# Amicus Curiae Brief — Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0115%3A10

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 523 U.S. 637

## Text

MOTION FILED ;
sep 17 1997. 3

No. 97-300

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997

TERRY STEWART, Director,
Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

RAMON MARTINEZ-VILLAREAL,

Respendeni.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KENT S. SCHEIDEGGER
Criminal Justice Legal Fdn.
2131 L Street

Sacramento, CA 95816
Telephone: (916) 446-0345

Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Do the limitations on second and successive petitions in

28 U. S. C. §2244(b) apply to competency for execution
claims?

2. Would applying the Act to prevent consideration of a
claim of incompetency for execution, which is raised in a
second or successive habeas corpus petition, constitute a
violation of the Suspension Clause?

3. By what means can this Court review these issues?

4. Does a federal habeas court have subject matter jurisdic-
tion to determine competency for execution?

(i)

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997

TERRY STEWART, Director,
Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

RAMON MARTINEZ-VILLAREAL,
Respondent.

MOTION OF AMICUS CURIAE FOR LEAVE
TO FILE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2, the Criminal Justice

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

of the accused into balance with the rights of the victim and of
society to rapid, efficient and reliable determination of guilt and
swift execution of punishment.

iv

The Ninth Circuit’s evasion of the successive petition limits
established by Congress is contrary to the rights of victims and
society which CJLF was formed to advance.

For the foregoing reasons, amicus requests leave to file its

brief.
September, 1997
Respectfully submitted,
KENT S. SCHEIDEGGER
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Crantodl hodes Leal Poondation

ooo coebesebehovtcccnancs

The decision in this case is not distinguishable from
the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Davis on any

EEE EE
Ill

A habeas court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review

competency to be executed ...... 26... 2...

(v)

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 , 66 L. Ed. 2d 308,

DGS BGR Gee coccbtoesceachecseescacsccs 10
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534,

89 L. Ed. 2d 501, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986) ............ 6
Edwards v. Balisok, 137 L. Ed. 2d 906, 117 S. Ct. 1584

|, PPPPPPP PTT eee 9
Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. (28 U. S.) 193, 7 L. Ed. 650

Pers eee 9
Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund,

513 U. S. 88, 130 L. Ed. 2d 439,

SESE Gh Ser ee dchicocccsccncsedscccsccces: 8
Felker v. Turpin, 135 L. Ed. 2d 827, 116 S. Ct. 2333

GP ccccceccstcedeteudetebaeesbeasstcccceces 9
Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F. 3d 301 (CA9 1996) ............. 9
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335,

106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986) . 2... ccc cece 9, 10
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 36 L. Ed. 2d 488,

SD Ge Ee 06 we Gatieee oc cmenccessicceces 11
Gomez v. Fierro, 136 L. Ed. 2d 204, 117 S. Ct. 285

GORUED 0 000000000006064shenbenehimenennesanes 9
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383,

BOOE, GR BO wcvecdceccsescvcccsccess 9,10
Hill v. Martin, 296 U. S. 393, 80 L. Ed. 293,

, BE Ga bo cn ekereiscdedecccccessocsn 10

In re Davis, No. 97-00312, 1997 U. S. App. LEXIS 22736
OE, Ree TE Ri ois vcdccaveccdanbatahtnce 7,8

vii

In re Medina, 109 F. 3d 1556 (CA11 1997)............. 8

Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 72 L. Ed. 2d 492, 102 S. Ct. 2099

EEN TEE eT RISES TPN ES a s
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 129 L. Ed. 2d 775,

ESE Se 5
Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260,

ERR ET y
Martinez- Villareal v. Arizona, 137 L. we. 28 1044,

Ne ee cceécccce 3
Martinez-Villareal v. Arizona, 474 U. S. 975,

88 L. Ed. 2d 324, 106 S. Ct. 339 (1985) ............. l
Martinez-Villareal v. Arizona, 493 U. S. 874,

107 L. Ed. 2d 158, 110 S. Ct. 205 (1989) ............ 2
Martinez-Villareal v. Arizona, 506 U. S. 893,

121 L. Ed. 2d 196, 113 S. Ct. 267 (1992) ............ 2
Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F. 3d 1301

Citi’. encemineanebesb 6codbeee ce 1,2
Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517,

EE Wide Ra dubieebddéccocccesoce 3
Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F. 3d 628

tee wu duiddeb0d6b00 00 ce. 3, 5,7,8
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597,

Eg tn ‘

State v. Martinez-Villareal, 702 P. 2d 670 (Ariz. 1985) ... 1

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989) ............ 8

viii

Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669,

O1 B. Ce. PAS CIGTE) . .nccccccccccccccccsescccees 10
Rule of Court
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22(a@) .......5seeeeeeeeeeeeeees 5
United States Statutes

2B U. BC. BIBSS .ccsccccccdvccccsvescccccccccsce 6
WU. B.C. GIBBAE) . oc cccccvccscccsvcccsccvesoves 4
BU. B.C. GIBGIED on ccccccccccceseccsccsecccesds 6
2B U. B.C. GATED... oc vcvcvcccccccccccecccvevccees 10
2B U. B.C: GABOGED 2 ncecccsccrcccccccccccscceseons 6
28 U.S. C. §2244(b)(3M(E) .. 66. cece eee ee ee eens 5
BOGGS. GID cccccecccvccccccccvcessceseceses 6
2B U. S.C. SA2SAM) . nc cccccvccccccccccsccececvess 6
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,

Pub. L.. Mo. 106-192 0... ccccccccccccccccesceces 3,6

State Statutes
Ariz Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4021 ..........6- cece eens 3
Ariz Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4022 .......... 0s cece ee eeee 3
Ariz Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4023 ...... 6.6. - cece e ee eeee 3
Ariz Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4024 ....... 6.62 ee cece eeees 3
Treatise

17 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and

Procedure (2d ed. 1988) ..... 2.0.62 cece cece eee eeee 7

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1997

TERRY STEWART, Director
Arizona Department of ee nl et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.

RAMON MARTINEZ-VILLAREAL,

Respondent
SS
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SSS

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

Fifteen years ago, Ramon Martinez-Villareal murdered Jim
McGrew and Fernando Estrada.' He stated later that he killed
them “because of his pure balls, that he was very macho.” State
v. Martinez-Villareal, 702 P. 2d 670, 673 (Ariz. 1985). He was
convicted of these murders and sentenced to death. The
Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. /d., at 681, cert. denied sub
nom. Martinez-Villareal v. Arizona, 474 U. 8. 975 (1985).

Subsequent proceedings through April of 1996 are described
in the Ninth Circuit’s previous opinion, Martinez-Villareal v.
Lewis, 80 F. 3d 1301, 1304-1305 (1996):

1. Rule 37.6 Statement: This brief was written entirely by counsel for amicus, as
listed on the cover, and not by counsel for any party. No outside contributions
were made to the preparation or submission of this brief.

1. State post-conviction review (PCR), denied April 18,
1986.

2. State supreme court review of the denial, denied June 9,
1986.

3. A federal habeas petition, denied for containing unex-
hausted claims.

4. A second federal habeas petition, on which a stay of
execution was issued June 10, 1986 to exhaust state remedies.

5. A second state PCR, denied July 12, 1988.

6. Review of the second state PCR denied by the Arizona
Supreme Court.

7. Certiorari on the second state PCR, denied. Martinez-
Villareal v. Arizona, 493 U.S. 874 (1989).

8. A third federal habeas petition, including for the first
time a claim of incompetence to be executed, dismissed as
unexhausted in 1991.

9. A third state PCR, denied August 13, 1991. The
competency to be executed claim was denied on the ground that
PCR was not the correct procedure for such a claim. See 80
F. 3d, at 1307.

10. Review of the denial of the third state PCR, denied
April 7, 1992.

11. Certiorari on the third state PCR, denied October 5,
1992. Martinez-Villareal v. Arizona, 506 U. S. 893.

12. A fourth federal habeas petition, filed March 25, 1993.
denied relief on the guilt phase, granted relief on the penalty
phase, and held the incompetency claim to be premature. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed on guilt and reversed on penalty, thereby
reinstating the judgment. The competency holding had not been
challenged on appeal. 80 F. 3d, at 1309.

)
()

hy

13. This Court denied certiorari to review the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision December 9, 1996. Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis,
136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 117 S. Ct. 588.

14. This year, Martinez-Villareal finally invoked the
procedure established by Arizona for adjudicating competency
claims, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4021 to 13-4024. After four
days of testimony, the trial judge held he was competent.
Combined Alternative Petition 2.

15. On May 16, 1997, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld
this ruling. Jbid.

lo. The same day, the federal district court denied
Martinez-Villareal’s motion to reopen the prior habeas proceed-
ing, holding that such reconsideration was precluded by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-132. Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 628, 630
(CA9 1997) (per curiam).

17. On May 20, 1997, this Court denied certiorari to review
the state competency holding. Martinez-Villareal v. Arizona,
137 L. Ed. 2d 1044, 117 S. Ct. 1840 (1997).
Martinez-Villareal moved in the Ninth Circuit for permission to
file a successive habeas petition, 118 F. 3d, at 629, and pre-
sented an original habeas petition to Circuit Judge Nelson of
that court. Jd., at 634. The Ninth Circuit panel dismissed the
former as unnecessary and transferred the latter to the District
Court. Id., at 634-635.

Terry Stewart, Director of the Arizona Department of
Corrections, respondent in the court below, has petitioned this
Court for relief in several alternative forms, due to the uncer-
tainty as to which form is appropriate and available in this
situation.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioner has thoroughly presented the compelling case for
review of the judgment below. Amicus CJLF will therefore
limit this brief to three points, each of which requires only a
short discussion.

First, the order to be reviewed here is the Court of Appeals
transfer of the original habeas application to the District Court,
not its statement that permission to file in the District Court was
unnecessary. The order to be reviewed falls within this Court’s
ordinary statutory certiorari jurisdiction.

Second, the decision below is not distinguishable from the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Jn re Davis, filed after the filing of
the present petition, on any rational basis. The ground on which
Davis purported to distinguish the present case, that the inmate
did not include a competency claim in his first petition, when it
was unripe and could not be adjudicated, is a distinction without
a difference.

Third, a claim of incompetency to be executed is neither a
challenge to the fact or duration of custody nor an attack on the
underlying judgment, and a federal court in habeas corpus lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate it.

ARGUMENT

I. Certiorari is an appropriate procedure to review the
Ninth Circuit’s transfer order.

Petitioner has requested several different modes of review
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this matter. Although the
others are available if the Court deems necessary, amicus CJLF
submits that the regular statutory writ of certiorari, 28 U. S.C.
§ 1254(1), is available and preferable.

As petitioner notes, see Combined Alternative Petition 21-
22, the statutory prohibition on certiorari review of grant or
denial of leave to file a successive petition is inapplicable. The

Court of Appeals neither denied nor granted the inmate’s
request, but declared permission unnecessary. /d., at A-11; cf.
28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)(E). The key point, though, is not the
language of the opinion but the dispositive order of the Court of
Appeals. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1003, n. 5
(1994).

“[W]e dismiss as unnecessary Martinez-Villareal’s motion
for authorization to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the district court. We transfer the petition presented to
Judge D. W. Nelson on May 30, 1997 (Docket No. 97-
80249) to the district court pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
$2241(b).” Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F. 3d 628,
634-635 (CA9 1997).

The latter subsection reads: “The Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the
application for hearing and determination fo the district court

having jurisdiction to entertain it.” (Emphasis added.)

If 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)(A) applies and is jurisdictional,
as petitioner contends, then the transfer order was unauthorized.
Furthermore, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Congress amended Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 22(a) as follows:

“RULE 22. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS AND
SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS (Amended. }

“(a) Application for the Original Writ—An application
for a writ of habeas corpus shall be made to the appropriate
district court. If application is made to a circuit judge, the
application witt-ordinarily shall be transferred to the
appropriate district court. If an application is made to or
transferred to the district court and denied, renewal of the
application before a circuit judge ts-not-favored;the-proper
remedy-ts-by shall not be permitted. The applicant may,
pursuant to section 2253 of title 28, United States Code,

appeal to the appropriate court of appeals from the order of
the district court denying the writ.” (As amended Apr. 24,

1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 103, 110 Stat. 1218, deleted

language in strikeout, added language in italics.)

If the second sentence applies and is jurisdictional, as
amicus CJLF intends to argue if this case is accepted on the
merits, neither Judge Nelson nor the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to entertain the original writ petition at all. It
should never have been filed.

Where no exception applies, this Court has jurisdiction to
review via certiorari “[c]Jases in the courts of appeals ... (1)...
before or after rendition of a judgment or decree.” 28 U.S. C.
§ 1254; cf. id., § 1257(a) (state courts, final judgments only).
Certiorari jurisdiction thus turns on whether the case was “in”
the Court of Appeals. .

The first issue in this regard arises from the question of
whether the case was properly in the Court of Appeals. That is,
the successive petition limitations of the AEDPA are jurisdic-
tional, and the court of appeals had no authority to act on a
successive petition where their requirements were not met.

The rule on this issue is well settled. Where a lower court
wrongly exercises jurisdiction, this Court has certiorari jurisdic-
tion “not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting
the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.” Bender v.
Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 541 (1986)
(quoting United States v. Corrick, 298 U, S. 435, 440 (1936)).”

The second issue deals with the distinction between an
application filed with a circuit judge and one filed in the Court
of Appeals. Jurisdiction to entertain original habeas writs lies
with circuit judges, not courts of appeals. 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2241(a), 2254(a). From the final order of the circuit judge,
an appeal lies to the Court of Appeals. Jd., § 2253. Therefore,
there is no certiorari jurisdiction to directly review the order of

2. Corrick referred to appeal, rather than certiorari, but Bender applied its
principle to a certiorari case.

the circuit judge. 17 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4036, pp. 18-19 (2d ed. 1988).

In the present case, though, the Court of Appeals did not
judge, exercised jurisdiction over the petition and made the
transfer order. The case was therefore treated by the Court of
NS Sena Sales ungpey dae

Here again, the principle stated in Bender, supra, applies.
Whenever the Court of Appeals exercises jurisdiction, rightly
or wrongly, the case is “in” the court of appeals for the purpose
of this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction to review the jurisdictional
question. The Court of Appeals’ action of transferring this case
to the District Court without the finding required by 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(C) is reviewable in this Court on statutory certio-
rari under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

Il. he decision in this case is not
from the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Davis
on any rational basis.

Petitioner has already briefed the conflict between the
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, a conflict acknowledged by the
latter. See Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F. 3d 628, 632,
n. 4 (1997). Since the filing of the petition, the Fifth Circuit has
spoken on the question. Although the conflict is not as stark,
the Fifth Circuit case is not distinguishable on any rational

In re Davis, No. 97-00312, 1997 U. S. App. LEXIS 22736
(CA5, Aug. 27, 1997) was a motion for permission to file a
second habeas application based on a claim that petitioner was
incompetent to be executed. Jd.; at *2-*3.

Davis held that 28 U. S. C. §2244(b) applies to competency
claims and barred Davis’ claim. /d., at *11-*13. This was so
even assuming “that Davis is seeking to assert his Ford claim
at the first properly available opportunity.” Jd., at *12. Davis

also rejected the constitutional attack on the statute, following
In re Medina, 109 F. 3d 1556, 1564 (CA11 1997).

Davis noted the decision in the present case but purported
to distinguish it on the ground that Davis had not claimed
incompetence to be executed in his first petition, a petition filed
when execution was not imminent. 1997 U. S. App. LEXIS, at
*7-*8.

This purported distinction makes no sense. “The law does
not require the doing of a futile act.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S.
56, 74 (1980). If Davis and the present case are both correct,
then an inmate who files a pointless claim, which must be
dismissed, Martinez-Villareal, 118 F. 3d, at 633, in his first
federal petition gets a federal reconsideration of his competency
later, while the inmate who quite properly declines to file a
frivolous claim does not and is limited to state remedies. This
cannot be right. Such a rule would be irrational.

While Davis may have avoided a head-on collision with the
calls for resolution on certiorari. Two opinions which reach
opposite results on facts which make no rational difference
create an anomaly in the law just as bad, if not worse, than an
outright split of authority.

Ill. A habeas court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
review competency to be executed.

Questions of subject matter jurisdiction are not waivable
and must be considered sua sponte if not raised by the parties.
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxiies de
Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702 (1982). The fact that a court
exercised jurisdiction in a prior case without discussing the
issue does not establish a binding precedent that
exists. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 63,
n. 4 (1989); Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory
Fund, 513 U. S. 88, 97 (1994).

In Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F. 3d 301, 306 (CA9 1996), vacated
on other grounds in Gomez v. Fierro, 136 L. Ed. 2d 204, 117
S. Ct. 285 (1996), the Ninth Circuit held that method of
execution claims may be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
That decision undercuts the exercise of habeas jurisdiction in a
competency to be executed case.

The line between habeas and § 1983 has sharpened since
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986). Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U. S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 137 L. Ed. 2d
906, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997) strongly imply that the two
remedies are mutually exclusive. A challenge to the conviction
and sentence must be brought in habeas, and until it is set aside,
no action lies under § 1983 for a claim inconsistent with the
validity of the judgment. Heck, 512 U. S., at 486-487; Ea-
wards, 137 L. Ed. 2d, at 915, 117 S. Ct., at 1589.

The Ninth Circuit held in Fierro that method of execution
claims are analogous to conditions of confinement claims and
therefore may be brought as § 1983 actions, whereas habeas is
appropriate “whenever the requested relief requires as its
predicate a determination that a sentence currently being served
is invalid or unconstitutionally long.” 77 F. 3d, at 305 (quoting
Young y. Kenney, 907 F. 2d 874, 876 (CA9 1990)). If that is
correct, a competency-to-be-executed claim does not fall within
the habeas jurisdiction at all. Such a claim is neither an attack
on the legality of custody, the subject of habeas at common law,
see Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202 (1830), nor a collateral
attack on the criminal judgment, the typical function of the writ
today. See Felker v. Turpin, 135 L. Ed. 2d 827, 840, 116 S. Ct.
2333, 2340 (1996).

However, it does not follow that every death row inmate
could bypass state procedures and file his competency claim in
federal court. Substantively, Justice Marshall’s opinion in Ford
is only a plurality in parts III, 1V, and V. See Ford, 477 U. S.,
at 401. The controlling opinion is the one concurring in the
result on the “narrowest grounds.” See Marks v. United States,
430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977). Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Ford

10

states expressly that inadequacy of state remedies is an essential
element of Ford’s case, 477 U. S.. at 427 (opinion concurring in
the judgment in part), and Juice Powell’s opinion implies as
much. /d., at 427 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).

Procedurally, while §1983 suits are not subject to an
exhaustion requirement, Heck, supra, 512 U. S., at 489, they are
subject to the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401
U. S. 37 (1971). As a general rule, federal courts do not enjoin
ongoing state proceedings. /d., at 45. Ongoing proceedings
include execution of judgments. Hill v. Martin, 296 U. S. 393,
403 (1935) (under Anti-Injunction Act). The Full Faith and
Credit Act applies to § 1983 actions, giving state court judg-
ments the same preclusive effect as they would have in a
subsequent action in state court. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S.
90, 96 (1980); 28 U. S. C. § 1738.

Under this analysis, in any state which has an adequate
procedure for determining competency, the federal courts would
not interfere. They would either abstain under Younger or deny
relief on the ground that one of the elements of the claim,
inadequacy of state process, is missing. Once the state court
determines, with due process, that the inmate is indeed compe-
tent, that finding would be res judicata, and again the federal
court would not interfere. Federal intervention remains
available as a last resort where there is no adequate state
process. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 577
(1973).

They involve matters of life and death, and they go to one of the
most sensitive areas of relations between the state and federal
courts. They are worthy of this Court’s review.

CONCLUSION
A writ of certiorari should be granted.
September, 1997
Respectfully submitted,

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0115%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.