# Amicus Curiae Brief — Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 520 U.S. 725

## Text

Suprome Svonr® Us
Fu BE SBS
JAN 9 W39T
No. 96-243
r — iteatnt
In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1996
-

BERNADINE SUITUM,

Petitioner,

TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY,

Respondent.
*

On Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

+

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

S

Of Counsel: Brian W. Biaesser*
Daniet R. MANDELKER *Counsel of Record
Stamper Professor of Law __H. Bissett Carey, III
Washington University in} Rosinson & Coit

St. Louis One Boston Place
Campus Box 1120 Boston, Massachusetts
St. Louis, Missouri 63130 02108
(314) 698-7233 (617) 557-5900

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

January 9, 1997

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-0964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE......

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT

I.

MRS. SUITUM’S TAKINGS CLAIM IS NOT
RIPE BECAUSE SHE DID NOT SUBMIT AN
APPLICATION FOR TRANSFERABLE
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (TDRS) TO
ENABLE A COURT TO DETERMINE THE
EXTENT OF ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRPA’S
LAND USE REGULATORY SYSTEM....

A. There is No Evidence in the Record that
Mrs. Suitum’s Property Has Been Ren-
dered Valueless.......

By Merely Filing a Building Permit Appli-
cation, Mrs. Suitum Did Not Satisfy the
One Application Rule Developed in Agins,
Hamilton Bank, and MacDonald .

THE COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE TEN-
SION BETWEEN THE AGINS-MACDONALD
RULE, THAT A LANDOWNER MUST SUB-
MIT AT LEAST ONE “MEANINGFUL”
APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL, AND THE
HAMILTON BANK RULE, THAT A LAND-
OWNER MUST UTILIZE ALL AVAILABLE
ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF AT THE LOCAI
RES adhe tho uwh su bessecOeessrens

A. Simplify the One Application Rule.

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page

B. The Reapplication Rule Is Irrelevant to Due
Process and Equal Protection Claims.... 14

Ill. HAMILTON BANK REQUIRED TAKINGS
PLAINTIFFS TO APPLY FOR A VARIANCE
TO MAKE THEIR TAKINGS CLAIMS RIPE,
BUT THE RELATED APPROVALS NECES-
SARY TO MAKE A TAKINGS CASE FINAL
SHOULD DEPEND ON THE TYPE OF LAND
USE REGULATORY SYSTEM ............... 15

IV. THIS COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE A
FUTILITY EXCEPTION TO THE RIPENESS
RULE AND SHOULD REQUIRE COURTS TO
APPLY IT AFTER A PLAINTIFF HAS MADE
ONE APPLICATION FOR A LAND USE
APPROVAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF 20

A. Site-Specific Studies, Including Environ-

enental Studies ....vc.scotevcesenebeeunas 22
B. Statements of Officials Before, During and
After the Application Process ........... 22

C. Local Land Use Policies and Regulations... 22

D. The History of ae and Other Land
Use Decisions in the Community ....... 23

E. The Nature of Surrounding Land Uses.. 23

V. THE COURT SHOULD ELIMINATE THE SEC-
OND PRONG OF THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE
REQUIRING THE LANDOWNER TO HAVE
SOUGHT AND BEEN DENIED JUST COM-
PENSATION THROUGH AVAILABLE STATE
PROCEDURES AND ALLOW LANDOWNERS
WITH REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIMS TO
PURSUE THEIR FEDERAL REMEDY IN FED-
BRAL QOURE ...sccccscncpensuseneenennenen 23

CONCLUSION 2... ccccccccccccsvccsesescnuseeuneenes 26

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1993)......... 14

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)
eT Ee rr rr rrrrrereerererereriree 10, 11, 12, 27

Carroll v. City of Prattville, 653 F. Supp. 933 (M.D.

EE th bheaud wiedevee< 15
Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995

I I on so vcccecenccceceescecce: 24
City of Merriam v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City

of Merriam, 748 P.2d 883 (Kan. 1988).............. 16
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S.

DPPPETESEGRGEURGSscceccesccesotcceccccocce: 7
Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir.

UCU SCAEEUSSOebbedbceeccccescccccccceccce: 26

East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d

ee eect ececcccecceeseceses: 24
Estate of Himelstein v. City of Fort Wayne, 898 F.2d
ET Dabs bs cbeberccesccccccceccccce: 24

Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Authority, 953
i i Ms a ccwcccccccesceccececee: 25

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Les Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
SUUMEMEMUERUEEEAES EES CR sebdcoecescecceces 7, 24, 25, 26

Glisson v. Alachus County, 558 So.2d 1030 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Ist Dist. 1990), review denied, 570
EY ME coc ce cccnccnsccccecccescecce 19

Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)............ 7

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Golemis v. Kirby, 632 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.1. 1985)...... 14
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)............ 7
HMK Corp. v. County of Chesterfield, 616 F. Supp.
GOP GELEWe. BOER oo cccccccccnvcvccccccscccoccesss 13
Kaiser Development Co. v. City and County of Hono-
lulu, 649 F. Supp. 926 (D.Hawaii 1986), aff'd, 848
F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947
CODON. cv ccccncevcccccccesccssecuevadesusgens +e 13
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
WG, BO GIT cc cccccccccvcccsevcceeccesceseces 7, 10
Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir.),
modified, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
GB6 UG. BOGD CIGEED. oc cccccccccseccccecccscees 14, 21
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
Perr rrerrrrrrr rrr rrr rer rr rrr? rT rr 7

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477
U.S. 340, reh’g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (1986)

WTTTTITTTTT Tre PriiT eet e 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 21

Mary Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Commission,

125 N.J. 193, 593 A.2d 251 (1991) ...... 66... - 0 eee 19

Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). ..........00005:
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).......... 600005.

Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) ..... 16

Northern Va. Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria,

680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988)...............05. 24

Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 900 F.2d
1434 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990) ....

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
Ochoa Realty Corp. v. Faris, 815 F.2d 812 (1st Cir.
ened ocnese site dddddbevsedundsusdecncciscnse 14, 24
Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. San Marcos, 989
ee ee ee SC banibebcéccketeivedeevacees 25
Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) ..... 8
Penn Central tion Co. v. City of New York, 438

US. 104, reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978) ...... 5, 9, 19

Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, __. U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995) .... 24

River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164
SPUN Gb DN Sd ud iUe Vabedddededdvncddéececeé veces 14

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)...... 7

Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d
375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851 (1988)..... 14

Shubert Organization, Inc. v. Landmarks Preservation
Comm'n, 166 A.D.2d 115, 570 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1st
Dep’t 1991), appeal dismissed without op., 78
N.Y.2d 1006, 575 N.Y.S.2d 456, 580 N.E.2d 1059
(1991), and appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 751, 579
N.Y.S.2d 651, 587 N.E.2d 289 (1991), and cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 946, 112 S. Ct. 2289 (1992)........ 19

Silver v. Franklin Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
966 P.2d 16351 (6th Cie. 1992). .... 2. ccc cecccceness 24

Southview Assocs., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, U.S. 987 (1993) ........ 24

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 80 F.3d
See Oe GE EE cd veneccndededcdcoudesesecencecs 5

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued .
age

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir.
Pin cdccecsdnceveseus petucetesendesubatacsadeess 17

Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir. 1995) .... 24
United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952),

reh'g dewied, 344 U.S. 919 (1953)... . 2... 6c eee ween ees 7
Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988).............. 14
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. .

Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)............ passim
Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D.

GR, BED ce cvcccescccccccccccescnccessseccesesces 13
MIscELLANEOUS:
L. Kendig, Perrormance Zoninc (American Plan-

ning Association 1978). ............0-cecee eee eeees 17
Pub. L. No. 95-625, § 502, 92 Stat. 3492 (codified at

16 US.C.A. § 471i) (1996)... 2.6.66 cece cece 19
3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., RarHxorr’s THe Law or

ZONING AND PLANNING at § 39.02[d] (1996) ......... 18
3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., RarHxorr’s THe Law or

ZONING AND PLANNING at § 39.02[e] (1996) ......... 19

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE*

The American Planning Association (“APA”) is a
non-profit association of 27,000 members, all of whom are
employed in the field of land use planning or are other-
wise vitally concerned with the discipline.

Virtually all members of APA are engaged in land use
pianning either on behalf of governmental bodies exercis-
ing regulatory authority over the use of real property or
for the benefit of holders of land subject to land use
regulation. Consequently, APA does not represent the
interests of those who seek to increase the constitu-
tionally permissible scope of government regulation nor
of those who promote the interests, constitutional or oth-
erwise of individual landowners. APA and its members
are fundamentally and vitally interested in the promotion
of the rational, predictable, effective, and beneficial use of
real property consistent with the needs of individuals
having recognized interests in property and the public at
large. APA members are the professionals who engage in
the planning to accomplish that fundamental goal.

°

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Mrs. Suitum’s takings claim is not ripe because she
has not submitted an application for a development
rights transfer that would determine the economic impact
of the regulatory system on her property. Neither is there
evidence in the record that Mrs. Suitum’s property is

* The consents of the parties to the filing of this amicus brief
are on file with the Clerk.

made valueless by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(“TRPA”) regulations, and this Court has held that the
retention ot some value in property is enough to defeat a
takings claim. This Court has made clear that under its
takings jurisprudence there is no assumption that the
only uses of property cognizable under the Constitution
are developmental uses.

Mrs. Suitum’s filing of a building permit application
did not satisfy the requirement that she make at least »ne
application for approval because it was clear umder
TRPA’s regulations that the building permit could not
issue. However, there is a tension between the Agins-
MacDonald rule that a landowner must submit one
“meaningful” application and the Hamilton Bank rule that
a landowner must utilize all available administrative
relief at the local level. This tension creates a weakness in
ripeness law that, frankly, some local governments have
exploited to frustrate “as-applied” takings claims in fed-
eral courts.

This weakness in ripeness law promotes uncertainty
in land use decision making by local governments that
ultimately undermines the rational, predictable, effective
and beneficial use of property — goals of vital concern to
Amicus curiae. Because of these two rules, a landowner
whose proposal has been denied has an agonizing choice.
Should she “reapply” with something “less ambitious,”
or apply for relief from the land use agency? What is
“meaningful” and what is “grandiose” within the limits
of a planning and zoning program is a matter of judg-
ment. Amicus curiae believes the Court should resolve this
tension between these two rules and create a more precise

and fair basis for determining when federal courts have
jurisdiction in takings cases.

Amicus curiae submits that it is the developer who
should decide whether she wishes to reapply for a land
use approval or risk litigation on her takings claim over
the denial of one application. This Court should also
clarify the confusion in the lower federal courts over the
scope of the reapplication rule and hold that while the
one application rule is always applicable to “as applied”
challenges, the reapplication requirement is not relevant
to substantive due process and equal protection claims.
Because such claims challenge the rationality of a regula-
tory decision and do not require proof that a landowner’s
property has been rendered valueless by the regulation,
these two claims do not require speculation on what
forms of less intensive development a local government
might have permitted.

This Court required applicants specifically to apply
for a variance to make their takings claims ripe, but it
should recognize that a variance is only one type of
administrative relief available to landowners. The type of
administrative relief available depends upon the land use
regulatory system the local government has adopted. The
transfer of development rights system option available in
this case is simply another form of administrative relief
available in many land use regulatory systems.

This Court should also recognize a futility exception
to the ripeness rule and should apply it after a landowner
has made one application for a land use approval or
administrative relief. Landowners should be able to rely

on a number of factors, including official statements and
local land use policies and regulations, to show futility.

This Court should also eliminate the second prong of
the ripeness doctrine that requires landowners to seek
and be denied just compensation through available state
procedures. Landowners with regulatory takings claims
should be able to pursue their federal compensation rem-
edy in federal court.

ARGUMENT

The Petitioner, Mrs. Suitum, did not seek authoriza-
tion for transferable development rights (“TDRs”) under
the land use and development regulations of the Respon-
dent, the TRPA. Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit properly held that Plaintiff's regulatory
taking claim was premature under the “finality require-
ment,” the first prong of the ripeness standard enunci-
ated in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The Ninth Circuit
stated:

Without an application for the transfer of devel-
opment rights, TRPA is foreclosed from deter-
mining the extent of the use of Suitum’s
property. By failing to apply to the TDR pro-
gram, Suitum denies TRPA the ability to grant a
“different form [ ] of relief . . . which might
abate the alleged taking.” Without pursuit of the
transfer of development rights, we cannot know
whether the regulations have gone too far
because at this point, no one knows how far the
regulations have gone. Without attempting to

transfer the rights she currently possesses,
Suitum cannot know the “nature and extent of
permitted development|[,|” and thus cannot
know the regulations’ full economic impact or
the degree of their interference with her reason-
able investment-backed expectations, two criti-
cal components of a regulatory taking claim
analysis.

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359,
362-63 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

I. MRS. SUITUM’S TAKINGS CLAIM IS NOT RIPE
BECAUSE SHE DID NOT SUBMIT AN APPLICA-
TION FOR TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS (TDRS) TO ENABLE A COURT TO
DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF TRPA’S LAND USE REGULATORY
SYSTEM.

In the context of land use regulation, this Court's
ripeness doctrine was intended to address the Article III
posture of regulatory takings claims by determining if, and
the extent to which, the decision maker has inflicted a
concrete economic injury to the plaintiff. Ironically, the
first land use case in which this Court applied the ripe-
ness doctrine was Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978), a
case involving land use regulations that also included
provisions for use of transferable development rights
(TDRs). The Court rejected a taking claim based on a
refusal of the city’s landmarks commission to approve a
high-rise building over Grand Central Terminal, which
had been designated an historic landmark. In rejecting
Penn Central's taking claim, this Court based its decision

on lack of ripeness on two factors, noting first that Penn
Central had “not sought approval for the construction of
a smaller structure” than the proposed 50-story office
building. Id. at 137. For this reason, the Court did “not
know” whether the plaintiff would be denied “any use”
of the airspace above the Terminal building. Second, the
Court noted that Penn Central could not accurately assert
that it had “been denied all use” of its “pre-existing air
rights” because these rights were transferable to other
parcels. Id. As to the relevance of the city’s TDR program
to the takings claim, the Court stated:

While these [TDR] rights may well not have
constituted “just compensation” if a “taking”
had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubt-
edly mitigate whatever financial burdens the
law has imposed on appellants and, for that
reason, are to be taken into account in considering
the impact of regulation.

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added)

A. There is No Evidence in the Record that Mrs.
Suitum’s Property Has Been Rendered Value-
less.

In order to conclude that the finality requirement of
the ripeness doctrine allows Mrs. Suitum to stop short of
making any application under the TDR program, it must
be assumed that Mrs. Suitum’s property has been ren-
dered valueless under TRPA’s regulations.' However,

' Of course, even if that were true, this Court has held that
in some circumstances a law that renders property valueless

there is no evidence in the record below that this is the
case. By contrast, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the state trial court had found
that the prohibition against erecting any permanent hab-
itable structures on Lucas’s parcels under the state's
Beachfront Management Act (the “Act”) rendered those
parcels “ ‘valueless’ ” Id. at 1007. The Court in Lucas also
made clear that its takings jurisprudence makes no
assumption that the only uses of property cognizable
under the Constitution are “ ‘developmental uses,’ ” stat-
ing:
We make no such assumption. Though our prior
takings cases evince an abiding concern for the
productive use of, and economic investment in,
land, there are plainly a number of noneconomic
interests in land whose impairment will invite

exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings
Clause.

Id. at 1020 n.8. Moreover, this Court in Lucas never
restricted the “property interest” involved in takings to a
developmental interest. In fact, the Court acknowledged

may nonetheless not constitute a taking. See, e.g., First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 313 (1987); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596
(1962); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155 (1952), reh’g
denied, 344 U.S. 919 (1953); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 657 (1887); cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1011 (1984); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475
U.S. 211, 225 (1986). In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 490 (1987), the Court stated:
“ “Although a comparison of values before and after’ a
regulatory action ‘is relevant... it is by no means conclusive’ ”
(citation omitted).

that the “rhetorical force” of its “ ‘deprivation of all eco-
nomically feasible use’ rule is greater than its precision,
since the rule does not make clear the ‘property interest’
against which the loss of value is to be measured.” Id. at
1016 n.7. The Court observed:

When, for example, a regulation requires a
developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its
natural state, it is unclear whether we would
analyze the situation as one in which the owner
has been deprived of all economically beneficial
use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as
one in which the owner has suffered a mere
diminution in value of the tract as a whole.

Id. The Court did not need to reach this “difficult ques-
tion” because the record demonstrated that the Act had
left each of Lucas’s beachfront lots “without economic
value.” Id.

Plainly the Court’s language in Lucas indicates that
the principal focus of regulatory takings analysis is the
impact of the regulation upon economic value, not the loss
of the opportunity to physically develop the property. As
in Penn Central, the TDRs available to Mrs. Suitum could
mitigate the financial burden imposed by TRPA’s regula-
tory system and must be taken into account in consider-
ing their economic impact. However, because Mrs.
Suitum never submitted an application under the trans-
ferable development rights (TDRs) program, she has
made it impossible for a court to determine the extent of
the economic impact of TRPA’s regulatory system on her
property. In Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496
(1982), the Court recognized that “the finality require-
ment is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker

has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that
inflicts an actual, concrete injury;. ...” Hamilton Bank,
supra, at 193. It begs the question for a court to commence
an assessment of that impact under a takings claim with-
out the court having the evidence of a TDR application
before it. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
477 U.S. 340, reh’g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (1986), the Court
referred explicitly to use of an available TDR program as
one means to satisfy the ripeness question.

The local agencies charged with administering
regulations governing property development
are singularly flexible institutions; what they
take with the one hand they may give back with
the other. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, for example, we recognized that
the Landmarks Preservation Commission . . . had
authority in appropriate circumstances to authorize
alterations, remit taxes, and transfer development
rights to ensure the landmark owner a reasonable
return on its property. [citation omitted] Because
the railroad had “not sought approval for the
construction of a smaller structure” than its pro-
posed 50-plus story office building, [citation
omitted], we concluded “that the application of
New York City’s Landmark Law hal[d] not effec-
ted a ‘taking’ of [the railroad’s] property.” [cita-
tion omitted]. Whether the inquiry asks if a
regulation has “gone too far,” or whether it seeks to
determine if proffered compensation is “just,” no
answer is possible until a court knows what use, if
any, may be made of the affected property.

Id. at 350 (emphasis added).

10

B. By Merely Filing a Building Permit Applica-
tion, Mrs. Suitum Did Not Satisfy the One
Application Rule Developed in Agins, Ham-
ilton Bank, and MacDonald.

In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), this
Court held that a landowner must obtain a decision on
his land use proposal from the local government before
he can bring an as applied takings challenge. In that case,
the plaintiffs had attacked the ordinance facially, as a
taking, without submitting a development plan. This
Court dismissed the case because the plaintiffs were “free
to pursue their reasonable investment expectations by
submitting a development plan to local officials.” Id. at
262. Although the Court in Agins did not use the term,
the decision clearly meant that a case involving a claim
that an ordinance as applied to a landowner’s property
constitutes a taking is not ripe for a judicial decision
unless the plaintiff has submitted a development plan for
approval when the ordinance permits such an applica-
tion.?

Once an application is submitted, the applicant must
pursue all other required approvals related to that appli-
cation to enable the decision maker to arrive at a “final,

2 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987), this Court held that a facial takings challenge,
namely, a claim that a regulation on its face and in its entirety, as
it applies to all property affected by it (including the
landowner'’s), effects a taking, is not subject to the ripeness
doctrine. However, it noted that plaintiffs “face an uphill battle
in making a facial attack on [a regulation] as a taking.” 480 U.S.
at 495.

11

definitive position” as to the application of the regula-
tions to the plaintiff's land. Hamilton Bank, supra, at 191.
Mrs. Suitum’s building permit application did not satisfy
this requirement because the building permit could not
issue under TRPA’s land use regulations.

This Court again addressed the application require-
ment in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477
U.S. 340, reh’g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (1986). There the
plaintiff had submitted one subdivision application and
the county had rejected it. Nevertheless, the Court stated
that it was not clear the county would not allow “some
development,” id. at 351-52, and explained that the his-
tory of the case indicated “not that future applications
would be futile, but that a meaningful application had
not yet been made.” /d. at 352 n.8. In addition, the Court
stated that “[rjejection of exceedingly grandiose plans
does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will
receive similarly unfavorable reviews,” suggesting that
reapplication may be necessary before a court can deter-
mine the extent of economic injury. Id. at 353 n.9
(emphasis added).

Amicus curiae believes the tension between the Agins-
MacDonald rule that a landowner must submit one
“meaningful” application and the Hamilton Bank rule that
a landowner must utilize all available administrative
relief at the local level, creates a weakness in ripeness law
that many local governments have exploited to frustrate
as-applied takings claims in federal courts. We believe the
Court should resolve this tension and create a more pre-
cise and fair basis for determining when federal courts
have jurisdiction in takings cases.

12

Il. THE COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE TENSION
BETWEEN THE AGINS-MACDONALD RULE,
THAT A LANDOWNER MUST SUBMIT AT LEAST
ONE “MEANINGFUL” APPLICATION FOR
APPROVAL, AND THE HAMILTON BANK RULE,
THAT A LANDOWNER MUST UTILIZE ALL
AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL.

A. Simplify the One Application Rule

The MacDonald Court no doubt thought that by elab-
orating on the Agins rule to say that rejection of “grandi-
ose development” plans is not enough and that
reapplication is necessary, it was adding clarification to
the ripeness doctrine. However, in attempting such clari-
fication the MacDonald Court ignored the realities of land
use control and, consequently, created an agonizing
choice for the landowner. The reality is that what is
“grandiose” and what is “meaningful” within the limits
of a local planning and zoning program is a matter of
judgment. Because of the Agins-MacDonald and Hamilton
Bank rules, the landowner whose development proposal
has been denied, does not know what to do. Should the
landowner “reapply” with something less ambitious, or
apply for relief from the land use agency? If the land-
owner decides to reapply, the landowner does not know
how many times to reapply - risking that a court will
decide that her project is “grandiose” or that her applica-
tion is not “meaningful” no matter how many times it is
rejected, and require her to apply again. Neither is it clear
who has the burden of proof to show that the reapplica-
tion process has been exhausted.

13

Amicus curiae submits its brief on behalf of an asso-
ciation of planners, many of whom work for local govern-
ments. Many other planners who belong to the
association work for members of the development com-
munity. In fairness to the development community, it
must be recognized that the reapplication requirement
invites local government to create a more complicated
and time consuming review and approval process. It is, in
fact, an open invitation for some local governments to do
mischief. Unscrupulous officials can and often do easily
assert, after the fact, that they “would have been willing”
to consider an intensity of use or an alternative type of
use that the landowner never proposed. This is plainly
unfair and an abuse of the reapplication rule and is why
such a rule is unrealistic and should no longer be
required to demonstrate ripeness for adjudication.

Amicus curiae submits that, as discussed below, the
determination of when “enough is enough” should not be
left to the local governments to decide.*® Rather, it should
be for the landowner or developer who must weigh the
risks of litigation versus another application proposal to
decide whether in fact to contest the decision rendered
after the first application. Unless the Court's ruling in the
case sub judice resolves this tension between the Agins-

3 In fact, many lower federal courts have openly admitted
their difficulty in determining “when enough is enough” under
this aspect of the “finality” requirement. See, e.g., Zilber v. Town
of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Kaiser Development
Co. v. City and County of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926 (D.Hawaii
1986), aff'd, 898 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947
(1991); HMK Corp. v. County of Chesterfield, 616 F. Supp. 667
(E.D.Va. 1985).

14

MacDonald rules, that a landowner must submit a “mean-
ingful” plan for approval, and the Hamilton Bank rule,
that a landowner must utilize all available administrative
relief at the local level, landowners will continue to be
faced with an agonizing and unfair choice. Put simply, if
the landowner seeks administrative relief before reapply-
ing with a less “grandiose” project, the reapplication
requirement of the ripeness rule will, in all likelihood, bar
the landowner’s takings claim. That surely is not the
result that this Court intended under the “finality”
requirement of the ripeness doctrine.

B. The Reapplication Rule Is Irrelevant to Due
Process and Equal Protection Claims.

In MacDonald, the Court stated that “[o]ur cases uni-
formly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and
extent of permitted development before adjudicating the
constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit
it.” MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 351. Many lower courts have
focused upon this sentence and, where they have found a
takings claim to be unripe, have dismissed substantive
due process and equal protection claims as equally
unripe. See River Park, Inc. v. Citw of Highland Park, 23 F.3d
164 (7th Cir. 1994); Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970 (3d Cir.
1993); Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d
375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851 (1988); Kinzli v.
City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir.), modified, 830
F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988);
Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988); Ochoa Realty v. Faria, 815
F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1987); Golemis v. Kirby, 632 F. Supp. 159

15

(D.R.1. 1985). Other courts, however, have declined to
apply the reapplication rule. See Carroll v. City of Pratt-
ville, 653 F. Supp. 933 (M.D. Ala. 1987); Oberndorf v. City
and County of Denver, 900 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 845 (1990).

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, following
its earlier ruling in Kinzli, held in this case that Mrs.
Suitum’s substantive due process and equal protection
claim were also premature under the ripeness doctrine.
Amicus Curiae submits, however, that because substantive
due process and equal protection claims challenge the
rationality of a regulatory decision and do not require
proof that a landowner’s property has been rendered
valueless by the regulation, these two claims do not
require speculation as to what forms of less intensive
development might have been permitted by the local
government. This Court should clarify the confusion in
the lower federal courts on this issue and rule that while
the one application rule reasonably applies to substantive
due process and equal protection claims, the reapplication
rule is not relevant.

Ill. HAMILTON BANK REQUIRED TAKINGS PLAIN-
TIFFS TO APPLY FOR A VARIANCE TO MAKE
THEIR TAKINGS CLAIMS RIPE, BUT THE
RELATED APPROVALS NECESSARY TO MAKE
A TAKINGS CASE FINAL SHOULD DEPEND ON
THE TYPE OF LAND USE REGULATORY SYS-
TEM.

In Hamilton Bank, this Court held a takings case not
final because the plaintiff had not applied for a variance
from applicable subdivision control regulations. This

16

Court’s emphasis on the need for a variance has confused
lower federal courts that have tried to apply Hamilton
Bank. The reason is that zoning systems usually include
other forms of administrative relief besides the variance,
and this Court should provide guidance on when admin-
istrative relief besides a variance is necessary.

Under the traditional Euclidean zoning system, the
variance was originally conceived as a “safety valve” to
give relief to a landowner while protecting the ordinance
from invalidation on the constitutional ground that the
particular landowner’s property was burdened to a
greater extent than other land in the vicinity, in violation
of the due process clause.* The courts generally distin-
guish between a use variance and an area variance. The
area variance fits the notion that was originally intended
in the State Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) pro-
mulgated by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1926. It
authorizes departures from ordinance restrictions on the
construction or placement of buildings and other struc-
tures. In other words, the area variance allows adjust-
ments to the requirements for yards, height, frontage,
setbacks and similar dimensional aspects. A use variance
quite simply permits a use that is otherwise prohibited in
the particular zoning district. See, e.g., City of Merriam v.
Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City of Merriam, 748 P.2d 883
(Kan. 1988).

4 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)
(invalidating a zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds as
applied to a particular parcel, and articulating a balancing test
weighing the public interest against the private interest).

17

Traditional zoning systems also usually include
another form of administrative relief, known as a “condi-
tional use” or “exception.” A conditional use is a use
authorized by the zoning ordinance if certain criteria are
met, such as a requirement that the use be compatible
with uses in the surrounding area. The conditional use is
not a safety valve. It is not appropriate to require a
takings plaintiff to ask for an amendment, as some fed-
eral courts require, because an amendment is a legisla-
tive, not an administrative, act. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991).

There are also land use systems based on what is
known as “performance” zoning. Performance zoning is a
flexible zoning technique designed to permit maximum
development on a site in a manner that minimizes
impacts upon neighboring uses and systematically avoids
the wastage of land and the destruction of natural
resources.> Under performance zoning, each tract of land
is considered unique — a function of its size, shape, and
natural features. Unlike conventional zoning, which con-
trols development by means of rigid lot size, setback, and
housing regulations, performance zoning controls inten-
sity of development with standards that set maximum
density, impervious surface coverage, and minimum open
space, or buffer yards. For example, in the residential
land use context, performance zoning utilizes two key
elements: (a) bufferyard standards that provide a range of
options to a developer; and (b) housing-type options

5 See generally, L. Kendig, Perrormance ZoninG (American
Planning Association 1978).

18

based upon site capacity analysis. Flexible bufferyard
provisions enable a developer to build at varying land
use intensities on a particular site without significantly
impacting neighboring land uses. Housing-type options
based upon site capacity analysis free the developer of
the restrictions in sizes and types of housing under con-
ventional zoning districts and enable the developer to
provide housing at various sizes and scales of units in
response to a fluc‘uating housing market, subject to per-
formance criteria. In this type of regulatory system, “vari-
ances” are not typically relied upon as a relief or
adjustment mechanism. Rather, the municipality simply
decides to give or withhold approval as part of an admin-
istrative decision rnaking system.

It is important, therefore, that the extent to which
approvals relating to an application must be pursued is
assessed within the context of the particular type of land
use system, whether it be based on a Euclidean zoning
system, a performance zoning system, or some other type
of land use control system. Transfer of development
rights (TDR) is simply another form of administrative
relief available in many zoning systems, including tradi-
tional and performance zoning. Transfer development
rights are well recognized in many jurisdictions as an
integral component of the local government's overall
land use regulatory system, particularly in efforts to pre-
serve agricultural lands and natural resource areas.® In
New Jersey, for example, the Pinelands TDR program has
made it possible to mitigate the effects of regulations

6 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Ratuxorr’s THe Law or ZONING
AND PLANNING at § 39.02[d] (1996).

19

enacted to preserve unique resources of the pine-oak
forest and wild and scenic rivers, which include habitats
for many rare, threatened and endangered plant and
animal species.” In addition to preserving these resources,
TDR regulations protect the seventeen-trillion-gallon
Cohansey aquifer, believed to be one of the largest
untapped sources of pure water in the world.

Many local governments have also enacted TDR pro-
grams to save open space.* Programs can be found in
Malibu and Monteray Counties, California, and cities and
towns in Florida, New Jersey, Vermont, Montana and
Pennsylvania. For example, the 3,100 acre special study
area in the Cross Creek region of Alachua County, Flor-
ida, with its exceptional wetlands and upland habitat
areas, has been saved through the use of TDR.?

Another major area in which governments have put
TDR to work to save critical resources while preserving
property rights is landmarks preservation.’ Private

7 Mary Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Commission, 125 N.].
193, 198; 593 A.2d 251 (1991). The U.S. Congress enacted The
National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 to establish the one
million acre Pinelands Natural Reserve. Pub. L. No. 95-625,
§ 502, 92 Stat. 3492 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 471i) (1996).

8 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Ramuxorr’s THe Law or ZONING
AND PLANNING at § 39.02[e] (1996).

% Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1036 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. Ist Dist. 1990), review denied, 570 So.2d 1304 (Fla. 1990).

10 Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978); Shubert Organization, Inc. v. Landmarks
Preservation Comm'n, 166 A.D.2d 115, 117-18, 570 N.Y.S.2d 504
(1st Dep’t 1991), appeal dismissed without op., 78 N.Y.2d 1006, 575
N.Y.S.2d 456, 580 N.E.2d 1059 (1991), and appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d

20

property owners, developers, planners and preservation-
ists all benefit by the use of TDR in landmarks preserva-
tion. The use of TDR today enables future generations to
experience and appreciate our historic resources.

In short, over the last 30 years TDR programs to
preserve critical natural resources, open space and land-
marks have become important and integral components
of land use planning and regulatory programs in this
country.

IV. THIS COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE A FUTILITY
EXCEPTION TO THE RIPENESS RULE AND
SHOULD REQUIRE COURTS TO APPLY IT
AFTER A PLAINTIFF HAS MADE ONE APPLICA-
TION FOR A LAND USE APPROVAL OR ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE RELIEF.

This Court, of course, has recognized that a land-
owner is not required to use “unfair” procedures or to
make “futile” applications. Hamilton Bank, supra, at
205-206 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, this Court
seems to be unaware of the importance of exceptions to
the ripeness doctrine or the impact they could ultimately
have on the doctrine scope and effect. Amicus curiae sub-
mits that the major difficulty is that this Court sees more
certainty and less discretion in the land use control proc-
ess than actually exists, and views its final decision
requirement as a simple requirement, easily met. Nothing

751, 579 N.Y.S. 2d 651, 587 N.E.2d 289 (1991), and cert. denied, 504
U.S. 946, 112 S. Ct. 2289 (1992).

—_

21

could be further from the truth in a system where judg-
ments are qualitative and administration requires the
exercise of substantial discretion.

Cases in the Ninth Circuit have developed the futility
exception most fully. Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d
1449, amended, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1043 (1988). This case held the futility rule applies
after a plaintiff has made one application or an applica-
tion for a variance.

It is respectfully submitted that the “futility” excep-
tion should always apply after one application has been
made for a land use approval or administrative relief. In
addition, the “one meaningful” application suggested in
MacDonald, because it has been abused by many local
governments and misinterpreted by the lower courts,
should not be used to gauge whether the futility excep-
tion is satisfied. Rather, the finality requirement should
be applied reasonably to recognize that a local govern-
ment’s position on the nature and intensity of develop-
ment can be determined from factors other than repeated
applications and denials. These factors should include:

1. Site feasibility studies (i.e., environmental)

2. Statements of officials before and during the
application process

3. Local land use policies and regulations

4. The history of zoning and other land use
decisions in the community

5. The nature of surrounding land uses.

22

A. Site-Specific Studies, Including Environmental
Studies

Often a land use agency will reject a development
because site conditions make it ineligible for approval.
For example, an ordinance may allow approval of a con-
ditional use only if services available to the site, or ade-
quate. If a land use agency rejects a proposal because
services at the site are inadequate, the applicant should
be able to show that further application is futile because
services are adequate yet the agency refused to give
approval.

B. Statements of Officials Before, During and
After the Application Process

Local zoning officials often make statements on
pending land use applications, either during a hearing or
in public. These statements can demonstrate that further
application is futile, once land use agency has reiected an
application.

C. Local Land Use Policies and Regulations

Often a land use agency will reject a land use appli-
cation because of a local land use policy continued either
in a comprehensive plan or in development regulations.
Unless there is some evidence that the municipality may
be willing to change the policy, further application will be
futile.

et A ee . .

23

D. The History of Zoning and Other Land Use
Decisions in the Community

The rejection of a plaintiff's development application
may simply be part of a pattern of similar rejections in
the community. For example, the application may be for
low-cost housing and the applicant may be able to show
the community has regularly rejected applications for
such housing. Evidence of this also should be enough for
a futility holding.

E. The Nature of Surrounding Land Uses

The nature of surrounding land use is often critical to
the success of a land use application, such as an applica-
tion for a conditional use. If an application is rejected in
this kind of case because the land use agency claims
surrounding uses are incompatible, but the applicant can
show they are compatible, further application will be
futile and the claim should be ripe.

V. THE COURT SHOULD ELIMINATE THE SECOND
PRONG OF THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE REQUIR-
ING THE LANDOWNER TO HAVE SOUGHT AND
BEEN DENIED JUST COMPENSATION
THROUGH AVAILABLE STATE PROCEDURES
AND ALLOW LANDOWNERS WITH REGULA-
TORY TAKINGS CLAIMS TO PURSUE THEIR
FEDERAL REMEDY IN FEDERAL COURT.

When the Supreme Court first adopted the ripeness
rules in Hamilton Bank, it held that one prong of the
doctrine requires takings plaintiffs to seek compensation
in state court if it is available. Lower federal courts have

24

abused this requirement. Some courts require a showing
that state courts will grant a compensation remedy. See,
e.g., Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 1693 (1995); Silver v.
Franklin Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031 (6th
Cir. 1991); Ochoa Realty Corp. v. Faris, 815 F.2d 812 (1st Cir.
1987). Other courts bar plaintiffs from federal court even
when it is not clear a state court remedy is available. They
hold a plaintiff must attempt to seek compensation in
state court until the state court holds the compensation
remedy is unavailable. See, e.g., Southview Assocs., Ltd. v.
Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 US.
987 (1993); Estate of Himelstein v. City of Fort Wayne, 898
F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1990); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood
Ass'n v. Macon Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).

These holdings effectively drain the ripeness rules of
any meaning. They prevent federal courts from ever
reaching the final decision issue because, under this view,
a takings plaintiff must seek compensation in state court
until that court clearly says it will not entertain a com-
pensation remedy.

Some federal courts take an even more extreme posi-
tion on the availability of a state compensation remedy.
They hold that takings plaintiffs must sue in state court
under the implied federal constitutional action for com-
pensation created in First English. Tari v. Collier County, 56
F.3d 1533, 1537 n.23 (11th Cir. 1995); Christensen v. Yolo
County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1993);
Northern Va. Law School, Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 680 F.
Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988). This view of ripeness even
more clearly makes the ripeness rules an absolute bar to a

25

taking remedy. The federal constitution is always action-
able in state court. If takings plaintiffs must always sue in
state court first on the federal remedy, they will never
establish federal court jurisdiction over a takings claim.

This problem becomes even more serious if a takings
plaintiff cannot return to federal court once a state court
adjudicates the takings claim. A plaintiff usually is barred
from relitigating a state case in federal court under res
judicata and collateral estoppel principles. An exception
exists when a federal court forces a plaintiff into a state
court by abstaining, but it is not clear whether it applies
when ripeness rules force a plaintiff into state court.
Compare Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Authority, 953
F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992) (exception applies), with Pal-
omar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362
(9th Cir. 1993) (contra).

Amicus curiae submits that the rule that takings plain-
tiffs must first sue in state court for compensation under
the federal constitution is incorrect. When this Court first
adopted the ripeness rules, there was no remedy for
compensation in federal courts. Indeed, this Court
adopted ripeness rules to avoid deciding whether a fed-
eral compensation remedy is available. In the absence of a
federal compensation remedy, it perhaps made sense to
require takings plaintiffs to seek a state compensation
remedy first.

This situation has now changed. In 1987, in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 302 (1987), this Court held that a remedy
for compensation in takings cases is available under the
federal constitution. Federal courts should not require

26

takings plaintiffs to go to state court to seek compensa-
tion before taking advantage of this federal remedy.

A Ninth Circuit panel has now held that the avail-
ability of a compensation remedy i state court under
First English does not satisfy the requirement that a tak-
ings plaintiff must sue for compensation first in state
court. Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir.
1995). The court held that federal ripeness rules require
the availability of a state compensation remedy. It stated
that “to hold that a taking plaintiff must first present a
Fifth Amendment claim to the state court system as a
condition precedent to seeking relief in a federal court
would be to deny a federal forum to every takings claim-
ant.” Id. at 860. The court was “satisfied that Williamson
County may not be interpreted to command such a revo-
lutionary concept and draconian result.” Id. at 861.

This issue is important in Suitum because forcing the
plaintiff to seek a remedy under First English in state
court will make her case unripe even though she later
satisfies the final decision rule. This Court should follow
the holding in Dodd in order to make it clear that plain-
tiffs in as-applied takings cases can obtain a ruling in
federal court on the federal takings law that this Court
has developed so extensively in recent years.

°

CONCLUSION

This case affords the Court an opportunity to clarify
the application of the “finality” requirement of the ripe-
ness doctrine to land use cases so that the requirement
serves its intended purpose. That purpose is to encourage

et

27

the decision maker to arrive at a definitive position on
the issue that is alleged to inflict an actual, concrete and
justiciable injury. It is not to encourage the creation of
complex, time-consuming review and approval processes
that waste the resources of local government and create a
climate of regulatory uncertainty that does not promote
the public interest.

The Court’s ruling in this case should resolve the
tension between the Agins-MacDonald rule, that a land-
owner must submit a “meaningful” plan for approval,
and the Hamilton Bank rule, that a landowner must utilize
all available administrative relief at the local level. The
Court's clarification and guidance on the “finality” prong
of the ripeness doctrine will promote the rational, effi-
cient and predicable and beneficial use of real property in
concert with the public interest.

January 9, 1997

Respectfully submitted,

Brian W. Biagsser*

“Counsel of Record

H. Bissert Carey, Ill
Rosinson & Core

One Boston Place

Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 557-5900

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Of Counsel:

Danie. R. MANDELKER

Stamper Professor of Law
Washington University in St. Louis
Campus Box 1120

St. Louis, Missouri 63130

(314) 968-7233

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0011%3A30. Public record. Not legal advice.