prevail on appeal by arguing that the jury might have awarded
all of the damages for one of a plaintiff's injuries and none for
any of the others. Cf Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 572 U.S.
108, 119 (1963) (“it is the duty of the courts to attempt to
harmonize the [jury] answers, if it is possible under a fair
reading of them”). In sum, even if, as petitioner argues, the
evidence did not support awarding large sums for respondents’
fear of cancer, there is no reason to presume that the jury did so.

C. None Of Petitioner’s Various Arguments Is Relevant To
From Asbestosis May Recover Under FELA For Fear of
Cancer Based On Such Asbestosis

Petitioner and its amici dedicate volumes to legal issues not

presented by the facts and procedural posture of this case. They
contend that a plaintiff should not be able to maintain a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless the
emotional distress is sufficiently “severe” to be corroborated by

physical manifestations.” They argue, more particularly, that
such emotional distress claims based on fear of cancer should

be subject to especially rigorous scrutiny because of the
background risks of cancer everyone faces. And petitioners and

26

its amici contend that the nation faces an asbestos litigation
“crisis” that warrants the judiciary’s guarding against any
expansion of tort remedies to those ht gama of
future physical injuries. See, e.g., Pet. Br. '

The hort pc to all these contentions is that unlike the
railroad employees in Metro-North, respondents here are not
maintaining a stand-alone claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. They were not merely exposed to asbestos;
they were not mere bystanders to the physical injury of others;
and they are not complaining of some incidental, trivial
physical impact with only a tangential relationship to their
principal injury. Respondents are not physically unimpaired
plaintiffs. Consistent with the trial judge's instructions (JA
573), respor:dents are instead claiming the right to recover
damages for mental injuries as an element of damages for a tort
otherwise established that caused physical injury.

Petitioner’s basic error lies in its confusing two distinct legal
categories for the recovery of mental injuries: (1) Where mental
injuries are simply an additional aspect of damages for a tort
cause of action otherwise established (sometimes referred to as
“parasitic” damages); and (2) Where no physical injury
occurred and the mental injuries themselves purport to satisfy
the injury element necessary to establish the prima facie case
necessary for tort recovery. See generally William L. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts 213 (1941); Thomas A. Street, I The
Foundations of Legal Liability - Theory and Principles of Tort, 460
(1906); Restatement (Second) of Torts, Ch. 2, Intro. Note, p. 23;
id. at § 924(a) & comment (a). This case implicates the first legal
category. Because, moreover, all of the legal authorities and
policy arguments vigorously asserted by petitioner and its
amici presuppose application of the second category, they are
erected on a foundational mischaracterization of the case at
hand. And, like a house of cards, petitioner’s entire argument
utterly collapses upon removal of that single, fictional card.

1. Petitioner devotes most of its brief (Br. 16-31) to the
proposition that the common law requires physical
raanifestations of severe mental injury. The legal precedent and
authorities upon which petitioner principally relies, however,
are all cases in which the petitioner is maintaining a stand-alone

27

claim for recovery of emotional distress either intentionally or
negligently’ inflicted. Many are bystander cases. None is
relevant to this case."

We do not deny that for stand-alone emotional distress claims
there is precedent providing that the mental injury element
necessary for liability must be “severe” and sometimes even
established by physical manifestations. This precedent
includes claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress for
persons not physically impacted or injured but only a bystander
within the “zone of danger.” But no comparable substantial
precedent exists for instances where the plaintiff is not seeking

'* Jones v. CSX Transportation, 287 F.3d 1341 (11" Cir. 2002) is completely
out of step with both traditional tort law and the vast majority of judicial
rulings addressing whether victims of asbestosis can also recover for their
reasonable fear of cancer. The court erred by completely rejecting the
longstanding and established distinction between stand-alone claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and recovery of damages for

mental injury “simply as an element of damages in an ordinary negligence
action.” Id. at 1348.

'° The result in this case, however, would not change even if, contrary
to our submission, the relationship of respondents’ mental injury to their
physical injury (asbestosis) was not deemed sufficient to make this a
parasitic damages claim. Although some courts imposed additional limits
on the recovery of mental injury when they expanded recovery to
plaintiffs in the “zone of danger” but lacking physical impact and injury,
those precedents do not intimate an intention simultaneously to contract
recovery where, as here, such an impact and injury are both present. As

“this Court has itself noted, moreover, the precedent is not nearly as one-

sided as petitioner suggests, and not all jurisdictions are so insistent on
such proof of physical manifestations even for stand-alone claims of
negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Gottschall, 512 U.S. at 549

n.11; see, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, 400 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1981);

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916 (1980); Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398 (1974); Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets, Inc.,
444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Versland v. Caron Transport, 206 Mont. 313
(1983); Burd v. Sinn, 486 Pa. 146 (1979). In all events, whether formally
recovered as “parasitic” damages or on the basis of a “stand-alone” tort,
the policy reasons for imposing the physical manifestation requirement
(the only issue raised by the question presented) on mental injury are not
present in this case where respondents are suffering from asbestosis.

28

recovery of mental injury on a stand-alone basis for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Quite the opposite is true. The
reasons for requiring greater degrees of proof for stand-alone
claims for mental injury are simply not present, which is why
it would be “absurd[ to] apply[] the bystander rule to a case
where the direct victim is seeking recovery for emotional
distress which is reasonably related to a physical injury.”
McAdams v. Eli Lilly, 638 F Supp. 1173, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
As described by this Court in Metro-North, the common law
“ does not examine the genuineness of emotional harm case by
case.” 521 U.S. at 436. There is consequently no rule of tort law
generally applicable to mental injuries that makes such injuries
recoverable only if they are “severe” and are “physically
manifested.” Courts have instead decided that whether a form
of “emotional distress” is recoverable should turn on whether
“the distress falls within specific categories.” Id. at 429. The
limitations that apply to the recovery of mental injuries vary
widely between categories.'° What is entirely absent from tort
law’s categorical approach is any support for petitioner's claim
that there are universally applicable requirements that mental
injuries, including emotional distress, are recoverable only if
they are severe and physically manifested.

Even more significantly, the Metro-North Court expressly
identified respondents’ circumstances as one such “category”
of plaintiffs that is entitled to recovery for mental injury: “that
category of plaintiffs who suffer from a disease” caused by the

16 For some of those categories, there are courts that require that the
mental injury be severe, such as for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in general (see Restatement (Second) Torts, § 46), and some even
further require that the emotional distress result in “bodily harm” (id. § 46
(2)(b) (where tortious conduct directed at third party who is not amember
of the plaintiff's immediate family)). But such categorical rules are
context-specific and without general applicability. For example, false
imprisonment (id. § 35), assault (§ 21), or offensive battery (§ 18) are all
torts where, unlike this case, the mental injury provides the injury element
necessary to establish the tort in the first instance, but no such severity or
physical manifestations requirement applies to any of those torts. See, e.g.,
id. § 21 comment c (“It is not necessary that [the assault] should directly
or indirectly cause any tangible and material harm”).

29

defendant's negligent conduct. 521 U.S. at436. The reasons the
Court offered for that categorical rule are those which justify
frall recovery where, as in this case, the plaintiff has otherwise
established his tort based on physical injury and merely seeks
to recoves ior “related” mental injury (id.) as “parasitic
damages”: “a desire to make a physically injured victim whole
or because the parties are likely to be in court in any event” (id.
at 436-37). Because of their asbestosis, respondents are just
those “physically injured victim[s]” who will “be in court in
any event” and are therefore entitled to be made “whole” for all
their injuries caused by petitioner's negligence.

. Tort law's categorical approach to the recovery of mental
injuries is also why petitioner is mistaken in relying (Br. 28-30)
on any of the “general policy reasons” previously identified by
this Court for why courts have restricted recovery of mental
injury. See Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 433. The very reason for
the categorical approach is to address those policy concerns by
substantially limiting the number of potentially valid plaintiffs.
Hence, where, as in this case, the plaintiff fits in a traditional
tort category because he is suffering froma physical disease, the
category has itself already “separat[ed] valid, important claims
from those that are invalid or ‘trivial.’” Id. Likewise dissipated
by the categorical bounds is the “threat of ‘unlimited and
unpredictable liability,” or “the ‘potential for a flood’ or
comparatively unimportant, or ‘trivial,’ claims.” Id.

It is especially noteworthy in this respect that the categorical
requirement that a plaintiff suffers from a physical disease such
as “asbestosis” does in fact dramatically limit the number of
potential plaintiffs who can maintain a valid cause of action. At
trial, it was established that only a small percentage of those
exposed to asbestos suffer from the intensity of lung scarring
and pulmonary impairment necessary for a diagnosis of
asbestosis. JA 95-96, 211.” Petitioner in this case is

oe Petitioner acknowledges this essential fact, but fails to account for its
significance. See Br. 22 n.16 , quoting In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases
734 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (D. Haw. 1990) ( “of those exposed to asbestos,
only a small percentage suffer from asbestos-related physical
impairment.’”). During the Metro-North oral argument, the railroad

30

uently hard pressed to claim that allowing asbestosis
plaints to Ase for all their injuries according to traditional
tort law will unduly open the litigation floodgates.

2. Equally lacking in merit is petitioner's assertion (Br. 21-25)
that fear of cancer is per se unreasonable. According to
petitioner, such “knowledge-based " ars” are too inherently
subjective” and, “[e]specially when measured against the —
background risks every individual faces, * * * not the kind )
information that reasonably causes severe emotional injury to
the normally constituted person.” Id. at 12, 21-22, 24. .

Petitioner's error is two-fold. First, petitioner s argument is
preted on the same false notion that infects its entire brief,
which is that the mental injury must be “severe” to warrant
recovery. As previously described, no such severity
requirement generally applies where, as here, the plaintiffs are
not asserting a stand-alone claim for mental injury.

Petitioner’s second error, however, iseven more fundamental.
Stripped of its exaggerated rhetoric, petitioner s attack on what
it dubs “knowledge-based fears” is little more than a thinly-
guised effort to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Because any fear is necessarily based on personal knowled ge,
petitioner’s indictment must be that the information upon
which respondents’ fear was based in this case was insufficient
to sustain any jury award. Petitioner supports its argument by
citing to a series of miscellaneous articles (Br. 22-24 & nn.17-21)
that discuss asbestos exposure (not asbestosis) and

othelioma or lung cancer.
"We could easily Seed to this argument by lengthy
discussion of substantial competing scientific authority
concerned with asbestosis and not just asbestos exposure, ~ but
the proper course is instead to rely on the factual om
actually produced in the trial court. As previously described,

counsel was similarly clear, advising the Court that “it is undisputed that
the overwhelming majority of exposure-only plaintiffs will never develop
asbestos-related injuries.” Metro-North Oral Arg. Trans. 14-15.

8 E.g., Churg & Green, Pathology of Occupational Lung Disease, supra;
Browne, Is Asbestos or Asbestosis the Cause of the Increased Risk of Lung
Cancer in Asbestos Workers?, supra.

31

that trial evidence, which included the introduction of scientific
studies subject to cross examination, was more than sufficient
to establish the reasonableness of respondents’ fear of cancer
based on asbestosis. See pp. 3-4, 7, supra. A reasonable person
would not have to view a 10 percent risk of mesothelioma, or a
39 percent risk of fatal lung cancer for smokers as “trivial,”
“small,” or “incremental. “ Pet. Br. 25, 30.
What petitioner plainly cannot now do is either introduce

new evidence or invite this Court to reweigh the evidence.
Petitioner had ample opportunity at trial to introduce evidence
that an asbestosis victim cannot reasonably apprehend cancer.
Petitioner cannot now supplement the trial record without
improperly invading the jury’s factfinding responsibilities and
the supervisory authority of the trial judge. “Courts are not free
to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely
because the jury could have drawn different inferences or
conclusions * * *.” Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R. Co., 321 U.S. 29,

35 (1944). Nor is it a fair objection “to say that the jury’s verdict

involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in

dispute * * * a measure of speculation and conjecture is required
on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute.”

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). This Court,
moreover, has long made especially clear the impropriety of
challenges to the amount of jury awards in FELA cases."
3. Finally, petitioner's assertion that respondents should be

" For instance, the Court in St. Louis I. M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S.
648, 661 (1915) readily dismissed a claim “that the award of $5,000 as
damages for pain and suffering” was “excessive.” While acknowledging
that “[t]he award does seem large,” the Court ruled that “the power, and
with it the duty and responsibility, of dealing with this matter rested upon
the courts below. It involves only a question of fact and is not open to
reconsideration here.” Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner's implicit
challenge to the amount of the jury award in this case is even thinner. The
railroad defendant in Craft at least knew that the plaintiff had been
awarded a substantial sum: $5,000 in 1915. Notwithstanding its reference
(Br. 2, 6) to “staggering recoveries” and “massive verdicts,” petitioner can
make no such comparable claim with regard to the jury’s assessment of
damages for respondents’ fear of cancer. Here, the record does not reveal
how much, if any, damages the jury awarded based on such fear.

32

denied any recovery for their reasonable fear of cancer because
the nation faces an asbestos litigation “crisis” is no more
persuasive. As described in the very documents upon which
petitioner relies, those who claim that a crisis exists focus on the
litigation burden presented by thousands of lawsuits filed by
so-called “exposure only” plaintiffs - those who have been
exposed to asbestos, but do not suffer from any physical disease
or impairment as a result. They contend that this litigation
threatens to overwhelm the courts and thereby deny judicial
relief to those deserving victims who are actually suffering from
a physical disease. They single out victims of asbestosis as
examples of those “clearly entitled to compensation.” See
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation
Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental
Distress, and Medical Monitoring, reproduced in Pet. Lodging, p.
27. Respondents, however, represent the very victims of
asbestosis - the “individuals who actually have asbestos-
related illnesses” - routinely acknowledged as legitimate
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce Amicus Br. 2.

The policy arguments advanced by petitioner and its amici
are further misdirected because neither this Court nor FELA is
the proper avenue for securing the law reform they seek. If
current tort law is incapable of addressing the claims brought
by thousands negligently exposed to asbestos, then it is for
Congress and state legislatures, and not this Court, to change
the applicable law.” FELA would, in all events, be an

2° Congress has, in fact, been considering legislative action to reform tort
law and related civil procedural matters for the past several years in
response to the challenges presented by mounting asbestos litigation. See,
e.g., S. 2546, Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998, 105" Cong.
2d Sess. (1998); H.R. 1283, Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999,
106" Cong. 1* Sess. (1999). Notably, in those legislative proceedings, those
supporting petitioner in this case freely admitted that legislative, rather
than judicial, action was the only legitimate avenue for addressing the
complex issues. See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999,
Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106" Cong., 1"
Sess. 320 (1999) (testimony of Conrad Mallet, Jr., Chairman, Coalition for
Asbestos Reform) (“resolution of the [asbestos litigation] dilemma lies not
with the judiciary, but with Congress”); 145 Cong. Rec. $3510 (March 25,

33 -

especially inappropriate vehicle for the kind of tort reforms
sought by petitioner and its amici. Not only does FELA play
only a peripheral role in asbestos litigation, but as long
emphasized by this Court, FELA is a “broad remedial statute”
and its statutory language must be interpreted “‘liberally’ in
light of its humanitarian purposes.” Atchison T. &S.F.R. Co. v.
Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987); Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 429,
quoting, Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543. As described by the Court
decades ago in rejecting a similar effort to limit FELA’s
deliberate expansion of railroad employee recovery, “[i]n the
face of the legislative policy embodied in [FELA] * * *
considerations of public policy of the general kind relied upon
*** cannot be permitted to encroach further upon the special

policy expressed by Congress in the Act.” Still v. Norfolk & W.
R. Co., 368 U.S. 35, 44-45 (1961).

Il. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY TO APPORTION
RESPONDENTS’ DAMAGES BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND ABSENT THIRD PARTIES

Petitioner argues that the trial judge should have instructed
the jury to apportion damages to various absent third parties
that petitioner alleges are partially responsible for respondents’
injuries. Petitioner’s initial argument (Br. 32-42) is that
apportionment was warranted because respondents’ injuries
were “divisible” based on causation. Petitioner's alternative
proffer (Br. 42-47) is that even if causation does not provide a
basis for apportionment, the Court should now devise for FELA
a new, unspecified scheme of comparative fault for
apportionment. Both arguments should be rejected.”"

1999) (statement of Senator John Ashcroft) (“Judges who make legal rules
out of whole cloth in the absence of constitutional or statutory text
damage the standing of the judiciary and our constitutional structure. * *
* [A] legislative solution to th{e asbestos] problem * * * provides the
proper incentives for courts to be restrained and reinforces the proper
roles of Congress and the Judiciary.”).

21 +4: , ,
Petitioner's apportionment arguments pertain at most only to ~

1. Contrary to petitioner's submission (Br. 32-35), FELA’s
“simple and direct” language establishes a “relaxed standard of
causation” that compels rejection of petitioner's proposed
“relaxed” apportionment standard. Coray v. Southern Pac. Co.,
335 U.S. 520, 524 (1949); Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543. FELA
unambiguously answers the question whether a railroad
employer is liable for an employee's personal injuries for which
the railroad’s negligent conduct was only a partial cause.
According to the express terms of the statute, a railroad “shall
be liable in damages” to the injured employee “for such injury
or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence” of the
railroad. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (emphasis supplied). It is therefore well
settled that it is neither a complete nor a partial defense to an
employee's lawsuit for complete recovery that the employee's
injuries were “caused jointly by the fault of the carrier and third
persons.” See, e.g., Gaulden v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 654
P.2d 383, 391(D. Kan. 1983) (“bear all of the loss”).

This Court's own decisions are fully in accord. In Rogers v.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957), this Court
reversed a state court ruling that had construed FELA to impose
a test of causation under which the railroad defendant's
negligence had to be “the sole, efficient, producing cause of
injury.” Emphasizing the “in whole or in part” language, the
Court held that causation is established when “the proofs
justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence

respondents Ayer and Butler because only for those two did petitioner
argue below that there was evidence of asbestos exposure at nonrailroad
workplaces. See JA 647; note 3, supra. Petitioner did not assert asbestos
manufacturers liability in its proposed jury instruction or verdict form and
declined to put on evidence as to their culpability. JA 539, 550-60; pp. 7-8,
supra. Petitioner's oblique references (Br. 8, 49) to respondent Spangler’s
2 years of service on a Navy submarine fall far short of the minimum for
apportionment, no matter what the legal standard, given the lack of any
evidence concerning the extent or nature of his asbestos exposure there.

35

played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or
death for which damages are sought.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
See, e.g., Sentilles v. Inter-Carribean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S.
107, 109 (1959); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 187 (1949).

To be sure, the Court in Rogers did not elaborate on the
precise scope of damages recoverable by an employee when the
railroad’s negligence “played any part” in causing the injury,
and there was also a contributing third party cause. 352 U.S. at
507. But there is no merit to petitioner's suggestion that the
Rogers’ ruling does not bear on that question. The Rogers Court
described as “drastic” the employer's duty to pay damages for
injury “due ‘in whole or in part’ to its negligence.” Id. The
Court characterized FELA as having “stripped [an employer] of
his common law defenses” to such a degree that “for practical
purposes the inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more
than the single question whether the negligence of the
employer played any part, however small, in the injury * * *.”
Id. at 507-08. Finally, the Court deemed as wholly “irrelevant”
“whether the immediate reason” for the injury was “some cause
not identified by the evidence.” Id. at 503.

Hence, in Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1947), the
Court similarly described as “irrelevant” even “[t}hat the
foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal
misconduct.” The railroad “nonetheless had a duty to make
reasonable provision against it” and “[b]reach of that duty
would be negligence.” Id. Rejecting the railroad’s defense, che
Court held that “we cannot say as a matter of law that
petitioner's injury did not result at least in part from such
negligence.” Id.

Under petitioner's view by contrast, apportionment would be
required whenever an injury is “caused by successive
independent causes” (Br. 32) and the existence of a contributing
cause would be highly “relevant” whether intentional, criminal,
negligent, or even nonnegligent in nature. FELA litigation
would regularly rather than “rarely” present more than the
“single question” whether the employer's negligence played
“any part.” FELA litigation would become encumbered by the
far more complex, nonbinary inquiry of the precise percentage ~
of the employer's causal contribution to the injury. In short,

36

injected into FELA would be the very kind of limitation on
liability that Congress intended to eliminate by rejecting the
assumption of risk and fellow servant rule defenses and by
making employers liable for injuries they caused “in part.”

Finally, petitioner’s radical reading of FELA is contradicted
by the virtual absence in almost a century of FELA litigation of
any indication in either the judicial precedent or the litigation
practices of railroads that a railroad’s liability to a plaintiff must
be reduced in inverse proportion to its causal contribution. Not
once in this Court’s many decisions reaffirming the specialized
and liberal nature of FELA’s “in whole or in part” causation
language has the Court even hinted at the existence of such a
major limitation on defendant liability. Instead, the federal and
state reporters are replete with contribution cases brought by
FELA defendants under state law. See Annot., Right of Railroad
Charged with Liability for Injury to or Death of Employee Under
Federal Employer's Liability Act, to Claim Indemnity or Contribution
from Other Tortfeasors, 19 A.L.R. 3d 928 (1968).* Those cases
arose because those railroad defendants were entirely liable
under FELA and sought to recover part of the damages by
suing a third party that jointly caused the injuries.”

* See, e.g. Mills v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 276 F.3d 222, 222 (6" Cir.
2002); Gaines v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 23 F.3d 1170, 1171 (7 Cir. 1994);
Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 349, 353-54 (9" Cir. 1989); Ala. Great. S.
R.R. v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry., 493 F.2d 979, 983 (8" Cir. 1974);
Kennedy v. Penn. R. Co., 282 F.2d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1960); Southern R. Co.
v. Foote Mineral Co., 384 F.2d 224, 226 (6" Cir. 1967); Fort Worth &
Denver Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307, 312 (5" Cir. 1955); Patterson v.
Penn. R. Co., 197 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1952); Stephens v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 991 F. Supp. 618, 620 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Tucker v. Reading Co., 335 F.
Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Reynolds v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 F.
Supp. 1141, 1142-43 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Spielman v. New York, New Haven
& Hartford R. Co., 147 F. Supp. 451, 453-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Engvall v. Soo
Line R., 632 N.W.2d 560, 569 (Minn. 2001); Freeman v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
Inc., 714 So.2d 832, 835 (La. App. 1998); Walter v. Dow Chem. Co., 195
N.W.2d 323, 324-25 (Mich. App. 1972); Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. v. Arthur
Dixon Transfer Co., 98 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (Ill. App. 1951); Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Prot. Co. 143 So. 316, 317 (Fla. 1932).

* Petitioner properly relegates to a footnote (Br. 33 n.26) Dale v.

37

2. Petitioner and its amici seek to overcome FELA’s plain
meaning by relying on two other statutory clauses that they
contend mandate apportionment of damages between joint
causes. Petitioner’s reliance on both clauses is misguided.

a. According to petitioner (Br. 32-33 n.26) and amicus
Coalition for Asbestos Justice (Br. 24-27) FELA’s adoption of
comparative fault for plaintiff's negligence (45 U.S.C. § 53)
demonstrates congressional intent in favor of apportionment in
this case. Rather than support petitioner’s view, however, this
Court has previously made clear that the fact that Congress
took such an explicit step reinforces the opposing view that
Congress intended no similar reduction in plaintiff recovery on
account of the joint liability of nonrailroad third parties. While
45 U.S.C. § 53 provides that when the employee’s own
negligence causes his injury, “the damages shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to such employee,” no comparable provision exists
with regard to third party causes. As this Court pointedly
explained in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443
U.S. 256, 268 n.23 (1979), “[i]t would be particularly curious for
Congress to refer expressly to the established principle of
comparative negligence, yet say nota word about adopting anew
rule limiting the liability of the [defendant] on the basis of the
nonparty employer's negligence” (emphasis supplied). Hence,
both the “in part” causation standard and comparative
negligence standard set forth in 45 U.S.C. §§ 51,53 affirmatively
reinforce the full scope of railroad liability.

Nor is there any merit to the suggestion of petitioner and its
amicus that FELA’s imposition of complete liability on a
railroad is inconsistent with FELA’s adoption of comparative
fault for plaintiff's negligence. FELA adopted a comparative

Baltimore & Ohio R.Co., 552 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa. 1989), which served as the
centerpiece of its petition (pp. 20-21) and reply (pp. 6-7). The Dale court
found “implicit” in FELA a reduction in damages for third party causes,
somehow based on FELA’s treatment of contributory negligence and the
Rogers decision. 552 A.2d at 1041. We think that the reasoning of the Dale
dissenters (id. at 1043-44 (Papadakos, J., joined by Larsen, JJ), which is
consistent with the overwhelming precedent, is more persuasive.

38

fault approach in order to expand an employee's ability to
recover by eliminating the contributory negligence defense that
otherwise would have barred recovery altogether. Petitioner's
proffered apportionment standard, by contrast, would limit
employee recovery by placing the burden on the employee,
rather than on the railroad employer, to establish the liability of
other third parties and to assume the risk that those other third
parties are judgment proof. Indeed, because petitioner
contends that its liability must be reduced if there are other
contributing nonnegligent causes (Br. 36), unlike even the rule
for comparative fault, petitioner's unprecedented theory of
limited defendant liability would virtually guarantee that
plaintiffs would be denied full recovery for their injuries.

Accordingly, because comparative fault and joint and several
liability were both intended to expand employee recovery, they
reinforce rather than oppose each other. It is therefore not at all
surprising that many federal and state liability schemes
combine the two approaches, thereby directly contradicting
petitioner’s claim of their fundamental incompatibility. See
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220 (1994);
Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 260-61 & n.7; Coats v. Penrod Drilling
Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 1123, 1129 (5 Cir. 1995) (en banc); Dobbs,
supra, at 1086 & n.2; Jerome H. Nates, Damages in Tort Actions,
§ 48.03[6] (1993 & 1997 Supp.).

b. Equally without merit is petitioner's claim (Br. 32) that
FELA “makes clear that railroads are not liable for employee
injuries that result from outside causes” because 45 U.S.C. § 51
provides that railroads are liable only “to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier.” The single word
“while” has no bearing on the joint causation issue.

First, petitioner's unfortunate phrasing “result trom outside
causes,” obscures the vital distinction between (1) the scope of
railroad liability for injuries that result exclusively from
“outside” or nonrailroad causes; and (2) the scope of railroad
liability for injuries that result from a combination of railroad
and “outside” causes. Under the first scenario, the railroad is
plainly not liable. A railroad must be a legal cause of the injury
to be liable. But the apportionment question raised in this case
concerns only the second scenario, and it is equally plain that

39

the “while he is employed” language upon which petitioner
relies does not remotely address the distinct circumstance of
joint causation. The more natural, and historically accurate,
reading of the language is simply that it ensures that FELA’s
remedial scheme would be available to persons injured in the
course of theiremployment with an interstate common carrier.”*

Second, the statutory reference to “while” would have, in any
event, been an especially inapt means of addressing the joint
causation issue. Multiple-tortfeasor situations typically occur
when the employee’s injuries are caused by more or less
simultaneous and concurrent railroad and nonrailroad causes.
See, e.g., Rogers, supra. The statutory language “while he is
employed” offers no more guidance as to whether damages
should be apportioned in that circumstance than it does if the
multiple causes are not concurrent. If, moreover, petitioner is
suggesting that the word “while” means that an employee is
entirely barred from recovering for diseases traceable to
railroad conduct, but which remain latent until long after
employment has ended, this Court has already rejected such a
crabbed view of FELA’s remedial scope. See Urie, 337 U.S. at
187 (“We do not think the mere difference in the time required
for different acts of negligence to take effect and disclose their
harmful, disabling consequences would justify excluding the
one type of injury from the Act's coverage.”).

B. Traditional And Settled Common Law Liability Rules
Also support The Trial Judge’s Refusal To Instruct The

:
See jlroad And Absent Third Parti

The trial judge’s refusals to give petitioner's proposed
apportionment instruction and special verdict forms to the jury

** Congress added “while he is employed” in two provisions when it
reenacted FELA in 1908 in order to address the constitutional concerns
this Court raised in striking down FELA’s predecessor law, by ensuring
that the regulated activities had sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.
See 35 Stat. 65 (1908); 34 Stat. 232 (1906); 42 Cong. Rec. 4526-27 (1908) (Sen.
Dolliver); The Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908).

40

are also consistent with the common law ‘liability rules
applicable under FELA. Petitioner misstates the role of
apportionment under both traditional and evolving common
law principles, which provide for the possibility of
apportionment only in circumstances far narrower than
petitioner suggests and not for the kind of indivisible injuries
suffered by respondents.

1. To avoid FELA’s plain meaning, petitioner alternatively
claims (Br. 35-39) that FELA silently incorporated a common
law rule allegedly prevalent in 1908 mandating apportionment
of damages in multiple-cause cases. Not only would sucha rule
fail to overcome FELA’s language and remedial purposes
(Sinkler v. Missouri P.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 329 (1958); Rogers,
352 U.S. at 508), but petitioner's exaggerated account of the
common law at the time of FELA’s enactment is wrong. It is
simply not true that “[s]everal liability was not only the general
rule, but the overwhelming rule.” Pet. Br. 35.

FELA’s common law liability scheme was expressly modeled
upon the “liberal interpretations * * * that now prevail in the
admiralty courts of the United States” (42 Cong. Rec. 4536 (1908)
(introductory statement of Senator Dolliver)), which in 1908
firmly embraced joint and several liability. See Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-155 (2d ed. 1994).

As described by the Ccurt in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93
U.S. 302 (1876), in which two vessels negligently collided and
caused the sinking of a third vesse! owned by the plaintiff,
“[njothing is more clear than the right of a plaintiff, having
suffered such a loss, to sue in a common-law action all the
wrong-doers, or any one of them * * * and it is equally clear,
that, * * * he is entitled to judgment in either case for the full amoun:
of his loss.” Id. at 315 (emphasis supplied), citing Murray v.
Lovejoy, 3 Wall. 19 (1863); Smith v. Hines, 2 Sumn. 348 (Me.
1836). Nor was the then-prevailing admiralty rule out of step
with common law at the time. The admiralty rule favoring
joint and several liability was “in accord with the common law”
in “allow[ing] an injured party to sue a tortfeasor for the full
amount of damages for an indivisible injury that the tortfeasor’ s
negligence was a substantial factor in causing * * *.” Edmonds,
443 US. at 260-61 & n.7. See Pet. 22 (describing joint and

4]

several liability as “the traditional rule”).

Unlike petitioner, we are willing to acknowledge that there
was “considerable difference of opinion” in 1908 concerning the
precise scope of joint and several liability.” Universal
consensus, however, is not required for the application of such
a standard under FELA both because joint and several liability
then reflected the clear majority view and because it is the view
consistent with FELA’s remedial purposes and plain language.
The 1906 edition of Judge Cooley’s celebrated treatise on torts
surveyed the case law and concluded that, notwithstanding
“considerable difference in opinion,” the “weight of authority”
supported application of joint and several liability “where the
negligences of two or more persons concur in producing a
single, indivisible injury” even in the absence of any “common
duty, common design or concert[ed] action.” T. Cooley, Treatise
on the Law of Torts, 247 (3d ed. 1906); Dobbs, supra, § 390 (same).
There can be no question, moreover, regarding what standard
of liability is more in harmony with FELA, even if FELA’s
statutory language did not already plainly impose entire
liability on railroads whose negligence was at least a “ part[ial]”
cause of the employee’s injury. A “progressive rule of liability
that [i]s less restrictive * * * [is] more consistent with * * *

* Because scholars in 1906 found it impossible to “harmonize all the
authorities” (T. Cooley, Treatise on the Law of Torts, 246 (3d ed. 1906)),
petitioner can find some early cases that press for a strict rule of causal
apportionment in multiple tortfeasor cases. But petitioner cannot
possibly maintain its claim that several liability was so
“overwhelming|ly]” the rule (Br. 35) that Congress must be deemed, sub
silentio, to have adopted it. At least one of petitioner's citations, sampled
because of its illustrious author, is even wholly inapposite. Justice
Holmes’ opinion for the court in Middlesex Co. v. City of Lowell, 21 N.E. 872,
873 (Mass. 1889), arose from a bill of equity to abate a nuisance caused by
two polluters and hence says little about the availability of joint liability
in damages actions at common law. In 1902, the same court applied joint
and several liability to independent tortfeasors who caused a single
personal injury. See Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902). Because,
moreover, some of those courts’ preference for several liability was based
on restrictions on contribution among joint tortfeasors long since
abandoned, those rulings provide an especially poor historical basis for
petitioner's arguments. See Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 52 (5" ed. 1984).

42

FELA’s broad remedial goals.” Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555
(adopting zone of danger test).

2. Petitioner’s claim that the common law has since evolved
away from joint and several liability for the kind of indivisible
injuries suffered by respondents in favor of apportionment is no
more persuasive. Both the First and Second Restatement of Torts
confirm the pedigree and contemporary acceptance of joint and
several liability for indivisible injury.

Section 879 of the First Restatement (1939) provides that “each
of two persons who is independently guilty of tortious conduct
which is a substantial factor in causing a harm to another is
liable for the entire harm, in the absence of a superseding
cause.” The commentary explains that “[a] person whose
tortious conduct is otherwise one of the legal causes of an
injurious result is not relieved from liability for the entire harm
by the fact that the tortious act of another responsible person
contributes to the result.” Id. § 879 comment a.

The Second Restatement of Torts, published in 1965 and 1979, is
entirely in accord. Section 875 provides that “[e]ach of two or
more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single
and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability
to the injured party for the entire harm.” The Second
Restatement also makes clear that the kind of injuries being
suffered by respondents in this case constitute the paradigmatic
example of the kind of “indivisible harm” for which joint and
several liability rather than apportionment applies.
Respondents suffer from a physical disease, asbestosis, and
from a variety of physical and mental impairments resulting
from that disease. The Second Restatement commentary explains
that, “[c]ertain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally

incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division” and
offers as examples of such “indivisible” harms “death” and
“any single wound,” which fairly describes the impact of
asbestosis upon the lung. Id. § 433A comment i (“By far the
greater number of personal injuries * * * are thus normally
single and indivisible.”).

Relevant Restatement provisions also specifically reject
petitioner’s claim (Br. 36) that the common law distinguished
between joint causation caused by successive and simultaneous

43

torts of independent actors. According to the First Restatement,
there is liability for the entire harm “where both are
simultaneously negligent * * * and also where the act of one
either occurs or takes harmful effect after that of the other.”§
879 comment a. The Second Restatement even more directly
refutes petitioner's claim. Section 879 provides that where joint
and several liability is otherwise applicable, “each is subject to
liability for the entire harm, irrespective of whether their
conduct is concurring or consecutive.”

3. Contrary to petitioner's claim (Br. 40-42), Section 433A of
the Second Restatement does not support petitioner’s view that
the common law rule provides for apportionment in the kind of
factual circumstances presented by this case. Section 433A
provides for apportionment between multiple causes only for
“divisible” injuries, which are present only if either “there are
distinct harms” or “there is a reasonable basis for determining
the contribution of each cause toa single harm.” Respondents,
however, are not suffering from distinct harms, as are
presented, for instance, when a victim is suffering from a
broken leg caused by one action and a broken arm caused by
another. Nor are they suffering from the kind of single harm
for which there could remotely exist a “reasonable basis” for
determining the causal contribution. Instead, as previously
described, their injuries arise from their asbestosis, which is
quintessentially an “indivisible” personal injury under
longstanding and contemporary tort law principles. See, e.g.,
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094-
96 (5 Cir. 1973) (asbestosis as indivisible injury); Owens
Corning Fiberglass v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467, 476-77 (Ky. 2001)
(same). The accompanying Second Restatement commentary
specifically explains that “indivisible” injury is not subject to
apportionment and contrasts “personal injury,” which is
generally indivisible, from injury to real property in nuisance
law, which is more susceptible to being considered divisible.
Second Restatement § 433A comments d & i; see First
Restatement § 881 (apportionment for nuisance).”°

© This longstanding judicial distinction between real property and
personal injury in applying joint and several liability is also why

44

Petitioner’s reliance on common law apportionment rules is,
in all events, misguided because the burden is on the party
seeking to “apportion” damages based on causation to establish
that a reasonable basis of apportionment exists and therefore
that the injury at issue is in fact divisible.” At trial, however,
petitioner introduced hardly any evidence on the question,
despite multiple opportunities. Petitioner’s effort to construct
a basis for apportionment for the first time now, based
exclusively on sketchy testimony, is too little, too late.

The beginning and end of the evidentiary basis for
petitioner’s current claim that an apportionment instruction
should have been given was testimony by respondents’
witnesses that two of the respondents (Butler and Ayers) may
have been exposed to asbestos in nonrailroad employment.”
When respondents’ medical expert was asked on direct

petitioner is mistaken (Br. 38-39, 49) in relying on nuisance, trespass, and
polluted stream cases as “analogous” to “ pollution of a lung by asbestos,
and the resulting asbestosis” (id. at 49).

” See Second Restatement § 433B(2) (“Where the tortious conduct of
two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and
one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the
harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to
the apportionment is upon each such actor.”); Third Restatement § 26
comment h (“Whether damages are divisible is a question of fact. A party
alleging that damages are divisible has the burden to prove that they are
divisible.”); Dobbs, supra, § 174; Second Restatement App. §§174-423, at
pp. 271-302 (1995) (listing cases); Tracy v. Cottrell, 206 W.Va. 363 (1999).

* The trial judge during voir dire specifically asked petitioner's counsel
whether they intended to put on evidence regarding negligence and
causation of third parties. JA 69-70. In the ensuing colloquy, the only third
parties counsel mentioned were asbestos manufacturers. Petitioner's
counsel at first denied any intent to introduce evidence regarding the
manufacturers, but then suggested that they might. /d. But, in all events,
petitioner never introduced such evidence (see pp. 7-8 & note 6, supra) and
both its proposed jury instruction, verdict form, and new trial motion
referred exclusively to nonrailroad employment and made no mention of
manufacturers. JA 539, 550, 647-49. Thus, despite petitioner's plea (Br.
50), it long ago forfeited its opportunity to base apportionment on asbestos
manufacturers. Respondents’ settlements with some manufacturers were
also the basis of setoffs from the final award. See p. 9, supra.

45

examination about the relative asbestos exposure to which
Ayers had been subjected in his railroad job as compared to his
automotive maintenance job, the doctor simply replied “Well,
It's hard for me to say. I’m just going to say that they’re
probably equivalent.” JA 205. On direct examination, the same
witness testified, in addressing the relative exposure to which
Butler was subjected in his three months working in the
locomotive engine repair shop as compared to his thirty years
as a pipefitter, that the railroad employment was a
“contributing cause” and the nonrailroad employment was “a
bigger contributor.” JA 195. On cross examination, the witness
refused to acquiesce in petitioner’s counsel's characterization of
the exposure during railroad employment as “very minimal”
and instead said the role was “minimal” but “I don’t know how
much,” at which point petitioner’ s counsel declined to allow the
witness to elaborate any further. JA 236-37. In describing the
contribution of nonrailroad employment to Butler’s asbestos
exposure, petitioner’s own expert likewise acknowledged that
because he “didn’t take any measurements” at those locations,
he could conclude only that Butler had “ample opportunity for
exposure” at nonrailroad employment. “ JA 376. He further
conceded he could not even recall how one possible “model for
attributing causation in asbestos disease” might apply. JA 392.

Such evidence establishes at most that there may have been
other nonrailroad causes of the two respondents’ injuries. The
evidence does not remotely establish that their personal injury
is divisible based on causation. The paucity of evidence is no
doubt why the trial record is devoid of any argument by
petitioner, in support of his apportionment instruction, verdict
forms, or new trial motion, actually setting forth a “reasonable
basis” for apportionment. Petitioner made no argument
because a personal injury such as asbestosis, including the
physical and mental harms resulting from that physical disease,
is precisely the kind of classic “indivisible” injury appropriate
for joint and several liability and not subject to apportionment.

Nor can petitioner now, in any event, correct its lapses at trial.
The evidence must be read in the light most favorable to
respondents as the prevailing party and petitioner cannot
proffer possible bases for apportionment and new evidence.

46

Hence, while petitioner now suggests that damages might be
apportioned based on “volumetric evidence” (Br. 38, 49),
derived presumably from “the length of the plaintiff's periods
of exposure, the quantity of asbestos contained in each product,
and the extent to which those products emitted asbestos fibers”
(Br. 42, 49), petitioner could have introduced such specific
evidence with regard to Butler or Ayers, but did not do so. No
reasonable basis for apportionment was ever proffered at trial.
Indeed, petitioner's own brief undercuts its theory (Br. 49)
that the mere fact that Butler worked at one location for three
months and at other locations for a nonrailroad employer for 30
years creates a reasonable basis for apportionment. The causal
mechanics of asbestos exposure to asbestosis are hardly so
simple. As petitioner itself explains (Br. 3, 24), because the risks
created by asbestos exposure, including asbestosis are “dose-
related,” they “vary significantly with fiber type” as well as
with “intensity and duration of asbestos exposure.” See id. at 24
& n.19 (“certain asbestos fibers are less hazardous”). While
there was evidence that the asbestos fibers at petitioner's
employment were hazardous and that the exposure, especially
in the repair shop where Butler worked for three months
without any protection, was particularly intense (see note 3,
supra), petitioner failed to introduce any evidence of fiber type,
intensity or duration of actual exposure, presence or absence of
protective measures, or ventilation, at any nonrailroad
employment, let alone of the similarly absent “epidemiological
evidence” to which petitioner now elusively refers (Br. 49).”
In arguing that a more “relaxed” apportionment standard
should apply, petitioner also confuses the essential distinction
between apportionment principles that limita plaintiff's recovery
and contribution principles that do not limit a plaintiff's
recovery but apply instead only in lawsuits between jointly
responsible defendants. Precisely because contribution does

* OSHA regulations reflect the complexity of the causal mechanics
related to asbestos exposure and resulting disease. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1001 (exposure rate depends, inter alia, on fiber concentration, air
flow rate, and fiber size); 59 Fed. Reg. 40964, 40970, 40992 (1994)
(regulatory changes based on complexity).

° 47

not affect the plaintiff's ability to recover in full for her injuries,
the courts do in contribution cases apply a dramatically
reduced standard of divisibility and are much more willing to
engage in rough speculation in allocating damages between
various defendants. United States v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307,319
(6" Cir. 1998). Petitioner nonetheless cites in support of relaxed
apportionment, which would deny plaintiff recovery, cases that
are contribution actions. For instance, in Moore v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1061 (5 Cir. 1986), cited by petitioner (Br.
42), the court was merely allocating damages in contribution
between defendants. In direct conflict with petitioner's
apportionment arguments here, the Moore court made clear that
each of the defendants was jointly and severally liable for the
plaintiff's entire injury. Id. at 1063. We do not deny the
availability of contribution actions under FELA, and, as
previously noted, FELA defendants have routinely filed such
actions in the past. See p.36 & note 22, supra. But the availability
of contribution, which diminishes the harshness of joint and
several liability without doing violence to FELA’s purposes, is
a reason why apportionment is not available. It is not evidence
of judicial acceptance of a relaxed standard of apportionment.”

* Petitioner similarly mischaracterizes the import of lower court cases
arising under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.
Although courts have held that “apportionment is available” (Pet. Br. 44),
they have further held that pursuant to “traditional and evolving common
law principles” it is available only when the injury is divisible and not, as
in this case and virtually all CERCLA cases, where the injury is indivisible.
See, e.g., Chem Nuclear System v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 259-61 (D.C. Cir.
2002); U.S. v. Hercules, 247 F.3d 706, 716-19 (8" Cir. 2001); Brighton, 153
F.3d at 317-18 (6" Cir.); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-80 (1" Cir.
1989); U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 & n.23 (4" Cir. 1988); U.S. v.
Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. 802, 808 (S.D.Ohio. 1983). In determining,
moreover, when such indivisibility is present, the courts have uniformly
rejected the kind of unduly simplistic volumetric approximation that
petitioner here suggests (Br. 38, 49). See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172; Chem-
Dyne, 572 F.Supp. at 811. In both U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d
711,722 (2d Cir. 1993) and U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270
(3d Cir. 1992) cited by petitioner (Br. 45), the courts did not apportion
damages; they simply concluded that a defendant was liable for no

48

4. Finally, FELA’s language, structure, and well-established
remedial purposes would compel rejection of any more relaxed
standard for apportionment pursuant to either petitioner's
unsupported account of common law principles (Br. 42-43) or
its penultimate invitation (Br. 45-48) to this Court to adopt a
new fault-based standard of apportionment.

As previously described, FELA’s “simple and direct”
language leaves no doubt that Congress intended for joint and
several liability to apply where, as in this case, a railroad’s
negligence has been a partial cause of an indivisible injury. See
pp. 34-39, supra. Pursuant to the statute’s plain meaning, “[i]t
does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with
reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to other
causes * * *” or that “the immediate reason” for the injury was
“some cause not identified by the evidence.” Rogers, 352 U.S.
at 503, 506-07. For this reason, petitioner's characterization of
how the common law should evolve to be more consistent with
petitioner's “ policy considerations” (Br. 45) is wholly beside the
point. Petitioner's preferred policies cannot trump FELA’s. In
FELA, Congress “introduced a new policy and quite radically
changed the existing law” to further “humanitarian purposes”
by “permit[ting] recovery, in cases where recovery could not be
had before, and tak[ing] from the defendant defenses which
formerly were available.” Winfree v. Northern P. R. Co., 227
U.S. 296, 302 (1913); Gottschall, 512 U.S. at 543.

Indeed, petitioner’s account of what the common law should
be or is becoming is both fictional and self-defeating. It is
simply not true either that “most States now apportion even
indivisible harms” or that joint and several liability has been
“long abandoned” Pet. Br. 42, 50. Joint and several liability for

damages if it was not a cause of the injury in the first instance. And, in In
re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 903-04 (5" Cir. 1993), unlike in this case,
the source of the injury was the same facility operated by different
defendants and the defendant offered extensive, numerical evidence of the
relative contribution for each time period. See id. at 903-04; Hercules, 247
F.3d at 718 (“Evidence supporting divisibility must be concrete and
specific.”) (emphasis supplied); Chem Nuclear Sys., 292 F.3d at 261 (ruling
“some circumstantial evidence” insufficient for geographic divisibility).

49

indivisible harms clearly remains a dominant rule.

Most directly relevant to this case, joint and several liability
remains today the settled rule in admiralty cases (see
Schoenbaum, supra, § 514; Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 260-61)" and
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688, which “adopts ‘the
entire judicially developed doctrine of liability’ under [FELA].”
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 456 (1994),
quoting Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439
(1958). Federal courts apply joint and several liability under
the Jones Act because, as this Court explained in Edmonds,
describing the policies favoring joint and several liability in
admiralty, otherwise “there will be many circumstances where
the [employee] will not be able to recover in any way the full
amount of the damages determined in his suit ** *.” 443 U.S. at
269; see Joia v. Jo-Ja Service Corp., 817 F.2d 908, 916-17 (1" Cir.
1983); Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540,
1548 (11™ Cir. 1987); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d
1113, 1134 (5" Cir. 1995) (en banc). Similar uniformity is
evident in federal hazardous waste law. Virtually every federal
court to address the issue has concluded in the past two
decades that “ traditional and evolving common law principles”
mandate the application of joint and several liability for
indivisible injuries. See note 30, supra.

Nor does the Restatement (Third) of Torts (2000) compel a
contrary view. The Third Restatement itself “takes no position
on whether joint and several liability, several liab

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0533%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.
