# Joint Appendix Vol I — New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0429%3A08

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Joint Appendix Vol I
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 533 U.S. 947

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

‘

\ -

Nos. 00-568 anv 00-809 JUN 18 2001

In The q CLERK

Supreme Court of the Anited States

People of the State of New York and the Public
Service Commission of the State of New York, etal.
Petitioners,
v.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.,
Respondents.

Enron Power Marketing, Inc.,
Petitioner,
vV.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.,
Respondents.

On Waits Or Cerriorart To Tue Unitep STATES
Court Or Appeacs For Tue District Or CotumBia Circuit

JOINT APPENDIX (Vol. 1 of 2)

Louis R. Cohen * Theodore B. Olson *
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering Solicitor General
2445 M Street, N.W. Edwin S. Kneedler
Washington, D.C. 20037-1420 Deputy Solicitor General
(202) 663-6000 Austin C. Schlick
For Petitioner/Respondent, artmentof Justice
Enron Power Mkt., Inc. 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Room 5259

Lawrence G. Malone * Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
Public Service Commission (202) 514-2217

of the State of New York For Respondent, Federal
Three Empire State Plaza Energy Regulatory
Albany, NY 12223-1350 Commission
(518) 474-2510
For Petitioners, People of * COUNSEL OF RECORD
the State of New York. et al.

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.
CINCINNATI, OH 800-890-5001

James Bradford Ramsay
General Counsel
Sharla M. Barklind
Associate General Counsel
National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners
1101 Vermont Ave., N.W., Ste. 200
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 898-2208

Catherine D. Bedell

General Counsel

Richard Bellak

Associate General Counsel
Florida Public Service
Commission

2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850
(850) 413-6092

Alan G. Lance

Attorney General

Donald L. Howell, I!
a Attorney General
Idaho Public Utilities
Commission

472 W. Washington Street
P.O. Box 8372

Boise, ID 83720-0074
(208) 334-0312

John J. Farmer, Jr.
Attorney General
State of New Jersey
Helene S. Wallenstein
Sr. Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for New Jersey Board
of Public Utilities
124 Halsey Street, Sth Floor
P.O. Box 45029
Newark, New Jersey 07101
(973) 648-4846

Counsel for Petitioners/Respondents Raleigh, NC 27626-0520

State Public Service Commissions

(Counsel continued on inside back cover)

William H. Chambliss
General Counsel

C. Meade Browder, Jr.
Attorney

Virginia State Corp. Comm'n
Office of General Counsel
P.O. Box 1197

Richmond, VA 23218

(804) 371-9671

Christine O. Gregoire

Attorney Genera

William Berggren Collins

Sr. Assistant Attorney General
Robert D. Cedarbaum, Sr. Counsel
(forthe Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission)

P.O. Box 40128

Olympia, WA 98504-0128

(360) 664-1188

Harvey L. Reiter

(for Vermont Dept. of Public Service)
Morrison & Hecker

1150 18th Street, N.W., Ste. 800
Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 785-9100

Harry Ivey

(for Wyoming Public Service Comm'n)
Attorney General's Office

State of Wyoming

123 Capitol

Cheyenne, WY 82002

(307) 777-7824

Jo Anne Sanford

North Carolina Utilities Comm'n

Robert P. Gruber

Public Staff - North Carolina
Utilities Comm'n

Gisele L. Rankin, Staff Attorney
P.O. Box 29520

(919) 733-2435

ie

TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME I:

Relevant Docket Entries in District of
jee esse shee eeveescceess App. 5

Relevant Docket Entries Before Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ................. App. 15

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Recovery of

Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting

Utilities in Docket No. RM 94-7-000,

59 Fed Reg. 35,274, 35,283-86; 7/11/94 ...... App. 17

Comments of North Carolina Utilities Commission
and the Public Staff of the North Carolina Utilities
Commission; pp. 1, 2-4, 6-7; 5/10/95 ........ App. 34

Order No. 888 Promoting Wholesale Competition

Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory

Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery

of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting
Utilities; pp. 31,632-31 684; 31,687-31,703;
31,718-31,736; 31,743-31,753; 31,764-31,766;
31,770-31,785; 31,898-31,899; 31,919-31,926;
PUES ITED ccc ccc ccc eccees App. 42

VOLUME II:

Part 35 - Filing of Rate Schedules - 61 Fed. Reg.
EE App. 431

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s Petition
for Rehearing; pp. 1-2, 18-35; 5/23/96 ...... App. 444

App. 1

Virginia State Corporation Commission’s Request
for Rehearing; pp. 1, 3-9; 5/24/96 ......... App. 467

Motion for Rehearing of the Public Service
Commission of the State of New York; pp. 1-22;
PE + oetksinece sens bhebe ended ms App. 475

Request of the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners for Rehearing; pp. 1, 4-9;
DE 00d céuhedcseeséewetewesoaken App. 499

Application of the Coalition for a Competitive Electric
Market For Reconsideration and Clarification or, in the
Alternative, Rehearing; pp. 1, 4-8; 5/24/96 ... App. 509

Order No. 888-A - Order on Rehearing;

pp. 30,172-30,188; 30,200-30,218; 30,255-30,226;
30,278-30,281; 30,334-30,350; 30,402-30,424;
waste eadeadbeean App. 517

Brief for the Public Service Commissions of New
York, Arkansas and Florida, et al.; pp. 1-20; 30-32;
DE vsete¥adsabevuecuueelaueee App. 792

Excerpts from Electric Power Flow Research Institute:

A Primer on Electric Power Flow for Economists and

Utility Planners, “Resistance and Ohm’s Law”

pp. 2-6 - 2-11; “Structures of Utility Systems”

pp. 3-1 - 3-2; “Transmission and Distribution”

Te fe) TUTTE RT ore ee eee App. 818

NOTICE

The following documents have been omitted in the printing of
this Appendix. These documents may be found in Petitioner
Enron Power Marketing, Inc.’s Appendix to its Petition for
Writ of Certiorari (00-809) at the following pages:

APPENDIX A:

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Colombia Circuit filed
ai a rns a OP ia ae as a ee a a la

APPENDIX B:

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit filed 6/30/00 ....... 3a

APPENDIX C:

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit filed 8/22/00 ....... 123a

APPENDIX F:

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open

Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services

by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by

Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking, [1988-1998 Proposed Regs.] F.E.R.C.

Stats, & Regs. 432,514 (1995) (pertinent portion)
SEED 6 6:00 © 04446 4000600 68 Re 8 eH 553a

APPENDIX G:

sn ci wnhedenbeceswun 645a
APPENDIX H:
List of Parties to the Proceeding .............. 683a

Some may also be found in the Petitioner’s People of the State
of New York and The Public Service Commission of the State
of New York’s Appendix to its Petition for Writ of Certiorari
(00-568) at the following pages:

APPENDIX A:

Order of United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit filed 8/22/00 ........ A-l

APPENDIX B:

Judgment of United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit filed 6/30/00 ........ B-1

APPENDIX C:

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit decided 6/30/00 ...... C-1

APPENDIX G:

Statutory Provisions Involved ....... ae aed eae G-1

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES IN
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

DOCKET FOR CASE NOS.: 00-568 and 00-809
(Court of Appeals Docket No.: 97-1715, Complex)

12/5/97

1/2/98

1/12/98

4/30/98

PETITION FOR REVIEW CASE docketed.
Petition for Review filed by Petition Transm
Access Picy. [314268-1] (mcm) [97-1715]

CLERK’S ORDER filed granting non-party
motion to intervene filed by VT Dept Pub Srvc
[316424-1]. (sha) [97-1715]

CLERK’S ORDER filed granting non-party
motion to intervene filed by Edison Elec Inst
[320723-1] granting non-party motion to
intervene filed by City & Cty San [320823-1]
granting non-party motion to intervene filed by
Oprt Co Amer elec [318537-1]. (mcm) [97-
1715]

CLERK’S ORDER filed, on court’s own
motion, that cases are consolidated;
FURTHER ORDERED that EEI motion for
leave to amend is granted. The amended
motions are dismissed as moot, in light of
1/12/98 order granting EEI leave to intervene
in 97-1715; FURTHER ORDERED that
motions of WA Util, So CA Gas, KS City, PSI
Energy, and Cincinnati Gas to intervene be
granted; FURTHER ORDERED that parties
advise the court by 5/15/98 of any remaining
motions, etc.; FURTHER ORDERED that
petitioners show cause, by 6/01/98 why the

App. 5

6/2/98

petitions for review in 98-1110, 98-1117, 98-
1121, 98-1130, 98-1133, 98-1135, 98-1138,
98-1144, 98-1151, 98-1157, 98-1158, 98-
1161, 98-1164, 98-1167, 98-1179 should not
be dismissed as incurably premature.
Responses limited to 20 pages and failure to
respond will result in dismissal. Respondent
may file a reply, limited to 10 pages, within 10
days thereafter; FURTHER ORDERED that
by 6/01/98, parties shall provide a list of five
lead counsel. Within 30 days thereafter,
counsel shall provide joint proposed briefing
schedule, etc.; FURTHER ORDERED that
parties shall resubmit Rule 26.1 disclosure
Statements by 6/01/98, etc.; FURTHER
ORDERED that respondent shall provide by
5/15/98 a current master service list; Clerk is
directed to send a copy of this order by
certified mail to petitioners in cases identified
above. (su) [97-1715 98-1179 98-1180}

CLERK’S ORDER filed granting non-party
motion to intervene filed by Suffolk Cty Elec
[355394-1] granting non-party motion to
intervene filed by Fl Pub Svc Cmsn [354722-
1] granting non-party to intervene filed by
Rochester Gas & Elec [354086-1] granting
non-party motion to intervene filed by
Carolina Power [353289-1] granting non-party
motion to intervene filed by FL Power & Light
[353301-1] granting non-party motion to
intervene filed by Pub Svc Elec Gas (353314-
1] granting non-party motion to intervene filed
by OH Consum Coun, Natl Assn St Util
[353328-1] granting non-party motion to

App. 6

8/13/98

intervene filed by Dairyland Power Coop
[353189-1] granting non-party motion to
intervene filed by Natl Rural Elec Coop
[353333-1] granting non-party motion to
intervene filed by NE TX Elec Coop Inc, Sam
Rayburn Elec G&T, TX-LA Elec Coop TX
[352000-1] granting non-party motion to
intervene filed by FL Muni Power Agcy
[352033-1] granting non-party motion to
intervene filed by MI S Ctrl Power Agcy
[352034-1] granting non-party motion to
intervene filed by Wolverine Power [352035-
1] granting non-party motion to intervene filed
by Pub Svc Cmsn St NY [352047-1] granting
non-party motion to intervene filed by Natl
Assn Reg Util [352050-1] granting non-party
motion to intervene filed by NY St Elec & Gas
[350758-1] granting non-party motion to
intervene filed by GA Transm Corp [354045-
1]. (mem) [97-1715]

PER CURIAM ORDER: on the court’s own
motion, that these case be designated
“COMPLEX”. FURTHER ORDERED that
the order to show cause be discharged.
FURTHER ORDERED that the petitions for
review in No. 98-1110, 98-1117, 98-1121, 98-
1130, 98-1133, 98-1135, 98-1138, 98-1144,
98-1151, 98-1157, 98-1161, 98-1167 and 98-
1179 be dismissed as incurably premature.
[374127-1] FURTHER ORDERED that the
initial briefing schedule is as follows (SEE
ORDER FOR BRIEFING FORMATS)
[374127-2]: Petitioner’s brief due on 10/1/98
in 97-1715; Intervenor supprtng Petitioner’s

App. 7

brief due 10/1/98 in 97-1715; Respondent’s
brief due on 2/1/99 in 97-1715; Intervenor
supportg Respondent’s brief due 4/1/99 in 97-
1715; Petitioner’s reply brief due 5/3/99 in 97-
1715; Intervenor supprt Petitioner’s reply brief
due 5/3/99 in 97-1715; Deferred appendix due
on 6/10/99 in 97-1715; Final briefs due on
6/24/99 in 97-1715. FURTHER ORDERED
that motion for leave to file joint proposed
briefing schedule be granted. The Clerk is
directed to file the lodged pleading [363672-1].
FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to
exceed page limits be granted. FURTHER
ORDERED that the motion to change party
name be granted. The Clerk is directed to
amend the docket to reflect that the
intervenor’s name is Enron Power Marketing,
Inc. rather than the Coalition for a Competitive
Elec Market [360864-1]. FURTHER
ORDERED that the motion to intervene filed
by IL Power Co [360901-1] be granted.
FURTHER ORDERED that the motions
adding a new attorney [356458-1] filed by 11
movants and Ontario Hydro [356721-1] be
granted. Lead counsel are as follows: John
Conway (FERC), Susan Court (FERC),
Robert Zener, Robert Jablon, Jonathan
Feinberg, Sara Schotland, Peter Kirby and
Isaac Benkin (lead counsel for petitioners and
intervenors). FURTHER ORDERED that the
motion of Pacific Legal Fndtn for leave to
participate as amicus [353194-1] and for leave
to dispense with service on all parties be
denied [353194-2]. This denial is without
prejudice to PLF’s refiling the motion for

App. 8

os ee are. ee oe =

8/13/98

10/1/98

10/1/98

leave within ten days of the date of this order,
after serving all parties listed in the current
master list. Before Judges Wald, Sentelle,
Randolph. [97-1715] (mcm) [97-1715 98-1110
98-1117 98-1121 98-1130 98-1133 98-1135
98-1138 98-1144 98-1151 98-1157 98-1161
98-1167 98-1179]

PER ABOVE ORDER lodged motion
establishing the initial briefing schedule
[363672-1] is filed. (mcm) [97-1615]

BRIEF [DISCRIMINATORY
DISCOUNTING AND FUNCTIONAL
UNBUNDLING] filed by Petitioner Transm
Access Plicy in 97-1715, Petitioner Transm
Dpndnt Util in 98-1145, Petitioner Enron
Power Mkt Inc in 98-1178 [386444-1].
Copies: 15. of service date 10/1/98. (97-1715,
98-1145, 98-1178] (mcm) [97-1715 98-1145
98-1178]

BRIEF [INVESTOR OWNED UTILITY
PETITIONERS] filed by Investor IL Power
Co in 97-1715, Petitioner Pub Svc Elec & Gas
in 98-1119, Petitioner FL Power & Light in
98-1120, Petitioner Rochester Gas & Elec in
98-1124, Petitioner Carolina Power in 98-
1125, Petitioner NE Util Svc Co in 98-1126,
Petitioner NE Util Sve Co in 98-1127,
Petitioner NY St Elec & Gas in 98-1139,
Petitioner Boston Edison Co in 98-1162,
Petitioner Ctrl VT Pub Svc Corp in 98-1162,
Petitioner Niagra Mohawk Power in 98-1168,
Petitioner Con Edison Co NY Inc in 98-1174,

App. 9

10/2/98

Petitioner Con Edison Co NY Inc in 98-1175,
Petitioner GPU Engy in 98-1176, Petitioner
Edison Elec Inst in 98-1180 [386545-1].
Copies: 7. Certificate of service date 10/1/98.
[97-1715, 98-1119, 98-1120, 98-1124, 98-
1125, 98-1126, 98-1127, 98-1139, 98-1162,
98-1168, 98-1174, 97-1175, 98-1176, 98-
1180] (mem) [97-1715 98-1119 98-1120 98-
1124 98-1125 98-1126 98-1127 98-1139 98-
1162 98-1168 98-1174 98-1175 98-1176 98-
1180}

BRIEF W/2 VOLUME APPENDIX OF
LEGESLATIVE HISTORY [STATE
COMMISSIONS] filed by Intervenor for
Petitioner WA Util Trans Cmsn in 97-1715,
Intervenor St NJ Bd Pub Util in 97-1715,
Intervenor WY Pub Svc Cmsn in 97-1715,
Intervenor for Petitioner ID Pub Util Cmsn in
97-1715, Intervenor for Petitioner NC Util
Cmsn in 97-1715, Intervenor for Petitioner
Natl Assn Reg Util in 97-1715, Intervenor for
Petitioner FL Pub Svc Cmsn in 97-1715,
Petitioner People St NY in 98-1111, Petitioner
Pub Scv Cmsn St NY in 98-1111, Petitioner
VA St Corp Cmsn in 98-1142, Petitioner AR
Pub Svc Cmsn in Petitioner VT Dept Pub Srvc
in 98-1148, Petitioner OH Coun in 98-1150,
Petitioner Natl Assn St Util in 98-1155
[386734-1]. Copies: 7. Certificate of service
date 10/1/98. [97-1715, 98-111, 98-1142, 98-
1147, 98-1148, 98-1150, 98-1155] (mcm) [97-
1715 97-1111 98-1142 98-1147 98-1148 98-
1150 98-1155]

App. 10

2/16/99

4/16/99

5/18/99

5/19/99

BRIEF filed by Respondent FERC in 97-1715
[416562-1]. Copies: 6. Certificate of service
date 2/16/99. (mcm) [97-1715]

BRIEF filed by Intervenor Edison Elec Inst in
97-1715, Intervenor NY St Elec & Gas in 97-
1715, Intervenor Cm Edison Co in 97-1715,
Intervenor Consum Engy Co in 97-1715,
Intervenor VA Elec Power Co in 97-1715,
Intervenor New Engl Power Co in 97-1715,
Intervenor WI Pub Svc Corp in 97-1715,
Intervenor Atl City Elec Co in 97-1715,
Intervenor for Repsondent FL Power & Light
in 97-1715, Intervenor Rochester Gas & Elec
in 97-1715; Intervenor FL Power Corp in 97-
1715 [430200-1]. Copies: 6. Certificate of
service date 4/16/99. (mcm) [97-1715]

REPLY BRIEF [DISCRIMINATORY
DISCOUNTING AND FUNCTIONAL
UNBUNDLING] filed by Petitioner Transm
Access Plicy in 97-1715, Petitioner Transm
Dpndnt Util in 98-1145, Petitioner Enron
Power Mkt Inc in 98-1178 [436794-1].
Copies: 7. Certificate of service date 5/18/99.
(97-1715, 98-1145, 98-1178] (mcm) [97-1715
98-1145 98-1178]

REPLY BRIEF [STATE COMMISSIONS]
filed by Intervenor for Petitioner WA Util
Trans Cmsn in 97-1715, Intervenor St NJ Bd
Pub Util in 97-1715, Intervenor WY Pub Svc
Cmsn in 97-1715, Intervenor for Petitioner
Pub Stf NC Util Cmsn in 97-1715, Intervenor
for Petitioner NC Util Cmsn in 97-1715,

App. 11

8/19/99

8/19/99

Intervenor for Petitioner Natl Assn Reg Util in
97-1715, Intervenor FL Pub Svc in 97-1715,k
Petitioner People St NY in 98-1111, Petitioner
Pub Svc Cmsn St NY in 98-1111, Petitioner
VA St Corp Cmsn in 98-1142, Petitioner VT
Dept Pub Srvc in 98-1148, Petitioner OH
Consum Coun in 98-1150, Petitioner Natl
Assn St Util in 98-1155 [436812-1]. Copies: 7.
Certificate of service date 5/18/99. (97-1715,
98-1111, 98-1142, 98-1147, 98-1148, 98-
1150, 98-1155] (mem) [97-1715 98-1111 98-
1142 98-1147 98-1148 98-1150 98-1155]

FINAL BRIEF filed by Intervenors for
Respondent, Enron Power Marketing, Inc.,
Electricity Consumers Resource Council,
American Public Power Association, NE TX
Elec Coop Inc, Sam Rayburn Elec G&T, Tex-
La Elec Coop TX, Natl Rural Electric
Cooperative Assoc., et al. in 97-1715 [458098-
1}. Copies: 15. Certificate of service date
8/19/99. [STYLED AS JOINT BRIEF FOR
ALL OTHER INTERVENORS IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT]. (ivs) [97-1715]

FINAL BRIEF filed by Petitioners Transm
Access Plicy, Transm Dpndnt Util, Enron
Power Mkt Inc [488131-1]. Copies: 15.
Certificate of service date 8/19/99. [STYLED
AS INITIAL BRIEF OF THE
TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY STUDY
GROUP, ENRON POWER MARKETING,
INC. AND TRANSMISSION DEPENDENT
UTILITY SYSTEMS ON FUNCTIONAL
UNBUNDLING AND DISCOUNTING]. [97-

App. 12

8/19/99

8/20/99

8/20/99

1715, 98-1145, 98-1178] (lvs) [97-1715 98-
1145 98-1178]

FINAL REPLY BRIEF filed by Petitioners
Transm Access Plcy, Transm Dpndnt Util,
Enron Power Mkt Inc [458144-1]. Copies: 15.
Certificate of service date 8/19/99. [STYLED
AS REPLY BRIEF OF THE
TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY STUDY
GROUP, ENRON POWER MARKETING,
INC. AND TRANSMISSION DEPENDENT
UTILITY SYSTEMS ON FUNCTIONAL
UNBUNDLING AND DISCOUNTING]. [97-
1715, 98-1145, 98-1178] (Ivs) [97-1715 98-
1145 98-1178]

FINAL BRIEF for the Public Service
Commissions of New York, Arkansas and
Florida, ID Pub Util Cmsn, NC Util Cmsn,
WY Pub Svc Cmsn, NJ Board of Public, VA
Corp Cmsn, WA Util Trans Cmsn, VT Dept
Pub Srvc, Natl Assn Reg Util [458523-1].
Copies: 15. Certificate of service date 8/19/99.
(97-1715, 98-1142, 98-1147, 98-1148, 98-
1162, 98-1169] (Ivs) [97-1715 98-1142 98-
1147 98-1148 98-1162 98-1169]

FINAL REPLY BRIEF ffiled by
Petitioners/Intervenors VA St Public Service
Commissions of NY, AR and FL, Natl Assn
of Regulatory Util Cmsn, Pub Util Cmsn ID,
NC and WY, NJ Board Pub Util, VA Corp
Cmsn, WA Util Trans Cmsn, VT Dept Pub
Srvc, OH Consum Coun, Natl Assn St Util
([458643-1]. Copies: 15. Certificate of service

App. 13

8/20/99

date 8/19/99. (97-1715, 98-1142, 98-1147, 98-
1148, 98-1150, 98-1155, 98-1162, 98-1169]
(Ivs) [97-1715 98-1142 98-1147 98-1148
98-1150 98-1155 98-1162 98-1169]

APPENDIX [VOLUME I & II] OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FOR STATE
COMMISSIONS’ BRIEF filed by
Petitioners/Intervenors Pub Svc Cmsn NY,
AR, FL, Natl Assn of Regulatory Util Cmsn,
Pub Util Cmsn ID, NC and WY, NJ Board
Pub Util, VA Corp Cmsn, WA Util/Trans
Cmsn, VT Dept Pub Srvc, OH Consum Coun
[458663-1]. Copies: 10. Certificate of service
date 8/19/99. (97-1715, 98-1142, 98-1147, 98-
1148, 98-1150, 98-1155, 98-1162, 98-1169]
(lvs) [97-1715 98-1142 98-1147 98-1148
98-1150 98-1155 98-1162 98-1169]

App. 14

ee I te

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES BEFORE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Issuance
19980421-0175

Submittal
19960530-0195

Submittal
19960530-0202

Submittal

3/4/97

5/24/96

5/24/96

5/24/96

App. 15

Ltr to Vice President A
Gore, Jr providing final
rules issued on
promoting wholesale
competition through
open access non-
discriminatory
transmission servs by
public utils etc under
RM95-8 et al. Portland
General Elec Co
submits.

Motion for rehearing of
Public Serv
Commission of New
York of Order 888 &
889 re open access
transmission & stranded
costs under RM95-8 &
RM94-7.

Pennsylvania _— Public
Util Commission
member J Hanger
submits ltr of dissent re
960523 petition for
rehearing of Order 888
under RM95-8 &
RM94-7.

Appl of Coalition for

19960530-0279

Submittal
19960530-0188

Issuance
19960425-0263

Submittal
199508 1 1-0061

5/23/96-
5/24/96

4/24/96

8/7/95-
8/10/95

App. 16

Competitive Elec
Market for reconside-
ration & clarification or
in alternative rehearing
of FERC’s Order 888
re promoting wholesale
competition etc.

Request of Virginia
State Corp Commission
for rehearing of Order
888 re open access
transmission etc under
RM94-7 & RM95-8.

Order 888 final rule re
promoting wholesale
competition thru open
ee-ces -s
nondiscriminatory
svc/recovery of
stranded costs by public
utils. Corrected
Hoecker.

Comments of NC
Utilities Commission re
notice of proposed
rulemaking & suppl
notice of proposed
rulemaking re recovery
of stranded cost by
public utilities etc under
RM95-8, et al.

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING -
RECOVERY OF STRANDED COSTS BY PUBLIC
UTILITIES AND TRANSMITTING UTILITIES IN

DOCKET NO. RM-94-7-000
59 FED. REG. 35,274; 35,283-86

[pp. 35,274; 35,283-86]

[35,274]

SUMMARY: The Commission is proposing to amend its
regulations to establish provisions concerning the recovery of
wholesale and retail stranded costs by public utilities and
transmitting utilities under sections 205, 206, 211 and 212 of
the Federal Power Act. The Commission seeks public
comment concerning the issues raised by the proposed
rulemaking.

DATES: Written comments must be received by the
Commission by September 9, 1994. Reply comments must be
received by the Commission by October 11, 1994.

ADDRESSES: Send comments to: Office of the Secretary,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

James H. Douglass, Office of the General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20426; Telephone: (202) 208-2143
(legal issues).

Michael A. Coleman, Office of Electric Power Regulation,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol

App. 17

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426; Telephone: (202) 208-
1236 (technical issues).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In addition to
publishing the full text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission also provides all interested persons
an Opportunity to inspect or copy the contents of this
document during normal business hours in room 3104, at 941
North Capitol Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.

The Commission Issuance Posting System (CIPS), an
electronic bulletin board service, provides access to the texts
of formal documents issued by the Commission. CIPS is
available at no charge to the user and may be accessed using
a personal computer with a modem by dialing (202) 208-
1397. To access CIPS, set your communications software to
use 300, 1200, or 2400 bps, full duplex, no parity, 8 data bits
and 1 stop bit. CIPS can also be accessed at 9600 bps by
dialing (202) 208-1781. The full text of this order will be
available on CIPS for 30 days from the date of issuance. The
complete text on diskette in WordPerfect format may also be
purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, La Dorn
Systems Corporation, also located in room 3104, 941 North
Capitol Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
June 29, 1994.
Table of Contents

I. Introduction
Il. Public Reporting Burden

App. 18

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

Ill. Discussion
A. Background
B. Current Stranded Cost Policy
1. Wholesale Customers Leaving The System
2. Retail-Turned-Wholesale Customers Leaving The
System
.3. Retail Customers Leaving The System
C. The Proposed Regulations
1. Recovery of Stranded Costs Associated With New
Wholesale Power Sales Contracts
2. Recovery of Stranded Costs Associated With
Existing Wholesale Power Sales Contracts
3. Recovery Of Wholesale Stranded Costs In
Wholesale Transmission Rates
4. Filing Requirements For Wholesale Stranded Cost
Recovery
5. Evidentiary Demonstration For Wholesale Stranded
Cost Recovery
6. Recovery Of Retail Stranded Costs
i. Jurisdictional Analysis
ii. Treatment of Retail Costs
IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act
V. Environmental Statement
VI. Information Collection Statement
VII. Public Comment Procedures
Regulatory Text

I. Introduction
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Commission) seeks public comment on amending its

regulations to establish provisions concerning the recovery of
wholesale and retail stranded costs by public utilities and

App. 19

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

transmitting utilities under sections 205, 206, 211 and 212 of
the Federal Power Act (FPA).' Wholesale stranded costs are
defined as any legitimate, prudent and verifiable costs
incurred by a public utility or a transmitting utility to provide
service to a wholesale requirements customer that
subsequently becomes, in whole or in part, an unbundled
transmission services customer’ of that public utility or
transmitting utility. Retail stranded .. .

[35283]

'A public utility is defined under section 201(e) of the FPA
as “any person who owns or operates facilities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission under this Part (other than facilities
subject to such jurisdiction solely by reason of section 210, 211, or
212)." A transmitting utility is defined under section 3(23) of the
FPA as “any electric utility, qualifying cogeneration facility,
qualifying small power production facility, or Federal power
marketing agency which owns or operates electric power
transmission facilities which are used for the sale of electric energy
at wholesale." Not all transmitting utilities are public utilities. For
instance, a municipally-owned electric utility that owns transmission
facilities which are used for the sale of electric energy at wholesale
is a transmitting utility, but is not a public utility.

24n unbundled transmission services customer is one who
purchases transmission as a product that is separate from the
purchase of generation.

App. 20

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

6. Recovery of Retail Stranded Costs

As discussed earlier, there are two general ways in
which retail stranded costs are likely to occur: (1) A retail
franchise customer may, through State or local government
action, become a wholesale customer who can then obtain
unbundled transmission services in order to reach a new
power supplier;*' (2) a retail franchise customer may obtain
voluntary unbundled retail transmission services from its
existing power supplier in order to reach a new power
supplier, or there may be a State or local action that results in
the existing supplier [35,281] providing such retail
transmission services.

In the first example (a retail franchise customer
becomes an unbundled wholesale power and transmission
customer), the Commission clearly has exclusive jurisdiction
under sections 201, 205 and 206, or section 212 of the FPA,
over the rate for the wholesale interstate transmission
services” used by the new wholesale entity in order to reach
its new generation supplier. In the second example, in which

Retail stranded costs may result from "self-help" actions
such as customer self-generation, and this has long been a fact of
life for utilities. See, supra, n.18. This proceeding does not address
these situations.

*'In addition, certain retail customers may become retail
customers of a newly-created wholesale entity.

Under FPA section 211, the Commission's authority to
order wheeling does not turn on whether the transmission services
will be in interstate commerce.

App. 21

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

a retail franchise customer becomes a retail unbundled
transmission customer of its former franchise utility, and a
retail power customer of another utility, we conclude that we
also have exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, tems uaa
conditions for the retail interstate transmission services.”

(i) Jurisdictional Analysis

The Commission's jurisdiction over the rates, terms
and conditions of transmission in interstate commerce derives
from Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce under
the United States Constitution™ and the FPA. When Congress
enacted the FPA, it gave the Commission exclusive
jurisdiction over the rates, terms and conditions of
transmission in interstate commerce by public utilities. The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that federal
laws enacted pursuant to the powers delegated to the federal
government by the United States Constitution are the supreme
law of the land.* Accordingly, to the extent that retail
wheeling involves transmission in interstate commerce by
public utilities, the rates, terms and conditions of such service

‘3We make no determination here regarding the physical or
jurisdictional distinctions between transmission and local
distribution. Section 201(b)(1) of the FPA states that the
Commission has no jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in
Parts Il and Ill of the FPA, over facilities used for local
distribution. Nor do we address here whether States have authority
to order retail wheeling in interstate commerce.

US. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl.3.
5S. Const. Art. VI, cl.2.

App. 22

ee EEL

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission,
and the rates for such service must be filed with the
Commission.”

Section 201 of the FPA, by its very words, does not
limit the Commission's jurisdiction over transmission to
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce sold at
wholesale.

Subsection 201(b)(1) of the FPA provides:

(b)(1) The provisions of this Part shall apply to the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to
the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce
* * * The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all

facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy * *
+

16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).

Much of the legislative history of the FPA indicates
that Congress intended the Commission's jurisdiction to
extend only to those matters which the Aftleboro decision”
held to be beyond the reach of the States. For instance, the

*°See Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public
Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1951) (Montana-Dakota).

*’Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam &
Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927) (Attleboro). In Attleboro, the
Supreme Court held that State regulation of the interstate sale of
electricity was barred by the Commerce Clause because such
regulation would impose a “direct burden" on interstate commerce.

App. 23

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35, 283-86

report accompanying the Senate bill states that subsection (b)
"leaves to the States the authority to fix local rates even in
cases where the energy is brought in from another state. "**
The Senate report also states:

The rate-making powers of the Commission are
confined to those wholesale transactions which the Supreme
Court held in [Attleboro] to be beyond the reach of the States.
Jurisdiction is asserted also over all interstate transmission
lines whether or not there is sale of the energy carried by
those lines. * * *

S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 48 (1935). Thus,
federal jurisdiction over transmission lines is not dependent on
whether those lines are used to effect a sale, wholesale or
otherwise.

While the provisions of section 201 reserving certain
regulatory authority to the States have been interpreted
narrowly,” the courts have construed "in interstate
commerce" broadly. The term does not turn on whether the

‘85 Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 48 (1935). See
also H.R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1935).

While Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause
authority to grant the States that “ability to restrict the flow of
interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy," Lewis
v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980), States
may not exercise such regulatory powers unless Congress has
expressly stated its intention to make such an affirmative grant of
power. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 55 U.S. 331,
343 (1982).

App. 24

fe sheets ot. iheied

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

contract path for a particular power or transmission sale
crosses state lines, but rather follows the physical flow of
electricity. Because of the highly integrated nature of the
electric system, this results in most transmission of electric
energy being "in interstate commerce.

For example, in Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v.
FPC, 319 U.S. 61 (1943), the Court stated:

It is impossible for us to conclude that this definition
[of transmission in interstate commerce] means less than it
says and applies only to the energy at the instant it crosses the
state line and so only to the facilities which cross the line and
only to the company which owns the facilities that cross the
line.

_ 319 U.S. at 71. Thus, a critical question regarding the

jurisdictional status of a wheeling transaction is whether the
facilities used to provide the service transmit electric energy
in interstate commerce. See also Connecticut Light & Power
Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515 (1945) (CL&P); FPC v. Florida
Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972). In CL&P, the
Court emphasized that whether certain facilities transmit
electric energy in interstate commerce is more a technical than
a legal question. The Court stated, "[fledera! jurisdiction was
to follow the flow of electric energy, an engineering and
scientific, rather than a legalistic or governmental, test." 324
U.S. at 529.

In all of the above cases, the Court's decisions turned
on whether energy flowed in interstate commerce as a
technical matter. The decisions did not turn on whether the
energy flowing in interstate commerce was being sold for

App. 25

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

resale or was being sold to an end user. However, under FPA
section 201(b), the Commission does not have jurisdiction
over facilities used in local distribution. In CL&P, the Court
stated that local distribution facilities are exempt from
Commission jurisdiction even if those facilities “carry no
energy except extra-state energy." 324 U.S. at 531. The
Court rejected the argument that transmission and local
distribution facilities could be distinguished by the proportion
or amount of interstate energy that they carried:

We do not find that Congress has conditioned the
jurisdiction of the Commission upon any particular volume or
proportion of interstate energy involved, and we do not think
it would be appropriate to supply such a jurisdictional
limitation by construction.

324 U.S. at 536. The determination of whether facilities are
local distribution facilities remains a factual matter to be
decided in the first instance by the Commission. See FPC v.
Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).

While the precise demarcation between transmission
and local distribution remains unclear, and the Commission
has not yet definitively addressed this issue, there is nothing
in the statute, its legislative history, or the case law to indicate
that the Commission's jurisdiction over rates, terms and
conditions of transmission in interstate commerce extends
only to [35,285] wholesale transmission and not retail
transmission.

App. 26

ete oe i

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

(ii) Treatment of Retail Costs

Because the Commission has jurisdiction over the
rates, terms and conditions of both wholesale and retail
transmission services in interstate commerce by public
utilities, arguably it may allow retail stranded cost recovery
in rates for either wholesale or retail transmission services.
There nevertheless may be important legal or policy reasons
to exclude retail stranded costs from transmission rates. As
noted earlier, however, the Commission has been presented
only with the question of whether it should permit public
utilities to seek recovery in wholesale transmission rates of
stranded investment costs incurred to serve former retail
customers (Scenario 2, section III.A.). The Commission has
not been presented with the question of whether it should
permit public utilities to seek recovery in retail transmission
rates of stranded costs incurred to serve the customer when it
was a retail customer (Scenario 3, section III.A.).

While we believe the Commission has the authority to
address retail stranded costs through its jurisdiction over the
rates, terms and conditions of interstate transmission services
used by retail or newly-created wholesale customers, we also
believe that the recovery of the costs of transition to
competition at the retail level is a matter that should be
addressed by State authorities. This is because retail stranded
costs will occur primarily as a result of State and local
decisionmaking regarding retail franchise areas and the
creation of new wholesale entities. In particular, the
Commission believes it is incumbent upon states to deal with
the consequences of stranded costs that occur as a result of
retail wheeling. Our strong policy preference is that states
explicitly address the issue. State and local decisionmakers

App. 27

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

have a first-hand understanding of the regulatory bargain with
respect to stranded costs incurred to serve retail customers,
and they are familiar with the planning, investment and
purchase activities of the utilities they regulate.

There are a number of procedural mechanisms which
we believe States can use to address retail stranded costs. For
example, a State that permits a retail franchise customer to
become a wholesale entity may consider whethef to impose an
exit fee prior to, or as a condition of, creating the wholesale
entity. Similarly, a State may consider whether to require
payment of an exit fee prior to a franchise customer being
permitted to obtain unbundled retail wheeling. In situations in
which local distribution facilities are used by a retail wheeling
customer, the State may consider whether to allow recovery
of stranded costs through rates for local distribution services.
If a State decides not to impose exit fees, or a surcharge
through distribution rates, it may consider whether to allow
recovery of stranded costs from remaining customers.

In situations in which a new wholesale entity obtains
ownership or control of a franchise utility's transmission or
distribution facilities, it is possible that State condemnation
proceedings will provide a forum for a utility to seek recovery
of ary stranded costs. What types of payments, if any, do new
municipal utilities make to prior service providers? Do these
reimbursements allow for recovery of stranded generation
costs? Is there variation among the States as to the legal
ability of local entities to municipalize? Is there variation
among the States as to the payments made by new municipal
utilities to previous suppliers ?

App. 28

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35, 283-86

There may, of course, be other mechanisms which
States can use to determine whether to allow stranded cost
recovery, and from whom to allow recovery. The Commission
solicits comments on what other mechanisms might be used,
and whether these mechanisms are adequate to deal with
retail stranded costs.

While our strong preference is for States to address
retail stranded costs in whatever way they deem appropriate,
we are willing to explore whether there are circumstances
under which this Commission should consider claims for
recovery of retail stranded costs. We will therefore present
two proposed alternatives regarding retail stranded costs, and
seek comment on both. However, as noted above, we express
no preference in favor of either alternative.

Under the first alternative, the proposed rule provides
that if in a specific circumstance an appropriate State authority
explicitly considers and deals with retail stranded costs and
there is no conflict within or among State regulatory bodies
regarding a State's disposition of the issue, this Commission
will not entertain a request for retail stranded cost recovery.
However, in the absence of a clear expression by an
appropriate State authority that it has dealt with the issue, or
in the event of « conflict between States” or among State

“For example, a conflict between States could result if
State A's legislature allows a former retail customer to become a
wholesale entity and the wholesale entity obtains transmission
services so that it now takes only one half of its 100 MW load from
its current utility supplier, which is a multistate utility. As a result
of State A's action, the utility has retail stranded costs for 50 MW
of generation. State A's commission allocates the utility's retail

App. 29

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

officials within a single state, the Commission proposes to
entertain requests to recover retail stranded costs.

Under the second alternative, the proposed rule
provides that the Commission will not enter.au any request
for recovery of retail stranded costs. Under inis proposal,
State or local authorities will be the only forum for addressing
the issue. The aforementioned preference for States to address
retail stranded costs in whatever way they deem appropriate,
the need for regulatory certainty, and the States’ knowledge
and expertise regarding utility planning, investment and
purchase activities arguably favors the second alterative.
However, we solicit comment on whether there should be
limited exceptions to the second alternative rule.

As to both alternatives, the Commission solicits
comments on the following questions.

Are there circumstances under which it is not
necessarily appropriate to defer to the States (e.g., where one
State takes an action regarding retail stranded costs which
has adverse consequences for another State)? Are there
circumstances under which a State may not have an adequate
mechanism for addressing retail stranded costs, and may want
the Commission to provide a forum?

costs so that State A's retail customers are responsible for only one
half of the stranded costs. State B's commission, the other State in
which the utility operates, allocates the utility's retail costs so that
none of the retail stranded costs are allocated to State B's retail
customers.

App. 30

et

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

If a State does not explicitly address stranded costs
resulting from an action that allows retail customers to
purchase from a supplier other than the franchised utility,
should this Commission entertain requests from the utilities
left with the stranded costs? Beyond silence from the State,
are there other factors that the Commission should consider
before accepting requests for retail stranded cost recovery?
Specifically, would financial health and possible adverse
impacts on reliability be sufficient reason for Federal action?

The Commission further solicits comments on the
following questions:

(1) Does the Commission have legal authority to allow
retail stranded costs in rates for wholesale transmission
services ? Should the Commission do so as a matter of policy?
If so, which costs?

(2) Does the Commission have legal authority to allow
retail stranded costs [35,286] in rates for retail transmission
service? Should the Commission do so as a matter of policy?
If so, which costs?

(3) Does FPA section 212 give the Commission legal
authority to allow recovery of retail stranded costs in rates for
wholesale transmission services under FPA section 211?

(4) Are there legal or policy reasons why in Scenario
2 (p. 15), the Commission should ente;tain requests for
recovery of retail stranded costs in wholesale transmission
rates, but should not entertain requests for recovery of retail
stranded costs in retail transmission rates in Scenario 3
(section II1.A.)?

App. 31

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

If the Commission determines that it will entertain
requests for recovery of retail stranded costs through rates for
wholesale or retail transmission in interstate commerce, the
Commission proposes not to apply the “reasonable
expectation" test used for wholesale stranded costs. To apply
such a test would require a hearing on whether the franchise
utility had a reasonable expectation, e.g., of having its
franchise renewed, of municipalization occurring, or of a
section 212(h) non-sham wholesale entity being created by the
State or local authority. No such test appears warranted
because, in general, there is at the retail level an obligation to
serve which is much stronger than any contractual obligation
to serve at the wholesale level. The regulatory compact that
has governed provision of retail service includes an implicit
obligation to purchase concomitant with the utility's obligation
to serve.

The Commission requests comments on whether these
assumptions are correct, i.e., is the reasonable expectation
test inapplicable to retail stranded costs ? Are there situations,
for instance, in which utilities could have expected
municipalization to occur based on an established course of
dealing?

Based on these assumptions, if the Commission
determines that it will entertain requests for retail stranded
costs, the proposed regulations for retail stranded costs would
require only a showing of the dollar amounts that have been
stranded as a result of the retail customer no longer taking
bundled service from the franchise utility's system. In
essence, this results in direct assignment of retail stranded
costs to the former franchise customer. The Commission
requests comments on how to determine retail stranded costs

App. 32

Lt ee

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

as a general matter. Is there a future time when a retail
customer's action of leaving a local franchise no longer has
any adverse economic consequences on the franchise utility?
If so, what is an appropriate way to make such a
determination?

App. 33

[pp. 1-4]

Comments of North Carolina Utilities Commission
and the Public Staff of the North Carolina Utilities
Commission

Designated Pages - 1-4, 6-7

[2]

COMMENTS OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION
AND THE
PUBLIC STAFF - NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES
COMMISSION

TO THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGARDING
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND
SUPPLEMENTAL
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
DOCKET NO. RM95-8-000
PROMOTING WHOLESALE COMPETITION
THROUGH OPEN ACCESS NON-DISCRIMINATORY
TRANSMISSION SERVICES BY PUBLIC UTILITIES
DOCKET NO. RM94-7-00 |

RECOVERY OF STRANDED COSTS BY
PUBLIC UTILITIES AND TRANSMITTING UTILITIES

App. 34

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95
[3]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Filed August 10, 1995] —

Docket Nos. RM95-8-000 and RM94-7-001

Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access
Non-discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities

Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Utilities )
)

INITIAL COMMENTS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
UTILITIES COMMISSION AND THE PUBLIC STAFF-
NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

The North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) and
the Public Staff of the North carolina Utilities Commission
(Public Staff) respectfully offer the following comments for
consideration by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) in its proposed rulemaking in Docket Nos. RM95-8-
000 and RM94-7-001 regarding open access to the electric
transmission system and the recovery of stranded costs
occasioned by open access.

App. 35

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

1. C HED ON A

The NCUC and the Public Staff are concerned that the
FERC is proposing a generic remedy for a less-than-generic
problem. The FERC position that the anti-discrimination
provisions of the Federal Power Act (FPA) require across-the-
board tariffs for open access to the electric transmission
system of every utility is misguided. We recognize that the
FERC and various states may disagree about whether a
generic approach to open access is legal.' Nevertheless, even
assuming that such an approach is legal, we believe that a
case-by-case approach to open access would be far preferable
from a policy standpoint for a number of reasons.

Discriminatory wholesale wheeling rates and
discriminatory denial of wholesale access to the electric,
utilities’ transmission systems vary greatly among the states
and are simply not consistently present to the extent necessary
to justify a generic approach to open access. The NCUC is
unaware of complaints to the FERC by any wholesale
customer regarding discriminatory denial of access to [3] or
of discriminatory rates for use of the transmission system in
North Carolina. The absence of such complaints strongly

‘This legal argument, as we understand it, is based on the
fact that § 211 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824j, as amended by § 721
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (the source of the FERC's
authority to order wholesale wheeling) provides that the FERC can
order a transmitting utility to provide transmission service upon
application and after notice and an opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing. We will be monitoring with great interest the comments of
others with respect to this issue.

App. 36

ee ne

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

Suggests that discrimination is not a problem in North
Carolina.

If anything, the generic open access proposal by the
FERC has the potential to cause undue discrimination where
none existed before. For example, the electric transmission
system of each utility is interconnected with neighboring
transmission systems in order to ensure greater reliability.
However, this interconnection exposes each transmission
system to greater loop flows.* Open access will greatly
complicate loop flows by increasing the number of
participants contributing to such loop flows, and it will also
cause an unfairly disproportionate burden of dealing with the
impact of loop flows to fall on many utilities that are not
direct participants in an open access wheeling transaction.

*As the FERC is well aware, the actual path taken by
electric power flow across a transmission system is difficult to
predict. Because of its interconnection with neighboring systems,
a transmission system typically consists of a number of possible
paths between any two points. . Electric current essentially flows on
a path of least resistance. An electric load placed on the
transmission system will usually cause electric current to flow in all
possible paths, but the amount of flow in each path will vary
depending on the amount of resistance to flow in a given path. The
resulting circuitous route (or mutes) that electric current actually
takes in order for electric power to be transferred between two
points is called loop flow. In sum, the actual flow of electricity
typically diverges significantly from the contract path, with the
result that the supposed economics of the contract path frequently
have little to do with the actual cost of the power transfer.

App. 37

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

Section 211 of the Federal Power Act, as mended by
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT), provides that an
electric utility, power marketing agency or non-utility
generator may apply to the FERC for an order requiring
access to the electric transmission system ora transmitting
utility (including enlargement of transmitting capacity as
necessary). Thus, the EPACT clearly contemplates the
ordering of wholesale wheeling upon request. We believe
this reflects a congressional intent for wholesale wheeling to
be required on a case-by-case basis and that the FERC should
review issues of “undue discrimination" on a case-by-case
basis as intended by the EPACT.

The FERC's current generic approach to pricing may
well inhibit greater competition in the wholesale generation
market. The FERC's authority to require new transmission
facilities to be built, for example, is dependent upon the states
granting authority for the new facilities to be constructed.
Because the granting of a certificate by a state commission for
the construction of transmission facilities could well preclude
that commission from disallowing recovery in retail rates,
many states may be reluctant to grant such authority with little
or no assurance that retail ratepayers will not be required by
default to carry a disproportionate share of the costs. Of
substantial concern in this regard is the fact that many utilities
appear to be unwilling to challenge the FERC's authority
and/or its determinations with regard to open access because
such action is perceived as endangering approval of market
based rates for affiliated generating companies. Obviously, to
the extent transmission costs are not recovered by the users of
the transmission system, there is a danger that the utilities’
captive retail ratepayers will end up covering these costs.

App. 38

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

xx kK kK *

(pp. 6-7]
[6]
3. EACH UTILITY'S GENERATIN A T
PANSION PLAN REF AN O ATION

ERVE THAT TRANSCENDS ITS CONTRACTUA

OBLIGATIONS TO CUSTOMERS.

The NCUC and the Public Staffare concerned about
the negative impact that open access to the electric
transmission system will have on each utility unless its
obligation to serve its wholesale customers is waived. State
regulators have charged each utility with an obligation to
serve at the retail level in their respective states, and the
FERC has created a "de facto" obligation to serve at the
wholesale level.

The obligation to serve is reflected in each utility's
generating Capacity expansion plan, and it transcends any
contractual obligation the utility may incur with a customer at
either the retail level or the wholesale level. Any "reasonable
expectation" that a wholesale customer will remain on a
utility's system for the duration of the cost to serve that
customer is based on the utility's "de facto" obligation to
serve and the resulting generating capacity expansion plan.
Until the obligation to serve wholesale customers is clarified,
the NCUC and other state commissions will have little choice
but to require each utility's integrated resource planning to
include the assumption that the obligation to serve extends
past the expiration date of its wholesale contracts.

App. 39

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

Mandatory wholesale wheeling and a _ utility's
obligation to serve wholesale customers are inconsistent with
each other. The obligation to serve arises from a utility's
monopoly status. If open access to the electric transmission
system is required for wholesale customers in order to
promote greater competition, then a utility's obligation to
serve them must be waived. Otherwise, the utilities are under
a handicap and true competition cannot exist. We urge the
FERC to recognize this inconsistency.

4. THE DIVISION OF J DICTION BETWEEN THE
FERC AND T STATES IN TH PEN
PR LEMAKING IS NOT SUPPORT Y

THE FPA OR BY CASE LAW.

The NCUC and the Public Staff are concerned that the
division of jurisdiction between the FERC itself and the states
in the open access proposed rulemaking is not supported by
the FPA or the relevant case law. The FERC open access
proposal contains the assertion that the FERC has jurisdiction
over all transmission facilities, on the assumption that all
transmission facilities are interconnected with neighboring
transmission systems and are, therefore, directly or indirectly
used [7] to serve wholesale customers. While it is generally
recognized that the FERC has jurisdiction over transmission
facilities serving wholesale customers and over transmission
facilities used for inter-utility transactions, the FISA and the
case law provide that the FERC has no jurisdiction over
facilities used in local distribution. Local distribution facilities
have been defined as facilities used to deliver electric energy
to the ultimate consumer. Therefore, because retail customers
in many instances are served directly off the transmission

App. 40

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

system, transmission facilities can be facilities used in local
distribution.

Open access to the transmission facilities that directly
serve retail customers will invite sham transactions and sham
municipalization by those transmission level retail customers
seeking to become wholesale customers and thereby gain
access to wholesale wheeling. This is an issue that is certain
to invite litigation and potentially delay true wholesale open
access. An example of this is the case involving Falls Church,
Virginia, and Virginia Electric & Power Company. The
NCUC and the Public Staff believe that the FERC has
underestimated the creativity with which those individuals
who are consultants to large retail customers will approach
this issue. A significant cottage industry may well arise solely
to convert retail customers into wholesale customers, thereby
subverting the intent of Congress as expressly set forth in
EPACT.

App. 41

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
ORDER 888

[Issued April 24, 1996]
Docket Nos. RM95-8-000 and RM94-7-001

Order No. 888

** * kK *

[pp. 31,632 - 31,684]

[31,036]
61 F.R. 21540 (May 10, 1996)

18 CFR Parts 35 and 385

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Commission) is issuing a Final Rule requiring all public
utilities that own, control or operate facilities used for
transmitting electric energy in interstate commerce to have on
file open access non-discriminatory transmission tariffs that
contain minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory
service. The Final Rule also permits public utilities and
transmitting utilities to seek recovery of legitimate, prudent

App. 42

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

and verifiable stranded costs associated with providing open
access and Federal Power Act section 211 transmission
services. The Commission's goal is to remove impediments to
competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to
bring [31,633] more efficient, lower cost power to the
Nation's electricity consumers.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This Final Rule will become effective
on July 9, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David D.
Withnell (Legal Information -- Docket No. RM95-8-000)
Office of the General Counsel Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission 888, First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426
(202) 208-2063

Deborah B. Leahy (Legal Information -- Docket No.
RM94-7-001) Office of the General Counsel Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington,
DC 20426 (202) 208-2039

Michael A. Coleman (Technical Information) Office
of Electric Power Regulation Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission 888, First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426
(202) 208-1236

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In addition to
publishing the full text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission also provides all interested persons
an opportunity to inspect or copy the contents of this
document during normal business hours in the Public
Reference Room at 888, First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426.

App. 43

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

The Commission Issuance Posting System (CIPS), an
electronic bulletin board service, provides access to the texts
of formal documents issued by the Commission. CIPS is
available at no charge to the user and may be accessed using
a personal computer with a modem by dialing 202-208-1397
if dialing locally, or 1- 800-856-3920 if dialing long distance.
CIPS is also available through the Fed World system (by
modem or Internet). To access CIPS, set your
communications software to 19200, 14400, 12000, 9600,
7200, 4800, 2400, or 1200 bps, full duplex, no parity, 8 data
bits and | stop bit. The full text of this order will be available
on CIPS indefinitely in ASCII and WordPerfect 5.1 format.
The complete text on diskette in Wordperfect format may also
be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, La
Dorn Systems Corporation, also located in the Public
Reference Room at 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C.
20426.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction/Summary
II. Public Reporting Burden
Ill. Background
IV. Discussion
A. Scope of the Rule
1. Introduction
2. Functional Unbundling
3. Market-based Rates
4. Merger Policy
5. Contract Reform
6. Flow-based Contracting and Pricing
B. Legal Authority
1. Bases for Legal Authority

App. 44

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

2. Response to Commenters Opposing our Legal
Authority
C. Comparability
1. Eligibility to Receive Non-discriminatory Open
Access Transmission
2. Service that Must be Provided by Transmission
Provider
3. Who Must Provide Non-discriminatory Open
Access Transmission
4. Reservation of Transmission Capacity by
Transmission Customers
5. Reservation of Transmission Capacity for Future
Use by Utility
6. Capacity Reassignment :
7. Information Provided to Transmission Customers
8. Consequences of Functional Unbundling
D. Ancillary Services
1. Definitions and Descriptions
2. Obligations of Transmission Providers and
Transmission Customers with Respect to Ancillary
Services
3. Unbundling and Bundling Ancillary Services
4. Reassignment of Ancillary Services
5. Pricing of Ancillary Services
6. Accounting for Ancillary Services
E. Real-Time Information Networks
F. Coordination Arrangements: Power Pools, Public
Utility Holding Companies, Bilateral Coordination
Arrangements, and Independent System Operators
1. Tight Power Pools
2. Loose Pools
3. Public Utility Holding Companies

[31,634]

App. 45

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

4. Bilateral Coordination Arrangements

G. Pro Forma Tariff

1. Tariff Provisions That Affect The Pricing
Mechanism '

2. Priority for Obtaining Service

3. Curtailment Provisions

4. Specific Tariff Provisions

H. Implementation

I. Federal and State Jurisdiction: Transmission/Local
Distribution

J. Stranded Costs

1. Justification for Allowing Recovery of Stranded
Costs

2. Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC

3. Responsibility for Wholesale Stranded Costs
(Whether to Adopt Direct Assignment to Departing
Customers)

4. Recovery of Stranded Costs Associated with New
Wholesale Requirements Contracts

5. Recovery of Stranded Costs Associated with .
Existing Wholesale Requirements Contracts

6. Recovery of Stranded Costs Caused by Retail-
Turned-Wholesale Customers

7. Recovery of Stranded Costs Caused by Retail
Wheeling

8. Evidentiary Demonstration Necessary -- Reasonable
Expectation Standard

9. Calculation of Recoverable Stranded Costs

10. Stranded Costs in the Context of Voluntary
Restructuring

11. Accounting Treatment for Stranded Costs

12. Definitions, Application, and Summary

K. Other

App. 46

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

1. Information Reporting Requirements for Public
Utilities
. Small Utilities -
Regional Transmission Groups
Pacific Northwest
. Power Marketing Agencies -
. Tennessee Valley Authority
Hydroelectric Power
8. Residential Customers
V. Environmental Statement
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
VII. Information Collection Statement
VIII. Effective Date
Regulatory Text
Appendices (These Appendices will not appear in the Code of
| Federal Regulations)
A. List of Section 211 Applications
B. List of Commenters in Docket Nos. RM95-8-000
and RM94-7-001
C. Allegations of Public Utilities Exercising
Transmission Dominance
D. Pro Forma Open Access Transmission Tariff
E. List of Group 1 Public Utilities
F. List of Group 2 Public Utilities
G. Legal Analysis of Commission Jurisdiction Over
the Rates, Terms and Conditions of Unbundled Retail
Transmission In Interstate Commerce
H. U.S. NO/X/ Emissions
Statement of Commissioner Hoecker
Statement of Commissioner Massey

NAWSwWH

App. 47

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96
I. Introduction/Summary

Today the Commission issues three final, interrelated
rules designed to remove impediments to competition in the
wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more
efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity
consumers.' The legal and policy cornerstone of these rules is
to remedy undue discrimination in access to the monopoly
owned transmission wires that control whether and to whom
electricity can be transported in interstate commerce. A
second critical aspect of the [31,635] rules is to address
recovery of the transition costs of moving from a monopoly-
regulated regime to one in which all sellers can compete on a
fair basis and in which electricity is more competitively
priced.

‘These rules are the rules on open access and stranded costs
in the above dockets (FERC Statutes and Regulations - 431,036),
and an accompanying rule on Open Access Same-Time Information
System and Standards of Conduct (OASIS Final Rule) (FERC
Statutes and Regulations {3 | ,037) being issued contemporaneously.
The Commission also is issuing contemporaneously a notice of
proposed rulemaking on capacity reservation open access
transmission tariffs in Docket No. RM96-11-000, FERC Statutes
and Regulations 432,517. These final rules and proposed rule are
being published concurrently in the Federal Register.

App. 48

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

In the year since the proposed rules were issued,’ the
pace of competitive changes in the electric utility industry has
accelerated. By March of last year, 38 public utilities had
filed wholesale open access transmission tariffs with the
Commission. Today, prodded by such competitive changes
and encouraged by our proposed rules, 106 of the
approximately 166 public utilities that own, control, or
operate’ transmission facilities used in interstate commerce
have filed some form of wholesale open access tariff. In
addition, since the time the proposed rules were issued,
numerous state regulatory commissions have adopted or are

On March 29, 1995, the Commission issued two notices
of proposed rulemaking concerning open access transmission and
stranded cost recovery. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open-Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Service by Public
Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 60 FR 17662 (April
7, 1995), FERC Statutes and Regulations 432,514 (1995). On
December 13, 1995, the Commission issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking on information systems. Real- Time Information
Networks and Standards of Conduct, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 60 FR 66182 (December 21, 1995), FERC Statutes
and Regulations 432,516 (1995).

>The Commission's notice of proposed rulemaking in the
above dockets proposed to apply the proposed requirements to
public utilities that own and/or control facilities used for the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. "Own
and/or control" is intended to include public utilities that "operate"
facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce. However, we have modified the Final Rule regulatory
text to remove any ambiguity.

App. 49

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

actively evaluating retail customer choice programs or other
utility restructuring alternatives. These events have been
spurred by continuing pressures in the marketplace for
changes in the way electricity is bought, sold, and
transported. Increasingly, customers are demanding the
benefits of competition in the growing electricity commodity
market.

The Commission estimates the potential quantitative
benefits from the Final Rule will be approximately $3.8 to
$5.4 billion per year of cost savings, in addition to the non-
quantifiable benefits that include better use of existing assets
and institutions, new market mechanisms, technical
innovation, and less rate distortion. The continuing
competitive changes in the industry and the prospect of these
benefits to customers make it imperative that this Commission
take the necessary steps within its jurisdiction to ensure that
all wholesale buyers and sellers of electric energy can obtain
non-discriminatory transmission access, that the transition to
competition is orderly and fair, and that the integrity and
reliability of our electricity infrastructure is maintained.

In this Rule, the Commission seeks to remedy both
existing and future undue discrimination in the industry and
realize the significant customer benefits that will come with
open access. Indeed, it is our statutory obligation under
sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) to
remedy undue discrimination.

To do so, we must eliminate the remaining patchwork
of closed and open jurisdictional transmission systems and
ensure that all these systems, including those that already
provide some form of open access, cannot use monopoly

App. 50

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

power over transmission to unduly discriminate against
others. If we do not take this step now, the result will be
benefits to some customers at the expense of others. We have
learned from our experience in the natural gas area the
importance of addressing competitive transition issues early
and with as much certainty to market participants as possible.

Accordingly, in this proceeding and in _ the
accompanying proceeding on OASIS, the Commission,
pursuant to its authorities under sections 205 and 206 of the
FPA:

eRequires all public utilities that own, control or
operate facilities used for transmitting electric energy in
interstate commerce

°To file open access non-discriminatory transmission
tariffs that contain minimum terms and conditions of non-
discriminatory service;

[31,636]

To take transmission service (including ancillary
services) for their own new wholesale sales and purchases of
electric energy under the open access tariffs;

To develop and maintain a same-time information
system that will give existing and potential transmission users
the same access to transmission information that the public
utility enjoys, and further requires public utilities to separate
transmission from generation marketing functions and
communications;

App. 51

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Clarifies Federal/state jurisdiction over transmission
in interstate commerce and local distribution and provides for
deference to certain state recommendations; and

¢Permits public utilities and transmitting utilities to
seek recovery of legitimate, prudent and verifiable stranded
costs associated with providing open access and FPA section
211 transmission services.

Open Access

The Final Rule requires public utilities to file a single
open access tariff that offers both network, load-based service
and point-to-point, contract-based service. The Rule contains
a pro forma tariff that reflects modifications to the NOPR's
proposed terms and conditions and also permits variations for
regional practices. All public utilities subject to the Rule,
including those that already have tariffs on file, will be
required to make section 206 compliance filings to meet the
new pro forma tariff non-price minimum terms and conditions
of non-discriminatory transmission. Utilities may propose
their own rates in a section 205 compliance filing.

The Rule provides that public utilities may seek a
waiver of some or all of the requirements of the Final Rule.
In addition, non-public utilities may seek a waiver of the tariff
reciprocity provisions.

The Final Rule does not generically abrogate existing
requirements contracts, but will permit customers and public
utilities to seek modification, or termination, of certain
existing requirements contracts on a case-by-case basis. As to
coordination arrangements and contracts, the Rule finds that

App. 52

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

these arrangements and contracts may need to be modified to
remove unduly discriminatory transmission access and/or
pricing provisions. Such arrangements and agreements include
power pool agreements, public utility holding company
agreements, and certain bilateral coordination agreements.
The Rule provides guidance and timelines for modifying
unduly discriminatory coordination arrangements and
contracts, and specifies when the members of such
arrangements must begin to conduct trade with each other
using the same open access tariff offered to others. The Rule
also provides guidance regarding the formation of independent
system operators (ISOs).

The Rule does not require any form of corporate
restructuring, but will accommodate voluntary restructuring
that is consistent with the Rule’s open access and
comparability policies.

As discussed in the NOPR, not all owners or
controllers of interstate transmission facilities are subject to
the Commission s jurisdiction under sections 205 and 206 of
the FPA and therefore are not subject to this Rule’s open
access requirements. Therefore, the Final Rule retains the
proposed reciprocity provision in the pro forma tariff.
Without such a provision, non-open access utilities could take
advantage of the competitive opportunities of open access,
while at the same time offering inferior access, or no access
at all, over their own facilities. Thus, open access utilities
would be unfairly burdened. We note that some non-
jurisdictional utilities have expressed an interest in a
mechanism for obtaining a Commission determination that
their transmission tariffs satisfy the reciprocity provisions in

App. 53

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

the pro forma tariffs, and we provide such a mechanism in the
Rule.

The Final Rule does not generically provide for
market-based generation rates. Although the Rule codifies the
Commission’s prior decision that there is no generation
dominance in new generating capacity, intervenors in cases
may raise generation dominance issues related to new
capacity. In addition, to obtain market-based rates for existing
generation, we will continue to require public utilities to
show, on a case-by-case basis, that there is no generation
dominance in existing capacity. Further, in all market-based
rate cases, we will continue to look at whether an applicant
and its affiliates could erect other barriers to entry and
[31,637] whether there may be problems due to affiliate abuse
or reciprocal dealing.

Finally, contemporaneously with this Rule the
Commission issues a NOPR on capacity reservation tariffs as
an alternative, and perhaps superior, means of remedying
undue discrimination.

Transmission/Local Distribution ,

The Rule clarifies the Commission's interpretation of
the Federal/state jurisdictional boundaries over transmission
and local distribution. While we reaffirm our conclusion that
this Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates,
terms, and conditions of unbundled retail transmission in
interstate commerce by public utilities, we nevertheless
recognize the very legitimate concerns of state regulatory
authorities as they contemplate direct retail access or other
State restructuring programs. Accordingly, we specify

App. 54

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

circumstances under which we will give deference to state
recommendations. Although jurisdictional boundaries may
shift as a result of restructuring programs in wholesale and
retail markets, we do not believe this will change fundamental
state regulatory authorities, including authority to regulate the
vast majority of generation asset costs, the siting of generation
and transmission facilities, and decisions regarding retail
service territories. We intend to be respectful of state
objectives so long as they do not balkanize interstate
transmission of power or conflict with our interstate open
access policies.

Stranded Costs

With regard to stranded costs, the Final Rule adopts
the Commission’s supplemental proposal. It will permit
utilities to seek extra-contractual recovery of stranded costs
associated with a limited set of existing (executed on or before
July 11, 1994) wholesale requirements contracts and provides
that the Commission will be the primary forum for utilities to
seek recovery of stranded costs associated with retail-turned-
wholesale transmission customers. It also will allow utilities
to seek recovery of stranded costs caused by retail wheeling
only in circumstances in which the state regulatory authority
does not have authority to address retail stranded costs at the
time the retail wheeling is required. The Rule retains the
revenues lost approach for calculating stranded costs and
provides a formula for calculating such costs.

Environmental Issues

The Commission has prepared a Final Environmental
Impact Statement (FEIS) evaluating the possible

App. 55

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

environmental consequences of changes in the bulk power
marketplace expected to occur as a result of the open access
requirements of this Final Rule. The FEIS focuses, as do most
commenters, on possible increases in emissions of nitrogen
oxides (NO/X/) from certain fossil-fuel fired generators,
which could affect air quality in the producing region and in
areas to which these emissions may be carried.

In response to comments on the Draft EIS, the
Commission performed numerous additional studies. The
FEIS finds that the relative future competitiveness of coal and
natural gas generation is the key variable affecting the impact
of the Final Rule. If competitive conditions favor natural gas,
the Rule is likely to lead to environmental benefits. Both EPA
and the Commission staff believe this projected scenario is the
more likely one. If competitive conditions favor coal, the Rule
may lead to small negative environmental impacts. However,
even using the most extreme, unlikely assumptions about the
future of the industry, the negative consequences are not
likely to occur until after the turn of the century. Because the
impacts will remain modest at least until 2010, there is no
need for an interim mitigation program. In addition, even if
the data showed more significant negative consequences
requiring mitigation, the Commission does not have the
Statutory authority under the Federal Power Act or the
expertise to address this possible far- term problem. The
Commission believes, however, that there is time for federal
and state air quality authorities to address any potential
adverse impact as part of a comprehensive NO, regulatory
program under the Clean Air Act.‘

*42 U.S.C. §7401, et seq.

App. 56

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Despite our conclusions regarding the lack of
environméntal impacts expected to result from the Rule, the
Commission has examined a wide variety of proposals for
mitigating possible adverse effects. We share the view of most
commenters [31,638] that the preferred approach for
mitigating increased NO/X/ emissions generally is a NO/X/
cap and trading regulatory program comparable to that
developed by Congress to address sulfur dioxide emissions in
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.° The Commission
has examined various means of establishing such a program,
including use of existing federal authorities under the Clean
Air Act, cooperative efforts by state and federal air quality
regulators, and development of a new emissions regulatory
program administered by the Commission under the Federal
Power Act. The Commission has concluded that a NO/X/
regulatory program could best be developed and administered
under the Clean Air Act, in cooperation with interested states,
and offers to lend Commission support to that effort should it
become necessary.

Conclusion

The Commission believes that the Final Rule will
remedy undue discrimination in transmission services in
interstate commerce and provide an orderly and fair transition
to competitive bulk power markets.

542 U.S.C.A. §7651b-e.

App. 57

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96
II. Public Reporting Burden

The Open Access Final Rule and the Stranded Cost
Final Rule specify filing requirements to be followed by
public utilities that own, control or operate transmission
facilities in interstate commerce in making non-discriminatory
open access tariff filings and filings to recover legitimate,
prudent and verifiable stranded costs. The information
collection requirements of the final rules are attributable to
FERC-516 “Electric Rate Filings." The current total annual
reporting burden for FERC-516 is 828,300 hours.

A. Docket No. RM95-8-000 (Open Access Final Rule)

The Open Access Final Rule requires public utilities
filing non-discriminatory open access tariffs to provide certain
infermation to the Commission. The Commission estimated
that the public reporting burden for the information collection
_ would average 300 hours per response. This estimate included
time for reviewing the requirements of the Commission's
regulations, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the necessary data, completing and reviewing the
collection of information, and filing the revised information.
No comments on the burden estimate were received. Because
the Final Rule adopts essentially the same information
requirements that are contained in the proposed rule, we
believe that the average filing burden is same for the Final
Rule.

In the proposed rule, the Commission noted that there
are approximately 328 public utilities, including marketers
and wholesale generation entities. We initially estimated that
137 public utilities own, control or operate facilities used for

App. 58

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,
and would be subject to the filing requirements of the
proposed rule. Upon further review, the Commission believes
that approximately 166 public utilities will respond to the
information collection. Accordingly, the public reporting
burden is estimated to be 49,800 hours.

\
B. Docket No. RM94-7-001 (Stranded Cost Final Rule)

In the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, the
Commission estimated that the information requirements of
the proposed rule would not differ substantially from those
contained in the initial proposed rule. In that notice, the
Commission estimated that the public reporting burden for the
information requirements contained in the proposed rule
would be 50 hours per response with 10 responses annually.
No comments on this filing burden were received. The
information requirements adopted in the Stranded Cost Final
Rule are not substantially different from those in the proposed
rule. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there will be
no additional public filing burden associated with the Stranded
Cost Final Rule.

III. Background

In the NOPR, we set out a detailed statement of the
events leading up to this rulemaking. We repeat that
background here, updated to reflect what has happened since
March 1995, and discuss why it is necessary to undertake
regulatory reform in the electric industry at this time. We do
so to provide the necessary [31,639] backdrop to our action
in adopting this Rule.

App. 59

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

A. Structure of the Electric Industry at Enactment of Federal
Power Act

The Federal Power Act was enacted in an age of
mostly self-sufficient, vertically integrated electric utilities, in
which generation, transmission, and distribution facilities
were owned by a single entity and sold as part of a bundled
service (delivered electric energy) to wholesale and retail
customers. Most electric utilities built their own power plants
and transmission systems, entered into interconnection and
coordination arrangements with neighboring utilities, and
entered into long-term contracts to make wholesale
requirements sales (bundled sales of generation and
transmission) to municipal, cooperative, and other investor-
owned utilities (IOUs) connected to each utility's transmission
system. Each system covered limited service areas. This
structure of separate systems arose naturally due primarily to
the cost and technological limitations on the distance over
which electricity could be transmitted.

Through much of the 1960s, utilities were able to
avoid price increases, but still achieve increased profits,
because of substantial increases in scale economies,
technological improvements, and only moderate increases in
input prices.° Thus, there was no pressure on regulatory

*Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern:
Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Regulation, 17 J.
Law & Econ. 291, 312 (1974); see also Charles F. Phillips, Jr.,
The Regulation of Public Utilities 11 (1988).

App. 60

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

commissions to use regulation to affect the structure of the
industry.’

B. Significant Changes in the Electric Industry

In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a number
of significant events occurred in the electric industry that
changed the perceptions of utilities and began a shift to a more
competitive marketplace for wholesale power.* This was the
beginning of periods of rapid inflation, higher nominal
interest rates, and higher electricity rates.” During this time,
consumers became concerned about higher electricity rates
and questioned any price increases filed by utilities.'°

During this same time frame, the construction of
nuclear and other capital-intensive baseload facilities--
actively encouraged by federal and some state governments--

- contributed to the continuing cost increases and uncertainties

’See Joskow, supra at p. 312; see also Phillips, supra at
p. 12.

*See Joskow, supra at p. 312; see also Phillips, supra at
pp. 12-13.

*See Joskow, supra at pp. 312-13; see also Phillips, supra
at p. 13. The Arab oil embargo resulted in significantly higher oil
prices through the 1970s. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants
and Excess Capacity, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 501 (1984).

See Joskow, supra at p. 313; see also Phillips, supra at p.
13.

App. 61 |

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

in the industry.'' These investments were made based on the
assumptions that there would be steady increases in the
demand for electricity and continued large increases in the
price of oil.'* However, due to conservation and economic
downturns, the expected demand increases did not
materialize. Load growth virtually disappeared in some areas,
and many utilities unexpectedly found themselves with excess
capacity. In addition, by the 1980s, the oil cartel collapsed,
with a resulting glut of low-priced oil.'* At the same time,
inflation substantially increased the costs of these large
baseload generating plants.'° Surging interest rates further
increased the cost of the capital needed to finance and
capitalize these projects and completion schedules were

'' See generally Jersey Central Power & Light Company v.
FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

21d.

"See Pierce, supra at 503. By 1983, the Department of
Energy had estimated that the sunk costs for canceled nuclear plants
alone amounted to $10 billion. /d. at 498.

41d.

'SSee Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the
U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 Col. L. Rev. 1339, 1346 (1993)
("Actual costs of nuclear power plants vastly exceeded estimates,
sometimes by as much as 1000%.").

App. 62

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

significantly [31,640] extended by, in part, more stringent
safety and environmental requirements. '°

As a result, expensive large baseload plants for which
there was little or no demand, came onto the market or were
in the process of being constructed. Accordingly, between
1970 and 1985, average residential electricity prices more
than tripled in nominal terms, and increased by 25% after
adjusting for general inflation.'’ Moreover, average electricity
prices for industrial customers more than quadrupled in
nominal terms over the same period and increased 86% after
adjusting for inflation.'* The rapidly increasing rates for
electric power during this period, together with the
Opportunities provided by the Public Utility Regulatory

‘See Phillips, supra at p. 13. Fossil fuel-fired plants
became subject to increased regulation as a result of the Clean Air
Act of 1970, and its 1977 amendments. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642.
In 1971, nuclear plant licensing became subject to the
environmental impact statement requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 42 U.S.C. §4332. Following
the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, nuclear
plants also became subject to additional safety regulations, resulting
in higher costs. See Energy Information Administration, The
Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 1970-1991
(March 1993) 35. Between 1976 and 1980, most states and many
localities instituted laws governing power plant siting.

"Based on retail prices reported in Energy Information
Administration (EIA), Monthly Energy Review, January 1995,
Table 9.9 (Prices adjusted for inflation using the GDP Deflator
(1987 = 100)).

S/d.

App. 63

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) (discussed infra), also
prompted some industrial customers to bypass utilities by
constructing their own generation facilities. This further
exacerbated rate increases for remaining customers --
primarily residential and commercial customers.

Consumers responded to these “rate shocks" by
exerting pressure on regulatory bodies to investigate the
prudence of management decisions to build generating plants,
especially when construction resulted in cost overruns, excess
capacity, or both. Between 1985 and 1992, writeoffs of
nuclear power plants totalled $22.4 billion.'? These writeoffs
significantly reduced the earnings of the affected utilities.”
Delays in obtaining rate increases to reflect the effects of
inflation further reduced investor returns. Thus, many utilities
became reluctant to commit capital to long-term construction
decisions involving large scale generating plants.”'

In addition to economic changes in the industry,
significant technological changes in both generation and
transmission have occurred since 1935. Through the 1960s,
bigger was cheaper in the generation sector and the industry
was able to capitalize on economies of scale to produce power

"See Black & Pierce, supra at p. 1346 (These writeoffs
were “about 17% of the book value of total 1992 utility
investment. ")

201d.

*\Id. ("The high perceived risk of future disallowances
reversed utilities’ incentives to overinvest, and made utilities
extremely reluctant to build new power plants.").

App. 64

et ek ee cnt

!

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

at lower per-unit costs from larger and larger plants.” As a
result, large utility companies that could finance and manage
construction projects of larger scale had a price advantage
over smaller utility companies and customers who might
otherwise have considered building their own generating
units. Scale economies encouraged power generation by large
vertically-integrated utility companies that also transmitted
and distributed power. Beginning in the 1970s, however,
additional economies of scale in generation were no longer
being achieved.” A significant factor was that larger
generation units were found to need reiatively greater
maintenance and experience longer downtimes.” The electric
[31,641] industry faced the situation "where the price of each
incremental unit of electric power exceeded the average
cost." Bigger was no longer better.

See Preston Michie, Billing Credits for Conservation,
Renewable, and Other Electric Power Resources: an Alternative to
Marginal-Cost-Based Power Rates in the Pacific Northwest, 13
Environmental Law 963, 964-65 (1983).

Id. at p. 965.

Energy Information Administration, The Changing
Structure of the Electric Power Industry 1970-1991 (March 1993)
37 ("As larger units were constructed, however, utilities discovered
that downtime was as much as 5 times greater for units larger than
600 megawatts than for units in the 100-megawatt range.")

*Id.; see also George A. Perrault, Downsizing Generation:
Utility Plans for the 1990s, Pub. Util. Fort. 15-16 (Sept. 27, 1990)
("The large base-load generating units that form the backbone of
utility systems are almost totally absent from capacity plans for the
1990s.").

App. 65.

“

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Further dictating against larger generation units were
advances in technologies that allowed scale economies to be
exploited by smaller size units, therebv allowing smaller new
plants to be brought on line at costs below those of the large
plants of the 1970s and earlier. Such new technologies include
combined cycle units and conventional steam units that use
circulating fluidized bed boilers.”

The combined cycle generating plants generally use
natural gas as their primary fuel. This technology has been
made possible by the development of more efficient gas
turbines, shorter construction lead times, lower capital costs,
increased reliability, and relatively minimal environmental
impacts.*’ Similarly, the circulating fluidized bed combustion
boilers, fueled by coal and other conventional fuels, provide
a more efficient and less polluting resource.

Today, "the optimum size (of generation plants) has
shifted from (more than 500 MW) (10-year lead time) to
smaller units (one-year lead time) (in the 50- to 150-MW

"From 1982 through 1991, the average capacity of
fluidized-bed units increased rapidly to 72 megawatts for 4 units in
1991. The average capacity for the 19 units planned to begin
operating in 1992 through 1995 increases to 83 megawatts." Energy
Information Administration, The Changing Structure of the Electric
Power Industry 1970-1991 (March 1993) 38.

>” See Charles E. Bayless, Less is More: Why Gas Turbines
Will Transform Electric Utilities, Pub. Util. Fort. (Dec. 1, 1994)
21.

App. 66

ee eee

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

range)."** Indeed, smaller and more efficient gas-fired
combined-cycle generation facilities can produce power on the
grid at a cost ranging from 5 cents per kWh to less than 3
cents per kWh.” This is significantly less than the costs for
large plants constructed and installed by utilities over the last
decade, which were typically in the range of 4 to 7 cents per
kWh for coal plants and 9 to 15 cents for nuclear plants.”
Significant changes have also occurred in the transmission
sector of the industry. Technological advances in transmission
have made possible the economic transmission of electric
power over long distances at higher voltages.*' This has made

81d. at p. 24. See also Wallace E. Brand, Is Bigger Better?
Market Power in Bulk Power Supply: From FDR to NOPR, Pub.
Util. Fort. (Feb. 15, 1996) 23 at p. 25 (while the optimal baseload
unit size is about 500 MW for coal-fired steam turbines, the optimal
size for gas fired combined-cycle units is about 150 to 200 MW).

°FERC staff calculations based in part on combined-cycle
plant cost data reported in 1994 FERC Form No. | for a sample of
units placed in service during 1990-94. Costs vary with regional
fuel and construction costs, among other reasons.

Coal and Nuclear plant cost data reported in 1994 FERC
Form No. | and the EIA report, Electric Plant Cost and Power
Production Expenses 1991, 1993 DOE/EIA-0455(91), for plants
placed in service during 1986-94; see also The 1994 Electric
Executives’ Forum, Bakke (President and CEO of the AES
Corporation), Pub. Util. Fort. (June 1, 1994) 45 ("New generation
can be built at about 3 cents per kilowatt-hour (U.S. average). Old
generation costs about twice that * * *").

*'See Black & Pierce, supra at p. 1345 (In the late 1960s
and 1970s, improved transmission efficiency and development of

App. 67

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

it technically feasible for utilities with lower cost generation
sources to reach previously isolated systems where customers
had been captive to higher cost generation. In addition, the
nature and magnitude of coordination transactions” have
changed dramatically since enactment of the FPA, allowing
increased coordinated operations and reduced reserve
margins. Substantial amounts of electricity now move between
regions, as well as between utilities in the same region.
Physically isolated systems have become a thing of the past.

[31,642]
C. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act and the Growth
of Competition

In enacting PURPA,* Congress recognized that the
rising costs and decreasing efficiencies of utility-owned
generating facilities.were increasing rates and harming the

regional transmission networks "made it possible to build power
plants up to 1000 miles from power users.").

“Coordination transactions are voluntary sales or
exchanges of specialized electricity services that allow buyers to
realize cost savings or reliability gains that are not attainable if they
rely solely on their own resources. For sellers, these transactions
provide opportunities to earn additional revenue, and to lower
customer rates, from capacity that is temporarily excess to native
load capacity requirements.

3Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in U.S.C.
sections 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, and 43).

App. 68

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

economy as a whole. To lessen dependence on expensive
foreign oil, avoid repetition of the 1977 natural gas shortage,
and control consumer costs, Congress sought to encourage
electric utilities to conserve oil and natural gas.” In
particular, Congress sanctioned the development of alternative
generation sources designated as "qualifying facilities" (QFs)
as a means of reducing the demand for traditional fossil
fuels.*° PURPA required utilities to purchase power from QFs

See generally FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745-46
(1982).

“The Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978.
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in U.S.C. sections 15,
16, 26, 30, 42, and 43).

*°QFs include certain cogenerators and small power
producers. PURPA also added sections 210, 211, and 212 to the
FPA, providing the Commission with authority to approve
applications for interconnections and, in limited circumstances,
wheeling. However, under section 211, as enacted in PURPA, the
Commission could approve an application for wheeling only if it
found, inter alia, that the order "would reasonably preserve existing
competitive relationships." Because of this and other limitations in
sections 211 and 212 as originally enacted, the provision was
virtually ineffective. Only one section 211 order was ever issued
pursuant to the original provision, and it was pursuant to a
settlement. See Public Service Company of Oklahoma, 38 FERC
461,050 (1987). As discussed infra, section 211 was subsequently
revised by the Energy Policy Act of 1992.

App. 69

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

at a price not to exceed the utility's avoided costs and to sell
backup power to QFs.””

PURPA specifically set forth limitations on who, and
what, could qualify as QFs. In addition to technological and
size criteria, PURPA set limits on who could own QFs.*
Notwithstanding these limitations, QFs proliferated. In 1989,
there were 576 QF facilities. By 1993, there were more than
1,200 such facilities.*’ For the same time period, installed QF
capacity increased from 27,429 megawatts to 47,774
megawatts.“ The rapid expansion and performance of the QF
industry demonstrated that traditional, vertically integrated
public utilities need not be the only sources of reliable power.

7456 U.S. at p. 750. Congress recognized that
encouragement was needed in part because utilities had been
reluctant to purchase electric power from, and sell power to,
nonutility generators. /d. at pp. 750-51.

**For example, PURPA provided that a cogeneration
facility or small power production facility could not be owned by
a person primarily engaged in the generation or sale of electric
power (other than from cogeneration or small power production
facilities). See 16 U.S.C.

“Energy Information Administration, Electric Power
Annual 1993 (December 1994) 124 (Table 77).

“Id. EIA data for 1989 through 1991 was for facilities of
5 megawatts or more and for 1992 and 1993 was for facilities of 1
megawatt or more. A comparison with Table 74 on page 121 for
the years 1992 and 1993 reveals that this mixing of data bases is
likely of minimal effect.

App. 70

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

During this period, the profile of generation
investment began to change, and a market for non-traditional
power supply beyond the purchases required by PURPA
began to emerge. QFs were limited to cogenerators and small
power producers. *'

However, other non-traditional power producers who
could not meet the QF criteria began to build new capacity to
compete in bulk power markets, without such PURPA
benefits as the mandatory purchase requirements. These
producers, known as independent power producers (IPPs),
were predominantly single-asset generation companies that did
not Own any transmission or distribution facilities. While
traditional utilities were generally [31,643] reluctant at that
time to invest in new generating facilities under cost of
service regulation, utilities increasingly became interested in
participating in this new generation sector. They organized
affiliated power producers (APPs), with assets not included in
utility rate base, and sought to sell power in their own service
territories and the territories of other utilities. At the same

*'Generally, the law has imposed an 80 MW cap on small
power producers. A limited exception enacted in 1990 permitted
small power facilities that could exceed 80 MW and still qualify as
QFs under PURPA. This exception was limited to certain solar,
wind, waste, and geothermal small power production facilities and
only covered applications for certification of facilities as qualifying
small power production facilities that were submitted no later than
December 31, 1994 and for which construction commences no later
than December 31, 1999. See Solar, Wind, Waste, and Geothermal
Power Production Incentives Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-575,
104 Stat. 2834 (1990), amended, Pub. L. No. 102-46, 105 Stat.
249 (1991).

App. 71

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

time, power marketers arose. These entities -- owning no
transmission or generation -- buy and sell power.”

There were two major impediments to the development
of IPPs and APPs. First, the ownership restrictions of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA)”® severely
inhibited these new entities from entering the generation
business.“* Second, these entities needed transmission service
in order to compete in electricity markets.

While the Commission had no authority to remove
PUHCA restrictions,* it encouraged the development of IPPs
and APPs, as well as emerging power marketers, by
authorizing market-based rates for their power sales on a case-
by-case basis and by encouraging more widely available
transmission access. From 1989 through 1993, facilities
owned by IPPs and other non-traditional generators (other

“The first power marketer in the electric industry was
Citizens Energy Corporation. See Citizens Energy Corporation, 35
FERC 461,198 (1986). Power marketers take title to electric
energy. Power brokers, on the other hand, do not take title and are
limited to a matchmaking role.

15 U.S.C. §79 et seq.

“As discussed infra, Congress eventually provided a means
to avoid the PUHCA restrictions by creating exempt wholesale
generators (EWGs) in the Energy Policy Act.

““The industry was successful to some extent in developing
ownership structures that permitted such investment. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth Atlantic Limited Partnership, 51 FERC 461 ,368 at
p. 62,240 and n.20 (1990).

App. 72

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

than QFs) increased from 249 to 634 and their installed
Capacity increased from 9,216 megawatts to 13,004
megawatts.“ Indeed, "[{iJn 1992, for the first time, generating
capacity added by independent producers exceeded capacity
added by utilities. "*’

Market-based rates helped to develop competitive bulk
power markets. A generating utility allowed to sell its power
at market-based rates could move more quickly to take
advantage of short-term or even long-term market
opportunities than those laboring under traditional cost-of-
service tariffs, which entail procedural delays in achieving
tariff approvals and changes.

In approving these market-based rates, the
Commission required, inter alia, that the seller and any of its
affiliates lack market power or mitigate any market power that
they may have possessed.” The major concern of the
Commission was whether the seller or its affiliates could limit
competition and thereby drive up prices. A key inquiry

“Energy Information Administration, Electric Power
Annual 1993 (December 1994) 124 (Table 77).

“Black & Pierce, supra at p. 1349 n.25.

"See, e.g., Ocean State Power, 44 FERC 461,261 (1988);
Commonwealth Atlantic Limited Partnership, 51 FERC 461,368
(1990); Citizens Power & Light Company, 48 FERC 461,210
(1989); Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., 42 FERC 461,012
(1988); Doswell Limited Partnership, 50 FERC 461,251 (1990)
(Doswell); and Dartmouth Power Associates Limited Partnership,
53 FERC 461,117 (1990).

App. 73

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

became whether the seller or its affiliates owned or controlled
transmission facilities in the relevant service area and
therefore, by denying access or imposing discriminatory terms
or conditions on transmission service, could foreclose other
generators from competing.” As we have previously
explained:

The most likely route to market power in today's
electric utility industry lies through ownership or control of
transmission facilities. Usually, the source of market power
is dominant or exclusive ownership of the facilities. However,
market power also may be gained without ownership.
Contracts can confer the same rights of control. Entities with

“contractual control over transmission facilities can withhold
supply and extract monopoly prices just as effectively as those
who control facilities through ownership.”

As entry into wholesale power generation markets
increased, the ability of customers to gain access to the
transmission services necessary to reach competing [31,644]

“See, e.g., Doswell, 50 FERC at p. 61,757.

Citizens Power & Light Corporation, 48 FERC 461,210
at p. 61,777 (1989) (emphasis in original); see also Utah Power &
Light Company, PacifiCorp and PC/UP&L Merging Corporation,
45 FERC 461,095 at pp. 61,287-89 (1988), order on reh'g, 47
FERC 461,209, order on reh'g, 48 FERC 461,035 (1989),
remanded in part sub nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC,
939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991), order on remand, 57 FERC
461,363 (1991).

App. 74

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Suppliers became increasingly important.*' In addition,
beginning in the late 1980s, in order to mitigate their market
power to meet Commission conditions, public utilities seeking
Commission approval of mergers or consolidations under
section 203 of the FPA or Commission authorization for
blanket approval of market-based rates for generation services
under section 205 of the FPA, filed "open access"
transmission tariffs of general applicability. The

*'In earlier years, a few customers were able to obtain
access as a result of litigation, beginning with the Supreme Court's
decision in Otter Tail Power Company v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1973). Additionally, some customers gained access by virtue
of Nuclear Regulatory Commission license conditions and
voluntary preference power transmission arrangements associated
with federal power marketing agencies. See, e.g., Consumers
Power Company, 6 NRC 887, 1036-44 (1977) and The Toledo
Edison Company and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, 10
NRC 265, 327-34 (1979). See Florida Municipal Power Agency v.
Florida Power and Light Company, 839 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Fla.
1993). See also Electricity Transmission: Realities, Theory and
Policy Alternatives, The Transmission Task Force Report to the
Commission, October 1989, 197.

"See, e.g., Public Service Company of Colorado, 59 FERC
461,311 (1992), reh'g denied, 62 FERC 461,013 (1993); Utah
Power & Light Company, et al., Opinion No. 318, 45 FERC
461,095 (1988), order on reh ‘g, Opinion No. 318-A, 47 FERC
{61,209 (1989), order on reh'g, Opinion No. 318-B, 48 FERC
461,035 (1989), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Environmental
Action Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Northeast
Utilities Service Company (Public Service Company of New
Hampshire), Opinion No. 364-A, 58 FERC 461,070, reh'g denied,
Opinion No. 364-B, 59 FERC 461,042, order granting motion to

App. 75

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Commission applied its market rate analysis to IOUs, as well
as IPPs, APPs, and marketers, and allowed IOUs to sell at
market-based rates only if they opened their transmission
systems to competitors.’ The Commission also approved
proposed mergers on the condition that the merging
companies remedy anticompetitive effects potentially caused
by the merger by filing "open access" tariffs. These early
"open access" tariffs required only that the companies provide
point-to-point transmission services, which is a much
narrower requirement than that being imposed in this Rule
and did not require transmission owners to provide to others
the same quality of service that they themselves enjoyed.

Following PURPA, the economic and technological
changes in the transmission and generation sectors helped give
impetus to the many new entrants in the generating markets
who could sell electric energy profitably with smaller scale
technology at a lower price than many utilities selling from
their existing generation facilities at rates reflecting cost.
However, it became increasingly clear that the potential
consumer benefits that could be derived from these
technological advances could be realized only if more efficient
generating plants could obtain access to the regional
transmission grids. Because many traditional vertically

vacate and dismissing request for rehearing, 59 FERC 461,089
(1992), affirmed in relevant part sub nom. Northeast Utilities
Service Company v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937 (Ast Cir. 1993).

3See, e.g., Public Service of Indiana, Inc., 51 FERC
461,367 (1990), reh’g denied, 52 FERC 461,260 (1990), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Northern Indiana Public Service Company v.
FERC, 954 F.2d 736 (D.C.Cir. 1992).

App. 76 :

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

integrated utilities still did not provide open access to third
parties and still favored their own generation if and when they
provided transmission access to third parties, barriers
continued to exist to cheaper, more efficient generation
sources.

D. The Energy Policy Act

In response to the competitive developments following
PURPA, and the fact that PUHCA and lack of transmission
access remained major barriers to new generators, Congress
enacted Title VII of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Energy
Policy Act).* A goal of the Energy Policy Act was to
promote greater competition in bulk power markets by
encouraging new generation entrants, known as exempt
wholesale generators (EWGs), and [31,645] by expanding the
Commission's authority under sections 211 and 212 of the
FPA to approve applications for transmission services .~

An EWG is defined as

“Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992), codified at,
among other places, 15 U.S.C. §79z-5a and 16 U.S.C. §796(22-
25), 824j-1.

**See El Paso Electric Company and Central and South
West Services Inc., 68 FERC 461,181 at p. 61,914 (1994) (CSW);
see also Paul Kemezis, FERC's Competitive Muscle: The
Comparability Standard, Electrical World 45 (Jan. 1995) ("In
EPAct, Congress made it clear that the electric-power industry was
to move toward a fully competitive market system, but left most of
the implementation to FERC.").

App. 77

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Any person determined by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission to be engaged directly, or indirectly
through one or more affiliates as defined in [PUHCA] section
2(a)(11)(B), and exclusively in the business of owning or
operating, or both owning and operating, all or part of one or
more eligible facilities and selling electric energy at
wholesale.

If the Commission, upon an application, determines
that a person is an EWG, that person will be exempt from
PUHCA.” This provision removed a significant impediment
to the development of IPPs and APPs by allowing them to
develop projects as EWGs free from the strictures of PUHCA
or the QF PURPA limitations.

While sections 211 and 212, as enacted by PURPA,
were intended to provide greater access to the transmission
grid, the limitations placed on these sections made them
unusable in virtually all circumstances.** However, as
amended by the Energy Policy Act, these sections now give
the Commission broader authority to order transmitting
utilities to provide wholesale transmission services, upon
application, to any electric utility, Federal power marketing
agency, or any other person generating electric energy for
sale for resale.

4615 U.S.C. §792z-5Sa.
5715 U.S.C. §79z-Sa(e).
**See supra note 36.

App. 78

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

The Energy Policy Act also added section 213 to the
FPA. Section 213(a) requires a transmitting utility that does
not agree to provide wholesale transmission service in
accordance with a good faith request to provide a written
explanation of its proposed rates, terms, and conditions and
its analysis of any physical or other constraints.’ Section
213(b) required the Commission to enact a rule requiring
transmitting utilities to submit annual information concerning
potentially available transmission capacity and known
constraints.”

E. The Present Competitive Environment

Following the Energy Policy Act, the Commission
established rules: (1) for certain generators to obtain EWG

See Policy Statement Regarding Good Faith Requests for
Transmission Services and Responses by Transmitting Utilities
Under Sections 211(a) and 213(a) of the Federal Power Act, as
Amended and Added by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 58 FR
38964 (July 21, 1993), FERC Statutes and Regulations 430,975
(1993) (Policy Statement Regarding Good Faith Requests for
Transmission Services).

“See New Reporting Requirements Implementing Section
213(b) of the Federal Power Act and Supporting Expanded
Regulatory Responsibilities Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992,
and Conforming and Other Changes to Form No. FERC-714, 58
FR 52420 (October 8, 1993), FERC Statutes and Regulations
430,980 (Order No. 558), reh 'g denied, Order No. 558-A, 65
FERC 461,324 (1993), regulations modified, 59 FR 15333 (April
1, 1994) FERC Statutes and Regulations 30,993.

App. 79

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

status and thus an exemption from PUHCA;” and (2) that
required transmission information availability. The
Commission also pursued a number of initiatives aimed at
fostering the development of more competitive bulk power
markets, including aggressive implementation of section 211,
a new look at undue discrimination under the FPA, easing of
market entry for sellers of generation from new facilities, and
initiation of a number of industry-wide reforms. As stated by
the Commission, in recognition of the Congressional goal in
[31,646] the Energy Policy Act of creating competitive bulk
power markets:

Our goal is to facilitate the development of competitively
priced generation supply options, and to ensure that wholesale
purchasers of electric energy can reach alternative power
suppliers and vice versa.”

6! See Order No. 550, Filing Requirements and Ministerial
Procedures for Persons Seeking Exempt Wholesale Generator
Status, 58 FR 8897 (February 18, 1993), FERC Statute and
Regulations 430,964, order on reh’g, Order No. 550-A, 58 FR
21250 (April 20, 1993), FERC Statutes and Regulations 430,969
(1993). As recognized by Congress and the Commission,
availability of transmission information is critival in developing
competitive markets. See supra notes 59 and 60. This opened the
“black box" of information that previously was available only to
transmission Owners.

®2See Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 FR
35274 (July 11, 1994), FERC Statutes and Regulations 432,507 at
p. 32,866 (Stranded Cost NOPR); American Electric Power Service
Corporation, 67 FERC 461,168, clarified, 67 FERC 461,317
(1994).

App. 80

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

1. Use of Sections 211 and 212 to Obtain Transmission
Access

The Commission has aggressively implemented
sections 211 and 212 of the FPA, as amended by the Energy
Policy Act, in order to promote competitive markets.°? When
wheeling requests under sections 211 and 212 have been
made, the Commission has required wheeling in almost all of
the requests it has processed. To date, the Commission has
issued orders (proposed or final) requiring wheeling in 12 of
the 14 cases it has acted on.™

As a general matter, section 211 has permitted some
inroads to be made by customers in obtaining transmission
service from public utilities that historically have declined to
provide access to their systems, or have offered service only
on a discriminatory basis. Under section 211, the Commission
has granted requests for the broader type of service that most
utilities historically have refused to provide -- network
service. Although transmission owners have provided limited
amounts of unbundled point-to-point transmission service,
third- party customers have not been able to obtain the
flexibility of service that transmission owners enjoy.

*°16 U.S.C.A. §§824j-824k (West 1985 and Supp. 1994).

"See, e.g., final orders issued in City of Bedford, 68 FERC
{61,003 (1994), reh'g denied, 73 FERC 461,322 (1995); Florida
Municipal Power Agency v. Florida Power & Light Company, 67
FERC 461,167 (1994), order on reh 'g, 74 FERC 461,006 (1996):
Minnesota Municipal Power Agency, 68 FERC 461,060 (1994):
and Tex-La Electric Cooperative of Texas, 69 FERC 461,269
(1994); see also Appendix A.

App. 81

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

In Florida Municipal, a section 211 case, the
Commission ordered "network," rather than the narrower
"point-to-point, " service.” Network service permits the
applicant to fully integrate load and resources on an
instantaneous basis in a manner similar to the transmission
owner's integration of its own load and resources. At the
same time, the Commission made the generic finding that the
availability of transmission service will enhance competition
in the market for power supplies and lead to lower costs for
consumers. The Commission explained that as long as the
transmitting utility is fully and fairly compensated and there
is no unreasonable impairment of reliability, transmission
service is in the public interest.”

As discussed infra, based on the mounting competitive
pressures in the industry and rapidly evolving markets, we

°5 See Florida Municipal Power Agency v. Florida Power &
Light Company, 65 FERC 461,125, reh'g dismissed, 65 FERC
461,372 (1993), final order, 67 FERC 461,167 (1994), order on
reh'g, 74 FERC 461,006 (1996). The Commission has
"characterized point-to-point service as involving designated points
of entry into and exit from the transmitting utility's system, with a
designated amount of transfer capability at each point." El Paso
Electric Company v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 68
FERC 461,182 at p. 61,926 n.9 (1994) (citing Entergy Services,
Inc., 58 FERC 461,234 at p. 61,768 (1993), reh'g dismissed, 68
FERC 461,399 (1994)). Network service allows more flexibility by
allowing

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0429%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
