# Amicus Curiae Brief — Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0277%3A21 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2000 - **Citation:** 529 U.S. 861 ## Text - : FILED | ) Ve [tale f NOY 19 No. 98-181] OFFICE OF THE CLERK SS, s IN THE Supreme Court of the United States ALEXIS GEIER, ET AL.. Petitioners, We AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR Co., INC., ET AL.. Respondents. On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit BRIEF FOR THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT Of Counsel: THEODORE B. OLSON ROBIN S. CONRAD Counsel of Record NATIONAL CHAMBER THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR. LITIGATION CENTER, INC. THOMAS G. HUNGAR 1615H Street, N.W. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP Washington, D.C. 20062 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. (202) 463-5337 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 955-8500 Counsel for Amicus Curiae QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seg. (1988), and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1987), preempt a state common-law tort claim that an automobile manufactured in 1987 was defectively designed because it did not contain an air- bag. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CUFESTION PIREIEIIC TSO cceccsscesssccoscunssctesctateebikipobtastinanal i ey) Boe Pts, > 55 | FRO smc Tey iv INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE .....................00+. l STATIS accecosincesiitstatncciebieniicieb ta tea arr l SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...........cccccccsccccccsccsscssseseeees 4 ARRAS TIIIGE cediiiccncatessitinicocdeibiiesaiscicticiacinte ete ae ele 6 I. PETITIONER’S SUIT IS EXPRESSLY PRE- EMPTED BECAUSE IT SEEKS TO IMPOSE A “STANDARD” DIFFERENT FROM THAT IMPOSED BY FEDERAL LAW. ............cccccccseseeseeeees 6 A. Precedent Demonstrates That State Court Adjudication Establishes “Standards”.................. 7 B. Common Sense And Experience Confirm That State Court Adjudication Establishes “Standards” That Industry Must Satisfy Or Face Potentially Crushing Liability...................0. 9 C. Petitioners’ Suit Seeks To Establish A “Standard” That Is Different From Stan- Il. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED PREEMP- TION BARS PETITIONERS’ SUIT ..........ccccceseesees 14 A et il A. This Court’s Precedents Make Clear That Implied Preemption Analysis Is Appropri- ate Under Statutes Containing An Express Preemption Provision ..............:..0c.sscssscseseseeeeesees B. The Evisceration Of Implied Preemption Analysis Sought By Petitioners And Their Amici Would Work A Dramatic And Dis- astrous Shift In The Balance Of State And ST ilitiesidbh deinenthdicdainsinstisnasedenrseincsencsenssseenssenee iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, FED Un SEP CSOD ccnvtivrstcneemnatinnes ease -ctnisiipmndaiaie American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998) .cs.ccccssccccsesessueseeee Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Empls. & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491 CU i Re Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) secc.cccccccsssesessues CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, SOF Wah GE CORSO cheentvctantntninnciesrnmeens Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d RC A CITI ite tihenpicinbacheitninctittintgectaieasstnenaiin Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., SOD ULE. FOO CED cenvinetneniirnennentemtmiseereninnss Cox v. R.O. Corp., 470 So. 2d 790 (Fla. Dist. he iin I i Dallas v. F.M. Oxford Inc., 552 A.2d 1109 We ate Ci I saci sect heer Davis v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., S92 F 26 S7B (SEs Cit. BDBG) wcccoscccevccceceecescscersceseeee Doty v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 639 N.Y.S.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) ..cccccccsssssssseee _. mee SC Vv Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 632 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds by Duncan v. Cessna Air- craft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) and Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 Ae 8 EE eee 9 Dura-Stilts Co. v. Zachry, 697 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App. 1985, writ ref’d 1.1.€.) .....c.ccccececeeeeees 10 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) ........ccccccccceeeseees 26 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) .......cccccccsseeeeeereeens 26 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, I Ree 14,15,18 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1999) .........cccceeees 2-3,14,15 Grover v. Grover, 972 S.W.2d 568 GR DR, Baa FE cenpcscssectercsterecicenpessetcommsencaseese 11 Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25 ECE Ca 10 Hopper v. Crown, 646 So. 2d 933 (La. Ct. Billy: TI cecharinbiinnstncinadentichamesittintetcteranamnanssieee 10 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1977) .....ccccseese0 19 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, i) Sf a 1,16 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, | OE __, aS eee 16 Joe Sartain Ford, Inc. v. American Indem. Co., 399 So. 2d 281 (Ala. 1981), over- ruled in part on other grounds by Lloyd vi Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 543 So. 2d 671 (Alla. 1989) ..........c.ccccccererereesese John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, eS Fe Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 CRD ED ccmescemacretsinsarremnenstinseienteemmageines Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, FOS UD Se GRIGG cecenccisnnncnicsiinmmans Miller v. Varity Corp., 922 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. Ch, RA, GID ectetetersvcticennninitinsinlttones Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., 151 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 1998) ........cccccseeeereeeees Morgen Indus., Inc. v. Vaughan, 471 S.E.2d GED CUE. BODE enecsstensintshitnitinsinicnastcmes Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., SED Ul . Be Ge cntciieritrcrensticmnserencsnenes New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, BOS UT. Bee CEDURE cetcesestnestntncssireerncecemneces Nicolodi v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 370 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ... Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers’ Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117 CN i Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Ee vii Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, et Lt | Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., FEE Ce SUED ERIE D cccennectncsinsectcccsesenenisines San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar- MON, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) .....ccecceeeserereees Selmo v. Baratono, 184 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. RS Ee cee Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 483 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1985) ..........scceceessereees Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907) ......cccscesersereeees United States v. Locke, Nos. 98-1701 and Watson v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 827 P.2d 656 (Idaho 1992) ...........s00000 Widson v. International Harvester Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) Wisconsin Dep't of Industry, Labor & Hu- man Relations v. Gould Inc., SFIS UB. Fae CEPR) cxcccecssssesevesscocesescceces CONSTITUTION U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 3....ccccccercereenenees ee ee prepennvenetenes 18 Vill STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS BS UB.C. GB USB1 60 Bie. (IGG ccscccnccsrnvensccessccsctocnnstons l BS TTB © GBI ccnccctcssccreasisinnisiinttsnimnilectenssesttiniasietnaes 6 BS UGC. © SEDI EAD cccccsccvssasiicitnsinsinesonsiviisuapiitipabiaibdininnse 6 BS ERC. © ROTI ccccnsceteintntactensiisiasticnitsteesionmaduiacte 2,4,7 RS TEBE. 6 CIPD cnsevcsnsnceccieccsbeastaiccietpegninaieviontene 3,16 BE Bis eI ectenccosckesicetiinbichinintnctenentevinianngiieeictapibe 7 GIGI A, © SVB IOW coticetsreccsssttinnsstennithinstiveseinigticinninn 2 GD CIR. © STUDER BAB secrcccccccvesstsorscsnvessncessesseses 2 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (1984) ............ccssscsssrsrsssrsseeeseresenes 2 Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 ........cccccccssesereresensees 1 MISCELLANEOUS 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION Chars Fae 06... TBTE) sccascsscscsvessennmansssrceeevsesenees 19 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 647 (1995) .........cccceeseee 12 Marc M. Arkin, Products Liability and the Threat to Contraception, Manhattan In- stitute Civil Justice Memo No. 36 (Feb. 1999) ............c0cceeeeeeereees 22 David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fi- asco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457 (1999) .....cccccersceeseensenes 22 THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamil- tom) (amtaa O06. 196Z) .... (describing lawsuits that led to withdrawal of Copper-7 IUD from market). Less apparent, but equally real, are the costs imposed on society by the loss of potentially beneficial products that are never developed, or never released to market, because of concerns about potential liability. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O” Connor, J., concurring in apts and d dissenting in part) (“Some manufacturers of un F . have decided that it is better to pater eae iability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the market. Similarly, designers of air- planes and motor vehicles have been forced to abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of punitive damages.”) (citations omitted); 23 Wayne C. Koff, The next steps toward a global AIDS vaccine, SCIENCE, Nov. 25, 1994, at 1335 (risk of tort li- ability is a “ si gnificant economic disincentive[]” that has seco lah “Sestin Giedaiiiatenten to dindlaaia or enalo back AIDS vaccine development”). Every state of the Union suffers these adverse conse- quences of the current tort system, even if only a relative handful of states is to blame for the over-regulation and over-deterrence resulting from out-of-control tort ver- dicts and lawsuit abuse. Manufacturers and other busi- nesses releasing their products or services into the stream of commerce have no choice but to tailor their productive activities to take account of the most exces- sive and burdensome version of state tort-law schemes. Thus, non-preemption should not be blithely equated with true federalism. In a national market, the common-law tort system itself shows scant respect for the autonomy of those states that choose to adopt more reasonable standards of tort liability in a vain attempt to avoid the disadvantages of over-deterrence. Where each state is already beholden to the whims and vagaries of judges and juries in other states, federal ion does not shatter a perfect picture of states’ ri Given these realities of our modern national econ- omy and tort system, it is more important than ever that the federal courts vigorously police the boundaries be- tween federal and state authority to ate economic activity, because only if the courts are diligent in striking down excessive local regulation will this Nation’s citi- zens continue to enjoy the fruits of a truly national econ- omy that the Framers sought to obtain more than two centuries ago. Rather than weakening the doctrine of implied preemption out of manufactured concerns for “federalism,” as petitioners and their amici would have it, the federal courts should instead redouble their vigi- lance in this area. Implied preemption is absolutely es- sential whenever state courts and local juries take steps to impinge upon the province of federal regulatory re- 24 gimes that enhance the efficiency and productivity of the national economy by providing consistent nationwide standards and implicitly displacing the of often-inconsistent local regulations and . When federal regulators have made a considered de- termination about what specifications a product in inter- state commerce must meet (after evaluating the costs and benefits to be borne by the Nation as a whole), it be- comes especially likely that any stricter requirement im- posed by an isolated state court or jury will not only spawn confusion but also be inconsistent with the needs and broader interests of the national economy. Although petitioners’ amici argue that federal regulators are less able to impose appropriate safety regulations than are state court judges and juries (e.g, Leflar Br. 12-13), that contention is flatly inconsistent with the reality that fed- eral agencies like the Department of Transportation are well suited to weigh competing interests and adopt ap- propriate and uniform national standards to govern par- ticular aspects of the national economy. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 33 (1983) (Congress adopted the Act and granted the Secretary authority to establish motor vehicle safety standards because “con- siderable e ise” is required to determine appropriate standards; “(bjefore changes in automobile design could be mandated, the effectiveness of these changes had to be studied, their costs examined, and public acceptance considered”). Indeed, federal agencies typically enjoy the benefits of specialized expertise and utilize procedures designed to ensure that they consider the views of all affected groups. As a consequence, uniform national standards adopted by federal agencies offer considerable advan- tages over the alternative mechanism urged by petition- ers, namely, the continued imposition of arbitrary, un- predictable, inconsistent, and excessively strict post hoc standards selected on the basis of limited information by 25 state courts and juries. Far from adopting a stance of heightened judicial skepticism towards the doctrine of implied preemption, therefore, this Court should instead take this opportunity to reemphasize the need for, and the jety of, strict judicial enforcement of uniform nati standards in instances where, as here, those standards have been established by the federal agency charged by Congress with responsibility for promulgat- standards. ing uniform Petitioners and their amici make much of what they characterize as the “presumption” against preemption, but in reality there is no conflict between that “pre- sumption” and the analysis set forth above. While this Court has traditionally approached every preemption case with an appropriate sense of respect for the author- ity of state governments within their spheres of : sibility, it is equally important to avoid frustrating Con- sae purposes—and the overarching goals of the Commerce Clause—by eviscerating the benefits of uni- form national standards that have been authorized by federal legislation and adopted by responsible federal agencies. Properly understood, in fact, there is no meaningful “presumption” against implied preemption of state-law requirements that are inconsistent with uniform federal standards imposed pursuant to a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme. To be sure, this Court has stated that when Congress has “legislated .. . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” the Court will “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con- gress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), quoted in cn 51 , U.S. at 485. om that bac ion no force in an i Gin cots Setmii doses ann bo ao sasas for docht that Congress intended to inconsistent or con- flicting state laws; indeed, the Supremacy Clause renders 26 all such laws null and void. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Accordingly, “[wJhere, as here, the issue is one of an as- serted substantive conflict with a federal enactment, then ‘(t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material ... for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevai il.”” Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Empls. & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 1. 503 (1984) Fy Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 ( (1962)); acco Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). The “presumption” against preemption is doubly in- appropriate in cases like this one that involve the clash between uniform federal standards and state tort suits because, as noted above, the modern tort system has been transformed into a full-fledged regulatory scheme that allows individual states (or, more precisely, state judges and juries) to exert power and influence far be- yond their borders, un ining or eliminating the abil- ity of other states to choose different, and less excessive, regulatory schemes. Thus, the se that federal preemption of liberal state-law liability standards some- how nett state sovereignty and requires a “pre- sumption” against preemption has absolutely no force; state “sovereignty” is already undermined by the exces- sive regulatory schemes imposed by some states on the Nation at large, and the actions of Con and federal agencies in promulgating uniform balanced stan- dards serve only to bring the federal s back into balance, as avalos or the Framers when they granted Congress the commerce power more than two centuries ago. 27 CONCLUSION For the ing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted. Of Counsel: THEODORE B. OLSON ROBIN S. CONRAD Counsel of Record NATIONAL CHAMBER THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR. LITIGATION CENTER, INC. | THOMAS G. HUNGAR 1615 H Street, N.W. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP bet ows we D.C. 20062 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. (202) 463-5337 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 955-8500 Counsel for Amicus Curiae November 19, 1999 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0277%3A21. Public record. Not legal advice.