# Amicus Curiae Brief — Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0074%3A12

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1999
- **Citation:** 526 U.S. 66

## Text

a

Cee Sve r Pee ome
Supreme Court, U.°.
er ge PAE ae

JUL 2 1996
No. 96-1793

CLERK

In the
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1997

CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT ,
Petitioner
v.
GARRET F., A MINOR BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT
FRIEND, CHARLENE F.,
Respondent

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

GWENDOLYN H. GREGORY
Counsel of Record

P. O. Box 2298

Middleburg, VA 20118

(540) 687-3339

JULIE UNDERWOOD

General Counse!

National School Boards Association
1680 Duke Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

(703) 838-6710

Il. USE OF A STANDARD TO INTEPRET THE MEDICAL
SERVICES EXCLUSION THAT FOCUSES ON THE
INDIVIDUAL CASE AND CONSIDERS THE
CONSTANCY, COMPLEXITY AND CRITICAL NEED FOR
SERVICES IS CONSISTENT WITH STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY LANGUAGE, THIS COURT’S DECISIONS,
AGENCY INTERPRETATION AND THE APPROACH OF
A MAJORITY OF COURTS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED

C. The majority of courts addressing this issue have
used a multi-factor analySis..............:ececssceereseeeeseee 13

D. Interpretive letters from the Department of Education
support individualized determinations based on multi-
factor analysis to resolve the medical services
GRTBRIEEE NOTIND cncsccscessersesotiniabaithsnptiiicitseniaus cae 16

Ill. SCHOOL DISTRICTS CURRENTLY LACK ADEQUATE
SCHOOL NURSING SERVICES AND THE FINANCIAL
RESOURCES TO EMPLOY THE ADDITIONAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS NECESSARY TO FULFILL THE
LOWER COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE MEDICAL
SER VD MR AON sn sescscnocmnasstnactienibaienmbbendapibida ta 17

IV. SCHOOL DISTRICTS CANNOT SHOULDER THE
ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL STRAIN THAT THE LOWER
COURT’S DECISION WOULD IMPOSE GIVEN THE
ALREADY BURDENSOME COST OF SPECIAL
EFA, Fie corcevsesensinseiecneisitinnsessheassandasantieialiian ae taaae at 24

CONC IIIUIN «.:.2:10- 20 U.S.C. §

* The regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 300.5, and the statute, 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(25), define assistive technology device as “any item, piece
of equipment or product system whether acquired commercially off
the shelf, modified, or customized, that is used to increase,
maintain, or improve the functional capabilities of children with
disabilities.” See Elena Gallegos, The Impact of Assistive
Technology Devices on Special Education, Related Services and
Program Modifications, in SCHOOL LAW IN REVIEW 7-1 (NSBA
1995), for a more detailed discussion of this topic.

9

1401(a)(25), (26), and transition services,’ 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(19), to the statute. In 1997 Congress amended the IDEA
related services definition to include orientation and mobility
services. Pub. L. 105-17, Title I, § 602, 111 Stat. 42, to be
codified at 20 U.S.C.§ 1401(a)(22). In none of these instances has
it changed or clarified the original exclusionary language which
limits medical services owed to children served under the IDEA to
those necessary for evaluation and diagnostic purposes.

The definition of medical services is the focus of this case.
The regulations specifically list “school health services” and
“medical services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes” in the
examples of related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a) “School health
services” are defined as “services provided by a qualified school
nurse or other qualified person.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(11)

“Medical services” are defined as “services provided by a licensed

* Transition service includes “post-secondary education, vocational!
training, integrated employment (including supported
employment), continuing and adult education, adult services,
independent living, or community participation.” 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(19).

10

physician to determine a child’s medically related disability that
results in the child’s need for special education and related
services.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4). Thus, neither the statute nor
the regulations define excluded medical services.

Related services, thus, cover a myriad of support services,
as determined to be necessary for a student with disabilities to
benefit from special education. Only medical services and
individually prescribed equipment are excluded.

B. This Court’s decision in Tatro does not compel use of
the bright line physician/non-physician standard.

This Court in Irving Independent School District v. Tatro.

468 U.S. 883 (1984), devised a three-part test to determine whether

* Note also that the components of room and board plus
transportation to and from a residential placement can also be
considered a “related service.” As put by one court, “That
residential placement as sought by Douglas and Christopher may
be available as a ‘related service’ under the Act is indisputable; . ..
if residential placement is necessary in order for Douglas and
Christopher to receive any educational benefits from special
education, then under the EHA, the District must pay for the cost
of that placement.” Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107 (N_D. Cal. 1982).

ll

a school district is required to provide a particular service to a
student as a related service: (1) the child must be “handicapped”
SO as to require special education; (2) the service must be necessary
for the child to benefit from his or her special education; and (3)
the service cannot be specifically excluded, i.e., medical or
individually prescribed equipment.

Applying this three part test, this Court in Tatro found
clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) to be a related service, not
within the “medical service” exclusion. It promised this
conclusion on the fact that “CIC is analogous to the type of service
that school nurses have traditionally provided to students.” Tatro,
468 U.S. at 893 — 94.

While one could conclude that Congress wanted “to spare
schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well
prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their
competence...,” Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892 - 93, it was also logical to
conclude that “Congress intended to impose the obligation to

provide school nursing services.” Jd. This Court did state that

12

services which must be provided by a physician are necessarily
medical services. However, it did not necessarily limit medical
services to only those provided by a physician and thus left the
door open for consideration of other factors in making that
determination. Jd. at 894. This distinction was drawn by the
Ninth Circuit: “The Court held only that services which must be
provided by a licensed physician, other than those which are
diagnostic or evaluative, are excluded and that school nursing
services of a simple nature are not excluded.” Clovis Unified
School Dist. v. California Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635
(9" Cir. 1990).

G The majority of courts addressing this issue have used a
multi-factor analysis.

Several other courts have had to address services of a more
complex nature than those at issue in Tatro. In these cases courts ,
based on the concerns expressed by this Court in Tatro, have
crafted a definition of an excluded medical service by examining

the complexity, frequency, and emergency nature of the services

—

13

provided. E.g., Detsel v. Board of Educ. of Auburn, 82\’ F.2d 587
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 981 (1987); Granite School
District v. Shannon M., 787 F.Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992),
Macomb County Intermediate School District v. Joshua S., 715 F.
Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Bevin H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 7!
(W.D. Pa. 1987). 4

In Detsel v. Board of Educ. of Auburn Enlarged City
School Dist., 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
981 (1987), the court held that constant respiratory assistance was a
“medical service” and thus not required from the school district. In
Clovis Unified School Dist. v. California Office of Admin.
Hearings, 903 F.2d 635 (9" Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an emotionally disturbed students’ temporary
hospitalization was a “medical service” and thus not the
responsibility of the school district. In Neely v. Rutherford County
School, 68 F.3d 965 (6" Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1134
(1996), the court rejected the argument that constant respirator

care for a student was a related service under IDEA. These

14

decisions are consistent with other lower court decisions and state
rulings. E£.g., Fulginiti v. Roxbury Tp. Public Schools, 921 F.
Supp. 1320 (D.N.J. 1996), aff'd, 116 F.3d 468 (3 Cir. 1997):
Ellison v. Board of Educ. of Three Village Central School Dist.,
597 N.Y.S.2d 483 (App. Div. 1993); Granite School Dist. v.
Shannon M., 787 F.Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992); Spencerport
Central School Dist., 16 EHLR 1042 (N.Y. Comim’r Educ. 1990);
Glen Rock Board of Educ. 16 EHLR 1102 (N.J. Admin L.J. 1990).
Contra Macomb County Intermediate School Dist. v. Joshua S.,
715 F.Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Morton Community Unit
School Dist. No. 709 v. J.M., 986 F. Supp. 1112 (C.D. Ill. 1997);

Skelly v. Brookfield LaGrange Park School Dist., %8 F. Supp. 385
(N.D. Ill. 1997).

15

D. Interpretive letters from the Department of Education
support individualized determinations based on a multi-factor
analysis to resolve the medical services exclusion issue.

The Department of Education has addressed the issue as
well, in responses to inquiries. Continuing the policy of the statute

to make individualized determinations of a student’s needs the

Department stated:

A threshold issue raised by your inquiry is whether
“one-to-one nursing services” to enable a disabled student
to attend school would be considered an eligible “school
health service”, or an excluded “medical service” because
the services are for purposes other than those that are
“diagnostic and evaluative in nature.” 34 C.F.R.
300.16(b)(4) and (b)(11). Courts that have addressed this
issue have reached differing conclusions based on factors
such as the nature and intensity of the nursing services
required for a particular student and the level of skill
required of the individual performing the services. If the
care required is intermittent and could be provided by a
regular school nurse, courts have generally held that the
service is an eligible related service. . . . However, if the
care required is continuous, courts relying on the private
duty aspect of the services, generally have held that the
service is an excluded medical service. [citations omitted]

Hehir Letter to Anderson, 211 EHLR 392 (June 24, 1986).
Use of a standard which focuses on the individual case and

takes into consideration the constancy, complexity and critical need

16

for the services is not in violation of this Court’s ruling in Tatro
and would be consistent with the interpretation of the statute, the
agency and a majority of the courts who have addressed this issue.
Applying such a standard this Court could find that the constant,
complex, critical medical care of the student in this case is an
excluded medical services despite the fact that it does riot have to
be performed by a physician. As Petitioner’s brief clearly
demonstrates, case law and regulations in other contexts support
the notion that medical services are not limited to those which
must be performed by a physician.

Ill. SCHOOLS CURRENTLY LACK ADEQUATE SCHOOL
NURSING SERVICES AND THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES
TO EMPLOY THE ADDITIONAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS NECESSARY TO FULFILL THE

LOWER COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE
MEDICAL SERVICES EXCLUSION.

The question of who must provide health related services
often raises concerns. It is not clear that the statute and regulations
would base the mandate of services totally on the title of the
individual se:vice provider. A comment to the regulations states:

There are certain kinds of services that might be provided
17

by persons from varying professional backgrounds and with

a variety of operational titles, depending upon requirements

in individual States. For example, counseling services

might be provided by social workers, psychologists, or
guidance counselors; and psychological testing might be
done by qualified psychological examiners, psychometrists,
or psychologists, depending upon State standards.

34 C.F.R. § 300.16 Note.

In Tatro this Court indicated that school districts should not
have to provide services that are “beyond the range of their
competence” and have never been “part of the educational system.”
Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892 - 93.°

Cedar Rapids is a moderately large district with about
18,000 students, and might be able to muster the financial and
human resources to undertake the lower court’s mandate. It must
be noted that it is not a “typical” school district. Eighty-eight

percent of the 15,000 school districts in this country have less than

5,000 students, and 30% have less than 500 students. U. S.

* A broader question relevant to this case was raised during oral arguments in
Tatro : “Well my question really is will the school have to employ somebody
that they ordinarily wouldn't employ in order to carry out this procedure?”
question from Justice White, Trans. of Oral Argument, p. 20, lines 2-4.

“Well, if there were a school nurse in the building, that would solve the problem
wouldn't it?” Jd. at p. 23 1.7 -9.

Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Common Core of Data, 1995-96. These small school districts also
fall under the mandate of this Court. They typically lack the
specialized staff and resources to perform complex constant health
services. Additionally, because of the economies of scale, costs in
smaller districts will generally be even higher than those faced by
larger districts such as Cedar Rapids.

The array of services currently provided by school nurses

been set forth in the literature. See table below:

19

School Health Services

Administration of first aid
Administration of medication
Alcohol/drug screening
Formal cardiovascular screenings
Child abuse evaluation and follow-up
Prenatal testing
Health risk appraisal
Development of health component of IEP
Development of health component of IFSP
Evaluation for emotional/behavioral problems
Dental services
Tube feedings
Irrigations
Monitoring vital signs
Clean dressing changes
Sterile dressing changes
Collection/testing of blood samples
Administration or monitoring oxygen
Urinary catheterization
Physical exams
Processing Workmen’s Compensation claims
School-based alcohol/drug treatment
Case management for chronic health problems
Complex nursing care to students with special health needs
Employee wellness programs
Annual physical exams and other primary health care services
Family counseling
Immunizations at school
Mental health counseling
Nutrition counseling
Physical fitness screenings
Screening (height, weight, vision, hearing)
Obtaining throat cultures

66 Journal of School Health 55,57 (February 1996).

20

This listing should not be construed as an itemization of the
services traditionally or typically provided by school nurses. While
some of them, such as administration of basic first aid and
medication, are common services routinely provided by school
nurses, others reflect the increasing responsibilities being foisted
upon schools to cope with the health needs of children to an extent
that far outstrips the historic educational mission of schools.

Most school districts do not currently employ enough
school nurses with sufficient expertise to provide complex constant
medical services, nor do most have the resources to employ full-
time school nurses assigned to only one school, much less one
student. In fact it is most common for a district to employ a few
nurses who are shared among a number of buildings.

In 1994, approximately 31,000 school nurses were
employed within the over 15,000 public school districts
nationwide. On the average, the national ratio of schoo! nurses to
students is 1:3,098 with the lowest average ratio in New

Hampshire (1:486) and the highest in Tennessee (1:10,814). Nat’!

21

Assoc. of School Nurses, National Survey of School Nurses (1995).
Unfortunately these data indicate that “the states with the fewest
nurses in schools are frequently also struggling to cope with thte
highest rates of poverty and growing student health needs.” Annie
E. Casey Foundation, Kids Count (1994).

This is compounded by the fact that not all school nurses
would be able to perform the tasks required. The Journal of
School Health reported in a survey of school districts, mostly with
larger enrollments, that 91% employ some type of nursing staff.
Most of these districts employ registered nurses, however, 36% of
these districts indicated that the R.N. was the coordinator of the
school health program. Thus, even if there were an R.N. on staff,
that individual would not necessarily be available to provide direct
services to students -- let alone constant services for one student.
Further, 30.7% of the districts report using health assistants, with
only 9.6% of these being certified health assistants. 66 Journal of
School Health, at 57. Clearly, schools could not rely on the current

work force employed to provide the constant, complex nursing

22

services at issue in this case, nor the full range of services that
would be mandated by the lower court’s bright line standard.

When one considers the full range of complex medical
services which schools may be forced to provide if the Eighth’s
Circuit’s ruling is upheld, the costs become overwhelming.
Further, it is not just the direct costs providing the related services,
but also the indirect burdens that attend them which concern schoo]
districts. Liability insurance and related needs cause costs to build
further. This would be inconsistent with this Court’s finding that
Congress did not impose “a burden of unspecified proportions and
weight” when it enacted IDEA. Tatro, 458 U.S. at 190 n.11

To provide a wide range of medical services, other
programs -- direct educational programs — may be sacrificed. If so,
the original intent of IDEA, to provide an education for children
with disabilities, may ultimately suffer. As discussed by Petitioner,
congressional intent is clear that local school board resources were
intended to focus on educational costs and other governmental

agencies were not relieved of their responsibility to provide

23

medical services.°

IV. SCHOOL DISTRICT BUDGETS CANNOT SHOULDER
THE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL STRAIN THAT THE
LOWER COURT’S DECISION WOULD IMPOSE GIVEN

THE ALREADY BURDENSOME COST OF SPECIAL
EDUCATION

The court of appeals grossly misinterpreted the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act. If this ruling is allowed to stand,
it will impose on school district who have met their obligations
under the IDEA a substantial financial burden not contemplated by
Congress and one that they can ill afford given the already
tremendous costs of special education.

The obligation under the IDEA to educate children with
disabilities is an enormously expensive proposition paid for
primarily with state and local tax dollars. Since its original
enactment, the costs have continually grown, more than doubling

in one decade. In 1982, special education expenditures were

° Congress specifically stated that “medical services” were the responsibility of
other governmental agencies:
Nothing in this title permits a State to reduce medical and other
assistance available, or to alter eligibility, under Titles V and XIX of
the Social Security Act with respect to the provision of a free
appropriate public education for children with disabilities in the State.
24

$11.75 billion. In the 1992-93 school year, these costs rose to
more than $24.25 billion. U.S. Department of Education, /6th
Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. In the 1993-94 school
year, special education costs continued to rise to more than $32
billion. T. Parrish, Special Education Finance Past, Present and
Future (Center for Special Education Finance, 1996).

Local school boards have struggled to meet these rising
costs. One report estimates that between 1967 and 1991 the
percentage of school spending on regular education declined from
80% to 59% of total education dollars, while the percentage spent
on special education during that time frame increase from 4% to
17%. Of net new money spent on education in 1991, regular
education received 26% in contrast to 38% expended for special
education. Rothstein, R. & K. Miles, Where's the Money Gone?
Changes in the Level and Composition of Education Spending 7-8

(Economic Policy Institute 1995). This escalation has caused grave

20 U.S.C. §1412(e) .

problems for public education. We, in a sense, have been forced
“to rob Peter to pay Paul.”

The differences between average per pupil expenditures in
regular and special education is staggering. Average per pupil
spending in the U.S. for 1994 was $5,325; and $5,483 in lowa.
National Center for Educational Statistics, Common Core of Data
(1997). It is generally calculated that spending on special
education is 2.28 times the spending on regular education. Center
for Special Education, What Are We Spending on Special
Education in the U.S. (Feb. 1998). This would bring the national
average expenditure on special education during that year to
$12,141 per pupil and Iowa’s to $12,501. Here, Respondents are
requesting that the school district assume an additional expense of
$20,000 to $30,000 annually on this child alone. Pet. App. 53a.

In enacting the IDEA, Congress recognized the limited
financial resources available to state and local education agencies
to develop programs for children with disabilities. When IDEA
was passed in 1975, Congress made a commitment to provide

26

states with 40% of the national average per pupil expenditure for
each eligible child to be used to defray the “excess cost” associated
with meeting the educational needs of children with disabilities.

Unfortunately, Congress has never even come close to
meeting that promise. Funding for the program has never exceeded
12% of the national average per pupil expenditure. U.S.
Department of Education, Justification of Appropriations Estimate
to the Congress Fiscal Year 1993 (1992). In fact, as can be seen
from the table below, the federal share of special education costs
has been declining while the local school district share has grown.
This percentage of burden is compounded by the increased costs
noted above.

FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL SHARES OF

SPECIAL EDUCATION SPENDING
Federal State Share Local
Share Share
1982-83 School Year 8.3% 53.8% 37.9%
1987-88 School Year 7.8% 56.0% 36.2%
1993-94 School Year 7.1% 44.0% 49.0%

Sources: The 1982-83 data are from the U.S. Department of
Education, Office of Special Education Programs Data Analysis

27

System (DANS). The 1993-94 data are from the CSEF Survey on
State Special Education Funding System, 1994-95, and the
Fourteenth Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Center for Special
Education Finance, http://csef.air.org/faq3-4.html

In light of the congressional failure to provide the state and
local education agencies with adequate financial assistance to pay
for the costs of speciat education, any judicial interpretations of the
IDEA which inflicts additional obligations to pay for additional
services fall inordinately upon already overburdened local public
education budgets. Upholding the court of appeals decision would
result in the siphoning of funds from school systems which have
already provided appropriate programs, thereby causing an

unjustifiable drain on an already limited amount of funds.

28

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Amicus respectfully requests
this Court to reverse the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals and adopt the multi-factored analysis (considering the
nature, extent, complexity, urgency and burdensome nature of the
medical tasks at issue) consistent with the Second, Fourth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

GWENDOLYN H. GREGORY JULIE UNDERWOOD

Counsel of Record General Counsel

Post Office Box 2298 National Schoo! Boards

Middleburg, VA 20118 Association

(540) 687-3339 1680 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 838-6710

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0074%3A12. Public record. Not legal advice.
