# Opposition Brief — Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 521 U.S. 424

## Text

a FILE fy
SEP 27 i996

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1996

METRO-NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL BUCKLEY,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Charles C. Goetsch
CAHILL, GOETSCH & DIPERSIA, P.C.

Attorneys for Respondent
43 Trumbull Street
New Haven, Connecticut 06511
(203) 777-1000
Virgil Mountain, Inc. (212) 779-4046 (L3614)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the practical effect of this FELA case is confined
to the unique facts concerning the Snowmen of Grand
Central Terminal, a handful of 141 railroad workers who,
due to the Railroad’s negligent violation of OSHA
asbestos regulations in GCT during the late 1980s, now
have a significant increased risk of death from cancer as a
result of ingesting into their lungs massive amounts of
carcinogenic asbestos fibers on a daily basis for three
years, and whose prolonged massive asbestos exposure
will never be experienced by any other employees so long
as employers comply with OSHA’s mandatory regula-
tions for asbestos in the workplace.

Whether there is any conflict between the Third Circuit’s
1985 decision in Schweitzer, which held that FELA
claims for physical asbestos injuries are not dischargeable

bankruptcy claims until they become physically manifest,
and the Second Circuit’s decision in this case, which
applied this Court’s 1994 Goftshall standard for FELA
negligently inflicted emotional distress claims to the
unique facts concerning the Snowmen of Grand Central
Terminal’s massive exposure to asbestos and resulting
significant increased risk of death from cancer.

Whether the Second Circuit was correct in ruling that a
railroad worker’s negligently unprotected ingestion of
massive amounts of carcinogenic asbestos fibers into his
lungs on a daily basis for three years resulting in a signifi-
cant increased risk of death from cancer constitutes a
“physical impact” under this Court’s Goftshall standard
sufficient to support a FELA negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim.

4. Whether the Second Circuit was correct in ruling that

when a railroad worker suffers negligently inflicted emo-
tional distress as a result of a physical impact with bodily
harm, the resulting emotional distress need not be severe
to be recoverable under the FELA.

. Whether the Second Circuit was correct in ruling that
given their significant increased risk of developing
asbestos-related disease as a result of their ingestion of
massive amounts of asbestos fibers into their lungs on a
daily basis over three years, the Snowmen of Grand
Central Terminal can recover damages for the cost of
future medical monitoring to ensure the early detection
and treatment of any asbestos-related disease they
develop.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Oe Fe iiicicicicciiematiiatidiale i, iv
I I certatientiintititithiiet ees i
gE ee. l
Reasons For Denying The WTit................cccccccccseseseeeseseseees 5

I. The Practical Effect Of This FELA Case Is
Confined To The Unique Facts Concerning
The Snowmen Of Grand Central Terminal ............. 7

Il. There ls No Conflict Between This Case
And The Third Circuit’s 1985 Decision In

Ill. The Second Circuit Correctly Applied
Gottshall’s Physical Impact Test .....000.00000..0.0.000.-.. 11

IV. The Second Circuit Correctly Ruled That
FELA Negligently Inflicted
Emotional Distress Need Not Be Severe
When It Results From A Physical Impact
|, EEE Sy Lo 14

V. The Second Circuit Correctly Ruled That
Medical Monitoring Costs Are An

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE(S)
Amendola v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.

699 F.Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 1988) .......c.cccccccecceceseeere 18
Buckley v. Metro-North Com. RR.

79 F.3d 1337 (2 Cir. 1996) oo... cccccececceeeee 9, 11, 14, 18, 20
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall

114 S.Ct. 2396 (1994)

ieee L i, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12,13, 14, 15, 17, 18

Flynn v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.
eR 13

In Re Paoli R.R. PCB Litigation
916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 961, 111 S.Ct. 1584 (1991) [Paoli I],
35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 1253 (1995) [Paoli U0) ..............0.sc0ececceccececceceeees 21

Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 507 N.E. 2d 476 (Ohio 1987)......... 15

Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co.
oN 14

Marchica v. Long Island Railroad Co.
31 F.3d 1197 (2™ Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

I a Ra 13, 14, 19, 20
Mellon v. Goodyear
gE 13

Morton v. Stack
122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) 0000 ee 14

Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna Western Railroad Co.
73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) 00.0... ccccccceccccceseececceseenees 14

Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

i a a i, 6,9, 10
United States v. Mendenhall

ES Sr A ee 13
Williams v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.

907 F.Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1995) 00 ce ceeeeees 18
Youakim v. Miller

SERS MEY SE ne ne 13
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Federal Employers’ Liability Act

CS ee passim

Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted
Emotional Harm -- A Comment on the Nature of
Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 477 (1982). ............... 12

Restatement (Second) of Torts................ 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns one of the Snowmen of Grand Central
Terminal, a handful of 141 railroad workers who were
exposed to massive amounts of asbestos fibers while working
in the miles of steam tunnels beneath Grand Central Terminal
during the late 1980s. They were called Snowmen because
every day after working on the old pipe insulation in the
tunnels, they would emerge covered from head to toe with
white pipe insulation dust [App. lla; “App.” refers to the
Appendix in the Petition]. Despite the fact the Railroad
knew the insulation was asbestos, for years the Railroad
ordered the Snowmen to physically handle and remove the
insulation without telling them it was asbestos and without

providing them with any protection from the asbestos, in
gross violation of OSHA’s mandatory regulations for asbes-
tos in the workplace. The Railroad now admits that it
knowingly and negligently exposed the Snowmen to the
carcinogenic asbestos fibers without warning or protecting
them.

The plaintiff respondent Michael Buckley is one of the
Snowmen. A pipefitter employed by the defendant Metro-
North Commuter Railroad, he is a married 42-year-old father
of two with a 10" grade education [JA 447-50; “JA” refers to
the Joint Appendix filed with the Second Circuit]. For three
years from 1985 to 1988 he was exposed to massive amounts
of carcinogenic asbestos fibers on a daily basis, and as a
result he now has a significantly increased risk of dying from
cancer.

There are only 140 other Snowmen, and the nature of
their asbestos exposure is now unique: although such pro-
longed unprotected exposure occurred prior to 1970, by the
late 1980s there were laws and OSHA regulations in place
that prevented employers from exposing unprotected workers

to asbestos [JA 252-54]. And indeed, since the OSHA
asbestos regulations went into effect in the mid-1970s, there
has been no other reported group of workers with the
prolonged massive amount of exposure suffered by the
Snowmen [JA 254].' This action was brought to address the
Snowmen’s unique situation by providing them with ap-
propriate medical monitoring and an opportunity to obtain
Just compensation for the Railroad’s negligent infliction of
emotional distress.

Asbestos fibers are microscopic, needle sharp, and vir-
tually indestructible. When a person inhales air containing
asbestos fibers, the fibers form into a longitudinal arrange-
ment parallel with the direction of the wind stream and pass
directly into the lungs [JA 113-14]. The fibers are swept into
the lungs’ tubes and parenchyma, where they impale the tis-
sue and become permanently embedded [JA 140]. The fibers
provoke irritation and initiate harmful biological changes in
the lung tissue [JA 684-89]. Those changes include the acti-
vation of macrophages which attempt to detoxify the em-
bedded asbestos fibers [JA 153-55]. While attempting to
engulf the asbestos fibers the macrophages die and release
enzymes that further damage the lung tissue [JA 246-51].
Among other things, this process impairs the lungs’ ability to
clean themselves. Accumulated asbestos fibers also can be
carried from the lungs to other parts of the body through the
bloodstream or lymphatic system [JA 140}.

| Asbestos is a known carcinogen that is active in many
sites in the human body. It causes mesothelioma (a cancer of
the lining of the lungs), lung cancer, and colon cancer, as
well as scarring of the lungs [JA 280-81]. Many of these

"The Snowmen’s exposure is equivalent to the asbestos exposure of
shipyard workers during the years of World War II [JA 252-53].

2

conditions can be beneficially treated if detected early enough
through medical monitoring [JA 136; 688-89].

Asbestos-related diseases can be entirely prevented by
controlling the release of asbestos in the workplace or by
providing workers with proper protective equipment. Em-
ployers who comply with OSHA’s workplace asbestos regu-
lations do not expose their employees to any significant
amount of asbestos fibers [JA 143; 287; 251; 689].

The Record established that Buckley inhaled massive
amounts of asbestos fibers into his lungs on a daily basis over
three years [JA 294-97; 305-06; 460-65]. His lung tissue was
impaled by the sharp asbestos fibers, damaging the tissue and
the ability of his lungs to clean themselves [JA 153-55]. The
asbestos fibers also physically contacted his hair, ears, nose,
and mouth as well as the skin of his face and hands [JA 460-
61].

The expert who testified regarding the degree of
Buckley’s increased risk, Dr. William J. Nicholson, is the
risk assessor the United States Environmental Protection
Agency relied on for its asbestos standards, and he also did
the risk assessment for OSHA on which OSHA's occupa-
tional asbestos exposure standards are based [JA 273; 276-
77]. He established that on a daily basis from 1985 to 1988
Buckley was exposed to enormously high concentrations of
asbestos fibers “far in excess” of OSHA’s Permissible
Exposure Limit [JA 304].

In the field of risk assessment, a .001% increased risk of
dying is a “highly significant” increased risk that should be
eliminated where possible [JA 297-98]. OSHA considers an
increased risk of death from asbestos exposure in the work-
place of even 1% to be “substantial” and an increased risk of
death of 5% to be “totally unacceptable.” [JA 276-77]. Asa

result of his asbestos exposure, Buckley now has an increased
risk of dying from asbestos-related cancer of between 1% to
5%, ranging from “substantial” to “totally unacceptable” and
10 to 50 times greater than “highly significant.” [JA 300-02].
As a result of his exposure, his total risk of dying from cancer
now has increased by up to 25% [JA 348-49], and his risk of
developing pleural scarring and fibrosis has increased by
10% [JA 162; 302-03].

Buckley has a reasonable scientific basis to fear that he
will develop a fatal asbestos-related cancer, and that basis
will continue for the rest of his life [JA 310-11]. Clinical
evidence of asbestos disease does not begin to appear until at
least 10 years after the first exposure [JA 263-64]. It is now
10 years since Buckley’s first exposure, and his asbestos
medical expert recommends that Buckley begin medical
monitoring on an annual basis for the rest of his life [JA 167-
68; 234-35; 244-46]. Many asbestos diseases can be
beneficially treated if detected early enough, and the purpose
of the medical monitoring is to detect and treat any asbestos
disease as early as possible [JA 230-31; 245-46; 263-64].
The annualized cost of the medical monitoring examinations
and tests is $950 [JA 168-70].

Buckley is aware that he has ingested a massive amount
of carcinogenic asbestos fibers into his lungs resulting in a
significant increased risk of dying from asbestos-related
cancer [JA 204; 398]. He is aware that his increased risk will
continue for the remainder of his life. He is aware that there
is no way to remove the asbestos fibers he has ingested and
no way to undo the harmful biological process set in motion
by those fibers [JA 487; 513-14]. He is aware that no amount
of medication or psychiatric treatment will change this reality
(JA 513-14]. In effect, the Railroad has placed a ticking time
bomb in his chest which may never go off but which he has
to live with for the rest of his life.

Buckley has and will continue to experience for the rest
of his life an appropriate level of distress in the form of anger
over what the Railroad has done to him and fear of the harm-
ful changes in his body resulting from his massive asbestos
exposure. His treating asbestos medical expert, Dr. Stephen
Markowitz, confirmed that Buckley has an appropriate
degree of fear and concern regarding the long-term effects of
his asbestos exposure [JA 266a] . Buckley’s anger over what
the Railroad has done to him was corroborated by the
testimony of his co-workers and by his complaints to his
supervisors and to the offices of the MTA Inspector General
and the New York Attorney General (which issued a Joint
Report confirming the Snowmen’s asbestos exposure resulted
from Metro-North’s violation of OSHA’s asbestos
regulations) [JA 487-91; 740-50].

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Contrary to the Railroad’s characterization, this is not a
case of “mere exposure” to asbestos that will unleash a
“flood of trivial suits” if left undisturbed. The Second
Circuit did not hold that “mere exposure” to asbestos is
sufficient to recover under the FELA. Rather, the Circuit
Court carefully applied this Court’s Goftshall test to the
unique facts of this FELA case and held that Buckley’s
“massive, lengthy, and tangible” exposure to asbestos fibers
resulting in a significant increased risk of death from cancer
constitutes a sufficient “physical impact” under Gottshall to

> Apparently the various amicus curiae are laboring under the
misapprehension that this is a case of “mere” or “trivial” exposure to
asbestos of the kind experienced by millions of people. The facts in the
Record prove otherwise. Indeed, after closely reviewing the Record, the
Second Circuit stressed that “Buckley and the other ‘snowmen’ present
what we believe is an unusual case, as Buckley’s exposure to asbestos was
massive, lengthy, and tangible.” [App. 23a].

support a FELA negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim [App. 22a-23a].

The Snowmen of Grand Central Terminal’s massive
prolonged asbestos exposure was a singular aberration, and
will never be experienced by any other workers on or off the
railroads so long as employers comply with OSHA’s
mandatory regulations for controlling asbestos in the
workplace. This “unusual case” [App. 23a] can have no
practical effect beyond the narrow category of the FELA, and
even within the FELA it will not expand liability as long as
railroads fulfill their legal duty to comply with OSHA’s
mandatory asbestos regulations.

There is no conflict with the Third Circuit’s decision in
Schweitzer, which preceded this Court’s landmark Gottshall
decision by nine years and which was not even a FELA
negligent infliction of emotional distress case. And damages
for the costs of future medical monitoring are appropriate
given Metro-North’s negligent, massive exposure of Buckley
to a known carcinogen resulting in his significant increased
risk of developing asbestos-related disease.

Metro-North’s incantation of a parade of horribles is
nothing more than an attempt to divert this Court’s attention
away from the unique magnitude of the wrong it committed
against the 141 Snowmen of Grand Central Terminal, a
wrong that will never be repeated as long as employers abide
by OSHA’s asbestos regulations but which Michael Buckley
will have to live with for the rest of his life.

1. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THIS FELA CASE
IS CONFINED TO THE UNIQUE FACTS CON-
CERNING THE SNOWMEN OF GRAND
CENTRAL TERMINAL

Metro-North makes the unsupported claim that this case
will open the courtroom door to “tens of thousands” of
plaintiffs with “extraordinary economic consequences” upon
“government and non-government” entities “under other fed-
eral statutes and the common law.” [Petition at pgs. 6, 12].
This argument has no foundation in reality, and is based on
two false premises: that this FELA case constitutes binding
precedent on all non-FELA state and federal tort cases; and
that the type of massive daily exposure to enormous amounts
of asbestos fibers over a three year period resulting in a
significant increased risk of death from cancer suffered by the
Snowmen of Grand Central Terminal is a common everyday
occurrence throughout the nation.

The FELA only applies to a narrow class of railroad
workers who are negligently injured on the job. It does not
apply to non-railroad workers or to the public at large.
Gottshall at 2412, 2418. The number of railroad workers
who can bring a negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim under the FELA is further limited by the test set forth
by this Court in Gottshall. And a FELA case simply does not
apply to or have any precedential effect on state common law
cases or on non-FELA federal statutory cases.

The facts of this case are unique, and will never recur as
long as employers comply with OSHA’s mandatory regula-
tions for controlling asbestos in the workplace. Indeed,
neither Metro-North nor Buckley has found a parallel fact
situation in any reported cases, state or federal. This is not
Surprising given that Metro-North’s gross violation of
OSHA’s asbestos regulations at Grand Central Terminal

during the late 1980s was an aberrant episode that even
Metro-North has not repeated. The asbestos medical expert
confirmed the medical literature does not contain any reports
of such massive prolonged exposure occurring since OSHA’s
asbestos regulations went into effect in the early 1970s. It is
not surprising there is a lack of similar fact situations because
OSHA’s asbestos regulations are designed to eliminate any
such exposure and employers are legally obligated to comply
with OSHA’s regulations.

Where then, will these “tens of thousands” of plaintiffs
suing “government and non-government” entities come
from? Non-railroad workers are covered by workmen’s
compensation statutes and are legally barred from suing their
employer. Members of the public simply do not have the
type of massive direct exposure to asbestos on a daily basis
for years at a time that is required to develop a significant
increased risk of death from asbestos-related cancer. This
FELA case does not even apply to railroad workers unless
they have that type of massive prolonged exposure. And
employers routinely comply with OSHA’s asbestos regula-
tions, completely eliminating any unprotected exposure to
asbestos fibers, much less the type of massive prolonged
exposure suffered by the Snowmen here.

Any railroad that fulfills its legal duty to comply with
OSHA’s asbestos regulations has nothing to fear from this
case. Conversely, any railroad that grossly violates OSHA’s
asbestos regulations by subjecting its workers to the type of
massive prolonged exposure suffered by the Snowmen of
Grand Central Terminal must face the consequences of such
egregiously negligent conduct, and deservedly so. Such
aberrant behavior has never recurred anywhere else, however.
If the importance of a case depends on how many other
persons apart from the litigants will be affected, then this
case is of no importance at all.

There is no injustice here, for the Second Circuit simply
applied Gottshall to provide an appropriate remedy for the
handful of Metro-North employees who had the singular
misfortune of being massively exposed to carcinogenic
asbestos fibers on a daily basis over a three year period in
gross violation of OSHA’s asbestos regulations and who as a
result now must live with a significant increased risk of dying
from asbestos-related cancer. There can and will be no
“flood of litigation” generated by this unusual case.

i. THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THIS CASE
AND THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S 1985 DECISION IN
SCHWEITZER

Schweitzer was a pre-Gottshall bankruptcy case that did
not concern a FELA claim for negligently inflicted emotional
distress. The issue decided by Schweitzer was “whether
plaintiffs, who allege that they were exposed to asbestos prior
to their employer’s [Bankruptcy Act] reorganization and did
not manifest any injury until after the relevant consummation
dates, had ‘claims’ that were discharged in the reorganization
proceedings.” Schweitzer at 941. Schweitzer merely followed
the obvious rule that a FELA claim for a physically
manifested physical injury does not accrue until the physical
manifestation occurs. By contrast, this case concerns a post-
Gottshall FELA negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim, which by definition does not involve or require a
physically manifested injury. There is no conflict because
Buckley and Schweitzer address two entirely different claims.

Metro-North confuses post-Goftshall FELA claims for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress (which do not
require any manifest physical injury) with more typical FELA
claims based on a physically manifested injury. There is a
sharp difference between the two types of claims. The classic

FELA claim is for a physical injury that is physically
manifest, and naturally such a claim does not accrue until the
physical injury becomes physically manifested (the same
holds true for occupational disease physical injury claims).

But a post-Gottshall FELA claim for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress is quite different. It does not
require any physical injury at all. In fact, that is what
differentiates a FELA claim for negligently inflicted
emotional distress: it is a cause of action for emotional
distress that accrues even though there is no manifest
physical injury (“The injury we deal with here is mental or
emotional harm (such as fright or anxiety) that is caused by
the negligence of another and that is not directly brought
about by a physical injury, but that may manifest itself in
physical symptoms.” Gottshall at 2405 [emphasis added}).

The legal issue confronting the Second Circuit in this
case was radically different from the bankruptcy issue con-
fronting the Third Circuit in Schweitzer. There, the Third
Circuit’s task was to decide whether non-manifested physical
injury claims were dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act.
Schweitzer did not address or decide anything regarding a
FELA claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Indeed, it was not until nine years later that the standard
applicable to such purely emotional distress FELA claims
was set forth by this Court’s 1994 landmark Goftshall deci-
sion.

Here, the Second Circuit’s task was to apply Goftshall’s
FELA negligent infliction of emotional distress standard to
the unique set of facts concerning the Snowmen of Grand
Central Terminal and their massive negligent exposure to
asbestos over a three year period resulting in a significani in-
creased risk of death. Schweitzer was a case concerning
FELA claims for manifest physical injuries, decided at a time

10

when Gofttshail did not even exist. Buckley is a FELA negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress case controlled by
Gottshall. There is and can be no conflict between the two.

i. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED
GOTTSHALL’S PHYSICAL IMPACT TEST

In Gottshall, this Court for the first time declared the
standard to apply to FELA negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims: “the zone of danger test limits recovery for
emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical
impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct, or who
are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that
conduct.” Gottshall at 2406 [emphasis added]. By definition,
a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim does not
require or involve a manifest physical injury. The focus is on
“physical impact” or “risk of physical harm,” not on physical
injury.

As this Court noted in Goftshaill, the zone of danger test
is less restrictive than the common law physical impact test
because it embraces claims based on threatened physical
impact as well as on actual physical impact. Goftshall at
2410-11. The physical impact test, in other words, is
subsumed within the broader zone of danger test. (“The
physical impact test, of course, would achieve many of the
same ends as the zone of danger test. We see no reason,
however, to allow an employer to escape liability for
emotional injury caused by the apprehension of physical
impact simply because of the fortuity that the impact did not
occur.” Gottshall at 2411). Metro-North’s mistaken reading
of the phrase “those within the zone of danger of physical
impact,” Gottshall at 2406, as excluding workers who sustain
a physical impact violates common sense: a railroad worker

within the zone of danger of the physical impact.

An application of Gottshall’s physical impact test to the
facts of this case reveals the following. Metro-North admits
that for years it knowingly and negligently exposed the
respondent Michael Buckley to carcinogenic asbestos fibers
without warning, training, or protecting him. Buckley’s body
sustained a physical impact from the asbestos fibers, and in
particular the needle-like fibers have become embedded in
the tissue of his lungs, causing bodily harm and initiating a
harmful biological process that cannot be reversed. As a
result of that physical impact, Buckley now has a
significantly increased risk of dying from asbestos-related
cancer. Clearly, Buckley has been physically impacted by the
asbestos fibers and now is able to recover for emotional
distress caused by his anger over what was done to him and
his fear of developing asbestos-related disease and death.

Metro-North simply ignores the fact that this is a FELA
negligent infliction of emotional distress case controlled by
Gottshall’s physical impact standard. Instead, Metro-North
pretends this is a run-of-the-mill occupational disease case
injury in order to be recoverable. But Buckley is not seeking
any FELA damages for a physically manifest occupational
disease. He merely is seeking recovery under the FELA for
negligently inflicted emotional distress resulting from his

* Contrary to Metro-North’s argument, the law review article quoted by
this Court in Gottshall did not exclude plaintiffs who sustain a physical
impact from the “zone of danger of physical impact” rule. Pearson,
Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm -- A
— eee

12

massive physical impact with asbestos, a ._.own carcinogen,
that has significantly increased his risk of dying from cancer.“

Moreover, Metro-North completely ignores the leading
post-Gottshall case relied on by the Second Circuit:
Marchica v. Long Island Railroad Co., 31 F.3d 1197 (2™ Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 727 (1995). Marchica also
applied Gortshall’s physical impact test to an unusual set of
facts, and allowed a railroad worker to recover under the
FELA for negligent infliction of emotional distress when his
hand was pricked by a discarded hypodermic needle under
circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to
develop a fear of AIDS. In Marchica, the Second Circuit
thoroughly surveyed the common law concerning emotional
distress for fear of developing a future disease in the light of
Gottshall’s FELA physical impact test, and properly adopted
the view most consistent with the FELA’s remedial ~ ure:
“Thus, a FELA plaintiff who has suffered a physical impact
may recover for a fear of developing AIDS if the impact
caused by the defendant's negligence occurred under
circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to de-
velop a fear of AIDS.” Marchica at 1206.

* Although Metro-North refers in passing to “claim-splitting” [Petition at
pgs. 10-11], Metro-North’s failure to raise or address that issue at the trial
court or court of appeals levels eliminates it as an issue before this Court
(“this Court does not decide questions not raised or involved in the lower
court.” Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551-52 n. 5 (1980)). Nevertheless, the cases
relied on by Metro-North - Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335, 344
(1928), and Flynn v. New York, N.H. & H. R Co., 283 U.S. 53, 56 (1931)

-- concerned the right of widows to bring a belated FELA death claim
long after the settlement of the underlying FELA physical injury claim,
and are inapposite here. A FELA claim for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress is separate and distinct from a FELA manifest physical

13

As it did in Marchica, the Second Circuit in Buckley
applied Gottshall’s physical impact standard to the unusual
facts concerning the Snowmen’s massive prolonged daily
ingestion of the needle-like carcinogenic asbestos fibers, and
properly held that “a jury, presented with the evidence in this
case, may find that Buckley suffered an impact that would
cause fear in a reasonable person.” [App. 23a]. Given the
extraordinary circumstances surrounding the Snowmen’s
massive asbestos exposure, there is nothing erroneous or
radical about such a holding. If anything, Buckley and
Marchica merely demonstrate the ongoing ability of this
Court’s Gottshall test to justly resolve a wide variety of
unusual fact situations.

Iv. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY RULED
THAT FELA NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS NEED NOT BE SEVERE
WHEN IT RESULTS FROM A _ PHYSICAL
IMPACT WITH BODILY HARM

After reviewing the common law and Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the Second Circuit found that “emotional
distress must be ‘severe’ only when a plaintiff has not

suffered a physical impact.” [App. 24a].° It is only where

* This is fully consistent with the common law physical impact standard
Court's Gottshall standard. See, for example: Porter v. Delaware,
Lackawanna Western Railroad Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906)
(dust in the eyes sufficient physical impact to allow recovery for fright);
Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of
smoke during apartment fire sufficient physical impact to allow recovery
for nervousness and trouble sleeping for several weeks thereafter); Laxton
v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 433-34 (Tenn. 1982)
(where defendant negligently permitted carcinogenic chlordane to
infiltrate family’s household water supply, family members’ consumption
of water containing chlordane in excess of State Department of Water
Quality Control safe limits constitutes sufficient physical impact to allow
recovery for anxiety that did not physically manifest itself and was not so

14

there is no physical impact that the severity of the emotional
distress must serve to guarantee the genuineness of the claim.
Since Buckley has suffered a physical impact here, he is
“entitled to all damages flowing from the impact, including
his reasonable emotional distress.” [App. 24a]

Metro-North, however, argues that to be recoverable,
emotional distress must be so severe as to manifest itself
physically (“severe emotional distress is accompanied or
followed by shock, illness, or other bodily harm.” Restate-
ment at Section 46 Comment k). However, Metro-North
ignores this Court’s own definition of negligently inflicted
emotional distress, which specifically states that manifest
physical symptoms are not necessary: “The injury we deal
with here is mental or emotional harm (such as fright or
anxiety) that is caused by the negligence of another and that
is not directly brought about by a physical injury, but that
may manifest itself in physical symptoms.” Goftshall at 2405
{emphasis added]. Clearly, it is not a prerequisite that FELA
negligently inflicted emotional distress be so severe as to
manifest itself physically.

this case: Michael Buckley not only has suffered a massive
physical impact from the asbestos fibers, he also has suffered
and will continue to suffer “bodily harm” in the form of harm
to his lung tissue that has set in motion an irreversible
harmful biological process. As the Restatement confirms, the
presence of such “bodily harm” from physical impact entitles

severe as to require medical treatment); Lavelle v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 507 N.E. 2d 476, 480-81 (Ohio
1987) (prolonged extensive physical contact with asbestos fibers resulting
in increased statistical likelihood of developing asbestos-related cancer
sufficient physical impact to allow recovery for increased fear of cancer).

15

Buckley to recover for his emotional distress with or without
a showing of “severe” emotional distress.

It is a basic principle of tort law that when a plaintiff has
suffered some “bodily harm” as a result of a defendant’s
negligent conduct, the plaintiff “is entitled to recover dam-
ages for past or prospective bodily harm and emotional dis-
tress [and] ... reasonable medical and other expenses.” Re-
statement at Section 924. The Restatement defines “bodily
harm” as “any physical impairment of the condition of
another’s body.” Restatement at Section 15. “Impairment” is
defined accordingly: “There is an impairment of the physical
condition of another’s body if the structure or function of any
part of the other’s body is altered to any extent even though
the alteration causes no other harm.” Restatement at Section
15 Comment a.

The record here establishes that Michael Buckley has suf-
fered “bodily harm” as a result of Metro-North’s negligent
conduct in exposing him to massive amounts of asbestos
fibers on a daily basis over a period of three years. That ex-
posure has caused him to ingest massive amounts of car-
cinogenic asbestos fibers into his lungs, where they have
become impaled and embedded in his lung tissue, altering the
structure of the tissue and setting in motion an irreversibly
harmful biological process. That is “bodily harm” within the
meaning of the Restatement.

The Second Circuit correctly read Section 436A of the
Restatement as not being applicable to the facts of this case.
Section 436A is entitled “Negligence Resulting in Emotional
Disturbance Alone,” and states: “If the actor’s conduct is
negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either
bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it
results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily
harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for

16

such emotional disturbance.” [emphasis added]. Section
436A only applies to situations where there is no bodily harm
caused by the negligent conduct. That is, it only applies to
instances where the negligent conduct does not cause initial
bodily harm, but rather only causes emotional disturbance
which itself does not generate any bodily harm. Where, as
here, the defendant’s negligent conduct does produce “bodily
harm,” the defendant is liable for any emotional disturbance
flowing from the negligent conduct even if the emotional dis-
turbance itself does not produce any additional bodily harm
(i.e., even if the emotional distress is not “severe’’).

This is demonstrated by Section 436A’s Illustration,
which concerns a plaintiff who while eating negligently
manufactured cottage cheese finds her mouth full of glass.
The entire example is predicated on the fact that the plaintiff
“is not cut or otherwise physically injured, and she succeeds
in removing the glass without bodily harm.” By contrast, if
she had suffered some bodily harm from the glass, she then
would be entitled to recover for whatever emotional distur-
bance flows from the negligent conduct, even if the emo-
tional disturbance is not severe, physically manifest, or
medically verified.

The fallacy in Metro-North’s argument is its failure to
acknowledge the fact established in the Record that Buckley
has indeed suffered a “bodily harm” that entitles him to
recover for whatever emotional disturbances flow from
Metro-North’s negligent conduct. The Second Circuit was
corre.. in ruling that Buckley, who suffered a negligent
physical impact causing bodily harm, does not have to show
“severe” emotional distress in order to recover for the emo-
tional disturbances flowing from Metro-North’s negligent
conduct. This is entirely consistent with Gottshall’s physical
impact rule and the common law of torts as distilled by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.

17

Metro-North misreads the pre-Gottshall Amendola v.
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 699 F.Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo.
1988), case as requiring “physical injury” rather than merely
some “physical harm.” Amendola held that “a plaintiff
seeking recovery under the FELA for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress must introduce evidence that he or she
has suffered physical harm as a result of the conduct which
caused the emotional distress.” Amendola at 1410. The
Amendola court carefully distinguished between “physical
injury” and “physical harm,” holding that in order to recover
for negligently inflicted emotional distress, “physical injury”
was not required, only some “physical harm.” Amendola at
1410-11. Thus Amendola’s “physical harm” is synonymous
with the Restatement’s “bodily harm.” There is no conflict
between Amendola and Buckley because the Record here
establishes that as a result of Metro-North’s negligent
conduct Buckley has suffered “bodily or physical harm”
within the meaning of both the Restatement and Amendola.®

Metro-North’s argument that Buckley’s emotional dis-
tress is “temporary,” “evanescent,” and “trivial” [Petition at
p. 23] is contradicted by the Record. Although it is uniquely
peculiar to Buckley’s unusually massive asbestos exposure,
the emotional distress stemming from his life-long wait to see
if the enormous amount of carcinogenic asbestos fibers he
has ingested will blossom into a fatal cancer is not temporary
or evanescent or trivial. In effect, Metro-North has placed a
ticking time bomb in Buckley’s chest, and his understandable

* Metro-North’s reliance on Williams v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 907
F.Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1995), is misplaced. Williams was a non-FELA
and non-Jones Act case decided by a Magistrate Judge. Because there
was no physical impact involved and no bodily harm proved, the
Magistrate Judge applied Section 436A of the Restatement (which only
applies to non-physical impact cases). Here, by contrast, there is proof of
physical impact and “bodily harm,” and Section 436A is inapplicable.

anger, fear, and distress over when and if that time bomb will
explode will continue for the rest of his life. Buckley knows
there is nothing he can do to remove those carcinogenic
fibers from his lungs or to reverse the harmful biological
process they have set in motion. All he can do is to wait for a
cancer to surface clinically and hope that medical monitoring
will detect it early enough to maximize his prognosis. His
resulting anger and fear, however, have become an
understandably permanent part of his life.

The Second Circuit did require objective evidence of
Buckley’s emotional distress, and found it in the Record
{App. 23a-25a]. Buckley’s treating asbestos medical expert
confirmed that Buckley exhibited an appropriate degree of
anger and concern over his massive exposure and
significantly increased risk of death by cancer. The amount
of objective evidence was “slim” only because the trial court
improperly limited Buckley from introducing evidence
establishing the full basis and context of his emotionai
distress [Plaintiff's Second Circuit Brief at pgs. 25-27], and
the retrial will allow a fuller record to be developed.

The Second Circuit was careful to note that speculative or
frivolous claims will be avoided by application of the test
used in Marchica, namely whether the impact would cause
fear in a reasonable person: “To make this determination, a
jury must take into account the nature of the toxic substance,
its method of transmission into the body, the extent of the
exposure to the substance and how the disease develops in
response to the presence of the toxic substance in the body.”
[App. 21a]

This standard is not, as Metro-North argues, “inherently
imprecise and unworkable.” [Petition at p. 10]. For example,
OSHA’s asbestos regulations contain a Permissible Exposure
Limit for asbestos fibers beyond which workers cannot safely

19

be exposed. Where, as here, the Record establishes that a
railroad worker has been exposed to carcinogenic asbestos
fibers “far in excess” of OSHA’s Permissible Exposure Limit
every day for three years, there is a sufficient objective basis
for a reasonable person to fear developing asbestos disease.
By contrast, exposure below OSHA’s Permissible Exposure
Limit would not cause a significant increased risk and not
provide a basis for fear in a reasonable person.

The reasonable person test applied by the Second Circuit
in Marchica and Buckley allows the unique nature of asbestos
exposure and disease to be taken into account while
screening out any speculative or frivolous claims based on
“mere” or “trivial” exposure to asbestos without significant
increased risk. Here, the Second Circuit reviewed the Record
and properly found that “Given the evidence of Buckley’s
prolonged and pronounced exposure to asbestos, a jury may
find that he suffered an impact that would cause fear in a
reasonable person.” [App. 21a].

v. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY RULED
THAT MEDICAL MONITORING COSTS ARE AN
APPROPRIATE ELEMENT OF DAMAGES IN
THIS CASE

_As the Second Circuit noted, the recovery of reasonable
medical expenses flowing from a defendant’s negligent con-
duct has always been an element of common law and FELA
tort law. The Restatement (Second) of Torts confirms that a
tort plaintiff who has suffered negligently inflicted “bodily
harm” is “entitled to recover damages for past or prospective
... Teasonable medical and other expenses.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts at Section 924.

For a medical monitoring claim, the “injury” is the fact
the plaintiff suffered a significant negligent exposure to a

20

proven toxic substance, resulting in a significant increased
risk of contracting a serious latent disease that makes peri-
odic diagnostic medical examinations and testing reasonably
necessary and beneficial. Jn Re Paoli R.R. PCB Litigation,
916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961,
111 S.Ct. 1584 (1991) [Paoli I], 35 F.3d 717, 787 (3d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1253 (1995) [Paoli II}.
Because it is a plaintiff's significant exposure to a proven
hazardous substance that justifies the need for medical
monitoring, proof of a present or future physical injury is not
a prerequisite for a medical monitoring claim.

Metro-North ignores the fact that this Court twice has
declined to alter the standard for medical monitoring claims
set forth in the Paoli cases. Indeed, Metro-North fails to
address or even cite the Paoli cases, the leading precedent in
the field, or the various common law cases upholding
medical monitoring claims cited and discussed by the Second
Circuit. [App. 26a-27a]. The Circuit Court in Paoli was not
concerned about provoking a flood of medical monitoring
claims because only claims based on significant exposure
with significant increased risk are allowed and because the
cost of medical monitoring is not high. Paoli II at 788.

Here, the respondent Michael Buckley satisfies each of
the elements for a medical monitoring claim. Metro-North
admitted that it negligently exposed Buckley to asbestos, a
known carcinogen, for many years. The medical experts es-
tablished that Buckley was exposed to a massive amount of
asbestos on a daily basis for several years and as a result has
a significant increased risk of developing asbestos-related
diseases. The experts also confirmed that those diseases can
be treated beneficially if caught early enough through peri-
of such medical monitoring for Buckley is $950.

21

There is no question that Buckley has suffered bodily
harm from his negligent ingestion of massive amounts of
carcinogenic asbestos fibers. The needle-like fibers have
embedded themselves in his lung tissue, damaging the tissue
and initiating a harmful biological process that is irreversible.
Such toxic exposure with bodily harm producing significant
increased risk of disease is a sufficient basis for recovery of
medical monitoring costs. Indeed, the whole point of
medical monitoring is to provide an early warning of illness
that may develop as a result of significant toxic exposure, and
thus a current diagnosed disease or physical injury is not
required.

Michael Buckley is precisely the type of plaintiff who can
benefit from medical monitoring: he has had a significant
exposure to asbestos with a significant increased risk of
developing asbestos-related diseases, but he has not yet
developed a clinically diagnosed asbestos disease and can
benefit from the early detection and treatment of any such
disease. The Second Circuit was correct in ruling there is a
reasonable basis for a medical monitoring claim in this case.

CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

Charles C. Goetsch

Cahill, Goetsch & DiPersia, P.C.
43 Trumbull Street

New Haven, CT 06511

(203) 777-1000

22

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0017%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
