# Joint Appendix — El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0204%3A05

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Joint Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1999
- **Citation:** 526 U.S. 473

## Text

kt LED
No. 98-6
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1998

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY; CYPRUS FOOTE MINERAL COMPANY;
AND CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY,

PETITIONERS,
Vv.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE; ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE; AND ZONNIE MARIE DANDY
RICHARDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
HAROLD J. RICHARDS, SR.,

RESPONDENTS.
On Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
JOINT APPENDIX

James R. Atwood* Seth Richard Lesser*
COVINGTON & BURLING BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. & GROSSMAN LLP
P.O. Box 7566 1285 Avenue of the Americas
Washington, D.C., 20044-7566 New York, New York
(202) 662-6000 (212) 554-1400
Attorneys for Petitioners Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI FILED JUNE 26, 1998
CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 13, 1998

Judgment, E/ Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie
(U.S.D.C. D. Arizona) (Jan. 5, 1996)

Verified Complaint, Neztsosie v. Rare Metals
Corp. (Court of the Navajo Nation, District
of Tuba City, Arizona) (Apr. 20, 1995)

Complaint, Cyprus Foote Minerai Co. v.
Richards (U.S.D.C. D. Arizona) (June 25,

Complaint, Richards v. Texas Zinc, et al.
(Court of the Navajo Nation, District of
Tuba City, Arizona) (Jan. 29, 1996)

Exhibit B: Order Denying Motion To
Dismiss, Richards v. Texas Zinc, et al.
(Court of the Navajo Nation, District of
Tuba City, Arizona) (Apr. 30, 1996)

Transcript of Proceedings and Order, El Paso
Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie (U.S.D.C.

D. Arizona) (May 28 & Nov. 3, 1996)

il

Order, Cyprus Foote Minerals Co. v. Richards,
(U.S.D.C. D. Arizona) (Nov. 21, 1996) ........ 72a

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (as amended Apr. 27,
ISDE) . nce tb een 5 0 ae eee 74a

Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit Amending Opinion and

Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc

(Age. St, TRS) ws ht ve 6 ee eee 97a

la

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV 96-0049-PCT-RGS

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY

Vv

LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE

Date No. Description

1/5/96 I
1/5/96 2
1/5/96 = 3
2/14/96 6

COMPLAINT FILED (ms) [Entry date
01/10/96]

MOTION for preliminary injunction by pla
El Paso Natural Gas [2-1] (ms) [Entry date
01/10/96}

STATEMENT OF FACTS by pla El Paso
Natural Gas re motion for preliminary
injunction by pla El Paso Natural Gas [2-1]
(ms) [Entry date 01/10/96]

MOTION to dismiss plas complaint for
injunctive relief and declaratory judgment by
dft Laura Neztsosie, dft Arlinda Neztsosie
[6-1] (tmc) [Entry date 02/10/96]

-

2/14/96

3/8/96

3/12/96

3/12/96

3/27/96

5/28/96

7

10

12

12

13

15

2a

MEMORANDUM by dft Laura Neztsosie,
dft Arlinda Neztsosie in support of dfts
motion to dismiss plas complaint and in
opposition to plas application for
preliminary injunction [6-1], [2-1] (tmc)
{Entry date 02/16/96]

SUPPLEMENTAL by dfts Brief in response
to plas complaint for injunctive relief (tmc)

RESPONSE by pla El Paso Natural Gas to
motion to dismiss plas complaint for
injunctive relief and declaratory judgment by
dft Laura Neztsosie, dft Arlinda Neztsosie
[6-1] (tme)

REPLY by pla El Paso Natural Gas to
response {to motion for preliminary
injunction by pla El Paso Natural Gas [2-1]
(tmc)

SURREPLY by pla El Paso Natural Gas to

dfts’ supplemental brief [10-1] (ms) [Entry
date 03/28/96]

MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits:) RGS Crt
Rptr: M. SANCHEZ granting in part
motion to dismiss plas complaint for
injunctive relief and declaratory judgment by
dft Laura Neztsosie, dft Arlinda Neztsosie
[6-1]. ORD denying in part motion for
preliminary injunction by pla El Paso
Natural Gas [2-1] FUR ORD that pltf post
bond in the amount of $1,000. See
transcript of details. [15] (qo) [Entry date
05/29/96]

11/6/96 29

11/14/96 30

$1,000.00 in support of this injunction
pursuant to FRCP 65(c) (cc: all counsel) re:
order [29-1] (tmc)

NOTICE of Preliminary Injunction Appeal
by El Paso Natural Gas from District Court

order [29-1] (cc: all counsel/9CCA/RGS
(jw) [Entry date 11/15/96}.

Date

6/25/96

6/25/96

8/2/96

8/2/96

8/2/96

4a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV 96-01524-PCT-RGS

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERALS COMPANY

v.
ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS

No. Description

l COMPLAINT FILED (ms) [Entry date

06/27/96]

2 MOTION for preliminary injunction by plas

[2-1] (ms) [Entry date 06/27/96]

5 ANSWER by dft Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards (rew) [Entry date 08/07/96]

6 RESPONSE (Memorandum of points and
authorities in support of dft’s opposition) by
dft Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards to motion
for preliminary injunction by plas [2-1]

(rew) [Entry date 08/07/96]

7 DECLARATION of David K Ringwood by
dft Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards in support
of response in opposition [6-1], re motion
for preliminary injunction by plas [2-1] [2-1]

(rew) [Entry date 08/07/96]

8/12/96 8

11/26/96 10

11/27/96 11

11/27/96 12

Sa

REPLY MEMORANDUM in support by all
plas to response to motion for preliminary

injunction by plas [2-] (rew) [Entry date
08/14/96}

ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting
in part and denying in part motion for
preliminary injunction by plas [2-1]; cash
bond approved in the amount of $1000.00 in
support of this injunction pursuant to FRCvP
65(c) (cc: all counsel/finance) (rew) [Edit
date 11/26/96}

NOTICE of Interlocutory Appeal by Cyprus
Foote Mineral, Cyprus Amax Minerals from
District Court order [10-1] (cc:
9CCA/cnsI/RGS) (rew) [Entry date
11/29/96}

NOTICE by all plas of filing cash bond in

support of injunction (rew) [Entry date
11/29/96}

6a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-17121

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY

Vv.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE

No. 96-17139

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERALS COMPANY and

Date

11/26/96

12/4/96

CYPRUS AMAX MINERAL COMPANY

v.
ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS

Description

DOCKET CAUSE AND ENTERED APPEAR-
ANCES OF COUNSEL, CADS SENT (Y/N):
YES. Preliminary Injunction appeal. Briefing to be
established pursuant to Cir. R. 3-3. CADS is past
due; CADS must be filed no later than 12/3/96 for
Christopher Robbins. [96-17121] (dl) [96-17121]

DOCKETED CAUSE AND ENTERED APPEAR-
ANCES OF COUNSEL. CADS SENT (Y/N):
YES. Briefing to be established by MoAtt pursuant
to Cir.R.3-3. This is an appeal from an order re:
a Preliminary Injunction. [96-17139] (dl) [96-
17139}

12/6/96

12/6/96

12/16/96

12/31/96

1/8/97

7a

Filed aplts’ joint motion to consolidate preliminary
injunction appeals and to consolidate briefing
schedules in 96-17121 & 96-17139; [96-17121]
served on 12/5/96 to (MOATT). [3132999] (jr) [96-
17121]

Filed aplts’ joint motion to consolidate preliminary
injunction appeals and to consolidate briefing
scheduled in 96-17121 & 96-17139; [96-17139]
served on 12/4/96 to (MOATT). [3133007] (jr) [96-
17139]

Rec’d aplts’ (El Paso Natural Gas, Cyprus Foote,
et al) joint brief in 15 copies 21 pages & 5 excerpts
of record in 2 volumes (Informal: no) deficient
need motion to consolidate and corrected proof of
service; served on 6/12/96. Notified csl. [96-
17121, 96-17139] (jr) [96-17121 96-17139]

Filed order MOATT (SL) granting aplts unopposed
joint motion to cons cases 96-17121 and 96-117139.
The brfg schedule established in 96-17139 shall
govern these cons appeals. Aplts jt brf, excerpts of
record are due 12/26/96; aples’ brf due 1/23/97;
ROA is due 1/30/97; rpy brf is due 14 days from
svc of the aples brf. [96-17121, 96-17139] (ot) [96-
17121 96-17139}

Received Appellant El Paso Natural Gas in 96-
17121, Appellant Cyprus Foote Mineral in 96-
17139’s satisfaction of (major) brief deficiency
(amended proof of service of opening brief, served
12/13/96) (Inserted in brief) [96-17121, 96-17139]
(em) [96-17121, 96-17139]

ee a

1/8/97

1/13/97

1/29/97

5/5/97

2/11/98

2/25/98

8a

Filed original and 15 copies Appellant El Paso
Natural Gas in 96-17121, Appellant Cyprus Foote
Mineral in 96-17139, Appellant Cyprus Amax
Minerals in 96-17139 opening brief (Informal: n)
21 pages and five excerpts of record in 2 volumes;
served on 12/13/96 [96-17121, 96-17139] (em) [96-
17121, 96-17139]

Filed original and 15 copies aples’ joint 24 page
brief; served on 1/9/97. [96-17121, 96-17139] (jr)
[96-17121 96-17139]

Filed original and 15 copies aples’ joint reply
(Informal: no) 18 pages; served on 1/27/97. [96-
17121, 96-17139] (jr) [96-17121, 96-17139]

ARGUED AND SUBMITTED TO Harry
PREGERSON, Warren J. FERGUSON, Andrew J.
KLEINFELD [96-17121, 96-17139] (mlm) [96-
17121, 96-17139]

FILED OPINION: AFFIRMED ins part,
REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. (Termi-
nated on the Merits after Oral Hearing; Affirmed
(in part) and Reversed (in part); Written, Signed,
Published. Harry PREGERSON, author; Warren J.
FERGUSON; Andrew J. KLEINFELD, dissenting)
FILED AND ENTERED JUDGMENT. — [96-
17121, 96-17139] (jr) [96-17121, 96-17139]

[3401655] Filed original and 40 copies Appellant
Cyprus Foote Mineral and Cyprus Amax Minerals
96-17139 petition for rehearing with suggestion for
rehearing en banc 16 p.pages, served on 2/24/98
(counsel to sent amended cert of service indicating

2/25/98

4/27/98

5/5/98

5/6/98

6/12/98

9a

date) PANEL AND ACTIVE JUDGES [96-17139]
(em) [96-17139]

[3402252] Filed original and 40 copies aplt’s
petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing
en banc 19 pages; served on 2/25/98 to (PANEL &
ALL ACTIVE JUDGES). [96-17121] (jr) [96-
17121]

Filed order amending opinion and denying pet for
rhrg en banc and amended opinion (Judges Harry
PREGERSON, author, Warren J. FERGUSON,
Ancrew J. KLEINFELD, dissent) (Orig. opinion
id: [3392495-1] in 96-17121, [3392495-1] in 96-
17139) [(3402252-1] in 96-17121, [3401655-1] in
96-17139 [96-17121, 96-17139] (gail) [96-17121
96-17139]

Filed aplts’ motion to stay mandate pending filing
of petition for writ of certiorari; [96-17121, 96-
17139] served on 5/4/98 to (PREGERSON).
[3445943] [96-17121, 96-17139] ORIGINAL &
COPIES REC’D (hard copies) (jr) [96-17121 96-
17139}

Filed aples’ opposition to motion to stay madt;
served on 5/5/98 to (PREGERSON). [96-17121,
96-17139] (jr) [96-17121 96-17139]

Filed order (Harry PREGERSON) plaintiff-aplts’
motion to stay the mandate pending petition for writ
of certiorari is granted. [3445943-1] in 96-17121,
96-17139 [96-17121, 96-17139] (jr) [96-17121 96-
17139]

7/6/98

10/16/98

10a

Rec'd ntc from Supreme Court; petition for
certiorari filed. Supreme Court No. 98-6; filed on
6/26/98 & placed on the dkt 6/29/98 [96-17121,
96-17139] (jr) [96-17121 96-17139]

Received notice from Supreme Court, petition for
certiorari GRANTED on 10/13/98. Supreme Court
No. 98-6 (PANEL) (sm) [96-17121 96-17139]

_— a. on

lla

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,
v.
LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE,
Defendants.
No. CIV 96-0049-PCT-RGS
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY
("EPNG"), by and through counsel undersigned, states the
following in support of its Complaint for Injunctive Relief and
Declaratory Judgment:

JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

1.

EPNG is a Delaware corporation, licensed to do
business, and doing business, in the State of Arizona.

> —_~sedee~ ~- -

12a
Il.

Laura Neztsosie and Arlinda Neztsosie are enrolled
members of the Navajo Indian Tribe and reside on the Navajo
Nation Reservation near Tuba City, Arizona.

Il.

This Court has jurisdiction over this dispute
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337, and 2201, et seq.
Furthermore, either the relief sought by Plaintiff herein is
within the jurisdiction limits of this Court, or Plaintiff need
not demonstrate adherence to any jurisdictional amount
requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Finally, venue in this
Court is appropriate as to all Defendants.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
IV.

Plaintiff incorporates Paragraph I through III of this
Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

V.

From 1957 through 1968, EPNG, and its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Rare Metals Corporation of America, Inc.
("RMCA"), which was subsequently merged into EPNG and
ceased to exist in 1962, operated open-pit, class one uranium
mines in the Cameron/Tuba City area.

VI.
At all times relevant hereto, these uranium mines

and their remains were operated and maintained properly,
pursuant to all necessary licenses and permits, and in

13a

conformance with requirements imposed by all appropriate
regulatory authorities, including the Navajo Nation, the United
States Atomic Energy Commission, the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, and the Arizona Atomic Energy
Commission.

Vil.

Throughout the time that EPNG and RMCA
operated the uranium mines, they sold to the United States
Atomic Energy Commission all of the uranium concentrate
mined, produced, processed, and ultimately milled, as a result
of uranium mining activities, pursuant to their operations
licenses with the United States Atomic Energy Commission.
Accordingly, all of EPNG’s activities at the mine sites, and
their surrounding areas, were performed pursuant to an
exclusive contract with the United States government.

VIL.

On April 20, 1995, Defendants Neztsosie filed a
Complaint against EPNG and its former defunct subsidiary,
RMCA,, in the Navajo Tribal Court, Tuba City District. (TC-
CV-0052-95)

IX.

The Complaint filed by Defendants Neztsosie
alleges that water collected in the Cameron mine pits, as a
result of uranium mining activities, was consumed by Laura
and Arlinda Neztsosie, and their livestock. Defendants
Neztsosie further allege that the same water also was used for

swimming, bathing, and washing clothes.

l4a
X.

The Neztsosie Defendants claimed that radioactive
substances gradually were released into the water, the
surrounding soil and the ambient air as a result of uranium
mining activities. Further, the Neztsosie Defendants assert
that, as a result of this alleged contamination, they have
suffered radioactive and heavy metal poisoning throughout
their lifetimes. The Neztsosies’ Complaint states causes of
action for negligence, strict liability based upon abnormally
dangerous activities, outrageous conduct, misrepresentation,
and fraud, all allegedly due to uranium mining activities. The
Neztsosie Defendants seek compensatory and punitive damages
against EPNG as a result of the described uranium mining
activities.

XI.

For its Answer to the Neztsosies’ Complaint in the
Navajo Tribal Court, EPNG affirmatively alleges that the
Navajo Tribal Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear
this case.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Request for Declaratory Relief)

XII.

Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs I through XI of
this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

XIll.
As there is a dispute regarding the substantial

federal question of whether the Navajo Tribal Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over the Neztsosies’ personal injury

15a

claims under the present circumstances, there is a justifiable
controversy between these parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 ef seq.

XIV.

Because the activities and resulting damages alleged
in the Neztsosies’ Complaint in the Navajo Tribal Court
involved the mining, processing, milling and production of
uranium pursuant to an exclusive contract with the United
States government, as well as the comprehensive laws of the
United States, there exist overriding federal interests in this
matter such that the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over EPNG
and the subject matter of the Neztsosies’ Complaint would be
inconsistent with these overriding federal interests.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff EPNG prays this Court to
enter judgment for declaratory relief in its favor as follows:

A. That the Navajo Tribal Court has no
jurisdiction over EPNG or the subject matter of the
Neztsosies’ pending Complaint in the Navajo Tribal Court;

B. For Plaintiff's reasonable costs incurred
herein; and

Cc. For such other and further relief as the Court
may deem just and proper under the circumstances.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Request for Injunctive Relief)

XV.

Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs | through XIV of
this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

16a
XVI.

Due to the content and nature of the Neztsosies’
allegations currently pending against EPNG in the Navajo
Tribal Court, EPNG has suffered, and continues to suffer,
immediate and irreparable harm.

XVII.

As a result of EPNG’s necessary efforts to defend
itself against the Neztsosies’ allegations in a tribal forum that
has no jurisdiction to hear this matter, EPNG has suffered and
continues to suffer immediate and irreparable harm.

XVIII.

The Neztsosie Defendants’ past and continuing
conduct in asserting the underlying personal injury claims
against EPNG in the Navajo Tribal Court have caused extreme
prejudice to EPNG, and is in direct violation of the rights of
EPNG.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff EPNG prays that this
Court grant its request for injunctive relief as follows:

A. A preliminary injunction and permanent
injunction barring the Neztsosie Defendants from maintaining
their underlying personal injury Complaint against EPNG, and
any of its subsidiaries, in the Navajo Tribal Court, inasmuch
as the Navajo Tribal Court possesses no jurisdiction to hear
that matter;

B. EPNG’s reasonable costs incurred in pursuit
of injunctive relief; and

Cc. For such other and further relief as the Court
may deem just and proper under the circumstances.

17a

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Sth day of
January, 1996.

O’CONNOR, CAVANAUGH,
ANDERSON, WESTOVER,
KILLINGSWORTH & BERESHEARS

By:
Richard J. Woods
Troy B. Froderman
Eric A. Mark

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and

Jamye Boone Ward, Co-Counsel
for Plaintiff

—— > ob

fe

ee te eR

18a

IN THE COURT OF THE NAVAJO NATION
DISTRICT OF TUBA CITY, ARIZONA

LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE,
Plaintiffs,
vs

RARE METALS CORPORATION and
EL PASO NATURAL GAS CORPORATION, and
all affiliates and assignees thereof,

Defendants.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS, ARLINDA
NEZTSOSIE AND LAURA NEZTSOSIE, by and through
their attorney, Cherie V. Daut, and file the following
Complaint:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Jurisdiction of this matter lies in the Navajo
Nation Court, Tuba City District, according to 7 N.T.C.
253(5), 7 Navajo Tribal Code section 133 (a,b,c,d,e), 7
Navajo Tribal Code section 254, 7 Navajo Tribal Code section
302, 7 Navajo Tribal Code section 6030610, 7 Navajo Tribal
Code section 651, Titlke 7 Navajo Tribal Code Section
602(a)(1), all of which provide for original jurisdiction in the
Tribal Courts of the Navajo Nation.

19a

¥ All Plaintiffs are Navajo Indians, all of
Defendants acts and emission took place solely on the Navajo
Nation Reservation. Venue in proper in Tuba City since all
transactions and occurrences took place in the Cameron and
Tuba City, Arizona areas, and is based on the current location
and convenience of the Plaintiffs.

3. Defendants or their affiliates or assignees,
owned and operated open pit uranium mines in_ the
Cameron/Tuba City area (Cameron mines) from
approximately 1950 to 1965. The Cameron mines were left
open and uncovered by Defendants during the mining
operations and upon the termination of Defendant's uranium
mining activities the Cameron mines remained open and
uncovered for many years.

4. Due to Defendants operation of the Cameron
mines the resultant open mining pits served as large collecting
areas for water which would have otherwise been scarce in the
Cameron/Tuba City arid climate.

5. Plaintiffs utilized the water which collected
in the Cameron mine pits, which were created by Defendants
mining operations, for drinking, bathing, swimming, clothes
laundering and stock watering, and as a result, Plaintiffs were
exposed to vast quantities of radioactive and non-radioactive
substances which were released into the Cameron mine water
and surrounding areas.

6. Defendants operation of the Cameron mines
into the water table from which plaintiffs utilized well water
for drinking, bathing, swimming, clothes laundering and stock
watering.

20a

7. Defendants operation of the Cameron mines
has caused Plaintiffs to suffer severe injuries and damages,
including severe health effects, emotion distress, annoyance
and discomfort, severe physical and mental impairment and
disability and fear of death, and as a result Plaintiffs have
incurred medical expenses, decreased earning capacity, pain,
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and other past, present and
future economic and non-economic damages.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF - NEGLIGENCE

8. Plaintiffs repeat the allegation which are
contained in paragraphs | through 7 and incorporate them by
reference herein:

9. Plaintiffs Laura Neztsosie and Arlinda
Neztsosie have at all times lived in the Cameron Mines area.
At all times relevant hereto, Defendants operated the Cameron
Mines, where Defendants mined, accumulated, handled
uranium ore.

10. Defendants knew or should have known that
the hazardous materials which were generated from the mining
of uranium ore constituted a grave risk to the health of
persons who might have come in contact with it, including the
Plaintiffs, and that care and caution should have been
exercised in the handling of such materials.

11. As a direct and proximate result of the
Defendants’ failure to properly, safely and adequately contain
waste has migrated off-site where it has entered the ground
and surface water which is, and has been, utilized by the
Plaintiffs.

2la

12. Uranium and uranium mining waste
continues to leave the Cameron mine sites which were created
by Defendants and are a continuing and ongoing source of
contamination to water, land and air, as well as to animals
(sheep and cattle) which are owned and consumed by
Plaintiffs.

13. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs to use
reasonable care in the handling and disposal of the hazardous
radioactive and toxic materials which were produced as a
result of their creation and operation of the Cameron uranium
mines.

14. Defendants negligently caused or permitted
radioactive and toxic emission to be released from the
Cameron uranium mines. These emissions were regularly
carried by ground water and soil and contaminated the
properties and air where Plaintiffs resided.

15. Defendants also negligently failed to warn
Plaintiffs of the potential for leakage and actual leakage of the
hazardous radioactive and toxic materials into the air, ground
water and soil in the vicinities of the Cameron uranium mines.

16. As a direct and proximate result of
Defendants’ breach of duty, Plaintiffs sustained severe injuries
and losses, including but not limited to emotion distress and
fear, severe physical injury, loss of enjoyment of life, and

17. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiffs
by failing to properly control and contain the radioactive
and/or hazardous materials which were produced by
Defendants mining activities at the Cameron mines, by
negligently releasing the radioactive and/or hazardous
materials into the air and allowing radioactive materials to

22a

migrate or leach into the ground water, surface water, rivers
and soil in the vicinity.

18. These releases and contamination of the air,
ground water, surface water, rivers and soil in the vicinity of
the Cameron mines were proximately caused by Defendants
and the results were aggravated by the negligent acts and/or
emissions of the Defendants including, but not limited to, the
following:

(A) permitting the emissions, releases and leaks
of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from the Cameron
mines to occur;

(B) failing to determine where and how the
emissions, releases and leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous
materials occurred and in failing to correct the problems to
prevent further leakage and emissions:

(C) failing to provide adequate containment of
the radioactive and/or hazardous material;

(D) failing to provide adequate air, surface
water, ground water, rivers and soil sampling and/or
monitoring to detect releases of radioactive and/or hazardous
materials;

(E) failing to take proper measurements of
particle sizes and emissions;

(F) failing to test uranium ores adequately for
the presence of hazardous or toxic materials;

(G) failing to timely and adequately warn or
otherwise notify Plaintiffs of such contamination and to
prevent recurring releases:

23a

(H) failing to take timely and adequate remedial
actions to contain and clean-up such contamination and to
prevent recurring releases;

(I) failing to properly train and supervise
Defendants employees to insure that the necessary safeguards
and procedures would be followed in the event that any
emissions, releases or leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous
materials from the Cameron mines and properties might
occur:

(J) failing to comply with applicable Navajo
Tribal laws;

(K) completely failing to construct and implement
remedial measures for containing radioactive and heavy metal
releases from the open pit mines and uranium tailing areas of
the Cameron mines. As a direct and proximate result of
Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs sustained severe injuries and
damages.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY -
STRICT LIABILITY

19. ‘Plaintiffs repeat the allegations which are
contained in Paragraphs 1 through 18 and incorporate them by
reference herein.

20. Defendants operated the Cameron mines in
a manner that created emissions containing high concentrations
of radioactive materials and toxic metals including but not
limited to the following: uranium, copper, manganese,
magnesium, molybdenum, sodium, chloride, sulfate, fluoride,
silica, barium, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, cobalt, iron,
lead, nickel, silver, strontium, vanadium, zinc, aluminum,

24a

lithium, radium 226, uranium 238, uranium 234, uranium
235, radon 228, radon222, selenium, plutonium, lanthandies
including cerium, luropium, lanthium, gallium, thorium,
arsenic, mercury, and nitrates, as well as alpha, beta and
gamma radiation, and other radioactive and toxic chemicals
and particularities which is, as such, as a non-natural use of
land and as such, constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity
which created risks to Plaintiffs and others.

21. Defendant’s open pit mining of radioactive
and non radioactive hazardous substances as indicated in
Paragraph 20 supra is an abnormally dangers activity or ultra
hazardous activity, i.e., one which necessarily involves a risk
of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care and is
not a matter of common usage.

22. Defendants area strictly liable to Plaintiff for
all damages and injuries which have resulted and will result
from the open pit mining of radioactive and non-radioactive
hazardous substances as indicated in Paragraph 20 supra at the
Cameron uranium mines.

23. Defendants’ open pit mining of radioactive
and non radioactive materials at the Cameron uranium mines
have directly and proximately caused releases of such
substances into the environment surround the Cameron
uranium mines. As a direct and proximate result of
Defendant’s operation of the Cameron uranium mines in the
aforesaid manner, Plaintiffs suffered the aforementioned
injuries and damages to themselves for which Defendants are
strictly liable.

—

25a

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT

24. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations which are
contained in Paragraphs | through 23 and incorporate them by
reference herein.

25. The actions and inactions of Defendants
complained of herein are so outrageous in character and so
extreme in degree as to compel a reasonable person in the
Navajo community to declare the same as atrocious, beyond
all bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
Navajo community.

26. Asa direct and proximate result of the above
conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered severe emotional distress and
have injured and damaged as alleged herein.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
MISREPRESENTATION/FRAUD AND DECEIT

27. Plaintiffs repeat the allegation which are
contained in Paragraphs | through 26 and incorporate them by
reference.

28. Defendants failed, both negligent and
intentionally, to disclose to Plaintiffs, material facts which
were known concerning the nature, magnitude and effects of
the releases of the exposure to radioactive and other hazardous
substances which were produced by Deferdant’s open pit
mining operations at the Cameron mines.

29. Defendants knew of and _ concealed,
misrepresented and failed to disclose the true facts which the
intention of creating a false impression of the actual facts in
the minds of Plaintiffs, and with the intent that Plaintiffs be

26a

lulled into complacency and refrain from seeking redress or
pursuing remedial action due to the development of Plaintiffs’
severe physical injuries.

30. ‘Plaintiffs reasonably believe Defendants’
misrepresentation and relied upon the same in refraining until
the present from seeking redress of pursuing remedial action.
As a direct result of Defendants’ negligent and/or intentionally
false and deceptive representations and Plaintiff's reasonable
relief of and reliance thereon, many of the injuries and
damages to Plaintiffs «rising out of the releases of hazardous
substances into the environment were compounded by the
passage of time and direct, daily exposure of Plaintiffs to
same.

31. Asa direct and proximate result of the above
conduct, Plaintiffs have been injured and damaged as alleged
herein.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAINST ALL
DEFENDANTS

32. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations which are in
Paragraph 1 through 31 above and incorporates them by
reference herein.

33. The actions of Defendants complained of
herein were attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, and
insult, and the wanton and reckless disregard for Plaintiffs
health and well being to and award of exemplary damages.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays that judgment be
entered in their favor and against Defendants for

27a

compensatory damages, consequential damages, special
damages and exemplary damages, reasonable costs and
expenses associated with this litigation, including attorney's
fees and such other and further relief as this Court deems just
and proper.

Cherie V. Daut,
Attorney for Plaintiffs’
Laura Neztsosie and
Arlinda Neztsosie
P.O. Box 1357
Shiprock, New Mexico 87420
(505) 368-5878
and
Rebecca Lorenz -——_—NO

Attorney at Law
Melat, Pressman, Ezell and Higby

Attorney at Law

711 South Tejon

Colorado Springs
CO 80903

[April 20, 1995]

28a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERAL COMPANY,
a Pennsylvania corporation;
CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS,
individually and as representative of the
Estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr.,

Defendants.
No. 96-1524-PHX-RGS

COMPLAINT

1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

1. This is an action by which plaintiffs Cyprus
Foote Mineral Company and Cyprus Amax Minerals Company
(collectively, "Cyprus") seek declaratory and injunctive relief
to bar the prosecution of a lawsuit entitled Zonnie Marie
Dandy Richards (The Estates of Harold J. Richards, Sr.,
Deceased) v. Texas Zinc, Vanadium Corporation of America,
Atlas Corporation, and all affiliates, joint venturers and
assignees thereof, pending in the District Court of the Navajo
Nation, Kayenta District, ("Navajo Tribal Court"), No. KY-
CV-002-95 (the "Tribal Court Suit"). The Tribal Court Suit

29a

is “patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions"
established by the Price Anderson Act, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2210 et seq. , and the exclusive federal control of the

_ entire field of nuclear safety.

Il. THE PARTIES

2. Cyprus Foote Mineral Company is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State
of Pennsylvania with its principal place of business in Kings
Mountain, North Carolina. Cyprus Amax Minerals Company
is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Delaware with its principal place of business in
Denver, Colorado. Cyprus Amax Minerals Company is the
parent of Cyprus Foote Mineral Company. Cyprus is the
successor by merger of Vanadium Corporation of America
("VCA") and Foote Mineral Company ("Foote"). Under AEC
Source Material License No. SUA-547, VCA operated the
Monument No. 2 uranium mine and concentrator from

approximately 1943 through 1967. In 1967, VCA was
merged with Foote. The Monument No. 2 facility was closed

during or shortly before 1969.

. 3. Defendant Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards,
individually and as representative of the Estate of Harold J.
Richards, Sr. ("Richards"), is a member of the Navajo Nation
and upon information and belief resides on that portion of the
Navajo Nation within the borders of the State of Arizona. On
or about March 29, 1995, Richards filed the Tribal Court Suit
against "Texas Zinc, Vanadium Corporation of America, Atlas
thereof." On information and belief, the Cyprus defendants,
as successor to VCA, are the only defendants to have been
served with process in the Tribal Court Suit. On January 29,
1996, Richards filed a First Amended Verified Complaint in

30a

the Tribal Court Suit, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit
A.

lll. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This Court has jurisdiction of this action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in that this is an action arising under
the Constitution, laws or treaties Of the United States,
particularly Art. 1, § 8 and An. VI, clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States. Jurisdiction is also
conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) of the 1988
Amendments; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship, and
the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000, exclusive of
interest and costs), and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (Acts of Congress
regulating commerce).

5. Venue is proper in this Distriet pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that defendants reside in this District
and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District. Venue is also
conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) in that defendants’
Tribal Court Suit claims for “public liability” arising out of a
“nuclear incident” occurred in this District.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

ee 1946, when the first Atomic Energy

3la

uranium, the basic raw material essential © the production of
nuclear weapons. All of the MED functions were transferred
to the AEC by Executive Order No. 9816, effective December
31, 1946. The AEC was established by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 (Pub.L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755).

7. At the end of World War II, uranium
production in the United States was practically nonexistent and
the nation was dependent on small and unreliable foreign
supplies of uranium. Responding to urgent military
requirements, the AEC in 1947 instituted the Domestic
Uranium Procurement Program ("the Procurement Program").
The Procurement Program was designed to create a domestic
mining and milling industry to provide uranium concentrate
for the government's vital nuclear weapons program. The
Procurement Program was designed to fulfill the "paramount
objective of assuring the common defense and security” set
forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The Director of the
Procurement Program has stated that "[njo single material
ever has been so essential to our safety, or even to our
survival, as uranium.”

8. Both the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and
1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2210 et. seq.) provided that the federal
government would be the sole owner of uranium products.
Moreover, at all times material hereto, the AEC exercised and

safety control measures. See e.g. 10 CFR parts 20 and
The control of the federal government over the entire
of nuclear materials has been described as “unique,”

32a

development of a domestic uranium industry, the AEC entered
into contracts with several different companies, including
VCA, calling for the construction and operation of uranium
mills. These AEC contracts typically contained terms
specifying where and when the uranium mills would be built,
how they would be built, what their capacities would be, how
much ore would be processed quarterly, how the uranium
concentrate would be verified, sampled, assayed and
packaged, from whom and where the company could purchase
ore, and for how much the concentrate would be sold to the
AEC.

10. | Under AEC Source Material License No.
SUA-547, VCA mined uranium at the Monument No. 2 mine,
located in Cane Valley, Arizona. On information and belief,
prospecting began at that site in approximately 1943. During
the mid-1960’s, the grade of uranium ore extracted from the
Monument No. 2 mine became lower. Thus, pursuant to
AEC specifications and instructions, VCA constructed the
Monument No. 2 concentrator, which concentrated the
uranium ore before shipping for further milling at VCA’s
Naturita and Durango, Colorado mills, and after 1963, at
VCA’s mill in Shiprock, New Mexico. The remnants of the
ore concentrating process consisted of sand-like particles
known as uranium tailings. These tailings were stored on a
tailings pile on land adjacent to the concentrator and mine. In
1954, Congress made a finding that "byproduct material” is to
be regulated “in the national interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d).
Uranium tailings are “byproduct material." 42 U.S.C. §
2014(e).

(2) The Price-Anderson Act and the 1988
Amendments

11. In1957, Congress passed the Price-Anderson
Act to address liability and compensation for damages and

33a

injury which might be occasioned by the atomic energy
program.

12. Asamended in 1988, the Price-Anderson Act
provides for federal jurisdiction over “public liability
action{s].". The term "public liability action" means “any suit
asserting public liability." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). “Public
liability” means “any legal liability arising out of or resulting
from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation." 42
U.S.C. § 2014(w). "Nuclear incident" means “any
occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence,
within the United States causing bodily injury, sickness,
disease or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of
or use of property, arising of or resulting from the
radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of
source, special nuclear or byproduct material." Id. § 2014(q).
"Source material” includes the uranium ore mined at the
Monument No. 2 mine. “Byproduct material" includes
uranium mill tailings. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(2).

13. A “nuclear incident” may be sudden and
accidental or occur over a long period of time. S.Rep. No.
296, 85th Cong., Ist Session 16, reprinted in 1957 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1803, 1817.

14. The Price-Anderson Act, as amended,
establishes a federal cause of action for radiation injuries,
establishes federal jurisdiction over that cause of action and
channels all legal liability to the federal courts for that cause
of action.

15. Acclaim growing out of any nuclear incident
is compensable under the terms of the Price-Anderson Act or
it is not compensable at all.

34a

16. Congress has completely occupied the field
of nuclear safety. Except to the extent specifically permitted
by Congress, neither States nor Indian Tribes, including their
courts, may assert authority or jurisdiction over any matter
touching this area. Congress has ceded no authority or
jurisdiction to Indian tribal courts to adjudicate “public
liability” actions.

(3) The Tribal Court Suit

17. As set forth in paragraph 3 above, Richards
filed suit against VCA and others on March 29, 1995 in
Navajo Tribal Court. On August 3, 1995, the Navajo Tribal
Court ordered the Foote Mineral Company, Cyprus Foote
Mineral Company and Cyrus Amax Mineral Company be
joined as defendants in the Tribal Court Suit. At the time the
Tribal Court Suit was filed, Cyprus was not transacting any
business within the Navajo Nation. No process was ever
personally served in the Tribal Court Suit upon Cyprus within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.

18. Cyprus filed a Motion for More Definite
Statement on September 19, 1995. By order dated January 3,
1995, the Navajo Tribal Court granted that motion. Thus,
Richards filed a First Amended Verified Complaint ("Tribal
Court Complaint") on January 29, 1995. Exhibit A. Cyprus
moved to dismiss the Tribal Court Suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on February 29, 1996. By order dated
April 30, 1996, the Navajo Tribal Court denied that motion.
Exhibit B.

19. In the Tribal Court Complaint, Richards
alleges that Mr. Richards lived near the Monument No. 2
mine and concentrator as a child, between approximately 1950
through 1959. Richards also alleges that Mr. and Mrs.
Richards lived near a uranium mill in Mexican Hat, Utah

35a

from approximately 1959 through 1965. Cyprus and its
predecessors had no interest whatsoever in the Mexican Hat
uranium mill.

20. Richards generally alleges that "{a]s a result
of Defendants’ conduct of milling and mining uranium ore .
. . Vast quantities of both radioactive and non-radioactive
hazardous substances released into the environment . . . and
have caused and will cause Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased)
and Plaintiff Zonnie Richards to suffer injuries and damages,
including adverse health effects, terminal primary renal cell
carcinoma, emotional distress, and annoyance and discomfort

21. The Tribal Court Complaint contains seven
counts, including claims for wrongful death and loss of
consortium, based on theories of negligence, strict liability and
fraud. Each count seeks damages "in excess of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000) DOLLARS and further
amounts that would fairly and accurately compensate [{Mrs.
Richards] for her damages. "

22. The Tribal Court Suit seeks to impose
"public liability" on Cyprus in an action arising out of a
“nuclear incident”.

23. The assertion of Tribal Court jurisdiction
over Cyprus in the Tribal Court Suit concerning the
transaction and occurrences set forth in the Complaint therein
constitute patent violations of express jurisdictional
eta a Gr canis a as
amended the exclusivity of federal law concerning
nuclear safety. vs

(4) EE! Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie

36a

24. Cyprus requests that the court take judicial
notice of the proceedings in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Laura
Neztsosie and Arlinda Neztsosie, CIV 96-0049-PCT-RGS. In
that action, the Neztsosies filed suit against El Paso Natural
Gas Co. ("EPNG") in Navajo Tribal Court, alleging that they
had suffered injuries resulting from EPNG’s operations of an
open pit uranium mine near Tuba City, Arizona. EPNG filed
an action in this district seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief on the ground that the Neztsosie’s Tribal Court Suit was
barred by express jurisdiction prohibitions in the Price-
Anderson Act, as amended.

25. A hearing was held on May 28, 1996 on
EPNG’s application for preliminary injunction before the
Honorable Roger G. Strand. Although no formal ruling has
been issued to date, Judge Strand indicated from the bench
that he would enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing claims for
relief in Navajo Tribal Court that constituted claims under the
Price Anderson Act.

COUNT ONE: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

26. Plaintiffs incorporated by reference all the
allegations of Paragraphs | through 23 of this Complaint.

27. Plaintiffs are “interested parties" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2201. They seek a declaration of
their rights and legal relations concerning whether they are
obligated to appear in and defend themselves in the Tribal
Court Suit.

28. Specifically, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
et seq., plaintiffs requests declaratory judgment against
defendants that:

37a

a. That the Navajo Tribal Court is without
subject matter jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate any claims
against plaintiffs of the sort alleged in the Tribal Court Suit.

b. That any "judgment," “order” or
"decree" or the like which the defendants may procure from
the Navajo Tribal Court with respect to any such pending or
threatened suit against plaintiffs by defendants in null, void
and of no force and effect.

c. That the efforts and threatened efforts of
the defendants to pursue claims of the sort currently alleged
in the Tribal Court Suit are and wold be violative of plaintiffs’
rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed plaintiffs under
the Constitution, Treaties, and laws of the United States aud
of the State of Arizona.

COUNT TWO: INJUNCTION

29. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the
allegations of Paragraphs | through 26 of this Complaint.

30. Unless preliminary and permanently
enjoined, Richards will proceed with their present and
threatened actions seeking to require Cyprus to defend actions
in the Navajo Tribal Court, which actions purport to impose
"public liability" for a "nuclear incident" upon Cyprus, all
without jurisdiction over the subject matter of such suits.

31. Other than by this suit, Cyprus lacks an
adequate remedy at law and Richards’ actions and threatened
actions will cause Cyprus irreparable harm and injury.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, independently and in
furtherance of their requested declaratory judgment, pray that
this Court issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary

38a

injunction and permanent injunction enjoining defendants and
their agents from prosecuting or pursuing the Tribal Court

' Suit or commencing any similar claims or proceedings against

plaintiffs or their property in the Navajo Tribal Court or
otherwise than in this Court or in some Court of the State of
Arizona having jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Plaintiffs further request an aware of their costs
incurred in this matter, together with such other and further
relief, equitable and legal, to which they may be entitled.

DATED this 25th day of June, 1996.

LEWIS AND ROCA LLP

By

Tom Galbraith

R. Neil Taylor III
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

39a
EXHIBIT A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE NAVAJO NATION
KAYENTA DISTRICT COURT

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS
the estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr.
(deceased)

Plaintiff,
vs.

TEXAS ZINC, VANADIUM CORPORATION OF
AMERICA, ATLAS CORPORATION, and all
affiliates joint venturers and assignees
thereof,

Defendants.
KY-CV-002-95
FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS, and
files the following VERIFIED COMPLAINT:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Jurisdiction of this matter lies in the Navajo Nation
Court, Kaventa District, according to 7 N.T.C. 253 (5), 7
Navajo Tribal Code Section 133 (a,b,c,d,e). 7 Navajo Tribal
Code Section 254, 7 Navajo Tribal Code Section 302, 7
Navajo Tribal Code Section 602-610, 7 Navajo Tribal Code
Section 651, Title 7 Navajo Tribal Code Section 602 (a) (1),

40a

all of which provide for original jurisdiction in the Tribal
Courts of the Navajo Nation.

2. The Plaintiff is a Navajo Indian and, all of the
Defendants’ acts and omissions took place solely on the
Navajo National Reservation. Venue is proper in Kayenta
based on the place or places where all transactions and
occurrences took place and the sites of the original injury
(Mexican Hat and Cane Valley) and is based on the current
location and convenience of the Plaintiff.

3 Texas Zinc Corporation, Atlas Corporation,
Vanadium Corporation of America, and their successors and
assignees partners, joint ventures and/or subdivision thereof
one another operated uranium mining and uranium milling
facilities in Mexican Hat, Utah and Cane Valley, Arizona.

4. From approximately 1950-1963 at various periods
of time Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased), husband of
Plaintiff Zonnie Richards resided at Defendants’ uranium
milling facilities in Mexican Hat, Utah and as a child at the
Cane Valley, VCA #2 Uranium mill and mine site, Arizona.

5. From 1950 to 1963, Plaintiff Harold J. Richards,
Sr. (deceased), C#116.384 was exposed to vanadium and
uranium and various radioactive substances and heavy metals
through his residence at Defendants’ Mexican Hat, Utah
uranium mill and as a child, at the Cane Valley, VCA #2
uranium mill and mine sites, Arizona.

6. Defendants operated the Mexican Hat and Cane
Valley uranium mine and mill, either as sole entities and/or as
partners, joint ventures and/or subdivisions or assignees
thereof of one another, from approximately 1950 to 1963.
Defendants produced vanadium and uranium concentrate from
raw ore which was mined from uranium mines through out the

4la

Navajo Nation Reservation and from VCA #2 (Cane Valley
mines) mine in Cane Valley where Harold Richards, Sr.
(deceased) resided as a child.

7. From 1959 to 1965, Mr. Richards (deceased),
resided in a small trailer located less than 50 yards away from
the Mexican Hat mill tailings pile.

8. Mr. Richards (deceased) resided with his parents at
the Vanadium Corporation of America (VCA #2 herein after)
Uranium Mill site in Cane Valley from approximately 1953 to
1959 when he was still a child.

9. From approximately 1953 to 1959, Mr. Richards
(deceased) resided with his parents at the VCA #2 site mill
less than 50 yards away from the VCA #2 mill in a residential
location which was provided by Defendants for VCA #2 mill
and mine workers so that they could walk to work at the VCA
#2 mill and mine.

10. During the time that Mr. Richards (deceased), as a
child, resided less than 50 yards away from the VCA #2 mill
site, no showers, bathing facilities or running water for daily
bathing or washing of clothes was available.

11. Asa result of Defendants’ conduct of milling and
mining uranium ore at Cane Valley and milling uranium ore
at Mexican Hat, Utah vast quantities of both radioactive and
non-radioactive hazardous substances released into the
environment at both the Cane Valley, VCA #2 mill site and
Mexican Hat mill site, and have caused and will cause Harold
Richards, Sr. (deceased) and Plaintiff Zonnie Richards to
suffer injuries and damages, including adverse health effects,
terminal primary renal cell carcinoma, emotional distress, and
annoyance and discomfort, physical and mental impairment
and disability, and fear of personal injury and death as well as

42a

loss of care, comfort and consortium and as a result, the
Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards has incurred medical
expenses and decreased earning capacity, pain and suffering,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other past, present and future
economic and non-economic damages.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
WRONGFUL DEATH OF

HAROLD J. RICHARDS, SR... NEGLIGENCE

12. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in
Paragraph | through 11 and incorporates them by reference
herein.

13. Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) was married to
Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards when they resided
together at the Mexican Hat mill site.

14. Harold J. Richards, Sr., (deceased), was born
December 4, 1936. From approximately 1955 to 1963, he
resided at either the Cane Valley, Arizona uranium mine and
uranium mill, as a child, Mexican Hat uranium mill with his
wife, Plaintiff, Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards. Harold
Richards, Sr. (deceased) was exposed to vanadium, uranium
and various radioactive substances and heavy metals through
his residence at the Defendants’ Cane Valley uranium mine
and mill, as a child, and Mexican Hat uranium mill areas
when he resided there with his wife, Plaintiff herein.

15. At the time of Harold Richard, Sr. (deceased) and
Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards residence in Mexican
Hat, Utah, they lived (50) yards away from Defendants
Mexican Hat uranium mill in a small trailer together. Plaintiff
Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards and Harold Richards, Sr.
(deceased) were allowed to live in such close proximity to the
Mexican Hat uranium mill by Defendants, herein, with

43a

Defendants’ full knowledge of this residence and its proximity
to the Mexican Hat uranium mill. At all times pertinent
hereto concerning the Mexican Hat uranium mill, Plaintiff
Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards and Harold Richards, Sr.
Sy ee ee a ene CIEE os tasband and
wife.

16. Asa result of Defendants’ conduct, i.e, the milling
of uranium and vanadium ores at Mexican Hat, Utah during
Plaintiff's husband Harold Richard, Sr. (deceased) residence
at the Mexican Hat mill, Plaintiff's husbaid Harold Richards,
Sr. (deceased) clothes, furniture, housewares, home and food
were contaminated with uranium ore dust, yellow cake and
toxic Chemical residue which came from Defendant's uranium
mill at Mexican Hat, Utah. These items were then handled,
laundered together, eaten, worn, sat upon and lived in or
otherwise came in contact with Mr. Richards (deceased) and
Plaintiff. Due to Defendants uranium milling activities in
Mexican Hat, Utah, excessive and deleterious quantities of
both radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous substances
were released into close proximity of Plaintiff Zonnie Marie
Dandy Richards and harold Richards, Sr. Mexican Hat
residence. Additionally due to Defendants uranium mining
and milling activities at Cane Valley at Harold Richard's Cane
Valley resided as a child.

Excessive and deleterious qualities of both radioactive and
non-radioactive hazardous substances were released into close

mental impairment and disability, and fear of personal injury
and death. As a result of defendants release of these
substances in both Mexican Hat and Cane Valley, Plaintiff
Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards and her deceased husband

44a

Harold Richards, Sr., have incurred and will incur in medical
expenses including decreased earning capacity, pain and
suffering, and death, loss of enjoyment of life, and other past,
present and future economic and non-economic damages.

17. During the years the Defendants operated and were
responsible for the Mexican Hat mill and Cane Valley
uranium mine and mill, Defendants accumulated, handled,
processed, treated, stored, burned, and otherwise disposed of
large quantities of radioactive and/or hazardous materials at
their property in Cane Valley, Arizona and Mexican Hat,
Utah.

18. Defendants knew or should have known that these
radioactive and/or hazardous materials and constituents posed
a hazard to the health and emotional well-being of Plaintiff
and her husband, Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased).

19. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff and to Harold
Richard, Sr. (Deceased) to use reasonable care in the handling
and disposal of the hazardous radioactive and toxic materials
used or produced at the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane
Valley uranium mine and mill.

20. Defendants negligently caused or permitted
radioactive and toxic emissions to be released from the
Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mill and
mine. These emissions were regularly carried by ground
water and soil and contaminated the properties and air where
Plaintiff and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) resided

21. Defendants also negligently failed to warn Plaintiff
and Harold Richards Sr. (deceased) of the potential for
leakage and actual leakage of the hazardous radioactive and
toxic materials into the ground water soil and in air of
Plaintiff and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) home or homes

4Sa

and the vicinities of the uranium mill as well as Plaintiff and
her husband's food, clothing and home environments.

22. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
breach of duty, the Plaintiff and Harold Richards, Sr.
(deceased) sustained injuries and losses, including but not
limited to emotional distress and fear, physical injury, loss of
as yet unknown.

23. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff and
Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) by failing to properly control
and contain the radioactive and/or hazardous materials within
the confines of the facility and property which they owned, by
negligently releasing the radioactive and/or hazardous
materials into the air and allowing radioactive materials to
migrate or leach into the ground water, surface water, rivers
and soil in the vicinity of the Mexican Hat mill site and Cane
Valley mine and mill site where Harold Richards, Sr.
(decreased) resided

24. These releases and contaminations of the air,
ground water, surface water, rivers and soil in the vicinity of
the facilities of the Mexican Hat mill site and Cane Valley
mill and mines sites as well as Plaintiff's husband’s food,
clothing and home environment were proximately caused by
Defendants and the results were aggravated by the negligent
acts and/or emissions of the defendants including, but not
limited to, the following:

(A) permitting the emissions, releases and leaks of
radioactive and/or hazardous materials from the facility
and property to occur;

(B) failing to determine where and how the emissions,
releases and leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous

46a

materials occurred and in failing to correct the problems
to prevent further leakage and emissions,

(C) failing to provide adequate containment of the
radioactive and/or hazardous materials;

(D) failing to provide adequate air, surface water, ground
water, rivers and soil sampling and/or monitoring to
detect releases of radioactive and/or hazardous materials;

(E) failing to take proper measurements of particle sizes
and emissions;

(F) failing to test incoming ores adequately for the
presence of hazardous or toxic materials;

(G) failing to timely and adequately warn or otherwise
notify Plaintiff and her husband, Harold Richards, Sr.
(deceased) of such contamination and to prevent
reoccurring releases;

(H) failing to take timely and adequate remedial actions
to contain and clean up such contamination and to prevent
reoccurring releases,

(1) failing to property train and supervise their employee
to imsure that the necessary safeguards and procedures
would be followed in the event that any emissions,
releases or leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous materials

from the facility and property might occur;
(J) failing to comply with applicable Tribal laws,
(K) being negligent in the construction and

of remedial measures for containing
releases from the tailing ponds and operating facilities;

47a

(L) failing to prevent Harold Richards. Sr. (deceased)
from coming in contact with touching or otherwise being
exposed to uranium dust, yellow cake and/or toxic
hemical residue on Plaintiff's husband Harold Richards.
Sr. (deceased) food, clothing, body, and home
environment.

25. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
conduct, Harold Richard, Sr. (deceased) sustained injury and
damage in that he contracted renal cell carcinoma.

26. As a direct and proximate result of Harold J.
Richards, Sr.’s (deceased) exposure to the radioactive and non
radioactive hazardous substances which were released by
Defendants at the Mexican Hat mill and the Cane Valley
uranium mine (VCA #2). Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased)
developed and died as a result of renal cell carcinoma.

27. As a consequences of aforesaid injury, Harold
Richards, Sr. died on January 5, 1993.

28. Left surviving was his wife, Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards.

29. As a result of the death of Harold Richards, Sr.,
Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards suffered the loss of
society of her husband and other related economic and non-

30. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards, pray’s for Judgment against the Defendant’s, in a
sum in excess of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
($100,000.00) DOLLARS and such further amounts that
would fairly and accurately compensate her for her aforesaid
damages.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
ULTRA HAZARDOUS
31. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in
Paragraph | through 30 and incorporates them by reference
herein.

32. Defendants operated the Mexican Hat uranium mill
and Cane Valley uranium mill and mine in a manner that
created emissions containing high concentrations of radioactive
materials and toxic metals including but not limited to the
following: uranium, copper, manganese, magnesium,
molybdenum, sodium, chloride, sulfate, fluoride, silica,
barium, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, cobalt, iron, lead,
nickel, silver, strontium, vanadium zinc, aluminum, lithium,
radium 226, uranium 238, uranium 234, uranium 235, radon
228, radon 222, selenium, plutonium, lanthanum including
curium, luropium, lanthium, gallium, thorium, asernic,
mercury, and nitrates as well as alpha, beta and gamma
radiation, and other radioactive and toxic chemicals and
particularities which is, as such, as a non-natural use of land
and as such, constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity
which created risks to Plaintiffs and others.

33. The collection, handling and processing of
radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous substances as
indicated in Paragraph 32 supra is an abnormally dangerous
activity or ultra hazardous activity, i.e., one which necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the
utmost care and is not a matter of common usage.

34. Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff and Harold
Richard, Sr. (deceased) for all damages and injuries which
have resulted and will result from the collection and

49a

processing of radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous
substances as indicated in Paragraph 32 supra at the Mexican
Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mine and mill
facilities and properties.

35. Harold Richard Sr. (deceased) was born on
December 4, 1936 and resided with his wife, Plaintiff Zonnie
Marie Dandy Richards at Defendants Mexican Hat uranium
mill site. Harold Richard Sr. (deceased) also resided as a
child at the Defendant's Cane Valley Uranium mill and mine
site.

36. Defendants’ collection, handling and processing of
radioactive and non-radioactive materials at the Mexican Hat
uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mill and mine facilities
and properties have directly and proximately caused releases
of such substances into the environment and community
surrounding the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley
uranium mill and mine facilities and properties where Harold
J. Richards, Sr. (deceased), either as a child (Cane Valley,
VCA #2 as a child and Mexican Hat as an adult) or as
husband to Plaintiff, resided.

37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's
operation of the Mexican Hat uranium mill and the Cane
Valley uranium mine and mill facilities in the aforesaid
manner, Plaintiff suffered the aforementioned injuries and
damages as alleged herein to herself for which Defendants are
strictly liable.

38. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
conduct, Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) sustained injury and
damage in that he contracted renal cell carcinoma.

39. As a consequence of the aforesaid injury, Harold
Richards, Sr. died on January 5, 1993. Left surviving is his

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wife, Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards, who has suffered a loss
of society comfort and consortium and other related damages.

40. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs Zonnie Marie Dandy,
prays for Judgment against the Defendant, in a sum in excess
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00) DOLLARS
and such further amounts that would fairly and accurately
compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM: NEGLIGENCE
HAROLD J. RICHARDS

41. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in
Paragraphs | through 40 above, and incorporates them by
reference herein.

42. Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) was born on
December 4, 1936. From approximately 1950 to 1963,
Plaintiff Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) was exposed to
radioactive and non-radioactive toxic substances at the
Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mine and
mill facilities, where he resided, either as an adult or as a

child.

43. Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards and her
husband Harold J. Richards, Sr., (deceased) were exposed to
vanadium, uranium and various radioactive substances and
heavy metals through their residence at the Defendants
Mexican Hat Uranium mill. Harold J. Richards, Sr.
(deceased) was also exposed to vanadium, uranium radioactive
and non-radioactive substances and heavy metals at the
Defendant’s Cane Valley uranium mine and mill facilities
where he resided with his parents as a child.

S5la

44. From 1959 to 1965 Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards and her husband resided less than (50) feet from
Defendants Mexican Hat uranium mill. Plaintiff Zonnie
Marie Dandy Richards and Harold J. Rich: eds, Sr. (deceased)
were allowed to live in such close proxim ‘ty to the Mexican
Hat uranium mill by Defendants and with Defendants full
knowledge of their residence in such close proximity to these
facilities. At all times pertinent hereto concerning the
Mexican Hat uranium mill, Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards and Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) were married
and resided together as husband and wife.

45. Asa result of Defendants’ conduct, i.e., the milling
of uranium ore, and Mr. Harold J. Richard Sr. (deceased)
residence at the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley
uranium mine and mill, as a child, Harold Richards, Sr.
(deceased) came in contact with deleterious quantities of both
radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous substances which
were released by Defendants’ operations at the Mexican Hat
and Cane Valley uranium facilities.

46. During the years the Defendants operated and were
responsible for the Mexican Hat mill and Cane Valley mine
and mill Defendants accumulated, handled, processed, treated,
stored, burned, and otherwise disposed of large quantities of
radioactive and/or hazardous materials at their properties in
Mexican Hat, Utah and Cane Valley, Arizona.

47. Defendants knew or should have known that these
radioactive and/or hazardous materials and constituents posed
a hazard to the health and emotional well-being of Plaintiff
Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased).

48. Defendants owed a duty to Harold Richards, Sr.
(deceased) and thereby to Plaintiff to use reasonable care in
the handling and disposal of the hazardous radioactive and

52a

toxic materials used or produced at the Mexican Hat uranium
mill and Cane Valley mines.

49. Defendants negligently caused or permitted
radioactive and toxic emissions to be released from the
Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mine and
mill. These emissions were regularly carried by ground
water, soil and air and, therein contaminated the property or
properties where Plaintiff and/or Harold Richards Sr.

(deceased) resided.

50. Defendants also negligently failed to warn Plaintiff
and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) of the potential for
leakage and actual leakage of the hazardous radioactive and
toxic materials into the ground water and soil of Plaintiff
and/or Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased), residence of

residences.

51. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
breach of duty, Harold Richards, Sr. and Plaintiff sustained
injuries and losses, including but not limited io emotional
distress and fear, physical injury, loss of enjoyment of life,
and other economic and non-economic losses as yet unknown.

52. Defendants breached their duty to Harold Richards,
Sr. (deceased) and to Plaintiff by failing to properly control
and contain the radioactive and/or hazardous materials within
the confines of the facilities and properties which they owned,
by negligently releasing the radioactive and/or hazardous
materials into the air and allowing radioactive materials to
migrate or leach into the ground water, surface water, rivers
and soil in the vicinity of the Mexican Hat mill and Cane
Valley mine and mill sites.

53. These releases and contaminations of the air, ground
water, surface water, rivers and soil in the vicinity of the

53a

facilities of the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley
uranium mine and mill sites were proximately caused by
Defendants and the results were aggravated by the negligent
acts and/or emissions of the Defendants including, but not
limited to, the following:

(A) permitting the emissions, releases and leaks of
radioactive and/or hazardous materials from the facility
and property to occur;

(B) failing to determine where and how the emissions,
releases and leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous
materials occurred and in failing to correct the problems
to prevent further leakage and emissions:

(C) failing to provide adequate containment of the
radioactive and/or hazardous materials:

(D) failing to provide adequate air, surface water, ground
water, rivers and soil sampling and/or monitoring to
detect releases of radioactive and/or hazardous materials:

(E) failing to take proper measurements of particle sizes
and emissions;

(F) failing to test incoming ores adequate!
y for the
presence of hazardous or toxic materials;

(G) failing to timely and adequately warn or otherwise
notify Plaintiffs of such contamination and to prevent
reoccurring releases;

(H) failing to take timely and adequate remedial actions
to contain and clean up such contamination and to prevent
reoccurring releases;

54a

(I) failing to properly train and supervise their employees
to insure that the necessary safeguards and procedures
would be followed in the even that any emissions,
releases or leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous materials
from the facilities and properties might occur;

(J) failing to comply with applicable Tribal laws;

(K) being negligent in the construction and
implementation of remedial measures for containing
releases from the tailing ponds and operating facilities.

(L) failing to prevent Harold J. Richards, Sr. from
coming in contact with, touching, or otherwise being
exposed to uranium dust, yellow cake and/or toxic
chemical residue on Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards’s husband's food, clothing and body and home
environment.

54. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff's
conduct, Harold J. Richards, Sr. sustained injury and damage
in that he contracted renal cell carcinoma.

55. As a consequence of the aforesaid injury, Harold J.
Richards, Sr. died on January 5, 1993.

56. Left surviving was his wife Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards.

57. Asa result of the death of Harold J. Richards, Sr.,
Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards has suffered and will
continue to suffer a loss of consortium.

58. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards, prays for Judgment against the Defendants, in a sum
in excess of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00)

55a

DOLLARS and such further amounts that would fairly and
accurately compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM: _
ULTRA HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY
59. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in

— 1 through 58 and incorporate them by reference
rein.

60. Plaintiff Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) was the
lawful spouse of Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards at
times relevant to the Defendant's Mexican Hat mill
operations.

61. Defendants operated the Mexican Hat uranium mill
and Cane Valley uranium mill and uranium mine in a manner
that created emissions containing high concentrations of
radioactive materials and toxic metals including but not limited
to the following: uranium, copper, manganese, magnesium,
molybdenum, sodium, chloride, sulfate, fluoride, silica,
barium, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, cobalt, iron, lead,
nickel, silver, strontium, vanadium zinc, aluminum, lithium,
radium 226, uranium 238, uranium 234, uranium 235, radon
228, radon 222, selenium, plutonium, lanthanum including
curium, luropium, lanthium, gallium, thorium, asernic,
mercury, and nitrates as well as alpha, beta and gamma
radiation, and other radioactive and toxic chemicals and
particulate which is, as such, was a non-natural use of land
and as such, constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity
which created risks to Plaintiffs and others.

62. The collection, handling and processing of
radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous substances as
indicated in Paragraph 61-supra is an abnormally dangerous

56a

activity or ultra hazardous activity, i.e., one which necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the
utmost care and is not a matter of common usage.

63. Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff for all
damages and injuries which have resulted and will result from
the collection and processing of radioactive and non-
radioactive hazardous substances as indicated in Paragraph 61-
supra at the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley
uranium mill and mine facility and property.

64. Defendants’ collection, handling and processing of
radioactive and non-radioactive materials at the Mexican Hat
uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mill and mines have
directly and proximately caused releases of such substances
into the environment and communities surrounding the
Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mill and
mine facilities and properties.

65. Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) was born on
December 4, 1936, and at times relevant to the Mexican Hat
uranium mill resided with his wife Plaintiff Zonnie Marie
Dandy Richards.

66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
operation of the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley
uranium mine and mill facilities in the aforesaid manner,
Harold J. Richards Sr. (deceased) suffered the aforementioned
injuries and damages as alleged herein, for which Defendants
are strictly liable.

67. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's
conduct, Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) sustained injury
and damage in that he contracted renal cell carcinoma.

57a

68. As a consequence of the aforesaid injury, Harold J.
Richards, Sr. died on January 5, 1993. Left surviving was his
wife, Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards.

69. Asa result of the death of Harold J. Richards, Sr.
his wife has suffered and will suffer loss of consortium.

70. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards prays for Judgment against the Defendant, in a sum
in excess of One HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00)
DOLLARS and such further amounts that would fairly and
accurately compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT

71. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in

Paragraph 1 through 70 above, and incorporates them by
reference herein.

72. The actions and inactions of Defendants complained
of herein are so outrageous in character and so extreme in
degree as to compel a reasonable person in the Navajo
community to declare the same as atrocious, beyond all
bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
Navajo community.

73. As a direct and proximate result of the above
conduct, Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress and
has been injured and damaged as alleged herein.

74. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff's Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards prays for Judgment against the Defendant, in sum in
excess of ONE THOUSAND ($100,000.00) DOLLARS and
such further amounts that would fairly and accurately

compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

58a

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
MISREPRESENTATION/FRAUD AND DECEIT

75. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in
Paragraph | through 74 above and incorporates them by
reference herein.

76. Defendants failed, both negligently and intentionally,
to disclose to Harold J. Richards, Sr. and to Plaintiff, material
facts which were known to them concerning the nature,
magnitude and effects of the release of and exposure to
radioactive and other hazardous substances which were
generated, handled, stored, treated or disposed of at the
Mexican Hat uranium mill and the Cane Valley uranium mill
and mine facilities and properties.

77. Defendants knew of and concealed, misrepresented
and failed to disclose the true facts with the intention of
creating a false impression of the actual facts in the minds of
Harold Richards, Sr. and Plaintiff, and with the intent that
Harold Richards, Sr. and Plaintiff be lulled into complacency
and refrain from seeking redress or pursuing remedial action
due to the development and death from renal cell cancer of
Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased).

78. Plaintiff and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased)
reasonably believed Defendants’ misrepresentations and relied
upon the same in refraining until the resent from seeking
redress or pursuing remedial action.

79. As a direct result of Defendants’ negligent and/or
intentionally false and deceptive representations and Plaintiff
and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased), reasonable relief of and
reliance thereon, many of the injuries and damages to Plaintiff
arising out of the releases of hazardous substances into the

59a

environment were compounded by the passage of time and
direct, daily exposure by Harold J. Richards, Sr. to same.

80. As a direct and prominent result of Defendants’
— Plaintiff has been injured and damaged as alleged
in

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards pray’s for Judgment against the defendant, in a sum
in excess of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00)
DOLLARS and such further amounts that would fairly and
accurately compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RULING

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAINST ALL
DEFENDANTS

81. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in
Paragraph 1 through above 80 and incorporates them by
reference herein.

82. The actions of Defendants complained of herein were
attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, and insult, and the
wholly wanton and reckless disregard of Harold Richards,
Sr.’s and Plaintiff's lives and health by Defendants actions
justifies to an additional award of exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards prays for Judgment against the Defendant, in a sum
in excess of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00)
DOLLARS and further amounts that would fairly and
accurately compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

60a
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered
in their favor and against Defendants for compensatory
damages, consequential damages, special damages and
exemplary damages, reasonable costs and expenses associated
with this litigation, including attorney’s fees and such other
and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

/signed/ 1-29-96
Cherie V. Daut
Attorney at Law for
P.O. Box 1357
Shiprock, New Mexico 87420
(505) 368-5878

6la
EXHIBIT B

IN THE DISTRICT OF THE NAVAJO NATION
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF KAYENTA, ARIZONA

(The Estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr.
Deceased),

Plaintiff,
VS.

TEXAS ZINC, VANADIUM CORPORATION OF
AMERICA, ATLAS CORPORATION, and all
affiliates joint venturers and
assignees thereof,

Defendants.

KY-CV-002-95
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter came before the Court on the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards, on behalf
of the Estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr., alleges that the
lived as a child near the defendants’ mining and
uranium milling facility in Mexican Hat, Utah. The plaintiffs
claim that the defendants operated the Mexican Hat uranium

Ht

62a

mill and VCA #2 uranium mine. They are located on Navajo
trust land. Through his residence near one or more of these
sites, Mr. Richards was exposed to radioactive materials from
the processing of uranium that allegedly caused his death. As
a result, Zonnie Richards filed a civil suit seeking damages for
injuries. It is unclear to the Court whether she has filed suit
in her capacity as representative of her deceased husband's
estate or, individually, in her own right or both.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants Vanadium Corporation of American and
the successors-in-interest to VCA, Cyprus Foote Mineral
Corporation and Foote Minerals Corporation assert that the
Navajo Court has no jurisdiction under express provisions of
federal law, the Price-Anderson Act. 42 USC ss2011 et esq.

This case presents the question of whether the
Navajo Court has civil jurisdiction over the defendants. They
claim that 1) Navajo Nation jurisdiction is pre-empted by the
Price-Anderson Act and 2) the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction
would frustrate the removal provisions of the Act, which give
the defendants an "absolute" right to remove the case to
federal court. That question can be resolved by considering
the impact of treaties, statutes and the inherent sovereignty of
the Navajo Nation.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The Navajo Nation Code grants the District Courts
original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the
defendant "...has caused an action to occur within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation." 7 NTC ss253(2).
The issue is whether the Navajo Nation has the power to
assert civil jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants whose

63a

allegedly tortious conduct occurred within the Navajo Nation,
given the Price-Anderson Act.

Indian nations have been characterized as "quasi-
sovereigns", Fisher vy. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390, 96
S.Ct. 943, 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 106 (976) (per curiam: , and it has
been noted that the sovereignty of tribes is different from that
of states. y
Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th cir. 1959); 1 NTC Chapter 1.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 143,
100 S.Ct. 2578, 2583, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980).

The United States Supreme Court has suggested the
following analysis for ascertaining the limits of tribal
sovereignty: Indian nations retain those powers of self-
government not voluntarily relinquished by treaty, not divested
by Congressional enactment, and not inconsistent with the
overriding sovereign interests of the United States. Oliphant
y. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09, 98 S.Ct.
1011, 1020-21, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). See United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303
(1978). Tribes may also exercise those powers which would
otherwise be inconsistent with overriding federal interests if
Congress has explicitly delegated such powers to them.
Montana v. United States. =F SsU.S._, 101 S.Ct. 1245,
67 L.Ed. 2d 493 (1981).

This Court does not find anything in the 1850 or
1868 Navajo Treaties to support the proposition that the
Navajo Tribe has explicitly relinquished civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians. However, the defendants have presented the
claim that the Price-Anderson Act precludes the Navajo
Nation from hearing the claims raised. The applicable
provision is 42 USC ss2210(n)(2) which confers original
jurisdiction on the U.S. District Courts, without regard for
diversity of citizenship or the amount in controversy, over any

64a

public liability action “arising out of or resulting from a
nuclear incident." ss2014(w). Whether or not this is a
"nuclear incident" is a factual issue for trial.

With respect to the third prong of the analysis, the
defendants argue that the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction
over it would be inconsistent with overriding federal interests
and thus is not among the retained powers of the tribe. The
tribal court’s power to adjudicate claims involving injuries
from uranium operations located on the Navajo reservation is
of the type the United States has a concern in protecting. The
federal government has an interest in regulating the production
of nuclear power and protecting the health and safety of the
public. However, the exercise of civil jurisdiction by the
Navajo court is consistent with the federal interests in
resolving claims of injuries arising out of a nuclear incident.
Assuming jurisdiction over this case is necessary to protect
tribal self-government, to control internal relations and does
not jeopardize the security and safety concerns which
prompted the Price-Anderson Act.

In this case, the alleged actions took place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation. As the
injuries occurred on the reservation, a tribal forum to redress
such injuries is clearly related to tribal self-government or
internal relations since the defendants’ allegedly tortious
conduct occurred on the reservation. Defendants are located
on the reservation and the plaintiffs live on the reservation.
Defendants are located on the reservation and the plaintiffs
live on the reservation. As such, the defendants’ activities
giving rise to the dispute are within the territorial sovereignty
of the tribe.

Further, the plaintiffs did business within the

Navajo Nation and thus there is a consensusal link under
United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). This is

65a

important since the U.S. Supreme Court make that an
underpinning for civil jurisdiction over non-Indian in
Montana. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a tribe
may regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensusal relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements. Id. at 565. Here, the defendants chose to
operate mills and mines on the reservation. It is assumed that
in order to do business on the reservation agreements or
dealings with the Navajo Nation were made which subjected
defendants to tribal court civil jurisdiction. Arizona Public

Services v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, A~CV-08-87
(decided 1990).

Another aspect of Montana is that a tribe may retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe. Id. at 566. The facts before the court suggest that
non-Indians operating uranium mines and mills threatens the
tribe’s political or economic security to justify tribal
regulation. Commercial activities in the Navajo Nation must
abide by Navajo Nation laws. In addition, the inherent
dangers entailed in uranium mining and milling may threaten
the welfare and safety of the Tribe. Thus, the defendants are
within the jurisdiction of the Navajo courts.

CHOICE OF LAW

The defendants ask the court to defer to federal
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. That is a reverse Farmer’s
Union claim. National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. et al.

y. Crow Tribe of Indians et al.. 471 U.S. 845 (9th Cir. 1985).
That court believed that the existence and extent of a tribal

court’s jurisdiction requires an examination of tribal

66a

sovereignty which should be conducted in the first instance in
the Tribal Court evaluating the factual and legal bases for a
jurisdictional challenge. Id. at 855-56.

The most recent Navajo Nation Supreme Court
decision on comity is Rough Rock Community School _v.
Navajo Nation, No. SC-CV-06-94 (March 14, 1996). This is
an “applicable law" decision and not a “deference to another
sovereign" decision.

In Rough Rock the Navajo Supreme Court ruled
that under the Navajo Nation doctrine of comity, a foreign
statute, court decision or public act must comply with Navajo
Nation public policy. The Navajo Nation is aware that
economic development is important to the Nation. However,
there are consequences for doing business on the Nation.
Under the Navajo Nation’s sovereign authority to regulate
business, establish the rules for doing business within the
Navajo Nation, or decide which acts of state of foreign
jurisdictions will or will not be honored within the Navajo
Nation is a matter of comity.

The Navajo Nation courts have the authority to
apply any federal law that may be applicable. 7 NTC
ss204(a). This action arose within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Navajo Nation involving Navajo plaintiffs. The Navajo
Nation courts have the power to apply federal law. Comity is
not applicable in this case.

In addition, defendants claim they have a right to
consolidate all related actions in the appropriate federal court
because “nuclear energy issues are emotionally charged;
scientific evidence on causation is complex; and damages
claims are potentially gargantuan." Defendants brief at 32.
argument that tribal courts are somehow biased or not
competent enough to render just decisions. lowa Mutual

67a

Insurance Co. vs. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987). Since
this case cannot be removed to federal court, requiring the
defendants to defend in the Navajo Nation court would not be
unduly unfair or inconvenient. Defendants are encouraged to
consolidate any related claims in this forum.

It is therefore, ORDERED that defendants Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is hereby
DENIED. The defendants are further encouraged to
consolidate any related claims in this forum.

So ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1996.

_t{signed}
JUDGE, District Court of the Navajo Nation

68a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV 96-0049-PCT-RGS

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Vv.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE,
Defendants.

Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary
Injunction and Granting Limited Injunction

Transcript of Proceedings
May 28, 1996

THE COURT: The plaintiff's application for preliminary
injunction is denied to the extent that it in any way seeks to
have this Court declare any aspect the jurisdiction of the
Navajo tribal court. There is -- there is a set of differing
views as to what this lawsuit involves. And when I say "this
lawsuit," I mean the lawsuit brought by the defendants here as
plaintiffs against El Paso Natural Gas in the tribal court.

The Navajo tribal court may or may not be presented with_
the issue of whether or not it has jurisdiction over all aspects
of this case, that is to say this case should it include claims

69a

under the Price-Anderson Act as well as simply claims of
negligence and other bases for a tort claim.

The Court does grant El Paso Natural Gas Company’s
requested relief to the extent that it enjoins the named
defendants here, plaintiffs in the tribal court, from pursuing a
Price-Anderson Act complaint in tribal Court. The Court's
rationale for granting that limited aspect of the relief is
application of the National Farmer’s three-factor test to the
issues involved plus a consideration of the holdings in the case
decided in this District Court in 1981, UNC Resources versus
Benally.

In citing that case, I recognize that there are significant
variations in the contacts, but taking the relevant analysis, the
Court does that in supporting its limited grant of relief to the
El Paso Natural Gas Company here by way of the preliminary
injunction granted.

Now, I want it clear to the parties as to what is granted
here and what is not granted here, and what the parties can
and can’t do in tribal court. The parties are enjoined from
pursuing, as I said earlier, a cause of action in tribal court
based upon the Price-Anderson Act for the reasons stated.

If the plaintiffs in that court want to, in effect, test the
extent to which the Navajo tribal court believes it has
jurisdiction, presumably it might be able to seek declaratory
relief in that court from the tribal court as to its opinions as to
its -- extent of its jurisdiction. And that is consistent with the
Court’s disinclination to in any way impede the jurisdiction of
the tribal court in exploring its powers.

It is a case of importance in the sense that there’s no
doubt but what the operation of a facility on the -- on tribal
lands that may affect a broad segment of tribal population
from a health standpoint or otherwise is a matter of dramatic
and significant concern to the tribe and to its government.

It is, of course, also true that the United States has a very
strong and compelling interest to assure that it operates its
nuclear industry in all of its varying facets in a manner that is

70a

uniformly appropriate for all who are exposed to both its
benefits and its burdens. And because of the uniqueness of
the geographic location of the sovereign tribal governments
within the boundaries of the United States, it compounds this
problem and, of course, also in part of that mix of complexity
is the power, burden and responsibility of Congress to enact
laws concerning the sovereign Indian nations within the United
States.

It is the Court's belief that its ruling in this area preserves
tribal sovereignty in its fullest measure, but at the same time
recognizes the interests that have been argued concerning the
nuclear industry, for lack of a better word, within the United
States.

It’s hoped that this will enable the parties to clarify the
issue within the tribal court of its jurisdiction. It may be that
it will conclude that on this narrow area it lacks jurisdiction
or defers jurisdiction or is otherwise willing to permit claims
to be adjudicated not in its own forum, or it may feel that
clearly it does have it and if that’s true, why then presumably
there will be opportunities to test that decision within its own
legal structure and there may be other occasions upon which
that can be tested as well and in the United States District
Court or in other courts.

I hope I’ve helped to clear and not muddy the waters that
have been brought to me by this litigation.

STRAND, Judge:

On May 28, 1996, plaintiff El Paso Natural Gas
Company’s application for a preliminary injunction of all
tribal proceedings in the case of Neztsosie v. El Paso Natural
Gas Company, Court of the Navajo Nation, District of Tuba

Tila

City, Case No. TC-CV-0052-95, came on for hearing. After
considering the parties’ written motions, their supporting
memoranda, and oral argument of counsel both at the hearing
on May 28, 1996, and at a telephonic hearing regarding the
wording of this order on July 11, 1996, this Court makes the
=— ruling pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Plaintiff El Paso Natural Gas Company's Application for
Preliminary Injunction is denied to the extent that it in any
way seeks to have this Court rule on any aspect of jurisdiction
of the Navajo tribal court. This Court denies El Paso Natural
Gas Company's request for an injunction of tribal proceedings
in Neztsosie v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, except to the
extent that Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie seek relief based upon
the Price-Anderson Act in tribal court. In all other respects,
the relief sought by the plaintiff in its application for
preliminary injunction is denied.

_ In reaching this decision, this Court relies on the
principles of tribal sovereignty, the tribal exhaustion doctrine,
the factors set forth in National Farmers Union Ins. Co. vy.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), UNC Resources,
Inc. v. Benally, 518 F.Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981), and on
arguments and authorities presented by the parties in their
papers and oral argument. In reaching this decision, the
Court does not determine whether or not the provisions of the
Price-Anderson Act have auy application to the claims asserted
by Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie in tribal court. It is further

ORDERED, approving cash bond in the amount of ONE
THOUSAND and 00/100 DOLLARS ($1,000.00) in support
ene Ponte

Cc).

SO ORDERED on this 3rd day of November, 1996.

Hon. Roger G. Strand
Judge of the United States District Court

72a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV 96-01524-PCT-RGS

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERALS COMPANY,
a Pennsylvania Corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Vv.

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS,
individually and as representative of
the Estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr.,
Defendant.

Order

Plaintiff has filed this action seeking an order enjoining
Defendant from pursuing the lawsuit of Zonnie Marie Dandy
Richards (The State of Harold J. Richards, Sr., Deceased) v.
Texas Zinc, et al., which is pending in the District Court of
the Navajo Nation, Kayenta District, No. KY-CV-002-95.
Plaintiffs have filed an application for preliminary injunctive
relief. After considering the parties’ pleadings, the Court
makes the following ruling:

Plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction is
denied to the extent that it seeks to have this Court decide
whether the Navajo tribal court has jurisdiction over the case
before it. Further, Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction of the
tribal proceeding in Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards (The State
of Harold J. Richards, Sr., Deceased) v. Texas Zinc, et al. is

73a

denied except to the extent that Defendant seeks relief under
the Price-Anderson Act in tribal court.

The Court bases its decision on the principles of tribal
sovereignty, the tribal exhaustion doctrine, the factors set
forth in National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), UNC Resources, Inc. v.
Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981), and the
additional authorities cited by the parties in their pleadings.

In reaching this decision, the Court does not determine
whether or not the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act have
any application to the claims asserted by Defendant in tribal
court.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary Injunction (doc. #2).

FURTHER ORDERED approving a cash bond in the
amount of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1000.00) in
support of this injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(c).

DATED this 21st day of NOVEMBER, 1996.

[signed]

HONORABLE ROGER G. STRAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

74a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE; ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-17121
DC No. CV-96-00049-RGS

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERAL COMPANY,
a Pennsylvania Corporation;
CYPRUS AMAX MINERAL COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS,
individually and as representative
of the Estate of Harold J.Richards, Sr.,
Defendant- Appellee.

No. 96-17139
DC No. CV-96-01524-RGS

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona

Filed February 11, 1998
Amended April 27, |

75a

Before: Judges Harry Pregerson, Warren J. Ferguson, and
Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges

Opinion by Judge Pregerson; Dissent by Judge Kleinfeld

OPINION
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Members of the Navajo Nation (the "Navajo Court
Plaintiffs") filed two separate actions in Navajo Tribal Court

against corporations that conducted uranium mining operations
on the Navajo Nation Reservation. The Navajo Court

Plaintiffs alleged personal injury and wrongful death claims
based on Navajo common law. In response to those actions,
El Paso Natural Gas Company ("El Paso") and Cyprus Foote
Mineral Company and Cyprus Amax Minerals Company
(collectively “Cyprus") filed two separate suits in federal
district court seeking preliminary injunctions to enjoin the
Navajo Tribal Court from asserting jurisdiction over the
Navajo Court Plaintiffs’ claims. El Paso and Cyprus
(collectively the “mining companies") alleged that all actions
arising from "nuclear incidents" fall within the Price-Anderson
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 ef seg., and must be litigated in
federal court.

The district court granted in part, and denied in part, the
mining companies’ requests for preliminary injunctions. The
district court granted the preliminary injunctions to the extent
the Navajo Court Plaintiffs alleged claims under Price-
did not allege Price-Anderson claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We affirm in part and reverse
in part.

76a
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

The two actions filed by the Navajo Court Plaintiffs have

been consolidated for this appeal. The facts and prior
proceedings in each of these actions are as follows:

1. Neztsosie v. El Paso

Between 1956 and 1959, Rare Metals Corporation of
America ("Rare Metals"), a now defunct subsidiary of El
Paso, conducted uranium mining operations on the Navajo
Nation Reservation. On March 29, 1995, Laura and Arlinda
Neztsosie (the "Neztsosies"), members of the Navajo Nation,
filed suit against Rare Metals in Navajo Tribal Court. The
Neztsosies asserted claims for personal injuries arising from
Rare Metals’ uranium mining activities.

On January 5, 1996, El Paso filed suit against the
Neztsosies in the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona. El Paso sought a preliminary injunction enjoining
the Neztsosies from prosecuting their claims in the Navajo
Tribal Court. El Paso also sought a declaration that the
Navajo Tribal Court had no jurisdiction over the Neztsosies’s
claims. El Paso asserted that the Neztsosies had to litigate
their claims in federal court because their claims alleged
liability arising from a “nuclear incident" under the Price-
Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2210.

After a hearing, District Court Judge Robert G. Strand,
entered an order denying in part, and granting in part, El
Paso’s request for a preliminary injunction. The district court
denied El Paso’s request for a preliminary injunction "to the
extent that it in any way seeks to have this Court rule on any
aspect of jurisdiction of the Navajo tribal court . . . except to
the extent that [the Neztsosies] seek relief based upon the
Price-Anderson Act in tribal court." In reaching its decision,
the district court relied on “principles of tribal sovereignty”
and the “tribal exhaustion doctrine." The district court stated,

77a

however, that it did not determine whether Price-Anderson
had any application to the claims asserted by the Neztsosies in
Tribal Court.

2. Richards v. Cyprus

Cyprus Foote Mineral Company is the successor by
merger to Vanadium Corporation of America ("VCA"). From
the 1940's through the 1960’s, VCA operated a uranium mine
in Cane Valley, Arizona, known as Monument No. 2 mine.
During the 1960's, VCA also constructed and operated a
uranium concentrator at the Monument No. 2 mine site. The
remnants of the ore concentrating process consisted of
uranium tailings. The tailings produced by the concentrator
were stored on a tailings pile on land adjacent to the
Monument No. 2 mine site.

On April 20, 1995, Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards, a
member of the Navajo\ Nation, filed suit individually, and as
representative of her deceased husband’s estate, against VCA
and others in Navajo Tribal Court. Richards asserted claims
for wrongful death and personal injuries arising from VCA’s
activities at the Monument No. 2 mine site.

On June 26, 1996, Cyprus filed suit against Richards in
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Like El Paso, Cyprus sought a preliminary injunction
enjoining Richards from prosecuting her claims in Navajo
Tribal Court. Cyprus also sought a declaration that the
Navajo Tribal Court had no jurisdiction over Richards’s
claims. Cyprus alleged that Richards had to litigate her
claims in federal court because she alleged liability arising
from a "nuclear incident" under Price-Anderson.

The Richards action, like the Neztsosie action, was
assigned to District Court Judge Strand. The district court
entered an order substantially similar to the order issued in the
Neztsosie matter. The district court denied in part, and
granted in part, Cyprus’s request for a preliminary injunction.

78a

El Paso and Cyprus timely appeal the district court’s
orders.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo whether the district court was
required to abstain from granting or denying an injunction
when a party has failed to exhaust tribal court remedies.
Burlington N. R.R. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868, 869-70 (9th
Cir. 1997) (en banc).

1. The Tribal Exhaustion Requirement

The Supreme Court has stated that, subject to certain
exceptions, comity principles require federal courts to either
dismiss or abstain from deciding cases in which a party asserts
that concurrent jurisdiction exists in an Indian tribal court.
Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th
Cir. 1991) (citing National Farmers Un. Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) and Jowa Mut. Ins. Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987)). “Considerations of comity
require the exhaustion of tribal remedies before the [tribal
court’s jurisdiction] may be addressed by the district court."
Wellman v. Chevron USA, Inc., 815 F.2d 577, 578 (9th Cir.
1987). “The requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies is
not discretionary; it is mandatory." Burlington N. R.R. v.
Crow Tribal Council ("Crow Tribal Council"), 940 F.2d 1239,
1245 (9th Cir. 1991). “Until petitioners have exhausted the
remedies available to them in the Tribal Court system, it
would be premature for a federal court to consider any relief."
National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 (footnote omitted); see
also Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1691 (1997) ("[A] party
must exhaust tribal court remedies before a federal district
court may entertain a challenge to tribal jurisdiction.")
(emphasis added); Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d at 1244

79a

("[FJederal courts should not even make a ruling on tribal
court jurisdiction until tribal remedies are exhausted.")
(citation omitted).

"[T]he initial determination of whether the Tribe has
jurisdiction lies with the tribal court alone.” Crow Tribal
Council, 940 F.2d at 1244. "[NJon-Indian defendants must
exhaust tribal court remedies before seeking relief in federal
court, even where defendants allege that proceedings in tribal
court exceed tribal sovereign jurisdiction." /d.

The tribal exhaustion requirement is based on
considerations of comity and the long-standing policy of
promoting tribal self-government and _self-determination.
National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856. "[T]he federal policy
supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to
Stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a ‘full
Opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.’" Jowa Mut.,
480 U.S. at 16 (quoting National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857).

The existence and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction
require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty. "[{T}hat
examination should be conducted in the first instance in the
Tribal Court itself." National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856.
"[P]roper respect for tribal legal institutions requires that they
be given a ‘full opportunity’ to consider the issues before them
and ‘to rectify errors.’" Jowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16 (citing
National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857).

While tribal exhaustion promotes tribal self-government
and self-determination, it also promotes judicial efficiency:

[T}he orderly administration of justice in the federal
court will be served by allowing a full record to be
developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits
or any question conce:ning appropriate relief is
addressed . . . . Exhaustion of tribal court remedies,
moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to
the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction,
and will also provide other courts with the benefit of

80a

their expertise in such matters in the event of further
judicial review.

National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57. “Congress is
committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and
self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide
the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first
opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the
challenge." Jd. at 856.

In this case, the mining companies have not exhausted
their tribal court remedies. Instead, the mining companies
chose to file actions in federal district court seeking to enjoin
the Navajo Tribal Court from asserting jurisdiction over the
Navajo Court Plaintiffs’ claims. See Jowa Mut., 480 U.S. at
17 ("At a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies means that
tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the
determinations of the lower tribal-courts."). Thus, unless an
exception to the tribal exhaustion requirement applies, the
district court was obligated to abstain from ruling on the tribal
court’s jurisdiction over the Navajo Court Plaintiffs’ common
law claims.

An exception to the tribal exhaustion requirement exists
where: (1) an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a
desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith; (2) tribal court
jurisdiction patently would violate express jurisdictional
prohibitions; (3) exhaustion would be futile because of the
lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the tribal court’s
jurisdiction; or (4) no federal grant authorizes tribal
governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by
Montana’s main rule. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, ___
U.S. __, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1416 n.14 (1997); National
Farmers, 471 U.S. 845 at 856 n.21. In this case, the parties
only dispute the applicability of the “express jurisdictional
prohibition" exception to tribal court jurisdiction. "A
substantial showing must be made by the party seeking to
invoke [the ‘express jurisdictional prohibition’] exception to

8la

the tribal exhaustion rule." Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley
("Farley"), 115 F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th Cir. 1997). "{T]ribal
courts rarely lose the first opportunity to determine
rae aioe an ‘express jurisdictional prohibition. ’"

II. The District Court’s Orders

. In this case, the district court’s orders appear to hold that
Price-Anderson constitutes an express prohibition of tribal
court jurisdiction. The district court denied the mining
companies’ requests for preliminary injunctions "except to the
extent that [the Navajo Court Plaintiffs] seek relief based upon
the Price-Anderson Act in tribal court." The district court also
stated that it did not determine whether Price-Anderson had
any application to the claims asserted by the Navajo Court
Plaintiffs.

The mining companies have appealed that portion of the
district court’s orders that allow the Navajo Court Plaintiffs to
pursue claims in Navajo Tribal Court other than Price-
Anderson claims. The mining companies assert that the
Navajo Court Plaintiffs are barred from pursuing any claims
in Navajo Tribal Court because the Navajo Court Plaintiffs’
claims arise from a nuclear tort and fall within the ambit of
Price-Anderson.

The Navajo Court Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have not
appealed the district court’s rulings that Price-Anderson
constitutes an express prohibition of tribal court jurisdiction.
Rather, the Navajo Court Plaintiffs seek to affirm that portion
of the district court’s orders that allow them to pursue claims
other than Price-Anderson claims in Navajo Tribal Court. The
Navajo Court Plaintiffs contend that their claims are based on
Navajo common law and do not implicate Price-Anderson.

It is unclear why the Navajo Court Plaintiffs have not
appealed the district court’s rulings that Price-Anderson
constitutes an express jurisdictional prohibition that prevents

82a

the Navajo Tribal Court from determining its jurisdiction over
such claims. Nevertheless, because of the important comity
considerations involved, we sua sponte examine whether
Price-Anderson constitutes an express prohibition of tribal
court jurisdiction. See Stone v. City and County of San
Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Issues
touching on federalism and comity may be considered sua
sponte.").'

As the following discussion demonstrates, we conclude
that Price-Anderson does not contain an express jurisdictional
prohibition barring the Navajo Tribal Court from determining
its jurisdiction over the Navajo Court Plaintiffs’ claims.
Therefore the mining companies, before proceeding in federal
court, are obligated to first exhaust their tribal court remedies.

‘Our decision to review this issue sua sponte is further supported by:
(1) the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Farley, 115 F.3d at 1505, which
expressly rejected the claim that Price-Anderson constitutes an express
jurisdictional prohibition; and (2) the district court's misplaced reliance on
UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981), in
considering the tribal exhaustion doctrine.

In Benally, a corporation operating a uranium mill near the Navajo
reservation brought an action in federal district court to enjoin several
members of the Navajo Nation from proceeding in Navajo Tribal Court on
civil actions alleging personal injuries and property damage arising from
the corporation’s activities. Jd. at 1048. The district court concluded that
the tribal court had no jurisdiction. Benally is not dispositive, however,
because it was decided before the Supreme Court announced the tribal
exhaustion doctrine in National Farmers. Moreover, the conduct at issue
in Benally took place off the reservation, whereas in this case the alleged
conduct took place on the Navajo Nation Reservation. Tribal jurisdiction
applies more clearly to conduct occurring on reservation lands. See lowa
Mut., 480 U.S. at 18 ("Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians
on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty .") (emphasis
added); Crawford, 947 F.2d at 1408 ("When the dispute is a ‘reservation
affair’ . . . there is no discretion not to defer.").

83a
Ill. Price-Anderson

its legislative history mandate exclusive federal court
Jurisdiction for claims arising from "nuclear incidents." The
mining companies also assert that we may infer an express
Jurisdictional prohibition. These contentions are not
persuasive.

Before 1954, a federal monopoly existed over the use,
control, and ownership of nuclear technology. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983). In 1954, however,
Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act to encourage the
Private sector to become involved in the development of
atomic energy under federal regulation. /d. at 206-07.

In 1957, Congress enacted Price-Anderson. Price-
Anderson amended the Atomic Energy Act by creating
specific protections for the nuclear industry from tort liability.
See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251
(1984). Price-Anderson contains three distinct elements.
First, it sets a ceiling on the aggregate damage award for
nuclear tort claims that can be imposed against an entity
involved in the use or handling of radioactive material. Jn re
TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 852 (3d Cir.
1991). Second, it indemnifies any entity exposed to potential
liability for activity resulting in a nuclear incident, even if the
entity did not directly participate in the activity. Jd. Third,
Price-Anderson established an indemnification program
through which the federal government would require entities
involved in nuclear activities to obtain private insurance to a
ee ges and then the federal government would pay all
public liability claims above that liabili iling. ;
F.3d at 1503. at

Until amended in 1988, Price-Anderson’s provisions
regarding nuclear tort litigation did not apply unless and until
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") determined that

84a

an “extraordinary nuclear occurrence" had transpired.
O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1095-
96 (7th Cir. 1994). The 1988 amendments to Price-Anderson
expanded its reach to include all "public liability actions” and
eliminated the requirement that the NRC designate an
extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).
See also S. Rep. No. 218, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 2, at 13
(1987) ("Any suit asserting public liability shall be deemed to
be an action arising under the Price-Anderson Act."); H.R.
Rep. No. 104, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1 (same).

Price-Anderson states:

With respect to any public liability action
arising out of or resulting from a nuclear
incident, the United States district court in the
district where the nuclear incident takes place
_ . . Shall have original jurisdiction without
regard to the citizenship of any party or the
amount in controversy. Upon motion of the
defendant . . . any such action pending in any
State court . . . or United States district court
shall be removed or transferred to the United
States district court having venue under this
subsection.

42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2). Price-Anderson defines “public
liability action" as "any suit asserting public liability." /d.
§ 2014(hh). “Public liability means any legal liability arising
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident." Jd. § 2014(w).
A “nuclear incident means any occurrence . . . within the
United States causing . . . bodily injury, sickness, disease, or
death . . . arising out of or resulting from the radioactive,

85a

toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source,’
special nuclear, or byproduct material."’ Jd. § 2014(q).

“Although the public liability cause of action is built
around preexisting state law, it contains some distinctively
federal elements as well." O'Conner, 13 F.3d at 1096: see
also 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) ("The substantive rules for decision
in [a public liability] action shall be derived from the law of
the State in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless
such law is inconsistent with the provisions of [42 U.S.C.
§ 2210)."). For example, Price-Anderson as amended in 1988
provides the limitations period for public liability actions, 42
U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1), provides for venue, id. § 2210(n)(2),
limits the availability of punitive damages in an action arising
out of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, id. § 2210(s), and
mandates the waiver of normally-available defenses in the case
of extraordinary nuclear occurrences. Jd. § 2210(n)(1).

IV. Price-Anderson does not Constitute an
Express Jurisdictional Prohibition

One exception to the tribal exhaustion requirement calls
for an express jurisdictional prohibition. See National
Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 n.21. This exception rarely
applies. See Farley, 115 F.3d at 1502 (noting that a tribal
court "rarely" loses the opportunity to determine its
jurisdiction because of an express jurisdictional prohibition).
"Civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands ‘presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal

*[S]ource material (1) uranium, thorium, . . . or (2) ores
containing one or more of the foregoing materials.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(2).

**[B]yproduct material” includes “the tailings or wastes produced by
the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore
processed primarily for its source material content.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e).

86a

statute." Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1989)
(emphasis added) (quoting Jowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18).

Price-Anderson contains no such express prohibition of
tribal court jurisdiction. Price-Anderson provides for
concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction over claims
arising from nuclear incidents. It merely grants defendants
the right, rather than the obligation, to remove such cases to
federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) ("Upon motion of
the defendant . . . any such action pending in any State court
_. . Shall be removed or transferred to the United States
district court having venue under this subsection. ").*

In Farley, the Tenth Circuit held that Price-Anderson
does not constitute an express jurisdictional prohibition. In
that case, certain members of the Navajo Nation filed an
action in the Navajo Tribal Court against two mining
companies. The mining companies had conducted operations
on the Navajo Nation Reservation between 1952 and 1973.
Farley, 115 F.3d at 1500. The plaintiffs alleged that the
mining companies’ mill released vast quantities of radioactive
and toxic materials, which caused injuries. Jd. The mining
companies, without answering the tribal court complaint, filed
an action in federal district court seeking to enjoin the suit
from proceeding in the tribal court. /d. The mining

‘The mining companies’ reliance on United States v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe, 784 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Yakima
Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986) is misplaced. In White
Mountain, we stated: “There is no point in requiring exhaustion . . .
because tribal court jurisdiction is clearly foreclosed by the sovereign
immunity of the United States." White Mountain, 784 F.2d at 920 n.10;
see also Yakima, 806 F.2d at 861 (following White Mountain). Unlike
White Mountain and Yakima, in this case, Navajo Tribal Court jurisdiction
is not “clearly foreclosed” by Price-Anderson. Moreover, it is for the
Navajo Tribal Court to first

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0204%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
