# Amicus Curiae Brief — Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0141%3A16 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1999 - **Citation:** 525 U.S. 70 ## Text IN THE Supreme Court of the United OCTOBER TERM,1997 — CEASAR WRIGHT, 8 Petitioner, UNIVERSAL MARITIME SERVICE CoRp.; STEVENS SHIPPING & TERMINAL Co.; STEVEDORING SERVICES OF AMERICA; RYAN-WALSH, INC.; STRACHAN SHIPPING Co.; CERES MARINE TERMINALS, INC.; and SOUTH CAROLINA STEVEDORES ASSOCIATION, Respondents. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, THE LABOR POLICY ASSOCIATION, and THE EMPLOYERS GROUP IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS JEFFREY A. BERMAN ROBERT E. WILLIAMS * SIDLEY & AUSTIN ANN ELIZABETH REESMAN 555 West Fifth Street DANIEL V. YAGER Los Angeles, CA 90018-1010 McGUINESS & WILLIAMS (213) 896-6000 1015 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Attorney for Amicus Curiae Suite 1200 Employers Group Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 789-8600 Attorneys for Amici Curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council and Labor Policy Association * Counsel of Record WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 BEST AVAILABLE COPY = TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURA STATEMENT OF THE CASE SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT f ARGUMENT I. THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY HELD THAT A COLLECTIVELY-BARGAINED AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE ALL DIS- PUTES ARISING OUT OF AN EMPLOY- MENT RELATIONSHIP IS ENFORCEABLE WITH RESPECT TO STATUTORY CLAIMS IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE INDI- VIDUALLY-BARGAINED AGREEMENT IN GILMER A. Agreements to Arbitrate A Re- lated Disputes Stand on the Same Footing as Other Contracts and Are Enforceable With Respect to Statutory Claims ............ . An Arbitration Agreement Negotiated and Executed by a Duly-Selected Collective- Bargaining Agent Is Binding on the Em- ployees on Whose Behalf It Was Made STRONG FEDERAL POLICIES FAVOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF £COLLECTIVELY- BARGAINED AGREEMENTS TO ARBI- TRATE EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DIS- PUTES, INCLUDING STATUTORY CLAIMS A. Enforcement of Agreements to Submit Stat- utory Claims to Arbitration Is Fully Con- sistent With the EEO Laws’ Policy of Pro- tecting Individuals Against Discrimination . Federal Policies Favoring Enforcement of Voluntary Agreements to Arbitrate Must Prevail Over Outmoded Suspicion of Arbi- tration CONCLUSION . ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Air Line Pilots Association, International v. ONeill, 499 U.S. 65 (19919 —————————9 17-18 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 10 —T—T—ͤ—„—— — 18. 19 Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 1 3. 5 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., e.. 20 Fairhaven Properties, 314 N. L. R. B. 763 (1994) 14 Gilmer v. Interstate / Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. rn ptgtlinenenoneiogoasel passim Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 r 3-4 Hughes Tool Co., 56 N. L. R. B. 981 „ enf'd as modified, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945) 7 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) 8.18 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) 12 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1993) 4 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 RET AIS aS eee 4 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 5 een Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 . 8,17 NLRB v. Boss Manufacturing Co., 118 F. 2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941) 8 12 NLRB v. Katz, 369 US. 736 (1962) 6 12 NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 RE ee SS 12 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddor, 379 U. 8. 650 r a 11 Securities Industry Association v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (Ist Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. D .... 8. 21 United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 196997 12 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued Page United Steelworkers of America v. American Man- ufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) 15 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) 15 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) 15 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) 8, 11,18 WJA Realty Ltd. Partnership, 308 N.L.R.B. 728 ER Re NEL © OO Ee 12 DOCKETED CASES Albertson's Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Civ. No. 97-35500 (9th Cir.) .... 4 STATUTES Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), ee ts ᷑ê . 3,9 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. r 7... 3 e Ee a 15 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 81 0 9 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. fo ae ee 3 e oS ee 6,11 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seg. . 17 Section 110 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 10111 15 Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations r x 10, 15 Section 10 (b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (b) a PE ELAR Paes 16-17 Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 e EE nS 17 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17 — 16 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued MISCELLANEOUS Page The Developing Labor Law (Patrick Hardin ed., Le 12 Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts Study Commitee (1990) 19 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1997 No. 97-889 CEASAR WRIGHT, V. UNIVERSAL MARITIME SERVICE Cor., — Petitioner, BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, THE LABOR POLICY ASSOCIATION, and THE EMPLOYERS GROUP IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS The Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC), the Labor Policy Association (LPA), and the Em- ployers Group respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae. Letters of consent from all parties have been 1 Counsel for the amici authored the brief in its entirety. No person or entity other than the amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submis- sion of the brief. 2 filed with the Clerk of the Court. The brief urges this Court to affirm the decision of the court below and, thus, supports the position of the respondents, Universal Maritime Service Corporation et al. INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE EEAC is an association of employers formed in 1976 to promote sound programs to end employment discrimination. Its members include more than 300 of the nation’s largest private employers. Its directors and officers include many of industry’s leading ex- perts on equal employment opportunity and affirma- tive action. Their combined experience gives EEAC valuable insight into the practical, as well as legal aspects of equal employment opportunity (EEO) pol- icies and practices. LPA is an organization of the senior human re- sources officers of more than 250 of the nation’s largest companies, collectively employing more than 12 mil- lion Americans. Since its founding in 1939, LPA has been concerned exclusively with the development and implementation of laws and public policies affecting human resources practices in the private sector. LPA’s mission is to ensure that such laws and policies are sound, practical, and responsive to the needs of the modern workplace. The Employers Group, headquartered in California, is one of the nation’s oldest and largest human re- sources management associations. It represents nearly 5,000 companies of all sizes in every industry, em- ploying in the aggregate approximately 2.5 million employees. Formerly known as the Merchants & Man- ufacturers Association and the Federated Employers, the Employers Group has been involved as amicus curiae in many significant employment cases. 3 The amici’s members are employers subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seqg., and other EEO laws, as well as to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seg. Many of them have con- tracts with their employees governing some or all terms and conditions of employment. Some of these contracts have been arrived at through collective bar- gaining with employee representatives, while others are products of direct dealings with unrepresented employees. Many such contracts contain provisions requiring arbitration of employment-related claims and disputes. The amici’s members have an ongoing interest in preserving the enforceability of agreements calling for arbitration of employment-related disputes, whether arrived at through collective or individual bargaining. Arbitration provides a fair, efficient, and effective means of resolving discrimination claims and other employment-related issues that otherwise would clog the courts. Because of their interest in this subject, the amici have filed friend-of-the-court briefs in nu- merous cases supporting the enforceability of arbitra- tion agreements, as well as many other important issues of employment law.? 2 For example, EEAC filed briefs supporting mandatory arbitration of statutory discrimination claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 U.S. 482 (1996); and Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d (3d Cir.), cert. 4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Following a 1992 workplace injury, petitioner Ceasar Wright claimed to be totally and permanently disabled. After he received a quarter-million dollar worker’s compensation settlement, however, Wright’s condition improved unexpectedly, and he reported to his union hiring hall saying he was ready to return to work. Over the next few days, he worked for several different stevedoring firms on referrals from the union. The firms balked, however, when they learned that Wright had received a large monetary settlement for a total and permanent disability. Re- lying on provisions of the applicable collective-bar- gaining agreement, they informed the union that they no longer would accept Wright for employment. The union protested the stevedoring firms’ decision, but neither it nor Wright pursued the matter through the grievance-and-arbitration procedure of the collec- tive-bargaining agreement. Instead, at the union’s suggestion, Wright went to a lawyer, with whose assistance he filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that the firms had discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Dis- abilities Act. Upon receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Wright sued in federal court on his ADA claim. denied, 118 S.Ct. 299 (1997). LPA filed a brief supporting mandatory arbitration of Fair Labor Standards Act claims in Albertson's Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Civ. No. 97-85500 (9th Cir.) (decision pending). The Employers Group has filed amicus briefs in M Kennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 518 U.S. 852 (1995) and Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994). 5 The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended that it be dismissed because Wright had failed to submit his claim to arbitration as re- quired by the collective-bargaining agreement. The magistrate judge concluded that the case was con- trolled by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996), which holds that a collectively-bargained agreement to arbitrate employment-related claims bars a covered employee from suing on statutory discrimination claims, at least without first exhausting arbitration. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge and dismissed Wright’s lawsuit. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Relying on Austin, the Fourth Circuit observed that “collec- tive bargaining agreements to arbitrate employment disputes are binding upon individual employees even when the dispute involves a federal cause of action,“ and that [where such an agreement exists, a failure to process a claim under the agreement precludes a court from exercising jurisdiction.” (Pet. App. at 4a). This Court granted certiorari on March 2, 1998. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT It is now settled that when an individual agrees, as a condition of employment, to submit all employment- related disputes to arbitration, that agreement stands “on the same footing as other contracts” and is en- forceable with respect to statutory discrimination claims as well as other disputes. Gilmer v. Interstate / Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The central question in this case is whether the same holds true when a union makes such an agreement on behalf of 6 employees it represents. The court below properly concluded that it does. Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a union duly selected by a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining is the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of negotiating and entering into contracts with their employer governing their “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. §159(a). Thus, when employees choose a union as their agent, they authorize it to bind them—both collectively and individually—to agreements covering the whole gamut of “terms and conditions of employment.” It is well settled that a procedure for resolving employment-related claims and disputes is a “term or condition of employment”—and thus a mandatory subject of collective bargaining—within the meaning of the NLRA. Accordingly, an agreement to adopt such a procedure lies well within the ambit of sub- jects on which a union can bind the employeees for whom it speaks. This Court has recognized that it is perfectly appro- priate—and, indeed, consistent with important federal policies—for an employer and an employee to agree in advance, as a condition of employment, to “trade[ ] the procedures and opportunities for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedi- tion of arbitration” as the means of resolving any disputes that may arise out of their employment rela- tionship, including statutory claims. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31, quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). ee 7 In a unionized setting, however, the only way such an agreement ordinarily can come into being is through collective bargaining, for the NLRA bars employers from dealing directly with union-repre- sented employees over dispute-resolution procedures. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1943), enf’d as modified, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945). Yet, under the rule the petitioner seeks in this case, a collectively-bargained agreement to arbitrate statu- tory claims would be unenforceable against employees who assert such claims, and hence would be of little or no value to the employer. Thus, the rule petitioner seeks would create an anomaly in employment law. It would make it vir- tually impossible for union-represented employees and their employers to exercise the same, basic right that the unrepresented employee in Gilmer and his em- ployer exercised with this Court’s approval—i.e., the right to trade the procedures of the courtroom for the more efficient, less expensive procedures of arbitration with respect to statutory claims. The petitioner and his amici argue that the EEO laws’ central policy of protecting individuals against discrimination trumps the NLRA’s central policies of majority rule and exclusive representation. But there is no need to decide in this case which of these statu- tory policies takes precedence, because individuals’ substantive rights under the EEO laws can be pro- tected as effectively through arbitration as through judicial processes. As this Court has recognized, an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims does not waive any substantive rights afforded by the EEO laws; it merely submits to their resolution in a differ- ent forum. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. This is equally true whether the agreement to arbitrate such claims was negotiated individually or collectively. The union’s duty of fair representation under fed- eral labor law stands as a bulwark against any danger that individuals’ rights might suffer as a result of their subordination to collective interests under the NLRA. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705 (1983); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1967). Thus, majoritarian control over the selection of the forum for resolving employees’ job-related com- plaints and charges is fully compatible with effective protection of their individual, substantive rights under the EEO laws. At bottom, most of the arguments supporting the petitioner’s position in this case rests on the out- moded “suspicion of arbitration” that this Court de- nounced in Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30. Those arguments run counter to strong federal policies favoring arbi- tration. The importance of those policies is amplified in the employment context by the explosive growth of employment-law litigation in the federal courts. Con- gress and the judiciary have long recognized that arbitration can, as one court put it, “serve as therapy for the ailment of the crowded docket.” Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1054 (1990). Given the current, overwhelming federal caseload, such “therapy” has never been more appropriate and necessary. 9 ARGUMENT I. THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY HELD THAT A COLLECTIVELY-BARGAINED AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE ALL DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IS ENFORCE- ABLE WITH RESPECT TO STATUTORY CLAIMS IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE INDIVIDUALLY- BARGAINED AGREEMENT IN G/LMER A. Agreements to Arbitrate Employment-Related Dis- putes Stand on the Same Footing as Other Con- tracts and Are Enforceable With Respect to Statu- tory Claims In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), this Court held that an arbitration agreement that an individual signed “[a]s a condi- tion of his employment,” id. at 23, in which he pledged to submit to arbitration any dispute that might arise out of his employment or the termination thereof, was enforceable under the Federal Arbitra- tion Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seg., so as to require him to arbitrate his subsequent claim that his em- ployer violated his rights under the Age Discrimina- tion in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. In so holding, the Court emphasized that the federal policy underlying the FAA places arbitration agreements “on the same footing as other contracts,” 500 U.S. at 24, 33, and makes them enforceable with respect to statutory claims, the same as with respect to other types of claims. Id. at 26.9 3 An exception is made where it is shown that Congress intended to preclude waivers of judicial remedies under a particular statute. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. However, after a careful analysis of the text, history, structure and purpose of the ADEA, this Court found no evidence of intent to 10 The present case involves an arbitration agreement that is generally similar to the one in Gilmer.* The only significant difference is that, while Gilmer him- self signed the document containing his agreement to arbitrate, petitioner Wright was represented by a labor union, which negotiated and executed the arbi- tration agreement in this case as part of a broader collective-bargaining contract covering Wright and his cohorts. That distinction, however, should not affect the enforceability of the agreement. For, as we show below, an arbitration agreement entered into on behalf of employees by their duly chosen collective- bargaining agent is binding on the individuals the union represents, just as if they had signed the agree- ment themselves. Gilmer was an action to enforce an arbitration agreement under the FAA, but collectively-bargained arbitration agreements also are enforceable under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. In Section 301 cases, this Court has long held that union-represented employees may not sue in court on claims raising issues covered by a preclude waivers of judicial remdies under that statute. Id. at 26-36. As discussed infra p. 13, a similar analysis of the Americans with Disabilities Act—the statute on which peti- tioner Wright bases his claim in this case—not only shows it to be devoid of any evidence of congressional intent to pre- clude such waivers, but in fact contains an express congres- sional endorsement of arbitration. 4 As the court below noted, the agreement in this case re- quired arbitration of “all matters affecting wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” (Pet. App. at 4a). In similarly broad language, the agreement in Gilmer required arbitration of “any dispute, claim or controversy” arising out of Gilmer’s employment. 500 U.S. at 23. 11 collective-bargaining agreement that contains a griev- ance and arbitration procedure, at least without ex- hausting that procedure first. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967). Thus, the deci- sion of the court below holding that Wright’s failure to pursue his claim through the contractual griev- ance procedure barred his suit in court is consistent with well-established labor law principles. B. An Arbitration Agreement Negotiated and Exe- cuted by a Duly-Selected Collective-Bargaining Agent Is Binding on the Employees on Whose Behalf It Was Made Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLHA), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), provides that “[r]epre- sentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in re- spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. That sec- tion embodies two of the NLRA’s most important, cen- tral concepts. First, it establishes the principle of exclusive representation—i.e., that a union chosen 5 A proviso to this section states that “any individual em- ployee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargain- ing representative, as long as the adjustment is not incon- sistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect.” A further proviso requires that the bargaining representative be given an opportunity to be pres- ent at such adjustment.” 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a). 12 by the majority of the employees in an appropriate unit is the sole bargaining agent for all the employees in the unit. Second, it defines the scope of such an agent’s authority broadly to encompass all matters relating to “terms or conditions of employment.” Within that broad ambit, the union can enter into agreements that are binding not only on itself and the employer, but on all the employees in the unit it rep- resents. See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944). With respect to such matters, the employer is prohibited from dealing directly with employees, or with any other agent on their behalf. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). It has long been recognized that a procedure for resolving employment-related complaints or disputes is a matter falling squarely within the ambit of “terms or conditions of employment.” See United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941); WJA Realty Ltd. Partnership, 308 N.L.R.B. 728 (1992). Indeed, a leading labor law treatise includes grievance and arbitration procedures in a list of topics that “are now so clearly recognized to be mandatory subjects of bargaining that no dis- cussion is required.” The Developing Labor Law 885, 885 n. 192 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992). Con- sequently, application of long-settled NLRA princi- ples dictates the conclusion that the choice of the forum for resolving any employment-related claims petitioner Wright or his unit colleagues might raise was an issue on which their union, as their exclusive bargaining agent, could make a binding, enforceable contractual commitment on their behalf. 13 To rule otherwise would destroy the mutuality of obligations on which collective bargaining depends. In labor contracts, a provision for arbitration of dis- putes typically is a quid pro quo for a no-strike/no- lockout clause. Together these provisions are the keys to industrial peace. As such, they are among the most important forms of consideration the parties exchange in entering into such agreements. If an employer cannot enforce a collectively-bargained agreement that all employment-related claims and disputes will be submitted to arbitration, the empoyer plainly will have been denied the benefit of its bargain. Wright and his amici, however, urge this Court, in effect, to carve out an exception to these bedrock NLRA principles. They ask the Court to rule that even if a union is an employee’s duly-chosen, exclu- sive bargaining agent, the union cannot consent on the employee’s behalf to an agreement requiring the employee to submit statutory claims to arbitration. Such a rule would create an anomaly in employment law. It effectively would deny union-represented em- ployees and their employers any practical way to do what the unrepresented employee in Gilmer and his employer did with this Court’s subsequent approval— that is, to trade [] the procedures and opportunities for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, infor- mality, and expedition of arbitration” as the means of resolving statutory claims. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31, quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). Gilmer recognizes that such agreements are entirely legitimate and enforceable when entered into between an individual and employer. In a unionized setting, however, individual employees ordinarily cannot enter 14 into such agreements with their employer on their own behalf, because the employer cannot by-pass the union and deal directly with employees on a manda- tory subject of collective bargaining without violating the NLRA. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); Fairhaven Properties, 314 N.L.R.B. 763 (1994). Consequently, collective bar- gaining is the only way in which union-represented employees ordinarily can trade the procedures of the courtroom for the more efficient, less costly processes of arbitration. Under the rule petitioner seeks in this case, how- ever, employers would have little or no incentive to agree to collectively-bargained arbitration procedures covering statutory claims, because the petitioner’s rule would make such agreements unenforceable against individuals who assert such claims. This Court should reject such an anomalous rule and hold instead, in keeping with long-established NLRA prin- ciples, that an arbitration agreement executed by an employee’s duly-chosen, exclusive bargaining repre- sentative is binding on the employee and enforceable like any other contract, just as if the individual signed it personally. Il. STRONG FEDERAL POLICIES FAVOR THE EN- FORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVELY-BARGAINED AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE EMPLOYMENT- RELATED DISPUTES, INCLUDING STATUTORY CLAIMS A. Enforcement of Agreements to Submit Statutory Claims to Arbitration Is Fully Consistent with the EEO Laws’ Policy of Protecting Individuals Against Discrimination As this Court recognized in Gilmer, strong federal policies support the enforcement of private agree- agreemen Id. at 24, 33. In the context of collective bargaining, additional strong policy support for enforcement of Furthermore, the statute under which petitioner Wright asserted his claim in this case—the Ameri- cans with Disabilities Act—expressly declares that: Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including . . . arbitration, is encour- aged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter. 42 U.S.C. § 12212. Thus, Congress not only has not expressed an intent to preclude enforcement of agree- ments to arbitrate claims arising under the ADA, but has expressed affirmative support for arbitration as a means of resolving such disputes. Significantly, Congress enacted the legislation adding this language to the ADA after this Court handed down its deci- sion in Gilmer." United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 7 The above-quoted language of 42 U.S.C. § 12212 was added to the ADA as Section 110 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081, which Con- 16 Petitioner and his amici would have this Court treat these strong federal policies favoring enforce- ment of arbitration agreements—as well as the inter- reiated NLRA policies of majority rule and exclusive representation—as all being secondary in importance to the EEO laws’ policy of protecting individuals against discrimination. But their argument poses a false dichotomy. There is no need to decide in this case which of these federal policies is the more im- portant—or to subordinate one statute’s policies to another’s—because there is no inherent conflict be- tween them. For the individual rights guaranteed under the EEO laws can be effectuated just as suc- cessfully by enforcing agreements to arbitrate as by allowing individuals direct access to the courts. As this Court has recognized, an agreement to ar- bitrate statutory claims does not amount to a waiver of any of the substantive rights guaranteed to in- dividuals under the EEO laws. It merely submits to a different forum for their resolution. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. An arbitrator can enforce substan- tive statutory rights as effectively as a judge or jury, and in most cases more quickly and efficiently. This is equally true whether the agreement to arbitrate was made directly by the individual, or by a union on behalf of a group of employees that selected it as their bargaining agent.“ gress passed on October 30, 1991, and President Bush signed into law on November 21, 1991. Thus, Gilmer had been the law of the land for over five months when Congress’ endorsed arbitration as a means of resolving ADA disputes [where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law.” It also is equally true whether the statutory rights in- volved arise from the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 17 Furthermore, even if, contrary to this Court’s ob- servation in Gilmer, a union’s agreement to substitute arbitration for courtroom adjudication of statutory claims could properly be characterized as a waiver of individuals’ substantive statutory rights, that would not provide a valid ground for denying en- forcement of such agreements. For this Court has held that, when employees select a union to represent them, they invest the union with power to waive their statutory rights through the collective bargain- ing process. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705 (1983). Indeed, in that case the Court made clear that this authority includes the power to waive not only statutory rights that are col- lective in nature, such as the right to strike and the right to refuse to cross picket lines, but also to waive protected rights that are individual in nature. Id. at 706-07. As this Court recognized in Metropolitan Edison, federal labor law contains a built-in safeguard against any danger that a union’s exercise of the authority to waive the rights of those it represents might somehow diminish the substantive protection afforded them by statutes. That protection lies in the duty of fair representation which the law im- poses on a union serving as a bargaining agent. Id. at 706 n.11 (“[T]he National Labor Relations Act contemplates that individual rights may be waived by the union so long as the union does not breach its duty of good-faith representation.”). See also Air § 78j (b); the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; or Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) ; or the federal equal employment opportunity laws. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, and cases there cited. 18 Line Pilots Ass’n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). Thus, there is no inconsistency between the EEO laws’ goal of protecting individuals against discrimination in employment and the labor laws’ policy of allowing a majority-selected bargaining agent to select the pro- cedural forum in which disputes over such rights will be resolved. B. Federal Policies Favoring Enforcement of Volun- tary Agreements to Arbitrate Must Prevail Over Outmoded Suspicion of Arbitration Petitioner and his amic: argue that this Court’s decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), requires reversal of the Fourth Cir- cuit’s decision in this case. Contrary to their conten- tions, however, Alexander does not preclude enforce- ment of a collectively-bargained agreement requiring submission of statutory discrimination claims to ar- bitration. Alexander simply does not address that issue. It merely holds that when an arbitrator has rendered a decision based on wholly contractual claims, that decision does not bar a subsequent Title VII suit to enforce statutory claims. The Court in Alexander observed that contractual rights and statu- tory rights “have legally independent origins and are equally available to the aggrieved employee.” 415 U.S. at 52. It stressed that the arbitrator in that ease was “confined to the interpretation of the col- lective bargaining agreement.” Id. at 53. Thus, Alexander turned on a distinction between contractual claims, which were covered by the appli- cable arbitration agreement in that case, and statu- tory claims, which were not. Id. at 52-53. It did not 19 address situations like the one in this case, in which an arbitration agreement plainly covers statutory as well as contractual discrimination claims. As the Fourth Circuit noted in Austin, this fact alone dis- tinguishes Alexander, 78 F.3d at 883 n.2. Furthermore, as this Court expressly recognized in Gilmer, Alexander’s marked distrust of labor arbi- tration as an adequate forum for resolving statutory discrimination claims is out of step with the Court’s recent holdings. 500 U.S. at 34 n.5. In light of to- day’s realities, courts simply cannot afford to fore- close the alternative of arbitration. Since 1974, when Alexander was decided, cases filed in the federal courts have increased by over 150 percent.’ Statistics with respect to employment cases are even more glar- ing. Between 1969 and 1990, employment claims filed in federal court increased by over two thousand per- cent. Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 61 (1990). Since 1990, the number of such claims has tripled.” To compound matters, increases in the total number of federal judgeships have not kept pace with court filings. In 1974, the number of cases filed per district court judgeship was 358. By 1997, that figure had risen to 480." Even these dramatic numbers do not tell the full story, however. As Chief Justice Warren Burger rec- Source: Statistics Division, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. 10 Source: Statistics Division, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. 11 Source: Statistics Division, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. 20 ognized some 17 years ago, people's patience with the judicial system is wearing thin.” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 752 (1981 ) (dissenting opinion). Thus, as Chief Jus- tice Burger put it, a holding that limits enforceability of a voluntary agreement to arbitrate statutory claims “runs counter to every study and every exhortation of the Judiciary, the Executive, and the Congress urging the establishing of reasonable mechanisms to keep matters of this kind out of the courts.” Id. Arbitration provides an extrajudicial means by which disputes that typically arise in the employment setting can be resolved in a more efficient and less expensive manner, without further burdening our overcrowed court system. The reasons favoring arbitration are as wise as they are obvious: litigation is costly and time consuming, and more importantly to the point in this case, judges are less adapted to the nuances of the disputes that typically arise in shops and factories than shop stewards, business agents, and managerial supervisors .... By bringing to- gether persons actually involved in the work- place, often assisted by a neutral arbitrator ex- perienced in such matters, disputes are resolved swiftly and cheaply. This mechanism promotes industrial harmony and avoids strikes and con- flicts, it provides a swift, fai and inexpensive remedy. Id. at 747-48. “Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act to help legitimate arbitration and make it more read- ily useful to disputants. The hope has long been that the Act could serve as therapy for the ailment of the 21 crowded docket.” Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (Ist Cir. 1989). Viewing the strong endorsements of arbitration by Congress and this Court against the ominous backdrop of the cur- rent, overwhelming federal caseload, such “therapy” is more appropriate and necessary now than ever. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the amici curiae respectfully submit that the court of appeals’ decision dismissing petitioner Wright’s Americans with Dis- abilities Act lawsuit because of his failure to submit his claims to arbitration as required by the collective- bargaining agreement should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, JEFFREY A. BERMAN ROBERT E. WILLIAMS * SIDLEY & AUSTIN ANN ELIZABETH REESMAN 555 West Fifth Street DANIEL V. YAGER Los Angeles, CA 90018-1010 McGUINEsS & WILLIAMS (213) 896-6000 1015 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Attorney for Amicus Curiae Suite 1200 Employers Group Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 789-8600 Attorneys for Amici Curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council and Labor Policy Association * Counsel of Record --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0141%3A16. Public record. Not legal advice.