# Amicus Curiae Brief — Beck v. Prupis > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0268%3A12 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2000 - **Citation:** 529 U.S. 494 ## Text _~ Supreme Cevrt, BO. on FILED L SEP 27 1999 Be OF THE QLERM No. 98-1480 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States ROBERT A. BECK, II, Petitioner, v. RONALD M. PRUPIS, ef al., Respondents. On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICI CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION AND ALLIED EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS DANIEL J. POPEO F. JOSEPH WARIN PAUL D. KAMENAR Counsel of Record WASHINGTON LEGAL ANDREW S. TULUMELLO FOUNDATION GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 2009 Massachusetts Ave.. NW _—_—1050 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 588-0302 (202) 955-8500 Counsel for Amici Curiae September 17, 1999 \ j IN THE Supreme Court of the United States ROBERT A. BECK, II, Petitioner, Vv. RONALD M. PRUPIS, ef ai., Respondents. On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS Pursuant to Rule 37.3(b) of the Rules of this Court, Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation respectfully move this Court for leave to file the attached brief as amici curiae in support of the re- spondents. The petitioner has consented to the filing of this brief as has each of the respondents except for re- spondent Ronald M. Prupis. Mr. Prupis, who is in bank- ruptcy proceedings, has indicated that, on advice of his bankruptcy counsel, he will not participate in this case. Mr. Prupis’s withholding of consent necessitates the fil- ing of this motion. INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) is a non- profit public interest law and policy center based in 2 Washington, D.C., with supporters nationwide. WLF devotes substantial resources to litigating cases and pub- lishing educational materials the. promote, inter alia, a limited and accountable government, the proper role of the judiciary, civil justice reform, and reasonable gov- ernment regulation. To that end, WLF has appeared before this Court as well as other federal and state courts to argue against overly expansive theories of tort liability, excessive punitive damages, and imposition of unwarranted attor- ney fee awards. Of particular relevance to this case, WLF has appeared as amicus in this Court arguing against an overly expansive interpretation of the Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. See, e.g., HJ. Inc. v. North- western Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Rotella v. Wood, 147 F.3d 438 (Sth Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3559 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1999) (No. 98-896). The Allied Educational Foundation (AEF) is a non- profit charitable and educational foundation based in Englewood, New Jersey. Founded in 1964, AEF is dedicated to promoting education in diverse areas of study, such as law and public policy, and has appeared as amicus curiae along with WLF in numerous cases be- fore this Court, including Rotella v. Wood. WLF and AEF are concerned that the reflexive invo- cation of RICO by civil litigants engaged in otherwise garden-variety commercial disputes does violence to the original purpose of RICO and unnecessarily burdens our federal judicial system. While Congress adopted RICO as a tool to fight organized crime, civil RICO is now in- voked primarily in “everyday fraud cases brought against respected and legitimate enterprises.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985). The instant case presents another example of the attempt by litigants to stretch the application of RICO further than what Congress intended. WLF and AEF believe that ——— sue [under section 1964(c)] if he has been inj in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added). 4. Petitioner contends that he was “injured” by rea- son of a “violation” of the RICO conspiracy provision, section 1962(d). That claim is without merit. Petitioner has not been injured by the conduct constituting the violation of section 1962(d)—a mere agreement to vio- late the substantive provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)- (c)}—but by something altogether different: an overt act purportedly taken to further that agreement. An overt act done in furtherance of a conspiracy is not “conduct constituting [a] violation” of section 1962(d). See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496. As set forth in Salinas, the conduct constituting the offense of conspir- acy is the act of agreement itself—nothing more. The damage that petitioner sustained as a result of his pur- portedly wrongful termination is not, therefore, injury suffered by reason of a “violation” of section 1962(d). Petitioner’s injury occurred by reason of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, but not by reason of the conspiracy itself. The courts that have granted standing to plaintiffs injured by an “overt act” fail to appreciate the signifi- cance of that distinction, frequently collapsing the cru- cial difference between injury that results by reason of an overt act and injury that results by reason of a con- spiracy. Some courts purport to gloss that distinction by ay aw ee that the particular overt act was “essential” to or “closely intertwined” with the conspiracy’s object. Whether- an overt act was expressly done “in further- ance” of the conspiracy, Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1169 (3d Cir. 1989), “essential” to the conspiracy, Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted), “critical” to the conspiracy, Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Sys., Inc., 130 F.3d 143, 153 (Sth Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 442 (1998), “directly related’’ to the conspiracy’s goals, Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 9 978 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 1992), or “not outside the scope of [the] conspiracy,” Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 643 (E.D. Ky. 1988), is irrelevant, however, because even if the overt act would not have occurred but for the existence of the conspiracy, and even if the causal nexus between the conspiracy and overt act is immediate and direct, the overt act is not itself a “violation” of section 1962(d). Put another way, section 1964(c) does not give a cause of action to persons injured “by reason of conduct in furtherance” of a RICO violation; it gives a cause of action to persons injured by the “conduct constituting the violation.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added). A section 1962(d) “violation” is constituted by the agreement of the parties to further a criminal endeavor, see Salinas, 552 U.S. at 63—nothing more. The plain language of the statute gives a cause of action only to persons injured by reason of that conduct. 5. Petitioner’s claim that the proximate cause re- quirement announced in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992), is the “appropriate limiting factor,” Pet. Br. at 27, for deter- mining whether a person has been “injured” under RICO, misses the point. Petitioner’s argument conflates two distinct statutory uirements: section 1964(c)’s command that a plain- tiffs injury result from (“by reason of”) a proscribed act, which is properly examined under principles of proxi- mate causation, and section 1964(c)’s threshold re- quirement that a “violation” of the criminal provisions of RICO must be shown as the indispensable predicate for any of causation analysis, ximate” or other- wise. ximate causation that there be “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injuri- ous conduct alleged.” Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. No principle of proximate causation, however, —— pe- titioner’s attempt to disregard the limits that the legisla- 10 ture has established as the threshold condition to civil li- ability. Thus, although the proximate causation requirement limits the extent to which a wrongdoer may be held re- sponsible for the consequences of his wrongful conduct, titioner may not trigger that analysis by claiming to — been injured by just any act. The “injurious con- duct” that serves as the starting point in the analysis must be conduct that the law otherwise makes action- able. Only after that conduct is identified may causation analysis properly proceed.” Here, the statute identifies the conduct to which the directness of the plaintiff's injury must be assessed. That conduct is a “violation” of section 1962(d)—an agreement to further a criminal endeavor. Petitioner does not purport to have suffered damage as a result of that conduct, but rather he claims an injury resulting from conduct “in furtherance” of it. No proximate cau- sation analysis is necessary in this case, because peti- tioner has attributed injury to conduct that is not action- able under the statute. Indeed, petitioner’s analysis reads the word “violation” out of section 1962(d). 2 The doctrine of proximate causation does not determine in the first instance whether conduct is wrongful. It is possible, for example, to assess whether X is the proximate cause of consequences A and B without making a jud t that X is contrary to law. Put another way, a proximal relati aione between conduct and harm does not ipso facto render that conduct wrongful (i.e., that X is a proximate cause of conse- quences A and B does not necessarily make X wrongful). Proximate cause determines only whether a person whose conduct is otherwise wrongful should be held liable for the consequences of his conduct. The doctrine presupposes that the first link in the chain of causation—the starting point from which the causation measurement is taken—is a wrong- ful act. — Pi In sum, petitioner’s embrace of “proximate causa- tion” does not avail petitioner much, use the con- duct constituting the violation of section 1962(d)—the conduct which must be the first link in the chain of cau- sation—is not the proximate cause of petitioner’s injury. Indeed, no one is injured by a confederation or agree- ment alone. See, e.g., Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1993) (“A nonconspira- tor cannot be injured in his or her business or property by a mere agreement to violate RICO”); Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 348 (“[A]n agreement to violate RICO, standing alone, cannot harm anybody”); Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). A conspiracy simpliciter simply does not cause private injury. Accordingly, the plain language of the statute estab- lishes that petitioner’s wrongful termination claim is not cognizable under RICO. RICO does not authorize suits for civil conspiracy. B. Conventional Rules Of Statutory Interpreta- tion Establish That Section 1964(c) Does Not Create A Private Right Of Action For Civil Conspiracy The conclusion that section 1964(c) never confers a cause of action for conspiracy per se is inescapable when three traditional canons of statutory interpretation ‘are upplied to the text. 1. First, Congress “expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court’s precedents.” United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 495 (1997). Long before RICO was enacted, it was well understood that the criminal law takes aim at conspiracy because it “poses distinct dan- gers quite apart from those of the substantive offense.” lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 (1975). Those dangers derive from the fact that conspiracy is a “partnership in crime.” Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961). Concerted action makes more 12 likely the completion of the substantive offense and the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the group was formed, and it “educat[es] and prepar[es] the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices.” United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915); see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946). Thus, although conspiracy is, at its core, an “inchoate offense,” /annelli, 420 U.S. at 777, it is considered to be “an offense of the gravest character” because of its potential for inflicting severe “injury to the public.” Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88 (emphasis added). A civil cause of action, by contrast, is invariably given to victims of actual harm. Had Congress intended to create a new cause of action for the act of reaching agreement—an act which itself causes no particularized injury to any individual—it may be presumed that “there would have been at least some mention of it in the legis- lative history.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 490. There is nothing in the legislative history, however, to suggest that Congress in enacting RICO understood itself to be creating a new cause of action for unlawful agreement. Instead, the legislative history of the statute is replete with references to the actual harm that racketeering con- duct—the target of the substantive offenses set forth at 18 U.S.C. § § 1962(a)-(c)—inflicts upon legitimate businesses. That legislative history was painstakingly reviewed both by the majority and dissenters in Sedima, see 473 U.S. at 486-88, 510-20, and it is not necessary to rehash that history here except to note that both the ma- jority and dissent agreed that the civil suit provision was motivated by the notion that “[t]hose who have been wronged by organized crime should at least be given ac- cess to a legal remedy,” id. at 487, 515-16, and that Senator Hruska, a principal sponsor of the bill, thought the civil remedy necessary because “the honest busi- nessman who has been damaged by unfair competition from the racketeering businessman ... does not have 13 adequate civil remedies” to gain him recompense for his injuries. /d. at 516 (citation and quotation omitted). That legislative history, while not conclusive, evinces preoccupation with actual harm suffered by legitimate businesspeople by virtue of the racketeering activity pro- scribed in sections 1962(a), (b), and (c). Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress contemplated the interplay between section 1964(c) and section 1962(d), much less intended to create out of whole cloth a theretofore unknown civil cause of action for conspir- acy. 2. Congress also must be understood to have legis- lated against the background of the common law “except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” Astoria Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (quotation and citation omitted). At comm n law, civil conspiracy was not, by itself, an in- dependent cause of action.3 “Being a civil remedy, the 3 Robinson v. Parks, 24 A. 411, 413 (Md. Ct. App. 1892) (“[T]he simple act of conspiracy does not furnish a substan- tive ground of action”); Domchick v. Greenbelt Cons. Servs., Inc., 87 A.2d 831, 834 (Md. Ct. App. 1952) (“No action in tort lies for conspiracy to do something unless the acts actu- ally done, if done by one person, would constitute a tort”); Beechley v. Mulville, 70 N.W. 107, 110 (lowa 1897) (“The general rule is that a conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a civil action unless something is done which without the conspiracy would give the right of action’’) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Root v. Rose, 72 N.W. 1022, 1023 (N.D. 1897) (“The charge of conspiracy adds nothing to the case. A conspiracy, if proved, might augment the damages; but it would not of itself transmute nonactionable into action- able facts”); Delz v. Winfree, 16 S.W. 111, 111 (Tex. 1891) (“[A] Ny ee cannot be made the subject of a civil action, although ages result, unless something is done which, without the conspiracy, would give a right of action”); Jayne v. Drorbaugh, 17 N.W. 433, 437 (lowa 1883) (same); Diver 14 gist of the action is not the conspiracy charged, but the tort working damage to the plaintiff.” James v. Evans, 149 F. 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1906).4 The doctrine was no more than a “convenient and proper mode of alleging [a] combination and [united] action” on the part of multiple tortfeascrs. City of Boston v. Simmons, 23 N.E. 210, 211 (Mass. 1890).°9 v. Miller, 148 A. 291, 292 (Del. Super. Ct. 1929) (“If, how- ever, there be no right of action in the plaintiff against the de- fendants, or either of them, independent of the conspiracy, there can be no recovery though a conspiracy be alleged”). 4 See also Porter v. Mack, 40 S.E. 459, 460 (W. Va. 1901) (“The gist of the action is the injury produced”); Van Horn vy. Van Horn, 28 A. 669, 670 (N.J. 1894) (“{I}n an action on the case for conspiracy, the gist of the action is not the conspir- acy, but the damage done to the plaintiff. . .. [C]onspiracy is not the groundwork of the action, but the damages done to the party”); City of Boston, 23 N.E. at 211 (“The gist of the action is not the conspiracy alleged, but the tort committed against the plaintiff, and the damage thereby done it wrong- fully”); Von Au v. Magenheimer, 110 N.Y.S. 629, 632 (App. Div. 1908) (“In a civil action for conspiracy the gist of the action is the damage, not the conspiracy”). 5 See also Robinson v. Van Hooser, 196 F. 620, 623 (6th Cir. 1912) (“Since to hold defendants liable in actions like this it is necessary to prove a combination and united action on their part, the conspiracy averments afford a convenient means of alleging such combination and action”); Von Au, 110 N.Y.S. at 632 (“[T]he averment and proof of conspiracy is only important to join all the defendants and hold them re- sponsible for the acts and declarations of each”); Robinson v. Parks, 24 A. 411, 413 (Md. Ct. . 1892) (“The party wronged [by a tort] may look beyond the actual participants in committing the injury, and join with them as defendants all who conspired to accomplish it”). ene jg 15 It would be wholly incongruous for Congress to have enacted section 1962(d) on “the common-law footing,” Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)—that is, by defining the offense as a conspiracy simpliciter, Salinas, 552 U.S. at 63—and, at the same time, to have effected a radical transformation of the common law by creating a novel and unprecedented cause of action for civil conspiracy. That result is all the more anomalous given that the crime of conspiracy has been targeted historically because it is an inchoate offense inherently dangerous to the public, and not a crime that in and of it- self causes ascertainable private injury to anyone. J/an- nelli, 420 U.S. at 770; Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88. 3. Congress “will not be deemed to have signifi- cantly changed the federal-state balance” absent a clear sign of legislative intent. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978) (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). Petitioner’s view would sanction the proposition that Congress intended to federalize an enormous range of conduct historically regulated by the states and to impose liability on an unimaginably broad range of conduct—the universe of “overt acts”— heretofore thought to have been the proper concern of state law enforcement, if not wholly innocuous. That petitioner has brought a claim for “wrongful termination” under RICO illustrates this danger per- fectly. Florida common law does not recognize the tort of wrongful termination. See Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1990); Smith v. Peizo Tech. & Prof'l Admrs., 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1993); De- Marco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).6 By dressing up his wrongful termination 6 In 1991, Florida enacted the Whistle Blower’s Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 448.101-05, prohibiting retaliatory termination in the private sector. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the statute does not apply retroactively. See Arrow Air, Inc. 16 claim as an “overt act” in furtherance of a section 1962(d) conspiracy, however, petitioner has effectively bypassed that State’s decision not to protect against the type of injury he purports to have suffered. Many other examples abound. At common law, as well as under the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, overt acts can be wholly innocuous. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, CRIMINAL LAW 549 (2d ed. 1986) (“[V]irtually any act will satisfy the overt act requirement”); see also United States v. O Brien, 972 F.2d 47, 52-53 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (“an interview with a lawyer, attending a lawful meeting, and making a phone call, have all been held to be overt acts sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction’) (citations omitted).’? The gloss on section 1964(c) urged by peti- tioner effectively would subject such acts to civil liabil- ity provided they were “essential to” or “directly related” to a conspiracy, rendering RICO a “font of tort law, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 717 (1976), unrivaled by any other federal statute or constitutional provision. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1994). Accordingly, the statute would not provide a cause of action to petitioner, who was terminated in 1988. Petitioner, however, is free to assert available contract claims, if any, in state court. 7 That notion is reflected in the Department of Justice RICO manual, which explicitly distinguishes “racketeering acts, which “must be violations of the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961,” and overt acts, which “should be ordinary actions, such as meetings, conversations, and other general activi- ties.” THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-110A.1 00 at 99-100 (1991-1 Supp.). The Manual instructs prosecutors that “[aJ]lthough they may be criminal in nature, the overt acts, unlike the racketeering acts, should not be alleged as criminal offenses. It is extremely important to avoid confus- ing these two concepts.” /d. 17 Congress could not possibly have intended such an anomalous result. C. The Plain Meaning Of The Statute Does Not Render Any Portion Of The Statute Mere Surplusage Or Produce An Absurd Result 1. Petitioner’s principal objection to according the statute its plain meaning is that such a construction pur- portedly would render section 1962(d) “superfluous” in the civil setting. Because a plaintiff is never “injured” by reason of a “conspiracy” alone, to have a cause of action under section 1964(c) a plaintiff would be re- quired to demonstrate injury by reason of a violation of one of sections 1962(a)-(c). According to petitioner, this would render section 1962(d) “superfluous” for civil plaintiffs. See Pet. Br. at 19. That objection is not persuasive. Although this Court does not construe statutes in a manner that “render{s] their provisions mere surplusage,” Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 472 (1997), that principle operates to bar interpretations that render statutory words “of no consequence” in all of the stat- ute’s applications. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994). This Court has never endorsed the sweeping proposition that courts must construe each provision in a legislative enactment in a manner that will render that provision pertinent to each conceivable ap- plication of the act. That principle would be especially unwarranted and unworkable if applied to RICO, the text and structure of which mandate substantial interplay between the civil remedies provision in section 1964, the statutory viola- tions enumerated in 1962, and the predicate acts and op- erative terms defined in section 1961. Complete inte- gration and complementarity of one provision to another under such a complex statutory scheme is neither practi- cable nor expected. 18 Indeed, this Court already has rejected a similar ar- gument in the RICO context. In United States v. Tur- kette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), this Court held that the term “enterprise” as defined in section 1961(4) refers to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, rejecting the claim, similar to that raised by petitioner here, that the plain meaning would “create several internal inconsis- tencies in the Act.” 452 U.S. at 582. The court of ap- peals had held that the term refers only to “legitimate enterprises,” reasoning: [Since] a “pattern of racketeering” can itself be an “enterprise” for purposes of section 1962(c), then the two phrases “employed by or associated with any enterprise” and “the conduct of such enter- prise’s affairs through [a pattern of racketeering activity]” add nothing to the meaning of the sec= tion. The words of the statute are coherent and logical only if they are read as applying to legiti- mate enterprises. 452 U.S. at 582 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1980)). The Court dismissed that argument as resting on the faulty premise that a “pattern of racketeering” is an “enterprise.” Jd. at 583. Moreo- ver, the Court pointedly observed, “even if that were not the case, the Court of Appeals’ position on this point is of little force. Language in a statute is not rendered su- perfluous merely because in some contexts that language may not be pertinent.” 452 U.S. at 583 n.5 (emphasis added). That principle applies to this case. The plain mean- ing of the statute establishes only that a criminal con- spiracy cannot be the predicate “violation” for a cause of action under section 1964(c). Section te is hardly “surplusage” under that interpretation. powerful sweep operates will full force, and to full o Ang in the criminal setting. 19 Indeed, Turkette explicitly rejected the notion that the existence of the civil remedies bears on the scope of the criminal provisions of section 1962. The First Circuit supported its “legitimate enterprise” requirement in that case in part on the ground that various civil remedies were provided by section 1964, including divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, restrictions on future activi- ties by violators of RICO, and treble damages, and that these remedies would only have utility with respect to legitimate enterprises. 452 U.S. at 585. This Court concluded that “[e]ven if one or more of the civil reme- dies might be inapplicable to a particular criminal enter- prise, this fact would not serve to limit the enterprise concept.” /d. “Congress has provided civil remedies,” the Court observed, “for use when the circumstances so warrant. It is untenable to argue that their existence limits the scope of the criminal provisions.” /d. (emphasis added). Turkette thus soundly rejects the interpretive direc- tive that petitioner asserts to be dispositive here. Con- has provided a cause of action in section 1964(c) _sytne s injured by reason of a “violation” of the RICO O criminal provisions. That section, however, in no way alters “the scope of the criminal provisions.” 7ur- este, 452 U.S. at 585. The scope of RICO conspiracy under section 1962(d) was settled in Salinas, and neither the existe..ce of section 1964(c), nor petitioner’s faulty “surplusage” argument, alter the fact that petitioner has not been injured by a “violation” of that provision. D. Summary Judgment Was Appropriately En- tered Against Petitioner Summary judgment was appropriately entered against petitioner. Summary judgment is proper where the record “show(s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party entitled to j t as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US. 317, 322-23 20 (1986). That is the case here. Petitioner has adduced no evidence that he has been injured by reason of a “violation” of the RICO criminal conspiracy provision. Petitioner seeks dam for injury he claims to have in- curred as a result of his purportedly wrongful termina- tion; he seeks no damages irur’ed by reason of the re- spondents’ purportedly unlawful agreement, which is what section 1962(d) prohibits. Petitioner therefore states no cause of action under section 1964(c), and judgment was properly entered against him. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be af- firmed. Respectfully submitted. DANIEL J. POPEO F. JOSEPH WARIN PAUL D. KAMENAR Counsel of Record WASHINGTON LEGAL ANDREW S. TULUMELLO FOUNDATION GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 2009 Massachusetts Ave., NW 1050 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036 Washi D.C. 20036 (202) 588-0302 (202) 955-8500 Counsel for Amici Curiae September 17, 1999 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0268%3A12. Public record. Not legal advice.