# Reply Brief — Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 531 U.S. 457

## Text

No. 99-1257 OCT - 5 200

—___ = ==

*

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

¢

CAROL M. BROWNER, Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.;

Petitioners,

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, et al.,
Respondents.

e

On Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The District Of Columbia Circuit

S

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

¢

Howaro I. Fox

Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund

1625 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.,
Suite 702

Washington, D.C. 20036-2212

(202) 667-4500

Counsel of Record for
American Lung Association

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-694
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

\

|

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE

American Lung Association (ALA) adopts the Rule
29.6 disclosure set forth in ALA’s opening brief at ii.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE CLEAN AIR ACT COMPLIES WITH THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE................

A.

2

The Clean Air Act Sets Forth Intelligible
Principles Sufficient to Satisfy this Court’s
Nondelegation Precedent, Which Does Not
Require a “Determinate Criterion.” ........

Because the Clean Air Act Is Undisputedly
Constitutional, There Was No Basis for the
D.C. Circuit to Undertake a Constitutionally
Based Examination of EPA’s Interpretation,
Much Less to Require a Constitutionally
Based Narrowing of That Interpretation....

Nonconstitutional Remedies Are Available
to Challenge Any Alleged Failure by EPA to
Follow Congressional Mandates or to
Engage in Reasoned Decisionmaking.......

THE D.C. CIRCUIT ERRED IN LIMITING EPA‘S
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT A NEW OZONE
RN

A.

EPA Has Authority Under Subpart 1 to Imple-
ment a More Protective Ozone NAAQS......

Classifications and attainment dates -
areas with design value 20.121.........

Classifications and attainment dates -
areas with design value See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. lowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388
(1999) (“the Act requires the FCC to apply some limiting
standard”) (first emphasis added).

7

B. Because the Clean Air Act Is Undisputedly
Constitutional, There Was No Basis for the D.C.
Circuit to Undertake a Constitutionally Based
Examination of EPA’s Interpretation, Much Less
to Require a Constitutionally Based Narrowing
of That Interpretation. -

The foregoing discussion demonstrates the error in
the D.C. Circuit’s requirement that EPA adopt a narrow-
ing construction of the Act. Like the statute at issue in
FEA v. Algonquin SNG, 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976), the Clean
Air Act’s NAAQS provisions are “clearly sufficient to
meet any delegation doctrine attack.” Accord, ATA Rsp. to
Cert. Petitions at 15 (§ 109 is “undisputedly” constitu-
tional). Accordingly, just as the Court rejected the request
for a narrowing construction there, it should do the same
here. See also USPIRGEF 99-1426 Br. Pt. II.

Moreover, industry has failed to cite a single decision
of this Court supporting the D.C. Circuit’s ruling — char-
acterized by one of industry’s own allies as “novel” and
“unprecedented” (Mercatus Br. 13) — that Congress's con-
stitutionally conferred legislative power can be protected
by requiring an Executive Branch agency to enunciate an
intelligible principle. As another of industry’s allies
notes, if the Act’s NAAQS provisions set forth an intellig-
ible principle to guide EPA, then the agency’s alieged
“failure to articulate that principle, while legally troub-
ling on other grounds,” would “not implicate the non-
delegation doctrine.” Inst. Justice/Cato Br. 29 (emphasis
added). See also Hatch Br. 30 n.22.

Finally, the specific interpretation requested by
industry — that EPA must balance health against cost and
other factors - would broaden the Act’s mandate (see pp.

8

2-3, supra), and thus does not constitute a “narrow” con-
struction within the meaning of Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989). ALA 99-1426 Br. 40. And
because industry’s interpretation is contrary to clear con-
gressional intent, id. 29-32, its adoption would constitute,
not a “construction” of the Act at all, but a congression-
ally unauthorized amendment. See USPIRGEF 99-1426 Br.
11.

C. Nonconstitutional Remedies Are Available to
Challenge Any Alleged Failure by EPA to Fol-
low Congressional Mandates or to Engage in
Reasoned Decisionmaking.

Industry's true objections to EPA’s NAAQS are statu-
tory, not constitutional. The assertion that EPA has taken
actions “incompatible with the scope of authority dele-
gated .. . by Congress” (APC Br. 2; see also id. 32) is
reviewable as a claim that EPA has acted “not in accor-
dance with law.” CAA § 307(d)(9)(A). See Chevron, U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(setting forth a two-step process for reviewing such
claims). The contention that EPA has failed to “explain
the statutory standard that guides [its] . . . exercise of
rulemaking discretion and how consideration of relevant
science is applied in reference to that standard” (APC Br.
29) is reviewable as a claim that the agency acted in an
“arbitrary” and “capricious” manner. CAA
§ 307(d)(9)(A). Indeed, Appalachian Power concedes that
“the Clean Air Act unquestionably provides law to
apply,” APC Br. 28 — from which it necessarily follows
that the Act provides a “meaningful standard against
which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Heck-
ler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). Thus, the Act offers

9

an intelligible principle sufficient to permit judicial
review, and the D.C. Circuit’s recourse to the constitu-
tional nondelegation doctrine — instead of to normal non-
constitutional review — was error.®

Arguing the contrary, Appalachian Power unper-
suasively suggests that, although “there are several ways
the lower court could have reached the same result”
(including constitutional nondelegation review as well as
nonconstitutional arbitrary-and-capricious or statutory
interpretation review), “[w]hichever basis for decision
one chooses, the essential principle is the same: an agency
must explain what it does in light of Congress’ delegation
of authority.” APC Br. 23. In short, Appalachian Power is
asserting that the D.C. Circuit had the choice between
deciding this case on constitutional and nonconstitutional
grounds, and chose the constitutional ground. This
approach stands the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
on its head.

Moreover, Appalachian Power’s attempt to equate
the D.C. Circuit’s nondelegation ruling with garden vari-
ety nonconstitutional judicial review is refuted by the

© The argument that EPA failed to provide sufficient
protection against health effects (Hatch Br. 29) is not a
constitutional argument, but rather a nonconstitutional
administrative law challenge under CAA § 307(d)(9)(A). See,
e.g., American Lung Association v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (responding to plaintiffs’ arguments that EPA had failed
to provide sufficient health protection, court reviewed and
remanded an EPA decision under § 109(b)(1)); Cross-petition of
Citizens for Balanced Transportation at 8-12 (arguing that the
1997 PM NAAQS is insufficiently health-protective, but
emphasizing that that claim is a nonconstitutional claim that
raises no nondelegation issues).

10

D.C. Circuit itself. That court “agree[d]” with circuit pre-
cedent holding that, “when there is uncertainty about the
health effects of concentrations of a particular pollutant
within a particular range, EPA may use its discretion to
make the ‘policy judgment’ to set the standards at one
point within the relevant range rather than another.”
App. 12a. But the court shunted that precedent aside,
asserting that “none of those panels addressed the claim of
undue delegation that we face here.” Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, the D.C. Circuit clearly believed that its invocation
of the constitutionally based nondelegation doctrine
made possible a ruling that the court would not have
been able to issue on nonconstitutional grounds. See App.
96a (Silberman, J., dissenting).

The conclusion that the D.C. Circuit’s constitutional
ruling was error fully disposes of EPA’s Question #1, and
the Court need not and should not address industry's
nonconstitutional judicial review. arguments. While these
arguments are not before the Court, ALA offers a few
brief observations in response to industry’s attacks on the
evidence underlying the NAAQS. First, industry’s asser-
tion that EPA did not rely on the adverse nature of health
effects occurring at pollution levels allowed by the prior
NAAQS (APC Br. 6) is simply wrong: EPA made express
findings of adverseness for both PM and ozone. 62 Fed.
Reg. 38657/1 (1997), JAPM 7; 62 Fed. Reg. 38864/1-2
(1997), JAO 9.

Moreover, the assertion that these effects are not
“demonstrated” by the scientific evidence (APC Br. 6) is
equally mistaken. For PM, the Criteria Document
expressly noted “recent studies providing evidence that
serious health effects (mortality, exacerbation of chronic

11

disease, increased hospital admissions, etc.) are associ-
ated with exposures to ambient levels of PM found in
contemporary U.S. urban air sheds even at concentrations
below current [i.e., pre-1997] U.S. PM standards.” CDPM
13-1, JA 1779 (emphasis added). See also 62 Fed. Reg.
38665 /2, JAPM 15 (evidence that pre-existing NAAQS do
not adequately protect health is “strong”). Contrary to
industry's assertions (ATA Br. 21; APC Br. 12 n.27), EPA
did not rely solely on the statistical significance of these
studies, but also concluded on the basis of extensive
analysis that the observed effects were unlikely to have
been caused by other factors (such as other pollutants),
see, ¢.g., PMSP V-55 to 56, JAPM 2012-14; RTCPM A-22,
JAPM 344; CDPM 13-57, JAPM 1835; 62 Fed. Reg.
38660-61, JPM 10-11, and that the consistency and
strength of the statistical association was substantial
enough to support a finding of causation. RTCPM 68,
A22-23, JAPM 295, 344-45; 62 Fed. Reg. 38658-59, JAPM
8-9.

For ozone, EPA examined human clinical studies -
studies that “relate known O3 exposures directly to
responses in individuals,” 62 Fed. Reg. 38872/1, JAO 17 -
and concluded that these studies provide “clear evi-
dence” of health effects (including adverse effects) at
ozone levels allowed by the prior NAAQS. Id. 38863-64,
JAO 8-9. Likewise, epidemiological studies provided
“strong evidence” of adverse effects at ozone concentra-
tions below the prior NAAQS. CDO 7-171, JAO 1624.

For both PM and ozone, this compelling evidence is
more than sufficient demonstration of adverse health

12

effects, especially in light of the Act’s precautionary man-
date. See ALA Br. 20-21; App. 54a-56a.”

Il. THE D.C. CIRCUIT ERRED IN LIMITING EPA‘S
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT A NEW OZONE
NAAQS.

A. EPA Has Authority Under Subpart 1 to Imple-
ment a More Protective Ozone NAAQS.

Though conceding that EPA has authority to promul-
gate a more protective ozone NAAQS, ATA Br. 39, ATA
erroneously claims that EPA lacks authority to implement
it. Id. 29.

Classifications and attainment dates - areas with
design value 20.121. The core of the D.C. Circuit's ruling
(as modified on rehearing) is that Subpart 2 sets forth
classifications and attainment dates under the 1997 ozone
NAAQS for areas with design value 20.121. ATA argues
that this ruling means that the 1997 NAAQS cannot be
implemented at all for areas with design value 20.121.
ATA Br. 29 (the Act precludes implementation “in any
fashion” of a more stringent ozone NAAQS). To the con-
trary: if Subpart 2 sets forth classifications and attainment
dates for such areas under the 1997 NAAOS, the third
sentence of § 181(a)(1) would clearly require that the
“primary standard attainment date for ozone” be the

” EPA’s statement that the risk assessments do not constitute
demonstrated effects (APC Br. 6 n.6) does not purport to
address the evidence documenting adverse effects at PM and
ozone concentrations below the prior NAAQS - but rather,
characterizes EPA’s attempts to predict how often individuals
would come into contact with such concentrations. Such
assessments are not a required component of NAAQS-setting.
ALA 99-1426 Br. 49-50.

13

appropriate date specified in § 181(a)(1)’s Table 1. For
many areas, the Table 1 dates had already expired as of
the July 1997 promulgation date of the new NAAQS. ALA
Br. 40-41, 45.

ATA cannot have it both ways: if the first sentence of
§ 181(a)(1) is to be read broadly to encompass all ozone
nonattainment areas, and not just those under the 1979
NAAQS, then the third sentence of that provision must
be given a similarly broad reading eonsistent with its
unqualified scope. Instead, ATA’s interpretation treats
that sentence’s unqualified reference to “the primary
standard attainment date for ozone” as a scrivener’s error
~ and amends it to read “the primary standard attainment
date for the 1979 ozone NAAQS.”

In short, the hybrid approach advocated by ATA (that
the first sentence of 181(a)(1) applies broadly to any
ozone NAAQS, but the third sentence applies only to the
1979 NAAQS) is not an available reading of the statutory
text. Instead, this case presents two choices for areas with
design value 20.121: either (1) Subpart 2 specifies classi-
fications and attainment dates under the 1997 NAAQS,
and those attainment dates for many areas had already
expired when the NAAQS was promulgated in July 1997
(i.e., both the first sentence and the third sentence of
§ 181(a)(1) apply to the 1997 NAAQS), or (2) Subpart 2
specifies no classifications or attainment dates for the
1997 NAAQS (i.¢., neither the first sentence nor the third
sentence of § 181(a)(1) applies to the 1997 NAAQS).
Because interpretation #(1) “makes no sense” (Ohio Br.
30) (citation omitted) and is “absurd” (Intel Br. 9), inter-
pretation #(2) is the only plausible reading of the Act.
Thus, because Subpart 2 specifies no classifications or
attainment dates under the 1997 NAAQS for areas with

14

design value 20.121, the ouster clauses of § 172(a)(1)(C)
and (a)(2)(D) do not apply, and the Subpart 1 classifica-
tion and attainment date provisions govern.
Classifications and attainment dates - areas with
design value <0.121. ATA likewise argues that the 1997
ozone NAAQS cannot be implemented at all for areas
with design value less than 0.121. ATA Br. 28-29. But see
App. 89a (Tatel, J., concurring). Once again, ATA’s read-
ing ignores the plain language of the statute. If the first
sentence of § 181(a)(1) is read to encompass areas desig-
nated nonattainment under the 1997 NAAOS, that same
sentence would expressly provide that “/eJach” such area
“shall be classified at the time of such designation, under
table 1, by operation of law, as a Marginal Area, a Mode-
rate Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme
Area, based on the design value for the area.” (Emphasis
added.) But by ATA’s own admission, such classification
is impossible for areas with design value <0.121, because
Table 1 establishes classifications (and attainment dates)
“only for areas with ozone levels above 0.12 parts per
million (“ppm”) — the level of the 1979 ozone NAAQS.”
ATA Br. 28 (second emphasis added). ATA’s reading, by
assigning to § 181(a)(1) nonattainment areas that cannot
be classified under Table 1, would treat as a scrivener’s
error § 181(a)(1)’s unqualified mandate that “[e]ach” Sub-
part 2 area “shall” be classified under that table. In short,
for areas with design value <0.121, the choice is not
between an absurd reading and a sensible one - it is
between an impossible reading (that § 181(a)(1) applies to
nonattainment areas under the 1997 NAAQS with design
value <0.121) and a possible one (that § 181(a)(1) does not
apply to such areas). Thus, because Subpart 2 specifies no
classifications or attainment dates under the 1997

15

NAAQS for areas with design value <0.121, the ouster
clauses of § 172(a)(1)(C) and (a)(2)(D) do not apply, and
the Subpart 1 classification and attainment date provi-
sions govern.

Control Measures. Strikingly, industry and Ohio
offer no defense whatsoever of the D.C. Circuit's ruling
(App. 34a) that the 1997 NAAQS must be implemented
only in accordance with the “control measures” of Sub-
part 2, and no response to ALA’s refutation of this ruling.
See ALA Br. 42-44. In particular, they have pointed to no
statutory ouster provision (comparable to § 172(a)(1)(C)
and (a)(2)(D)) that even colorably could be said to dis-
place the § 172(b) and (c) provisions concerning submis-
sion and content of pollution control plans. Instead, by
arguing broadly that the new NAAQS cannot be imple-
mented “in any fashion” (ATA Br. 29) — an assertion
which if accepted would override the pollution control
plan provisions of § 172(b) and (c) — ATA treats as a
scrivener’s error the absence from § 172(b) and (c) of an
ouster provision.

ATA’s argument must be rejected for another reason
as well. If ATA were correct that § 181(a)(1) applies to all
nonattainment areas under the 1997 ozone NAAQS, then
many areas with design value 20.121 would by the
express terms of the Act be required to submit — by dates
that had already expired when the 1997 NAAQS was
promulgated —- pollution control plans providing for
attainment of that NAAQS. ALA Br. 42-44. What was said
above concerning classifications and attainment dates for
such areas applies here also: a hybrid reading (under
which the first sentence of § 181(a)(1) applies to areas
designated nonattainment under the new NAAQS, but
the pollution control plan submission requirements of

16

§ 182(b)(1)(A)(i) and (c)(2)(A) apply only to the 1979
NAAQS) is not an available reading of the statute. ATA’s
attempt to advance such a hybrid argument reduces the
broad language of § 182(b)(1)(A)(i) and (c)(2)(A) — which
refers to plans to attain “the national primary ambient air
quality standard for ozone” and “the ozone national
ambient air quality standard,” rather than just the 1979
standard — to a scrivener’s error.

Designation of nonattainment areas. ATA’s argu-
ment that EPA may not designate nonattainment areas
under the new NAAQS, ATA Br. 39, 41, must (assuming
arguendo it is properly before the Court) be rejected — as it
was by the D.C. Circuit. App. 36a-37a. Aside from being
based on the erroneous premise that § 181(a)(1) applies to
the new NAAQS, ATA’s argument ignores the plain lan-
guage of 107(d), which provides that, “not later than 1
year after promulgation of a new or revised” NAAQS, “the
Governor of each State shall . . . submit to the Administra-
tor a list of all areas (or portions thereof) in the State,
designating as . . . nonattainment, any area that does not
meet” that NAAQS. § 107(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
Once again, ATA attempts to treat comprehensive and
mandatory statutory language as a scrivener’s error.®

§’ Contrary to ATA (Br. 39, 41), where available information
indicates an area is violating a revised NAAQS, the area cannot
be designated as “unclassifiable” for that NAAQS. Such a
designation is available only for an area that “cannot be
classified on the basis of available information as meeting or not
meeting” NAAQS. § 107(d)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).

17

B. The 1990 Amendments Left Unchanged EPA’s
Pre-existing Authority to Promulgate Revised
NAAQS.

Recognizing that EPA cannot plausibly be barred
from implementing a NAAQS that it has validly promul-
gated, Ohio argues that the 1990 Amendments stripped
EPA of authority to promulgate a revised ozone NAAQS
in the first place. Ohio Br. 29-31. This argument - again,
assuming arguendo it is properly before the Court — must
be rejected. As the D.C. Circuit correctly held, the 1990
Amendments made no change in EPA’s duty to review -
and, as appropriate, revise - NAAQS at least every five
years. App. 34a (citing § 109(d)(1)). Neither Ohio nor
anyone else has pointed to a shred of evidence in the
statutory text (or even legislative history) that the 1990
Amendments intended to limit or abrogate this funda-
mental duty, which is the very heart of the Act’s health-
protection mandate. See generally ALA 99-1426 Br. Incredi-
bly, Ohio cites as support for precluding tightening of the
1979 ozone NAAQS a committee report that recognized
such tightening might well be necessary to protect public
health. S. Rep. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1989). See
Ohio Br. 22, 23, 25.

Far from revoking EPA's pre-existing revision author-
ity, the 1990 Amendments enacted § 172(e), which clearly
presupposes that EPA retains authority to revise NAAQS.
App. 35a. The D.C. Circuit found “[tlelling[ ]” the failure
of industry and Ohio to address § 172(e), id., and their
continuing failure to do so in this Court is even more
striking.®

* Contrary to Appalachian Power's implication, APC Br.
49-50, EPA’s revision authority is not limited to promulgating

18

C. The Structure of the Act’s NAAQS Revision
and Implementation Provisions Offers No Basis
for Overriding the Statute’s Express Language.

Deprived of its purported textual argument, industry
is left with the vague assertion that Congress intended
Subpart 2 to be the exclusive ozone program for the
nation, thus displacing Subpart 1. ATA Br. 32-38; APC Br.
47-49; Ohio Br. 21-26. But Congress specified, in the ous-
ter provisions of § 172(a)(1)(C) and (a)(2)(D), the exact
extent to which it wanted Subpart 2 to displace Subpart 1
~ and those ouster clauses do not apply to the new ozone
NAAQS.

Where the ouster clauses are inapplicable, applica-
tion of Subpart 1 not only does not disserve congressional
intent — it is necessary in order to obey Congress’s intent
that Subpart 1 apply to “any revised standard, including a
revision of any standard in effect on November 15, 1990.”
§ 172(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Far from being a pre-
existing relic that Congress “abandoned” (Ohio Br. 9) or
“ghettoized” (ATA Br. 38), Subpart 1 was extensively
rewritten in 1990, and thus reflects the contemporaneous
intent of the same Congress that enacted Subpart 2.
Indeed, the 1990 House committee report - the same
report cited by industry as evidence of the alleged exclu-
siveness of Subpart 2 (APC Br. 47; ATA Br. 33; Ohio Br.
13) - expressly reaffirms the applicability of Subpart 1 to
ozone. ALA Br. 42. Thus, the Act’s language, as well as its

relaxations of NAAQS. Section 172(e), while clearly establishing
the 1990 Congress's intent that EPA retain its NAAQS revision
authority, does not itself confer such authority. Rather, EPA’s
NAAQS revision authority emanates from § 109, which clearly
requires the agency to promulgate whatever revised NAAQS are
“appropriate” in light of the health effects evidence.

19

legislative history, refute the notion that Subpart 2 was
intended to be the nation’s sole ozone abatement pro-
gram.

Moreover, the argument that implementation of the
new NAAQS under Subpart 1 will undermine Subpart 2
is meritless. First, for areas that are in attainment of the
1979 NAAQS, Subpart 2 specifies no classifications and
attainment dates. See pp. 14-15, supra. Accordingly, appli-
cation of Subpart 1 in such areas could not possibly
conflict with the Subpart 2 program. See App. 84a-88a
(Tatel, J., concurring).

Second, for areas that are in nonattainment status
under the 1979 standard, application of Subpart 1 will
likewise not undermine Subpart 2. EPA has expressly
decided that the 1979 NAAQS - and the associated Sub-
part 2 implementation strategies — will remain in place
for each such area until the area meets the 1979 NAAQS.
In the meantime, EPA requires areas to move towards
compliance with both standards, thus respecting the clear
timetables of § 172, and avoiding the adverse impacts that
would flow from sequential implementation: specifically,
requiring implementation of the 1997 NAAQS to await
attainment of the 1979 NAAQS would prolong the time
period during which the public suffers adverse health
impacts, ALA Br. 49, and would also be less efficient for
industry and for government anti-pollution officials, who
would need to gear up for two rounds of pollution reduc-
tions addressing largely the same emissions sources.'°

10 In any event, EPA has stated that there is only one area
where compliance with the 1997 standard could be required at
the same time as with the 1979 standard. App. 88a. While Intel
notes that areas must have three years of clean data in order to

20
CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the relief requested in ALA’s
opening brief (at 50). In doing so, the Court should reject
industry’s argument (ATA Br. 47-48) that EPA’s Question
#3 challenges only the rationale of the D.C. Circuit's
decision: the D.C. Circuit’s Subpart 2 implementation
ruling was not a rationale for the court’s ruling concern-
ing EPA’s authority to revise the NAAQS and designate
nonattainment areas, but rather was a separate ruling
reached only after the court had disposed of the revision
and designation issues. App. 34a-43a. Finally, if this
Court reaches the revision and designation issues, it
should affirm the D.C. Circuit’s ruling on those issues.

DATED: October 5, 2000.
Respectfully submitted,

Howarp I. Fox

Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund

1625 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.,
Suite 702

Washington, D.C. 20036-2212

(202) 667-4500

Counsel of Record for
American Lung Association

be considered in attainment of the 1997 NAAQS by the Subpart
1 deadline, Intel Br. 20-21, it fails to point out that three years of
clean data are also required in order for areas to be considered
in attainment of the 1979 NAAQS by the Subpart 2 deadlines. App.
32a n.6.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0353%3A26. Public record. Not legal advice.