# Amicus Curiae Brief — Miller v. French

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0328%3A15

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 530 U.S. 327

## Text

Jan BOO G OO] Ficen

Nos. 99-224 & 99-58 i 28 20

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

JACK R. DUCKWORTH,
Petitioner,
vs. |
RICHARD A. FRENCH,
Respondent.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD A. FRENCH,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF
AMICI CURIAE
OF
AMERICANS FOR EFFECTIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT, INC.,
JOINED BY THE
NATIONAL SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS.

(List of Counsel on Inside Front Cover)

;oowdL)

Of Counsel: Counsel For Amici Curiae:

RICHARD WEINTRAUB, ESQ. WAYNE W. SCHMIDT, ESQ.
National Sheriffs’ Association | Executive Director

1450 Duke Street Americans for Effective
Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Law Enforcement, Inc.
5519 N. Cumberland Ave.
Suite 1008

Chicago, Illinois 60656
E-mail: AELE@aol.com

BERNARD J. FARBER, ESQ.
1126 West Wolfram
Chicago, Illinois 60657-4330
E-mail: bernfarber@aol.com

JAMES P. MANAK, ESQ.
Counsel of Record
421 Ridgewood Avenue
Suite 100
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137-4900
Tele/Fax (630) 858-6392
E-mail: lelp@xnet.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................. ii
BRIEF OF AMICICURIAE .............6045: 1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............... l
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................ 3
ET ives dcheacemenseedeecseqaeiss 5

THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION OF
THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
IS A PROPER MEASURE TO PREVENT
MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF CORREC-
TIRRWAL, PACAILITEBS. 2. ccc cc ccccccccees 5

A. CONGRESS PROPERLY IMPOSED
PROCEDURAL DEADLINES RELATING
TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PRISONER
EEN nbc dubdrckenenedccescese dence 5

B. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION
OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM
ACT DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE
Pee 7

C. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION IS
NEEDED TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY
DELAY IN PRISON INJUNCTION PRO-
CHEDENGG. 2... ccc cccccccccccccccccsees 8

CONCLUSION . wc ccc cccccccccccccesccecss 12

-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Abbott v. Thornburg, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) ...... 10

Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999) . 9
French v. Duckworth, French and United

States of America, intervenor-appellant,

178 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1999) .......... passim
French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985)... 8
Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 1998) . 8,9
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,

EE 8 ibd due esc bcedeeépes 9
Ruiz v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 385 (Sth Cir. 1999) .... 9
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) ........... 10
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)

Pin cccesen teetecakeatcawaces 3,7
Statutes
nD iin vekes gadengeeaenas 5
rE. i: 4 vhevechoecedinbeees 6
SP eis EEE Sov cccacccicccsses passim
ED nc cb cncddvesecedéssees 6

Congressional Materials

141 Cong. Rec. $14,418 (1995) ...............
141 Cong. Rec. $14,419 (1995) .............--.
Pub. L. No. 105-119, @ 123, 11

Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997)

l
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

This brief is filed pursuant to Rule 37 of the United
States Supreme Court. Consent to file has been granted
by respective Counsel for the Petitioners and
Respondent. The letters of consent have been filed with
the Clerk of this Court, as required by the Rules.’

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.
(AELE), as a national not-for-profit citizens organi-
zation, is interested in establishing a body of law making
the police effort more effective, in a constitutional
manner. It seeks to improve the operation of the police
function to protect our citizens in their life, liberties, and
property, within the framework of the various state and
federal constitutions.

AELE has previously appeared as amicus curiae
over 100 times in the Supreme Court of the United States
and over 35 times in other courts, including the Federal
District Courts, the Circuit Courts of Appeal, and various
state courts, such as the Supreme Courts of California,
Illinois, Ohio, and Missouri.

' As required by Rule 37.6 of the United States Supreme Court, the
following disclosure is made: This brief was authored for the amici
by James P. Manak, Esq., counsel of record; Bernard J. Farber,
Esq.; and Wayne W. Schmidt, Esq., Executive Director of
authored this brief. Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.,
made the complete monetary contribution to the preparation and
submission of this brief, without financial support from any source,
directly or indirectly.

2

The National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), is the
largest organization of sheriffs and jail administrators in
America, consisting of over 40,000 members. It conducts
programs of training, publications, and related educa-
tional efforts to raise the standard of professionalism
among the nation’s sheriffs and jail administrators. While
it is interested in the effective administration of justice in
America, it strives to achieve this while respecting the
rights guaranteed to all under the Constitution.

Amici are national organizations that represent the
interests of law enforcement and correctional officials
who formulate and implement policy for detention
facilities, jails, and prisons. Because of this, we possess
direct knowledge of the impact of the ruling of the court
below, and we wish to impart that knowledge to this
Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, French v. Duckworth, French and United States
of America, intervenor-appellant, 178 F.3d 437 (7th Cir.
1999), held unconstitutional, as a violation of separation-
of-powers, the “automatic stay” provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626
(e)(2). This provides that any motion to modify or
terminate prospective relief in a prison conditions case
operates as an automatic stay beginning on the thirtieth
day after such a motion is made (which time period may
be extended by an additional sixty days for good cause
by the trial court). A panel of the Seventh Circuit ruled

8

3

that § 3626(e)(2) violated the principle articulated in
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871),
that Congress does not have the power to impose a rule
of decision for pending judicial cases, apart from its
power to change the underlying applicable law.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Congress, in enacting the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, made a legislative determination that there should be
an end to unnecessary and burdensome “micro-
management” of correctional institutions by the courts.
It changed the underlying applicable law concerning the
instances in which injunctive relief could be granted,
requiring findings that the relief is narrowly drawn,
extends no further than necessary to correct the violation
of the federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the federal right. The
procedural deadlines for judicial action on a timely
motion to terminate existing prospective relief are just
that—procedural, and do not dictate the result which the
court entertaining the motion will reach in a particular
case.

The “automatic stay” provision of the Act does not
violate separation-of-powers or constitute undue interfer-
ence by the other branches of government in the judicial
process. It requires a finding of necessity and prevents
relief predicated on superseded legal standards. Congress
intended that courts should ordinarily defer to correc-
tional officials for day-to-day decision making and the
allocation of resources.

4

Amici believe that the upholding of this “automatic
stay” provision is essential to ensure that injunctive relief
that is ongoing actually is necessary to remedy ongoing
violations of constitutional rights. Injunctive orders
entered prior to the enactment of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act may not, in many instances, be adequately
based on judicial findings of constitutional violations and
also may be overbroad in their scope. The procedural
deadlines contained in the “automatic stay” provision of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act serve as a safeguard to
prevent prospective relief granted under now superseded
legal standards, in some cases decades ago, from being
continued for years or decades yet to come without
judicial findings that such relief is appropriate under
current law.

This Court has appropriately and increasingly
recognized, in a variety of its recent decisions concern-
ing prison litigation, that correctional officials faced with
the already difficult task of administering and running
detention facilities, jails, and prisons, should be canted
substantial deference in the making of their day-to-day
decisions and allocation of resources. The legal standards
for injunctive relief enacted by Congress in the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, along with the procedural
deadlines which assist in enforcing them, are in line with
the Court’s deference to correctional officials, while still
providing judicial remedies in those instances where
prisoners’ constitutional rights are violated.

Accordingly, amici urge this Court to reverse the
ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, and uphold the constitutionality of 18
U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2).

5

ARGUMENT

THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION OF THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT IS A PROPER
MEASURE TO PREVENT MICRO-MANAGEMENT
OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES.

A. CONGRESS PROPERLY IMPOSED PROCE-
DURAL DEADLINES RELATING TO INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF IN PRISONER CASES.

When Congress passed the Prison Litigation
Reform Act in 1996, it very clearly made a legislative
determination that federal courts had engaged, in some
instances, in “micro-management” of correctional
facilities. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. $14,419 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Abraham) (“No longer will prison
administration be turned over to Federal judges for the
indefinite future for the slightest reason”); id. at $14,418
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I believe that the courts have
gone too far in micro-managing our Nation’s prisons.”).

In the Act, Congress provided that injunctive relief
should be granted only in cases where violations of
federally protected rights were found and that such
orders should be:

1. Narrowly drawn;

2. Limited in all cases to relief necessary to correct
the violation of a federal right; and

3. Utilizing the “least intrusive means” necessary to
correct the violation of the federal right.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1).

Recognizing that many correctional institutions

6

were already operating under existing injunctions,
Congress also provided a mechanism for correctional
administrators to seek termination of an outdated
injunctive order which does not meet the current legal
standard for grants of prospective relief as summarized
above. Section 3626(a)(2) provides for the immediate
termination of prospective relief upon a finding that it
does not meet this standard, with the trial court able to
deny such immediate termination upon entering written
findings, based on the record, that the standard was met.

Congress evidently was also concerned about what
would happen if a trial court did not hold a timely
hearing to make a determination, one way or the other,
about whether an existing injunctive order met the
current legal standard. Accordingly, it adopted, in 18
U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), the provision involved in this case,
that a motion to terminate or modify an existing
injunctive order would act as an automatic stay after no
judicial action was taken for thirty days. In 1997
amendments to the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Congress provided that the trial court could postpone the
effective date of this automatic stay “for not more than
60 days for good cause,” but that “no postponement shall
be permissible because of general congestion of the
court’s calendar.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3). See Pub. L.
No. 105-119, @ i123, 11 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997) (adding
this language).

The Seventh Circuit panel has incorrectly inter-
preted these mere procedural guidelines to be improper
Congressional interference with the judicial function. Yet
these deadlines are no different from procedural dead-
lines properly imposed on the courts by statutes in many

eee ree

7

other areas and upheld even when fundamental
constitutional rights such as life, liberty, or property are
involved. See Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judge
Manion and Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Posner,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc by the
Seventh Circuit, French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d at 448-
53.

B. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION OF THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT DOES NOT
INTERFERE WITH THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.

The Seventh Circuit panel ruled that the “automatic
stay” provision violates the principle articulated in
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871),
that Congress does not have the power to impose a rule
of decision for pending judicial cases, apart from its
power to change the underlying applicable law. This
concern is misplaced, as the “automatic stay”
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act is
entirely different. It does not attempt to dictate to the
trial judge what result to reach, prevent the holding of
hearings, the consideration of evidence, the entering of
findings, the issuance of orders on those findings, or
attempt to remove jurisdiction from the federal courts.

In holding as it did, in Judge Easterbrook’s view,
the Seventh Circuit panel “has invented a right of the
judicial branch to freedom from deadlines.” French v.
Duckworth, 178 F.3d at 453.

Whether or not the “automatic stay” provision is

interpreted as preserving the equitable power of the
courts to “stay the stay” in appropriate circumstances or

states absolute deadlines which cannot be modified, see
Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 946, (6th Cir. 1998)
(equitable power to suspend automatic stay remains) and
French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1999)
(statute does not allow suspension of automatic stay by
trial court), the provision, in stating procedural deadlines,
does not violate separation-of-powers or constitute undue
interference by the other branches of government in the
judicial process.

C. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION IS NEEDED
TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY DELAY IN PRISON
INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS.

Many injunctions in prison and jail cases were
entered under now superseded legal standards, in some
cases decades ago. Sometimes, these orders were entered
without detailed findings that ongoing constitutional
violations existed then—much less now-—years later.

The immediate case is just one example of how
litigation over prison conditions has been prolonged, and
the dangers of not imposing some procedural deadlines
to promote timely review. Prisoners in an Indiana
correctional facility filed a class action lawsuit against
the state complaining of prison conditions almost three
decades ago. French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d at 438.
Some of the relief sought by the prisoners was granted in
an injunction affirmed fifteen years ago in French v.
Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985), and the prison
has operated under that injunction, as modified over
time, ever since.

What happened in the instant case in more recent

years?
Defendants sought termination of the decree
by a motion in June 1997. Almost two years
have passed, but the district judge has yet to
take a single step toward acting on this
request—and the last word of the panel’s
opinion is “affirmed.” A process that is
supposed to be rapid drags on with no end in
sight.”

French v. Duckworth, 178 F. 3d at 449 (Easterbrook, J.,

dissenting).

Nor, unfortunately, is this case unique. In Hadix v.
Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 1998), the appeals court
had to revisit an injunctive order against Michigan
correctional officials which stemmed from litigation
begun in 1980. Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d at 930. In
Ruiz v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 385 (Sth Cir. 1999), the court
considered whether to terminate federal consent orders
that had governed Texas prisons for “almost twenty-five
years.” Ruiz v. Johnson, 178 F.3d at 387. In Berwanger
v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999), a panel of the
Seventh Circuit examined the status of injunctive orders
against a county jail growing out of litigation which
began in 1972.

When egregious violations of prisoner rights are
found to be ongoing, no one would deny that injunctive
relief may be appropriate. On the other hand, the
extraordinary relief of injunction should be used only to
cure actually present violations and should be terminated
or modified in a timely manner when conditions or the

underlying law change. Indeed, that is the essence of this
Court’s ruling in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,

10

502 U.S. 367 (1991). Instead, in some instances,
injunctive orders which once were found appropriate and
necessary linger on despite the passage of new genera-
tions of prisoners and correctional officials, despite
changing prison conditions, and despite the lawful
enactment of a new legal standard for injunctive
relief.

This Court has properly recognized, in a variety of
its recent decisions concerning prison litigation, that
correctional officials faced with the already difficult task
of administering and running detention facilities, jails,
and prisons, should be granted substantial deference in
the making of their day-to-day decisions and allocation
of resources. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987); Abbott v. Thornburg, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).

Prison and jail administrators must manage the
housing, feeding, clothing, safety, medical and mental
health care, exercise, recreation, telephone use, postal
needs, personal funds, and personal property of
prisoners. They must provide adequate access to the
courts and counsel, access to religious worship, reason-
able accommodation for prisoners with disabilities—
along with rehabilitative programs such as work and
education, counseling and other treatment for alcohol
and drug dependency. With limited financial and
personnel resources, administrators must manage inmates
with violent propensities, and others who refuse to
follow institutional rules of behavior.

The legal standards for injunctive relief adopted by
Congress in the Act, along with the procedural deadlines
for enforcing them, are in line with this Court’s past

11

deference to correctional officials, while still providing
judicial remedies in those instances where prisoners’
constitutional rights are violated.

Accordingly, amici urge this Court to reverse the
ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, and uphold the constitutionality of 18
U.S.C. Sec. 3626()(2).

12

CONCLUSION

Amici urge this Court to reverse the decision of the
court below on the basis of the precedents of this Court

and sound judicial policy.

Of Counsel:

Respectfully submitted,

Counsel For Amici Curiae:

RICHARD WEINTRAUB, ESQ. WAYNE W. SCHMIDT, ESQ.

National Sheriffs’ Association
1450 Duke Street

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

&

Executive Director

Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement, Inc.

5519 N. Cumberland Ave.
Suite 1008

E-mail: AELE@aol.com

BERNARD J. FARBER, ESQ.
1126 West Wolfram
Chicago, Illinois 60657-4330
E-mail: bernfarber@aol.com

JAMES P. MANAK, ESQ.
Counsel of Record
421 Ridgewood Avenue
Suite 100
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137-4900
Tele/Fax (630) 858-6392
E-mail: lelp@xnet.com

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0328%3A15. Public record. Not legal advice.