# Reply Brief — TRW Inc. v. Andrews

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 534 U.S. 19

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S
‘~TLED

JUN 28 200)

No. 00-1045

IN THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the

TRW INC.,

Petitioner,
v.
ADELAIDE ANDREWS,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

DANIEL MCLOON DANIEL H. BROMBERG
EUGENIA C. SALAMON (Counsel of Record)
JONES, DAY, REAVIS & GLEN D. NAGER

POGUE JONES, DAY, REAVIS &
555 WEST FIFTH STREET POGUE

SUITE 4600 51 LOUISIANA AVENUE,
Los ANGELES, CA 90013 N.W.

(213) 489-3939 WASHINGTON, DC 20001

(202) 879-3939

Counsel for Petitioner

———

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

I.

CONCLUSION

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 618
EXPRESSES THE TRADITIONAL
COMMENCEMENT RULE, NOT A

GENERAL DISCOVERY RULE. ........

THE MISREPRESENTATION
EXCEPTION ALSO SUPPORTS THE
TRADITIONAL COMMENCEMENT

PEE Amb aeeedvcnedesedeessvescocese

THE POLICY ARGUMENTS OF
RESPONDENT AND THE
GOVERNMENT ARE IRRELEVANT

AND UNPERSUASIVE. ...............

NEITHER RESPONDENT NOR HER
AMICI DEFEND THE PRESUMPTION

APPLIED BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT. ....

RESPONDENT’S ACTUAL DAMAGES
ARGUMENT IS NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT AND, IN ANY

EVENT, WITHOUT MERIT.............

“er eneeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee # # # @ @

ieout 5

seca OF

foto

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

CASES
Akutowicz v. United States, 859 F.2d 1122

(28 Cle. 1968)... cc cvccsecvesseseune see 10
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska,

460 U.S. $31 (19GF) oo eccecseccsue enn 4
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust

Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192 (1997) ......... 2
Bergman v. United States, 751 F.2d 314

Ci Ye 3) rr 10
Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 64 (1876)....... 19
Bowyer v. United States Dep't of Air Force,

87S F.2d 632 (Fis Cir. 19GB) . wc cccvccccvsvcsesss 10
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) ...........4.. 2

Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945)... 12
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,

Jnc., 121 8. Ce. 1GTB GABBER) onc cseccscscuuenseuen 19
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,

$14 US. 73 (1906) ..ccccvcscocnnsecuneeeneneee 11
Englerius v. Veterans Admin., 837 F.2d 895

(Sta Cle. 1968)... occccccsccscnscuueu ene 10
Estate of Cowart v. Nickles Drilling Co.,

$05 U.S. 460 (IGS) 2. ccccvcccnnsseussuueeenee 11
Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930) ......... 3
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) ............ 18
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997) ....... 18
McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951) ........ 3
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) ....... 12

Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291 (1995)... 11
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 604 A.2d 47

(DEE. 1992) . 0 oc cvcsccessessecennenneneeee 3,5
Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941) «2.2... eee ee ee eee 2
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987) ... 11, 12
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) ............ 17,18
Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ..... 10

ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page

United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998) ......... 6
United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997) ....... 6
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) ...... 4,18
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) .............. 4
West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,

eee cece tcccceccces 13
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) .............. 12
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

EEE 17, 18
STATUTES
peeveey Ast, SUS.C. 6 SS2m .... ccc ccc ccc ccces 9,10
Fair Credit Reporting Act,

Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 609, 84 Stat. 1131 .......... 13

EEE TTT TTTTORET 10

eee ect c ck eccccccccees 10

EEL EEE 12

ee ene ccccccécceceeses 8, 10

ee reac ccccecsccceecescse 10

eee eke ccocccccacccecccec: 1,7
Chee en ececcccecceececcccce 15
EE 16
Nee a cc ccccevceces 15
Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-393 ... 22... 0. ccc cece 16
Ohio Rev. Code § 3904.13 ........... ccc cece 16
CS 16
MISCELLANEOUS
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ............ 3,19
Ii Calvin C. Corman, Limitation of Actions

eee cc cccccccccccecse 2

Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern
Ee 5

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)

Fed. Trade Comm'n, JD Theft: When Bad

Things Happen To Your Good Name

CRD, FREED ivecvcccccccesesecoeccovescoss 13, 15
Fed. Trade Comm'n, /dentity Theft Complaints:

Figures and Trends November 1999 through

March 2001, available at http://www.consumer/

gov/idtheft/charts/nov99-mar0l-pdf .............. 14
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977) ......... 19
2 Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation

PPG occcnvececececanssncocensesoesss 20
Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice

GG BOSD cocccecéccavoncsdusbacedesacesee 18
The American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2000) ...... 2
1 The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) ........ 2
The Random House Dictionary of the English

Language (unabridged ed. 1973) ............650055 2
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary

CRINGE, GEGED cc ccccccccescccsccesvesess 2

eS RIED

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Petitioner demonstrated in its opening brief that the statute
of limitations in Section 618 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1681p, incorporates the traditional commence-
ment rule rather than the discovery rule applied below by the
Ninth Circuit. This conclusion is dictated by the language of
Section 618 and is confirmed by the section’s misrepre-
sentation exception, the overall structure of the FCRA, and the
Act's history. In addition, as the opening brief also showed,
the strong presumption in favor of the discovery rule employed
by the Ninth Circuit in departing from the traditional
commencement rule is without foundation and, in any event,
is rebutted by the text, structure, and history of Section 618.
Neither respondent nor her amici casts any reasonable doubt
upon these points.

I. THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 618 EXPRESSES
THE TRADITIONAL COMMENCEMENT RULE,
NOT A GENERAL DISCOVERY RULE.

Over the last two decades, a half dozen federal courts of
appeals decisions, a dozen district court decisions, and a
number of commentators have all concluded that Section 618
incorporates the traditional commencement rule starting the
statute of limitations when the formal right to sue under the
Act attaches. See Pet. Br. at 12-13 nn.4-7. As the opening
brief demonstrated, these decisions reflect the language of
Section 618, which expresses the traditional commencement
rule, id. at 14-16, and the decisions of this Court interpreting
statutes with similar language, id. at 16-17. Neither
respondent nor her amici has an answer to this demonstration.

1. Respondent’s interpretation of the language of Section
618 focuses, as it should, upon the meaning of the word
“arise” in the portion of the section's statute of limitations
stating the general commencement rule. Contrary to
respondent’s contention, however, that word expresses the
traditional rule, not a discovery rule.

2

As respondent acknowledges, Resp. Br. at 22, the word
“arise” means to “come[] into existence” or to “originate.” 1
The Oxford English Dictionary 629 (2d ed. 1989); see also
The American Heritage Dictionary 96 (4th ed. 2000) (defining
“arise” to mean “[t]o come into being; originate”); The
Random House Dictionary of the English Language 80
(unabridged ed. 1973) (“to come into being” or to “originate”’);
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 117 (unabridged ed.
1976) (“to come into being” or to “come about”). If “arise” is
understood in this common and ordinary sense, Section 618's
statute of limitations is naturally and easily read to begin
running upon “the date liability originates or comes into
existence.” As this Court has observed, under the traditional
commencement rule, the statute of limitations begins to run
when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of
action.” Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941); see
generally Il Calvin C. Corman, Limitation of Actions § 11.1.1,
at 1341991). Moreover, because a defendant’s liability is the
converse of a plaintiff's right to sue, see Gov. Br. at 13, a
defendant’s liability comes into existence when a plaintiff's
right of action becomes complete. See id.; accord Resp. Br. at
37 n.26. Thus, as respondent concedes, see Resp. Br. at 22, if
“arise” is understood to mean to come into existence, Section
618 expresses the traditional commencement rule.

Noting that the word “arise” can also mean “to spring up,”
“to come into . . . notice,” or to “present itself,” 1 The Oxford
English Dictionary at 629, respondent contends that the
language of Section 618 expresses a generally applicable
discovery rule. Resp. Br. at 13. The meaning of statutory
language is, however, “a creature not of definitional
possibilities, but of statutory context.” Brown v. Gardner, 513
U.S. 115, 118 (1994). As the opening brief pointed out, Pet.
Br. at 16-17, this Court has interpreted statutes of limitations
commencing when a claim or cause of action “arises” to begin
running when a plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of
action,” Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust

3

Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997), or upon the
“date of injury,” McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 26
(1951). See also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 604 A.2d
47, 54 (Md. 1992) (“Giving the word its ordinary meaning, we
believe that a cause of action arises when it first comes into
existence.”). The legal dictionary used by respondent
recognizes this usage as well: according to the dictionary,
when a statute of limitations uses the word “arise,” the
limitations period starts running “when [a] party has a right to
apply to [a] proper tribunal for relief.” Black's Law
Dictionary 108 (6th ed. 1990); see also Jamison v.
Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 641 (1930) (noting that a
defendant’s “liability arises when one suffers injury as a result
of any breach of duty owed to him for another’).

Far from showing that the word “arise” is used in a different
sense in Section 618, respondent fails to identify a single
situation in which the word “arise” has been used to refer to a
discovery rule. In fact, to petitioner's knowledge,
respondent’s application of this definition to a statute of
limitations — which respondent did not urge in either the
court of appeals or the district court below — is
unprecedented. Thus, respondent does not even begin to show
that her interpretation reflects the common, ordinary
understanding of the language of Section 618.

Indeed, respondent fails to explain how a discovery rule can
be culled out of Section 618 even if her definition of “arise” is
used. Under that definition, the limitations period in the
section would begin to run when “liability springs up, comes
into notice, or presents itself.” Although respondent contends
that this occurs when “a plaintiff actually or constructively
discovers that he has been injured,” Resp. Br. at 10 (quotation
omitted), she does not explain why that is so: the phrase
created by her definition does not mention either plaintiff or
discovery, and it refers to liability rather than injury. Thus,
respondent’s ability to identify an alternative definition of the

4

word “arise” does not establish that Section 618 can validly be
read to incorporate a general discovery rule.

2. In their brief in support of respondent, the United States
and the Federal Trade Commission do not attempt to defend
respondent’s analysis of the language of Section 618. Nor, for
that matter, does the Government contend that this language is
naturally read to incorporate a discovery rule. Instead, it
simply argues that the language “will bear that construction.”
Gov. Br. at 6; see also id. at 9-15. This argument is flawed.

In the first place, the Government’s argument starts from an
erroneous legal premise. In contending that Section 618 will
“bear” a discovery rule and then arguing that such a rule is
good policy, Gov. Br. at 9, 24, the Government assumes that
the text of a statute of limitations is relevant only to the extent
it permits a discovery rule and that whether the statute in fact
incorporates such a rule is a matter of policy left to judicial
determination in light of the purpose and structure of the
statute. That is not the law. As this Court has observed,
“deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well as
recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language
of a bill, generally requires us to assume that the legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambeli, Alaska, 480
U.S. 531, 548 (1987) (quotations omitted). Thus, in the
absence of “strong evidence that Congress actually intended
another meaning,” courts must apply the natural, ordinary
meaning of the language Congress enacts, whether or not that
language theoretically permits alternative interpretations. /d.

In addition, the Government fails to show that the language
of Section 618 permits a discovery rule. In arguing that it
does, the Government relies on decisions construing statutes
of limitations that commence when claims or causes of actions
“accrue.” Gov. Br. at 10-13 (discussing United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), and Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163 (1949)). Section 618, however, uses the word

5

“arise,” not “accrue,” and the two words are not
interchangeable. As previously demonstrated, see Pet. Br. at
19-20, the word “accrue” is more elastic and, unlike “arise,”
can be interpreted to refer to the discovery rule. See Owens-
Illinois, 604 A.2d at 53-54 (distinguishing between when a
claim “arises” and when it “accrues”); see also Bryan A.
Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 16 (2d ed. 1995)
(“Arise may refer to the onset of the underlying wrong (e.g.,
exposure to asbestos), whereas accrue may refer to the
ripeness of the claim (e.g., contraction of asbestosis or
discovery of the disease).”). In short, the Government’s
interpretation is defective as well as illegitimate.

II. THE MISREPRESENTATION EXCEPTION ALSO
SUPPORTS THE TRADITIONAL COMMENCE-
MENT RULE.

In addition to showing that Section 618 explicitly adopts the
traditional commencement rule, the opening brief showed that
the misrepresentation exception is inconsistent with a general
discovery rule for two separate reasons. First, an unstated
general discovery rule should not be implied into the section
in the face of an explicit exception to the general
commencement rule itself containing an express discovery
provision. See Pet. Br. at 21-23. Second, a general discovery
rule would, as a practical matter, deprive the misrepresentation
exception of any meaningful effect. See id. at 23-25.
Respondent and her amici do not cast any doubt upon the first
reason, which is fatal to the construction that they urge, and
they fail to undermine the second one as well.

1. In arguing that the presence of the misrepresentation
exception casts doubt upon the existence of a general
discovery rule, petitioner relied upon the well-established
interpretive principle, which this Court has recently applied to
statutes of limitations, that the presence of an express
exception generally precludes implication of an unstated one.
See Pet. Br. at 21-23 (discussing United States v. Beggerly,

6

524 U.S. 38 (1998), and United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S.
347, 351-52 (1997)). Unable to dispute the validity of this
principle, respondent asserts that it is not absolute and does not
“necessarily rule out the finding of other implied exceptions.”
Resp. Br. at 35. Respondent does not, however, distinguish
this Court’s decisions applying the principle to other statutes
of limitations or otherwise explain why it is inapplicable here.’

Although the Government attempts to offer such an
explanation, its explanation is unpersuasive. Cataloguing the
differences between the equitable estoppel doctrine, the
discovery rule, and equitable tolling, the Government argues
that inclusion of an exception codifying the equitable estoppel
doctrine does not raise an inference that Congress intended to
preclude application of a general discoyery rule. Gov. Br. at
15-21; see also Pet. Br. at 35 (explaining why equitable tolling
is inapplicable here). This Court has not, however, been
concerned with such doctrinal distinctions in refusing to imply
exceptions into statutes of limitations in prior cases, see, e.g.,
Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 48 (finding equitable tolling barred by
explicit presence of discovery rule); Brockamp, 519 U.S. at
351-52 (finding equitable tolling barred by presence of explicit
exceptions to general commencement rule), and the

' Instead, respondent launches into an attack on the “‘violation occurrence’
rule.” Resp. Br. at 36. This is a strawman that respondent employs at
several times in her brief. See id. at 11, 17 n.10, 20, 22-29, 35-37 & n.26,
41. As the opening brief clearly stated, however, petitioner’s position is
not that Section 618's statute of limitations adopts a “violation occurrence”
rule, but rather that Section 618 “adopts the traditional commencement rule
beginning the statute when the formal right to sue under the Act attaches.”
Pet. Br. at 15; see also id. at 16 (noting that in this case the injury was
suffered and the cause of action became complete when the violation
occurred). Other statements by respondent and her amici characterizing
petitioner's arguments, describing petitioner's conduct, and depicting the
credit reporting industry are similarly inaccurate and unfounded.

7

Government offers no reason why it should be specially
concerned about those distinctions in this case.

In any event, the presence of an explicit discovery provision
in the misrepresentation exception raises an inference that
Congress did not intend Section 618 implicitly to incorporate
a general discovery rule. Congress knows how to incorporate
a discovery rule into statutes of limitations clearly and
unequivocally and has done so frequently. See Pet. Br. at 17-
19 & nn.8-10. Congress did so in the misrepresentation
exception in providing that the exception would delay
commencement until “after discovery by the individual of the
misrepresentation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681p. As Congress did not
use such language in Section 618's general commencement
rule but instead used the phrase “liability arises,” language that
it has used in the past to distinguish the discovery rule from
the traditional commencement rule, see Pet. Br. at 20, the
misrepresentation exception raises a natural — and powerful
— inference that Congress did not intend to incorporate a
general discovery rule into Section 618.

2. In addition to showing that the misrepresentation
exception with its explicit discovery provision should preclude
the implication of an unstated general discovery rule,
petitioner also explained that a general discovery rule would
render the misrepresentation exception largely redundant. Pet.
Br. at 23-25. In response, both respondent and the
Government offer hypotheticals about possible residual
applications of the misrepresentation exception. Neither
hypothetical, however, identifies a substantial independent
application for the exception, which is petitioner’s point.

Respondent posits discovery of “misconduct or its
ramifications” in one year and of “a willful misrepresentation
material to the reporting agency’s extant FCRA liability” in
the next. Resp. Br. at 32-33. Petitioner has not, however,
argued that a general discovery rule would, as a theoretical
matter, duplicate the operation of the misrepresentation

8

exception; it contends that such a rule would, “/a/s a practical
matter,” operate similarly enough to deprive the exception of
meaningful, independent effect. Pet. Br. at 24 (emphasis
added). Because respondent’s hypothetical lacks any concrete
details about the injury suffered, the facts misrepresented, or
their discovery, it is too abstract to undermine petitioner's
pragmatic point and the interpretive inference that flows from
it.

Although the Government’s hypothetical is more concrete,
it does not work either because it ignores the operation of the
Act. ‘a that hypothetical,-a consumer who is denied credit
based upon an inaccurate report from a credit agency asks the
agency if it supplied a report, but is falsely told that the agency
did not do so. See Gov. Br. at 22. Under these circumstances,
the Government contends that the statute of limitations would
begin running under a general discovery rule when the
consumer learns that credit has been denied because the
consumer would be “put on inquiry notice of the violation” at
that time, but that the statute would not begin running under
the misrepresentation exception until later when the consumer
discovers that a report was in fact issued. Jd.

In fact, however, the consumer should learn about the report
at the same time that he discovers that credit has been denied,
because the FCRA requires that consumers who are denied
' credit based upon a report be notified of the denial and of the
identity of the credit reporting agency. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681m(a)(1) (requiring disclosure of adverse action); id.
§ 1681m(a)(2) (requiring disclosure of identity of the agency
furnishing report on which adverse action based). The
Government does not explain why the misrepresentation
exception would apply in that situation or, if so, why it would
operate differently there than the discovery rule. Even more
importantly, the Government also fails to explain how in such
a situation the misrepresentation exception would serve any
function intended by Congress. Thus, the Government’s

9

hypothetical fails to show that the misrepresentation exception
has any meaningful role to play in the presence of a general
discovery rule.

It is, of course, possible that, with more time and reflection,
either respondent or the Government might come up with a
concrete hypothetical in which the misrepresentation exception
plays a meaningful role despite the presence of a general
discovery rule. If, however, neither respondent nor the Federal
Trade Commission, the agency primarily responsible for
enforcing the FCRA, can easily identify such a situation, such
situations must be relatively anomalous and therefore unlikely
to have prompted Congress to include the exception. In any
event, even if respondent could point to some meaningful role
that the misrepresentation exception would play despite a
general discovery rule, that fact would not affect the basic
textual point that the express inclusion of a discovery
provision in the exception undermines any suggestion that
language adopted at the same time, in the same amendment
implicitly incorporates a general discovery rule.

3. In arguing that the language of Section 618 is
compatible with a general discovery rule, respondent and the
Government both rely upon appellate decisions construing the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Resp. Br. at 37-39; Gov. Br. at
13-15. This reliance is misplaced.

Neither respondent nor the Government explains why this
Court should look to cases under the Privacy Act, rather than
the numerous cases and commentators considering Section
618 and concluding that it generally applies the traditional
commencement rule. See Pet. Br. at 12-13 nn.4-7. These
latter authorities reflect the breadth and depth of legal opinion
that formed the previously settled understanding of Section
618 for the better part of two decades and that was left
undisturbed (and thereby embraced) when Congress reworked
the FCRA in 1996. See id. at 39-40. If this Court is to rely
upon authority, this is the proper authority.

10

In any event, the Privacy Act cases cited by respondent and
the Government are unpersuasive. None of them explain how
a discovery rule can be culled out of the language of that
statute. In all but one, there is no analysis of the text; instead,
they simply declare that they are applying the discovery rule in
the absence of any apparent objection by the Government.
See Bowyer v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 875 F.2d 632,
636 (7th Cir. 1989); Akutowicz v. United States, 859 F.2d
1122, 11265 (2d Cir. 1988); Englerius v. Veterans Admin., 837
F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1988); Bergman v. United States, 751
F.2d 314, 316 (10th Cir. 1984). Moreover, the remaining
decision considered only whether a discovery rule would
render the misrepresentation exception in the Privacy Act’s
statute of limitations superfluous. See Tijerina v. Walters, 821
F.2d 789, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1987). And the decision’s contrary
conclusion is irrelevant here, because it was based upon the
theoretical differences between the discovery rule and the
misrepresentation exception there rather than their practical
operation in the context of the Privacy Act, see id., which in
any event differs materially from the FCRA in its notice,
access, and remedial provisions. Compare 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552a(b), (d) & (g) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681d &
1681m-1681lo0. Similarly, policy arguments concerning the
difficulty of discovering violations of the Privacy Act (see
Englerius, 837 F.2d at 897; Tijerna, 821 F.2d at 797-98) are
inapposite here because of the differences in the notice and
access provisions of the two statutes. For these reasons as
well, the lower court decisions construing the Privacy Act
provide no basis for ignoring the language of Section 618 and
the cases construing it.

Ill. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT
AND THE GOVERNMENT ARE IRRELEVANT
AND UNPERSUASIVE.

The Government contends that a general discovery rule
should be implied into Section 618 based upon its reading of

11

the purposes of that section and related policies. Gov. Br. at
24-30. It does not, however, contend that the ordinary
meaning of the statute's language violates the clear intention of
Congress or leads to a patent absurdity. Instead, assuming that
this language can be read to incorporate a general discovery
rule, the Government argues that such a rule would best serve
the statute’s purposes and policies. As that assumption is
false, these arguments are irrelevant. Moreover, even
considered on their own merits, the Government’s arguments
are unpersuasive because, among other things, they ignore the
structure and history of the Act.

1. As this Court has repeatedly observed, “‘[w]hen a
Statute speaks with clarity to an issue, judicial inquiry into the
Statute’s meaning, in all but the most extraordinary
circumstance, is finished.’” Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo,
515 U.S. 291, 295 (1995) (quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992)). Accordingly, where,
as here, “the text alone yields a clear answer,” this Court has
been “reluctant to indulge an argument based on legislative
purpose.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S.
73, 81 (1995); see generally Rodriguez v. United States, 480
U.S. 522, 526 (1987). Such forbearance is especially
appropriate here, because there is no suggestion of any
extraordinary circumstances justifying disregard of the
statute’s language, and because the legislative history shows
that Congress specifically considered the proper commence-
ment rule for Section 618 — and rejected a proposal for a
discovery rule in so doing. See Pet. Br. at 35-39. Thus, the
ordinary meaning of the language of Section 618 controls.

2. In any event, the policy arguments offered by the
Government are unpersuasive.

a. Tle Government’s policy arguments ignore relevant
policies. Contending that Congress’ goal of “encourag[ing]
the prompt presentation of claims” would not be served by
commencing Section 618’s limitations period before a plaintiff

12

suspects injury, the Government asserts that the discovery rule
would serve the purposes of the statute. Gov. Br. at 25-30.
That goal is not, however, Section 618’s only goal. To the
contrary, as petitioner pointed out, Pet. Br. at 29-30, statutes of
limitations are also intended to serve the interests of
defendants and the public in avoiding the litigation of stale
claims and the interests of defendants in certainty and peace of
mind. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985);
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).

As it “frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s
primary objective must be the law,” Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at
526 (emphasis omitted); see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1993) (noting that a statute cannot be
interpreted based upon “‘vague notions of [the] statute’s “basic
purpose’”), the Government’s one-sided policy argument is
inadequate.

b. In addition, the Government ignores Section 609 of the
FCRA, even though petitioner’s brief showed (Pet. Br. at 31-
32) that the section is inconsistent with any suggestion that
Congress intended to permit improper disclosure claims to be
brought more than two years after discovery of the disclosure.

Section 609 gives consumers the right to learn who has
received their credit reports, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3), a
right that is normally essential to bringing improper disclosure
claims because of the inherent difficulty of discovering such
disclosures. This right does not, however, extend for an
indefinite period of time. To the contrary, as the opening brief
pointed out, Pet. Br. at 32, Section 609 generally requires
credit reporting agencies to identify recipients of reports only
for the “l-year period preceding the date on which the
[consumer’s] request is made.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3)(11);
see also id. § 1681g(a)(3){i) (two-year period for reports
requested for employment purposes). Moreover, when the
FCRA was passed, agencies were generally required to

13

disclose recipients going back only six months. See FCRA,
Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 609, 84 Stat. 1131. As these restrictions
effectively prevent many (if not most) plaintiffs who do not
request access to their files within a year or two of disclosure
from bringing improper disclosure claims, they are
inconsistent with a general discovery rule presumably intended
to allow such claims to be brought within two years after
discovery of disclosure.

In fact, Section 609 casts serious doubt upon any claim that
Congress intended to incorporate a general discovery rule into
Section 618. As the Government acknowledges, Gov. Br. at
27, the notice and access provisions in the FCRA help to
ensure that consumers discover any injuries suffered as a result
of an inaccuracy in a credit report as well as any injuries
suffered as the result of the disclosure of an investigative
consumer report. See Pet. Br. at 26-28. Consequently, a
general discovery rule would apply primarily to improper
disclosure claims (and, indeed, to improper disclosure claims
dealing with ordinary, rather than investigative, consumer
reports). As Section 609 undermines the ability of consumers
to bring such claims more than two years after disclosure, it
also undermines any suggestion that Congress intended to
incorporate a general discovery rule into Section 618.
Moreover, because the ‘est evidence of [congressional]
purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of
Congress and submitted to the President,” West Virginia Univ.
Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991), Section 609
offers more significant evidence of Congress’ purposes than
any of the Government’s arguments.

c. The Government’s reliance upon the identity theft
problem (Gov. Br. at 29) is misplaced.

First, as both respondent and the Government note, Gov.
Pr. at 29; Resp. Br. at 2, the issue of identity theft only became
prominent in the last decade. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n,
ID Theft: When Bad Things Happen To Your Good Name 2

14

(Aug. 2000) (hereinafter, JD Theft]. It therefore cannot fairly
be said that Congress was concerned with identity theft in
1970, when Section 618 was enacted. Moreover, if Congress
had intended Section 618 to deal with identity theft, it could
have amended the Act to do so in 1996 when tie Act was
overhauled. See Pet. Br. at 39-40.

Second, a general discovery rule is not needed to deal with
the identity theft problem. When an imposter poses as a
consumer, he typically obtains and then abuses credit, leaving
the consumer to deal with the fallout. As a consequence,
consumers victimized by identity theft are often denied credit
as a result of the thief’s activities or are hounded by bill
collectors seeking payments evaded by the imposter. See
Resp. Br. at 3. For example, in this case, respondent
(allegedly) was denied a loan in late May 1995, Pet. App. 18a,
and in October of that year, she was contacted by two
collection agencies seeking to collect on separate debts due
from the imposter who assumed her identity. Resp. Br. at 5,
7; ER 75, 138. Thus, a market mechanism ensures consumers
will discover identity theft and thereby receive notice of any
improper disclosure claims they may have under the FCRA.

No doubt anticipating this argument, the Government
asserts, based upon data assembled by the Federal Trade
Commission, that more than 25% of the victims of identity
theft take more than a year to discover the theft. Gov. Br. at
29. That same data, however, also shows that approximately
35% of the victims of identity theft discover the theft within a
month, that another 30% do so in the next five months, and
that over 80% of the victims learn of thefts by the end of two
years. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, /dentity Theft Complaint
Data: Figures and Trends November 1999 through March
2001, Figure 8, available at
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/charts/nov99-mar01 .pdf
(last visited June 27, 2001). Thus, if the Government’s figures
are correct, the vast majority of identity theft victims receive

15

notice of their injuries long before the statute of limitations
expires under a traditional commencement rule.

Third, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to distort the
language of the FCRA to deal with the problem of identity
theft. The primary means of dealing with that problem is not
private lawsuits against credit reporting agencies; it is actions,
either civil or criminal, against identity thieves. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 1028 (criminal); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571h (civil).
Moreover, because identity theft is currently the subject of
legislation at both the state and federal levels, see /D Theft at
10-12, the problem is best left to legislatures to remedy.

3. Respondent does not contend that policy considerations
demand a general discovery rule. Instead, she argues more
modestly that policy supports her interpretation of the text of
Section 618. Resp. Br. at 40-46. Even these limited
arguments are, however, unpersuasive.

a. In addition to echoing the Government’s concerns over
identity theft and improper disclosures, respondent objects that
the FCRA’s notice and access provisions do not afford
consumers enough time to bring their claims because,
according to her, a consumer typically needs two years to
prepare a FCRA suit. Resp. Br. at 41-43. At trial, however,
respondent revealed that she filed suit within two months after
contacting counsel. See Trial Tr. 52, 1955 (noting contact in
August 1996 and filing in October 1996). As respondent fails
to explain why a typical counsel would need much longer than
that, her conclusory assertions concerning the time needed to
bring a suit deserve no weight.

b. Respondent similarly errs in disputing petitioner’s
demonstration that a discovery rule would not impose a
significant burden upon the credit reporting industry because
the costs of data storage are “plummeting.” Resp. Br. at 44-45
& n.32. In the first place, storage costs are not the only costs

imposed by a discovery rule. As the opening brief pointed out,

16

a general discovery rule would undermine the ability of
potential defendants to project their potential liabilities and
require them to litigate claims that have grown stale. Pet. Br.
at 29-31, 41-42. In addition, discovery rules impose
transaction costs upon defendants and courts alike because
they require resolution of often nettlesome questions over
when injuries should have been discovered. See id. at 42.
Finally, even if respondent’s claims about the cost of data
storage were substantiated by more than a press release, it
would not follow that a general discovery rule would have no
impact on credit reporting agencies. Given the sheer volume
of information stored and processed by credit agencies —
hundreds of millions of consumer credit files, more than half
a billion reports each year, and more than two billion pieces of
information each month, see id. at 30-31 — even a tiny per
unit increase in the cost of data storage would cost the industry
millions of dollars a year.

c. Respondent also asserts that incorporating a general
discovery rule into Section 618 would not significantly add to
the credit industry’s burdens, because statutes dealing with
credit reporting in California, Georgia, and Ohio have
limitations periods incorporating the rule that already compel
the necessary data storage. See Resp. Br. at 45. The
California statute, however, sets an outside limit on the age of
suits brought under it that would not be present under either of
respondent’s readings of Section 618, see Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1785.33 (requiring suits to be brought “not more than seven
years from the earliest date on which liability could have
arisen’’), and the other statutes impose only limited obligations

in connection with either willful violations, see Ga. Code Ann. —

§ 10-1-393(b)(29), or insurance transactions, see Ohio Rev.
Code §§ 3904.13, 3904.21(B). Thus, these limited provisions
do not have the same import that the sweeping and unlimited
discovery rule urged by respondent would have, and, like the
rest of the policy arguments advanced by respondent and the

17

Government, they cannot justify departure from the plain and
ordinary meaning of the language of Section 618.

IV. NEITHER RESPONDENT NOR HER AMICI
DEFEND THE PRESUMPTION APPLIED BY
THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

As the opening brief demonstrated, the strong presumption
that the Ninth Circuit used in implying a general discovery rule
into Section 618 has no basis in the decisions of this Court,
which have not applied any presumption in favor of a
discovery rule to statute of limitations that contains an explicit
commencement provision. Pet. Br. at 40-45. As also
demonstrated, such a presumption makes no sense in light of
Congress’ repeated practice of including explicit discovery
provisions in statutes as well as the uncertainty about how a
discovery rule would affect the balance between protecting
valid claims and enabling repose struck in particular statutes
of limitations. /d. at 41-42. Neither respondent nor her amici
attempt to defend the Ninth Circuit’s presumption, or any
other presumption in favor of the discovery rule, against these
objections. Indeed, the Government appears to reject the
presumption. Gov. Br. at 11 n.3 (recognizing the traditional
rule as the “standard” one “in most circumstances”) (quotation
omitted).’

? Respondent does assert that the discovery rule applies beyond the realm
of bodily injuries and medical malpractice, where “the cry for a discovery
rule is loudest.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000); accord
Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although respondent
relies upon Zenith Radio Carp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321
(1971), in doing so, she does not invoke the case’s treatment of claims for
lost future profits. Instead, noting Zenith’s statement that a cause of action
accrues “if a plaintiff feels the adverse impact of an antitrust conspiracy,”
Zenith, 401 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added), respondent asserts that this
Court implicitly adopted a discovery rule on the ground that a plaintiff
“feels” an injury only when he “consciously suffers” it. Resp. Br. at 19-
20. This is frivolous. Far from suggesting that an injury must be

18

Vv. RESPONDENT’S ACTUAL DAMAGES
ARGUMENT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT AND, IN ANY EVENT, WITHOUT
MERIT.

No doubt recognizing the flaws in her attempt to read a
discovery rule into Section 618 and in the presumption applied
by the Ninth Circuit, respondent advances a new, alternative
argument in her opposition brief. While asserting that
petitioner breached her “financial privacy” and that these
breaches facilitated the theft of her identity, see Resp. Br. at 4,
respondent also contends that she did not suffer any “actual
damages” cognizable under the FCRA until she realized that
her privacy had been invaded by the allegedly improper
disclosure of her credit records. See id. at 22-29. This new
argument is not properly before this Court and, in any event,
is meritless.

Although a party that prevailed below can go beyond the
question presented in defending the judgment at issue, as a
general rule, this Court “will not consider a claim that was not
presented to the courts below.” Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 234 n.1 (1980); see generally Robert L. Stern et ai.,
Supreme Court Practice 344 (7th ed. 1993). As respondent
did not advance her “actual damages” argument in either the
district court or the court of appeals, this argument should not
be considered here. First, respondent does not cite any lower
court decisions pertinent to her argument, and petitioner is
unaware of any. As a consequence, this Court lacks the

consciously suffered to trigger the limitations period, Zenith states that
future damages accrue “on the date they are suffered,” without any
reference to consciousness. Zenith, 401 U.S. at 339; see also id. at 338
(noting that a claim accrues “each time a plaintiff is injured”). Thus, as
this Court has noted, Zenith articulates the traditional “injury occurrence”
tule, not a discovery rule. See Rotella, 528 U.S. at 553-54 & n.2; Klehr v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 198 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).

—_—-

19

benefit of the views of the lower courts on this argument.
Second, focusing largely on strawman arguments concerning
the “violation occurrence” theory not advanced by petitioner,
see supra p. 6 n.1, respondent ignores the real issue raised by
her new argument, which is whether an invasion of privacy
unknown to its victim constitutes a cognizable injury sufficient
to warrant a damage award under the FCRA and therefore to
start the Act’s statute of limitations running. On that issue, she
simply asserts in a footnote, without argument or authority,
that the “unwitting victim suffers no actual damages unless
and until some personal realization occurs, usually through
discovery.” Resp. Br. at 24.n.17. As this conclusory assertion
offers no real guidance to petitioner or to the Court, this Court
should decline to address it and, instead, treat respondent’s
actual damages argument as waived below.

In any event, the actual damages argument is without merit.
As noted above, respondent contends that the allegedly
improper disclosure of her credit reports breached her financial
privacy, and it is hornbook law that an individual may recover
damages not only for emotional distress and pecuniary harm
resulting from an invasion of privacy, but also for the “harm
to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977).

Nor is there any reason to think that, by providing for
recovery of “actual damages,” Congress intended to prevent
consumers from receiving compensation for such injuries
under the FCRA. The term “actual damages” refers to
amounts awarded to “compensate for a proven injury or loss.”
Black's Law Dictionary 394; see also Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93
U.S. (3 Otto) 64, 64 (1876) (interpreting “actual damages” to
refer to damages resulting from “injury alleged and proved”).
Thus, the term is used to distinguish compensatory damages
from punitive and nominal ones, see, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1686, 1688
(2001) and, in the defamation and privacy contexts, to

20

distinguish unproven “presumed” damages from proven ones,
see, e.g., 2 Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 9:22, at
9-11 (2000). Consequently, the actual damages requirement
does not preclude a plaintiff from seeking damagés due to
improper disclosure of her purchasing habits and other private
financial information and therefore does not save the judgment
below.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in petitioner’s
opening brief, the judgment of the United States Comt of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL J. MCLOON DANIEL H. BROMBERG
EUGENI/. CASTRUCCIO SALAMON = (Counsel of Record)
JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE GLEN D.NAGER

555 West Fifth Street JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE
Suite 4600 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Los Angeles, CA 90013 Washington, DC 20001

(213) 489-3939 (202) 879-3939

Counsel for Petitioner TRW Inc.

June 28, 2001

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0442%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.
