# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 523 U.S. 26

## Text

Su —_

preme Cours,

\) FILED
v

961482 mar 1 8 1997
NO. pecs 5 me OL

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

LEXECON INC., et al.,

. Petitioners,

MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES
& LERACH, A PARTNERSHIP, et al.,
Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL MICHAEL K. KELLOGG
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO Counsel of Record
MICHELE L. ODORIZZI MARK C. HANSEN

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT JEFFREY A. LAMKEN

190 S. LaSalle Street AUSTIN C. SCHLICK
Chicago, IL 60603 SEAN A. LEV

(312) 701-7201 KELLOGG, HUBER, HANSEN,
KENNETH S. GELLER Topp & Evans, P.L.L.C.
MAYER, BROWN & PLATT 1301 K Street, N.W.

2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Suite 1000 West

Suite 6500 Washington, D.C. 20005
Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) S26-7900

(202) 463-2000
Counsel for Petitioners

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a district court, to which a case has been
transferred solely for “consolidated pretrial proceedings”
under the federal multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a), may transfer the case to itself for purposes of
trial, notwithstanding section 1407(a)’s explicit command
that every such case “shall be remanded” at the conclu-
sion of pretrial proceedings “to the district from which
it was transferred.”

2. Whether, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a district
court may go outside the four corners of the complaint
and rely on its own analysis of public record materials to
decide disputed questions of fact.

(i)

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW

The following persons or entities were parties to the
proceeding in the court of appeals:

Lexecon Inc.

Daniel R. Fischel
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach
Cotchett, Ilston & Pitre
Patrick Coughlin
William S. Lerach
Kevin P. Roddy
Leonard B. Simon
Melvyn I. Weiss
Patricia Hynes

Michael C. Spencer
Stephen R. Steinberg
Joseph Cotchett

Susan Illston

PARENT COMPANIES AND NONWHOLLY
OWNED SUBSIDIARIES

Lexecon Inc. is a privately held corporation that has
no parent companies or subsidiaries that have issued

shares to the public.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............................................. i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW ...... aes ii
PARENT COMPANIES AND NONWHOLLY
TU ca ii
ZABLE OP AUTIBORITIMG nn... cccceccccecec-c.-....-.-........ iv
i 1
EE 1
a ne 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE...
A. Background and Prior Proceedings
cee
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..._. 10

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION RATI-
FIES AN ENTRENCHED FEDERAL COURT
PRACTICE THAT IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY
TO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE RELE-
VANT STATUTES AND THAT UNDER-
MINES CONGRESS’S EXPRESS INTENT TO
PRESERVE PLAINTIFFS’ CHOICE OF
ELL 10

Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RULING WRONGLY
AUTHORIZES DISTRICT COURTS TO GO
OUTSIDE THE FOUR CORNERS OF A COM-
PLAINT AND RELY ON THEIR OWN ANAL-

YSIS OF PUBLIC RECORD MATERIALS TO
DECIDE DISPUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT
AT THE MOTION TO DISMISS STAGE... 21

SI ib eiecareieddiiesbdieeeetasescescencnecunsenencenensaneceaseses 27

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page
Allen v. Westpoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40

> 7 25
Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir),

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1853 (1996) -.................... 25
Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1996) ....... 26
Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust

Ca, 196 B, Gd. GET CRIBS) ccecccecscccscessse a. scscsessessees 20
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,

MG GW SE EEE 11
Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758

PR (GH EEE 22
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate

Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 8. Ct. 1439 (1994) .... 20
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) ....................... 22
Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249

(1992) .. Ee 18
Ernst & Ernct_ v. ~ Hochfelder, 425 US. 185

0 ——————E, 16
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S.

I _>Ee——E—E———E——— 11
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) ....16, 17, 20
Frey v. Stoneman, 722 P.2d 274 (Ariz. 1986) ....... 22
Friedman v. United States, 927 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.

25, 26
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. 1.B.M. Corp., 342

F. Supp. 1143 (D. Minn. 1972) ~....................... 20
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) _..... 11
Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir.

. 25
In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l

Airport, 479 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ........ 19
In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport,

Denver, Colo., 720 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Colo.

EEE 19
In re Aircrash Near Duarte, Cal., 357 F. Supp.

en 20
In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366

(S.D.N.Y. 1978) ........... sieinennbindinns 19
In re Dow Co. “Sarabond Products” ” Liability
Litig., 664 F. Supp. 1403 (D. Colo. 1987) .......... 19

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810

(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156

Ee es ee 19
In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act

Litig., 73 F.3d (4th Cir. 1906) ..................... 19
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171

(D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 490

SE ee ee 11
In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 70 F.R.D. 23

SS ES eo ee eee 20
In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litig., 62

F.R.D. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom.

Schulman v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 515 F.2d 505

EES A Ee ee 20
In re Plumbing Picture Cones, 296 F. Supp. 484

(J.P.M.L. 1968). ot te 13
In re Tax Refund Litig., “723 F. “Supp. 922

TE ee Se en ee 19
In re Viatron Computer Sys. Corp. Litig., 86

F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1980) 20
Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479 (1933)... 16
Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.

1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) _....... 19
Lane v. Pefia, 116 8. Ct. 2092 (1996) . 18
Leonard v. Frankfort Elec. & Water Plant Bd.,

762 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1985)... 26
Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015

EE Eva RE ee 8 ee 25
Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. ‘Rambo, 115 S. Ct.

ET oes 2 SS Oe ee 15, 20
Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,

102 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 1996) .... 26
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,

ee ee I tt 17

Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971) _. 19
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) . 26
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau,
Ge a Siena i 22
— ee a OS ee ee

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) .... 13
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 388 U.S. 338

ES EE SE aT 26
Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserv-
ing, Inc., 37 F.3d 1053 (4th Cir. 1994) —.............. 25
STATUTES AND RULES
A )lU,l 1
LO ee passim
Ob a dd passim
a passim
8 0 4! Ee ae ee 25
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) ........... ...... 21
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
141 Cong. Rec. $8894 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) ........ 21
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. ms
a
H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
dp 2968 WBC.C.AuN. BEBB .nnccrcncceccecccccseccccscsessessees 12, 13

OTHER MATERIALS
15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 3866 (2d ed. 1986) ............................ 14
15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 3867 (Supp. 1996) ................. ®

Administrative Office of United States Courts,
Judicial Business of the United States Courts:
1995 Report of the Director -....................... ........ 10
George T. Conway III, Note, The Consolidation of
Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 Yale
L.J. 1099 (1987) 15
John F. Cooney, Comment, The Experience of
Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict Liti-
gation Act, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 588 (1972) ........... 14
Ross D. Cooper, The Korean Air Disaster: Choice
of Law in Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 57
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (1989) 14

vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation
and the Federal Courts, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 41
REE a ae ee

Report of the American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Su-
preme Court’s Decision in California v. ARC
America Corp., 59 Antitrust L.J. 273 (1990) _.

Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking,
140 U. Penn. L. Rev. 711 (1991) 0.

Mike Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the
Judicial Panel, Transfer and Tag-Along Orders
Prior to a Determination of Remand: Proce-
dural and Substantive Problem or Effective
Judicial Public Policy?, 23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev.
ee

Robert H. Trangsrud, ‘Joinder “Alternatives in

Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 779
(1985)

lieth LEE LLL eee

Page

14

14

14

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1996

No.

LEXECON INC., et al.,

¥. Petitioners,
MILBERG Weiss BersilAD HYNES
& LERACH, A PARTNERSHIP, ef al.,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Lexecon Inc. and Daniel R. Fischel petition for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-52a)
is reported at 102 F.3d 1524. The district court’s opinion
granting summary judgment in part (Pet. App. 64a-79a) is
reported at 884 F. Supp. 1388; the court’s opinion grant-
ing defendants’ motion to dismiss in part (Pet. App. 80a-
99a) is reported at 845 F. Supp. 1377.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
December 20, 1996. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

2

. STATUTES INVOLVED

The federal multidistrict litigation statute states in
pertinent part:

When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts,
such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section
upon its determination that transfers for such pro-
ceedings will be for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred
shall be remanded by the panel at or before the con-
clusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated: Provided, however, That
the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim,
counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any
of such claims before the remainder of the action is
remanded.

28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
The federal transfer statute provides in relevant part:

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Citing policy concerns, the Ninth Circuit has endorsed
a widespread district court practice that is directly con-
trary to the relevant statutes and that undermines plain-
tiffs’ historical right to their choice of forum for litigation.

In enacting the multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407, Congress authorized the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation (“JPML”) to transfer cases only for

3

purposes of “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceed-
ings.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). Congress specified that all
such cases must be remanded as soon as those proceed-
ings are complete: “Each action so transferred shall be
remanded by the [JPML] at or before the conclusion of
such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was
transferred unless it shall have been previously termi-
nated.” Jd. (emphasis added).

Despite this unequivocal statutory directive, district
courts assigned to oversee coordinated pretrial proceed-
ings have “routine[ly]” decided to retain those cases for
all purposes, including trial. Pet. App. 3la (Kozinski,
J., dissenting). Citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), they have
transferred” these cases to themselves, preventing the
Cases from ever returning to their home district, as Con-
gress intended. Section 1404(a) provides no support for
this practice. By its terms, it authorizes transfer only
“to any other district or division where it might have been
brought” (emphasis added). It does not authorize a dis-
trict court to transfer a case to itself.

Nonetheless, through repeated use of this “self-transfer”
mechanism, the district courts have, in Judge Kozinski’s
words, “parlayed a narrow grant of authority to conduct
consolidated discovery into a mechanism for systematically
denying plaintiffs the right to trial in their forum of
choice.” Pet. App. 30a (Kozinski, J., dissenting). And
they have accomplished this “remarkable power grab” (id.)
without any protest from the courts of appeals, which
have cited pragmatic considerations based on efficiency as
a sufficient basis for self-transfer. In fact, the practice
has been sanctioned by the JPML itself. The JPML’s
rules—which (unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure ) are not reviewed by this Court prior to becoming
effective—expressly State that cases need not be remanded
for trial where they have been “ordered transferred by the
transferee judge to the transferee or other district.” JPML
Rule 14(b).

Such concerted disregard of a clear congressional man-
date cries out for correction. Review by this Court is

4

necessary to align federal court practice with the plain
language of sections 1404 and 1407 and to restore plain-
tiffs’ traditional prerogative in choosing the forum for
trial.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision also presents a second
issue of importance to the administration of justice. It is
a fundamental premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure that plaintiffs must have an opportunity to conduct
discovery and substantiate their allegations before their
claims may be dismissed for a failure of proof. In decid-
ing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), therefore,
a court must assume the truth of all the allegations in
plaintiff's complaint. In this case, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected that bedrock rule as an outdated “formalism. Pet.
App. 23a. The majority held that courts may go outside
the four corners of the complaint and rely on public record
materials—including, in this instance, the unsworn state-
ments of a recused judge—to decide disputed questions
of fact at the motion to dismiss stage. That understanding
of the appropriate use of public records undermines the
important role of Rule 12(b)(6) and directly conflicts
with the law of other circuits.

A. Background and Prior Proceedings

1. Lexecon is one of the nation’s leading law and
economics consulting firms. Daniel Fischel is a principal
of Lexecon and the Freeman Professor of Law and Busi-
ness at the University of Chicago Law School. Professor
Fischel frequently testifies as an expert in complex class
action securities cases.

The respondents—two law firms" and certain individual
members of those firms—are plaintiffs’ class action law-
yers. They have, in recent years, brought numerous,
highly-publicized class action securities lawsuits. Professor
Fischel provided what was characterized by many com-
mentators—such as the Wall Street Journal—as decisive

1The two law firm defendants are Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach and Cotchett, Illston & Petrie.

5

testimony for the defense in a number of those suits,
thereby costing defendants millions of dollars in contin-
gency fees.

In 1992, Lexecon and Professor Fischel (jointly “Lexe-
con”) filed this diversity action in the Northern District
of Illinois, their home district, alleging that respondents—
angered by this succession of costly losses—engaged in a
wide-ranging effort to ruin Lexecon’s reputation and put
it out of business. The first step in respondents’ scheme
was to name Lexecon as a defendant in Shields v. Keating,
a case heard in the District of Arizona as part of MDL
No. 834, American Continental Corporation/Lincoln
Savings & Loan Litigation. Respondents, who were class
counsel in that case, falsely accused Lexecon of com-
plicity with Charles Keating in one of the most notorious
savings and loan scandals of this century. Respondents
then used their Lincoln Savings complaint against Lexe-
con in courtrooms around the country, in the press, and
with Lexecon’s clients and business associates to portray
Professor Fischel as a “crook” and a “racketeer” and
Lexecon as a firm whose expert credentials could no longer
be trusted. As a result, Lexecon lost millions of dollars in
fees, and both petitioners suffered significant damage to
their reputations.

2. In this suit, Lexecon seeks damages for respondents’
malicious prosecution of the Lincoln Savings case, abuse
of process, tortious interference with petitioners’ existing
and prospective client relationships, defamation, and com-
mercial disparagement.

Initial pretrial matters in this case were handled by
Judge Zagel in the Northern District of Dlinois. Those
proceedings did not go well for respondents. The district
court rejected their personal jurisdiction arguments and
indicated that it did not agree with some of their key
legal contentions.

After six months of pretrial proceedings before Judge
Zagel, respondents filed a motion with the JPML pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to have this case transferred to the

6

District of Arizona and consolidated with the Lincoln
Savings litigation that gave rise to some of Lexecon’s
claims. Before the JPML could rule on defendants’ trans-
fer motion, Judge Bilby, the presiding judge in the Lincoln
Savings case, sent a letter to the JPML recusing himself
from the Lexecon case because his “involvement” in the
resolution of the underlying case would make it “improper”
for him to act as a judge in the Lexecon case.

Notwithstanding Judge Bilby’s recusal, respondents re-
newed their motion to transfer, asking the JPML to send
the Lexecon case to any other judge in Arizona. Over
Lexecon’s objections, the JPML granted respondents’ mo-
tion to transfer on the ground that there was an extensive
document depository in Arizona and that there might be
some opportunity for coordination with a still unfinished
settlement involving one of the defendants in Lincoln
Savings. Pet. App. 100a-102a. Once transferred to the
District of Arizona, the case was assigned to Judge Roll,
who had no previous familiarity with this matter or with
any of the Lincoln Savings cases.

3. No coordinated proceedings ever ensued. The trans-
fer did, however, have a significant impact on the course
of the litigation. In particular, the district court, relying
on its own “independent” evaluation of the merits of the
Lincoln Savings suit against Lexecon—and not accepting
the truth of the allegations contained in Lexecon’s com-
plaint—granted respondents’ motion to dismiss as to the
malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims. Pet.
App. 85a-92a.

After this case had been in Arizona for a year, it had
become abundantly clear that there would never be any
“coordinated or consolidated” pretrial proceedings. In-
deed, all other proceedings in MDL No. 834 had long
since been concluded, and the only other factor cited by
the JPML in ordering transfer—the presence of a “docu-
ment depository” in Arizona—did not even exist any
more. The documents that had been produced in this
case—over a million pages worth—were being kept in

7

Illinois, and only one of the 42 deponents or potential
deponents resided in Arizona. Thus, in accord with the
procedures specified by the JPML (see JPML Rule
14(d)), Lexecon moved the Arizona district court to
remand the case back to the Northern District of Illinois,
where it had been filed. The district court deferred deci-
sion on that motion until the end of discovery, at which
_ Lexecon renewed its request to return the case to
inois.

Respondents objected to the remand motion and filed
their own motion to transfer the case permanently to
Arizona. They also moved for summary judgment on all
remaining issues. Without ruling on Lexecon’s remand
motion, the court granted summary judgment to respond-
ents on all remaining issues, except for one aspect of
Lexecon’s defamation claim. Pet. App. 64a-77a.

Soon thereafter, the Arizona district court denied Lexe-
con’s motion to remand and simultaneously granted re-
spondents’ request that it transfer the case permanently to “
itself. Pet. App. 61a-62a. Without mentioning the lan-
guage of 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the court stated that there was
“[sJubstantial authority’—including JPML Rule 14(b)—
establishing that section 1407 does not require a case to
return to its original district after coordinated pretrial
proceedings are complete. Pet. App. 6la. The court fur-
ther concluded, again without mention of the relevant
statutory language, that 28 U.S.C. § 1404 gave it the
“power to transfer this action to itself.” Pet. App. 61a.

4. Lexecon believed that the district court’s actions in
transferring this case to itself violated sections 1404 and
1407 and subjected the company to potentially irreparable
harm—requiring it to go to trial in a forum thousands of
miles from home where “there was much popular feeling”
against companies that, like Lexecon, were alleged to have
been involved in the Charles Keating/Lincoln Savings
scandal. Pet. App. 47a (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Lexe-
con thus petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of
mandamus.

The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on the mandamus
petition, but eventually determined that extraordinary re-
lief was not warranted in this instance. Pet. App. 55a-
60a. The two-judge majority did note, however, that
Lexecon’s legal position had considerable force. The
majority explained that section 1407 provided an appar-
ently “clear statutory mandate” and that the court “might
well” decide on direct review that the district court’s self-
transfer decision was unlawful. Pet. App. 58a.

Judge Kozinski dissented from the refusal to issue a
writ. He would have granted the petition to correct the
district court’s “egregious, oft-repeated error” in “disre-
gard{ing] the statutory mandate” of sections 1404 and
1407. Pet. App. 58a, 59a (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Section 1407, in his view, represented an “important policy
choice”—allowing limited transfers, but retaining plain-
tiffs’ “ancient right” to select a forum for trial—that “fed-
eral judges are bound to respect.” Pet. App. 60a; see 15
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 3867, at 111 (Supp. 1996) (discussing Judge Kozinski’s
mandamus dissent).

5. The trial on the defamation claim—a claim that
was governed by Illinois law—then went forward in the
District of Arizona. The respondents prevailed in a jury
trial, and the district court entered final judgment.

B. The Decision Below

On appeal from that judgment, a different and sharply
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s rulings in all respects. Judge Kozinski was the
only member of this panel who had also ruled on the
mandamus petition.

1. The majority, relying on “longstanding practice and
the efficiency arguments” in favor of self-transfer (Pet.
App. 14a), found no flaw in the district court’s decision
to transfer this case to itself. Such transfers, the majority
stated, are authorized both by the TPML’s rules and by a

9

long series of court of appeals and district court decisions.
Pet. App. 12a & n.3 (collecting cases). The majority
further concluded that, in the multidistrict litigation con-
text, the judicial interest in “efficien[t]” disposition of
cases “trump[s]” the “usual deference to a plaintiff's choice
of forum.” Pet. App. 13a & n.5. Finally, the majority
Suggested that section 1407 is concerned only with the
powers of the JPML and thus does not disturb the “tradi-

tional powers of the district court to which a case has
been transferred.” Pet. App. 15a.

The majority also affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of Lexecon’s malicious prosecution and abuse of
process claims. It rejected as “absurdly formal” the require-
ment that a district court confine its review at the motion
to dismiss stage to the allegations in Lexecon’s complaint.
Pet. App. 23a. Rather, in the majority’s view, it was
appropriate for the district court to consider the “public
record” in resolving disputed factual questions at that
stage. Id. Applying that logic here, the majority held
that Lexecon’s claims failed because, notwithstanding the
allegations in Lexecon’s complaint, the record in Lincoln
Savings showed as a matter of fact that (1) Lincoln Sav-
ings did not result in a “termination” favorable to Lexe-
con and (2) naming Lexecon as a defendant in the Lin-
coln Savings suit did not have as its “primary purpose to
inflict harm” on the company. Pet. App. 24a, 28a.

the Plain terms of section 1407 and with Congress’s
explicit intent not to authorize section 1407 transferee
courts to conduct trials. Pet. App. 30a-31la (Kozinski,
} dissenting). Nor could the district court’s course of
action be reconciled with section 1404(a), whose text
states “in plain and simple terms” that a case may be
transferred only to “‘any other district or division where

10

it might have been Brought.’” Pet. App. 41a (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (quoting section 1404(a)). By upholding
the practice of self-transfer in the face of such clear

this
area and put the last coffin nail into the « "periment Con-
gress started in 1968 when it gave the federal courts only
a limited MDL authority.” Pet. App. 52a (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting ).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION RATIFIES AN
ENTRENCHED FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE

The lower federal courts have illegitimately converted
the multidistrict litigation statute into a mechanism for
shuttling entire cases off to far-flung districts for trial in
forums that plaintiffs would never have chosen. Although
over 92,000 cases have been transferred in the past three
decades under section 1407, only 3,500—less than four
percent—have ever returned to their home district. See
Pet. App. 30a (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Admin-
istrative Office of United States Courts, Judicial Business
of the United States Courts: 1995 Report of the Director
32). The stark reality is that “once a case is sucked
into the MDL vortex, it seldom comes back.” Pet. App.
45a (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

To be sure, some cases have not returned to their
home districts because they settled or were dismissed
while consolidated pretrial proceedings were still under-
way. Many others, however, have not returned because
the district court assigned to oversee pretrial proceedings
decided to retain the case for all purposes, including

11

trial. As Judge Kozinski explained, federal judges have
“develop[ed] proprietary feelings toward the cases en-
trusted to them” and have “routine[ly]” refused to relin-
quish them at the end of pretrial proceedings. Pet. App.
31a. Thus, in the multidistrict litigation context, plain-
tiff's choice of forum—which, under traditional principles,
“should rarely be disturbed” (Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
530 yp 501, 508 (1947) )—has “devolved to the signifi-
cance a tailbone or an appendix.”
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). de
This practice of “self-transfer” cannot be reconciled
with the language of either section 1407 or section 1404.
It is directly contrary to all evidence of i
intent and to the historical rights of plaintiffs to choose
their forum for trial. And it has been uniformly criticized
by a host of scholarly commentators as a usurpation of
legislative authority by the courts. The very fact that the
practice is now so entrenched—notwithstanding clear con-
trary directions from Congress—com is Court’
review. . ~
a. It is well established that courts must follow the
plain language of a statute and may not depart from its
ordinary English” to pursue their own ideas of wise
policy. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson
116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996). See also Estate of Cowart v.
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (“courts

must give effect to the clear
itten”). meaning of statutes as

pretrial proceedings.
47 U.S.C. § 1407(a). See In re Korean Air Lines Dis-
aster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (R.B. Gins-
a (section 1407 “authorizfes] transfers only for
pretrial purposes”) (emphasis added),
grounds, 490 U.S. 122 (1989). so nat aad

12

If a case has not been concluded by the time such
pretrial proceedings are over, it must be returned to the
district where it was initially filed: “Each action so trans-
ferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferred unless it shall have been

conclude. The statute states that the case “shall be re-
manded,” and remanded it must therefore be.

This clear statutory command is reinforced by the

“any other district.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (emphasis
added). There is no way, in ordinary English, that the

section 1404(a).

Moreover, if one looks beyond the plain text of the
relevant statutes to their legislative history, it becomes
even clearer that the lower court practice is flatly at odds
with the Congressional design. The drafting history of
section 1407 demonstrates that Congress specifically re-
jected the idea of authorizing broader transfers in the

from the standpoint of the parties and witnesses”—why
the statute “does not . . . include the trial of cases in
the consolidated proceedings” and would “not affect the
place of trial in any case.” H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898,
1900, 1901 (emphasis added). If “future experience”
demonstrated that “consolidation and coordination for

5
jf
BF
gs

55

F

:

3

:

2
:
Rage
li
7
rf

Sie 34]
Le : 4
5

do by statute in 1969: amend section 1407 to allow trans-
fers for trial.” Robert H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives
in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 779, 809

*The Ninth Circuit’s opinion incorrectly suggests that the
legislative history supports its conclusion. Pet. App. l5a. The

majority (Pet. App. 15a), the House Report makes clear that a fur-
ther amendment would be necessary to allow the transferee court to
keep the case for all purposes. See 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1902.

14

make a certain determination, “courts [can]not take it
upon themselves” to make that same determination).

Given the abundant evidence establishing that self-
transfer is fundamentally incompatible with the language
and intent of sections 1404 and 1407, it is hardly sur-
prising that commentators have uniformly criticized this
practice. Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper have
stated, with characteristic understatement, that the prac-
tice is of “questionable” legitimacy. 15 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3866, at 619
(2d ed. 1986). Other independent observers concur in
more forceful terms.’ As Judge Kozinski noted, “[r]e-

® Robert H. Trangsrud, supra, 70 Cornell L. Rev. at 804 (“The
reasoning in these cases is demonstrably wrong.”) ; Ross D. Cooper,
The Korean Air Disaster: Choice of Law in Federal Multidistrict
Litigation, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145, 1159 (1989) (practice of
self-transfer “does not comport with the express language of sec-
tion 1407 or section 1404 or with section 1407's legislative his-
tory”); Mike Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the Judicial
Panel, Transfer and Tag-Along Orders Prior to a Determination
of Remand: Procedural and Substantive Problem or Effective Judi-
cial Public Policy?, 23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 841, 866 (1993) (“It is
a leap in logic to conclude that causes of action not terminated upon
dispositive motions should be retained in the transferee court under
the rubric of § 1404(a), when the statutory language of § 1407
explicitly directs remand to the transferor court.”); Report of the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force
to Review the Supreme Court's Decision in California v. ARC
America Corp., 59 Antitrust LJ. 271, 302 (1990) (“[T)he use of
Section 1404(a) transfers to consolidate multidistrict cases for
trial is of dubious legal validity.”); Blake M. Rhodes, Comment,
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethink-
ing, 140 U. Penn. L. Rev. 711, 734 (1991) (“[A] transferee court's
use of § 1404(a) sets Congress’s carefully crafted plan for multi-
district litigation on its head.”); Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multi-
district Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 41,
64 (1971) (the language and legislative history of section 1407 (a)
are so clear that it “originally appeared to be a futile exercise for
a 1407 transferee court to rule on a 1404 transfer motion”); John
F. Cooney, Comment, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under
the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 588, 606
(1972) (“[T]he apparently mandatory nature of the remand clause

b. The Ninth Circuit gave three reasons in support of
the result it reached. None withstands scrutiny.

First, the Ninth Circuit suggested that “longstanding
practice” was itself a sufficient justification for self-transfer.
Pet. App. 14a, 16a. The panel noted that “[rjespect for
our brethren” made it reluctant to “accuse the JPML of
violating the statute that created it” or to second-guess the
many courts that had engaged in self-transfer. Pet. App.
14a n.7, 16a.

But past practice is no excuse for ignoring a clear
Congressional command, As this Court recently recog-

nized, the existence of long-standing errors in statutory
interpretation requires action, not “hesitation,” because
“‘la]ge is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a stat-
ute.’” Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 115 S. Ct.
2144, 2149 (1995) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 115
S. Ct. 552, 557 (1994) (finding 60-year old agency inter-
pretation inconsistent with statute)). Essentially, the
Ninth Circuit is suggesting that, even if two wrongs don’t
make a right, two decades worth will—or at least we
should pretend that they do, notwithstanding a clear
conflict with an express statutory command. That has
never been, nor should it be, the law.

Nor does the existence of a JPML rule permitting self-
transfer transform an unlawful practice into a lawful one.

Congress expressly provided that the JPML’s rules must
be consistent with its enabling statute and, indeed, all of

. . » implies that transferee courts lack this jurisdiction [to grant
a section 1404 motion].”) ; George T. Conway III, Note, The Con-
solidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 9% Yale LJ.
1099, 1102-08 (1987) (“[{C)onsolidation for trial almost certainly
defies both the letter of section 1407 and the intent of its drafters.” )
(internal footnote omitted).

16

federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f). See also Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976)
(agency rules “cannot exceed the power granted . . . by
Congress”); Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 US. 479,
503 (1933) (invalidating local court rule that was incon-
sistent with powers granted by Congress).

Section 1407, which circumscribes the authority of the
JPML, unequivocally states that a transfer is only for
“coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” and
that each case “shall be remanded” following pretrial pro-
ceedings “unless it shall have been previously terminated.”
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). The JPML rule violates this ex-
press statutory command. It states that “[eJach trans-
ferred action that has not been terminated in the trans-
feree district court shall be remanded . . . unless ordered
transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or
other district.” JPML Rule 14(b) (emphasis added).
The italicized language simply rewrites the JPML’s en-
abling statute and adds an excuse for failure to remand
that the statute does not recognize and does not permit.

Second, the Ninth Circuit noted that self-transfer
“strongly promotes judicial efficiency, which was a pri-
mary purpose of the legislation that created the JPML.”
Pet. App. 16a. But, again, this Court has made clear that
such concerns do not justify federal courts’ disregard for
the plain meaning of the statutes that define their author-
ity. In Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989),
for example, the Court acknowledged that the exercise
of so-called pendant-party jurisdiction over state claims
resulted in “efficiency end convenience” by allowing for
the consolidation of related issues in a single proceeding.
Id. at 555. Nevertheless, because the plain meaning of
the relevant statutes demonstrated that Congress had not
granted federal courts any such authority, the Court held
that they lacked the power to hear such pendant-party
claims. See id. at 547 (“‘courts which are created by
written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written

17

law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction’”) (quoting Ex

Parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 93 (1807) (Marshall,
C.J.)).

Congress established the balance between efficiency con-
cerns and plaintiffs’ traditional choice of forum when it
wrote section 1407. The judiciary is not free to strike a
different balance. As in Finley, the lower courts may
not “trump” (Pet. App. 13a n.5) the plain language of
sections 1404 and 1407—which evince Congress’s judg-
ment that preserving plaintiffs’ choice of forum for trial
is more important than efficiency—based on their own
notions of wise judicial administration. See also Pavelic
& LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S.
120, 126 (1989) (Court is not free to pursue policy
objective at expense of “unnatural” textual interpretation;
“[ojur task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it”).

Third, the Ninth Circuit argued that section 1407’s
obligation to remand applies only to the JPML, not to
the transferee court. Pet. App. 15a. On this theory, a
transferee court is free to transfer a case to itself for trial
pursuant to section 1404(a) without regard to the JPML’s

express duty under section 1407(a) to remand the case
before trial. Pet. App. 15a-16a.

But the district court’s power to preside in a transferred
case is itself circumscribed by section 1407. The trans-
feree court is assigned the case only for the limited pur-
pose of conducting “consolidated” pre-trial proceedings.
It cannot expand its power beyond what Congress has
granted under the express terms of the statute. For that
reason, the transferee court must remand the case once
consolidated pretrial proceedings are complete and its
authority under section 1407(a) has thus expired.

Moreover, the JPML’s own rules instruct litigants to
seek a remand, in the first instance, from the transferee
court. See JPML Rule 14(d). This makes sense, since
it is the judge presiding over the case, not the JPML
panel, who will know when consolidated pre-trial proceed-
ings are over and, thus, when the case must be remanded.

18

But in executing that delegated responsibility, the district
court necessarily has the same underlying statutory obli-
gation that the JPML would have if it handled requests
in the first instance. The JPML cannot alter or broaden
its authority by delegating it.*

Nor can the transferee court use its general authority un-
der section 1404(a) to render a nullity section 1407(a)’s
specific requirement that a case be remanded. It is a
fundamental canon of statutory construction that laws
should not be read in a way that makes any statutory
provision superfluous. See, e.g., Lane v. Pefa, 116 S. Ct.
2092, 2100 (1996); Connecticut National Bank v. Ger-
main, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). Yet if the district court
could transfer a case pursuant to section 1404(a), then
section 1407(a)’s requirement that the case be remanded
at the conclusion of consolidated proceedings would serve
no purpose at all. Congress provided only one exception
to the JPML’s mandatory duty to remand the case at the
end of consolidated proceedings—where the case is “termi-
nated” during coordinated pretrial proceedings. Congress
did not create an exception for transfers; indeed, a statu-
tory “command” that effectively said “the case shall be
remanded unless it is transferred” (i.e., unless it is not
remanded) would be nonsensical.

4 For this reason, it is bizarre for the Ninth Circuit to suggest
(Pet. App. 16a-17a) that Lexecon should have sought relief directly
from the JPML and that its failure to do so somehow left the
district court with no choice but to transfer the case to itself “to
avoid the absurdity of indefinitely suspended litigation, the pre-
trial proceedings of which have come to a close.” Under the
JPML’s own rules, the proper practice was for Lexecon to bring
its section 1407 argument to the district court, and not the
JPML, in the first instance. Once the district court denied the
remand motion, Lexecon was unable to pursue the matter with the
JPML because the district court simultaneously transferred the
case to itself, thereby depriving the JPML of authority to rule.
See JPML Rule 14(b). Lexecon accordingly sought mandamus,
which was the only immediate remedy available to it to vindicate
the requirement of section 1407 (a). Moreover, Lexecon objected to
the self-transfer on the additional ground that it violated the
express terms of section 1404 (a).

19

Finally, even if section 1404(a)’s general transfer au-
thority could somehow nullify the specific remand require-
ment of section 1407(a), the Ninth Circuit’s ruling per-
mitting selftransfer would still collide head-on with the
plain language of section 1404(a). As we have explained,
that provision authorizes a court to transfer a case only
to some “other district or division,” not to itself. Section
1404(a) thus provides a completely independent reason
why the court of appeals’ decision—and, indeed, all the
lower court rulings on this issue—cannot pass muster.

c. The absence of a circuit conflict, though often a
basis for denying review, in this case points in the other
direction. The very fact that the judicial highjacking of
JPML cases is so entrenched provides a powerful reason
for this Court to intervene.

As early as 1971, the Second Circuit upheld a district
court’s self-transfer decision against a claim that it violated
section 1407. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122,
124-25 (2d Cir. 1971). In the years since, the JPML
itself has issued a rule that expressly contemplates self-
transfer, and the lower courts, relying on that rule and on
the perceived efficiency benefits of self-transfer, have uni-
formly determined that such transfers are lawful. The
array of lower court precedent on this point now includes
three square circuit court holdings,® as well as a host of
district court rulings.* Indeed, the lower courts’ under-

5 In addition to the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit
so held in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819-20
& n.7 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983) Two
other appellate court decisions assume that self-transfer authority
exists. See In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act Litig.,
73 F.3d 528, 532 n.7 (4th Cir. 1996); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines,
504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).

* See, e.g., In re Tax Refund Litig., 723 F. Supp. 922, 924
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) ; In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Air-
port, Denver, Colo., 720 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (D. Colo. 1988); Jn
re Dow Co. “Sarabond Products” Liab. Litig., 664 F. Supp. 1403,
1408-04 (D. Colo. 1987); In re Air Crash Disaster at John F.
Kennedy Iit’l Airport, 479 F. Supp. 1118, 1122-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ;
In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 374 (S.D.N.Y.

20

Standing on this point is now so thoroughly entrenched
that the Federal Judicial Center’s Manual for Complex
Litigation (Third) treats self-transfer as standard proce-
dure. See id. § 21.61, at 117 & n.346.

As already noted, the existence of such longstanding
errors in statutory interpretation requires action, not
“hesitation,” by this Court. Metropolitan Stevedore, 115
S. Ct. at 2149. This Court has accordingly granted re-
view to address such errors in interpretation even where
every circuit court’s precedents upheld the practice at
issue. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Inter-
state Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994);
id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (practice addressed
by Court had been upheld “in hundreds of judicial and
administrative proceedings in every circuit in the federal
system”). See also Finley, 490 U.S. at 558 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (district court practice reviewed—and reversed
—by Court had been supported by “overwhelming con-
sensus of federal judges”).

The statutory question in this case particularly merits
the Court’s attention because it involves the limits of tlie
authority that Congress has granted to the lower federal
courts. As the Court has recognized since its earliest days,
ensuring that the federal courts stay within the bounds of
the authority Congress has vested in them is an issue of
paramount importance. See Ex Parte Bollman, supra.
Indeed, in recognition of this principle, just last Term the
Court reviewed a case involving the statutory scope of
federal.court authority even though only one circuit had
ever passed on the statutory question at issue. See Bank
One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116

1973) ; In re Aircrash Near Duarte, Cal., 357 F. Supp. 1013, 1015
(C.D. Cal. 1973) ; Greyhound Computer Corp. v. 1.B.M. Corp., 342
F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (D. Minn. 1972); In re Viatron Computer
Systems Corp. Litig., 86 F.R.D. 431, 432-83 (D. Mass. 1980) ; Jn re
Master Key Antitrust Litig., 70 F.R.D. 23, 28 (D. Conn. 1975);
In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litig., 62 F.R.D. 341, 345
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Shulman v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
515 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1975).

21

S. Ct. 637 (1996) (ruling upon federal court authority
under the Expedited Funds Availability Act). And review
of such questions is especially warranted where the federal
court practice has a significant effect on the substantive
rights of a wide class of litigants—in this instance, by
robbing multidistrict litigation plaintiffs of their historical
right to choose their forum and subjecting them to trial
in distant places before potentially hostile juries.

II. THE NINTH CIRCUITS RULING WRONGLY AU-
THORIZES DISTRICT COURTS TO GO OUTSIDE
THE FOUR CORNERS OF A COMPLAINT AND
RELY ON THEIR OWN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC
RECORD MATERIALS TO DECIDE DISPUTED
QUESTIONS OF FACT AT THE MOTION TO DIS-
MISS STAGE

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling also implicates important
public policy concerns regarding the integrity of the legal
profession. Respondents are the nation’s leading filers of
securities class action suits. In enacting the Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (1995), with bipartisan majorities in both
houses, Congress emphasized the serious societal problems
and injuries to innocent parties caused by unethical class .
action lawyers. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, 104th
Cong., Ist Sess. 31-32 (1995). See also 141 Cong. Rec.
$8894 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (“it has become in-
creasingly clear that securities class actions are extremely
vulnerable to abuses by entrepreneurs masquerading as
lawyers”) (remarks of Sen. Dodd).

Here, Lexecon alleged that respondents fabricated evi-
dence to support claims that they privately acknowledged
were baseless, attempted to use their meritless suit in an
attempt to extort concessions from Lexecon and its clients,
intimidated witnesses, defrauded the courts, and then en-
gaged in wholesale document destruction to cover-up their
misconduct. These are serious allegations, of more than
private concern, that should not have been rejected with-
out careful consideration on the merits as required by

22

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’
precedents. _ :

This Court established long ago that, in ruling on a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a court must accept the truth of all allegations
in the plaintiff's complaint. See Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier
Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 411 n.2 (1986) (collecting
cases). The text of Rule 12 itself makes plain that courts
may not stray beyond the four corners of the pleadings to
resolve such motions: “If . . . matters outside the plead-
ing are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . .
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to

present all material made pertinent t i
wee A pe Oo such a motion by

The Ninth Circuit, however, discarded these funda-
mental procedural protections as outmoded “formalism.”
Pet. App. 23a. In the court’s view, it is perfectly appro-
priate for a court to use any material in the “public
record”—which could include, for example, newspaper
articles, investigative reports, and all sorts of public filings
by private parties—as a basis for rejecting, at the motion
to dismiss Stage, the factual assertions in a plaintiff's com-
plaint. Id. This ruling conflicts with decisions in other
circuits and threatens to eviscerate the traditional protec-
tion afforded plaintiffs by Rule 12(b) (6).

a. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Lexe-
con’s malicious prosecution claim and its abuse of process
claim. In both instances it went beyond the four corners
of the complaint to resolve disputed issues of fact.

Under Arizona law, a necessary element of Lexecon’s
malicious prosecution claim was that the Lincoln Savings
case had terminated favorably to Lexecon. Under Arizona
law, favorable termination is a question of fact.” Lexecon’s

* See Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1313,

pee (Ariz. 1988); Frey v. Stoneman, 722 P.2d 274, 279 (Ariz.

23

complaint accordingly detailed the circumstances leading
up to the dismissal of Lexecon from that suit and why
those circumstances demonstrated that the suit terminated
favorably to Lexecon. Lexecon C.A. Excerpts 68-75, 89.

After Lexecon’s complaint was filed in Chicago, Judge
Bilby, who had presided over the earlier Lincoln Savings
case in Arizona, somehow obtained a copy and read it
“more out of intellectual curiosity than anything.” Milberg
Weiss C.A. Excerpts 359. Judge Bilby then issued an
extraordinary “order” (see Pet. App. 7a-8a n.2) describ-
ing why he disagreed with certain factual allegations in
Lexecon’s Chicago complaint concerning Lexecon’s dis-
missal from the Lincoln Savings case." Judge Bilby stated
that the purpose of his order was to give “the judge in
Chicago . . . something to rely upon.” Milberg Weiss
C.A. Excerpts 441. Judge Bilby recognized that his
recollection of various off-the-record events made him a
potential witness in the Lexecon case in Chicago, but
stated “that ain’t going to happen.” Jd. at 437. More-
over, when the Lexecon case later came before the JPML,
Judge Bilby sent the JPML a letter recusing himself be-
cause of his “involvement” in resolving the underlying case.

The Ninth Circuit held that the factual characteriza-
tions of the Lincoln Savings litigation in Judge Bilby’s
order “plainly indicated that the litigation was not ‘termi-
nated’ in Lexecon’s favor.” Pet. App. 22a. Yet, as Judge
Kozinski noted below, that “order” amounted to “little
more than testimony” by a recused judge who was not
present during key events described in Lexecon’s com-
plaint and whose statements were not “subject to the

8 The crux of Judge Bilby’s disagreement with Lexecon’s Chicago
complaint focused on the circumstances surrounding Lexecon’s de-
cision to return its professional fees of approximately $700,000
from its Lincoln Savings engagement, which it first announced four
months after its dismissal from Lincoln Savings. In his order,
Judge Bilby expressed his view, contrary to the allegations in
Lexecon’s complaint and what Judge Bilby himself said at the time
he dismissed Lexecon as a “non-settling defendant,” that this pay-
ment was a disguised quid pro quo for Lexecon’s earlier dismissal

from Lincoln Savings.

24

normal safeguards applicable to witnesses.” Pet. App.
47a n.16 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

The treatment of Lexecon’s abuse of process claim was
even more extraordinary. Here, the Ninth Circuit itself
purported to make findings of fact. Under Arizona law,
an abuse of process claim requires proof that legal process
was used primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it
was not designed. The complaint alleged that respondents
brought suit against Lexecon in an attempt to ruin Lexe-
con’s reputation and destroy Professor Fischel’s credibility
as an expert witness. Lexecon was prepared to substan-
tiate those allegations, but was never given an opportunity
to do so.

The Ninth Circuit panel stated:

[T]he task of this court is to determine whether the
addition of Lexecon as a defendant in the [Lincoln
Savings} litigation had as its primary purpose an
objective for which that litigation was not intended
[i.e., “to inflict harm on Lexecon or Fischel”]. We
hold that no such objective existed... .

Pet. App. 27a, 28a. The panel, of course, had no such
task. The job of a court in dealing with a 12(b)(6)
motion is not to make findings of fact, but to determine
whether the allegations in the complaint, which the court
must assume to be true, are sufficient to state a claim.

If factual disputes—particularly disputes about motive—
can be decided conclusively at the motion to dismiss stage
based on a court’s own analysis of public record materials,
plaintiffs have no assurance that they will ever have an
opportunity to prove their case. The Ninth Circuit asked
rhetorically: “[WJhy should the district court be limited
by Lexecon’s selective telling of a story?” Pet. App. 23a.
But that is what pleading is all about. Lexecon gets a
chance to tell its side of the story, and the court must
assume the truth of that story for purposes of a 12(b) (6)
motion.

ma

on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the facts in the public

i that they
be the subject of judicial notice. See, e.g., Lovelace vy.
Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (Sth Cir.
1996); Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Osmose Wood Pre-
serving, Inc., 37 F.3d 1053, 1054 (4th Cir. 1994); Hen-
son v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1994);

Allen v. Westpoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44
Cir. 1991). Ragiems

|
:

is “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid.
201(b); see Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1018 (court may look
to SEC filings at motion to dismiss Stage to determine

truthful; citing Fed. R. Evid. 201); Americanos v. Carter,
74 F.3d 138, 141 (7th Cir.) (court could take notice
of facts that were “easily ascertainable” from the face of a
state statute), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1853 (1996). The
evidence relied upon by the Ninth Circuit here—particu-
larly the after-the-fact perceptions of one participant in
the earlier litigation—was plainly subject to reasonable
dispute. Thus, these courts would not have reached the
conclusion that the Ninth Circuit did here.

Indeed, application of these standards has led the Sixth
Circuit to reach a conclusion directly contrary to the
Ninth Circuit’s on facts similar to those presented here.
In Friedman v. United States, 927 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.
1991), the district court, in deciding a motion to dismiss,
had relied on a prior decision to supply a “factual basis
to consider whether plaintiff had a valid claim.” Id. at

26

261. Unlike the Ninth Circuit—which sanctioned just
such behavior here—the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
court should not have noticed such contested facts at the
motion to dismiss stage. Id. See also Newman & Schwartz
vy. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir.
1996) (concluding that district court “improperly relied
upon extra-complaint information” to resolve a disputed
issue on a 12(b)(6) motion); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d
190, 197 (Sth Cir. 1996) (reversing district court's order
dismissing plaintiff's complaint on grounds that it failed
to accept as true plaintiff's factual allegations and adopted,
instead, evidence outside the pleadings “as fact without
acknowledging any contradiction with the complaint”).

The Ninth Circuit's decision to rely upon public record
evidence to resolve the disputed question of motive is
particularly remarkable. This Court has long established
that determinations as to motive normally require cred-
ibility determinations of the kind that can only be made
after trial. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338
U.S. 338, 341 (1949) (“Findings as to the design, motive
and intent with which men act depend peculiarly upon
the credit given to witnesses by those who see and hear
them.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 US.
273, 287-93 (1982). Accordingly, other circuit courts
have made clear that motive determinations are generally
not suitable for resolution even at summary judgment,
much less on Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Leonard v.
Frankfort Elec. & Water Plant Bd., 752 F.2d 189, 194
(6th Cir. 1985) (“questions of intent or motive are par-
ticularly ill-suited for disposition on summary judgment”) ;
Triad Assocs. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir.
1993) (allegations of intent need only be pleaded gener-
ally and satisfy “notice pleading minimum” to survive
motion to dismiss).

“Formalism has its place,” the Ninth Circuit stated,
“but that place is not here.” Pet. App. 23a. In fact, it is
precisely here—in judging a motion to dismiss a well-

27

pleaded complaint—that formalism does have its place as
a critical protection for plaintiffs who have not yet been
afforded a chance to prove their case. The Court should
accordingly grant certiorari to resolve the intercircuit con-
flict on the appropriate use of public records at the motion
to dismiss stage and to restore Rule 12(b)(6)’s tradi-

tional protections to plaintiffs.°
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL MICHAEL K. KELLOGG
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO Counsel of Record
MICHELE L. OporR1zz1 MARK C. HANSEN

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT JEFFREY A. LAMKEN

190 S. LaSalle Street AUSTIN C. SCHLICK
Chicago, IL 60603 SEAN A. LEV

(312) 701-7201 KELLOGG, HUBER, HANSEN
Kmomrs 8. Guam Topp & EVANS, P.L.L.C.
MAYER, BROWN & PLATT 1301 K Street, N.W.
2000 Pennsylvania Ave.,N.W, Suite 1000 West
Suite 6500 Washington, D.C. 20005
Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 326-7900

(202) 463-2000

Counsel for Petitioners

March 18, 1997

12(b) (6) ruling will become interlocutory. As
late review of the 12(b) (6) decision will take dog nap ony hie

Circuit and, if necessary, be subject to review by this Court at that

APPENDICES

if

%
:
i
E
i

A

ship; PATRICK COUGHLIN; WILLIAM S. LERACH

No. 95-15759
D.C. No. CV-93-01087-JMR

la

A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEXECON INc.; DANIEL R. FISCHEL,

v.

No. 95-16403

D.C. No. CV-93-01087-JMR
SavinGs & LOAN SECURITIES LITIGATION

-

P. Roppy; LeonarD B. Simon; MELVYN

MILBERG WeEIss BERSHAD Hynes & LERACH, a
IN RE: AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION/LINCOLN

2a

LEXECON INC.; DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

Vv.

MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HyNeES & LERACH, a partner-
ship; PATRICK COUGHLIN; WILLIAM S. LERACH; KEVIN
P. Roppy; LEONARD B. Simon; MELVYN I. WEISS;
PaTRicIA HYNES; MICHAEL C. SPENCER; STEPHEN R.
STEINBERG, COTCHETT, ILLSTON & PITRE; JOSEPH

COTCHETT, SUSAN ILLSTON,
Defendants-A ppellees,

Nos. 95-16595; 95-16754
D.C. No. CV-93-01087-JMR

IN RE: AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION/ LINCOLN
Savincs & LOAN SECURITIES LITIGATION

LEXECON INC.; DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
Cross-Appellees,

MILBERG WeEIss BERSHAD Hynes & LERACH, a partner-
ship; PATRICK COUGHLIN; WILLIAM S. LERACH; KEVIN
P. Roppy; LEoNARD B. Simon; MELvyN I. WEISS;
PATRICIA HYNES; MICHAEL C. SPENCER; STEPHEN R.

STEINBERG, Defendants-A ppellees,
Cross-A ppellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding

3a

Argued and Submitted
June 13, 1996—San Francisco, California

Filed December 20, 1996

Before: Joseph T. Sneed, Harry Pregerson, and
Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Sneed;
Dissent by Judge Kozinski

OPINION
SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Of the many consequences of the failure i
Savings and Loan and its parent, American facies
Corporation, the litigation that produced these consoli-
dated appeals was just one. At the heart of these appeals
is a suit by Lexecon Inc, against a number of the attor-
neys who represented the consolidated class of investors
who lost money in the collapse of Lincoln Savings and its
parent. Lexecon is a law and economies consulting firm
that frequently serves as a defense expert in securities
class actions prosecuted by the law firms that are defend-
ants here. Lexecon had prepared several reports for Lin-
coln Savings and American Continental, and consequent!
became a target of the class’ claims. In due course ood
claims were resolved. Thereafter Lexecon and its prin-
cipal, Professor Daniel R. Fischel of the University of
Chicago Law School, brought an action for, inter alia
malicious prosecution and defamation in federal district
~~ for the Northern District of Illinois against several

the class attorneys—Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach and affiliated attorneys ( “Milberg Weiss”), and
Cotchett Illston & Pitre and affiliated attorneys (“Cotch-
ett”). The underlying theory is that Milberg Weiss and

‘The firm of Greenfield & Chimicles ,
tially, but is not involved in these appeals, also a defendant ini-

—

4a

i Lincoln
Cotchett wrongfully dragged Lexecon into the oln
Savings litigation to satisfy a personal vendetta against
Lexecon and Fischel. The Judicial Panel on 4g
Litigation (“JPML”) transferred this case to District 0
Arizona and assigned it to Judge John M. Roll.

The resolution of Lexecon’s claims in Judge Roll’s
court generally was unfavorable, as were its rulings on
Milberg Weiss’ counterattacks. These have resulted =
four appeals to this court which have been consolidated.

In No. 95-16595, Lexecon appeals the adverse judg-
ment on its malicious prosecution and abuse of process
claims and the denial of its motion for leave to amend,
as well as the denial of its motion to remand the case to

i the
Illinois. In No. 95-16403, Lexecon appeals from
final judgment in favor of the Cotchett defendants.

i Weiss appeals, in No. 95-15759, the district
a denial of np se to obtain injunctive relief
against Lexecon’s prosecution of its claims, and, in No.
95-16754, the dismissal of its counterclaims against
Lexecon.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm the judgments of the district court.

I.
SOURCES OF THIS LITIGATION

Following the collapse of Lincoln Savings, investors
residing in many districts of the federal judicial system
brought actions charging violations of federal securities
laws and RICO. In due course, these cases were trans-
ferred to the District of Arizona, consolidated into MDL
834 (sometimes designated as “Shields” or “Lincoln Sav-
ings’) and assigned to Judge Richard Bilby.

As early as 1990, the consolidated plaintiff class, now
represented by (among others) Milberg Weiss and Cot-
chett, sought to add Lexecon and Fischel as defendants by

Sa

filing a fifth amended complaint. Judge Bilby denied
their motion to do so without prejudice. In February
1991, Judge Bilby granted the class’ motion to file a sixth
amended complaint, which added only Lexecon as a
defendant, and alleged that:

during 1987 and 1988 defendant Lexecon was en-
gaged by ACC/Lincoln to perform services, including
writing reports advocating the safeness of Lincoln's
operations and the value of ACC/Lincoln’s assets
which were submitted to federal and state regulators
in order to persuade them not to take regulatory
action adverse to Lincoln.

Following a period of discovery, Lexecon’s motion for
summary judgment was denied. See In re American
Continental Corp./Lincoln S&L Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp.
1424, 1448-49 (D. Ariz. 1992). Judge Bilby found there
existed material issues as to whether Lexecon’s reports
were false and misleading, and whether Lexecon possessed
reckless scienter as to Lincoln’s fraudulent activities. In
March 1992, the trial commenced. Almost four months
later, and shortly before the close of evidence, Lexecon
moved for a directed verdict. Judge Bilby deaied the
motion, again finding a jury question as to the level of
Lexecon’s knowledge of, and involvement in, Lincoln
Savings’ actions and practices. |

On June 22, 1992, the class attorneys and Lexecon’s
counsel met in Judge Bilby’s chambers to consider a means
by which Lexecon’s exposure to a jury verdict could be
resolved without harmful consequences to its professional
credibility and reputation. In furtherance of this end,
Lexecon urged that any agreement that might be reached
not be designated a “settlement.” To accommodate Lexe-
con’s concern, the term “resolution” was adopted. The
terms of the resolution provided: First, that the court
would enter an order dismissing Lexecon without prejudice;
second, that the parties would sign a stipulation dismissing
Lexecon with prejudice, which stipulation would be held

—_

6a

by Judge Bilby to be entered on the court’s record only if
a new suit was initiated against Lexecon on the same
claims; and, third, that Lexecon would provide class serv-
ices as a subcontractor to Touche Ross who, as another
defendant in MDL 834, had settled its liability for $7.5
million. The resolution also placed restrictions on class
counsel’s ability to cross-examine Lexecon experts in future
lawsuits about Lexecon’s involvement in MDL 834.

This unusual arrangement was implemented, although
because of disagreements between Lexecon and class coun-
sel, Lexecon discharged its obligations by turning over to
the class the approximately $700,000 it had received in
professional fees from Lincoln Savings and American
Continental, rather than performing the class services.
This discharge was accomplished in October 1992.

Those who then thought that the concerns of Lexecon
had been relieved were wrong. On November 25, 1992,
Lexecon filed in the Northern District of Illinois (Lexe-
con’s home state) the action now before us on appeal.
The complaint set forth claims for malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, tortious interference, defamation, and
common law and statutory commercial disparagement.
In June 1993, the JPML transferred the case to the Dis-
trict of Arizona for consolidation with MDL 834, and
assigned it to Judge Roll because Judge Bilby had recused
himself.

Judge Bilby’s recusal obviously resulted in part from his
reaction on learning of Lexecon’s suit in Illinois. He
arranged a telephonic hearing held on December 7, 1992,
and therein charged Lexecon with what he viewed as its
incorrect portrayal of the resolution of its role as a de-
fendant in MDL 834. Following this hearing and the
submission of letter briefs by the parties, Judge Bilby
placed an order in the record of MDL 834 in which he
found portions of Lexecon’s [Illinois complaint to be “a
false description of the conditions under which Lexecon

7a

was dismissed from this case.”* The key portions of
his order disputed Lexecon’s characterization of its pay-
ment to the Lincoln Savings class as “voluntary,” and of

2 The text of this order reads as follows:

On August 12, 1992, Lexecon Inc. was dismissed from the
above captioned matter. As this dismissal was without preju-
dice the Court retained jurisdiction and uses its powers now
to clarify the terms and conditions of that dismissal. More-
over, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) the Court of its own
initiative may correct any errors or omissions of the record.
This Order in no way “rewrites” history, rather, it serves to
clarify the terms and conditions of the Class Plaintiffs and
Lexecon’s agreement. This act of Court is required due to
certain allegations made by Lexecon in Lezecon Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Spechrie & Learch [sic], Case No. 92 C 7768
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 1992), a suit filed against Class Plaintiffs’
counsel in the Northern District of Illinois.

Specifically, in that Complaint Lexecon alleges :

63. In June 1992, after all the evidence was in, but before
closing arguments, Defendants finally agreed to dismiss
Lexecon, implicitly acknowledging the lack of merit in
their complaint.

64. At the same time, because it believed that its profes-
sional services had been misused by Lincoln and [Charles
H.] Keating [Jr.], Lexecon voluntarily undertook to bene-
fit the class by providing claims administration services
(computerizing mailing lists, processing claims and the
like). When Defendants’ complaints to the court made it
impossible for Lexecon to provide these services, Lexecon
decided to benefit the class instead by voluntarily return-
ing the professional fees paid to it by Lincoln and Keat-

92. The Shields case was terminated in Lexecon’s and
Fischel’s favor.

Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Spechrie & Learch
[sic]. Complaint, {| 63, § 64 and {| 92.

The Court finds these paragraphs to be a false description of
the conditions under which Lexecon was dismissed from this
case. Although counsel for Lexecon at hearing argued that
7198 [sic) is pled merely to satisfy one of the elements of

the resolution as a termination of the litigation in Lexe-
con’s favor:

malicious prosecution, it does not meet with reality and is
factually incorrect.

The Class Plaintiffs/Lexecon resolution was a bargained-for
exchange wherein consideration flowed both ways. Lexecon
agreed to perform through Touche Ross certain administrative
services to the Class Plaintiffs. Subsequently, Lexecon paid
approximately $900,000 in cash instead of performing the ser-
vices. (footnote omitted)

In return, Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed to dismiss Lexecon from
the case without prejudice and to not cross-examine the Lexe-
con experts about any “settlement” by Lexecon of the case.
The fact that a case was filed and subsequently resolved with-
out mention of the terms was always to be a proper subject of
cross-examination. This aspect of the resolution was included
because Lexecon and Mr. Fischel were concerned that if the
term “settlement” was used, Lexecon experts would be open
to in-depth cross-examination in courts across the country with
consequent injury to its business. Hence, the term “settle-
ment,” and the connotations it might imply, was explicitly
avoided and the term “resolution” used instead.

Counsel for Lexecon has furnished the Court with a portion
of a transcript from the Eastern District of Tennessee, North-
ern District in a case captioned, FDIC v. Ernst & Whitney,
CIV 8-87-8364 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 1992) as evidence of Class
Plaintiffs’ Counsels’ bad faith breach of the resolution. A copy
of this transcript is attached as Exhibit “A”.

It is the finding of this Court that Mr. Spencer cross-
examined the Lexecon expert in accordance with the agree-
ment reached with Lexecon in MDL 834 in every respect. Mr.
Spencer never made any reference to the MDL 834 settlement
before the jury in the Tennessee case, nor asked any questions
in that case concerning a settlement in MDL 834. Indeed,
Ms. Brickell on redirect, made the point that the FDIC had
hired Lexecon after the Lincoln project. As long as Plaintiffs’
counsels’ future conduct is in accordance with Mr. Spencer’s
cross-examination in the Tennessee case, then the Lexecon
resolution will not have been breached.

Moreover, under no circumstances was the Class Plaintiffs/
Lexecon compromise a resolution in favor of either party or,
more importantly, an adjudication on the merits. Instead, it
was a bargained-for resolution of a disputed matter from
which both parties benefited.

9a

The Class Plaintiffs/Lexecon resolution was a bar-
gained-for exchange wherein considerations flowed
both ways.

Moreover, under no circumstances was the Class
Plaintiffs/Lexecon compromise a resolution in favor
of either party or, more importantly, an adjudication
on the merits. Instead, it was a bargained-for-resolu-
tion of a disputed matter from which both parties
benefited.

Lexecon’s attempt to appeal this order to this court
failed because there was as yet no final judgment in
MDL 834. Lexecon took no appeal from the final judg-
ment subsequently entered in March 1994.

Meanwhile, Judge Roll had begun his work on the case.
In November 1993 he dismissed Lexecon’s malicious
prosecution and abuse of process claims. /n re American
Continental Corp./Lincoln S&L Sec. Litig., 845 F. Supp.
1377, 1383-86 (D. Ariz. 1993). All the defendants in this
case then answered, and Milberg Weiss filed counterclaims
for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, and
promissory estoppel. Discovery proceeded, followed by
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

In March 1994, before Judge Roll resolved the sum-
mary judgment motions, final judgment was entered in
MDL 834. Lexecon thereupon moved under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 for a remand of its case to the Northern District
of Illinois. Judge Roll instructed Lexecon to renew this
motion after the close of discovery, which Lexecon did in
November 1994. In response, Milberg Weiss moved to
make the transfer to Arizona permanent under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404(a) and 1406, and additionally moved for pre-
liminary and permanent injunctions against the pursuit of
this action, as well as all other claims made by Lexecon.
Judge Roll denied the latter motion, and Milberg Weiss
appealed. No. 95-15759.

10a

Prior to ruling on the remand and transfer motions,
Judge Roll granted summary judgment against Lexecon
on its claims of tortious interference, commercial dispar-
agement, and defamation based on the dissemination of
Milberg Weiss’ sixth amended complaint. Jn re American
Continental/Lincoln S&L Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp. 1388
(D. Ariz. 1995). Lexecon’s defamation claim based on
a sentence in a letter written by a Milberg Weiss partner,
Kevin P. Roddy, to, and which appeared in, The National
Law Journal, survived. Judge Roll also dismissed Milberg
Weiss’ counterclaims. /d. at 1397. Because the Cotchett
defendants, who were never Lexecon’s principal target in
this litigation, had no part in the Roddy letter, Judge
Roll entered a final judgment in their favor pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Lexecon timely appealed that
judgment. No. 95-16403.

Thereafter, Judge Roll entered an order denying Lexe-
con’s motion to return the case to the JPML for remand
to the Northern District of Illinois, and granting the Mil-
berg Weiss motion to make the transfer to the District of
Arizona permanent. Lexecon appealed the remand and
transfer decision to this court by means of a petition
for writ of mandamus, which was denied without prejudice
as to Lexecon’s raising the issue on direct appeal.

The climactic event in Judge Roll’s court occurred on
July 25-28, 1995, when Lexecon’s defamation claim based
on the Roddy letter to The National Law Journal was
tried to a jury. The jury verdict favored Milberg Weiss.
Lexecon appealed the subsequently entered final judgment,
in particular the district court’s transfer order and its
dismissal of Lexecon’s malicious prosecution and abuse of
process claims. No. 95-16595. Milberg Weiss cross-
appealed the dismissal of its counterclaims. No. 95-16754.

The order in which this court will address the issues
before us on this appeal is as follows:

lla

ae

. The permanent transfer of Lexecon’s case from
the Northern District of Illinois to the District of
Arizona.

2. The denial of Milberg Weiss’ motion for prelimi-
nary and permanent injunctions against the pur-
suit by Lexecon of its claims against Milberg
Weiss and Cotchett.

3. The dismissal of Lexecon’s malicious prosecution

and abuse of process claims.

4. The dismissal of Milberg Weiss’s counterclaims.
I.

THE PERMANENT TRANSFER TO
THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Nos. 95-16595 and 95-16403

The JPML transferred Lexecon’s action to the District

of Arizona pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a), which states:

When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts,
such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section. . . .
Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings to the district from which it was trans-
ferred unless it shall have been previously termi-
nated[.]
The decision of the court below to transfer Lexecon’s sole
surviving claim to itself for trial, and its refusal to refer the
case to the JPML for remand to Illinois, are vigorously
challenged by Lexecon—and not for the first time.

Prior to the trial on the defamation claim, Lexecon
brought before this court a petition for a writ of manda-

l2a

mus seeking: (1) to vacate the district court’s order per-
manently transferring the remaining claim to the District
of Arizona; and (2) to direct the district court to refer
the case to the JPML for remand to the Northern District
of Illinois. In an unpublished disposition, this court denied
the petition and, while recognizing that Lexecon’s argu-
ments based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407 and 1404(a) might
not lack merit, pointed out that they were contrary to
existing case law and Multidistrict Litigation Rule 14(b).
We explicitly recognized that the issue could be raised in
an appeal on the merits. The dissent vigorously argued
that 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) authorizes the JPML to transfer
a case for pretrial proceedings only, precluding a section
1404(a) transfer for a trial on the merits by the transferee
court to itself, and that Multidistrict Litigation Rule 14(b)
lacks a statutory basis. We now revisit these issues.

We review the district court’s transfer under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) for an abuse of discretion. Lou v. Belzberg,
834 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 993 (1988). We review de novo the district court’s
interpretation of its duties under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
Monrad v. FDIC, 62 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1995).

A. Authority for the Section 1404(a) Transfer

The power of a section 1407 transferee court to transfer
a case to itself for trial has been recognized, explicitly or
implicitly, by the courts that have considered the issue."
Patricia D. Howard, the Clerk of the JPML, has stated:

8 See, e.g., In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act
Litig., 73 F.8d 528, 582 n.7 (4th Cir. 1996); Washington Pub.
Util. Group v. United States Dist. Ct., 848 F.2d 319, 326 (9th Cir.
1988) ; Jn re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1988, 829 F.2d
1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987), af’d, 490 U.S. 122 (1989); Kohr v.
Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-
25 (2d Cir. 1971); Matter of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodia-
lysis Catheter Patent Litig., 750 F. Supp. 330, 382 (N.D. Ill.
1990) ; In re Air Crash Disaster, 476 F. Supp. 445, 450 (J.P.M.L.
1879) ; In re CBS Color Tube, 342 F. Supp. 1408, 1404-05 (J.P.M.L.
1972).

l3a

Although the Panel's power for the most part is
limited to transfer for pretrial only, it is

common for a transferee judge assigned by the Panel
to transfer to his ow or another district under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406 the actions which were

previously assigned to him or her by the Panel under
Section 1407.*

Permitting the transferee court to transfer a case to itself
upon completion of its pretrial work often promotes effi-
ciency in the disposition of the case or cases. The time
required for a new judge to become acquainted with the
litigation is eliminated, as is the possibility of conflicting
or duplicative rulings and proceedings. The above rea-
sons strongly favored trial by the transferee court in this
case, where pretrial proceedings left only one claim to be
resolved by a trial that was scheduled to begin imme-
diately and conclude in four days.

Moreover, the transferee court is empowered to dis-
pose of the cases transferred to it by means of summary
judgment or dismissal. Therefore, logic supports its abil-

* Patricia D. Howard, “A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation,” 124
F.R.D. 479, 479 (1989) ; see also Stanley A. Weigel, “The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Trans-
feree Courts,” 78 F.R.D. 575, 581 n.42 (1977); Moore’s Federal
Practice, Manual for Complex Litigation { 31.18 at 251 n.785 (3d
ed. 1995) (“Although transfer by the panel under § 1407 is only for
pretrial purposes, the transferee court may find it appropriate to
transfer cases to itself for trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or § 1406.”).

5 Judge Kozinski, in his dissent, decries the fact that in multi-
district litigation cases concerns for judieial economy trump the
usual deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum. We fail to see
the problem here. Judicial economy is extremely important in mul-
tidistrict litigation: sufficiently important that Congress enacted
a special statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, to ensure that in multidistrict
cases the interest in judicial economy would not be overridden by
deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum.

* See, e.g., In re Food Lion, Inc., 78 F.3d at 582; In re Korean
Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1178; Weigel, “The Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation,” 78 F.R.D. at 582-83.

l4a

ity to dispose of the case, at least under the circumstances
present here, by trial.

Despite longstanding practice and the efficiency argu-
ments, Lexecon argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) re-
quires remand for trial. The provision states in relevant
part:

Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings to the district from which it was trans-
ferred unless it shall have been previously terminated
(emphasis added). -

Equally specific is JPML R. 14(b), promulgated under
the authority granted the JPML by 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f):

Each transferred action that has not been terminated
in the transferee district court shall be remanded by
the Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless
ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the
transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404
(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406.

This conflict between statute and rule, while apparent,
is not real.’ Congress in enacting section 1407 in 1968

™ The dissent contends that Judge Roll contravened the text of
28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1407(a) by denying Lexecon’s motion
to return the case to the JPML and granting Milberg Weiss’ mo-
tion to transfer the case permanently to the District of Arizona.
In making this argument, the dissent conveniently ignores the text
of JPML Rule 14(b), which clearly interprets section 1404(a) to
authorize the transferee judge to transfer the case to the transferee
district. The dissent also conveniently ignores the text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(f), which explicitly grants the JPML broad authority to
“prescribe rules,” such as Rule 14(b), as long as those rules are
“not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f).

Implicit in the dissent’s argument, then, is a claim that Rule
14(b) is inconsistent with sections 1404(a) and 1407(a). The
dissent is far too quick to accuse the JPML of violating the statute
that created it. It is useful to recall that the JPML consists of
“seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time

15a

was concerned with the emerging phenomenon of com-
plex, multidistrict litigation. Its focus was upon creating
and defining the functions of the JPML, not on redefin-
ing or circumscribing the traditional powers of the district
court to which a case has been transferred. This is made
reasonably clear by the House Report accompanying the
proposed statute; that report stated that the bill “affects
only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. It
would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude
the possibility of transfer under other Federal statutes.”
H. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N, 1898, 1900. The report continued,
id. at 1901-02:

The subsection requires that transferred cases be
remanded to the originating district at the close of
coordinated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not
therefore, include the trial of cases in the consoli-
dated proceedings. The experience of the Coordinat-
ing Committee [for Multiple Litigation of the U.S.
District Courts, established by the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States] was limited to pretrial
matters, and the committee consequently considers it
desirable to keep this legislative proposal within the
confines of that experience. . . . Of course, 28
U.S.C. 1404, providing for changes of venue gen-
erally, is available in those instances where transfer
of a case for all purposes is desirable.

Thus, Congress, because of the nation’s limited experi-
ence with multidistrict litigation, sought to design only
the powers and duties of its new creation, the JPML.

by the Chief Justice of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).
Respect for our brethren, and their longstanding practice, requires
us to presume, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, that
the rules promulgated pursuant to section 1407(f) are “not in-
consistent with Acts of Congress.” The alleged inconsistencies
cited by the dissent are not sufficiently glaring to overcome that
presumption. Hence, we conclude that Rule 14(b) is a valid exer-
cise of the JPML’s rulemaking authority, and that Judge Roll’s
actions in this case were fully justified.

l6a

Despite some uncertainty about this matter initially, the
power of the transferee court to transfer a case to itself
for trial has been reinforced by its consistent recognition
in practice. Recourse to such sustained practice, particu-
larly when approved by the JPML, is a legitimate aid to
statutory interpretation. See United States v. American
Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940). In the case
before us, this reading also strongly promotes judicial
efficiency, which was a primary purpose of the legislation
that created the JPML. See H. Rep. at 2, 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1899.

B. The Procedures Available to Initiate Remand

Additional insight into the apparently mandatory lan-
guage of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) is provided by JPML Rule
14(c). That rule imposes the duty on the JPML to:

consider remand of each transferred action . . . at or
before the conclusion of coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings on (i) motion of any party, (ii)
suggestion of the transferee district court, or (iii)
the Panel’s own initiative[.]

The absence of any such “motion” by a party, “sugges-
tion” by the transferee court, or “initiative” of the Panel
appears to leave the case in the care of the transferee
court. Under these circumstances the transferee court
must complete the litigation, even if it involves a trial,
to avoid the absurdity of indefinitely suspended litigation,
the pretrial proceedings of which have come to a close.
Therefore, where the transferee court has declined to
suggest a remand, the JPML has not ordered a remand
on its own initiative, and the litigant has failed to seek a
remand before the JPML, the transferee court is entitled
to terminate the proceedings by conducting the trial.
Besides setting out a procedure by which the JPML’s
duty to remand is triggered, this rule thus gives effect to
the final clause of section 1407(a) by rendering its man-

17a

datory clause inoperative where the action has been
terminated, even by trial.

That is the precise position in which the case rests in
this appeal. The JPML’s duty to remand was not acti-
vated. To repeat, the trigger to such activation was never
pulled. Neither the district court nor the JPML sought to
remand the case. Moreover, Lexecon, in lieu of moving
the JPML for a remand, brought its motion before the
district court, and now appeals to us for a remedy. Neither
this procedure, nor its earlier petition for a writ of manda-
mus, amounts to a motion for remand brought before the

JPML. Lexecon failed to seek succor from the one source

that easily could have granted it if it so chose.’ The
district court, therefore, properly proceeded to conduct a
trial on the single remaining, defamation claim, following
the completion of the pretrial proceedings.
C. Propriety of the Section 1404(a) Transfer

Besides arguing that the district court’s transfer to
itself was without authority by virtue of section 1407,
Lexecon also argues that it was improper under section
1404(a). Lexecon argues that any incremental gain in
efficiency was at its expense, and that it was prejudiced
by being dragged from Chicago, Illinois, to Arizona and
forced to appear before Judge Roll, who was unfamiliar

with MDL 834 and who improperly proceeded to “dis-
mantle” its case. We disagree.

* The dissent argues that Lexecon should not be faulted for its
failure to move the JPML for remand, because Lexecon knew that
the JPML would probably have denied the motion. Even assuming
that Lexecon’s prospects for success were slim, the fact remains
that Rule 14(c) gave Lexecon the option to present its case to the
JPML, including the arguments advanced by Judge Kozinski in
his dissent. Lexecon chose not to pursue that option. In making
this choice, Lexecon also knew, or should have known, that the
option would expire, pursuant to Rule 14(b), if and when Judge
Roll decided to transfer the case permanently to the District of

18a

Lexecon, to put it gently, was no stranger to the District
of Arizona; its participation in MDL 834 precludes any
such claim. Moreover, Judge Roll had become quite
familiar with the case by the time of his decision to
transfer the trial of the defamation claim to his own
district. Finally, Judge Roll’s dismissal of most of Lexc-
con’s claims is not a ground for showing prejudice.

After a careful examination of the record and considera-
tion of the arguments, we find no reason to question the
district court’s authority to try Lexecon’s defamation claim
in the District of Arizona, or the fairness of doing so.

Ill.

THE DENIAL OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT
BY MILBERG WEISS

No. 95-15759

After final judgment was entered in MDL 834 and
Lexecon renewed its motion for a suggestion of remand,
Milberg Weiss sought injunctive relief on the ground that
the final judgment was res judicata as to Lexecon’s
claims. Milberg Weiss requested:

(1) an order preliminarily enjoining plaintiffs .. .
from prosecuting or otherwise pursuing against the
Milberg Defendants, in any other judicial district or
forum, any claims or other matters that were raised
or could have~ been raised in the Lincoln Savings
action .. .; and (2) an order permanently enjoining
plaintiffs from prosecuting or otherwise pursuing those
claims or other matters in any court or forum.
The district court concluded that Lexecon’s claims were
not precluded, and denied the motion.

We must uphold the denial of injunctive relief “unless
the court incorrectly applied the law, relied on clearly
erroneous factual findings, or otherwise abused its discre-
tion.” Contract Serv. Network, Inc. v. Aubry, 62 F.3d
294, 297 (9th Cir. 1995). We review de novo issues of

19a

law underlying the denial, including the determination that
songs 8 Claims were not barred by res judicata. Id. We

events occur which prevent the appellate court from t-
ing any effective relief even if the dispute is decided in
favor of the appellant.” Holloway v. United States, 789

B. Res Judicata

Milberg Weiss supports its effort to enjoin Lexecon
arguing that the MDL 834 litigation seutiond pei
claims by reason of res judicata. This considerably over-
states the preclusive effect of Judge Bilby’s actions.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, “{a] final judgment
on te tonite of an estan pasibases tee partie oo ak
privies from relitigating issues that were or could have
been raised in that action.” Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981). Judge Bilby’s action
pertaining to Lexecon was to dismiss the claims of the
class against Lexecon without prejudice, in accordance
with the parties’ resolution. We have held that a dismissal

20a

without prejudice lacks res judicata effect. In re Corey,
892 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 815 (1990). Nor was Judge Bilby’s subsequent
order of December 31, 1992 (see supra n.2), a judgment
on the merits of the claims against Lexecon, That order
merely clarified the terms of the resolution, indeed empha-
sized that there had been no judgment on the merits of
the claims against Lexecon. .

Lexecon’s reliance on Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958
F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1050
(1993), and Golden v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 786 F.2d
1425 (9th Cir. 1986), is therefore misplaced. Those cases
develop the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act, which allows a district court to enjoin litigation in
other courts if such litigation is barred by res judicata.”
Because Lexecon’s claims are not barred by res judicata,
those cases are not controlling.

C. The Requirements for Injunctive Relief

Even if Lexecon’s claims were barred by res judicata,
Milberg Weiss has still failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion in declining to grant injunctive
relief. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must
show either “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits and
the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) the existence
of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of
hardships tipping in the movant’s favor.” MAI Sys. Corp.
v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 516 (9th Cir.
1993) (internal quotation omitted), cert. dismissed, 114
S. Ct. 671 (1994). At the time the Milberg Weiss’ motion
was filed, no such showing could be made. At that time,
February 6, 1995, Milberg Weiss had also moved for a

1© See 28 U.S.C. § 2288 (“A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”’) ;
Western Sys., 958 F.2d at 871; Golden, 786 F.2d at 1427.

2la

permanent transfer of this case to the Arizona District, and
Judge Roll was poised to rule on Lexecon’s motion to refer
the case to the JPML for remand. His rulings thereafter
were generally favorable to Milberg Weiss. Even had these
rulings been adverse to Milberg Weiss, it could have ap-
pealed them to this court; therefore, it could not show
either the possibility of irreparable injury or that the bal-
ance of hardships tipped in its favor. See United States v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 699 (D.N.J. 1989)
(refusing to enjoin itself from entering proposed consent
decree where appealability of the decree defeated any
claim of irreparable harm). Nor was there any indication
that Lexecon was likely to initiate an entirely new lawsuit
on the same claims in a different forum. In short, Milberg
Weiss failed to establish the conditions prerequisite to the
issuance of the preliminary and permanent injunctions it
sought.”
IV.

THE DISMISSAL OF THE MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION AND ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIMS
Nos. 95-16595 and 95-16403

We now turn to Lexecon’s appeal from the dismissal by
the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of its
malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims. Our
review of this dismissal is de novo, with all factual allega-
tions taken as true and construed in the light most favor-
able to Lexecon. See Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097,
1099 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W.
3605 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-1385). The district
court's denial of Lexecon’s motion for leave to amend its
complaint is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United

1) Lexecon requests attorneys’ fees for a frivolous appeal under
Fed. R. App. P. 88. However, Rule 38, as amended effective Decem-
ber 1, 1994, requires that any such request be made by a separately
filed motion. Without commenting on the merits of its request,
we therefore deny Lexecon’s request without prejudice to its filing
a separate motion for attorneys’ fees.

_ 22a

States v. County of San Diego, 53 F.3d 965, 969 n.6
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 183 (1995).

A. Malicious Prosecution

instituted a civil action which was (2) motivated by
malice, (3) begun without probable cause, (4) termi-
nated in plaintiff's favor and (5) damaged y
Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 758 P.2d
1313, 1319 (Ariz. 1988). Under Arizona law, probable
cause requires that the plaintiff honestly believe in the
lawsuit’s possible merits and that the belief be objectively
reasonable. /d. (citing Restatement (2d) of Torts § 675
comment c; Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 120
at 893 (Sth ed. 1984).

There is no dispute here that Lexecon has properly
pyar ngs hanage pcan ye. ung 2 ramen

as well its claim fails nonethless. Jods Eli's sulian io
MDL 834 including his order of December 31, 1992 (see
supra n.2) plainly indicated that the litigation was not
“terminated” in Lexecon’s favor.

Lexecon attempts to avoid this roadblock to its mali-
cious prosecution claim by insisting that the district court
erred in examining the MDL 834 record in ruling on
Milberg Weiss’ 12(b)(6) motion.” In general, material
Outside the pleadings cannot be considered in ruling on a
motion to dismiss, unless the motion is treated as one for
summary judgment and the parties are “given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such

23a

a motion by Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Jacobsen
v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 F.3d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir.

tion to the matters at issue, may be looked to when ruling
on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Shaw v. Hahn,
F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
(1995); Henson v. CSC Credit Serv., 29 F.3d 2
(7th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria
Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248
(9th Cir. 1992).

It would be absurdly formal to hold that Judge Bilby’s
published opinion in MDL 834 and his December 31,

et ee ee ee ee

the claim.” Frey v. Stoneman, 722 P.2d 274, 277 (Ariz.
1986) (en banc). “If entry of summary judgment was

prosecution action.” Jd. at 278-79 (internal quotation
omitted). Here, the avoidance of the use of the term

24a

“settlement” in favor of the alternative “resolution” does
not alter that result.

Lexecon urges us to rely on Bradshaw, 758 P.2d at
1321, which held that a settlement may be a favorable
termination depending on the surrounding facts. Lexecon
argues that favorable termination is a question of fact
that cannot be resolved on a 12(b)(6) motion. We dis-
agree. In Bradshaw, the settlement terms called for the
plaintiff to withdraw its action, pay the defendants
$60,000, and stipulate to a dismissal with prejudice.
Here, it was the defendant Lexecon that paid $700,000
in exchange for its dismissal from MDL 834. No addi-
tional factual development is necessary. The circum-
stances of this case do not indicate that the MDL 834
litigation against Lexecon terminated in its favor. It fol-
lows that Lexecon’s malicious prosecution claim against
both Milberg Weiss and Cotchett fails.

It also follows that we need not consider the argument
of Milberg Weiss that the tort of malicious prosecution
has been reshaped by First Amendment principles devel-
oped in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine ™ and Professional
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 113 §. Ct. 1920, 1925 (1993) (“PREI”). Milberg
Weiss argues that these decisions have raised the thresh-
old for access to a malicious prosecution claim by requir-
ing the plaintiff to show that the defendant's earlier suit
was “objectively baseless” and one in which “no reason-
able litigant could realistically expect success on the
merits.” ** This formulation, if applied, would alter the

18 See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381

25a

meaning under Arizona law of the “probable cause” ele-
ment, and to some degree the “malice” element, by elim-
inating the subjective, honest belief requirement.

Noerr-Pennington and PREI were federal antitrust
cases that did not address the state law tort of malicious
prosecution. In this circuit, the application of this line of
cases to state law claims has been unpredictable. For
example, the PREI objective baselessness standard was
not applied to a National Labor Relations Board decision
that a libel suit brought by an employer against a union
was an unfair labor practice. PREI was said not to be on
point. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d
1085, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other hand, a
timber company counterclaim against an environmental
organization for abuse of process, based on that organi-
zation’s efforts to enjoin logging on the timber company’s
land, was required to meet the heightened pleading stand-
ard associated with Noerr-Pennington. Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531, 533-35 (9th
Cir. 1991).

The rationalizing principle of these cases is unclear,
unless it rests on a judicial preference for certain types
of litigation that appear to promote specifically recog-
nized public interests. To encourage vigilent pursuit of
these interests, it may be thought proper to protect them
against threats of malicious prosecution by raising the
barrier to access to that remedial tort action. Milberg
Weiss argues, in substance if not in form, that the class
action on behalf of Lincoln Savings investors easily con-
forms to that rationalization. Innocent investors in im-
properly operated savings and loan institutions and their
legal representatives are as deserving of protection from
the threat of malicious prosecution by those who have
rendered financial services to such institutions as are
plaintiffs in antitrust or environmental proceedings.

While there is a certain appeal in such an approach, we
decline to rest our rejection of Lexecon’s malicious prose-

26a

cution on this ground." We hold only that the MDL 834
litigation against Lexecon was not terminated in its favor.
Therefore, under Arizona law, Lexecon has failed to state
a claim of malicious prosecution.

=

B. Abuse of Process

Abuse of process is described by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 682 (1977) as follows:

One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or
civil, against another primarily to accomplish a pur-
pose for which it is not designed, is subject to lia-
bility to the other for harm caused by the abuse of
process.
This definition is accepted by the Arizona courts. See
Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. App.
1982); Morn v. City of Phoenix, 730 P.2d 873, 875
(Ariz. App. 1986). Plaintiff must show that defendants
(1) committed a willful act in the use of judicial process

4% There is now extensive case law on both sides of the question
whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine brings first amendment
principles to bear on state law tort claims. See, ¢.g., State of South
Dakota v. Kansas City Southern Indus., 880 F.2d 40, 50-51 (8th
Cir. 1989) (applying first amendment analysis to a state claim
for tortious interference with contractual relations), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1028 (1990); Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home,
Ine. v. Wells, 889 F.2d 155, 159-60 (8d Cir. 1988) (applying defa-
mation and Noerr-Pennington analyses to tort claim based on de-
fendants’ actions in alerting authorities to plaintiff’s violations of
law); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 6438, 649 (7th
Cir. 1983) (applying Noerr-Pennington and its sham litigation
exception “to protect the First Amendment right to petition
against claims of tortious interference with business relation-
ships”) ; Sierra Club v. Butz, 849 F. Supp. 984, 988-89 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (applying first amendment analyses of Noerr-Pennington
and defamation cases to state counterclaim for interference with
advantageous relationship); Florida Fern Growers, Inc. v. Con-
cerned Citizens of Putnam County, 616 So.2d 562, 569 (Fla. 1993)
(declining to follow Sierra Club v. Butz). The time may come
when this circuit must speak definitively on the question. How-
ever, this is not the right time, or the right case in which, to do so.

27a

(2) for an improper ulterior purpose. Nienstedt, 651
P.2d at 881.

The gravamen of the tort is not “the wrongful procure-
ment of legal process or the wrongful initiation of crim-
inal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no
matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than
that which it was designed to accomplish.” Restatement
§ 682, comment a; see also Morn, 730 P.2d at 875.

Accordingly, the task of this court is to determine
whether the addition of Lexecon as a defendant in the
MDL 834 litigation had as its primary purpose an ob-
jective for which that litigation was not intended. We
hold that no such objective existed in MDL 834.

It is clear that the primary purpose of the MDL 834
litigation was to recover from the collapse of American
Continental/Lincoln Savings on behalf of the investors
therein such assets as was possible under the law. Lexe-
con, of course, does not deny that. Rather, its focus is
upon its inclusion as a defendant. It asserts that class
counsel’s primary purpose in attempting to add Lexecon
and Fischel as defendants was “(1) to extract false testi-
mony implicating other Shields defendants, (2) prevent
‘Arthur Young & Co. from using Lexecon as an expert in
Shields, and (3) ‘to make Lexecon . . . far less attractive
to potential clients as expert witnesses.’” In re American
Continental, 845 F. Supp. at 1382.

Lexecon alleges that after Milberg Weiss sought to
file a fifth amended complaint adding both Lexecon and
Fischel as defendants, it offered to dismiss the motion in
exchange for “false testimony” against defend-
ants. Lexecon refused, and leave to file this fifth
complaint was subsequently denied. The alleged attempt
to extract false testimony therefore never amounted to

file their sixth amended complaint, the attempt to coerce
false testimony was not repeated. Therefore, Lexecon

28a

cannot show that the primary purpose behind Milberg
Weiss’ use of process was to coerce false testimony.

Lexecon also points to additional acts of Milberg Weiss
that it claims amounted to an abuse of process. Some of
these acts, such as the unsuccessful motion to file the
fifth amended complaint, occurred “pre-process,” and
were therefore not actionable.** Others were collateral to
the MDL 834 litigation, such as Milberg Weiss attorneys’
use of that litigation to impeach Lexecon expert witnesses
during cross-examination in separate and distinct litiga-
tion. Such cross-examination, so long as it conformed
to the terms of the MDL 834 resolution, was not improper
and therefore cannot form the basis of an abuse of proc-
ess claim.

The acts alleged by Lexecon did not have as their
primary purpose to inflict harm on Lexecon or Fischel.
Nor did the addition of Lexecon as an MDL 834 defend-
ant to assert that Lexecon bore some responsibility for
those investors’ losses constitute an abuse of
Lexecon’s abuse of process claim was therefore properly
dismissed.”"

V.

THE DISMISSAL OF MILBERG WEISS’
COUNTERCLAIMS
No. 95-16754

The Milberg Weiss counterclaims alleged fraud, breach
of contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel.

%* Although Arizona courts define “process” broadly, Nienstedt,
651 P.2d at 880, we agree with the district court that it is not
read so broadly as to include a failed attempt to sue in which
process never issued.

7 Examination of Lexecon’s proposed second amended complaint
shows that it merely reiterates the same claims in new language.
Because leave to amend is inappropriate where the amendment
dos not solve the legal deficiencies in the complaint, the district

did not abuse its discretion in denying Lexecon’s motion for
Jackson, 902 F.8d at 1387.

f
Y

29a

The alleged source of these claims is the negotiations that
led to the resolution of Lexecon’s exposure to liability in
MDL 834. We review their dismissal de novo. Gotcher,
66 F.3d at 1099; Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 469
(9th Cir. 1995).

First, Milberg Weiss alleged that while Lexecon said
it was negotiating the “resolution” to avoid damaging
cross-examination about MDL 834 in future cases, its true
reason was to preserve its ability to sue class counsel for
malicious prosecution by avoiding an unfavorable jury
verdict. The district court properly dismissed this claim.
While Milberg Weiss is a party in the litigation now before
this court, it was not a party in the MDL 834 litigation;
rather, it was a counsel to the class on whose behalf the
proceedings against Lexecon were brought. As the district
court put it: “Whatever harm resulting from the resolu-
tion was sustained by the class, not by class counsel.” In
re American Continental, 884 F. Supp. at 1397.

Second, Milberg Weiss argues that during the negotia-
tions, Lexecon represented that it had no applicable in-
surance when in fact it did have such insurance, and that
it relied on that representation in agreeing to the resolu-

pleadings, or to request leave to amend. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a).

i

CONCLUSION

The judgments in Nos. 95-15759, 95-16403, 95-16595,
and 95-16754 are affirmed.

2 see a

30a

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Since the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML) was created in 1968, it has Cendirred 92.562
cases for consolidated pretrial proceedings. Only 3,508
of these—less than four percent—have been sent back
for trial in the district where the complaint was filed.
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial
Business of the United States Courts: 1995 Report of the
Director 32. Yet the statute which authorizes the JPML
to transfer cases for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
Proceedings commands that “{eJach action so transferred
shall be remanded by the [JPML] at or before the con-
clusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from
which it was transferred .. . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
These numbers tell the story of a remarkable power grab
by federal judges who have parlayed a narrow grant of
authority to conduct consolidated discovery into a mech-

3la
thorizing the JPML to transfer cases for all parposes but

Soon after the MDL process got underway, a peculiar
thing started happening: Judges began to develop
prietary feelings toward the cases entrusted to them;
began using 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the venue
statute, to hold on to these cases for trial. Some
worried that such transfers were not authorized:
recognize candidly,” wrote Judge Bownes, then of
District of New Hampshire, “that there is nothing in
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) or 1404(a) whi

Fle:

i
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‘
goa?
cr eee

(D.N.H. 1971). Such scruples were cast aside after the
Second Circuit’s opinion in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d
122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1971), a case that proved unusually

Since Pfizer, this practice (known as “self-transfer” )
has become a routine aspect of the MDL process. The
bwssed self-transfer by its Rule 14(b), which

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Tube Patent Litig., 342 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (J.P

32a

1972) (“In view of the pendency of [a § 1404(a)] mo-
tion, we expressly refrain from granting this motion for
remand and interfering in matters within the discretion
of the transferee judge.”).’

The majority thus has ample company in holding that
a district judge to whom a case has been sent for pretrial
under section 1407(a) may latch onto it by ordering a
section 1404(a) self-transfer. See maj. op. at 15787.
Every court that has examined the issue since Pfizer has
held or assumed that such authority exists.? But a close

1 It is for this reason that the majority’s suggestion that Lexe-
con somehow waived its right to seek return of the case to the
Northern District of Illinois is ill founded. See maj. op. at 15790-
91. Under the Panel’s rules and precedent, the JPML will not nor-
mally consider a transfer without a recommendation from the dis-
trict judge. See, e.g., J.P.M.L. R. Proc. 14(d) (“The Panel is re-
luctant to order remand absent a suggestion of remand from the
transferee district court.”); In re A.H. Robins Co., 453 F. Supp.
108, 110 (J.P.M.L. 1978); In re Holiday Magic Securities & Anti-
trust Litig., 488 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (both noting
that, absent a suggestion from the transferee court, a party seeking
remand from the JPML bears a heavy burden of persuasion).
Lexecon—in compliance with this authority—petitioned the district
court in August 1994 to refer the case back to the JPML because

stayed consideration of this motion pending the end of discovery,
Lexecon renewed its remand request at the close of discovery in
November 1994. In December 1994, defendants moved for a sec-
tion 1404(a) transfer, and in March 1995, the district court

33a

fact, Pfizer, with its one page of analysis

Washington Pub. Util. Group v. United S Dist. Ct., 848 F.2d

450 (J.P.M.L. 1979); In re CBS Color Tube, 342 F. Supp. at 1404-
065).

* See, ¢.g., Washington Pub. Util. Group, 848 F.2d at 326; In re
Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1988, 829 F.2d at 1178 n.7;
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 68F F.2d at 820 n.7; East-
ern Air Lines, Inc. (in re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades
on Dec. 29, 1972), 649 F.2d at 1009 n.4; In re Air Crash Disaster
at Detroit Met. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 787 F. Supp. 391, 394
n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1989) ; In re Taz Refund Litig., 728 F. Supp. 922,
924 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l
Airport, Denver, Colo., on Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1455, 1458
(D. Colo. 1988) ; In re Dow Co. “Sarabond Products” Liab. Litig.,
664 F. Supp. 1408, 1408-04 (D. Colo. 1987); In re Air Crash Dis-

at John F. Kennedy Int’l Airport on June 24, 1975, 479 F.
1118, 1122-28 (E.D.N.Y.
Near Chicago, 476 F. Supp. at 450; In re Anthracite Coal Anti-

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36a

Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the
Federal Courts, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 41, 64 (1971)
(the language and legislative history of section 1407(a)
are so clear that it “originally appeared to be a futile
exercise for a 1407 transferee court to rule on a 1404
transfer motion.”); John F. Cooney, Comment, The Ex-
perience of Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict
Litigation Act, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 588, 606 (1972)
(“{T]Jhe apparently mandatory nature of the remand

(“{C]onsolidation for trial almost certainly defies both
the letter of section 1407 and the intent of its drafters.”
(footnotes omitted) ); Note, The Judicial Panel and the
Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
1001, 1030-31 (1974) (legislative history of section

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39a

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40a

It makes perfect sense for Congress to permit the trans-
feree court to handle most pretrial legal issues—incluc ing
some dispositive motions—and still insist that trial (if

The majority’s second block quote is no more helpful. Presum-
ably, again, the majority intends to emphasize the portion of the
quote which allows, “Of course, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, providing for
changes of venue generally, is available in those instances where

complaint was filed. Trial is a unique part of the litiga-
tion process in that it involves fact-finding, usually by a

venue to itself? Again, it helps to read the applicable
statute, which in plain and simple terms provides “For
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (emphasis added). I
don’t see how this language can be read to authorize a

3

42a

U. Penn. L. Rev. at 740 (“A transferee court using
§ 1404(a) is not transferring a case to another district.
It is simply proclaiming trial jurisdiction over the case.”
(emphasis in original)). Indeed, the drafters of section
1404(a) could not possibly have meant to authorize
self-transfers because that section long predates section
1407; the possibility that a district court would be in a
position to transfer a case to itself was not something
anyone at the time could have anticipated.’ Thus, this is
not a case where the statutory language imperfectly reflects
the intention of the drafters. The language of section
1404(a) precisely matches the understanding of the Con-
gress that enacted it.

Are the federal courts nevertheless justified in tweaking
section 1404(a) to make it yield up an authorization for
self-transfer in the MDL context? Even under the best
circumstances such judicial legerdemain would be awk-
ward because it would require us to ignore the term
“other” in section 1404(a). But these are not ideal
circumstances because such manipulation creates a power

® Defendants make a Rube Goldberg argument that Lexecon’s
case was, in fact, transferred to another district: Although trans-
ferred temporarily for pretrial purposes, the case was still techni-
cally pending in the Northern District of Illinois when the section
1404(a) transfer moved it to the District of Arizona, an “other
district .. . where it might have been brought.” See Br. of Milberg
Defendants and of Cross-Appellant Milberg Weiss, at 25. Defend-
ants seem to think that section 1404(a) merely requires that a
case be transferred from one court to another.

This argument makes no linguistic sense because section 1404 (a)
provides that “a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district ....” 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (emphasis added). The
phrase “any other district,” which specifies the receiving court,
stands in contrast to the earlier phrase “a district court,” which
refers to the court making the transfer. Or, to put it differently,
the term “other district” must relate back to the term “district”
within the same sentence. Thus, the court making the transfer
cannot, under the terms of section 1404(a), be the same as the
court receiving the transfer.

43a

that Congress considered giving federal courts but ex-
pressly rejected. See p. 15805 supra.

This, then, is not a case where Congress passed two
laws at different times and forgot to harmonize them.
Congress, rather, made a deliberate choice to leave trial
of cases subject to the MDL process in the district where
they were filed. Given section 1407(a)’s explicit com-
mand that cases be remanded for trial in the district where
they were filed, and legislative history making it clear
that this was a deliberate choice, I don’t’ see how we can
possibly fudge section 1404(a) to make it authorize
self-transfer.

This question was not raised in Pfizer and no other
federal court of appe

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0059%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
