# Respondents Brief — American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Browner

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0357%3A14

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 530 U.S. 1202

## Text

Gapreme Court, US.
FILED
JUL 21 200
2
«
No. 99-1426 CLERK

In The Supreme Court of the United States
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC... ET AL.,

Cross-Petitioners,
v.

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL..,

Cross-Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF STATES OF OHIO, MICHIGAN AND WEST
VIRGINIA IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-PETITIONERS

BETTY D. MONTGOMERY

Attorney General of Ohto

EDWARD B. FOLEY

State Solicitor

JUDITH L. FRENCH*

ELISE W. PORTER

FRANK J. REED, JR.

Assistant Attorneys General

Office of the Attorney General

30 East Broad Street, 17th Flr.

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428

(614) 466-2872

Counsel for Respondent State of Ohio
*Counsel of Record

| Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover]

MARK J. RUDOLPH

Deputy Chief

Ottice of Legal Services

West Virginia Division of

Environmental Protection

1356 Hanstord Street

Charleston, West Virginia 25301]

(304) 558-9160

Counsel for Respondent State of West Virginia

JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM
Attorney General of Michigan
THOMAS CASEY

Solicitor General

ALAN F. HOFFMAN
PAMELA J. STEVENSON
Assistant Attorneys General
Natural Resources Division
300 S. Washington, Suite 315
Lansing. Michigan 48917
(517) 373-7540

Counsel for Responcent State of Michigan

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Clean Air Act requires that the Environmental
Protection Agency must, in setting national air quality
standards, ignore all factors “other than health effects relating
to pollutants in the air,” given that consideration of such
factors would permit both the Agency and reviewing courts
to avoid confronting constitutional nondelegation issues.

Ea. ~—_>

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ee I crcenseresnnnsnineneenncenmnsnssnentmennnsetl i

COs a Cy CD cccrertarsnesremnnemmnnninene iil

A. The Court Should Avoid Consideration of
the Nondelegation Issue by Interpreting
Section 109 to Allow EPA to Consider
Factors Other Than Direct Public Health
Effects When Setting A National Ambient
ET a ec cnevsssssnscssnnnensemenneenes 4

B. The Language and the Legislative History
of Section 109, as well as Principles of
Administrative Policy, Support the
Consideration of Costs and Other Factors
Besides Direct Public Health Effects in
Setting a National Ambient Air Quality
PRIN, ccscesncsecsnetsnmnesssmmemeemenammenmenies 10

a ag Onarnccevscncapsienscsnsevennsnsnnnsssescentenasmesemmpesnsesteets 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

CASES
American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle,

oe fly lk | | 14
American Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. EPA,

4 & Bl | ee 14
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA,

175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999)..........cccccoceeese passim
Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC,

£28 fe 9, 10, 16, 21
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,

el 15, 20
Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. EPA,

51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995)................cccceees 14, 19
George E. Warren Corp. v. U.S. EPA,

199 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998)...........ccccccccscccccceeees 13
Gomez v. United States,

Sa eas Se cccncensnssutmnnsennssnienenensemensmeenescned 4
Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA,

ok oe 13
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,

ee ee ee icicnnestsneneuneremenensepencammneneininenes |
International Union v. OSHA,

ee Se is Gale Be Recercccesecenenscscnsnecesien 19
Lead Industries Ass'n. v. U.S. EPA,

647 F.2d 1130(D.C. Cir. 1980)...................... passim

Michigan Department of Environmental Quality v. EPA
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3209

ie Ga Ge eeetenesnenmmnnennen 14, 15
Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA,

902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990).........cccccccccsssrssrsesees 14
National Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA,

oe Te ee 13

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA,

824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987)... passim
Union Electric Co. v. U.S. EPA,

gE R Re eS EERIE 14
STATUTES
Clean Air Act §101;

Eee a ee 2
Clean Air Act §107;

Ps I iii aint iia 2
Clean Air Act §108;

Is aici 2, 11
Clean Air Act §108(a)(2);

a Ne ETT 11
Clean Air Act §108(a)(2)(A)-(B):

42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2)(A)-(B) .......ccccccrsssesssssssseeseees 1]
Clean Air Act §108(b);

I 7,8, 11
Clean Air Act §108(b)(1);

Eee 11,12
Clean Air Act §108(b)(2);

I ls 12
Clean Air Act, §109;

I a ial passim
Clean Air Act, §109(b);

a aati alliances ia 15, 16
Clean Air Act, §109(b)(1);

Eo 10, 11

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Clean Air Act, §109(d);

PRR oy 15
Clean Air Act, §109(d)(2)(A);

G2 U.S.C. FEBPIG ZA) ceccccccvccccccescccccccccvcccceccsccees 15
Clean Air Act, §109(d)(2)(C (iv);

42 U.S.C. 7409(d (2M CIV) .....ceccscesssscrrrereeereeeeeees 15
Clean Air Act, §1 10;

gk ky ses 5
Clean Air Act §110(a)(1);

Pog Ca |) 8
Clean Air Act §110(a)(2)(A);

42 U.S.C. T41 O(a 2A) .ceeceeereereereeeeeneneeneeneenneees 8
Clean Air Act §112;

SUE FOES cccencscsssreseesmemmennne 12, 15
FEDERAL REGISTER
62 Fed. Reg. at 38,652 (1997) ........cccrcsersrrsssrrrscsseeserees 19
62 Fed. Reg. at 38,856 (1997) .......csssssscsserrreeeeerreseeeesenees 20
62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863/3 (1997) .....ccccccccccesereeeeereeeeeeeeneeeees 5
62 Fed. Reg. at 38,867 (1997) .....ccccccscssseseseneereeeseeeeeeeeeeees 20
62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883/2 (1997) ........cscccsssserssessereeeeeeereeeeees 6
62 Fed. Reg. at 38,688 (1997) ..ccccccccssseeeeeeerereeeeeeeeeeeeees 19

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
MISCELLANEOUS

Senate Public Works Subcommittee on Air
Pollution, 91st Cong. 160 (1970)..........ccccceeeeeeeees 17

Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 11-21 (Harvard
Ey GID Ce Phcrsemnescecessssonsesesnsnemensnstenmseneed 6

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Report, 127 (May 12, 1977)
GOED CIID ccccscesenecsesencosscsencnnenssssssesseneesen 17

Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress for the Committee on Environment
and Public Works, U.S. Senate, A Legislative
History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
FOR PD 6 Oe ee Piantesenninsnnennennsnemenmmenne 18

Stephen G. Breyer, Richard B. Steward, Cass R.
Sunstein & Matthew L. Sitzer, Administrative
Law & Regulatory Policy 65 (4th ed. 1999).......... 18

Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic
Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613
GST, Fier Prcnssncccscssenssssenscsncamemssnesinienesemvenen 19

INTRODUCTION

The States of Ohio, Michigan and West Virginia
(“Supporting States”), along with a number of other parties,
challenged the 1997 revisions to the national ambient air
quality standards for ozone and particulate matter issued
under section 109 of the Clean Air Act by the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”). The District of Columbia
Circuit agreed with the challengers that EPA had not
articulated an “intelligible principle” for its revisions, and
remanded the case to the agency to do so. American
Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-40 (D.C. Cir.
1999). However, the lower court, based on flawed precedent
in the Circuit, also held that the Administrator of EPA is
unable to consider any factor other than direct public health
effects when setting or revising a standard under section 109.
Id. at 1040-41. The Supporting States opposed EPA's
petition for certiorari (No. 99-1257)', and supported the
conditional cross-petition for certiorari of the American
Trucking Associations (No. 99-1426), both of which were
granted. The Supporting States submit this brief in support
of cross-petitioners American Trucking Associations in Case
No. 99-1426.

The regulation of public health and the environment
is of manifest importance to the Supporting States. Long
before federal legislation for air pollution controls, the Court
acknowledged the States’ responsibility to use their police
powers to combat air pollution. “Legislation designed to free
from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls
within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of
what is compendiously known as the police power.” Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960).

' Ohio did not oppose certiorari on the first question presented in EPA's
petition.

2

The Supporting States not only acknowledge, but
embrace their responsibility to ensure public health and a
safe environment. The Supporting States support efforts to
promote a healthy environment and control air pollution, and
therefore support the general goals and policies embodied in
the Clean Air Act. The Supporting States also support the
policy that consideration of public health is the primary
consideration in setting and implementing air standards.

Congress’s passage of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
7401 et seg. (°CAA” or “the Act”), established a federal-state
partnership for controlling air pollution, but confirmed that
the States maintain primary responsibility for ensuring that
clean air is achieved. Specifically, while EPA is responsible
for setting and periodically revising air quality standards
under sections 108 and 109, the States are responsible for
adopting and enforcing an implementation plan that will
assure that the standards are met under sections 107 and 110.
CAA §§107, 108, 109, 110; 42 U.S.C. 7407, 7408, 7409,
7410.

EPA’s decisions in this case, as well as the lower
court's interpretation of section 109 of the Clean Air Act,
upset this federal-state partnership. The District of Columbia
Circuit, following a line of cases starting with Lead
Industries Ass'n vy. U.S. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.
1980), held that EPA is bereft of discretion to consider the
social, economic and environmental costs of a national
ambient air quality standard under section 109; EPA can
consider only the direct public health consequences of the
particular pollutant. This interpretation can and does result in
EPA setting unrealistic standards without considering
numerous other factors, including the cost of implementation,
direct and indirect effects on the economy such as higher
costs for energy, and even the adverse health effects of a
lower amount of the pollutant. In addition, under EPA’s

3

interpretation, it can set a standard without a_ specific
explanation of the standard’s health benefits.

The States are then left to enforce an unjustified
standard that may be impossible to implement. Such an
unreasonable interpretation, when applied to a non-threshold
pollutant, would effect an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. See 175 F.3d at 1033.

The Supporting States therefore submit this brief to
respectfully request that the Court affirmatively resolve the
Statutory issue by holding that EPA can and should consider
costs as well as benefits when setting or revising a national
ambient air quality standard under section 109. Not only will
this interpretation avoid a potential constitutional issue, it
also is a reasonable interpretation of both the language and
the legislative history of the Clean Air Act. In addition, the
EPA can only make sound regulatory decisions, which the
States are expected to implement, when all factors regarding
a proposed standard are taken into account.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Industry parties have devoted approximately 100
pages of detailed analysis of the issues in this case. The
Supporting States do not reiterate all of that analysis here, but
submit this brief to present arguments most relevant to the
States. In addition, rather than repeat the factual account and
background adequately covered elsewhere, the Supporting
States hereby adopt the Statement of the Case of the
American Trucking Associations’ brief in this case.

The Supporting States submit this brief to make two
main points. First, EPA’s and the lower court’s
interpretation of section 109 creates significant problems for
the States. EPA’s failure to consider factors other than direct
public health effects in setting an air quality standard may

4

require States to meet an unjustified standard that is
impossible to implement using “enforceable” control
measures.

Second, the language and legislative history of the
Clean Air Act, as well as sound administrative judgment,
indicate that an interpretation of section 109 of the Act that
allows EPA to consider factors other than direct public health
effects of a non-threshold pollutant is reasonable. EPA’s
interpretation is unreasonable because it prevents the
consideration of non-public health factors, but allows EPA
unfettered discretion to set the standard without an
intelligible basis.

ARGUMENT

A. The Court Should Avoid Consideration of the
Nondelegation Issue by Interpreting Section 109 to
Allow EPA to Consider Factors Other Than Direct
Public Health Effects When Setting A National
Ambient Air Quality Standard.

This Court has made clear on numerous occasions
that it is “settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal
statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable
alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.”
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989). In this
case, a correct interpretation of section 109 will avoid
altogether the need to reach the nondelegation issue raised by
the lower court. The Supporting States therefore respectfully
request that this Court affirmatively avoid the constitutional
issue, affirm the lower court’s finding that EPA has failed to
articulate intelligible principles for selecting standards for

5

ozone and particulate matter, and allow EPA on remand to
consider costs and other non-health factors in adopting those
intelligible principles.

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
correctly found that EPA has failed to find an “intelligible
principle” for selecting a standard for ozone and fine
particulates. 175 F.3d at 1034. It therefore correctly
remanded the revised standard to EPA “to give the agency an
opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its own.”
175 F.3d at 1038. However, in so doing, the court acted as if
constrained by Lead Industries and its progeny to deny EPA
the one tool that would most help in selecting an air pollution
standard: the consideration of costs and other non-health
factors.

Ozone and fine particulates are “non-threshold”
pollutants; that is, there is no threshold amount, above which
deleterious health effects are certain, and below which no
health effects are known. As the lower court stated, “EPA
regards ozone definitely, and [particulate matter] likely, as
non-threshold pollutants, /.e. ones that have some possibility
of some adverse health impact (however slight) at any
exposure level above zero.” 175 F.3d at 1034, citing Ozone
Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38863/3 (1997). See also Natural
Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146,
1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Vinyl Chloride”) (a “non-threshold”
pollutant is one that “appears to create a risk to health at all
non-zero levels of emission”). Cf. Lead Industries, 647 F.2d
at 1137-41 (discussing various thresholds for lead exposure
used to support the standard for lead). The court below also
noted that “the only concentration|] for ozone... that is

6

utterly risk-free, in the sense of direct health impacts, is
zero.” 175 F.3d at 1034. ~

In the absence of a health threshold for a pollutant
such as ozone, it is not surprising that EPA has difficulty
articulating an “intelligible principle” based on health alone
for its ozone standard, as any presence of the pollutant is
assumed to present some threat to health. Without the ability
to consider some other factor, only one logical result is
possible if section 109 is read to protect against any threat to
health: EPA must set the standard for a non-threshold
pollutant at zero.

However, rather than setting the standard at zero,
EPA chooses to interpret section 109 to allow the
Administrator essentially unbounded discretion to select any
level of protection for a non-threshold pollutant, without
articulating a principled reason for doing so. Although EPA
states reasons for which it claims to have chosen the ozone
standard, they consist of vague references to “the nature and
severity” of health effects, “the size of the sensitive
populations at risk,” and the “kind and degree of
uncertainties that must be addressed.” 175 F.3d at 1034-35,
citing Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883/2 (1997).
These factors do not provide a principled method for drawing
a line identifying a level of air quality that is “requisite” to
protect the “public health,” nor to determine “safety,” so that
an “adequate margin of safety” can be established. Viny/
Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1163-65.

* Threshold pollutants are not directly at issue in this case; however the
same arguments presented here with regard to non-threshold pollutants
may be made to some extent for threshold pollutants. Although there
may be a health-based threshold above which these pollutants pose a risk,
and that threshold should be the primary factor in setting the standard, it
is still a question whether the cost of abating a certain percentage of the
pollutant is worth the risk reduction. See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious
Circle 11-21 (Harvard University Press 1993).

The dilemma produced by Lead Industries and its
progeny, and EPA’s standardless assertion of authority is
what led the D.C. Circuit to invoke the nondelegation
doctrine, for if EPA does indeed have such boundless
discretion, then Congress has delegated too much legislative
authority to an executive agency. However, this Court is not
bound by the Lead Industries line of cases. The correct
interpretation of section 109 will permit EPA to establish
principled reasons for the standards set for non-threshold
pollutants, thus setting boundaries for EPA’s discretion, and
eliminating the nondelegation problem. Rather than
considering the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, the
Supporting States respectfully request that the Court reject
the rationale of the Lead Industries line of cases, thereby
permitting EPA to consider factors other than direct public
health effects when setting or revising a standard for an air
pollutant.

EPA's standardless assertion of authority creates
serious problems between the federal government and the
States. Despite EPA’s alleged inability to consider factors
other than direct public health effects, it is required to gather
and issue to the States information on just such factors when
setting the criteria on which the standards are based. The
States are issued “information on air pollution control
techniques,” including “data relating to the cost of
installation and operation, energy requirements, emission
reduction benefits, and environmental impact of the emission
control technology.” CAA §108(b); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b). In
addition, the information must include data on “available
technology and alternative methods of prevention and control
of air pollution,” as well as “aiternative fuels, processes, and
operating methods.” CAA §108(b); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b).

After EPA has set the standard, each State is required
to develop a state implementation plan, or SIP for that

8

pollutant. CAA §110; 42 U.S.C. 7410. Specifically, section
110 requires the States to adopt and submit to EPA a plan to
implement, maintain and enforce air quality standards. CAA
$1 10(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(1). According to the Act, the
plan is to “include enforceable emission limitations and other
control measures, means or techniques (including economic
incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of
emissions rights), as well as schedules and timetables for
compliance, as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the
applicable requirements of this chapter.” CAA §110
(a2 A); 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2)(A).

In practical terms, States implement federal standards
by limiting emissions from “sources,” ¢.g., manufacturing
plants, electric utilities, automobiles. A manufacturing plant,
for example, may be forced to reduce emissions to meet State
requirements by purchasing advanced technology pollution
control equipment or reducing its hours of operation. An
electric utility, for example, may be forced to reduce
emissions by changing its fuel source to cleaner burning coal
imported from outside the region. State officials may reduce
automobile emissions by imposing emissions testing on car
owners and forcing equipment upgrades for older models.

The emission reductions resulting from the
combination of these individual control measures—imposed
through permit requirements for plants or license
requirements for car owners—create a State’s overall
strategy for implementing the federal standard. In creating
this strategy and making the difficult policy choices among
possible control measures, a State is presumably required to
consider and use the information provided for it under
section 108(b) on control techniques, costs of installation and
operation, energy requirements, emission reduction benefits,
and environmental impacts of the emission control
technology. CAA §108(b) 42 U.S.C. 7408(b). In addition,
this information is provided to the States early in the process,

9

presumably to allow them to participate in the federal rule-
making process.

Under the federal government's interpretation, EPA
could adopt a standard without considering any factor other
than direct public health effects, and without requiring EPA
to intelligibly explain the standard. At the same time,
however, the States must create the overall scheme for
meeting the standard by using “enforceable” control
measures and taking technological feasibility, cost and all the
other factors mentioned in section 108(b) into account.

If EPA’s interpretation is correct, it is free to
knowingly set a standard for a pollutant that is economically
impossible for the States to implement, and yet is
unsupported by an intelligible explanation of why EPA drew
the line where it did. The States are left in an impossible
position—required to attain the standard by a specific
deadline, using “enforceable emission limitations and other
control measures,” and taking cost and _ technological
feasibility into account, but without adequate public health
justifications.

If and when EPA provides adequate public health
justification and properly takes costs, technological
feasibility and other factors into account when setting a
national standard for a pollutant, the federal government can
then articulate an intelligible principle by which the standard
is set, and will be, in effect, taking responsibility for its own
decisions. The effects of technological feasibility, cost and
other factors, as well as the specific public health benefits of
an air quality standard can be debated openly with EPA. And
the standards, and the rationale behind them, will be properly
reviewable under the standard articulated in Chevron U.S.A.
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

10

This Court is not bound by Lead Industries. The
Supporting States respectfully request that the Court resolve
this case without reaching the nondelegation doctrine by
correctly interpreting section 109 to allow and require EPA
to consider costs and other factors besides direct public
health effects in setting a standard for ozone and other non-
threshold pollutants.

B. The Language and the Legislative History of
Section 109, as well as Principles of Administrative
Policy, Support the Consideration of Costs and
Other Factors Besides Direct Public Health Effects
in Setting a National Ambient Air Quality
Standard.

When a court reviews a statutory interpretation
asserted by an executive agency, the court must answer two
questions. The first is “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, . . .” Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842. If the statute is silent or ambiguous, the
court must determine whether the construction given it by the
administrative agency is “based on a permissible construction
of the statute.” /d. at 843. Lead Industries was wrongly
decided because the most reasonable interpretation of the
language of section 109 and related sections is that EPA has
the authority to consider factors other than health when
setting an air standard. And in addition to the language of
the statute, the legislative history and general principles of
administrative policy support the consideration of costs as
well as benefits when setting an air quality standard.

l. Under section 109, “ambient air quality standards”
are set, “the attainment and maintenance of which in the
judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and
allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to
protect the public health.” CAA §109 (b)(1); 42 U.S.C.

enna

7409(b)(1). The language of section 109, and particularly its
use of the terms “criteria” and “margin of safety,” indicates
that EPA may consider factors other than public health in
setting a standard under section 109.”

EPA is to set or revise a standard under section 109
based on “criteria” issued under section 108. EPA issues the
“criteria” in the form of a document summarizing studies and
other scientific information on the direct public health effects
of a particular pollutant. Under section 108, the criteria “shall
accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in
indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on
public health or welfare which may be expected from the
presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, ...” In
addition, the criteria are to incorporate information on a non-
exclusive list of factors, including other factors that might
alter the effects of the pollutant on public health and the
effect of other pollutants that might interact to cause adverse
health effects. CAA §108(a)(2)(A)-(B); 42 U.S.C.
7408(a)(2)(A)-(B). The fact that the list in section 108(a)(2)
is non-exclusive at least suggests that factors other than
“effects on public health or welfare” may be considered
when issuing “criteria” upon which to set or revise a
standard.

But even more telling is the very next subsection,
108(b). Simultaneously with issuance of the criteria, EPA
collects and issues to the States “information on air pollution
control techniques.” CAA §108(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1).
EPA gathers the information in consultation with advisory
committees and federal departments and agencies. CAA

* For more extensive discussions of the language of section 109 and
related sections, see Brief of American Trucking Associations Argument,
part Il A & B; see also Brief of Appalachian Power Company Argument,
part 1A & B.

12

§$108(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1). The information includes
data on a wide range of factors, including cost of installation
and operation, energy requirements, emission reduction
benefits, environmental impacts of the emission control
technology, alternative fuel processes, and operating methods
that will result in elimination or reduction of emissions,
CAA §108(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1). Section 108(b)(2)
also provides for the establishment of a standing consulting
committee for each pollutant, to develop the information in
section 108(b)(1). CAA §108(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(2).
It is unlikely that Congress intended for EPA to gather and
issue information on factors other than direct public health
effects to aid the States in implementing a standard, if they
did not also intend for EPA itself to consider the information
in setting the standard.

The use of the term “public health” suggests that
factors other than medical effects are to be considered in
setting a standard. See American Trucking Associations
Brief, section II A. In addition, the use of the language
“margin of safety” in section 109 strongly suggests that
factors other than health are to be considered in setting a
standard. The word “margin” implies that there is a line from
which that margin is measured. When EPA sets a standard
for a threshold pollutant, as it did in Lead Industries, that line
may be supplied by the threshold itself. (Lead is, or was at
the time of Lead Industries, considered a_ threshold
pollutant.) But where a non-threshold pollutant such as
ozone is under scrutiny, there is no principled way, using
only direct public health effects, to determine such a line. A
“margin” must be measured from something, and if health
factors alone do not supply the line, then other factors must.

This point is explored in Vinyl Chloride. In Vinyl
Chloride, the D.C. Circuit held that section 112, which
requires EPA to set an air quality standard for hazardous
pollutants with an “ample margin of safety” to protect the

13

public health, did not preclude a consideration of costs. Vinyl
Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1163. Vinyl Chloride suggests that
EPA must make an initial determination of what is “safe”
based solely on “the risk to health.” /d. at 1165 although this
determination “does not require a finding that ‘safe’ means
‘risk free,” or free from uncertainty. /d. EPA is to
determine what inferences can be drawn from available
scientific data, and decide what risks are “acceptable.”
However, the court goes on to state that “by its nature the
finding of risk is uncertain” and “at this point of the
regulatory process . . . the Administrator may set the
emission standard at the lowest level that is technologically
feasible.” /d. In other words, once “safe” is determined
using direct public health effects, EPA may use technological
feasibility (and presumably other factors) to provide the
“margin of safety.”

In addition to Vinyl Chloride, other cases hold that
an agency can consider costs if not expressly precluded
from doing so by statutory language. See George E. Warren
Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 622-23 (D.C. Cir.
1998)(nothing in text precludes EPA’s consideration of
effects of proposed rule on the price and supply of
gasoline); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154
F.3d 455, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(FAA may consider costs,
though not mentioned in the statute, in plan for “substantial
restoration of the natural quiet”); National Resources
Defense Council v. U.S. EPA, 937 F.2d 641, 645 (D.C. Cir.
1991)(EPA may use cost-benefit analysis in determining
whether fugitive dust from coal mines is a “major”
contributor to “significant deterioration” under sections 160
et seq.). As the D.C. Circuit observed recently, “These
cases are unexceptional in their general view that preclusion
of cost consideration requires a rather express congressional
direction.” Michigan Dep't of Environmental Quality v.

V4

EPA, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3209 at *36-40 (D.C. Cir.
March 3, 2000) (“NOx SIP call” (emphasis supplied).*

Lead Industries directly contradicts this point. Lead
Industries held that where Congress did not expressly and
specifically provide for consideration of cost or other factors,
an agency may not consider them. 647 F.2d at 1148. See
also National Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA, 902
F.2d 962, 972-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(EPA precluded from
considering the health consequences of unemployment in
setting particulate standard); American Petroleum Inst. v.
Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(EPA cannot
consider attainability and cost justifications for ozone
standards); Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1158-59 (dicta that
section 109 does “not allow consideration of technological or
economic feasibility”).

To be sure, the courts have correctly held that where
statutory language exclusively articulates the factors relevant
to an agency's decision, the agency may not base its decision
on other, irrelevant factors. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. U.S.
EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)(provision enumerating eight
criteria for consideration did not authorize consideration of
other criteria); American Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 52
F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (goal of ethane! marker
protection may not be considered in promulgating regulations
under section 211 because it could “possibly make air quality
worse”); Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir.
1995 (denial of waiver based on health considerations (rather
than the statutorily-required criterion) found impermissible),

* The Supporting States were among those who challenged EPA's NOx
SIP call rule. EPA’s position in that case is wholly inconsistent with its
position here; there, EPA inappropriately overemphasized costs almost to
the exclusion of the impact on air quality in the determination of
“significant contribution.”

Catt

15

See also NOx SIP call, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3209, *93
(Sentelle, J., dissenting).

But where, as here, there is no language articulating
an exclusive list of relevant factors, and no language
precluding the consideration of factors other than direct
public health effects, the Lead Industries rationale makes
little sense. The mandate in section 109(b), “an adequate
margin of safety,” is similar to “ample margin of safety,” the
language analyzed in Vinyl Chloride. The “adequate margin
of safety” language permits EPA less scientific uncertainty
than “ample margin of safety.” Environmental Defense Fund
v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Other than that,
there is no principled reason to distinguish the “margin of
safety” language in section 109(b) and in section 112.

Finally, section 109(d), under which EPA is to review
and revise criteria and standards every five years, requires the
establishment of an independent scientific review committee
to review and recommend changes to the criteria and
standards. CAA §109(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2 (A). In
addition to advising the Administrator of areas in which
additional knowledge and research on public health effects is
needed, the committee is to advise the Administrator of a
large number of other factors. These factors include “any
adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy
effects which may result from various strategies for
attaumment and maintenance of such national ambient air
quality standards.” CAA §109%d)2)”Cyiv); 42 U.S.C.
740% 0) 2C iv). in other words, the committee is to
investigate and report to the Administrator about public
health and non-public health factors regarding the national air
standards, Again, it is unlikely that Congress intended the
independent review committee and the Administrator to
investigate these factors, and yet not consider them when
revising an air standard,

16

In short, there is no “express congressional direction”
in the Clean Air Act as a whole, or in section 109 that
precludes EPA from considering cost or other factors when
setting or revising an air quality standard. On the contrary, a
reasonable interpretation of the language of the Act as a
whole, and section 109 itself, is that EPA is to gather and
consider such information when revising an air quality
standard. The Court should therefore hold that, properly
analyzed under Chevron and other cases, section 109(b)
allows EPA to consider costs as well as benefits in setting or
revising a standard.

2. The legislative history of the Clean Air Act also
includes indications that, while “criteria” deal exhaustively
with the scientific information available on the direct public
health effects of a particular pollutant, a “standard” should
also take other, non-health factors into account. The general
tenor of the debates certainly indicates a get-tough attitude
towards air pollution, and clearly demonstrates that the Act
was intended to be technology forcing. However, the history
also suggests that economic and technological factors were
not to be entirely ignored.

An exchange on this issue took place during 1970
Senate Public Works Subcommittee Hearings on Air
Pollution. At one point in the discussion, Senator Muskie
was discussing criteria and standards with Undersecretary of
the Department of Health Education and Welfare Veneman:

Muskie: The standard is something
different from the criteria, isn’t
it?

Veneman: The criteria are the basis upon
which you establish the
standard.

17

Muskie: How does that differ from a
criterion? What else is there of
a standard? ...

Veneman: . . .As well as the health
aspect, there are esthetic,
economic and other aspects.
You may want to take other
things into consideration in
your standards.

Senate Public Works Subcommittee on Air Pollution, 91“
Cong. 160 (1970).

The history of the 1977 amendments also contains a
pertinent comment in the Report by the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The Committee listed a
number of shortcomings in the existing standards, and then
stated:

The foregoing deficiencies in the [standards] are
pervasive and not easily cured. Some have
suggested that since the standards are to protect
against all known or anticipated effects and
since no safe thresholds can be established, the
ambient standards should be set at zero or
background levels. Obviously, this no-risk
philosophy ignores all economic and _ social
consequences and is impractical.

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report, 127
(May 12, 1977)(emphasis supplied).

Moreover, Congress has provided more than mere
suggestions, at least with regard to ozone. Congress has

18

already recognized that attainment of the |-hour ozone
standard was impossible or nearly so in some regions. In
enacting Title I, Part D, Subpart 2, Congress has set up an
alternative regime for managing ozone pollution, clearly
recognizing that attainment of the standard originally set by
EPA was not feasible given current technology. Comments
of Senator Durenberger with regard to the 1990 amendments
to the Act demonstrate this point:

{T]he whole purpose of this bill is, wherever
possible, to substitute, for artificial
unascertainable standards of health or safety,
technology standards that suit the economic
progress of an industrial society.

Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress
for the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S.
Senate, A_ Legislative History of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, 5683 (1993). As Congress clearly took
cost, technological feasibility and other factors into account
when it passed Subpart 2 of the Clean Air Act, it is
unreasonable to assume that Congress intends for EPA to
ignore these factors when revising a standard for the same
pollutant.”

3. Finally, sound administrative policy indicates that
cost in its broadest sense is always a factor in making a
decision about the environment and public health. “(CJan an
agency sensibly decide whether a risk is significant without
also examining the cost of eliminating it?” Stephen G.
Breyer, Richard B. Steward, Cass R. Sunstein & Matthew L.
Sitzer, Administrative Law & Regulatory Policy 65 (4" ed.

> As will be argued at more length in the Supporting States’ second brief,
given the existence of Subpart 2, EPA cannot revise the ozone standard at
all.

Be ak

19

1999). As discussed above, the consideration of non-health
factors is the only sensible way to establish an air quality
standard for a non-threshold pollutant. A_ cost-benefit
analysis means “only a systematic weighing of the pros and
cons” of a particular standard. /nternational Union v. OSHA,
938 F.2d 1310, 1319-21 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Public health
factors are not ignored, and indeed should be the primary
factor in determining a standard.

Some commentators have taken the view that
environmental agencies, while claiming to make decisions
based on science, are in reality largely cost and policy-
driven. Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk
Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613 (Nov. 1995). Wagner
espouses the view that environmental agencies have
perpetuated a “science charade” in which they exaggerate the
role of science in setting standards in order to avoid
accountability for the underlying policy decisions.

Where, as here, the scientific support for a more
stringent standard is thin, cost and other non-health factors
are even more important in making a sound administrative
decision. EPA’s action in revising the ozone standard is
unsupported by any reliable scientific evidence sufficiently
demonstrating health benefits for the new standard. Instead,
EPA admits that the new ozone standard is largely the result
of a policy judgment. Reasons for the revised standard “were
largely judgmental in nature . . . and may not be amenable to
quantification in terms of what risk is ‘acceptable,’ or any
other metric.” 62 Fed. Reg. 38652, 38688 (1997).

EPA has not shown that the proposed ozone standard
is “requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate
margin of safety.” The Court has construed “safety” under
the Clean Air Act as “a significant risk of harm.” Vinyl
Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1153 (quoting /ndustrial Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO vy. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642

20

(1980)). See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1063
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (EPA’s departure from “significant risk of
harm” to “reasonable basis for concern” standard criticized).

As mentioned above, the statutory mandate to provide
an “adequate” margin of safety permits EPA to take into
account somewhat less scientific uncertainty than under an
“ample” margin of safety. EDF, 598 F.2d at 81. However,
the margin of safety inquiry supposes a significant public
health risk, and EPA has not demonstrated that the revised
ozone standard is needed to avoid significant health risks.

EPA admits that the science supporting the change in
the standard is uncertain. See, e¢.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 38856,
38867 (1997) (“the Administrator and CASAC have
recognized . . . that there are many uncertainties inherent in
[risk] assessments and that the resulting ranges of
quantitative risk estimates do not reflect all of the
uncertainties associated with the numerous assumptions
inherent in such analyses”). The dubious science relied on
by EPA was criticized by many, including the State of Ohio.
“It is not possible to make an informed change in the
standard since there is no statistical basis upon which to
distinguish the range of proposals.” Ohio's Comments,
Record No. IV-D-9934.

Without hard scientific facts showing a significant
risk of harm, EPA must have revised the standard based on
other factors as well. EPA admits that it selected the ozone
standard based on “public health policy judgments in
addition to determinations of a strictly scientific nature.” 62
Fed. Reg. 38856, 38867 (1997). These vague “judgments”
make it impossible to determine whether the standard
provides an “adequate margin of safety.”

With such uncertain health benefits for the new
standard, the prudent course is to balance them against costs

oe

and other factors. To be useful, however, estimates of costs
and other impacts must be comprehensive and accurate. The
Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”) that EPA prepared (but
presumably did not consider in setting the ozone standard)
grossly underestimates the cost of the standard. For instance,
Ohio estimated that partial compliance with the standard for
the state would cost $760 million, while the RIA estimated
that partial compliance for the entire nation would cost $600
million. Ohio’s Comments, Record No. 1V-D-9934.°

In short, prudent administrative policy and plain
common sense demand that EPA consider costs and other
relevant factors when setting a new national ambient air
quality standard, while keeping the public health as its
primary goal. The Court should interpret section 109 to
allow and require that consideration.

The language of the Clean Air Act, as well as the
legislative history, point to the reasonable conclusion that the
EPA is to consider factors other than direct public health
effects when setting and revising a national ambient air
quality standard. Under the first part of Chevron, therefore, a
reviewing court must put the Congressional intent into effect.
But even if the intent is unclear, sound administrative policy
and plain logic render EPA’s rationale for revision of the
ozone and particulate standards “unintelligible.” Under the
second part of Chevron, a reviewing court must hold that
EPA’s rationale reflects an “impermissible construction of
the statute.”

* For a more extensive discussion of the costs of the revised ozone
standard, see Briet of Appalachian Power Company, er a/., Introduction,
part [I and Briet of American Trucking Associations, ef a/., Introduction,

part B I.

22
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the States of Ohio,
Michigan and West Virginia respectfully request that the
Court avoid the potential constitutional issue by reversing the
decision of the court of appeals to the extent that it precludes
EPA from considering “actors other than direct public health
effects of a pollutay’ when it sets or revises a national
ambient air qualit standard. In addition, the Supporting
States respectfully request that the Court order the lower
court to vacate the ozone and particulate matter standards,
and remand this case to EPA for reconsideration of those
standards.

Respectfully submitted,

BETTY D. MONTGOMERY
Attorney General of Ohio
EDWARD B. FOLEY

State Solicitor

JUDITH L. FRENCH*

ELISE W. PORTER

FRANK J. REED, JR.

Assistant Attorneys General
Office of the Attorney General
™®) East Broad Street, 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428
(614) 466-2872

C aunsel for Respondent State of Ohio

*Counsel of Record
July, 2000

| Additional Counsel Listed on Next Page]

23

MARK J. RUDOLPH

Deputy Chief

Office of Legal Services

West Virginia Division of

Environmental Protection

1356 Hansford Street

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

(304) 558-9160

Counsel for Respondent State of West Virginia

JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM
Attorney General of Michigan
THOMAS CASEY

Solicitor General

ALAN F. HOFFMAN
PAMELA J. STEVENSON
Assistant Attorneys General
Natural Resources Division
300 S. Washington, Suite 315
Lansing, Michigan 48917
(517) 373-7540

Counsel for Respondent State of Michigan

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0357%3A14. Public record. Not legal advice.
