# Amicus Curiae Brief — Boy Scouts of America v. Dale

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0345%3A24

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 530 U.S. 640

## Text

— ‘Coure US. |
ED
24 devo
fe b aN FEB 2 4 onnn
No. 99-699
In the Supreme Coc :
OF THE

United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1999

Boy Scouts OF AMERICA and MONMOUTH
CounciL, Boy Scouts oF AMERICA,
Petitioners,

Vs.

JAMES DALE,
Respondent.

Se
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
CALIFORNIA STATE CLUB ASSOCIATION
AND NATIONAL CLUB ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITION OF PETITIONERS

re ee

WILLIAM I. EpLuND
Counsel of Record

ADRIAN MuRPHY
900 Front Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, California 941 11
Telephone: (415) 956-1900
Facsimile: (415) 956-1152

Counsel for Amicus Curiae
California State Club
Association and National

Club Association
BARTKO, ZANKEL, TARRANT & MILLER

900 Front Street, Suite 300
Francisco, California 9411]
Of Counsel

Bowne of Los Angeles, Inc., Law Printers (213) 627-2200

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE...............
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................
REUFUFTE occ cvenscndasscreccevesesvessece

I. PUBLIC POLICY BARRING
DISCRIMINATION APPLIES ONLY TO
PUBLIC, NOT TO PRIVATE LIFE.......... 3

Il. AFFIRMANCE OF THE DECISION
BELOW WILL HAVE A CHILLING
EFFECT UPON PRIVATE NON-
COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND
et CLUBS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED
Seal ero neta: a TR hk NE Nee STATES AND WOULD LEAD TO THE
; ng Bicone are mR yds, aa EVISCERATION OF THE FIRST
PS eae ce ea rt ea et. B AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR ALL
wiya, Ae: VON ade” fous OE a em a SUCH ASSOCIATIONS AND CLUBS...... 8
A_ The Result-Oriented Legislative Definition
And Judicial Construction of “Private” Club
or Association to Mean “Place of Public
Association” or “Business Establishment”
are Constitutionally Flawed And Have a
Chilling Effect Upon The Membership
Selection and Activities of Private Non-
Commercial Associations And Clubs....... 8
B Coerced Companionship And Forced
Fraternization Dilute The Constitutionally
Nurtured Freedom of Association And
Ultimately Will Destroy The Diversity
Among Free People That is Enriched by
Private Associations and Clubs Safe From
Government Regimentation............... 12

CIFOR RAMIIIS vi cccccenecccsesecsdnseceseccss

wo

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Page
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) ........650005: 4
Board of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,

— ft Sg, PPT TTTTTT TTT Terre 4
Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment and

Housing Commission, (1986)

SBF Ge BO BEE sc ccccccccesvceseccccccccceees 11
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) .........650 005 4
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy

Scouts, 17 Cal 4th 670 (1998) ...........006: passim
Edward v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) ....... 16
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) ...... bennedese 4

Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) ...4

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and
| Bisexual Group of Boston

PT Te TT TTT Tey 6, 14, 16
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)...... 4
Nat. Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie,

Tes ccctendvdrersccdseresececse 15
National Endowment for Arts v. Finley,

Es cw cas cebetneoesececooce 15, 16
New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,

Se DO Ms Sin ced ccudibeceneccsesccccccces 8
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) ....... 7
Pacific-Union Club v. Superior Court (State Franchise

Tax Board), 232 Cal.App.3d 60 (1991)............ 14
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609

Psp DUabEb bes cb N Sees SACD ONO ee ROE NEC 3, 5, 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Page
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)........ 10
Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club,
nn oo idee Cie eecdeeneseee scene’ 9
Statutes |
ey ee ED Ot s Oils SU cc cc ccdccccescccccces 10
i oie 6 oi es ck decececndecs 10
Conn. Gen. Stat. § $2-STid(a) ............ccceees 9, 10
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-1002(h) (West 2000) ....... 9,10
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 36-501 (West 2000) ............ 9,10
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301, 37.2303 ....... 9,10
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.050 (West 2000) ............ 9,10
Other Authorities
Associations in a Nutshell, Nov. 30, 1999, American
Society of Association Executives .................. 6
Bay Area Clubs, Organizations & Associations,
A Guide to Getting Involved (April 1, 1999) San
Francisco Chamber of Commerce.................. 6
Beard, C. and M., The Rise of American Civilization
Dt inks esbetdeshbenesubobedeusetesnses 5
Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle (1977)
© Semana amen L.. 5. ZED on nc cccccccccccccccces 7
de Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America
(Tr. Henry Reeve, Rev. Ed. 1900) Vol. 1 ........... 5

Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal
Protection of the Law” (1950) 50 Col. L. Rev. 131 ...4

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Gutmann, Amy, editor, Freedom of Association
FReeePacccecccocucecssceneecotpansed 5,7, 11, 12, 15

Rosenblum, Nancy L., Membership and Morals:
The Personal Uses of Pluralism in America
GR anceseccecceeacctienneuceseanteeusseccs 5,7

Note, State Power and Discrimination by Private
Clubs: First Amendment Protection for
Non-expressive Associations (1991)

ae CS Gs od bkebescecucecééoeseses 8, 12
The Encyclopedia of Associations (33rd ed.)
Wee sdéecnsdondnhesteseceetuanmsabecunan 6

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE'

The California State Club Association (“CSCA”) is -
California non-profit, mutual benefit corporation. Its mem-
bership includes more than 100 private voluntary, non-profit
clubs in California that were formed and are operated for
recreational and private social purposes. Membership in the
clubs is based upon a goal of furthering and preserving
conviviality, congeniality and common interests of the indi-
vidual members. Use of the clubs and their facilities is
typically reserved to club members and their accompanied

guests.

CSCA’s purpose and activities have been and are to
monitor judicial decisions of interest to its members, to
inform its members of those developments through publica-
tions and seminars, and to speak for its members before the
state legislature and the courts. CSCA asserts the right of
voluntary private clubs and their individual members to
enjoy and practice the freedoms of association and assembly
guaranteed by the Constitution.

The National Club Association (“NCA”) is an associa-
tion of over 1,000 private clubs which have approximately
1 million individual members. NCA performs at the na-
tional level essentially the same functions as CSCA per-
forms in California.

Amici do not advocate or endorse discrimination. Amici’s
interest in this case arise from their concern that a decision
holding a bona fide voluntary non-commercial private or-
ganization, such as the Boy Scouts, subject to the New

‘Pursuant to Rule 37, written consent of counsel of record for all of
the parties in this case has been lodged with the Clerk of the Court. No
party or parties’ counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
person or entity other than amici curiae, their members, or their counsel,
have made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of

2

Jersey law could have a serious and irreparable prejudicial
impact on private clubs and associations throughout the
United States. It would send a signal to other states’ courts,
legislators, and government officials to follow the lead of the
New Jersey court in construing similar public accommoda-
tion anti-discrimination laws to infringe upon constitutional
provisions protecting freedom of association. Amici urge this
Court to reverse the judgment below and to make clear that
public accommodation anti-discrimination laws may not be
constitutionally applied to private voluntary social clubs and
associations that are piedominantly non-commercial regard-
less of whether those clubs and associations are expressive or

are sending any message.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Public accommodation anti-discrimination laws cannot be
enacted or construed to apply to private voluntary non-
commercial associations and clubs because they would in-
trude upon the constitutionally protected right of associa-
tion. There are thousands of clubs in the United States,
many of which are members of amici, that are private,
voluntary and no1-commercial with genuinely selective
membership, purely social purposes and policies prohibiting
commercial or business activities. If this Court sustains the
New Jersey Supreme Court decision stretching its “public
accommodation” law to include the Boy Scouts, there are
few private clubs that would not be exposed to claims based
on governmental compelled access laws. Such claims would
have a chilling effect upon First Amendment rights, includ-
ing membership policies, selection of leaders, and typical
club activities. They would result in burdensome, expensive
and oppressive litigation. The near universal impact of these
compelled access laws and claims based on thera will
inevitably change the composition and quality of life in

3

private associations and clubs, and the values they help to
preserve.

Government intrusion mandating membership and leader
selection within private clubs and associations against the
shared views and ideals of members of even non-expressive
associations would alter and transform those associations,
and ultimately undermine and diminish diversity with its
universally accepted value to our pluralistic society. It will
inevitably raise issues of political intrusion into private
associations and present the always lurking danger of the
politically correct dogma invading the cloister of private
friendships, collegial association, and social discourse.
Rather than promoting the goal of greater diversity among
free peoples gathering together, congeniality and individual-
ity will be sacrificed under the banner of bias eradication for
a sterile collection of governmentally approved homogenous

and fungible groups.

ARGUMENT
L.

PUBLIC POLICY BARRING DISCRIMINATION
APPLIES ONLY TO PUBLIC, NOT TO
PRIVATE LIFE.

New Jersey, like California and all other states, has a
deep and continuing interest in “ensuring nondiscriminatory
access to commercial opportunities in our society.” Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632 (1984)
(O’Connor and Kennedy JJ., concurring). That interest
does not extend to private voluntary associations of a non-
commercial nature. Discrimination in public and other com-
mercial places is banned, but in our homes, our clubs and
other private associations, we are free to choose our associ-
ates and companions.

4

The wall between the ban on discrimination in public
arenas and the freedom to choose one’s associates in private
associations was erected early in the first civil rights era, and
has long been recognized by this Court. “In the debates that
culminated in the acceptance of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the theme of granting ‘civil,’ as distinguished from
‘social,’ rights constantly recurred.” Bell v. Maryland 378

U.S. 226, 294 (1964) (Goldberg, Warren, C.J., and Doug-
las, JJ. concurring). (Footnote omitted.)

Recognizing its constitutional significance, this Court has
insisted upon the clear distinction between legally protected
equality of civil rights and unregulated personal choice of
social rights. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48, 59
(1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 294, 313 (1964). Accord, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 298-299 (1966); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gil-
more v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974)
(adopting referenced portion of Douglas, J. dissent); Board
of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
537, 547 note 6 (1987). “One central theme emerges from
the talk of ‘social equality’: there are two kinds of relations
of men, those that are controlled by the law and those that
are controlled by purely personal choice. The former in-
volves civil rights, the latter social rights. Bell v. Maryland,
supra, 378 U.S. at 294 note 14 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(quoting Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of
“Equal Protection of the Law” (1950) 50 Col. L. Rev. 131,
148-149).

This distinction between civil and social rights is compa-
rable and sets the same limits to anti-discrimination laws
and a state’s interest in enforcing those laws. “[T]he Con-
gress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment was particu-
larly conscious that the ‘civil’ rights of man should be
distinguished from his ‘social’ rights.” Bell v. Maryland,

5

supra, 378 U.S. at 313. Justice Goldberg’s opinion empha-
sized that “the constitutional right of every person to close
his home or club to any person” are social rights, which like
other “rights pertaining to privacy and private association
are themselves constitutionally protected liberties.” Jd.

The freedom to choose one’s associates, to form private
groups, associations and clubs, and to select leaders for those
groups, serve important values. Because “individuals draw
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with
others,” freedom of association “safeguards the ability inde-
pendently to define one’s identity that is central to any

concept of liberty.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra,

468 U.S. at 619. The freedom of association is integral to
being a free person. Freedom to choose one’s own compan-
ions, colleagues, associates or friends is what being free
means.

Private associations and clubs are fundamental building
blocks of pluralism and social diversity, a bulwark against
the power of the state. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
supra, 468 U.S. at 619 (1984); Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America, Vol. 1, 196 (Henry Reeve, trans.,
Rev. Ed. 1900); C. & M. Beard, The Rise of American
Civilization Vol. 2, 730-731 (1927) (referring to de Toc-
queville and the “tendency of Americans to unite with their
fellows for various purposes”). In our increasingly frag-
mented, mobile and impersonal world, private groups and
associations provide a critical sense of belonging, a fellow-
ship and a comfortable environment for social interaction
and the pursuit of happiness. Amy Gutmann, Freedom of
Association: An Introductory Essay, in Freedom of Associa-
tion 3-4 (Gutmann, ed., 1998); Nancy L. Rosenblum,
Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism in

6

America 3, 18, 25-26 (1998).? Freedom to select leaders
and members is essential to the continued vitality and
diversity of voluntary private associations and clubs.

There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into
the internal structure or affairs of an association than a
regulation that forces the group to accept members it
does not desire .... Freedom of association therefore
plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. (Cita-
tion omitted.)

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. at 623.
Accord, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisex-
ual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995) (a private
club may exclude anyone “whose manifest views were at
odds with a position taken by the club’s existing members”).

Just as the Boy Scouts provide emotional enrichment,
discipline, fun and identity formation for the young men in

*What was true in de Tocqueville’s time is equally true now. There
are tens of thousands of private associations and clubs in the United
States. The Encyclopedia of Associations (33rd ed.) Volume | identifies
23,000 national associations, including over 600 fraternal, nationality
and ethnic organizations, over 2000 cultural organizations, over 100
social fraternities and sororities, and over 2300 hobby and avocational
groups. The Encyclopedia also reports over 110,000 local, state, and
regional associations. Associations in a Nutshell, Nov. 30,
1999, American Society of Association Executives,
http: / / www.asaenet.org/research/fa. There are over 1000 fraternal, for-
eign interest, nationality and ethnic associations headquartered in Cali-
fornia. NCA membership of over 1000 private clubs represents an
estimated 20% of the total universe of 5000 private clubs. There are well
over 5 million individual members in the private club community alone
and several more millions if nationality, ethnic and cultural organiza-
tions and clubs are included. The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce
lists over 800 groups in Bay Area Clubs, Organizations & Associations, A
Guide to Getting Involved (April 1, 1999), including categories from
Animals and Arts to Women and Youth. The great variety and distinc-
tiveness of clubs and associations necessarily foster diversity and its
accepted values.

ee ae ae an i ee

7

Scouting, social clubs provide conviviality, a sense of be-
longing, a sharing of interests, and pleasure and relaxation
for their members. These benefits flow from voluntary
associations. They do not blossom in forced association with
others one would rather avoid.

People find in association a value itself. The point is
obvious, but it has not received enough judicial atten-
tion or protection .. .. [T]he web of relations housed in
an association can take on a tremendous value, greater
than the goals of the association.

George Kateb, The Value of Association, in Freedom of
Association, 37 (Gutmann, ed. 1998). See also, Bloustein,
Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle (1977) 8 Rutgers-
Camden L. J. 219, 278-279; Nancy L. Rosenblum, Mem-
bership & Morals, supra, 30. “The makers of our Constitu-
tion undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness .... [They] sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions. They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be left alone...” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). That right would
be diminished and adulterated by the affirmance of the
decision below.

8

Il.

AFFIRMANCE OF THE DECISION BELOW
WILL HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT UPON PRI-
VATE NON-COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATIONS
AND CLUBS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED
STATES AND WOULD LEAD TO THE EVISCER-
ATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTEC-
TIONS FOR ALL SUCH ASSOCIATIONS AND
CLUBS.

A The Result-Oriented Legislative Definition And
Judicial Construction of “Private” Club or As-
sociation to Mean “Place of Public Associa-
tion” or “Business Establishment” are
Constitutionally Flawed And Have a Chilling
Effect Upon The Membership Selection and
Activities of Private Non-Commercial Associa-
tions And Clubs.

In 1988, this Court sustained against facial attack a local
anti-discriminatory law targeting non-private organizations
which were “commercial” and “where business deals are
often made.” New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988). Since then there has been ever
increasing governmental intrusion into the membership and
activities of bona fide voluntary private associations with
scant or no attention to a fundamental premise of that
decision, namely, the requirement as a matter of constitu-
tional law that they be “sufficiently ‘public’ in nature” to be
regulated. Jd. at 5; see also id. at 12, 18 (referring to the
“critical respect of whether business activity is prevalent”);
Note, State Power and Discrimination by Private Clubs:
First Amendment Protection for Non-expressive Associa-
tions (1991) 104 Harv.L.Rev. 1835.

Thus, for example, Michigan’s Civil Rights Act defines a
“place of public accommodation” to include the facilities of

a — ——<—— eee et

9

each “private club” which is a “country club or golf club,” a
“boating or yachting club,” a “sports or athletic club,” or a
non-religious “dining club.” Such clubs are expressly ex-
cluded from the Act’s private club exemption. Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301 and 37.2303. Connecticut’s equal
access law covers a “golf country club” which is defined as
any association of twenty or more persons which maintains a
golf course of nine holes or more that accepts payments,
“directly or indirectly, from or on behalf of non members.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-571d(a). Nevada’s equal access law
exempts private clubs yet includes any facility “where food
or spirituous or malt liquors are sold”, “any place of “exhibi-
tion or entertainment”, any “service” establishment, any
place of “exercise or recreation”, and any establishment
which serves patrons of such described establishments. Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 651.050 (West 2000). The Kansas anti-dis-
crimination statute expressly incorporates “private clubs”
within food service establishments, which comprise public
accommodations, yet exempts religious, nonprofit fraternal,
or social associations smaller than 100 members. Kan. Stat.
Ann. §§ 44-1002(h) and 36-501 (West 2000). And in
California a private association or club that permits a
member to sponsor a non-member’s bar mitzvah or allows
gratuitous use by non-members of its facilities is exposed to
becoming a “business establishment” making it subject to
the state’s anti-discriminaiion law. Warfield v. Peninsula
Golf & Country Club, 10 Cal 4th 594 (1995); Cal. Civil
Code § 50.’ In his concurring opinion, Justice Mosk empha-

>The California Supreme Court held as a matter of law that any
revenue from a non-member of a private non-profit country club was a
“business transaction” regardless of the character of the “transaction”
(e.g., a member “sponsored” fashion show or wedding reception at-
tended by non-members) or its quality (e.g., the local high school team
using the golf facility) or the relationship of the non-member (e.g., non-
member employees using club facilities when the club was closed) or
whether such “business transactions” provided a net financial benefit.

10

sized the “vast array of voluntary associations, nonprofit
organizations, and charitable groups” potentially subject to
California law and presciently cautioned against “interpreta-
tion” based “on the personal views of individual judges
regarding a preferred composition of a private noncommer-
cial organization.” Jd. at 632. See also, United States v.
Virginia, (1996) 518 U.S. 515, 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(critically referring to Supreme Court dispositions based on
the Court’s ““Members’ personal view of what would make a
‘more perfect Union’” in the admission policy of Virginia
Military Institute).

Violations of such state and local laws may result in
substantial and serious exposure to multiple damages, penal-
ties and fines (e.g., California: three times actual damages
but no less than $1,000 for “each and every offense,”
attorney’s fees, and criminal sanctions, including possible
imprisonment (Cal. Civ. Code § 52, 52.1; Cal. Penal Code
§ 422.9); Michigan: injunction, damages, punitive damages,
costs and attorney’s fees (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 37.2801, 37.2802); Connecticut: actual damages but no
less than $250, statutory civil and attorneys’ fees (Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-571(g)); Nevada: injunction, damages,
costs and attorneys’ fees (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.050); and
Kansas: damages for pain and suffering (Kans. Stat. Ann.
§ 44-1002). Private associations, and their officers and di-
rectors, are constantly in peril of application of these laws. If
the Boy Scouts — an archetypical voluntary association not

Id. at 599-601, 621-623. The Court ruled that any club becomes a
“business establishment” if such non-member “business transactions”
were “regular and repeated” (which “business transactions” were less in
aggregate than 5% of the Club’s total revenues in this case.) Jd. at 602
note 3. As the dissenting Chief Justice points out, this ruling provides no
“principled basis” to determine when a private club is transformed into a
“business establishment.” Jd. at 640 (Lucas, C.J.). See also, Curran v.
Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (“Curran”); 17 Cal 4th 670,
721-722, 732-733, 733-734 (1998).

mle ell em men

1]

resembling a Rotary chapter in any meaningful way (Ap-
pendix 482 - 502) — is a “place of public accommodation,”
there are few private clubs that would not be subject to
claims based on government compelled membership re-
quirements.‘ Notwithstanding the New Jersey statutory
command not to construe the law to apply to “distinctly
private” bona fide clubs or places of accommodation, private
non-commercial life will have been constitutionalized for
government regulation if Respondent prevails. Professor
George Kateb makes this exact point:

If a private social club cannot be free of governmental
interference, ... [t]he right of association is left in a
precarious state: if social clubs can be regulated inva-
sively, almost any kind of association can be; and the
regulation can proceed with less reluctance.

George Kateb, The Value of Association, in Freedom of
Association, supra, at 41.

Clubs and associations will be required to vet each pro-
posed club activity to make certain it has no non-member
element. Caution will dictate that the club monitor all
activities and events, ask each member the identity and
position of each guest, and inventory that information for
possible government review. Private clubs and associations,
on pain of compelled membership of statutorily preferred
classes, will become more parochial; charitable, community
and other non-member usage will be discouraged ur prohib-
ited; and the value to pluralism of many private social,

* Neither do the number of troop members nor the attendance of non-
members at certain troop meetings demonstrate a lack of that private,
intimate atmosphere deserving constitutional protection. In Bohemian
Club v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission (1986) 187
Cal. App. 3d 1, appeal dismissed, (1987) 484 U.S. 805 for example, the
court noted that in a 2,000-member men’s club “the consequent rela-
tionship among members is undoubtedly ‘intimate’ in associational
terms” (187 Cal.App.3d at 13).

12

recreational, cultural and ethnic organizations and clubs will
be diminished or lost. “[G]overnment control over mem-
bership policies [of private social clubs] may destroy or
irreversibly alter the character of the organization.” Note,
supra, 104 Harv.L.Rev. at 1839. The pervasive impact of
laws such as those of New Jersey, California, and others like
them, necessarily has a chilling effect on the membership
policies and day-to-day activities of even the most private of
associations and clubs. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Com-
pelled Association, in Freedom of Association, supra, 87
(“Once the justification for compelled association is loosed
from its tether to public accommodation law and the aim of
‘clearing the channels of commerce,’ there is nothing to stop
the argument to cover every arbitrary and unjustified subor-
dination and exclusion’’).

B Coerced Companionship And Forced Fraternization
Dilute The Constitutionally Nurtured Freedom of
Association And Ultimately Will Destroy The Diver-
sity Among Free People That is Enriched by Private
Associations and Clubs Safe From Government
Regimentation.

Curran, 17 Cal. 4th 670 (1998), the California Supreme
Court decision holding the Boy Scouts not to be a “business
establishment,” is correct and the decision below holding
the Boy Scouts to be a “place of public accommodation” is
erroneous, but the opinions of both courts are fundamentally
flawed. While both opinions engage in complicated “inter-
pretation” and “construction” of the coverage definition
citing and referring to dozens of decisions, even a superficial
analysis shows that each “merely purports to apply the
phrase ‘business establishment’ in [California Civil Code}
section 51 [or “place of public accommodation” in N.J.S.A.
10:5-5] to the peculiar facts presented, and then asserts that
its words are broad enough to reach the entity in question.”
Id. at 722 (Mosk, J., concurring). This result orientation

13

“fail[s] to give guidance for lawful conduct outside of court
or for principled decision making within” the court. Jd.

More importantly, this ad hoc approach diverts from the
fundamental inquiry with its proper focus on the importance
of the constitutional freedoms of private voluntary associa-
tions of a non-commercial nature. In California, as in New
Jersey and other jurisdictions, “[t]his vice [developing
discrimination rules on an ad hoc basis] did not become
pernicious until recently because the results [of earlier
decisions] appeared consistent with the legislative intent to
prohibit discrimination by those engaged in commercial
activity regardless of its form” Curran, supra, 17 Cal. 4th at
733 (Brown, J., concurring). This “pernicious” vice has
brought California and, we submit, New Jersey and some
other states, to the point where there is an absence of
“useful guidance” in determining coverage or “predictabil-
ity” in applying nondiscrimination laws. In joining in the
judgment that the Boy Scouts were not a “business estab-
lishment,” all four concurring Justices in the California
Supreme Court recognized the ambiguity of that term and
its erroneous application to the Boy Scouts. Jd. at 703, et
seq., (Mosk, J.), 722, 728 (Kennard, J.), 730, 732-733
(Werdegar, J.), 733-734 (Brown, J.). “[T]he law is a
mess .. . [and] now desperately in need of critical reexami-
nation.” Jd. at 733. As this Court has properly focused in the
constitutional context on discrimination in public entities
and commercial opportunities and activities, the opinions of
two of the concurring Justices in Curran expressly recog-
nized that “principled” decisionmaking limits the anti-dis-
crimination law to commercial settings — activities
involving the providing of goods and services for a price in
the course of a non-continuous, non-personal and non-social
dealing and not relationships of a gratuitous, continuous,

14

personal and social nature. Jd. at 720 (Mosk, J.), 734
(Brown, J.); see also 731 (Werdegar, J.).°

The goal of some states since the New York State Club
Association decision has not been “ensuring nondiscrimina-
tory access to commercial opportunities in cur society;”
instead — apparently based on a determination to cleanse
all society of improper bias — their purpose appears to be
coerced social relations within all assoviations and clubs as
to certain approved classes. Such coercion is constitutionally
permissible when public places or commercial associations
are involved, but it is essential that this Court not authorize
that coercion of voluntary private non-commercial associa-
tions. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisex-
ual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995) (the goal of
ridding society of discrimination against certain classes “is a
decidedly fatal objective”). Regardless of any message,
private non-expressive associations are entitled to constitu-
tional protection. There is “no authority for the premise that
intimate associations are relegated to the basement of First
Amendment protection while expressive ones glide to the
penthouse.” Pacific-Union Club v. Superior Court (State
Franchise Tax Board), 232 Cal.App.3d 60, 77 (1991). If
New Jersey and other states have decided, as they are
entitled to do, not to remain neutral in the regulation and
rationing of economic opportunities to certain preferred
categories in the market place, the First Amendment re-
quires that neutrality in homes, private clubs, and Scout

troops.

> At least two of those Justices would simply jettison the result
oriented construction of past private association decisions and the
majority opinion in the Boy Scouts case because those “decisions have
almost universally failed to formulate a coherent and comprehensive
interpretation of ‘business establishment.’” Jd. at 733 (Brown, J.,
concurring), 722 (Mosk, J., concurring). See also, id. at 732-733
(Werdegar, J., concurring.)

15

Where the goal is diversity among free people, there can
be no question that it is best achieved by autonomous
activity by many persons pursuing their own individual
interests and ideals without inhibiting government direction,
regulation and oversight.

History and our own observations tell us that in a free
society, people associate for the sake of achieving an
indefinitely large range of ends. Association is essential
to their lives. . . . In pursuing their ends, and needing to
associate to do so, people discover numerous sources of
pleasure. ... They discover numerous opportunities for
many diverse kinds of experience. Associations of every
form provide accommodations for experience, much of
it pleasurable.

Kateb, The Value of Association, in Freedom of Associa-
tion, supra, at 37.

A government need not encourage associations whose
viewpoint it does not approve, but it cannot constitutionally
interfere with the viewpoint of individuals or, we submit,
private associations. Cf, National Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-588 (1998) and Souter, J.,
dissenting at 603 note 2. Many associations through control
of their membership criteria or their name alone reflect a
viewpoint or an identity which would be changed or de-
stroyed by government access dictates. Hadassah would lose
its identity and purpose if forced to admit Buddhist men; the
Loyal Orange Institution of the United States of America
would suffer a similar fate if compelled to accept a Knight of
Columbus; and the Italian Catholic Federation would be
significantly transformed if it had to accept Eastern Jews.
See Curran, supra, 17 Cal. 4th at 729 (Kennard, J. concur-
ring). For the same reasons, private associations and social
clubs are constitutionally entitled to preserve their own
identity and objectives. A message may be offensive, Nat.
Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977), or

16

loud and noisy, Edward v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
241 (1963), subtle or not (cf National Endowment for Arts
v. Finley, supra, 524 U.S. at 581-585, 590-591, 603-604), or
even the result of silence. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay
Group, supra, 515 U.S. at 574. The decision to include or
exclude a message from a communication, like a decision to
include or exclude an individual from an association —
when no public place or public benefit is present — cannot
constitutionally justify “mandated access.” Jd. at 580-581.
Regardless of the after-the-fact analysis by the New Jersey
Supreme Court about the clarity of the Boy Scouts’ histori-
cally announced message of its membership criteria, (17a-
18a, 36a-39a, 52a-56a), the Scouts cannot be constitution-
ally compelled to accept as members and leaders those
individuals it does not want.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below must be
reversed and this Court should rule that the New Jersey law
may not be constitutionally applied to non-commercial pri-
vate clubs and associations whether expressive or not.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM I. EDLUND
/ Counsel of Record
ADRIAN J. MURPHY

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

California State Club Association
and National Club Association

BARTKO, ZANKEL, TARRANT & MILLER
900 Front Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, California 94111
Of Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0345%3A24. Public record. Not legal advice.
