# Opposition Brief — Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 532 U.S. 970

## Text

No. 00-1089

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
ELLA WILLIAMS,

Respondent.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

|

ROBERT LESLIE ROSENBAUM
Counsel of Record

ROSENBAUM & ROSENBAUM, P.S.C.
300 Lexington Building .
201 West Short Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
(859) 259-1321

165545 ce

COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 * (800) 359-6859

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Table of Cited Authorities ..........cccccecees il
P<). bie eeeeiesaeebees ceees estes he l
Relevant Statutes and Regulations .............. l
Ue ror re a ee rere 3
District Court Proceedings .................... 6
Sixth Circuit Proceedings ...................4.. 7

Toyota’s Petition For Writ Of Certiorari Should Be
i <¢vnsec CeeeensPGhehGhes5base ets ber 12

ee en Ee ea 20

il

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases: ;
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999)

SICTTTTTTitTT 18
Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994)

00000 0sene sees 656 666 6 hee mie een 17
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (Ree 1,9, 11,13
Broussard v. University of California, at Berkeley,

192 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 1999) ............... 17
Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir.
BOOD) oo 00000 00.9060 nee 15, 16
Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635
(26 Cap. ISDE)... ov cescccccs enue 17
Cravens v. Blue Cross And Blue Shield, 214 F.3d
otk fe >) eee 15
Duncan v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Authority, 201 F.3d 482 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ...... 17
Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723 (Sth
Coe. BDDG) . 000000000 0n eee 17

Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 1998) .. 17

ill
Cited Authorities
Halperin v. Abacus Technology Corp., 128 F.3d 191
(4th Cir. 1997) 2.0.0... cece cece eee eee ees

Hilburn v. Murata Electronics North America, Inc.,
181 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1999) ..........055.

McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d
369 (6th Cir. 1997) 2... 6.6 e eee ee es

Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947
(3d Cir. 1996) ..... 0. cece cece eee e eee eeees

Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1 (Ist Cir.
MED cc cccccccccccccccccccccccccccsccces

Santiago Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213
F.3d 25 (Ist Cir. 2000) ..... 6... cece eens

Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d. 512 (7th
SC acca eeddeccccccscccccecoccece

Snow v. Ridgeview Medical Center, 128 F.3d 1201
(8th Cir. 1997) 20... 6c cece cece eee eee eee

Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318
(1th Cir. 1998) 2.0.6... cece eee eee eee

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)

LPO TT TTT TTT TTT. 1, 7, 11, 14,

Page

16

17

17

15

17

17

16

15, 19

iv

Cited Authorities

Page
Statutes:
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seg. ... 6... cece cence l
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) .. 0... cece ee eee ee eee 8,19
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2MA) .... eee eee eee eee l
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) ... «2. e eee eee eee 8
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2M(C) .. 0... ee eee eee ees 8
42 U.S.C. § L2TV1(B) 2... eee eee eee ees 2
42 U.S.C. § L2TLUD) «6. ce eee cece eee renee 2
42 U.S.C. § LZTTI(1O) 2... eee eee eee 2
42 U.S.C. § 12112f(a)” .. we eee eee eee 2,9, 18
42 U.S.C. § 12112(bM SMA) .... 6.6 eee ee ee eee 3
Other Authorities:
29 C.F.R. § 1630.21) . 0... eee ee ee ee eee eee 1
29 C.F.R. § 1630.24) Mii)... 6 oe ee ee 2
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j(2)Mi-ill) . 2 ee eee es 2

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j(3)) .. ee cee 2, 16

t

l
INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Circuit has ruled that Ella Williams is
“disabled” in the major life activity of performing manual
tasks without regard to whether she is disabled concerning
the major life activity of working. Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. (“Toyota”) misstates the
ruling of the Sixth Circuit and argues for an interpretation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seg. which would do away with the
requirement that disability determinations be made on an
individual basis and would further require that all ADA
claimants be disabled as concerns the major life activity of
working, contrary to the established precedent of Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) and Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

RELEVANT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)' states disability? means “with
respect to an individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individuals; . . .”

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) identifies major life activities such
as performing manual tasks or working.

Impairments are considered to substantially limit major
life activities if the individual is “Significantly restricted as

1. Hereafter reference will be made only to the appropriate
section of the ADA without reference to the Title number.

2. Only definitions of disability relevant to this case will be
addressed.

2

to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which
the average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1 (ii).

Three factors to be considered in determining whether
an impairment substantially limits a major activity are:
(1) nature and severity, (2) duration, and (3) permanent or
long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i-iii).

As concerns only the major life activity of working,
regulations state that in order to be substantially limited, the
individual must be restricted in the ability to perform either
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes
as compared to the average person. Importantly, the
regulation provides only as concerns working, “The inability
to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3 i).

The ADA, § 12112(a), prohibits discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities because of disability
in regard to terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

§ 12111(8) provides that a qualified individual with a
disability means a disabled individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.

“Reasonable accommodation” is not defined by a
limiting definition but instead requires employers to
accommodate disabled individuals unless to do so would
constitute an “undue hardship.” §§ 12111(9) and (10).

3

Importantly, an employer engages in prohibited
discrimination when the employer fails to make reasonable
accommodations to known physical or mental limitations
of otherwise qualified individuals with a disability.
§§ 12112(b)(S)(A).

FACTS

Ella Williams is 41 years of age, is married, and has
children. She reads at the ninth grade level, and her
mathematical skills are at the tenth grade level. She described
her vocational background as “Production work and factory
work’s (sic) what I’ve known all my life.”

She was first employed by Toyota, an automobile
manufacturer, in 1990 and was able to perform her job in
the paint department. Later, she was transferred to the power
train group which was an assembly line job where she helped
build car engines using pneumatic tools. This job caused her
to develop carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”), and after being
off work for several months, her physician returned her to
work with medical restrictions on her activity.

In 1992, those restrictions were to do only light work,
no lifting of more than 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently, avoid constant repetitive use of both hands and
arms, including flexion and extension of the wrists and
elbows, avoid overhead work, and no use of pneumatic tools.
Ms. Williams filed a workers’ compensation claim against
Toyota which was settled on the basis of a 20% occupational
impairment.

In 1993, Ms. Williams sued Toyota under the ADA for
not accommodating her disability by assigning her work she

4

could perform. That lawsuit was settled, and Ms. Williams
returned to work at Toyota in December, 1993.

When she returned, she was assigned to quality control
inspection operations in the body paint inspection group.
These jobs did not require as much physical exertion as
assembly line jobs and were not typical production line
positions. They were the least physically demanding jobs in
the plant.

There were four jobs in the new group: (1) assembly
paint, (2) paint second inspection, (3) shell body audit, and
(4) ED surface repair. Ms. Williams was required to perform
only two of the four jobs; paint second inspection and
assembly paint. These were primarily visual inspection jobs
although some manual activity was required.

In the late summer or fall of 1996, Ms. Williams was
asked to cross-train on the shell body audit job, and she
agreed. The shell body job required her to soak a sponge in
a highlight oil and wipe down part of the metal shell body of
a car. A part of 450 to 500 car shell bodies had to be wiped
down per shift with the allotted job time being about
58 seconds on each shell body. This job was more physically
demanding than the paint inspection jobs she previously had
been doing. The shell body job caused pain to her, and she
sought care from Industrial Health Services, Inc. (“IHS”)
which is Toyota’s on-site occupational medicine services
provider. IHS doctors diagnosed Ms. Williams as suffering
from (1) myotendonitis bilateral periscapular, an inflamation
of muscles and tendons around both of her shoulder blades,
(2) myotendonitis, (3) myositis bilateral forearms with nerve
compression causing media nerve irritation, and (4) thoracic
outlet compression which is a condition causing pain in the

5

nerves leading to the upper extremities. Additionally, IHS
doctor David Price diagnosed her as suffering from pan
myositis which is a general irritation of the trapezius, biceps,
and triceps muscles. Dr. Price confirmed and continued
Ms. Williams earlier medical restrictions caused by her CTS
and further restricted Ms. Williams’ activity by prohibiting
any work above chest level, any extended reach or repetitive
rotary or lateral movements of the head/neck. It was felt that
Ms. Williams’ problems were related to her employment.

Ms. Williams further sought treatment from Dr. Mark
Smith, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed
her as suffering from myofacial pain caused by work.
He restricted her from repetitive activity and stated that she
should not be wiping highlight oil on from 450 to 500 auto
shell bodies per shift because this would aggravate her
condition. Ms. Williams’ condition is objectively manifested
by knotting and spasms of the muscles which Dr. Smith
treated by trigger point injections. There also was an MRI
showing peritendinitis of muscles surrounding the shoulder
joint. Ms. Williams stated the shell body job caused the
following symptoms:

My shoulder starting getting some nerve—what
they—it’s like a tingling electricity in my arms
again. My arms going to sleep, going dead at
night, waking me up. My neck went to hurting
me a lot. My neck just felt lazy, went to
aching, and having pains in the back of my neck.
My shoulders when raising my arms would seem
like they were tiring out. They just-they were
giving out when I would be trying to work. And
at lunch every day, it got to the point to where
my arms was just like going to sleep again on

6

me. It’d take me an hour after we started back up
working to get back to where I could do the job like
I needed to.

Ms. Williams’ impairment affects activities of daily living
and curtails activities. She needs help in dressing herself.

She presented testimony from a vocational expert, William
J. Weikel, who opined that as a result of her medical restrictions,
she has lost access to 50% to 55% of the jobs in the economy.

Although Ms. Williams had been a successful Toyota
employee for the three years approximately since her return in
1993, Toyota informed her that she would have to do the shell
body job or be fired. She attempted to comply and thereby was
injured further to the point she could not continue working.
When she could not work, Toyota fired her under the guise that
she had voluntarily resigned her employment by not soming to
work.

DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

Toyota requested the District Court to enter a summary
judgment in favor of Toyota to the effect that Ms. Williams
was not “disabled.” The District Court agreed and specifically
held that Ms. Williams was not disabled as concems the major
life activity of performing manual tasks. The District Court S
logic was that Ms. Williams’ evidence of substantial limitations
in performing manual tasks “are irretrievably contradicted by
Plaintiff s continual insistence that she could perform the tasks
in assembly and paint inspection without difficulty; positions
requiring manual tasks.”

7

SIXTH CIRCUIT PROCEEDINGS

In the Sixth Circuit, Ms. Williams advanced the
proposition that she could be entitled to the protection of
the ADA by proving she was disabled as concerns performing
manual tasks and was not required to prove she was disabled
as concerns the major life activity of working. She argued
she obviously was substantially limited in the major life
activity of performing manual tasks, and it was not necessary

that she also prove she was disabled as concerns working.
The Sixth Circuit agreed.’

The Sixth Circuit noted this Court in Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) cautioned and
mentioned the EEOC has found that the major life activity
of working should not be considered if the individual

is substantially limited in any other major life activity.
App. Sa.

In this case, the plaintiff's claim is not based
solely on the difficult concept that she is disabled
as to work generally, but rather, includes the rather
simple concept that she is disabled as to
performing manual tasks because she suffers from
a severe impairment to her limbs, shoulders and
neck that seriously reduces her ability to perform
the manual tasks that are job-related.

Id. at Sa.

3. The Sixth Circuit Opinion is appended to Toyota’s Petition,
and.Ms. Williams will use the appendix pagination of the Opinion
as found in Toyota’s Petition when referring to the Sixth Circuit

Opinion.

8

Therefore, having concluded that Ms. Williams is
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, the Sixth
Circuit saw no need to determine whether she was
substantially limited as to the major life activities of lifting
or of working. /d. at 5a. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit found it
unnecessary to consider whether Ms. Williams made a
satisfactory showing of being disabled under the alternate
definitions of disability; § 12102(2)(B), having a record of an
impairment or § 12102(2)(C), being regarded as having such
an impairment. /d. at 6a.

Tre Sixth Circuit was well aware that in order for Williams
to be disabled, the involved impairment must substantially limit
or significantly restrict the major life activity involved.
The words, substantially limits, were emphasized by the Sixth
Circuit in its recitation of the impairment definition of disability.
§ 12102(2). App. 3a. It noted that the regulations require that
impairments “substantially limit.” Jd. at 3a. Ms. Williams’
impairment is described as “a severe impairment... .” /d. at Sa.
The Sixth Circuit specifically refers to the “significantly
restricted” language found in the regulation and concludes
that Ms. Williams suffers from an actual impairment
“that substantially limits a major life activity . . .” /d. at 6a.

As to the District Court’s finding that Ms. Williams was
not disabled because she could perform some manual tasks, the
Sixth Circuit said.

The fact that Williams can perform a range of
isolated, non-repetitive manual tasks performed over
a short period of time, such as tending to her personal
hygiene or carrying out personal or household
chores, does not effect (sic, should be affect) a
determination that her impairment substantially

9

limits her ability to perform the range of manual
tasks associated with an assembly line job.

Id. at 4a, parenthetical statement added.

This is consistent with the holding of Bragdon that
“The Act addresses substantial limitations on major life
activities, not utter inabilities.” Jd. at 641. An individual does
not have to be totally disabled before he is entitled to the
protection of the ADA.

The Sixth Circuit was concerned as to whether
substantial impairment in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks is sufficient to invoke the protection
of the ADA without reference to whether that impairment
affected working. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit required that
Ms. Williams demonstrate her performing manual tasks
disability “affects” her work. Jd. at 4a and 6a.

Of course, it is obvious that an individual with
Ms. Williams’ restrictions will be affected in factory,
production or other employment requiring repetitive manual
tasks. It is appropriate that the impairment claimed always
“affect” or be related to employment because this application
of the ADA only relates to employment. § 12112(a). The ADA
does not prohibit disability discrimination in social settings,
and the Sixth Circuit takes care to emphasize that when
disability is based upon a substantial impairment in a major
life activity other than working, then there still must be a
work or employment connection or “affect” between the
non-working disability and the employment. This is the
requirement of § 12112(a).

10

At no place does the Sixth Circuit suggest that an ADA
disability exists simply because work is “affected” without
regard to whether the impairment constitutes a substantial
limitation of the major life activity of performing manual
tasks.

The Sixth Circuit dissent deserves mention because it is
the blueprint for Toyota’s Petition herein.

This dissent mistakenly characterizes Ms. Williams’
functional limitations as being a subset of abilities related
to working. /d. at 1 la.

Certainly, this is true, but the description is not complete.
The limitations affect activities of daily living, and there was
no attempt by Toyota to prove Ms. Williams was not
substantially limited in performing manual tasks as compared
to the general population.

The dissent asserts the majority opinion “conflates
(and erodes)” the standards for demonstrating substantial
limits on working and on performing manual tasks.

Williams has not shown a substantial limitation
in working, because the inability to perform a
single, particular job is not a substantial
limitation, and she has not demonstrated that there
is a broader class of jobs from which her
impairment disqualifies her. Nor has Williams
shown a substantial limitation in performing
manual tasks, because her limitation is mostly
confined to a subset of job-specific tasks.

Id. at 11a.

1]

Aside from the erroneous statement that no evidence was
furnished as to disqualification for a broad range of jobs,
William J. Weikel says loss of access to 50% to 55% of jobs;
ironically the dissent conflates the requirements to be
disabled for performing manual tasks by simultaneously
requiring substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working.

The dissent says there is no performing manual tasks
disability because Ms. Williams’ limitation is only for a
subset of job-specific tasks which is contrary to the record.
Hence, the dissent would say a more substantial limitation
in working is necessary before an ADA disability can be
found in a major life activity other than working. In other
words, all impairments must constitute a substantial
limitation in working before these non-working impairments
can be the basis of an ADA impairment.

This is simply the wrong analysis; Bragdon, Id. at 631.
Also, the consideration of the major life activity of working
prior to or at lease in conjunction with consideration of other
major life activities such as performing manual tasks is
incorrect. Sutton, Jd. at 492. Impairment in major life
activities other than working should be considered first.

Finally, the Sixth Circuit rules Ms. Williams is disabled
as defined by the ADA and returns the case to the District
Court for trial only on the issue of whether Toyota failed to
reasonably accommodate her disability. App. 6-7a.

12

TOYOTA’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED.

Toyota’s Petition claims the question presented is
whether individuals whose impairments preclude them from
performing only a narrow category of tasks associated with
specific jobs are entitled to ADA protection. Petition, p. 1.

Although not presented as separate questions, Toyota
also contends the Sixth Circuit committed serious error
(1) by ignoring statutory and regulatory requirements that the
impairment substantially limit a major life activity and (2) by
violating what is incorrectly stated to be an almost universal
rule that an inability to perform a single particular job is not
entitled to ADA protection, regardless of the major life activity
involved.

Toyota misstates the holding of the Sixth Circuit when
Toyota contends the Sixth Circuit found ADA disability based
solely upon an impairment from performing only a limited
number of tasks associated with a specific job. Instead, the
Sixth Circuit found a substantial limitation of the major life
activity of performing manual tasks which was evidenced by
Ms. Williams’ inability to perform the physical functions
required by her particular job. The major life activity of working
was not involved, and Toyota’s contention only has relevance
when one is considering the major life activity of working.

The Sixth Circuit did not lower the standard of determining
an ADA disability from one which requires that the impairment
substantially limit a major life activity to one where it is required
only that the impairment only “affect” a major life activity.

13

Instead, the Sixth Circuit held that regardless of what the major
life activity was, the impairment must substantially limit that
major life activity, and further, if the major life activity is one
other than working, there must be a connection between the
substantially limited major life activity and working; i.e., the
impaired life activity must “affect” work.

Toyota misstates the law when it claims that all Courts have
held the inability to perform a single particular job does not
constitute an ADA disability, regardless of the major life activity
being considered.

Toyota’s Petition, p. 3, misstates the Sixth Circuit
holding to be that even though Ms. Williams could perform
a broad range of manual tasks, she is disabled because
“ “her impairment substantially limits her ability to perform
the range of manual tasks associated with an assembly line
job.’ /d. at 4a. (emphasis added).” Toyota’s quoted language
is taken out of context because the Sixth Circuit in the first
part of the sentence partially quoted by Toyota is simply
noting that the mere fact Williams can perform a range of
isolated, non-repetitive manual tasks is not relevant to
determination of whether she is ADA disabled. Of course,
this is the holding of Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)
which specifically he's that in order for a substantial
limitation to exist, it need not be complete or insurmountable,
only significant. Bragdon, Id. at 641.

Toyota misstates the Sixth Circuit holding to be, “that
Williams could demonstrate a substantial limitation on her
ability to perform manual tasks by simply showing that her
impairment ‘affected’ her ability to work—even if the
impairment did not otherwise substantially limit her in the
major life activity of working.” Petition p. 7. The Sixth

14

Circuit held that in order for Ms. Williams to be disabled as
concerns performing manual tasks, she must be substantially
limited in performing manual tasks. In fact she did not have
to be substantially limited in working, and the Sixth Circuit
never considered whether she was substamially limited in
working. Only Toyota believes one has io be disabled for
working before there can be disability in another major life
activity.

This is an important and perhaps subtle point. Individuals
can be disabled as concerns major life activities other than
working. In such cases, it is necessary that there be a causal
link or nexus between the non-working disability and the
employment before ADA protection attaches because the
ADA only prohibits discrimination in employment. In fact,
Toyota is arguing here that unless the impairment, whatever
it might be, substantially limits the major activity of working
instead of merely “affecting” the major life activity of
working, there can be no disability. To follow Toyota s
reasoning to its logical conclusion is to say that any disability
which does not constitute a substantial limitation on the
major life activity of working, but instead, merely affects
working, is not entitled to protection under the ADA.
The end result, if Toyota’s reasoning is adopted, is that the
only major life activity which can constitute an ADA
disability is the major life activity of working.

Needless to say, Toyota’s contentions are wrong and
have been expressly rejected not only in the regulations but
in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999).

To the extent Toyota contends that it is legally
established that CTS or like impairments cannot constitute
ADA disabilities, such a contention is incorrect. This is

15

because each disability determination is made on an
individualized basis. Sutton, Jd. at 483. Section 12102(2)
notes that disability is determined “with respect to an
individual.” CTS has been determined to be an impairment
creating an ADA disability. Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
172 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) and Cravens v. Blue Cross And
Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2000).

Toyota's citation of case precedents does not support its
contentions in this case. This is because the cited cases deal
with individualized disability determinations which cannot
be mechanically applied to individuals other than those
involved in the particular cases. Additionally, Toyota is not
sensitive to the major life activity at issue which is performing
manual tasks.

At page 10 of the Petition Toyota relies upon Chanda v.
Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2000). In that case
the claimant, a professional engineer was employed as a
quality control technician which required cutting
honeycomb-board with a utility knife and using a metal
scraper to obtain test samples. He developed mysositis which
is an inflamation of the wrist and forearm occurring on the
right arm. He was discharged because he could not perform
the cutting function of his job. He claimed a limitation on
the major life activity of performing manual tasks including
turning handles, grasping, holding or lifting objections, using
a computer or writing with a pen. Yet, he could attend school
and take classes which required the taking of notes, could
perform the functions of a quality control engineer, which
involved writing and computer use, and was able to conduct
the activities of daily living. This evidence was held to not
create an issue of whether Chanda was substantially limited
in performing manual tasks. Interestingly, the instant case

16

is discussed in Chanda which notes that “the case-by case
nature of the disability determination” makes the facts of
the instant case distinguishable from Chanda. Id. at 1224.
In fact, Chanda supports the Sixth Circuit result in this case
by noting how severe Ms. Williams’ impairment is.

At page 10 of Toyota’s Petition, it cites Hilburn v.
Murata Electronics North America, Inc., 181 F.3d 1220
(11th Cir. 1999) in which the claimant stated that the only
thing she was told that she could not do was lifting and she
never identified specifically or by class any major tasks
which she was unable to perform. /d. at 1228. In other words,
this is acase where no evidence of impairment was presented.

At page 10 of the Petition, Toyota relies upon Snow v.
Ridgeview Medical Center, 128 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir. 1997).
This is also a “no evidence” case, “appellant has presented
no evidence .. .” Jd. at 1207.

At page 15 of the Petition, Toyota cites numerous cases
for the proposition that an inability to perform in a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in
the major life activity of working. Ms. Williams agrees with
this general statement and notes that this result would be
required by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

Ms. Williams agrees that such an inability will not
suffice to prove a substantial limitation on the major life
activity of working, but Ms. Williams points out that a
different major life activity, performing manual tasks, is
involved here, and there is not and probably could not be in
a logical sense such a requirement for the major life activity
of performing manual tasks.

|
|

17

A brief review of Toyota’s cited cases shows they are
not relevant to the facts of Ms. Williams case. Colwell v.
Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir.
1998); “Evidence was insufficient to support finding that
any of the officer’s impairments were substantial, .. .”;
Santiago Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25,
30 (Ist Cir. 2000), “Impairment not shown to have
substantially inferred with her performance of any of the
identified major life activities.”; Olson v. General Elec.
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947 (3d Cir. 1996), only showed
limitation for a single job and claim actually was denied
because no evidence showed claimant to be “regarded as
disabled.”; Halperin v. Abacus Technology Corp., 128 F.3d
191 (4th Cir. 1997), no evidence of substantial limitation;
Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723 (Sth Cir. 1995),
no evidence; McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110
F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997) only deals with major life activity
of working; Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d. 512
(7th Cir. 1998), Plaintiff stated she could physically perform
job, no medical proof of severe restriction, and only proof
of inability to perform particular job; Gutridge v. Clure, 153
F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 1998), claimant was computer service
technician who had to lift computer equipment but could
not and found other employment in a job which did not
require lifting, held, no evidence of substantial limitation as
to working; Broussard v. University of California, at
Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 1999), no evidence of
impairment as to working; Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d
939 (10th Cir. 1994), no evidence presented; Standard v.
A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1998), no
evidence presented; and Duncan v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Authority, 201 F.3d 482 (D.C. Cir. 2000), no evidence
presented.

18
Il.

The Sixth Circuit decision does not conflict with this
Court’s recent precedent concerning the ADA.

Toyota claims the Sixth Circuit has held an ADA
disability may be proven simply by showing that an
impairment merely “affects” a major life activity instead of
the impairment being required to substantially limit or
significantly restrict a major life activity, citing A/berison's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). Petition p. 18.

As noted previously, Ms. Williams agrees that the
impairment must substantially limit the major life activity,
and Ms. Williams agrees that Albertson s so holds.

The Sixth Circuit opinion also is in conformity with this
principle.

However, Toyota misstates the Sixth Circuit holding to
be, “a mere effect—not a significant restriction—on the major
life activity of working is enough to demonstrate a substantial
limitation on performing manual tasks.” Petition p. 21.

The Sixth Circuit found that Ms. Williams was
substantially limited in the major life activity of performing
manual tasks. The Sixth Circuit opinion does not rest on a
determination of whether Ms. Williams is substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. The Sixth Circuit
simply required that Ms. Williams’ impairment in performing
manual tasks affect her work, a requirement previously
embodied in § 12112(a).

19

There is no conflict among the circuits concerning an
important and recurring issue that should be decided by this
Court.

Toyota notes the increasing number of repetitive stress/
trauma injuries in the workplace (Petition pp. 22-23) and
advances the proposition that individuals with the same sort
of impairments should not be covered under the ADA in one
part of the country but covered in another. Petition p. 24.

In essence, Toyota requests that a standard be adopted
on a national basis that carpal tunnel syndrome and repetitive
stress injuries cannot lead to a finding of disability under
the ADA. While it is easy to understand Toyota’s economic
motives for suggesting such a standard, such a position is
flatly rejected by the statute, § 12102(2) requiring that
disability be determined “with respect to an individual-. . . ,
and this Court’s holding, widely accepted, that a disability
determination be an individualized determination.”
Sutton, id. at 483.

There is no indication that the ADA is being construed
in anything other than a uniform manner as it is clear the
disability determination is an individualized determination
to be made on a case—by-—case basis.

20

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT LESLIE ROSENBAUM
Counsel of Record

ROSENBAUM & ROSENBAUM, P.S.C.
300 Lexington Building

201 West Short Street

Lexington, Kentucky 40507
(859) 259-1321

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0445%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.