# Reply Brief — Devlin v. Scardelletti > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0503%3A08 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Reply Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2002 - **Citation:** 536 U.S. 1 ## Text No. 01-417 In the Supreme Court of the Hrited States ROBERT J. DEVLIN, Petitioner, Vv. ROBERT A. SCARDELLETTI, Trustee of the Transportation Communications International Union Staff Retirement Plan, et ai., Respondents. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER BRIAN WOLFMAN THOMAS C. GOLDSTEIN PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION (Counsel of Record) GROUP AMY HOWE 1600 20th St., N.W. GOLDSTEIN & HOWE, P.C. Washington, DC 20009 4607 Asbury PI., N.W. Washington, DC 20016 (202) 237-7543 ERIK S. JAFFE ERIK S. JAFFE, P.C. 5101 34th St., N.W. Washington, DC 20008 March 19, 2002 | ee eee eee nn en eR te eR, A WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001 TABLE OF CONTENTS Ce Gr CU IN cxcneereszesscsnszscssscnvevsevesnesonensvecsncsesnesseees TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......cccccscoccossccsccscccscscesscescccsecsecsees I. The Fourth Circuit Erred In Holding That Objectors’ Appeals Should Be Forbidden For Reasons Of SEI censescnsuisssiessessenpesesnvesqensevenesunsenanessspsossensseustscueneceesee II. Class Action Objectors Are Parties To The Judgment And Thus Have The Right To Appeal To The Extent ee CIID: cencsenennnenessesectnnscssrsevesscsscesscnenesereenes III. Petitioner Prevails Under A “Pro Forma” Intervention Requirement, Although Such A Requirement Is Unwarranted..............csssssssssesseesseeenees CIE ccscccescersanscereveneenymmrvesssmncsenennscsesesoesssssnsenassnenseees ~ i we TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Other Authorities Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).......... l American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) ... 16 Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 132 F.3d 1147 (CA6 1998) ............0000 17 Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. GSE (Bee ep avscessvssssssnsnsnrsenenaseninninensennibaiaianiananal 6 Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 1 GAD FIRED ccnssrcsennssnienieneinmnitenieiiiaiaieaaaias 19 Felzen v. Andreas, 525 U.S. 315 (1999) (equally divided GUI ecnserseceremnisceninteniniiiamiatidieeee 1, 15, 16, 19 Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976)......cccccccccssssesseseeseceenes 10 Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626 (CA11 1987)........cccccccceeeees 3, 20 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) ........cccccccscesseeseeees 5, 6, 7,8 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (CA3), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995) ........ 17 Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977) .......ccccccccssecsessssseecees 10 Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) .......... 7 Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (per curiam)..............0++ 7] Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)........cccscccsesssesseesseeeeseees 5,8 Matsushita Electrical Industries Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. Se (EGO O a rccrcensiveensesemnstpseineniinicnemianitiaiddaaieniamaal, 5 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) ......csccscecssseeees 5 Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80(1988)............. 14 Sosna V. Lowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) ......ccscecssesseessessessereeeeees 9, 10 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) .cssccesssesssesssecsuscssecsesssecsnecess 6 United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977)......... 18 United States Parole Comm’ n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 il Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969)...c.ccccesesossssesssserseeenssssssssensnssssssnsassnsnsnssnsnsasansnsnensens 6 9 Fed. R. App. P. 42.....sscssssesssssssssssnsnsensensenssnssnsnnsensnsnnsnnsnnsnnsenes 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)....c-ccecsscecsssessreesenssssnsnenrsnsnnssennsnennsnsnnsnsnnenenes 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ..ccecceccsscessssersssensenssssnennserensensnnensnssnnsnsnnsnns 16, 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).....csccccsssersersessessserensnnsensnnsnnsnnsnnsnnsnnenssnnenens 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)....c-csecesceseresseresssesesensnsensnensnnsnnsnsnnsnsnnenes 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2)..0-. -escseeresserssessrennnensensnnsnsnesnnsnnenees 16, 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(€)....c-ccssecsessserseressensesnesssnnensnssnsnennsnennsnnensnsnnes 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 ..ccccceccsssssssssrsssersensssssssnsnssnsensnnensnnsnnsneenenes 16, 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)...-ccscccsssssrserersersnennsssnnsnssnsnssnnsnsnnsnnsnennes 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(C)....ccscscccssssssessesessnnsnnsnsensensnennanesnnnnsnnsnssnsnens 17 S. Ct. R. 24.1) ecccececceressercsserseserereerensnssnsnssrsnsensnsensnsnnsnrenensnnenees 13 13 2 NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 2755 (1977) ...-s:-s-ssseseererensreenenes 6 Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for ‘Adequacy’ in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 765 (1998)....---v-ssseerereerenseees 20 REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER I. The Fourth Circuit Erred In Holding That Objectors’ Appeals Should Be Forbidden For Reasons Of Policy. Respondents’ contention in this Court (at 28) that petitioner is relying on policy rationales as a “subtext” for reversal is wrong. It was the majority below that relied entirely on policy grounds — in particular, that appeals by objectors would be destructive of orderly class action litigation — to hold that objectors may not appeal. See Pet. App. A21-A24. Petitioner’s opening brief (at 30-36) simply demonstrated that the Fourth Circuit’s policy rationale is fundamentally flawed, aid respondents’ failure even to attempt to defend the decision below on its own terms is a telling admission. Thus, there is no serious dispute that appeals by objectors identify important legal errors, as in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), which respondents studiously ignore. The potential for appeals also deters collusive class action settlements and encourages district court judges to consider objections studiously. The empirical data establishes that district court fairness hearings regarding »roposed settlements tend to be perfunctory, and thus do not, standing alone, provide substantial protection to objectors, whose interests will be finally decided by the court’s judgment. See generally Pet. Br. 28-41. And this Court’s decision in American Pipe & Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1974), and its progeny establish that the Federal Rules should not be construed to as to invite unnecessary, burdensome, and distracting motions to intervene. See Pet. Br. 37-38. The Solicitor General joins in these points here (at 3-9) just as he did in Felzen v. Andreas, 525 U.S. 315 (1999) (equally divided court). The government thus explains that class actions can be abused by class representatives and their lawyers and that allowing objector appeals provides an important safeguard “by 2 assuring that judgments approving [class] settlements are subjected to appellate scrutiny.” Respondents echo the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in only one respect, contending that, if class action objectors may appeal, they will effectively have the power to take over the case. Resp. Br. 22-24. But, just as the class representative has no power to preclude the presentation of objections in the district court under Rule 23, she has no such power on appeal. And on appeal, objectors may press only their obiections to the settlement because (a) the appeal lies from that aspect of the district court’s decision rejecting his individual objections, and (b) a party may raise on appeal only the issues that he properly pressed below. Objectors may not, for example, contest the district court’s rulings on discovery, or granting summary judgment on certain claims, on any number of the many issues that arise during the course of litigation. Objectors thus cannot be said to “usurp” any prerogative of the class representative. Petitioner’s position is thus not that a class member “is entitled to assume the role of the named representative party.” Resp. Br. 21. _ Similarly, nothing about petitioner’s position implies that — enaphine Beye representative’s role in the district prior to or on appeal from a liti judgment. Objectors have the right to pursue their init chjoatioas in district court and on appeal only because the representative no longer acts in the objectors’ interests once a settlement has been proposed. Respondents themselves press this distinction: “Once a proposed settlement is reached, it is axiomatic that the named representative party who has negotiated the settlement does not Nor is there a realistic prospect, unique to class actions, of strategic appeals to gain leverage in the litigation. The only example given of supposedly strategic behavior (Duhaime v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 1, 6 (CAl 1999)) merely speculated regarding the possibility of improper objections and appeals, but found no such impropriety, and in any event the same prospect arises if objectors instead intervene before appealing. The proposed revisions to Rule 23 address the Duhaime concern by requiring the court’s permission before objections may be withdrawn. 201 F.R.D. 560, 617- 631-32 (2001). 3 adequately represent either the interests or the viewpoint of those class members opposed to the settlement.” Resp. Br. 30 (emphasis in original).* Absent such a conflict in interests, the ive is the class member’s champion, both in the district court and on appeal.” This case, moreover, presents the strongest possible circumstance for permitting an objector to appeal. Petitioner not only properly presented his objections, but the district court entered an injunction against Petitioner acting in contravention of its judgment approving the settlement. There cannot be any serious argument that his interests are not sufficiently affected by the proceedings in the district court to take an appeal. J.A. 174-77. Il. Class Action Objectors Are Parties To The Judgment And Thus Have The Right To Appeal To The Extent Of Their Objections. A. Class Action Objectors Have The Right To Appeal As “Parties” Because They Are Bound By A Class Action Judgment. 1. Respondents do not seriously contest the section of petitioner’s opening brief (at 16-24) demonstrating that, under this Court’s precedents, the right to appeal extends to all parties “to the judgment” as opposed to merely “named” parties. 2 Indeed, the class representative’s counsel would be disabled from acting on the objector’s behalf. See, ¢.g., Model Rule of Prof. Conduct 1.7(b). problem in Guthrie was one of unfair surprise, and thus is akin to the ordinary prohibition against raising on appeal issues that have not been raised in the district court. See supra. 4 Respondents correctly note (at 14-15) that certain provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (those identifying the persons who may raise Claims or take discovery) generally refer to ‘parties” as the named plaintiffs and defendaixts. But the Civil Rules are not determinative of what persons are “parties” for purposes of the right to appeal, as respondents essentially admit by acknowledging (at 22) the many classes of persons who are not named plaintiffs and defendants (and thus cannot State claims or take discovery in the district court) but may nonetheless appeal. See Resp. Br. 22 (discussing, ¢.g., putative intervenors and sanctioned attorneys). In any event, the Civil Rules equally assign “party” status to any person on whose behalf the named plaintiff or defendant acts. Rule 17(a) thus provides that persons such as an “executor, administrator, guardian, bailee [or] trustee * * * may sue in that person's own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought” (emphasis added). In a class action, the named representative is (as Rule 23(a) provides) a representative party” and must exercise her rights under the Civil Rules not just in her own personal interest, but also in the en or of all the class members, who are equally “parties” on at basis. 2. : Respondents therefore principally press the argument that an objecting class member is not a “party” because he is not bound directly by a class action judgment. This theory of class action judgments, even if accepted, would not change the outcome of this case. However one describes the manner in which class members are bound, there is no question that they are in fact bound. As a result, they have an a fortiori right to appeal under this Court’s long-standing precedents recognizing the right to appeal of quasi-parties — i.e., persons who have the right to appear in the case, do appear, and are directly affected by the judgment. See Pet. Br. 20-22.‘ 4 Respondents assert that, in some of the quasi-party cases, the “intervened.” But as the Solicitor General explained in his brief in Felzen (at 8 n.3), at the time the quasi-party cases were decided, the term “intervention” did not carry with it the same connotation of a formal 5 But in any event, respondents seriously misunderstand the effect of a class action judgment on the individual class members. Respondents emphasize, and this Court reiterated most recently in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., that there is a “due process ‘principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.’” 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). But respondents simply fail to understand the import of the fact that, as this Court has often repeated, class actions are “‘an exception to the general rule.” /d. (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (emphasis added)).° As an “exception” to the general rule, class members are personally bound notwithstanding that they were not named parties in the district court. As Ortiz explains, in a class action judgment, “/t)/he legal rights of absent class members * * * are resolved regardless either of their consent, or, in a class with objectors, their express wish to the contrary.” 527 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added). The Court made the same point in Matsushita Electrical Industries Co. v. Epstein: “[{A}\l members of the class, whether of a plaintiff or defendant class, are bound by the judgment entered in the action unless, in a Rule 23(b) action, they make a timely election for exclusion.” 516 U.S. appearance as a party for all purposes. Ultimately, the significance of the other quasi-party cases is not the means by which various individuals gained access to a case, but rather the mere fact that they had gained access and had a final decision rendered on their arguments so presented. Here, petitioner had access as a matter of right, not grace, made use of that access to present his objections, and had a final decision on those objections rendered by the court. He thus has as much a right to appellate review of such decision as do any other participants in a case, whether parties proper or quasi. 5 There is also a bitter irony in respondents’ attempt to invoke the “day in court ideal” to conclude that a class action objector, unlike any other person whose interests are adjudicated in a case, may not have a day in an “appellate court.” 6 367, 379 (1996) (quoting 2 NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 2755, at 1224 (1977), and citing Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984)). Respondents err in their reliance (at 17-18) on this Court’s determination in Hansberry v. Lee that a judgment is binding only to the extent that the class representative adequately represented the class members’ interests. The relevant point is Hansberry’s confirmation that, unless and until there is a successful collateral attack, the class members are “bound by the judgment.” 311 U.S. at 42. Moreover, Hansberry manifestly does not turn on any “fundamental distinction in the law of judgments” (Resp. Br. 19 (emphasis in original)) between class representatives, who are bound directly by a judgment, and class members, who (supposedly) are not. There is no such distinction. Hansberry merely applied the basic principle that any judgment, including a class action judgment, may not be enforced to the extent it was entered in violation of due process. Thus, “there has been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent partiss who are to be bound by it.” 311 U.S. at 42 (emphasis added). The principle announced in Hansberry is not, contrary to respondents’ argument, peculiar to unnamed class members. Instead, the Court in Hansberry relied on the holding of Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), that a plaintiff or defendant may not be deemed bound by the result in “a trial by a judicial officer who is in such situation that he may have an interest in the outcome of the litigation in conflict with that of the litigants.” 311 U.S. at 45. That basic rule of due process applies to a class representative as well, such that a judgment entered against a named representative would be equally void, and equally subject to collateral attack, if entered without notice and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969) (“It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.” (citing Hansberry)); cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 7 461, 482 (1982) (“A State may not grant preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment, and other state and federal courts are not required to accord full faith and credit to such a judgment.”).° Nor is there merit to respondents’ position (at 16-17) that class members are not “parties to the judgment” because they are merely “privies” of the class representatives, or to their related argument (at 24) that, if class members have the right to appeal, then so must every other “privy” who will be bound as a matter of res judicata. Respondents completely misunderstand the one case they cite, Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 US. 793 (1996). Richards held that a judgment in a prior suit was not res judicata as to a suit later brought by different persons as a class action. The question of privity was whether the class was sufficiently in privity with the parties to the first suit, not whether the class members were in privity with the class representative. Respondents latch on to Richards’ statement that one need not necessarily have been “a party to a judgment in order to be bound by it,” including “when it can be said that there is ‘privity’ between a party to the second case and a party who is bound by an earlier judgment.” 517 U.S. at 798. But Richards does not equate class members with privies. Rather, it discusses class actions in a separate paragraph, which avowedly sets forth “addition{al]” examples departing from the general rule, and which has nothing to do with privity. /d. (discussing not only ’ Respondents’ reliance on Hansberry is particularly surprising because of the natural parallel between that case — which was a successful challenge to a class action settlement approving a restrictive racial covenant — and this one. The Hansberry petitioners were unaware of the prior class action, and thus did not object or appeal but rather collaterally attacked the adequacy of the representative party. According to the ts in this case, however, if the Hansberry petitioners had stated - objections to the settlement in the prior case, and those objections had been rejected, they would have been prohibited from appealing. There is no warrant for immunizing trial court errors from review in that fashion. class actions but also “special remedial scheme[s] * * * expressly foreclosing successive litigation by nonlitigants”). Any ambiguity on this score is resolved by Hansberry itself, which explained (311 U.S. at 38) that it was uncontested that the class members in that case were not in “privity” with the named parties, wholly apart from whether they might be bound by the Class judgment. The error in respondents’ position is also evident from their immediate retreat from it. Thus, respondents themselves seem to recognize that class members are directly bound by a class action judgment, but they rely on this Court’s statement in Martin v. Wilks that the judgment is binding when a class member, “although not a party, has his interests adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is a party.” 490 U.S. at 762 n.2 (emphasis in Resp. Br. at 17). They similarly invoke the statement in Hansberry v. Lee that the petitioners in that case “were not parties” to the contested state court judgment. Wilks and Hansberry, however, involved only the preclusive effect of a judgment on persons who were neither plaintiffs nor defendants in the prior suit, and the Court was accordingly not referring to a “party” in the sense of the right to appeal. The Court just as frequently referred to class members as “absent parties.” See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42, 43, 44, 45; see also Pet. Br. 25-26 (detailing this Court’s precedents describing class members as “parties” and “absent parties”). Finally, that petitioner correctly describes the preclusive effect of a class action judgment is readily apparent from the facts of this case, and from respondents’ litigation of the case in the lower courts. The settlement agreement embodied in the district court’s judgment fundamentally alters the rights and obligations of the respondent trustees with respect to each plan member, including petitioner. The judgment thus leads directly to a substantial reduction in petitioner’s individual pension, precluding him from challenging respondents’ modification of the plan’s terms. On that very basis, respondents successfully secured an injunction prohibiting petitioner in personam from acting in contravention of the district court’s judgment by litigating related issues in any other forum. See J.A. 174-77. 9 Respondents totally fail to explain how, if they are now correct that petitioner is not bound by the settlement, the judgment in this case adjudicates petitioner’s individual rights as the district court held. B. Class Members Are “Parties” For Purposes Of The Right To Appeal At The Point The Class Is Properly Certified. Petitioner’s opening brief explained that Sosna v. lowa and its progeny hold that, at the point of certification, “the class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquire[s] a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the class representative],” because that is the point at which “the decision will bind” all the class members. 419 U.S. 393, 399 & n9 (1975). Sosna thus held that when the class representative's claims become on moot on appeal, the appeal need not be dismissed because a continuing case or controversy exists as to the individual class members, who are equally bound by the judgment. See also Pet. Br. 26-27 (discussing Sosna’s progeny). By parity of logic, a member of a certified class is a “party” who can appeal in his own right. Respondents’ answer (at 20-21) is to contend that Sosna actually held that, upon certification, the “class” as an entity — as opposed to its individual constituent members — has an interest in the judgment. But respondents simply confuse the question whether all the members of the class are bound with the separate question, at issue in Sosna, whether the individual class members are bound by the judgment and thus raise a sufficient case or controversy to present the case from becoming moot. Thus, in a class action, only the individual class members (as 7 In Part I-C of their brief, respondents attack a straw-man, contending that it is not sufficient for a person merely to “object” to a settlement to have the right to appeal. Petitioner’s position is not that an objection is a sufficient condition to “party” status, but that it is a necessary condition. The objection must be stated by a class member who is, as just explained, bound by the judgment. Respondents’ reliance on Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (per curiam), is thus misplaced because, as even the majority below acknowledged, the putative appellants in that case were not members of the class. See Pet. Br. 19-20; Pet. App. A15 n.12. 10 opposed to the aggregated entity) can have an Article III case or controversy. In turn, “classes” don’t appeal; individuals do. Respondents’ argument is just an attempt to undo this Court’s repeated holding (see supra) that a class action judgment binds each class member individually. Respondents’ description of Sosna is thus wrong. Sosna explained that the significance of certification was that “all persons” in the class would be bound (419 U.S. at 399 n.9 (emphasis added)), and the Court held there was an ongoing controversy because “it is clear that [the appellees] will enforce [the challenged statute] against those persons in the class that appellant sought to represent and that the District Court certified” (id. at 400 (emphasis added)). The Court then articulated its rule as follows: “The controversy may exist * * * between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot.” /d. at 402 (emphasis added). See also United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1980) (specifically relying on this statement of Sosna’s holding). Subsequently, in Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 756 (1976), this Court applied Sosna to hold that an appeal in a Title VII class action was not moot because the appellant class representative could pursue the interests of “[t]he unnamed members of the class involved [who] are identifiable individuals, individually named in the record” (emphasis added).® * Respondents’ further reliance on Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977), is similarly mistaken. Respondents quote Kremens for the proposition that, to avoid mootness, there must be a “proper ‘substitution of class representatives with live claims” (Resp. Br. at 21 (quoting 431 U.S. at 135)), but they omit any mention of the context of that decision. Kremens did not overrule Sosna and Franks, supra. Rather, intervening developments in Kremens had squarely called the class certification into question, such that it was unclear which individuals actually remained bound by the judgment. In that circumstance, the Court required not merely “substitution” but also “reconsideration of the class definition.” 431 U.S. at 134. As the Court explained, but respondents ignore, “The factors which we have just described make the class aspect of this litigation a far cry inleed from that aspect of the litigation in Sosna and in ——— ee eee ee — 11 *k#*e * Because class action objectors are “parties” to the judgment, they have the right to appeal without intervening in the case. For the reasons described infra, a more formal intervention requirement is unwarranted. Ill. Petitioner Prevails Under A “Pro Forma” Intervention Requirement, Although Such A _ Requirement Is Unwarranted. The government argues (at 18-21), anc respondents basically acknowledge (at 30), that this Court should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s rule that an objector’s right to appeal should be contingent on the objector filing a motion to intervene, which the district judge should grant essentially as a matter of course. The government thus asserts (at 21) that a class member who seeks to intervene generally “will satisfy Rule 24(a)’s interest, timeliness, and inadequate representation requirements, and, thus, be entitled to intervene for that limited purpose.” According to the government (at 24), the objector need not show that he is an adequate representative for any other member of the class but only “that his own interests will not be fairly represented on appeal, a showing that in most cases may be made simply by pointing to the class representative’s interest in foregoing an appeal” (emphasis in original). Intervention should be allowed in those circumstances, ,it maintains, because objectors “belong to the settlement class and will be bound by the judgment” (id. at 21), and because “inadequate representation will invariably be present when a class member seeks to appeal approval of a class action settlement over his objection” (id. at 23). Although petitioner would be entitled to appeal on the government’s approach, this Court should reject this invitation to create what amounts to no more than a procedural hurdle to Franks, where we adjudicated the merits of the class claims notwithstanding the mootness of the claims of the named parties.” /d. at 131. 12 appeals by objectors. Furthermore, to the extent this argument contemplates that district courts would screen objectors’ appeals, it lacks any foundation in the Rules of Civil Procedure or the experience of the federal courts. A. Petitioner Has Properly Presented And Preserved The Argument That He Would Prevail Under A Pro Forma Intervention Rule. It is undisputed that petitioner moved to intervene in this case pursuant to Rule 24 as soon as respondents proposed their settlement. The government and respondents nonetheless argue that, if this Court were to adopt a pro forma intervention requirement, the judgment in this case should be affirmed. The Solicitor General presses two arguments (only one of which is joined by respondents), both of which are meritless. First, the government (at 29) and respondents (at 34) contend that the Question Presented does not encompass the Seventh Circuit’s standard. But the pro forma intervention rule is not only “fairly encompassed” by the Question Presented in the Petition for Certiorari, it is explicitly encompassed by it. The question asks: “Whether a class member who, upon receiving notice of a proposed class action settlement, objects and moves to intervene has standing to appeal the district court’s approval of the settlement” (emphasis added). Respondent could not be more wrong in stating (at 35) that “the certiorari petition contained no argument, or so much as an intimation, that adequate grounds existed for a grant of certiorari” on this issue (emphasis in original). The Petition specifically argues that certiorari should be granted because the Fourti = scuit’s decision conflicts with the Seventh Circuit’s rule. Tue Petition states in the introduction (at 2): “petitioner would have been allowed to appeal in the Seventh Circuit.” The Reasons for Granting the Writ section then devotes an entire page to the issue, explaining, for example: “The Seventh Circuit would permit petitioner to appeal as well, although on a different basis. That court would hold that, although petitioner does not have standing to appeal as an objector, he does have standing to appeal as an intervenor” (emphasis in original). The certiorari 13 Reply Brief (at 8) returned to this precise issue, explaining that petitioner would prevail under the Seventh Circuit's standard and that “the relevant point here is that the Fourth Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's approach — it held that petitioner could not appeal notwithstanding that he had sought to intervene well before the district court approved the settlement” (emphasis in original). The Solicitor General’s contrary position that the Question Presented does not encompass this issue is impossibly confusing, for he repeatedly demonstrates that he does not believe his own argument. The government's brief (at i) restates the Question Presented as “[wJhether, or in what circumstances, a non-named class member who objects to a class action settlement may appeal-a district court judgment approving the settlement.” See also id. at 9 (same); S. Ct. R. 24.1(a) (“The phrasing of the questions presented need not be identical with that in the petition for a writ of certiorari or the jurisdictional statement, but the brief may not raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions already presented in those documents.”’). Second, the government contends (at 28) that petitioner did not specifically invoke, and the Fourth Circuit did not specifically reject, the Seventh Circuit's rule in those terms in the proceedings below. To put it charitably, this is nitpicking. Petitioner argued in the Fourth Circuit that he was entitled to appeal either as an intervenor or as an objector, and the court of appeals’ entire opinion is devoted to rejecting those arguments. If nothing else, the Fourth Circuit “passed upon” this issue when it held (Pet. App. Al2-A13, A21-A24) that class members generally may not intervene once the settlement is proposed because they will interfere with the class representative's administration of the case. Even respondents admit (at 34) that the issue was sufficiently resolved below. And, once again, the Solicitor General contradicts himself: if the government really believed that the pro forma intervention rule was not passed upon below, it could not ask this Court to adopt it. “This Court’s practice is to ‘deal with the case as it came here and affirm or reverse based on the ground relied on below.’” S.G. 14 Br. 28 (quoting Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86 (1988)).’ Finally, it bears emphasizing both that the district court did believe that petitioner had satisfied any “screening” criteria that might constrain an objector’s right to appeal, and furthermore that respondents consciously led the district court to conclude that petitioner could appeal without intervening. As petitioner’s opening brief detailed and respondents notably do not contest, respondents not only categorically took the position that it was unnecessary for petitioner to formally intervene to protect his interests, but furthermore secured approval from the district court of a class notice that explicitly contemplated objector appeals. Pet. Br. 6-7. The district court, in turn, rejected petitioner’s objections, but stated on the record that, “if I’m wrong, you got an appeal.” J.4. 154. Later, the district court eiterated: “I am perfectly clear that my order approving the class settlement should be appealed, should be reviewed by the Fourth Circuit in due course.” C.A. Supp. App. 1240. Respondents are judicially estopped from taking the contrary position in this Court. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001); Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 n.8 (2000)."° * The government's passing suggestion (at 27, 29) that petitioner’s merits brief does not sufficiently present this issue is inexplicable. As even respondents acknowledge (at 33), an entire section of petitioner’s merits brief (Part IV, at 41-43) is devoted to it. The government's further suggestion (at 28) that petitioner did not properly raise this issue in the district court because “he sought to intervene not only to move to oppose the preliminary approval of the settlement, but also to take discovery, secure an injunction, and disqualify class counsel” (emphasis added) contradicts its own proposal (at 14) that objectors should move to intervene and the district court should enter an order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d(3 that permits them to intervene but then “condition{}"their participation to appealing. ‘© Respondents are similarly estopped from asserting their newfound position (at 30) that the class representatives did not provide adequate representation once the settlement was proposed. They strenuously, and successfully, pressed the opposite position below. See J.A. 84-86; Resp. C.A. Br. 41-42. 15 B. A Pro Forma Intervention Requirement Is Unwarranted. In the Felzen case, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the S.E.C., argued that this Court’s quasi-party precedents firmly established the right of objectors to appeal without intervention, and advised this Court: [T]he standards for objecting under Rule 23.1 are different from intervention under Rule 24, and it was precisely that point that the [court in the leading case of Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721 (CA6 1942)} recognized in ruling that an objecting shareholder had a limited right to appeal without demonstrating that the standards for **** The court of appeals [in Fe/zen] concluded that if the objecting shareholders wished to appeal, they must first intervene as parties. As a practical matter, that conclusion imposes an unnecessary requirement. By appealing the district court’s approval of the settlement, the objecting shareholders are merely seeking to persuade the court of appeals that the district court erred in rejecting the arguments they were required to make if they hoped to avert the imposition of a binding judgment adverse to their interests. Requiring intervention as a party for the purpose of making an appearance in the court of appeals threatens to interpose an unwarranted obstacle to what historically has been an essentially automatic right that comparably situated quasi parties have had to pursue their appeals. Gov’t Br. at 24. With barely a side-long glance at those unambiguous arguments (Br. at 27 n.27), the Solicitor General now takes the opposite view.'' The government says its new position is the "The government notes (at 27 n.13) that, in a footnote in its Felzen brief, it referred to “a settlement that has yet to be proposed or accepted. 16 result of “further consideration” (id.) but the real reason is transparent. In Felzen, the Solicitor General spoke on behalf of the S.E.C. as a regulating entity. Because the decision in this case will apply to all civil litigation, the Solicitor General now advances the government’s interest as a class action defendant as “a named party in numerous class actions brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23” (Br. 1) because the decision in this case will apply to all civil litigation. With respect, petitioner submits that the views expressed by the government’s F elzen brief, which were unadorned with its own litigating self- interest, are more well founded. The government, unable to find any statutory basis for arguing that class members who are already “parties to the suit” (American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974)) must nevertheless intervene, latches on to the 1966 amendments to Rules 23 and 24, which it claims (at 14) “establish intervention as the mechanism by which non-named ata ae eh biceiee eee iee their interests * * *, including with respect to appeals.” Not so. Rule 24 does not mention Rule 23 class actions, let alone suggest that class action settlements may be appealed only by a Rule 24 intervenor. For its part, Rule 23 mentions intervention only with respect to class members who may wish “to intervene and present claims and defenses.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) (emphasis added). As explained in petitioner’s opening brief, that is the principal purpose of Rule 24 intervention: to allow interested persons to litigate claims and defenses that they believe are not being adequately advanced by the named litigants. Objectors such as petitioner seek no such right.'? But its position in Felzen was not limited to intervention prior to the submission of a settlement. Indeed, the case cited by the government in that footnote — American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) — Stands squarely for the proposition that unwarranted intervention requirements should not be imposed because they simply result in unnecessary collateral litigation. ? Seeking to fit within the scheme of Rule 24, the Solicitor General States that the objector’s motion to intervene should include “notice 17 After claiming (at 12) that the “Federal Rules” “[s)pecify” intervention as the avenue for appeal, the government relies not on the text of the Rule itself, but rather on two snippets from the 1966 Advisory Committee Notes, neither of which have anything to do with the question presented here. The Note to Rule 23(d)(2) — a Rule which concerns supplemental forms of court-ordered notice to the class — states that a class action notice may “encoviage interventions to improve the representation of the class” (emphasis added). Like the Rule itself, that statement in the Note plainly pertains to intervenors who (unlike objectors such as petitioner) wish to litigate the underlying action as representative parties, and thus the purpose of intervention is to allow a class member to take over the litigation. The same is true of the Note to Rule 24(a)(2), which provides that intervention is appropriate when a trust beneficiary can show that the current trustee is an inadequate representative, and that “similarly a member of a class should have the right to intervene in a class action if he can show the inadequacy of representation of his interest by the representative parties before the court.”"* Without any support in (or even citation to) the text of Rules 23 or 24, the government turns to case law, which it claims pleading stating his claims or defenses” as required by Rule 24(c). However, an objector is not pursuing “claims or defenses” different from the other class members, but instead seeks only to defeat the class settlement, which simply underscores that the Rule’s drafters did not contemplate Rule 24 intervention as procedural prerequisite for objector appeals. ‘3 Moreover, if intervention were the method contemplated by the drafters for class members to challenge a class settlement on appeal, that would effectively reduce the merits of the class settlement to one issue — adequacy of representation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(aX4), 24(a)(2). However, there are many other legitimate bases for overturning a class settlement or its fees component on appeal. See, ¢.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Litig., 5S F.3d 768 (CA3), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995) (settlement’s benefits not fair exchange for release of class members’ claims); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 132 F.3d 1147 (CA6 1998) (excessive attorney's fees). 18 supports the proposition that class members who object to an settlement must intervene to continue their objections in the court of appeals, relying chiefly (at 17) on United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). In that case, the district court had denied class certification in a Title VII gender discrimination action. As a result of that ruling, the non-named plaintiffs were not parties to the action and would not be bound by any subsequent judgment of the court. See supra. Thus, at that juncture, intervention was the only means for the unnamed class members to participate further in the litigation (if the class representatives did not take further action), because their legal interests had been formally excluded from the litigation. The sole question before this Court was whether a member of the uncertified class, who sought to intervene after judgment to appeal the district court’s denial of certification, was a timely intervenor, and the Court held that she was. Petitioner’s situation is exactly opposite to that of the putative appellant in United Airlines: Rather than being ousted from the litigation, the district court’s decisions in this case certifying the class and approving the class settlement confirmed petitioner’s party status and that he would be bound by the judgment just as assuredly as would the named plaintiffs. Thus, intervention would be redundant; it would merely corroborate a status that petitioner had already attained. Just as important, no provision of the Rules permits a district court to undertake, as the government proposes (at 28), to choose between potential objector appellants or otherwise screen out objectors. Rule 24 permits intervention; once -anted, the intervenor has a categorical right to appeal. Rule 23(d), on which the Solicitor General relies, lists a number of devices the district judge may do to manage class actions, but all of them relate to the district court proceedings, and none of them approach forbidding a class member from appealing. And the government’s proposed approach to intervention invites the pernicious possibility that the objector “chosen” by the district court will not advance certain arguments favored by those objectors who were “rejected” by the district court, or worse still, will settle or voluntarily dismiss the appeal (see Fed. R. 19 App. P. 42; Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 1 (CAI 1999), cited in U.S. Br. 28 n.12), leaving the non- appealing objectors subject to a settlement that they regard as unfair or unlawful, and which they were denied the opportunity to appeal. Moreover, the examples given by the government as a basis for interposing the district court as appellate gatekeeper make no sense. Each posits a situation in which the objector does not have standing to challenge the settlement even in the district court, such as when the objector is not, in fact, a class member or is not entitled to settlement relief. If the defect in the objector’s standing can be discerned at all, it will have already become apparent during the course of the Rule 23(e) fairness hearing process. Any dispute over the objector’s status will be resolved at that earlier stage, not in the context of a motion to intervene for the purpose of appeal. The government’s supposed concerns rest on a view of class action litigation that is totally imagined. Thus, the Solicitor General does not (because he cannot) cite a single case suggesting either that any of his concerns ever arise in practice, or that intervention for the purpose of appeal is an appropriate procedure for addressing those concerns. Nor does he cite a single court that has ever, in the history of the Federal Rules, adopted his proposal; petitioner is aware of none.'* The government claims that its intervention requirement would not pose a burden on objectors because the motion would be a formulaic request based on the objector’s obvious interest in taking an appeal from a settlement that the named plaintiffs favor. But, as the Solicitor General pointedly argued in Felzen (at 24), intervention is nothing more than an “unnecessary requirement.” The government (now in its role as a litigating defendant) ignores the burdens imposed by the intervention ‘4 As noted supra, the Seventh Circuit deems the intervention requirement entirely pro forma; the district court has no role in screening objectors’ motions to intervene, and certainly does not pick which objectors have a right to appeal or use intervention as a tool to determine class membership and the like, as the government now suggests. 20 requirement on objectors, on the istrict court (which must adjudicate the motions), and on the courts of appeals (because objectors will likely challenge a denial of intervention on appeal). The government’s position, like the respondents’, also ignores the fact that objectors are often pro se and will have no idea that they are expected to seek intervention to preserve their appellate rights.'° CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Fourth Circuit should be reversed. 'S The Eleventh Circuit in Guthrie v. Evans, upon which both respondents and the government rely, also supported its intervention requirement by stating that collateral attack — the filing of a separate, post- judgment lawsuit attacking the validity of the settlement — is a better alternative to appeal. 815 F.2d 626, 628 (1987). But that approach is unfair to class members and undermines the interests of the litigants and the courts in finality. As explained supra, an absent class member would be entitled to collaterally attack a judgment approving a class action settlement when due process was the basis for the attack, but would not be able to challenge the fairness of the settlement or other legal impediments that generally can be contested on direct review. That being the case, a collateral attack is a poor substitute for a direct appeal that can protect all of the absentees’ legal interests. See generally Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for ‘Adequacy’ in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 765, 780 & n.69 (1998) (hailing superiority of comprehensive direct review over collateral attack and criticizing intervention requirement as potential impediment to appellate review). Moreover, regardless of the scope of collateral attack, it is generally preferable to have challenges to a class action settlement heard in the original forum, with direct appellate review, rather than to encourage each class member to file a separate suit, in a distant forum, challenging the res judicata effect of a previously entered class action judgment. BRIAN WOLFMAN PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP 1600 20th St., N.W. Washington, DC 20009 March 19, 2002 Respectfully submitted, THOMAS C. GOLDSTEIN (Counsel of Record) AMY HOWE GOLDSTEIN & HOwgE, P.C. 4607 Asbury PI., N.W. Washington, DC 20016 (202) 237-7543 ERIK S. JAFFE ERIK S. JAFFE, P.C. 5101 34th St., N.W. Washington, DC 20008 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0503%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.