# Opposition Brief — US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0450%3A03

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2002
- **Citation:** 535 U.S. 391

## Text

6 Supreme Geert. 98
g FILED |
: |
ö

No. 00-1250

IN THE —
Supreme Court of the United States

US AIRWAYS, IN.,
Petitioner,

V.

ROBERT BARNETT,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Wnt of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
William C. McNeill, III Todd Schneider
Claudia Center* SCHNEIDER, MCCORMAC
THE EMPLOYMENT LAW & WALLACE
CENTER, A PROJECT OF 1700 California Street
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Suite 340
OF SAN FRANCISCO San Francisco, CA 94109
1663 Mission Street (415) 440-3440

Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94103
(415) 864-8848

— —

Counsel of Record

Richard L. Davis Robert W. Rychlik
18161 North Timber P.O. Box 10847

Ridge Dnve Palm Desert, CA 92255
Surprise, AZ 85374 (760) 772-4737

(623) 544-0354

Attorneys for Respondent
ROBERT BARNETT

—

PETITIONER’S QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. Whether, as the en banc Ninth Circuit held below. the
ADA requires an employer to reassign a disabled
employee to a different position as a “reasonable
accommodation” even though another employee is
entitled to hold the position under the employer’ s
bona fide and established seniority system, or
whether, as other courts of appeals have held, the
ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement
does not compel an employer to disregard the rights
of other employees under its seniority policy.

2. Whether, as the en banc Ninth Circuit held below.
evidence of an employer's failure to engage in an
interactive process with a disabled employee to
identify reasonable accommodations precludes the
employer from obtaining summary judgment in an
ADA action, or whether, as other courts of appeals
have held, any failure on the part of the employer to
engage in such an interactive process is of no legal
consequence in determining whether the employer
violated the ADA.

il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PETITIONER’S QUESTIONS PRESENTED..................... i
OL ii
7 ———ůůů N
. — vi
,.. ——ꝛ 1
nnn crcecccccceccsscesessssessessesees 2
— ——— 5

L THE CIRCUITS ARE IN SUBSTANTIAL
AGREEMENT THAT A DISABLED EMPLOYEE
UNABLE TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL
FUNCTIONS OF THE CURRENT JOB MAY
SEEK REASSIGNMENT, EVEN IF THE
TRANSFER IS NOT EXPRESSLY PERMITTED
BY THE EMPLOYER’S OWN POLICIBG............ 7

A. There is No Material Dispute that
Modification of an Employer's Transfer
Policy May Be a Reasonable
a 9

B. The Only Exception That Has Developed in
the Case Law is When the Requested Transfer
is Barred by an Applicable Collective
Bargaining Agreement; Even Then, Such
Agreements Are Scrutinized Closely to
Determine Whether Any Provision in the
Agreement Would Permit the Transfer......13

2 Neither the Recent Dicta in EEOC v. Sara

Lee Corporation Nor the 1997 Obiter Dicta in
Foreman Justify this Court’s Intervention. 16

1. Further Development of the Case Law
Will Likely Resolve Any Differences
Between the Case-by-Case Analysis
Used by Most Circuits and the Fourth
Circuit's Dicta Suggesting a Per Se
—: , , , 17

2. Here. Unlike the Seniority Policy
Discussed in Sara Lee, the Employer's
Policy Had Been Unilaterally
Modified to Assign Vacancies
Regardless of Seniority, and Created
No Contract Rights; Additionally, the
Employer Presented No Specific
Evidence That Permitting Mr. Barnett
to Remain in the Position Would Be

THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS
REGARDING THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
AN EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN AN
INTERACTIVE PROCESS WITH ITS DISABLED
EMPLOYEE: THE CIRCUITS AGREE THAT
SUCH A FAILURE HAS NO INDEPENDENT
LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE, BUT IS RELEVANT
EVIDENCE OF AN EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO
QO ＋—— —j—ẽ— 22

— |
iv Vv
A. While an Employer's Failure to Engage in the | LIST OF APPENDICES
Interactive Process May Be Evidence
Relevant to the Question of Whether the Appendix A
Employer Failed to Provide Accommodation, In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
No Circuit Has Held that an Employer's Situng En Banc
Failure to Engage Constitutes an Independent June 22, 2000
eee 24 Reporter s Transcript of Proceeding
(from official audiotape)

B. The Opinion in Barnett Joins Several Circuits
Noting That Where a Plaintiff Has Identified
a Possible Accommodation, and Presents
Evidence that the Employer Failed to Engage
in an Interactive Process, Summary Judgment
BP IIIIIOD, cccsscssrescsscecseensvsmmemmncscens 25

2. There is No Conflict Among the Circuits that
Summary Judgment May Be Granted Against

Appendix B
Lawrence Deposition, Exhibit X
Appellee’s Excerpt of Record, p. Il

— —

an ADA Plaintiff Where No Possible
Accommodation Has Been Identified,
Regardless of Whether There is Evidence that
the Employer Failed to Engage 28
D yr. 7 29

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) ..... passim
Aldrich v. Boeing, 146 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998)........... 14
Allen v. Rapides Parish School Board, 204 F.3d 619

— 28
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th

Re Ly ee 8,9, 27
Barnett v. U.S. Air, 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)

— passim
Beck v. University of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir.

— 10. 23. 28
Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir

—— — —— 14
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 21
Bratton v. SSI Servs., 185 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1999)............ 8

Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir.

Bouzianis v. U.S. Air, Inc., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15470 D. Mass. Sept. 30, 1985). 20

Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.

vii

Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schs., 100

.. 23
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) ...........0.. 16
Cannice v. Norwest Bank lowa, 189 F.3d 723 (8th

. —ñ̃ —̃ —— Ä—Ä— 24
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-23 (1980). . 21

Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629 (6th Cir.
Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research
Center, 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998) 23

Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas
City, 214 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2000)............... passim

Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437 (Ist Cir. 1998) ....23, 26

Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu, 141 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998)
scenseilibinssscupasannoemeseosnosnenessonenecessosssenescseass 9, 11, 18, 27

Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (SthCir. —--

Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301
0 14. 15

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242-48 (1979)... . 21

Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999 ͥ 10

Vili

Deane v. Poncono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138 (3d

I.— — 23
Deas v. River West, 152 F.3d 471 (Sth Cir. 1998)............... 8
Donahue v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226

„ 24. 28
Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corporation, 120 F.3d 1222

. ee 11
Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 2007 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir.

— . ˙ 28
Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th

11% 10, 14. 15
E. E. O. C. v. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th

J — 11
E. E. O. C. v. MCI Telecommunications Com., 993 F.

Sump. T26 CD. AB. 0909.8 26
E. E. O. C. v. Sara Lee, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 268

lee 4) | passim
Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391 (7th Cir. 1994) . 10

Feliberty v. Kember Corp., 98 F.3d 274 (7th Cir.

ix
Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut, 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999)
— n passim
Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800
r 8, 13,17
Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, 212 F.3d 638
n 10, 17
Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3rd
C 7
Gile v. United Airlines, 213 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2000) 10

Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492 (7th Cir.

Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2000)...23, 26

Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685
. 9, 10, 23

Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Association,
F.3d —. 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2099 (9th
.... · x 25

Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation
District, 104 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1997)... 28

Jackan v. New York Department of Labor, 205 F.3d
e 11, 15, 28

x

Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506 (Ist

„ 1—. 24, 27
Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1997).............. 13. 15
Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261

I erticatiginicincaditainintaninincincnnninl 6
Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731 (Sth Cir.

— 23, 28
Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415 (3rd Cir. 1997)

—- 3 23, 28
Miller v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 107

hE Fe ee 23, 28
Moses v. American Nonwovens, 97 F.3d 446 (11th

a, 1—— . ˙ 24. 28
Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. District, 157 F.3d 1169

1 T—T—P—— 26
Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995) . 8,17

N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498
— 6

Norville v. Staten Island University Hospital, 196
929990 7. 16

Pritchard v. Southern Company Services, 92 F.3d
reer 7

xi

Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetary, Inc.,

, 6
Ross v. Indiana State Teachers Association, 159

F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1998). 28
Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962). . . 6
Salanger v. U.S. Air, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 427 (N.D.

e . a, 20
Smith v. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir.

ERNIE e. passim
Soto-Ocasio v. Federal Express, 150 F.3d 14 (Ist

D ! 24, 28
Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Public

Service Co., 263 U.S. 508 (1924). 6, 20
Steffes v. Stepan Company, 144 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir.

RRR aR caries ere eis SL ee 28
Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) 21

Stewart v. Happy Hermans Cheshire Bridge, Inc.,
117 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1997)... eee . 28

xii
Taylor v. The Principal Finance Group, 93 F.3d 155
KK 23
Terrell v. U.S. Air, 132 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 1998)............ 13
The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export Inc., 359 U.S.
—T—7———— 6-7
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
TK ea 15
United States v. City and County of Denver, 943 F.
Supp. 1304 OD. Colo. 1996) ... 12-13
Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Systems, 101
26000 ee 8, 18
Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282 (11th Cir.
— — 8. 24. 28
Willis v. Pacific Maritime Association, 108 F. 3d 282
Ge, BD ——— 14, 15
Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 1997)......14
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276 (1986)......21
Statutes and Regulations
U.S. C. S. Supreme Ct. R. 10—L.u——)eů]n.——9——.———.“)ê 5
20.169 04.!1!ñ!ñUñẽtüéñüñũV 7
I veccecsneenecrenesenemnenenecinintatimanennmananians 7

42 U.S.C. 6 18681 26

Xili

r 16
American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,

660 —̃ —— passim
r 7
JJ... hinscncnsccnscnitentrneuanisinnoninnasusiinenesenenites 9
WW ee 16
üer 7, 16
r 16-17
. 22
eee 20

Additional Authorities
S. Rep. No. 116, 10lst Cong. Ist Sess. (1989) 22
House Comm. on Educ. & Labor H.R. Rep. No.

485(I1), 101" Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) 7

29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(0) . . .. 8

E. E. O. C. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the ADA
(March 1, 1999), at 39; accord 29 C. FR. Pt. 1630, App. §
r 8. 11

2B Sutherland Construction § 51.02 at pp. 200-201
c 16

INTRODUCTION

Respondent Robert Barnett respectfully requests that
the Court reject the Petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari
for the following reasons: There is no material conflict in
the Circuits with regard to the questions presented. As to the
first question, the Circuits are in complete agreement that a
disabled employee unable to perform the essential functions
of the current position may seek a transfer as a reasonable
accommodation, so long as the transfer does not directly
contravene the bargained-for seniority provisions of a
governing collective bargaining agreement. Further, the
Circuits are in overwhelming agreement that such a transfer
may be an accommodation even when not expressly
recognized by the employer's own policies. Recent dicta
from the Fourth Circuit stands alone in suggesting a per se
rule against any transfer requiring a modification of an
employer's unilaterally adopted seniority policy. Moreover,
the Fourth Circuit position will likely be reconciled with the
majority view without the intervention or resources of this
Court.

As to the second question, the Circuits are in accord
that an employer's failure to engage in the interactive process
can be considered evidence relevant to whether the employer
failed to accommodate the disabled employee. Furthermore,
and despite the Petitioner’s allusions to the contrary, no
Circuit has held that an employer's failure to engage in the
interactive process states an independent cause of action.
Significantly, the Respondent in this matter has never
asserted, nor did the Ninth Circuit find, that the Petitioner's
failures with regard to the interactive process constitute a
claim regardless of whether a reasonable and effective
accommodation was available.

2

Additionally, the petition’s characterizations
notwithstanding, the Ninth Circuit simply did not rule that an
employer's failure to engage in the interactive process
reflexively bars summary judgment. Rather, the Ninth
Circuit ruled precisely the same as has every other Circuit
which has considered the question: Where the plainuff has
demonstrated that a possible accommodation existed, the
employer's failure to engage in the interactive process is to
be construed as additional evidence precluding summary
judgment. This is only logical and practical, as this
additional evidence bars any conclusion as a matter of law
that it was the employee's fault that the possible
accommodation was not implemented. Certainly, where the
plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a possible accommodation
existed, the employer's failure to engage will not bar
summary judgment on the defendant's behalf.

Finally, and importantly, the Ninth Circuit found
disputed issues of fact as to three possible reasonable
accommodations, only one of which would have required a
modification of the Petitioner’s seniority policy. Under these
circumstances, the Ninth Circuit's decision to reverse
summary judgment was clearly proper. Thus, for all of these
reasons, the petition should be denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
held that an employer is not automatically enutled to
summary judgment merely because the disabled employee
sought among other possible accommodations — a
reassignment that required a modification of the employer s
unilaterally adopted seniority policy. It concluded that
additional evidence is required before such an employer may
obtain judgment as a matter of law: “It would seem that the
seniority system without more should not bar reassignment.

3

A per se bar conflicts with the basic premise of the
ADA, which grounds accommodation in the individualized
needs of the disabled employee and the specific burdens
which such accommodation places on an employer.” Barnett
v. U.S. Air, 228 F.3d 1105, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc). Significantly, the court also found disputed issues of
material fact as to whether two other proposed
accommodations, not requiring modification of the
Petitioner’s seniority policy, would have been effective. Id
at 1116-17. In light of these specific facts, the court reversed
, Sara, Id.
at 1122.

As the record establishes, Respondent Barnett
successfully worked for the Petitioner U.S. Air for ten years
before he became disabled through an on-the-job injury. At
that time, Respondent transferred into a mailroom position
that effectively accommodated his disability. Two years
later, Respondent learned that he would be displaced from
this position through the application of Petitioner’s seniority
policy. This policy was not part of a collective bargaining
agreement; rather, it was contained in the 1992 Personnel
Policy Guide. Ironically, the Petitioner U.S. Air has argued
in past cases that this Personnel Policy Guide creates no
legally enforceable rights for employees.

After learning that he would be displaced from his
existing position, Respondent contacted the Petitioner in
August of 1992 and requested accommodations for his
disability, and suggested a modification of the seniority
policy to permit him to remain in the mailroom. As noted by

' Tellingly, in the oral argument, counsel for the Petitioner was asked
more than one dozen times whether the seniority policy created legally
enforceable contract rights. At no time did counsel provide an answer to
this question. Respondent's Appendix A at 26-29, 31-33, 40-41.

4

the en banc panel, “U.S. Air did not respond to Barnett for
five months,” and then only “informed Barnett that he would
be removed from the mailroom.” 228 F.3d at 1109. At that
time, the Respondent also suggested special lifting
equipment permitting him to perform the functions of a
cargo position, or restructuring of the cargo position. A
month and a half later, in March of 1993, the Respondent
summarily denied any and all of the requested
accommodations. “U.S. Air rejected all three of Barnett’s
proposed reasonable accommodations and offered no
practical alternatives. ... U.S. Air did not seek to have a
dialogue with Barnett but instead rejected his proposed
accommodations by letter.” 228 F.3d at 1116-17.

The court found disputed issues of material fact as to
each of the three accommodations requested by the
Respondent. First, as to the Respondent's request to remain
in the mailroom position, the court declined to accept that the
existence of a seniority policy unilaterally adopted by an
employer is, without more, a per se bar to a reasonable
accommodation reassignment. Id. at 1120. Instead, the
court required a “case-by-case fact intensive analysis” to
determine whether reassignment is required by the ADA. /d.
Here, the court perceived no specific evidence of hardship or
disruption. Id. Second, the court found that the requested
lifting equipment was another “potentially reasonable
accommodation.” Id. at 1116-17. Finally, as to the third
requested accommodation, the court found disputed issues of
material fact as to whether the proposed job restructuring
would have been an appropriate accommodation. Id. at
1117.

The court further held that employers who have
received a request for accommodation must engage in an
interactive process with employees to determine appropriate
accommodations. Wie join explicitly with the vast

5

majority of our sister circuits in holding that the interactive
process is a mandatory rather than a permissive obligation on
the part of employers under the ADA and that this obligation
is triggered by an employee or an employee s representative
giving notice of the employee’s disability and the desire for
accommodation.” Id. at 1114.

In short, the court held. tj his is not a case where it
is obvious that no modification could enable the employee to
perform the essential functions of a job or where the
employee has caused the process to break down. Given U.S.
Air's failure to engage in the interactive process, liability
would be appropriate if a reasonable accommodation would
otherwise have been possible. There remains conflicting
evidence in the record as to whether a reasonable
accommodation without undue hardship to the employer was
possible. Thus, a triable issue of fact exists on this issue.”
Id. at 1117.

The court’s ruling follows black letter principles of
ADA jurisprudence. Where triable evidence exists that any
of three proposed accommodations - only one of which
would have required a modification of the Petitioner’s
seniority policy - would have enabled the Respondent to
continue working, and that the Petitioner failed to engage in
appropriate interaction with the Respondent, it is proper and
unremarkable that summary judgment for the employer was
reversed. The petition should be denied.

ARGUMENT

Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,
but of judicial discretion. U.S.C.S. Supreme Ct. R. 10. A
petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for
compelling reasons. /d. Petitions for certiorari seeking
resolution of a purported conflict in the courts are granted

6

only “in cases where there is a real and embarrassing
conflict of opinion and authority between the circuit courts
of appeals.” V. LR. B. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S.
498, 502 (1951) (quoting Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western
Well Works, 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923)) (emphasis added);
see also Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetary, Inc.,
349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955). No such conflict exists here. There
is no holding by another court of appeals that creates any real
or intolerable conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
The Circuits are in substantial agreement as to the first
question proffered by Petitioner, and the conflicting dicta
from the Fourth Circuit will certainly be resolved by further
development of the case law without the intervention or
resources of this Court. Additionally, and contrary to
Petitioner’s brief, there is no conflict as to the second
question. Accordingly, the petition should be rejected.

Moreover, the ruling below found disputed issues of
material fact as to two accommodations unrelated to
Petitioner’s first question. It is plain that a Circuit court may
properly find unreviewable and triable issues of fact as to
whether lifting equipment or job restructuring would have
effectively accommodated an employee. Illt is not for this
Court to re-examine the evidence, and disturb [the court's]
findings.” Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 278
(1962). Furthermore, Petitioner’s brief is disingenuous at
best in its discussion at footnote 3 of the Ninth Circuit's
plain holding with regard to these additional reasonable
accommodations. See Southern Power Co. v. North
Carolina Public Service Co., 263 U.S. 508, 509 (1924)
Wie have pointed out the necessity for clear, definite and
complete disclosures concerning the controversy when
applying for certiorari.”). As the ruling below was clearly
appropriate as to the alternative accommodations, the
petition should be denied. See The Monrosa v. Carbon
Black Export Inc., 359 U.S. 180, 183 (1959) (“It appears that

7

in any event the respondent will be able to try its claim in the
district court.”).

I. THE CIRCUITS ARE IN SUBSTANTIAL
AGREEMENT THAT A DISABLED
EMPLOYEE UNABLE TO PERFORM THE
ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CURRENT
JOB MAY SEEK REASSIGNMENT, EVEN IF
THE TRANSFER IS NOT EXPRESSLY
PERMITTED BY THE EMPLOYER’S OWN
POLICIES.

In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), Congress announced its sweeping intention “to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The ADA expressly
includes “not making reasonable accommodations to an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability” as prohibited
employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). The
right to accommodations is a “key requirement” of the Act.
House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, H.R. Rep. No. 4850),
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1990). The ADA specifically
identifies “reassignment to a vacant position” as a reasonable
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); cf. 29 U.S.C. 88
791(g), 794(d) (reflecting 1992 amendments).

In light of the ADA’s express mandate, it is
unremarkable that the Circuit courts have universally
acknowledged that reassignment must be considered as a
possible accommodation for a disabled employee unable to
perform the essential functions of the current position.? The

* Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 785-86 (1st Cir. 1998);
Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1999);
Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc, 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3 Cir. 1998).
E.E.0.C. v. Sara Lee, 237 F.3d 349 (stating in dicta that even if

8

en banc ruling in Barnett only falls into rank with this
considerable line of cases. 228 F.3d at 1118.

That a reassignment is a possible reasonable
accommodation under the ADA does not create an unfettered
right. As clarified by the E. E. O. C. regulations and guidance,
reassignment to a vacant position is “the reasonable
accommodation of last resort,” which need only be
considered when an employee is not able to perform the
essential functions of his or her job even with
accommodations. E. E. O. C. Enforcement Guidance:
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
ADA (March 1, 1999), at 39; accord 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630,
App. § 1630.2(0); Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156
F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). An employer
need only transfer the employee to a position for which the
employee is otherwise qualified. Baert v. Euclid Beverage,
Lid., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). Further, the
employer is not required to “bump” other employees to
create a vacancy, or to create a new position for the disabled

employee disabled, reassignment required only when position is vacant);
Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 811 (Sth Cir. 1997),
cert denied, 522 U.S. 1115 (1998) (noting in dicta that even if employee
were disabled, his request for reassignment could not prevail because the
proposed transfer would violate the collective bargaining agreement);
Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471 (Sth Cir. 1998) (noting in dicta
that even if employee were disabled, she failed to identify an available
position); Bratten v. SSI Servs., 185 F.3d 625, 634 (6th Cir. 1999); Gile v.
United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996); Cravens v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir.
2000); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut, 188 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 1999); Smith
y. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Willis
v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 284 (11th Cir. 1997); Pritchard v.
Southern Company Services, 92 F.3d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir. 1996)
(permitting failure to transfer case to go forward), Aka v. Washington
Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); contra.
Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1995); but see Williams v.
Channel Master Satellite Systems, 101 F.3d 346, 350 & n.4 (4th Cir.
1996) (recognizing rea.signment as possible accommodation).

9

employee. Id. Ar r ployer need not convert

positions into permanent ones. Dalton v. Subaru - Isuxu
Automotive, 141 F.3d 667, 680 (7th Cir. 1998); Hendricks-
Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir. 1998)
Indeed, the Barmen court did not hold otherwise. |

The employer is not required to provide the
with the accommodation or transfer he — —
employer need only provide some effective accommodation
Baer. 149 F.3d 626, 633. “[W]hen an employee requests a
transfer as reasonable accommodation and the employer
offers alternative reasonable accommodation, which the
employee then refuses, the employer cannot be liable for
failing to reasonably accommodate the employee by not
transferring him to another position.” Gile v. United Airlines
95 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 1996). Finally, an employer need not
provide a transfer that imposes an undue hardship. 42

og § 12112(b)(S)(A). Barnett is in accord. 228 F.3d at

A. There is No Material Dispute that Modification of
an Employer's Transfer Policy May Be a
Reasonable Accommodation.

The Petitioner asserts that the ADA can nev
a deviation from an employer's own — 1
policies, and that this “principle” has been adopted by the
‘virtually all circuits.” Brief at p. 17. This statement is
misleading and plainly wrong. ¶ A] djustment or
modification of . . . policies” is expressly listed as a possible
accommodation in the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9\B)2

* Notably, the “principle” against policy modification asserted
Petitioner would eviscerate the — to — —
accommodation See Smith v. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1176. Any
accommodation could be deemed subject to the employer's voluntarily
adopted policies and therefore unavailing to the requesting employee.

10

An overwhelming majority of Circuit courts have
endorsed such modifications. These cases are legion:
Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 646
(Ist Cir. 2000) (“The company's apparent position that the
ADA can never impose an obligation on a company to grant
an accommodation beyond the leave allowed under the
company's own leave policy is flatly wrong under our
precedent.”); Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391, 1396 (7th Cir.
1994) (“reasonable accommodation may even include a
requirement that an employer alter existing policies or
procedures that it would not change for nonhandicapped
employees”); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d
1041, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1996) (provisions of union contract
may be modified so long as modification does not implicate
collectively-bargained seniority rights); Hendricks-Robinson,
154 F.3d at 694-700 (defendant's medical layoff and
reinstatement policy which excluded certain vacant jobs, and
which required “physical fitness” for new positions, did not
meet accommodation obligation); Gile v. United Airlines,
213 F.3d 365, 374 (7th Cir. 2000) (employee not required to
comply with United's bidding and competitive transfer
procedures) Beck v. Univ. of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th
Cir. 1996) (“employer must be willing to consider making
changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and
conditions”); Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 214
F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2000) (employer's internal
application procedure insufficient to provide accommodation
to employee who requested assistance in locating job within
the company); Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1134 (10th
Cir. 1999) (duty to reassign disabled police officers required
modification of employer’s policy against transferring

Fortunately, there is no need for the Court to clarify this basic analysis,
as the en banc panel properly ruled in Barnert that the employer’s policy
could be modified to effectuate an effective accommodation. 228 F.3d at
1118-20.

11

officers to Career Service positions, and employer’s request
for jury instruction that ADA simply requires equal
treatment was properly denied — An employer’s policy that
does not provide accommodations for non-disabled workers .
. . will not excuse the employer’s failure to reasonably
accommodate disabled workers.”).*

Of particular note are the en banc panels of the Tenth
and D.C. Circuits. These courts recognize the plain language
of the statute by holding that the accommodation duty is not
limited to simply making available existing policies of the
employer, but may require adjustments to these policies:

If the ADA requires [the employer] to reassign [the
employee], and [the employer) has the power to make
the reassignment without violating the CBA rights of
its other employees, [the employer] must make the
reassignment, and may not refuse to do so on the

See also E. E. O. C. Guidance at 41 (“If an employer has a policy
prohibiting transfers, it would have to modify that policy in order to
reassign an employee with a disability, unless it could show undue
hardship.”); Jackan v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 565
(2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to affirm the trial court on the grounds that the
civil service rules in effect would have prohibited the plaintiff's transfer,
and instead affirming on other grounds; cf. Duckett v. Dunlop Tire
Corporation, 120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1997) (court cited
employer's policy against transfers from management to production line,
but also noted that reassignment was barred by applicable collective
bargaining agreement and that plaintiff testified that he was unable to
work at all); E. E. O C. v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028-29
(7th Cir. 2000) (anti-discrimination laws may require employers to
change policies adopted for non-discriminatory reasons, but employer not
required to deviate from “consistent and honest” policy of selecting best
candidate for vacancy); Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679-680 (discussing in dicta
concept of “legitimate nondiscriminatory prerequisites,” and concluding
that employer not required to convert temporary, “light duty” positions
available persons with on-the-job injuries to permanent positions for
persons with disabilities).

12

grounds that it subjectively judges the CBA's
standard not to be satisfied.

[T]he word ‘reassign’ must mean more than allowing
an employee to apply for a job on the same basis as
anyone else.. Numerous courts have assumed
that the reassignment obligation means something
more than treating a disabled employee like any other
job applicant. -

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1303 n.25, 1304.

If the reassignment language merely requires
employer to consider on an equal basis with all other
applicants an otherwise qualified existing employee
with a disability for reassignment to a vacant
position, that language would add nothing to the
obligation not to discriminate, and would thereby be
redundant. [T]he reassignment obligation must
mean something more than merely allowing a
disabled person to compete equally with the rest of
the world for a vacant position.

[O}ther policies of an employer might have to be
subordinated to an employer’s reassignment
obligation under the ADA because to do otherwise
would essentially vitiate the employer’s express
statutory obligation.

Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164-65, 1176; see also United States v.
City and County of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 D.
Colo. 1996) (“If reassignment is only required where a
reassignment policy already exists for all employees, there

13

would be no need for the ADA to provide that it be available
for people with disabilities.”).°

Indeed, the plain wording of the statute belies the
Petitioner’s stance, and the en banc ruling below merely
joins this long and properly decided line of cases. “[A]
modification in workplace policy can be a reasonable
accommodation, absent undue hardship.” Barnett, 228 F.3d
at 1117-18. The employer’s “seniority system without more
should not bar reassignment.” Id.

B. The Only Exception That Has Developed in the
Case Law is When the Requested Transfer is
Barred by an Applicable Collective Bargaining
Agreement; Even Then, Such Agreements Are
Scrutinized Closely to Determine Whether Any
Provision in the Agreement Would Permit the
Transfer.

Concerning situations not pertinent here, Circuit
courts have constructed an exception to the right to a
reasonable accommodation transfer where the sought-after
vacancy is subject to the seniority provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement, and permitting the disabled employee
to fill the vacancy would conflict with the bargained-for
seniority nghts of other employees. Feliciano, 160 F.3d at
786-87; Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1997);
Foreman, 117 F.3d at 810; Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co.,

Modifications permitting an employee to transfer to a vacant position
and thereby avoid job loss and unemployment are not the “preferential
treatment” critiqued in Terrell v. U.S. Air, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir.
1998). In that case, the plaintiff sought a transfer to a particular, part-
time position, despite the fact that no such vacancy existed as all of those
jobs had been eliminated. The court noted that the plaintiff's argument
would give her a job while all similarly situated persons would be
unemployed. The Barnett decision does not conflict with this
conclusion.

14

138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051;
Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.
1995); Willis v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 236 F.3d 1160, 1162
(9th Cir. 2001), petition for ren g filed (Jan. 30, 2001);
Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1271 n.5 (10th Cir.
1998); Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301,
1306-07 (11th Cir. 2000). Under these cases, CBA seniority
rights have a special status, as they, like accommodation
rights, are protected by federal statutes. Ecxles. 94 F.3d at
1045. Accordingly, disabled employees who seek
reassignment into a position, but who are not next in line for
the job under the union contract, are in effect asking to
“bump” other employees who are contractually entitled to
the position. Because a reasonable accommodation can not
bump another, nondisabled employee, this type of transfer is
not permitted. There is no conflict with these cases

presented here.

However, at the same time, the courts of appeal have
attempted to reconcile union contracts with an employer's
statutory duty to accommodate, and therefore they closely
scrutinize collective bargaining agreements to determine
whether any provision permits the reassignment. See, e. g.
Kralik, 130 F.3d at 81, 83 (transfer might be reasonable
accommodation if union waives objection); Buckingham v.
United States, 998 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 1993)
(transferring employee with HIV would not violate union
agreement which permitted exceptions for “unusual
circumstances”); Willis v. Pacific Maritime Association, 236
F.3d at 1162 (rule that reassignment in violation of CBA not
required by ADA “is only applicable where there is a direct
conflict between the proposed accommodation and the
collectively-bargained seniority rights of other employees”);
Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997)
(reassignment is reasonable accommodation where not

expressly prohibited by collective bargaining agreement);

15

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1303 (“an interpretation of [CBA] section
14.5 which allows WHC to implement its ADA obligations
is distinctly preferred”); accord Jackson v. New York Dep't
of Labor, 205 F.3d 562 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that
provision in civil service rules permitted reasonable
accommodation transfers); Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1052 (limiting
holding to collectively bargained seniority rights, and
expressly declining to find that all provisions found in
collective bargaining agreements take precedence over the
ADA duty to reasonably accommodate.)

The Petitioner baldly asserts on page 16 that there is
no basis for distinguishing between a seniority system
established by a collective bargaining agreement and an
employer's voluntarily adopted seniority policy. This is not
the case. In virtually every decision discussing the
interaction between the accommodation duties required by
the ADA and the seniority rights established by collective
bargaining agreements, the stated rationale for the exception
relies upon the special nature of collectively bargained
seniority rights as protected by federal laws. “Collective
bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable
agreements between management and labor, lies at the core
of our national labor policy, and seniority provisions are
universally included in these contracts.” Eckles, 94 F.3d at
1048 (quoting Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 79 (1977)). In the words of the Third, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits, these rights have “a pre-existing special
Status in the law. Kralik, 130 F.3d at 82; Eckles, 94 F.3d at
1052; Davis, 205 F.3d at 1307. As the Ninth Circuit has
recently concluded, “[w]e are persuaded that it would be
improper to subject an employer to the Hobson's choice of
violating the ADA or the NLRA, or at least subjecting itself
to the threat of litigation under these statutes.” Willis, 236
F.3d at 1162.

16

By contrast, an employer's unilaterally adopted
seniority policy creates no federally protected rights for any
of its employees. Often such policies create no legal nghts
at all, whether under state or federal law. Moreover, they
can be withdrawn at any time.

C. Neither the Recent Dicta in E. ER. O. C. v. Sara Lee
Corporation Nor the 1997 Obiter Dicta in Foreman
Justify this Court’s Intervention.

There is no language in the ADA exempting
employers that have adopted senicrity policies from the duty
to provide reasonable accommodation. “(T]he meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language
in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
Congress was capable of drafting an exception for seniority
systems, as it did in Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h)(2000), but chose not to do so. Where a statute, with
reference to one subject contains a given provision, the
omission of such a provision from a similar statute is
significant to show that a different intention existed.” 2B
Sutherland Construction § 51.02 at pp. 200-201 (6th Ed.
2000).

Thus, where an employee has demonstrated that no
accommodation will permit continuation in the current job,
and there is the existence of a funded, vacant position for
which the employee is qualified, then the only statutory
defense is whether the proposed transfer would impose an
undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(2000); Norville
v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1999).
“Undue hardship” is an action requiring significant difficulty
or expense, with reference to the statutory and regulatory
factors. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10A)(2000); 29 C.F.R. §

17

1630.2(p). “Undue hardships are not limited to financial
impacts; the term includes accommodations that are unduly
extensive, substantially disruptive, or that would
fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business.”
Garcia-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 650.

In support of its request for certiorari, the Petitioner
relies heavily on the recent Fourth Circuit ruling in E. E. O. C.
v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2001). In Sara
Lee, the court of appeals suggested, in dicta, a per se rule
against transfers not authorized by the employer s seniority
policy. Id. at 354-55 (even if employee disabled, she is not
enutled to reassignment that would supercede employer's
senionty system); see also Foreman, 117 F.3d at 810 (even
if employee disabled, employer not required to provide
reassignment in violation of rights of other employees under
collective bargaining agreement. and “even if there were no
CBA in place,” employer not required to provide
reassignment). Despite the apparent conflict suggested by
the Fourth Circuit dicta, the dispute is rhetorical rather than
real: dicta simply does not create an intolerable conflict, and
further case law is likely to reconcile any differences. The
attention of the Court is not necessary.

1. Further Development of the Case Law Will

be Fourth Circuit was alone in its 1995 ruling that an employer need
not reassign an employee who is unable to meet the demands of his or
her present position. Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d at 284. One year later, that
Circuit recognized the error in its ways and stepped back from its solitary
position. See Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Systems, 101 F.3d at
350 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1996). As that Circuit has already demonstrated its
ability to reconcile its internal conflicts, there is no need for this Court to

18

As the Tenth Circuit has explained, also in dicta,
under particular facts a requested accommodation may
amount to a fundamental alteration of the employer's
business and is therefore not mandated by the ADA. Such
facts might include “a well entrenched seniority system
which, even though not rooted in a collecuve bargaining
agreement, is so well established that it gives rise to
legitimate expectations by other, more senior employees toa
job that the disabled employee might desire.” Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1176.

Under those circumstances, “[rlequiring an employer
to disrupt and violate any such well-established reasonable
expectations of seniority rights in order to favor a disabled
employee in a job reassignment could, at least under some
circumstances, constitute a fundamental and unreasonable
alteration in the nature of the employer s business. Id. |
(emphasis added). However, the mere adoption of a policy
is not enough: “An employer cannot, of course, convert its
responsibility to look into a broad range of jobs into a "
‘narrow band’ simply by adopting a ‘no transfer’ policy.
Id. at 1176 (quoting Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679).

Appropriately, the Tenth Circuits ruling proposes a
case-by-case, fact-specific analysis of whether a parucular
employment policy, including a non-collectively bargained
seniority policy, can bar a reasonable accommodation
transfer. The Barnett ruling endorses a similar case-by-case
analysis. [A] seniority system is a factor in the undue .
hardsh‘p analysis. A case-by-case fact intensive analysis is
required to determine whether any particular reassignment
would constitute an undue hardship to the employer. 228
F. zd at 1120. Such an individualized analysis substantially

19

reconciles the Fourth Circuit’s dicta in EE O C. v. Sara Lee
with the overwhelming majority view.’

Under the approach outlined by both Smith and
Barnett, the nature and terms of an employer’ s seniority
policy would be facts relevant to whether a reassignment in
violation of the policy would constitute an undue hardship.
One important factor is whether the seniority policy creates
legally enforceable rights, as do collective bargaining
agreements, and the corresponding possibility of litigation.
Alteration of such a policy under these circumstances may
impose undue hardship. For example, the Fifth Circuit has
noted that a reassignment in violation of a legally
enforceable city charter would constitute an undue hardship.
Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 699-700.

Similar considerations were highlighted in the Sara
Lee case. “To mandate that a company exempt workers from

” The establishment of any per se rules barring or authorizing a transfer is
antithetical to the structure and design of the ADA, which favors case-
by-case determinations. Contrary to the repeated mischaracterizations
found in Petitioner's brief, see pages 11, 14 and 15, the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling in Barnert did not create a per se rule that reassignment is always
required. Indeed, the opinion specifically rejected any per se rule one
way or the other. 228 F.3d at 1120 (We hold that reassignment is a

reasonable accommodation and that a seniority system is not a per se bar
to reassignment. However, a seniority system is a factor in the undue
hardship analysis.).

20

this long-standing policy would disrupt the legitimate
expectations of Sara Lee's longtime employees. It could
potentially expose the company to the threat of lawsuits by
disgruntied employees who were placed behind employees in
need of accommodation.” 237 F.3d at 355 (noting possible
claim of breach of implied contract based on employer's

policy).

In stark contrast, Petitioner’s seniority policy creates
no legally enforceable rights for U.S. Air's employees. Cal.
Labor Code § 2922 (California — a, 4
will”); Respondent's A dix at 26-29, 31-33, ;
— v. U.S. Air, Ine., NO. 84-3798-K, 1985 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15470, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 1985) (U.S. Air
successfully argued that “personnel policy guide” did not
create enforceable contract); Salanger v. U.S. Air, Inc., 611
F. Supp. 427 (N.D. N.Y. 1985) (same). Petitioner’ s footnote
6, stating that employer initiated policies, like collective
bargaining agreements, frequently create legal rights, is
remarkably contradictory to U.S. Air’s own stated position
that its policy does not create contract rights.

Another relevant factor is whether the policy has

been maintained in the same form over time, or if it has been
unilaterally amended by the employer. In the Sara Lee case,
the court noted that Sara Lee has maintained [its] policy for
at least thirty years, and it has been in its present form for the
last fifteen years.” 237 F.3d at 354. In the seniority policy
considered here, the Petitioner U.S. Air unilaterally amended
its seniority policy in 1993 - three years after th unendment

* Indeed, judicial estoppel should preclude the petition being granted.
Judicial estoppel “prevents a party from asserting a factual position in a
legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken by [the
party] in a prior legal proceeding.” Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201
F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2000). It is so here, and the petition should thus
be denied. See Southern Power Co., 263 U.S. at 509.

21

of the ADA by adding an exception for persons with
catastrophic illness or with family members with
catastrophic illness. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1121 n.11:
Respondent’s Appendix B at 1-2.

Also consistent with a case-by-case analysis would
be any factual evidence of disruption that likely would be
caused by the proposed reassignment.” In this matter, the
Petitioner has presented no evidence of disruption. To the
contrary, Mr. Barnett had successfully worked in his
mailroom position for two years with no identified hardship
to the defendant. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120-21. Moreover,
Mr. Barnett had more than a decade’s worth of faithful
service, became disabled in the course and scope of this
service, and was then subjected to an employer’ s
discretionary policy that operated to foreclose entirely a
critical accommodation. The disruption to his expectations
was severe, and the result was not the loss of a desired shift
or assignment, but the loss of his job.'°

In Daugherty, the city’s director of personnel not that plaintiff, a part-
time employee with only nine months of service, would supercede a full-
time employee with five years of service who had been waiting and
preparing for the position. 56 F.3d at 699. Similarly, in Sara Lee, the
court noted that the person filling the vacancy sought by the plaintiff had
20 years more seniority, and was displaced because a plant had closed.
persons with disabilities who can no longer perform their current
positions face imminent job loss, and not similarly situated to their non-
disabled co-workers who seek a transfer. This court has determined that
the denial of a possible future employment opportunity does not present
the same concern as the loss of an existing position. See, eg. Wygant v.
Jackan Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276, 282-83 (1986); Firefighters v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561, 574-76 (1984); Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979). While Petitioner emphasizes its concern for the expectations of
its nondisabled workers, Respondent holds a concurrent expectation that
his federal rights will be recognized and effectively enforced. Cf. Beli v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242-
48 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-23 (1980).

22

Under the prevailing case-by-case analysis adopted
by the Ninth Circuit below, some factual record that included
an employer s seniority policy might well support a finding
of undue hardship or fundamental alteration, such that
reassignment was not appropriate or required. However, the
Ninth Circuit concluded as it may that on this record, triable
issues remain. The petition should be rejected.

II. THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS
REGARDING THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF AN EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO ENGAGE
IN AN INTERACTIVE PROCESS WITH ITS
DISABLED EMPLOYEE: THE CIRCUITS
AGREE THAT SUCH A FAILURE HAS NO
INDEPENDENT LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE, BUT
IS RELEVANT EVIDENCE OF AN
EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO
ACCOMMODATE.

“[ T]he reasonable accommodation requirement is
best understood as a process in which barriers to a particular

individual's equal employment opportunity are removed.” S.

Rep. No. 116 101st Cong. Ist Sess. 33 (1989). “To
determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may
be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal,
interactive process with the qualified individual with a
disability in need of the accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(0)(3). “A problem-solving approach should be used
to identify . . . possible accommodations that will result in a
meaningful equal opportunity for the individual with a
disability.” S. Rep. No. 116 at 33.

The employer's participation is critical, particularly
where the most suitable accommodation may be
reassignment. This is because the employee usually
possesses incomplete, and often inaccurate, information

23

about the options available, including the existence of
appropriate vacancies. See, e.g., Mengine v. Runyon, 114
F.3d 415, 420 (3 Cir. 1997); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.
Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 316 (3 Cir. 1999); Bultemeyer v. Fort
Wayne Community Sch.s, 100 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (7th Cir.
1996); Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483,
486-87 (7th Cir. 1997); Smith, 180 F.3d at 1173; Aka, 156
F.3d at 1304 n.27.

The overwhelming majority of circuits have stated
that once an employee requests accommodation, the ADA
imposes an obligation upon both sides to engage in an
interactive process to identify and implement an effective
accommodation. “Once an employer knows of an
employee's disability and the employee has requested
reasonable accommodations, the ADA and its implementing
regulations require that the parties engage in an interactive
process to determine what precise accommodations are
necessary.” Beck, 75 F.3d at 1137. At least one circuit has
opined that the process, while advised, is not mandated.
Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 448 (11th
Cir. 1996).'* However, regardless of whether or not the
interactive process is characterized as required or advised,

'' Grenier v Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 677 (Ist Cir. 1995);
Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1998); Mengine, supra
at 419; Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist. 184 F.3d at 312-313, 317;
Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (Sth Cir.
1996); Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 735-36 (Sth Cir.
1999); Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Center, 155 F.3d
775, 783-784 (6th Cir. 1998); Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523
(7th Cir. 2000); Hendricks-Robinson, 154 F.3d at 693; Beck, 75 F.3d at
1135-1136; Feliberty v. Kember Corp., 98 F.3d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 1996);
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285-1286; Fjellestad 188 F.3d at 952, Smith,
180 F.3d at 1172.

fe interactive process is also endorsed as an inexpensive form of
mediation designed to avoid litigation. Deane v. Pocono Medical
Center, 142 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d at 316 n.6.

24

the identifiable rules regarding this issue are identical
throughout the Circuits.

A. While an Employer's Failure to Engage in the
Interactive Process May Be Evidence Relevant to
the Question of Whether the Employer Failed to
Provide Accommodation, No Circuit Has Held
that an Employer's Failure to Engage Constitutes
an Independent Basis of Liability.

The courts are unanimous that an employer's failure
to engage in the interactive process may be evidence relevant
to the question of whether the employer failed to provide
accommodation. See, e. g., cases cited in foomote 11, ante.
However, no court — including the Ninth Circuit in this case
has held that an employer's failure to engage constitutes an
independent basis of liability. Rather, those courts which
have considered the question directly have expressly rejected
any separate cause of action for an employer's failure to
engage. See, e.g., Soto-Ocasio v. Federal Express, 150 F.3d
14, 19 (Ist Cir. 1998) (plaintiff's assertion that employer
failed to engage in meaningful interaction “is of no moment”
where plaintiff not qualified); accord Donahue v. Consol.
Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2000); Rehling v.
The City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (7th Cir.
2000); Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1021; Cannice v. Norwest Bank
Iowa, 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1999); Fjellestad, 188
F.3d at 952; Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d at 285; Moses,
97 F.3d at 448; see also Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96
F.3d 506, 513 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding jury verdict against
employee on failure to accommodate despite plaintiff's
allegations of employer's failure to engage).

Moreover, Respondent did not claim failure to engage in the
interactive process as a separate cause of action regardless of possible
accommodation, nor is this a case where Respondent has failed to
identify a possible accommodation:

25

Thus, the Petitioner's brief is again incorrect on page
22, where it suggests that there is a conflict among the
circuits as to whether an employer's failure to engage can
constitute an independent violation. There is no such
conflict.

B. The Opinion in Barnett Joins Several Circuits
Noting That Where a Plaintiff Has Identified a
Possible Accommodation, and Presents Evidence
that the Employer Failed to Engage in an

Interactive Process, Summary Judgment is
Inappropriate.

The Court in Barnett ruled that where the plaintiff
presented evidence of the employer's failure to engage in the
interactive process despite the employee's request, and the
presence of a possible effective accommodation, summary
judgment is inappropriate. “We hold that employers, who
fail to engage in the interactive process in good faith, face
liability for the remedies imposed by the statute if a
reasonable accommodation would have been possible. We
further hold that an employer cannot prevail at the summary
judgment stage if there is a genuine dispute as to whether the
employer engaged in good faith in the interactive process.”
228 F.3d at 1116 (emphasis added); Humphrey v. Memorial
Hospitals Association, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2099, at *32
(9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2001) (“Given MHA's failure to engage in
the *nteractive process, liability is appropriate if a reasonable
accommodation without undue hardship to the employer
would otherwise have been possible,” citing Barnett.

be various judicial references to “split(s]” and “conflicts” cited by
the Petitioner have undoubtedly created a perception of divergent views.
A closer examination, however, reveals that the substantive analysis is
consistent throughout the Circuits, as described herein.

26

This ruling concurs with decisions from several other
Circuits which have held that summary judgment is
inappropriate where the disabled employee has shown that
the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the
employee in seeking accommodation, and that the employee
could have been reasonably accommodated but for the
employer's lack of good faith efforts to accommodate. Taylor
v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d at 318-319; Cravens, 214
F.3d at 1021; Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952; see also Criado,
145 F.3d at 444 (Ist Cir. 1998)."°

An employee who cannot demonstrate a possible
accommodation does not benefit from the rule: “The
employee still carries the burden of showing that a particular
accommodation. would have made the employee
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job.”
Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 954 (citing Taylor v. Phoenixville
Sch.): see also Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1113 n.3 (plainuff “bears
the initial burden of showing that the suggested
accommodation would, more probably than not, have
resulted in his ability to perform the essential functions of his
job”) (citing Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d
1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998), and at 1116 (citing Fjellestad
and Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.); Hansen v. Henderson, 233
F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 2000). The Petitioner's brief neglects
to mention this key requirement.

As the Seventh Circuit recently explained, in those
cases precluding summary judgment, the claims were “(not]
based solely on the employer's failure to engage”; instead,
the courts “found potential liability based on an employer's

'S The Petitioner's argument that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a somehow
demonstrates a Congressional intent that courts must disregard the
interactive process during the liability phase of litigation has been
implicitly rejected. EE O. C. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. 993 F.
Supp. 726 n.10 (D. Az. 1998).

27

failure to engage in an interactive process in circumstances
where the plaintiff alleged that the result of that breakdown
was the employer's failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation.” Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d
1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Baert, 149 F.3d at 634
(summary judgment improper where plaintiff identified
potential vacancies, and produced evidence disputing who
was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive
process); Dalton, 141 F.3d at 677 (summary judgment
improper where plaintiffs offered evidence of possible
accommodations, and of the employer's failure to engage).
Under these circumstances, there are simply disputed
material questions of fact regarding whether the employer
failed to accommodate the employee.

While not every Circuit has considered the question,
none has ruled that summary judgment is somehow
appropriate where a plaintiff has presented evidence both of
possible accommodation and of the employer's failure to
engage. Accordingly, there is no conflict requiring this
Court's attention.

'° Similarly, where the plaintiff proves at trial that the interactive process
would have made the difference, the employer faces liability. Jacques, 96
F.3d at 515 (“There may well be situations in which the employer's
failure to engage in an informal interactive process would constitute a
failure to provide reasonable accommodation that amounts to a violation
of the ADA.”). The Petitioner's characterization of the 1996 Jacques
dicta in footnote 10 is unpersuasive. The Jacques panel considered a
plaintiff s appeal of a jury verdict, and concluded that there was no
discrimination as a matter of law for the defendant's purported failure to
engage, because the jury could have reasonably concluded that any such
failure did not cause a failure to accommodate, in that there was evidence
that the proposed transportation accommodation was not necessary and
the proposed scheduling accommodation would eliminate an essential
function. In light of that context, the dicta only means that liability may
— —— GENT Gd GNSS
termined by the jury in Jacques - the failure to en
made the difference. N *

28

C. There is No Conflict Among the Circuits that
Summary Judgment May Be Granted Against an
ADA Plaintiff Where No Possible Accommodation
Has Been Identified, Regardless of Whether There
is Evidence that the Employer Failed to Engage.

There is no conflict among the Circuits that summary
judgment may be granted against an ADA plaintiff where no
possible accommodation has been identified, regardless of
whether there is admissible evidence that the employer failed
to engage in the interactive process. Soto-Ocasio, 150 F.3d
at 19 (failure to engage of no moment” where plaintiff
undisputable not qualified); accord Mengine, 114 F.3d at
420-21; Donahue, 224 F.3d at 234; Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola
Company, 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999); Willis v.
Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d at 285; Moses, 97 F.3d at 448; Earl
v Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 2000),
see also Jackan, 205 F.3d at 566 (plaintiff bears burden of
providing that an accommodation exists that permits her to
perform the job's essential functions); Allen v. Rapides
Parish Sch. Board, 204 F.3d 619, 622 (Sth Cir. 2000)
(employer's failure to engage does not create liability where
employer provided reasonable accommodation).

'7 Conversely, summary judgment against an ADA plaintiff may be
appropriate where it is undisputed that the plaintiff caused the breakdown
in the interactive process. See Loulseged, 178 F.3d at 740; Beck, 75 F.3d
at 1136: Ross v. Indiana State Teacher's Association, 159 F.3d 1001,
1016 (7th Cir. 1998); Steffes v. Stepan Company, 144 F.3d 1070, 1072
(7th Cir. 1998); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge Inc. 117
F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Miller, 107 F.3d at 486
(summary judgment affirmed where plaintiff stated she was not
interested in vacant positions for which she was qualified); Hunt.
Golliday v Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004, 1013
(7th Cir. 1997) (summary judgment affirmed where plaintiff failed to
request accommodation). There is no conflict among the Circuits as to

29

Thus, the Petitioner's brief is again incorrect at
22, where it suggests that there is conflict among the cheits
as to whether an employer's failure to engage at the time of
the events in question eliminates the plaintiff's subsequent
burden, during litigation, to identify and establish a possible
accommodation that would have effectively permitted the
plaintiff to perform the position's essential functions. No
court of appeals has so held, and there is no such conflict.
The en banc opinion in Barnett certainly does not create such
a conflict: the plaintiff in this matter established multiple
possible effective accommodations.

CONCLUSION

There is no real conflict as to the uestions presen
and there are additional and — grounds for 1
lower court's decision. For all of the reasons stated herein
the petition should be denied. ;

Dated: March 3, 2001 Respectfully submi

Claudia Center
Counsel of Record

For Respondent
Robert Barnett

'* Contrary to the Petitioner’s brief at 9, the ruli j

* . — de

eliminate the plainuff i — —
accommodation; the discussion cited related to the burdens of the parties
at the time that the employee requests accommodation. In that context,
it would make little sense to insist that the employee must have arrived
at the end product of the interactive process before the employer has a
duty to participate in that process.” Barnert, 228 F.3d at 1113. The same
passage cites Buckingham, 998 F.2d at 740 and Mustafa, 157 F.3d at
1176 for the proposition that the plaintiff bears the burden during
litigation of showing possible accommodation. 228 F.3d at 1113 n.3.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

In the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, Sitting En Banc
June 22, 2000
Reporter’s Transcript of Proceeding
(from official audiotape)

THE COURT: So ladies and gentlemen, time set for
the hearing of Barnett vs. [unintelligibie] for employment
opportunity information and U.S. Air. The EEOC is amicus
curiae [unintelligible] party. Let's hear from the appellants.

MR. WHITEMAN: Good morning, distinguished
Chief Judge and distinguished circuit judges. May it please
the Court. I am Bob Whiteman, and I represent
Mr. Bob Barnett, the plaintiff appellant in this case.

THE COURT: I should mention -- sorry, I would
have [unintelligible] -- that we have two of our judges who
are joining us on the telephone. Judge Gregorson and
Judge Fletcher. And I, before we start I want to make sure
that they are with us.

JUDGE FLETCHER: Well I'm here, Judge Fletcher.
And I can hear everything.

THE COURT: All right. Judge Gregorson? Not
here.

A MALE VOICE: Harry, where are you?

THE COURT: You can be seated if you like. You
don’t have to stand until we get the connect. We had -- we
had both judges on hold. Something happened.

A MALE VOICE: We were here for unintelligible}.

THE COURT: Mr. Clerk, I presume we do have
someone that’s going to be reconnecting us?

THE. CLERK: Yes.

THE COURT: Judge Gregorson?

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 2

A MALE VOICE: [Unintelligible}.

JUDGE FLETCHER: Judge [unintelligible]?

THE COURT: Yes, Judge Fletcher.

JUDGE FLETCHER: We're back, I think.

THE COURT: Judge Gregorson, are you with us?

JUDGE GREGORSON: Im back.

THE COURT: All right. Good. All right, we'll
proceed to hear from the appellant.

MR. WHITEMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

The appellant is urging that the matter be reversed
and remanded for three essential reasons.

Number one, that the case in its present configuration
by the decision of the appellate majority panel is tantamount
to applying a per se rule of exclusion for seniority systems,
bounded by seniority systems, and linking them directly with
the same level of per se analysis totally attributable only to
collective bargaining agreements where there are contractual
rights.

Secondly the appeilant urges that the case as it
presently stands allows a company to completely disregard
any responsibility for engaging in an interactive process.

And thirdly, I do believe that because of the various
illustrations in the record of modified disputes of essential
facts in the motion for summary judgment, that this case
now represents a destructive position regarding the high bar
that this court has normally reserved for employment
discrimination cases.

It is clear that when the appellant in this case
established through his affidavits and declarations what
occurred chronologically that he met all of the three
elements required for a case under the ADA as he brought it.
In particular, it was undisputed at the trial level that for
purposes of the summary judgment, Mr. Barnett was in fact
a qualified disabled employee.

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 3

Then we enter into a completely unrealistic
examination of what is a reasonable accommodation.
Reasonable accommodation cannot be an absolute
accommodation, but the case concluded that no matter what
Mr. Barnett would recommend to the company, the company
could merely hold its hands, disregard any obligations it had
to examine, to confer, to participate, and simply exclude him
under the shield of this unilateral seniority policy. It was not
a bargained-for seniority policy.

THE COURT: Why does that make a difference?

MR. WHITEMAN: It makes a difference because if
it is not a bargained-for seniority policy, but unilateral, that
means the company is required to participate in the
interactive process. If it’s not a seniority policy where
there’s contractual rights, and the company can unilaterally
make changes to it, all the more reason why it should
participate in reasonable accommodation.

It should enter into a way to find a way to keep the
employee working. The important --

A MALE VOICE: It seems to me you may be
interchanging two different concepts there. You've got the
association part off to one side, and it seems to me that
maybe there’s some overlap here. As I understand it, nine
circuits have held that there is no requirement to trump the
seniority system in these kinds of cases.

MR. WHITEMAN: Well, we have many words that
are used that are akin to a collective bargaining environment.
Comments like “trump” might do a lot of things. There's no
question but what the legislation requires employers to do
something, and the something may very well have an effect
where I’m going to adverse another employee.

A MALE VOICE: I’m just following up on the Chief
Judge’s question, which I think is quite pertinent here. Why
should the fact that the seniority system, which is in effect,
adopted by the company and followed so far as we know

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 4

completely, why should that make any difference that it is a
company-imposed rather than a collectively-bargained plan?
The -- in terms of the company operation it shouldn’t make
any difference.

MR. WHITEMAN: Well, it does make a difference,
because number one, it’s unilateral. In a collective
bargaining situation the two are dissimilar in the sense that
there are no absolute rights that the employees have that they
have contracted for.

A MALE VOICE: What does absolute mean as
compared to rights? I mean the other side tells us that this
seniority system does create rights enforceable in court.

MR. WHITEMAN: Well, I don’t know. It’s been
argued in the brief that U.S. Air was successfully argued in
another case a few years ago that their personnel policy
guide does not create any rights in the employees. They
successfully urged that.

So I think if you look at it, we have to realize that
personnel policies, if they’re unilateral, as admittedly it was
in this case, even though they say, please follow it, it is not
absolute because if they wanted to add a position, they
did, as they did in April of 1993.

If they want to set up the category, they do so, and it
is not contracted work, as they did with the emergency or
catastrophic illness policy.

If they want to change things, they can do so because
Barnett, you'll recall. only represented a mere 5 percent of
this particular work element of the Cargo Department. He’s
one employee. And when he bids, he doesn’t bid like a
collective bargaining unit, he bids for himself. He bids for

shift and base [unintelligible] and the supervisor assigns
specific duties.

So in that sense it’s not the same as the kind of
policy where we’re worried that, gee, now the ADA comes

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 5

in, we ve got these clear rights that are contracted for and
somehow we re going to go trump them.

A FEMALE VOICE: Well, Counsel, one thing that’s
a little different here that is like collective bargaining,
different from other cases. It is like a collective bargaining
agreement, is that they’re -- in established seniority system,
there’s someone else who otherwise would -- would rely on
getting a position by virtue of seniority. So that this -- so
that your client, in effect you’re arguing, would bump
someone else.

And what I’m wondering is, are there any cases
under this statute that suggest that bumping someone else
is -- must be done by the employer for it to be a reasonable
accommodation?

MR. WHITEMAN: The cases that I’m aware of have
prohibited that only when it flows out of a collective
bargaining agreement where there are contracted rights. The
[unintelligible] and so forth say, well, if you’ ve got one of
those, that there’s nothing in the ADA that we can see that
mandates we can allow bumping.

7 On the other hand, bumping or taking another
position, is very interesting when applied to this case
because there are so many other alternatives that the
company refused to participate in. He wanted to stay. He
didn’t want to bump anybody.

And they says: Well, we decided now we’re going to
open it up for bid and you have to go.

He’s there for two years doing the same thing. Then
they say gratuitously: Well, we created another position for
you for five months. That’s part of our, quote, you know,
interactive process or reasonable accommodation.

It meant nothing of the kind. He just happened to
Stay there.

In addition to that, when Mr. Barnett asked for
consideration for a couple of other reasonable things. And

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 6

then I want to mention here is something that really -- I think
it’s important for the whole effectiveness of the ADA. And
that is it’s a vehicle to make adjustments to retain skilled
workers.

He’s got ten years in the company, so he’s got rights
and U.S. Air’s going to deal with him in the California
version of good faith [unintelligible] dealing. He’s going to
have an opportunity to suggest; they’re going to have an
opportunity to participate. .

They say: No. If you want expert equipment or
something, we summarily say that if you nse the word
“robotic,” we re going to claim that that’s somehow high
tech, too expensive, and we can’t afford it.

A MALE VOICE: Is he still an employee of the
company?

MR. WHITEMAN: He is not.

THE COURT: You hesitate.

MR. WHITEMAN: Well, it’s a categorization
problem. He doesn’t get paid and he doesn’t get any
benefits, and he’s in like a limbo status where he has --

A MALE VOICE: The other side says he’s still an
employee and he hasn’t exercised his opportunities to bid on
any other jobs, and that when asked if he would move to
another station he said no.

MR. WHITEMAN: That is -- that is incorrect, Your
Honor, and the record -- the record clearly says that before
he got this famous -- I don’t know how the panel
characterized it -- but this request to go to a meeting on
January 20" of 1993, where he was informed that he was out

for three days. Two days before, he had bid for a job in the

Cargo Department.

Now they’re not listening to his request for assistance

and to find an accommodation. They’re simply saying, you
want to go back there, but your doctor says you have a

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 7

lifting restriction. We’re not going to examine that. You
can’t go back there.

He bid before he was kicked out. And when less
senior people were there. So he tried to use the system, too,
and they just says, no, you can’t do that.

A MALE VOICE: Well, was he asked if he was
willing to go to another station and did he say no through
counsel?

MR. WHITEMAN: No, that is absolutely incorrect,
and he met that in his declaration.

And here’s what occurred very simply: He was
characterized by the attorney for the corporation, Mr. Comb,
saying he had heard an out-of-court statement that he was
trying to incorporate in his statement as being factual that
somehow the EEOC officer talked to Barnett, and Barnett
Says, well, I don’t want to go anywhere and I won’t go
anywhere. And that is not true. And he met that with his
declaration.

Otherwise --

A MALE VOICE: Is this - I’m sorry. Is this case
like Buckingham in your view?

MR. WHITEMAN: I don’t know if it’s quite like
Buckingham because it’s a new situation where we have to
show through reasonable efforts to take an employee who
has identified specific accommodations in a so-called
seniority system that’s unilateral, and he has to be met with

some kind of an effort on the part of the company. He must
have some kind of an effort. We say that the reciprocity was
not there.

A MALE VOICE: Well, if I remember Buckingham
correctly it said the seniority system in that case was
different because it accommodated various options, and so
it’s not a locked-in seniority system.

And I sort of take your argument here as saying
because this isn’t bargained-for in a collective bargaining

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 8

setting, that it’s open to the company to do what it wants
with the system. And it's kind of like Buckingham s
seniority system, isn’t it?

MR. WHITEMAN: But in Buckingham, the
Buckingham case stands for a narrow proposition that I
would worry about for the effectiveness of the ADA being
implemented to this extent. That if you’ve got a seniority
system, and even if it’s unilateral like we have, then a
company like U.S. Air would say: Well, Buckingham says,
unless can show me a lot of exceptions, then you can’t even
come in and get assistance under ADA in a unilateral
situation.

So Buckingham -- I would not want this court in
these western states to say: You've got to have a seniority
system with the most exceptions and then we'll let you
vindicate your rights under ADA. I don’t think that’s --

that’s too narrow.

A MALE VOICE: What's the rule? We have to
write a rule that people can follow out there in the real world
of employers and employees. What’s the rule that you
would have us write in connection with the ADA and
seniority systems?

MR. WHITEMAN: I think if the seniority system is
unilateral, like it is here, because obviously if this case
continues to go against Barnett, then companies are going to
come up with all kinds of, quote, seniority policies, and
they Il have to worry about ADA any more.

But here’s what I would like. I would require the
same stricture for having a qualified injury. I would write
the same stricture for having the disabled employee identify.
He’s able to do that. Keep the onus on him as part of his
case. Identify, and make it specific.

If it’s reasonably specific, that’s kind of like a trior of

fact problem, I understand, then have the company be under
responsibility for communication.

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 9

And we've got so many badges of circumstantial
evidence here --

A MALE VOICE: But what’s the rule on seniority
systems? How do they play in -- in the process? The
unilateral, they’re out. You don’t pay any attention to them
at all?

MR. WHITEMAN: No. With seniority systems --
even what --

A MALE VOICE: It sounds to me that you just said
even if it’s a seniority system, that if it’s unilateral, you
don’t pay any attention to it at all. Did I hear you wrong?

MR. WHITEMAN: Well by distinguishing a
seniority system imposed by the company alone and a
seniority system --

A MALE VOICE: Yeah, and that’s what I’m asking
about. I’m asking about.

MR. WHITEMAN: -- and a seniority system that’s
part of a CBA.

A MALE VOICE: We're not talking about CBAs
now. There's no CBA here. But the rule that I’m hearing

_ you asking -- that I hear you asking for is one that says you

can disregard the seniority system all together so long as it’s
unilaterally imposed. Is that the rule that you're asking?

MR. WHITEMAN: No, that is not the rule I’m
asking for, because if a seniority system has, who knows
what kind, and there are many variations of seniority
systems. It may be possible to do the variety of
accommodations that are indicated in the law for job
restructuring, a different kind of reassignment part time;
there’s a whole range of solutions to that.

A MALE VOICE: So you’ re saying if there's a
seniority system that has within it an accommodation for
something like this, then you have to use it.

But what if there’s one that says we do all of these
things based on seniority. That’s it, over and out. You’re

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 10

asking us to disregard that in connection with the AD -- to
say that’s irrelevant in connection with the ADA.

MR. WHITEMAN: If it’s a unilateral system I would
Say. yes.

A MALE VOICE: Okay, that's

THE COURT: Counsel -- excuse me.

JUDGE GREGORSON: This is Judge Gregorson.
Let me ask you a question, Counsel.

Have you thought about whether the existence of the
unilateral seniority system ought to be a factor to consider in
the reasonableness of the accommodation offered by the
employer? Have you thought about that?

MR. WHITEMAN: Yes. Yes, because reasonable as
far as I’m aware in the ADA confidential plan, reasonable is
not an absolute. So some consideration should have to bear
on the company’s attitude toward reasonable --

JUDGE GREGORSON: But what you're if I
understand what you’re saying is if you've got a collective
bargaining agreement, then the employee -- and the
employee is represented through the union -- and the
employer --they’ ve agreed on a deal.

And some of those collective bargaining agreements |
understand do have provisions for disabled employees.
That’s something the employees collectively have agreed to.

But if you have a -- a system that’s just created by
the employer, and that system doesn’t have that type of
accommodation in it for disabled employees, then the -- that
pure unilateral system, that doesn’t provide for an
accommodation, would then be a factor to consider in the
reasonableness equation? Is that what you’re saying?

MR. WHITEMAN: I think it would be a factor, but
that’s why this case illustrates the extreme difficulty of being
able to ascertain what’s taking place by the appellate level
when there is no duty to communicate and participate --

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 1)

JUDGE GREGORSON: Let me ask you this: Was
discovery taken here?

MR. WHITEMAN: Discovery was taken. It was not
closed. And all of the conflicted facts as indicated in our
briefs were adjudicated against the appellant.

JUDGE GREGORSON: So you mean you went to
summary judgment and you hadn't completed discovery?

MR. WHITEMAN: Correct.

JUDGE GREGORSON: Did you point that out to
the trial judge?

MR. WHITEMAN: In our briefing, I believe -- or in
our argument I believe we did.

JUDGE GREGORSON: Did you say: Your Honor,
can we have a continuance? We haven't completed our
discovery.

JUDGE FLETCHER: This is Judge Fletcher
speaking. If | understand this standard, accommodations are
to be adjusted and tried to be worked out. And only if the
employer finds that it's an undue hardship does he not have
to give the job placement or the accommodation. So it
seems to me one needs to think about hardship.

MR. WHITEMAN: Hardship generally follows after
there's an attempted reasonable accommodation, but even if
hardship is claimed, in contrast to what Oliver Lawrence,
who was responsible for the whole program said, I thought
they ruled it out immediately without an analysis on
hardship.

If hardship is claimed, it must be proven by specifics
depending on the size of the company, the resources
available, and so forth. It was not done in this case. Yet
they claimed hardship and the court so found.

A MALE VOICE: Could you clarify what standard
the plainuff has to meet here? Because I -- now I'm

confused.

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 12

The panel opinion says that the plaintiff must be able
to point to at least one specific reasonable accommodation
that was available to the employer. Do you quarrel with
that?

MR. WHITEMAN: No, absolutely not.

A MALE VOICE: So you think that’s in a that
states the prima facie burden that they have to meet.

MR. WHITEMAN: Part of it, yes, sir. He did three,
and all were rejected.

A MALE VOICE: But he has to -- he has to
identify -- because the EEOC talks about a plausible
alternative. You're -- you're comfortable with the
formulation that's in the panel opinion?

MR. WHITEMAN: A reasonable accommodation.
And I believe that's adjudicated by a trior of fact if there s a
dispute.

A MALE VOICE: The direct link --

MR. WHITEMAN: And the reserve --

A MALE VOICE: I don’t know how much -- just a
minute. I don’t know how much time we have left, but at
some point, I think you ought to address this Thompson vs.
Holy Family Hospital. And frankly, | don’t think your
supplemental brief on that was very strong. And if you can’t
get by Thompson, your client's not qualified under the ADA;
he's not disabled.

MR. WHITEMAN: May I respectfully reserve that
for my rebuttal?

A MALE VOICE: Fine.

MS. STAR: May it please the Court. My name is
Susan Star. | represent the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as amicus.

The American's With Disabilities Act does more
than require competition on an equal basis. It mandates
equal opportunity by requiring employers to take the
affirmative step of removing barriers to employment for

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 13

persons with disabilities. So that what results is a level
playing field. 7

The weight barriers are to be removed through
accommodation.

A MALE VOICE: How do you measure level? |
mean the other sides tells us “level” means you take the
seniority system and that's part of the leveling factor that
you have to look at.

MS. STAR: Congress made clear that
accommodations is a modification in either the workplace or
in workplace policies. A seniority system is not -- Congress
did not make a distinction among seniority systems versus
any other employer policy. That's the track of the Title VII
in the ADEA.

in both of those statutes Congress said, it specifically
said, in the legislative -- in the language, that bona fide
seniority systems are excepted --

A MALE VOICE: Yeah, that's true, but what do
y —

MS. STAR: in the prohibitions of both statutes.

A MALE VOICE: That's right, but what do you do
with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973? It seems that Congress
with the ADA said that the Rehabilitation Act should pretty
much track -- the ADA should pretty much track the
Rehabilitation Act.

In all the cases that I can find, pretty much
shove seniority -- say seniority systems trump all the other
concerns.
MS. STAR: The Rehabilitation — in the
Rehabilitation Act, that changed. Parts of the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, did not -- did not just reassign them as
one of your reasonable accommodations.

And you're nght, that is how the courts interpreted
that. Once the ADA was enacted, Congress amended the
Rehabilitation Act to provide the reasonable

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 14

accommodations for -- I'm sorry, for reassignment as one of
the reasonable accommodations.

And so post-1992 approximately, when Congress
made that alteration, the case law on Rehabilitation Act is
consistent with the ADA.

A MALE VOICE: How do you --

MS. STAR: | agree with you --

A MALE VOICE: How do you -- how do you think
a seniority system should be handled in this precise context?
Ignored or become a factor?

MS. STAR: Your Honor, that’s the Commissions --
one of the primary problems we have with the panel
decision. It's the allocation of burdens.

A seniority system certainly should be considered.
But it should be considered under the prong of undue
hardship.

It is the employer s burden to demonstrate that a
seniority system -- the alteration of the seniority system
would be so destructive on the workforce and in the
workplace as to create an undue hardship.

If they can do that, then they do not have to make an
exception to that seniority policy.

A MALE VOICE: It seems that everybody is being -
- is left at sea by that test, though.

If I'm the practicing lawyer and companies and
unions and everybody comes to me, or nonunion people
come to me and they say, how do we handle this? You
know, if these things -- if they turn into a factor, it seems
everything ends up in a court, because there isn t sufficient
guidance so that you can determine how to handle these
things.

1 MS. STAR: I understand the dilemma. Congress
said that this has to be a case-by-case system.

A MALE VOICE: You mean everything is going to
have to go to court?

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 15

MS. STAR: What? What? [Unintelligible}.

A MALE VOICE: You see my problem? There has
to be some guidance out there when you call these things “a
factor.” What kind of “a factor

So the company says, all right, we've taken into
consideration as a factor. We have a seniority system and
it's going to 200 it up, so we're not going to make this
accommodation.

The other side says, here we go to court.

Because “a factor,” what do you do with that?
Always take it to a trior of fact, to a judge?

— MS. STAR: The nature of undue hardship is
to dem -- is for an [unintelligible] to demonstrate with
concrete evidence that undue hardship wouldn't result.

Congress wanted modifi --

An employer is responsible to make a reasonable
accommodation. Failure to make a reasonable
accommodation is discrimination under the Americans With
Disabilities Act.

A MALE VOICE: Okay, let's take this case.

MS. STAR: Okay.

A MALE VOICE: Let's say the seniority system is a
factor.

MS. STAR: Right.

A MALE VOICE: How do you work this case
through then regarding this seniority system as a factor?

MS. STAR: That's the problem. Because U.S. Air
utterly failed to meet its burden on undue hardship, there is
absolutely no concrete evidence in this record as to how --
how this could put --

A MALE VOICE: They say -- they say -- they say
it's an undue hardship because you're taking at least one
employee who has seniority rights and telling that employee,
you don’t get what you're entitled to based on the long-

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 16

standing policies of the company. They say, there it is.
That's the hardship.

MS. STAR: Your Honor, they only pointed to the
long-stand -- the only concrete evidence -- that’s -- that's
hypoth -- that’s not concrete.

The only concrete evidence they pointed to is that it
is a long-standing policy.

For example, we don’t know how many people over
which Barnett would have to jump in order to remain in the
mail room position.

A MALE VOICE: So one is not enough, but
twenty
MS. STAR: It's a way, Your Honor.

A MALE VOICE: Every time you have a single
person, though, I guess you're only going to have one person
displaced in a seniority system. So it's always going to be
only one person. And it sounds like you’ re telling me that
never can only one person be a hardship or a problem.

MS. STAR: I -- I don’t think that that’s necessarily
the case.

A MALE VOICE: Well, when could the
displacement --

MS. STAR: For example --

A MALE VOICE: - of one person be a problem,
then?

MS. STAR: Okay. If you have a situation in which
you have a 45-year employee. He has a sterling record. And
he’s been waiting for a position to open up for years. Then
you have somebody that's come in and maybe he’s worked
one year, and they are an okay performer, not a great
performer. They need an accommodation and they want that
position, that position that this person who has sterling
qualifications has waited for years and years and years for.

That situation under those facts, it seems to me that
an employer can certainly prove undue hardship because the

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 17

disruption on the workplace of something like that. Once
this information got out --

A MALE VOICE: It’s a hardship to the person, then
that becomes involved, not the hardship to the workplace or
the employer.

MS. STAR: No, it’s to the workplace, Your Honor,
because what I’m suggesting with that example is that once
that information got out to the workforce, that this person
who has been such a sterling performer for 35 years is not
getting his position that he’s been waiting for because this
mediocre performer that just was employed six months
previously is getting that position --

A MALE VOICE: So if the workplace

MS. STAR: You look to the --

A MALE VOICE: -- if the workplace raises hell and
all the employees turn out and start picketing and
threatening --

MS. STAR: I don’t think it would have to go --

A MALE VOICE: then that becomes a hardship?

MS. STAR: Your Honor, Congress, as it defines
unreasonable accommodations, looked also to destruction in
the workforce. Again, is it a burden? Is it a burden on the
employer to -- to provide a reasonable accommodation to
alter workplace policies?

A MALE VOICE: Counsel --

MS. STAR: But, Your Honor could view allowing
an individual to have a parking space closer to the building
than anyone else as a preference under the panel's decision.

A MALE VOICE: Counsel --

MS. STAR: Because everybody would want to be
able to park closer to the job.

THE COURT: You might stop for a minute and let
some questions --

A MALE VOICE: Okay. Counsel, I'm just
wondering whether this court has not already spoken in

=

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 18

[unintelligible] on this very matter. Now it is a Title VII
case and the issue was religious accommodation. But in
Valent vs. Carson City the Court held that such an
accommodation need only be made short of interfering with
the city’s seniority system and with no more than a
diminimous cost to the city. And that was a non-CBA
environment.

Haven’t we already established that we have to
recognize a seniority system and follow it?

MS. STAR: Your Honor, seniority -- the reasonable
accommodation in Title VII is dramatically different than the
reasonable accommodation provision in the ADA.

In the legislative history, Congress specifically
rejected the diminimous test of undue hardship. And the
reason that it is --

A MALE VOICE: I’m focusing on the seniority
system aspect. That’s been the focus of this entire
discussion so far.

MS. STAR: But the preface -- yes, I understand that,
Your Honor, but the preface of that statement that you have
read from is that it would -- all the employer has to show is
diminimous harm. |

A MALE VOICE: No, no. Short of interfering with
the city’s seniority system.

In other words, the Court held in that case that one
should not -- that one was not required -- the employer was
not required to change its seniority system for the
accommodation there.

And I grant you it’s Title VIL But aren't the
principles pretty comparable?

MS. STAR: No, they’re not comparable, because
what it takes to prove an undue hardship under Title VII is
dramatically different than what it takes to prove a hardship
under the ADA.

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 19

Under Title VII all you have to prove is a
diminimous harm. All the employer would have to show is
barely some hardship. And then they don’t have to make an
exception to their seniority policy. That is dramatically
different.

Congress specifically rejected that kind of approach
to undue hardship in enacting ADA.

A MALE VOICE: Well what about the qualified
definition? Is the employee qualified if he doesn’t have
enough seniority?

MS. STAR: No, Your Honor. In the recent case of
this court it, in [unintelligible] vs. [unintelligible] this court
said that to measure the ability to do the job is what -- the
definition of what qualification is the ability to do a job, and
that the standards must go to job performance.

In fact Congress made it very clear in the legislative
history that an expanse of the interpretation of the work
qualifications is exactly what’s led to the kind of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities that the
ADA was enacted to fight against.

A MALE VOICE: Counsel, does it matter if the
seniority system is contractual or not, even if it’s not a
collective bargaining agreement. But apart from that, does it
matter whether this unilaterally-established seniority system
creates contractual rights in the other employees?

And is that established in this record, or is that
something that would have to be proven at a trial to establish
undue hardship?

MS. STAR: Your Honor, those kind of contractual
rights which state law claims and the federal claim with the
Americans With Disabilities Act would preempt them. So --

And I do also want to make it clear that the
Commission’s position is that there isn’t that much of a
difference between a seniority system embodied in a

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 20

collective bargaining agreement and one outside of a
collective bargaining agreement.

The court [unintelligible] said that there is a
difference have pointed to the fact that a seniority systems
outside of a collective bargaining agreements are unilaterally
imposed and that within the seniority system you're dealing
with legal rights. =

A MALE VOICE: Well, why does that make --
excuse me. Why does that make a difference, to follow up

on Judge Gould’s question.

MS. STAR: Yes.

A MALE VOICE: It seems to me that maybe the
unilateral rights question isn’t particularly relevant. That the
question is, do you force the employer to violate someone's
legal rights, either contractually, implied in contracts, or by
virtue of a collective bargaining agreement?

So doesn’t the real question here come down to the
nature of the seniority system? In other words, if it’s an
informal custom, that’s one thing. If it’s part of a collective
bargaining agreement, it’s another. If it’s part of a contract,
it’s yet another obligation.

MS. STAR: Well, I would like to point the Court's
attention to Sarah Jacobs vs. United Airlines. It's this
panel’s -- this court’s decision. In which it said that there is
this inevitable tension between the ADA and the collective
bargaining agreements.

A MALE VOICE: Well, what’s the answer to Judge
Thomas’s question?

MS. STAR: What -- the answer is that —

A MALE VOICE: I mean, you seem to be saying
that seniority rights can be trumped regardless of the
circumstances.

Now it seems to me that there -- it really depends not
on the nature of the disability or the employee or the nature
of the exception, but rather the nature of the obligation that

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 21

the company either assumes or has imposed on it in terms of
a seniority system.

MS. STAR: We are not saying that seniority systems
are automatically trumped at all. What we're saying is that’s
the employer's burden. Whether it’s in a collective
bargaining agreement; whether it’s outside of a collective
bargaining agreement; whether or not there’s a contract:
whether or not it’s loosely formed. All of that goes to undue
hardship.

I would assume that the more - when you have a
collective vargaining agreement, then it might be easier to
prove undue hardship than in a situation where it’s you have
a seniority system that’s kind of loosely based.

A MALE VOICE: But along the logic of this --

MS. STAR: But again it’s the employee’s burden.

A MALE VOICE: It’s not [unintelligible], but the
logic of the collective bargaining agreement cases seems to
be that we don’t want to force employers to violate another
federal law. So you start with that end of the continuum.

So then you move down it. Do we want to force
employers to violate someone’s cont..:ct rights?

MS. STAR: Yeah, but those are state rights that if

A MALE VOICE: Then you're saying, yes, that's

MS. STAR: There’s tranche ou: -- yes, federal rights
[unintelligible] state rights. The state rights sometimes are
preempted.

And the Commission’s position on the federal rights
is the position of this Court, which is that the ADA rights are
not subject to the rights under a collective bargaining
agreement.

And the Commission proposes that the union and the
employer, both of which are covered entities under the ADA,
and are required to abide by its provisions, get together and
agree to a variance of that collective bargaining agreement

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 22

SO as to not put the employer and the union in this kind of
awkward Catch-22 position, which I can see exists.

A MALE VOICE: Counsel, can I just ask whether
you agree with counsel that the definition of the plaintiff's
burden as set forth in the panel opinion is acceptable to the
EEOC or not?

MS. STAR: The definition is acceptable. It’s the
application that’s not. Because it said that to prove
reasonable [unintelligible], an employee has to show that it
would not unreasonably burden the employer. That is
incorrect. That’s the employer’s burden.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, Counsel.

A MALE VOICE: We'll give the couple of moments
to respond.

MR. THOMAS: Good Morning, Your Honors. May
it please the Court, my name is Random Thomas, and I
represent U.S. Air, now U.S. Airways, in this matter.

And the discussion has been interesting so far. I
think we’ve hit on the main issues before the Court.

There are really two: Whether or not there’s an
independent violation of the ADA by failing to engage in --

sufficiently in an interactive process.

And understand that the facts in this case are not that
the employer refused to do so or would not do so. What
we re really talking about is whether or not it was done to
the satisfaction of the appellant in this case. There’s no
question but that process was engaged in.

The question is are we going to create a right, a cause
of action, independent of actually -- of actual violation of the
ADA for engaging in an insufficient interactive process.

Did the employer react too fast? Did it take the employer
too long? Was the letter long enough that was responded to?

In this particular case, there was lots of interaction.
There were -- there were communications from the plaintiff,

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 23

from the appellant’s lawyer, from several of appellant’s
doctors. These went to people at the corporate offices. They
went to local management. They went to people in the
workers’ compensation side of things. There was lots of
interaction over many months.

The problem is, in the end, is that the appellant was
not happy with the result that was reached. And our position
on the interactive process is simply that it should not and
cannot become an independent violation disconnected
completely from the actual existence of a reasonable
accommodation.

In this case after full discovery the appellant was
never in our view able to point to an actual -- the existence
of an actual accommodation that was reasonable.

JUDGE GREGORSON: This is Judge Gregorson.
Let me just interrupt for a moment:

So, I gather from what you’ re saying is that you agree
that the employer is required to engage in an interactive
process. Is that right?

MR. THOMAS: Well, if -- you mean when you’re
using the word “required” means that it somehow the --

JUDGE GREGORSON: Well that the ADA requires
the employer to engage in an interactive process. The
employer just can’t say: Get lost. I don’t want to talk to
you. Don’t bother me.

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think actually the ADA does
not require where you're at pain of violating the law to
engage in an interactive process.

What I -- our main point is if at the end of the day the
appellant or the employee cannot actually point to a specific
accommodation that was reasonable, after full discovery,
which they have in this case, then the fact that there was no
interactive process engaged in, or in the appellant’s view, as
is applicable here, it was somehow insufficient or
unsatisfactory, that we should not be litigating as a separate

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 24
violation the satisfactory-ness of that process. But actually

we --

JUDGE GREGORSON: But isn’t whether the
employer engage in -- engages in an interactive process, isn’t
that a factor to consider in determining whether there was 4
reasonable accommodation or an effort made for a
reasonable accommodation?

MR. THOMAS: Well, in almost -- in every case that
I’m aware of that has discussed the interactive process and
faulted an employer, it was always, always coupled with a
finding by the court that there was an -- actually was an
accommodation that could have been made.

In my view an employer acts at its peril when it
doesn’t engage in that process because it could well miss an
accommodation that is indeed reasonable.

JUDGE GREGORSON: Let me ask you this: So
your position is that the employer doesn’t have to sit down
with the employee face to face and talk about what would or
would not be a reasonable accommodation.

MR. THOMAS: I don’t think that’s a requirement of
the law, but again, I think an employer acts at its peril when
it doesn’t have that type of dialog, and we certainly did have
that in this particular case.

JUDGE GREGORSON: You would have face-to-
face meetings between the employer and the employee?

MR. THOMAS: Well, again, that occurred in this
case. I would not say as a -- as a prac -- as a legal matter --

JUDGE GREGORSON: I mean, that occurred in this
case that there were face-to-face meetings?

MR. THOMAS: There were definitely face-to-face
meetings. There were many meetings. There were -- there
was lots of communication. There were many, many players
involved in this dialog that went on for many months.

A MALE VOICE: Counsel, to follow up on
Judge Gregorson’s question. It seems that there 8 a

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 25

regulation at 29 CFR, Appendix 1630.9 that describes an
interactive process, including analyzing a particular job in
determining essential functions, consulting with the
individual with a disability to assess what they can do and
what might be a reasonable accommodation, and identifying
potential accommodations, and considering the person's
preferences, and so on. I'm not going to read the whole reg.
Im sure you're familiar with it.

But first, was that a process consistent with that
regulation engaged in here?

MR. THOMAS: All of that was done. But I want to
make clear that the regulation actually uses the word “may.”

A MALE VOICE: Well, it says “may -- it may be
necessary.” So it has the word “necessary” in it.

And I was impressed with Judge Fletcher's dissent,
pointing why “may be necessary” cannot possibly be a
totally permissive standard. If it has the word “necessary” in
it, doesn’t that suggest that there are situations Where
where it's a requirement?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think in the case -- I think in
the end, no, not if there is no reasonable accommodation at
the end of the road to be identified, and which is what our
view is of this particular case.

But | do want to emphasize, and in this particular
case we believe we did engage in all of those steps. Maybe
not to the satisfaction of the appellant, but we engaged in
them.

And that’s what I'm most concerned about with this
issue. Are we going to have a due process laden, very
structured, technically-driven type of requirement, where
we're simply going to be having litigation in the federal
courts about the interactive process and how it was done,
and not really focusing on whether or not there was an
accommodation that was available and reasonable that this
individual should or should not have had.

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 26

A MALE VOICE: Weill, turning - turning to that, I
want to ask you a question that I didn’t get a complete
answer from the government on that you may be familiar
with the record. Is it absolutely clear in this record that the
seniority system is contractual in the sense that if a person
were moved to accommodate Mr. Barnett, that that person's
legal rights would be violated?

Because as we know, sometimes unilateral systems
policies create contract obligations, and other times they
don't. What's the situation here? Has there been a record
made on that?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think what the record is
clear on is that this particular seniority system has been in
place for decades. And the word “unilateral” has been
thrown around a lot here. I don’t believe it is unilateral.

A MALE VOICE: Okay. But decades doesn't
necessarily mean contractual. | don’t -- so I'm asking you:
Is it contractual or is it not contractual? And is there any
truth to the argument of appellant that U.S. Air has taken the
position in other litigation that its personnel policies are not
contractual?

MR. THOMAS: | am unaware of what appellant's
counsel is referring to on that particular point.

I would say as an employment lawyer who defends
employers all the time, I can tell you that many many cases
are brought based on a lot less than a written policy such as
this alleging that, first of all it is an express contract, and
certainly an implied contract.

I think the real key thing here is though, it isn’t
unilateral. Employees come to work. They trust in the
system. They work year after year.

A MALE VOICE: Okay. I understand, but and I
don't mean to interrupt you. But it's my last point. It
sounds to me like from what you're saying that that record
does not establish, that it has not been adjudicated or

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 27

determined or stipulated that this seniority system is
contractual as to all the employees. That's the point I'm
trying to address.

MR. THOMAS: I think what the Court found was
that to deviate from this established system would violate the
legitimate rights and expectations of Mr. Barneti's fellow
employees.

A MALE VOICE: Where did the Court find that?

MR. THOMAS: When it found that -- when it found
that there was no -- there was -- it would not be reasonable --
it would not be a reasonable accommodation to depart from
the seniority system.

A MALE VOICE: Well, you're reading an awful lot
into that by saying the Court concluded that it was a right --
contractual right that would be violated, aren't you?

MR. THOMAS: No, I think what I said was, I think
that the Court found that it would violate the legitimate
rights and expectations of employees --

A MALE VOICE: Well, when you say legitimate
rights, do you equate that with legally enforceable rights?

MR. THOMAS: I certainly have been involved in
many cases trying to defend employers for a lot less.

A MALE VOICE: Well, how does that square with
the catastrophic --

A MALE VOICE: [Unintelligible] position usually
is that those cases are with out merit. I'm asking you in your
opinion, your position, are they legally enforceable rights?

MR. THOMAS: I think an employee could certainly
file --

A MALE VOICE: I'm asking you your position. Is
it the company’s position that their rights arising from the
seniority system are legally enforceable by the employee?

MR. THOMAS: I think that we have an obligation
to enforce the rights and expectations created by this system.

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 28

A MALE VOICE: How does that square with the
catastrophic medical policy adopted by U.S. Air that says, if
you're awarded a catastrophic medical transfer you will
receive a position in your desired location regardless of your
seniority date? What's the history and application of that?

MR. THOMAS: Well, it just -- as it says, there is
some limited exceptions, which the employees are all aware
of, and they are part of the system --

A MALE VOICE: Who put that system in place?

MR. THOMAS: The company did to react --

A MALE VOICE: And what was the employees
participation?

MR. THOMAS: I- I have no idea of that.

A MALE VOICE: So U.S. Air was able to upset the
[unintelligible] expectations under its decades-old policy by
putting that in without breaching somebody's contact rights“

MR. THOMAS: Well, I --

A MALE VOICE: Implied contracts rights.

MR. THOMAS: Since there is no record on when
that first went in, | couldn't tell the panel or the en
[unintelligible] court why or when that went in. All we
know is that the particular exception that everybody is aware
of, and it’s still -- in this particular thing, it is not unilateral.

Let's remember -- we want the Court to understand
that the customer service agent classification is a very broad
classification. It involves virtually everybody you see at the
airport: The people who load the luggage, the people who
fuel the planes, the people who take tickets, the people who
are out, you know, out on the ramp in the middle of the
winter, the people who are taking tickets in St. Thomas in
the Caribbean.

This system decides each and every job that this
person gets; where they can work, when they re going to
work, what kind of job they're going to have. This governs
all of their expectations. All of them.

BARNETT V.U.S.AIR 29

A MALE VOICE: Counsel, maybe to test that
question that has been presented, suppose the existing
mailroom person, who has the mailroom job today, is told by
management, sorry, we have an ADA-eligible employee who
needs to take your position. We're going to move you
someplace. What rights does that employee have?

MR. THOMAS: Well, what-would happen, it would
affect in most -- in almost every circumstance, more than
one employee. That employee would then likely ask to
exercise his or her seniority, take a position that they want,
which could then affect another employee, who would then
want to exercise his or her seniority to get the position that
they want. You would -- you could -- you would very likely
have bumping and movement throughout the entire system.

And. you know -- and it does I mean, people.

End of Tape 1, Side A.

MR. THOMAS: . waiting a long time to get a
particular shift so maybe they can get their kids to school or
pick them up, so that they can go to school themselves.
There's a variety -- as you can imagine, of reasons that
people want particular jobs at particular times. And it's
extremely upsetting.

A MALE VOICE: Where's the showing in the
record that supports what you just said? Where's that
developed so that we know that that is in fact more than your
experience speculation as opposed to what really -- the
impact on this particular employer would be?

MR. THOMAS: | don’t think there is a lot of that in
the record. I think it's clear when you have 14,000
employees under such a system, and you understand that as
it is in the record, that every single job, every variety of job
imaginable almost in -- in the airline industry is covered by

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 30

this system, that people are going to make those sorts of
decisions and make --

What type of record would you need? It’s absolutely
patently obvious that that would be the case.

A MALE VOICE: Well, we're on summary
judgment. Of course they have to construe the facts in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff. So why isn’t there a
genuine issue of material fact in this seniority system, as in a
collective bargaining agreement that we can read and we
know is legal and enforceable, and then you would be
subject to labor law violations if you violate it? Why isn’t
the genuine issue of material fact as to the nature of the
seniority system and whether or not exceptions could be
made?

MR. THOMAS: Well, there is a record on that
particular point. It’s clear that an employee who would
otherwise be entitled to the job is not going to get it. And in
our view that is enough.

A MALE VOICE: Why is that more of a hardship to
accommodate a disabled person than it is with the exception
with regard to catastrophic illness?

MR. THOMAS: Weill, one is if -I don’t know if
this has been developed in the record, but I could certainly
say that one, there's going to be fewer of those. I mean the
ADA is a very broad statute. It covers a lot of things that are
beyond what we would normally -- might normally consider
a disability, and it could have monumental -- it would have
monumental effects to allow anybody with any type of ADA-
protected disability to require an accommodation that would
require us to deviate from the seniority system.

Obviously Mr. Barnett is not the only person in the
company that has a back problem. And there are many,
many people who have these types of issues, and it would
lead to basically a disintegration of the entire system.

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 31

A MALE VOICE: Would that be something that
would factually be developed rather than at summary
judgment stage”

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think -- I think the summary
judgment is pos -- on the seniority system is positive on the
basic idea. It's clear that if I had the seniority and I had a
right to that job, am I required to have my right violated --

A MALE VOICE: Well, that’s also true with the
other exception though, too.

MR. THOMAS: Yes, that is, that’s true. I grant you
that. And it is -- but it is part of the policy and nobody is
deviating from the policy. There have been exceptions. |
think there were exceptions in some of the other cases we
talked about already where there was some limited
exceptions to a seniority system where the court found
that's that’s not enough, we're not deviating from the
policy.

A MALE VOICE: This question of a right to a job
that you mentioned, though, sounds fuzzy in the record to
me. I mean, is the seniority system in a policy handbook? Is
that --

MR. THOMAS: Oh, absolutely.

A MALE VOICE: Does the handbook have any
qualifying statements in it indicating it's not contractual, or
does the handbook say it is contractual?

MR. THOMAS: I don’t think it says either one.

A MALE VOICE: It doesn't say either one?
Shouldn't there have been a hearing to determine whether
the seniority system was contractual or not?

MR. THOMAS: I don’t think in my view that the
analysis is dependent upon having to be contractual.

A MALE VOICE: How do you square that with
Valent? You know, we talked about that. It's a Tide VII
case. One of the holdings of Valent, which I think is
instructive on a variety of issues that cut a number of

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 32

different ways, is that it’s not -- a seniority system in and of
itself doesn’t trump. You have to look at the undue hardship
factor, when -- and mix that into the analysis, which may be
a factual question. -

How do you square with what you're just saying with
Valent and our treatment in that case? .

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think that --

A MALE VOICE: Because your position is basically
not -- from what I understand that seniority systems trump,
night?

MR. THOMAS: Right.

A MALE VOICE: And we said they don’t in Valent.
How do you square that?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think in that particular case,
as I recall you -- the Court simply went on and said, and, you
know, because it would require some minimal cost, they
don’t have to do it because that’s part of the - the Title VII
analysis that’s used in a religious discrimination case.

But I think in this particular -- in our case, you're
talking about again -- and I think that case talked about
being able to move people around potentially without
violating their rights.

For example, in Buckingham. Certainly in that case
the seniority system was so fuzzy and left so many openings
and a few slots allocated. There was plenty of room as the
Court -- District Court found below and then the Appellate
Court agreed, that there was plenty of room for the employer
to be able to accommodate the disability without violating
actually any rights that any particular employee held. That's
not the case here.

A MALE VOICE: Are you aware of any case that --

where an employee has sued the company claiming that his
or her seniority nghts were somehow violated in a context
such as this?

MR. THOMAS: Well --

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 33

A MALE VOICE: Has it been adjudicated what the
nature of these would be -- everybody’s calling them rights.
What the nature of these, the standing of these at law are?

MR. THOMAS: Clearly in the collective bargaining
context there are many because there are seniority grievances
filed all the time.

This particular case does present a fairly rare animal,
which is a very strict non-collectively-bargained seniority
system. But that doesn’t mean that it still doesn’t create the
same rights and expectations.

Im not aware of anybody -- and I don’t handle all of
U.S. Air’s work on them, so I don’t know. I don’t know
whether or not any agent has actually ever sued under this
particular policy even though it’s not collectively bargained.

A MALE VOICE: Is Mr. Barnett an at-will
employee?

MR. THOMAS: I don't I don’t -- again, that was
never raised below. I'd have to check. I’m not sure that he
ever signed -- would have signed an at-will statement in the
kind of position he’s in now.

And I should add that just

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0450%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
