# Special Master Report — Cuban American Bar Ass'n v. Christopher

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0005%3A09

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Special Master Report
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 516 U.S. 913

## Text

>

No. 84, Original

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF ALASKA

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL \. ASTER

J. KEITH MANN
Special Master
Stanford, California

March 1996

RECEIVED

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Page
IIIT (osha iciareneesetereaainnsaebarneieammnoneapetenannn ix
; RR it allt RO xi
> SEIT sdlictaserinenutssanessossetsoasspapenecenesssesaneocveseese 3
A. Nature of the controversy .............:ccccsccseeeesseeeeees 3
Be iain ccccccesnsvensenpenensecoscssecssece 3
ni as 5
D. The joint statements of questions presented .......... 7
E. The motion for leave to intervene .......................+. 8

F. Additional proceedings before the Special
pelle: tana ed heb a oR Na 10

PART ONE
ALASKA’S COASTLINE

et Se 15
III. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE ..........++++. 19
A. The United States’ position .................cccceeeeeees 20
Be rari sdescecsertenssnnsceveccessctes 25
1. Questions 2 and 12: straight baselines ............ 25
2. Questions 3 and 13: the ten-mile rule ............. 29
3. Question 4: assimilation and simplification ... 30
C. Organization of the discussion ...................0.:000 32
Hy Soe a 34
1. The Alaska Statehood Act ..0............cccccceceeeeee 34
2. The Submerged Lands Act ................:000ce00000+ 36
a. The conditional grant .................:cceeeeeee 37
b. The definition of “coast line” .................... 39
(1) The Douglas amendment .................... 39
(2) The meaning of “open sea” ................ 41

**

CONTENTS

E. The impermissible contraction theory ................. 44
1. Article 4 straight baselines ..............:cccccseeeeees 45

2. Inland waters at statehood ............:ccceeeeeeeeees 49

3. GROSSES FERRITES .ccrccceccsacsoensnsascouiermmesiennets 51

F. Past delimitation practice of the United States .... 52
1. The Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case 52

2. United States policy to 1929 ........cccccceeeeeeeeees 56
©. DGRBWRRG TRG .cccecerscansessnsonssssememeientecnas 57
b. Long Island Sound .............:cccccssseceeeeeeeeeees 58
c. Cuba and the Florida keys ...............:00008 60
d. The Alaska boundary arbitration ............... 61
e. Mississippi Sound ...............:.cssesscsssseeseres 66
f. General statements .............ccrcrcesssserssrsseees 67
3. United States policy from 1930 to 1949 ......... 71
a. Proposals at the Hague conference of 1930 71
b. Authority of the 1930 proposals ................ 75
©. TRO TOG CORTE cccecececcssestatnisnnesseesscsmnentien 80
4. United States policy, 1950-1952 ..........ccce 83
a. The Chapman line (1950) ..........:cccceeeeeees 84
(1) Boggs’s theory .............::cccceeeeee an 85
(2) Clement’s Giecry ....ccccecccsosessssoresereesees 87
(3) Shalowitz’s theory ..............::ccccseeseeees 88
b. The Fisheries case (1951) .........c:cssceeeeeees 93
c. The State Department letter (1951) ........... 98
d. The Master’s report in California (1952) 103
e. The Alexander Archipelago (1952) ......... 105
C, DRRCUEERER. .connswsesenssteiniaiinaiinaiiiain 107
5. United States policy from 1953 to Alaska’s
SORAERBOT nncarsocessceecguensseseninneeninaiiaeaiaiianae 109
a. Application of the Submerged Lands Act
in Gan GE SARIS ccncencesenccinictaincies 110
b. Pres regulations in Alaska .................. 116
c. ED ccccsccetsmnnptentionetniie 122
d. ate on pre-Convention policy ......... 126

(1) ‘TED Ci CED GUD cncsencsscctseeesssbcsentenien 127

IV.

(3) Other formulations ...........................
ee IID Ssttnccsescesccccccscccccccce
f. The application of pre-Convention

Fe ee

6. Poststatehood developments .....................+.
FE a

(1) The Louisiana case, 1960-1961 .......

(2) The California case, 1963-1965 .......

(3) The Louisiana case, 1965 .................
b. Article 4 straight baselines ......................

(1) The Louisiana Boundary Case,

I i cesscceese

ae ccccsenes

C. The relation between the two sentences of
ESE SES TE

1. The Court’s interpretation ....................000+.
2. The history of Article 7(2) ............cccccccceee

I csi cacdeddccscessonsecccees
b. The International Law Commission ........
c. The 1958 Geneva conference a

D. Application EE
1. Initial analysis of the “well-marked

152

iv

CONTENTS
a. The meaning of “landlocked waters” ...... 208
b. Adaptation of the Court’s test ................. 211
c. Precedents on double-headed bays .......... 216
CUI Sicechctdceieitcncincniindsastisafinistiacenntsccesess 226
SENG TID cnccatnccesccsctnnsceenssnncscessetinatinnetincersesees 227
A, FR IRD cestecsitrtncetiscncievitiznecmnncnn 228
B. Background of the dispute ...............cc:cccsceeeee 230
C. The high water Gata ..............cccccccssessccessssseeees 234
1. Interpretation of “high tide” as mean high
CRED ccnseaitshsitcsstengctncntntctintstuisdntihnciimenstesesscens 234
2. Conditions in the Beaufort Sea .................... 236
D. Evidence predating the joint monitoring
SUNT cccpisintcteicisitiientiateindesieatiintmndennissrieseusecenscscs 240
1. The cartographic history .................c.0ccc0000 240
So ND tattcrestttecnenceccstetncecscsescvens 244
E. The joint monitoring project ...............ccccceeee 248
1. Determination of mean high water ............... 249
2. Determination of the height of Dinkum
ED wcicinsteinenenccntinctinbitintthdisieisiibibiiabatsiesiiainpniins 253
3. Alaska’s proposed adjustments to the tidal
GBTED ‘cchicnistinncmnnteasttitttinsesenssitithiatnnintecssees 255
a. Extent of the adjustments ........................ 255
b. The adjustment for trend ...................000+ 258
c. The adjustment for weather .................... 263
FS Le ee 266
F. The composition of Dinkum Sands ................... 269
Ee 270
2. Ice in international law ....................c0000000 271
3. Application to Dinkum Sands ...................... 274
G. Observations in 1982 and 1983 .............ccccecceee 276
1. Alaska’s measurements ................c0ccseeeeeeee 278
2. Late season observations .................ccceeeee0es 280
Be, CID vaectttiictiedcccntteensncatectnntettinnrensee 283
I. Requirements for an island ........................0c000++ 287

1. The notion of permanence ......................0+ 288
2. Horizontal permanence ....................cc00-00-+: 289
3. Vertical permamemce .............0csecceccsseserssessees 294

a. History and interpretation of the
EE Se 294
b. Features of variable height ...................... 302
c. The possibility of divided ownership ...... 304
d. Application to Dinkum Sands ................. 307
ey ere ee ee ee 310
VI. THE ARCO PIER EXTENSION ................escesceeseeseeseeeees 311

Vil.

VIII.

A. The Submerged Lands Act and the Convention 313
B. The pier extension as a permanent harbor work 314

1. Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention .............. 314

2. The question of permanence ........................ 316

C. The Convention as controlling .......................... 323
FOE 323

2. The argument from emergency .................... 325

3. The argument from the regulations .............. 329
a I Saiciehicheciictediceccnstctiiltbicthitemnenestncccete 337
LOW-TIDE ELEVATIONS ..........ccsccorcsssssssessesseeseeesenes 338

PART TWO
FEDERAL RESERVATIONS

THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM RESERVE-ALASKA ........ 343
A. Question 7: Harrison Bay and Smith Bay ......... 349
B. Question 8: Peard Bay ..........:.0.c.0ccsessesssssssesseees 352
Be ID tities citcereccsentedtctentuitoncocnedi 353

2. The boundary description ......................0+ 357

a. The three-mile requirement .................... 357

b. Peard Bay as a small lagoon ................... 360
A ee a ae 364

CONTENTS CONTENTS vii
C. Question 11: Wainwright Inlet and the Kuk 3. General considerations ....................ccs0e000 459
River, Kugrua Bay and River, and other small 4. Congressional retention by Statehood Act
inlets, bays and river estuaries ...............000++ 364 RRS eae ey Oe 462
1. Thee gengeaghay .......0...c.ccccsceccscscsesereceneneessnees 365 5. Executive retention under Submerged Lands
2, AREER ceccnessesitiniisitibtittitclrencennnes 366 | AER Sn 467
3. Construction of the boundary description .... 368 a. An application as an executive retention . 467
4. Application of the boundary description. ...... 372 b. Authority for an executive retention ....... 473
a. Wainwright Inlet ..................00cessseeeeeeeees 372 el et 477
b. Other indentations with sandspits and C. Question 10: The interpretation of the with-
IGE ceccecececncasccccapnscsesnpcenantquestscnstsnceces 374 I 477
c. Tidally influenced parts of rivers ............ 376 1. The location of the boundary ....................... 478
S, Comme sa ccecencesensicsntetiinintsiinencsccenesteceetns 380 a. The boundary description on its face ...... 481
D. Development of the Pollard doctrine ................ 381 b. Other evidence of the intended boundary 482
D, CI ccticccncennctsticinecnctntsemscemeresseseeee 382 (1) Prestatehood maps ......................:00+. 483
2. BRED GD crsctiactttsiiticttitcinceteceesvceses 386 (2) Development of the boundary
E. Issues stemming from Montana and Utah ........ 388 ESSE, 484
1. Inland waters versus territorial waters .......... 390 (3) The purposes of the Range ............... 485
2. Reservations or withdrawals versus (4) Comparison with other descriptions . 491
COMVCYEROGS .......cceccerscrsrencrersesersnssssosesoeees 395 2. Rights to submerged lands inside the
3. Authority for the reservation ...............00000 404 NE ll Seb 495
4. Intention to reserve submerged lands ........... 416 nt a te A SR OL IP 499
a. The precedent ..........cccesssvessssesssvessssessenes 416
b. The language and purpose of the
Executive Onder .........0..csccscrsesssreeereesseses 421 PART THREE
EE 429 SUMMARY
5. Intention to defeat state title .................:000 430
6. The scope of the rights retained ................... 440 X. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ............00000000e00e00e 503
FP. Com cctietcesntestencetesienditnanrchentersncetntenisionen 445
IX. THe Arctic NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE ............... 447 Re I a SE SA 507
Be, Te RAIA cccccenecnensenennssscilliltnciinstnctittnitinietenan 451 A. Text of questions presented ....0...............cccc0000 509
B. Question 9: The effectiveness of the withdrawal B. Report of January 10, 1984 .0.......ccccccccccceceeeeeees 513
GR AEIBGD ccscresinscnsveinssnenstesinesinecnttnssenctiesoesseeeee 455 C. Order of January 10, 1984 (intervention) .......... 557
1. Federal power to retain submerged lands ..... 455 D. Order of June 3, 1986 (intervention) .................. 560
2. The statutory framework ..............ccc0cceeeeeees 457 E. Stipulation on question 14 ...............ccccccceeeeeeeeees 564

1.1.

3.1.

3.2.

3.3.
3.4.

3.5.
3.6.
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
4.5.

4.6.

5.1.

5.2.

Page

The Arctic coast of Alaska ...............cccceeeeees facing 3
The normal baseline and the three-mile belt

in the presence of islands (schematic) ................ 23
The United States’ position in the leased

ITI sccestccnsetecneseurectbermietictinneornereepanenes facing 24
Article 4 straight baselines (schematic) .................. 27
Alaska’s position in the leased area using

ten-mile straight baselines ........................ facing 28
The ten-mile rule (schematic) ....................0000000008+ 31
The method of assimilation and simplification

ITITIITTITIIT sis oncestieeleteeaetd bauateemepocnnebimeconngteseczepneqcese 33
Harrison Bay (from NOS chart 16004) ................. 178
The parties’ positions on closing lines for

SUIEN TENE stccssnchenentecnssecsganscestnesasestosccosereceee 179
Tenakee Inlet and Freshwater Bay, Alaska

(from NOS chart 17300) .............ccccccccecseeeeeeeees 220
Shelikof Bay and Gilmer Bay, Alaska

(from NOS chart 17320) ............:ccccccccceeeeseeeeeee 221
Bodega Harbor and Tomales Bay, California

(from NOS chart 18640) .00..........:cccccccceeeeeeeees 223
Svaerholthavet, Norway

(from Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.)) 0.0... 224
Seasonal variation in sea level (adapted

from Ak. Ex. 84A-802) .0......cccccccccceeeseeeneeeeees 239
NOS estimates of mean high water and error

band compared to 1981 measurements of

SITTIN ctteh iderndieencsenetoernesdeeussesneuccsseete 252

9.1.

9.2.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Alaska’s estimates of mean high water and
error band compared to 1981 measurements

OE Tre BD cccaccncqsorentapeetisnrpneenneeeegeee 256
Mean high water adjusted for weather compared

to 1981 measurements of Dinkum Sands ......... 265
1982 elevations of Dinkum Sands ..................0000: 276
1983 elevations of Dinkum Sands ....................000+: 277
The ARCO pier and the 1976 extension ............... 312
The parties’ positions on the National

Petroleum Reserve—Alaska: panel 1,

Icy Cape to Peard Bay ..............c0sseceseeees facing 348
The parties’ positions on the National

Petroleum Reserve—Alaska: panel 2,

Point Barrow to Smith Bay .................... facing 348
The parties’ positions on the National

Petroleum Reserve—Alaska: panel 3,

Smith Bay to Harrison Bay .................... facing 348
Peard Bay (from NOS chart 16084) ........... facing 352
The parties’ positions on the Arctic

National Wildlife Refuge: panel 4 ......... facing 450
The parties’ positions on the Arctic

National Wildlife Refuge: panel 5. ......... facing 450

Table of Authorities

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
Page
SI ertisnictannensmnennntdimmnsicnemnnaretitbidiinheliiephetiaditiicisesddatished xii
III . US.

Historical Studies Division, U.S. Dep’t of se

Research Project No. 637, Status of Hecate”

Strait, 1876-1963 (1963) (Ak. Ex. 85-128) ....... 118, 122
Historical Studies Division, U.S. Dep’t of State,

Research Project No. 637B, Status of Queen

aa Sound, 1897-1963 (1963) (Ak. Ex.

| = Oe ee 118, 122
Historical Studies Division, U.S. Dep’t of

Research Project No. 0031-8, Unies Same

Policy Regarding the Oceans and the Law of the

Sea, 1960-1967 (1974), excerpt from 31
Sf 8 ee st fltetiveciiiens 169

DEPARTMENY OF JUSTICE

Seizure in Neutral Waters, | Op. Att’y Gen. 32 (1793) ... 57

Withdrawal of Public Lands, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 73
PONG Te a ED ain halt hall 406

Title to Naturally-Made Lands Under the Sub-
merged Lands Act, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 241 (1963) .... 292

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
45 Fed. Reg. 70,296 (1980) (Ak. Ex. 84A-8) ......... 258, 259

National Ocean Survey, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 9
United States Coast Pilot (9th ed. 1979) (Ak.
yg EE ieee 87, 139-40, 362, 366, 373, 374

XXXIV TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Chart No. 1, Nautical Chart Symbols and Abbrevi-
ations (Dep’t of Defense and Dep’t of Com-

merce, 7th ed. 1979) (Joint Ex. a) ...........cccccsceeeeereees 381
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Regulations
43 C.F.R. §§ 295.9-295.11 (Supp. 1953) (promul-
gated, 17 Fed. Reg. 7368, 7677 (1952) ............0-+. 465-66
43 C.F.R. §§ 295.9-295.15 (as promulgated, 22
Fed. Reg. 6613 (Aug. 17, 1957)) ........cccccserceeeerereeees 447
IE cecterentrenpnintersannaeeammanesmacnmncnsditivien 471
§ 295.1 1(a) (1954, Supp. 1962)
E,W. I enstleersetnieremnnatentenntemevemete 452-53, 459
AT aCe 471
FO Fe ee itrrrcitentseccccssnnectrectinstowiintbensoetn 121
EE eee 121
21 Fed. Reg. 5446 (1956) .0.........cccccccsccceeneeeeeees 116-17, 122
SD Ba Be Ge cenecss cece cerrernsvenccnscscccsmnennt 116, 122
OE Fa certrtrcsecrsctanreretentnennevtscceneccities 116
25 Fed. Reg. 7681 (1960) (notice of proposed
revision of fish and wildlife regulations) ................... 116
25 Fed. Reg. 8397 (1960) (revision and
reorganization Of SOC.P.R.) .............cscmssrcseerseosesreess 116
Public land orders

Public Land Order 82, 8 Fed. Reg. 1599 (1943)
(withdrawing public lands for use in connection
with the prosecution of the war), rewoked by

Public Land Order 2215, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,599
en 452, 471, 483

ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS XXXV

Public Land Order 128, 8 Fed. Reg. 8557 (1943) esees 409-10
Pp ie 10 Fed. Reg. 9479 (1945) 345
Order 1749, 23 Fed.
“ae ee
or Order 2213, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,597
ont Re tC CC DeN See tes ea necenatntenteectabiteseeeceeesesesesses..,. 493

Public Land Order 2214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598

Cs a 449-50, 476, 477, 479, 493
Public Land Order 2215, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,599

GUID cccoccnesnas er EES Se 452
Public Land Order 2216, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,599

eet inetaricneiieen. 493

Withdrawal applications and amendments
23 Fed. Reg. 364 (1958) 0. 448, 449, 479
23 Fed. Reg. 7592 ( Le eae 474
23 Fed. Reg. 8163 (1958) (Ak. Ex. 74) 0. 469, 492
TTT TALE 492
ee 474
25 Fed. Reg. 10,323 ( nn 474

Administrative cases
State of Alaska, 102 IBLA 357 (Interior Bd. of

Land Appeals 85-768, June i 423

Solicitors’ opinions

(D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 356U.S. 933 (1956) . 427

XXXVi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Memorandum from Acting Solicitor J. Reuel Arm-
strong to the Secretary of the Interior (Opinion
M-36239, Oct. 1, 1954) (Ak. Ex. 85-37, Ak. Ex.
85-335, U.S. Ex. 85-403) .......ccceeceeeeneerenenrnneesenenenenes 115

Memorandum from Deputy Solicitor Edmund T.
Fritz to the Under Secretary of the Interior

(Opinion M-36562, Aug. 21, 1959) (Ak. Ex.
TE secackaneincttcbisialecilsessctdheiessnsibheseesttl 469, 470, 492

Solicitor’s Opinion, 86 Interior Dec. 151 (1978)

(Ak. Ex. 80), supplemented and modified, 100

Interior Dec. 103 (1992) ........ccccereeeeeeneeeenensnenennennns 414,
427, 445, 452, 462, 469, 470-71, 484

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Navy Department, History of Naval Petroleum Re-
serves, S. Doc. No. 187, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1944) ...ccccscsocorsvcesssssserensensnserssssssosnsnnsosenenses 412, 427-28

Notice of Boundary Descriptics: of Naval Petroleum
Reserve No. 4, 37 Fed. Reg. 10,088 (May 19,

1972) (Ak. Ex. 90) ..ccccsssvecsccccscesssssseos 349-50, 365, 381
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
33 CFR. § 209.120(g)(10) (1976), 40 Fed. Reg.

ee 329-30
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i(2)( viii) (1976), 40 Fed. Reg.

31,322 Chal 25, IDPS) ccncccneceocoscccccorssnvesssseorone 328, 331
33 CFR. § 209.120, App. C (1976) ....coseesccsneecessnes 317, 318
33 CFR. § 320.4(f) (1994) -cccccccscsssssssssssssssssnossneesseseeee 330
OTHER

U.S. Public Land Law Review Comm’n, One Third
of the Nation's Land (1970) .........0-+-0:seseeeseveneees 395, 432

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS XXXVii

Report to the President by Emergency Board No
151 (appointed by Exec. Order 11,042, 3 C.F.R.
626 (1959-63)) (Southern Pac. Co. & Brother-
hood of Ry. Clerks, Nat’! Mediation Bd. Case

| i alls, Si aati 309
Legislative Materials

PICKETT ACT (1910)

45 Cong. Rec. 621 (1910) .o.cccccccccccscssssssssssssssesosesssseeson 412

Oil-land Withdrawals and the Protection of

Locators of Oil Lands: Hearings on H.R. 24070
Before the House Comm. on the Public Lands,

Gist Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) oo.cccccccccccsecceseees 412, 413-14
SUBMERGED LANDS ACT (1953)
Submerged Lands: Hearings on S.J. Res. 13 and

Related Bills Before the Senate Comm. on Inte-
rior and Insular Affairs, 834 Cong., 1st Sess.

ORES. 6: a A ch 100
S. Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong,, Ist Sess. (1953) ........... 40, 468
99 Cong. Rec. 2619, 4236 (1953) ooeccccccccesssessesesssen 468, 469
99 Cong. Rec. 4240-43 (1953) oo.cccccccoccsesscssssssseoeseee 40, 41
99 Cong. Rec., pt. 13, at 583, 601-02 (1953) ooo... 486
ACT OF SEPTEMBER 7, 1957

H.R. Rep. No. 950, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957) ........... 437

S. Rep. No. 1045, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (195
reprinted in 1957 U.S. Code Cong. rym
OU bnccerersernntencciiiehdeshienenenrsesiniinmenninetecsenn 437, 438

XXXViii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ACT OF JULY 3, 1958

S. Rep. No. 1720, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958),

reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 2893 ........ sailtinabbiadaeeensdliaiaeustiitnnninanes 434, 435, 438

104 Cong. Rec. 11,900, 12,256—57 (1958) .........0006 435-36

Alaskan Submerged Lands: Hearings on H.R. 8054
Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) .......:::0000+ 435, 436

H.R. 8054, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1, 103 Cong.
Ras. 19,GID—13 CIDA) cnrcccececccecesesccsesessssececososocsoscese

ALASKA STATEHOOD ACT (1958)
S. Rep. No. 1929, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) ....... 464, 466.

Alaska Statehood: Hearings on S. 50 Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,

83th Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) ............. 35, 36, 38, 438, 439

Alaska-Hawaii Statehood, Elective Governor, and
Commonwealth Status: Hearings on S. 49, S.
399, and S. 402 Before the Senate Comm. on In-
terior and Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
CBDGBD ccccescocsssnscssnsscsrencactolisiisiotslitzentnabisntitnanitiateeene
Hawaii-Alaska Statehood: Hearings on H.R. 2535,
H.R. 2536, and Related Bills Before the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 84th
Comg,, bat Seas. (9958) ..ccrcccccocccccsecsceresessesoces 35, 38, 439

Alaska Statehood: Hearings on S. 49 and S. 35 Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular

Affairs, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957) ......cc.ccccceceeeeeeees 439
Statehood for Alaska: Hearings on H.R. 50 and

Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on Territorial

and Insular Affairs of the House Comm. on

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS ,
XXXxix

Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., Ist
OG adenine ns 439, 466-67

H.R. Rep. No. 624, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957)
reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin

RP iilicetnierhsinthntdi Eta et 439, 465
104 Cong. Rec. 9410-1] a ~
ARCTIC WILDLIFE RANGE
S. y 899, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959), reprinted in

rctic Wildlife Range—Alaska, Lee 476

Miscellaneous Fish and Wildlife Le
gislation: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and ng
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and F. isheries, 86th Cong., Ist

scsceh spac, re ne aT 460
Biren tacmnbcerenieg at Agama

(U.S. Ex. 28) marvel aee hiatal oe 460
106 Cong. Rec. 2516 RELI 460-61
H.R. 7045, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960 ae

House, U.S. Ex. al ineniaia dois ohare 461

Arctic Wildlife Range—Alaska: Hearings on S.
1899 Before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm, on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess
pts. 1 & 11(1959-60) -.. 461, 476

OTHER

Provisional U.S. Charts Delimitin
1g Alaskan Terri-
torial Boundaries, Hearing Before the rte
Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972) (Ak. EX. 85-23) oo... cccccccccssssseeeeessesss... 118, 165

—_ — a retinas gece —

xl TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 942, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
I

International Materials

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

j he Codification
League of Nations Conference for t )
of International Law [1930) (ed. Shabta

Rosenne 1975) (4 vols.) ...... cee 68, 186
Conference for the Codification of im fonal
Law, 2 Bases of Discussion J errit aters,

League of Nations Doc. C.74.M@.39 1929 V
(1929), reprinted in 2 Rosenne, supra, ana

j . Ex. 85-4 ( Bases of
yma stg _—~ . ae were 68-70, 71, 294-95

Acts of the Conference for the Codification of In-

’ no “pe Minutes of the Second Commit-
tee: Territorial Waters, League of Nations Doc.
C.351(b).M.145(b).1930.V (1930), reprinted in

4 Rosenne, supra, and excerpted in Ak. Ex. 85-1

" 68, 71, 72,
“Acts of Conference”) ........c.sscccseeeeeeeeneeesennnes , 71,
one ~~ 75, 76, 101, 102, 187-88, 293, 294, 296

UNITED NATIONS

G.A. Res. 174 (II), 2 U.N. GAOR (123rd plen.
mtg., Nov. 21, 1947) at 105, U.N. Doc. A/519
(BTID eccccnctesccccrssantenrsenesecosenssnssncnessotoent iacherenrmers

Yearbooks of the International Law Commission,
1951-1956, U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951 &
1951/Add.1 through A/CN.4/SER.A/1956 & yan
I" cascardnomsiliadgnbsendennsenennes 186,

INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS xli

Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 6 UN. GAOR Supp. (No. 9),
U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [1951] 2
Y.B. Int’) L. Comm’ n 123 o.o.cccccccccccccseeses. 122-23, 188

J.P.A. Frangois, Report on the Régime of the Terri-
torial Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/53 (1952) (in
French), [1952] 2 Y.B. Int’] L. Comm’n 25 ..... 189, 297

J.P.A. Frangois, Second Report on the Régime of
the Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/6] (1953)

(in French), [1953] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 57 . 189, 297

Report of the Committee of Experts on Technical
Questions Concerning the Territorial Sea,
Annex to Frangois, Addendum to the Second
Report on the Régime of the Territorial Sea
NE tata 189, 193, 200

J.P.A. Frangois, Addendum to the Second Report on
the Régime of the Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/61/Add.1 (1953) (in French), [1953] 2
Y.B. Int’! L. Comm’n 75; also U.S. Ex. 85-228

+ Naina Sia 2 Ra Se (sie ee 189

J.P.A. Frangois, Third Report on the Régime of the
Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/77 (1954) (in

French), [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’] L. Comm’n 1 ......... 190, 297
Summary Records of the 260th Meeting, [1954] |
YB. Tot?) L. Comm'n 90 0.........ccccesceccoscescossesceess...... 297

Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 9 UN. GAOR Supp. (No. 9),
U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2
Y.B. Int?) L. Comm’ n 140 ooo. cccccccccccccscoscoeesseseoeees.. 297

J.P.A. Francois, Amendments Proposed on the Basis
of the Observations of Governments on the Draft
of Provisional Articles Adopted by the Commis-

xlii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

sion at Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/93
(1955) (in French), [1955] 2 Y.B. Int’ L.

Copeman $ ccccccscnssvsctinivsictsosrcscsescesccnsscessvessvecscvnensncete 190
Summary Records of the 317th Meeting, {1955} |

Y.B. Int’) L. Comm’ n 201 .......cccccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeee 191, 193
Summary Records of the 318th Meeting, [1955] |

Y.B. Int’) L. Comm’ n 207 ........:cccccceeeeereees 191, 192, 209
Summary Records of the 324th Meeting, {1955} |

Y.B. Int’) L. Comm’ n 247 ........cccccccsssrrrereessenseesens 192

Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
9), U.N. Doc. A/2934 (1955), reprinted in

[1955] 2 Y.B. Int’) L. Comm’ n 19 ........cccceceeee 192, 193
Summary Records of the 365th and 366th Meetings,
[1956] 1 Y.B. Int’) L. Comm’ n 187 .........0ccccceseeeereees 194

Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 11 GAOR Supp. (No. 9),
U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm'n 253 .... 124, 129-30, 194, 195, 298

U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official
Records. U.N. Docs. A/CONF.13/37-39 (1958)
(3 WOES.) .cccccccoscressccrescscecssroponnesooossonsoseoessnsesnessoossoosese 186

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.1/L.101 (1958), U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3 Official

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.1/L.109 (1958), U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3 Official
SSS RE eee = 195

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.1/L.112 (1958), U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3 Official
IE TIE sna ceccnstninsneniadiaianinateaanesnmniauntniiia 299-300

PLEADINGS, BRIEFS, ARGUMENTS

xliii
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.1/L.116 (1958), U.N.
Conference on the Law of the 3 Offici
het RCN a TR. i sedeaashics , pa paaA 130

U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Ist
Comm., 47th mtg., 3 Official Records 144 (1958) .... 196

U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Ist
Comm., 52d mtg., 3 Official Records 160 (1958) ..... 300

U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 19th
é len.
mtg., 2 Official Records 61 (1958) ........... ‘ ienaiis 196, 300

U.N. Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law
of the
Sea, The Law of the Sea: Baselines, an Examina-
tion of the Relevant Provisions of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N.
Sales No. E.88.V.5 (corrected printing 1989) ...... 17, 198

Pleadings, Briefs, Arguments
UNITED STATES V. CALIFORNIA

Memorandum of the United States in Respo
; nse to
Request of Special Master of June 29, 1949,
United States v. California (No. 11, Orig.)
(U.S. Ex. 85-202, Ak. Ex. 85-63) oooccccccsccoooos-...... 76-78

Brief for the United States in Answer to Califor-
nia’s Exceptions to the Report of the Speci
pecial
Master (June 1964) (Ak. Ex. 85-16), United
States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 EE 131-32

Brief in Support of Exceptions of the State of Cali-
fornia to the Report of the Special Master Dated
October 14, 1952, Pursuant to Court Order of
December 2, 1963, United States v. Cali
381 U.S. 139 (1965) _

xliv TABLE ©F AUTHORITIES PLEADINGS, BRIEFS, ARGUMENTS
xlv
UNITED STATES V. LOUISIANA Brief for the State of Mississippi in Support of Mo-
Brief for the United States in Support of Motion for Gon for (Before the Spe-
Judgment (Feb. 1957) (Ak. Ex. 85-6), United cial Master) (1983) (Ak. Ex. 85-31), United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) ..........:0000+ 111-12 5 v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93 (1985) oo... 79-80, 94
Brief for the United States in Support of Motion for neply Brief for the State of Mississippi (1984) |
Judgment on Amended Complaint (May 1958) nited States v. Louisiana (Alabama and Missis-
(Ak. Ex. 85-7), United States v. Louisiana, 363 ‘ppi Case), 470 U.S. 93 (1985) 55. 94
TT UY See re 91, Transcript of oral argument (1984) [mised
112, 114, 115, 137, 146, 149 Louisiana Siicesend knee hao er v
Reply Brief for the United States (Sept. 1958) (Ak. Case), 470 U.S. 93 (1985) (Ak. Ex. 85-2314) $5
Bu, 05-10, Ottis ieee a eae ss UCC (i i‘CiéC OO OC!
3 CROGED .-ocmperinsininnssiigaieaiaiainaaaiae 84, 112, 116, 137 UNITED STATES V. MAINE
Motion by the United States for Entry of a Supple- Supplemental Post Trial Brie: of the United §
mental Decree (No. 1), Proposed Supplemental (Before the Special Master) (1985) (Ak. mo.
Decree, and Memorandum in Support of Motion 333), United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89 ( 1986
(filed Nov. 23, 1965) (Ak. Ex. 85-167), United (Massachusetts Case) ........ rs 3
States v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 288 (1965) .........0++ 155-57 ee , 135
Motion by the United States for Entry of a Supple- Xa =e
mental Decree as to the State of Louisiana (No. Application of the United Kingdom, 1l9SI LCS
2), Proposed Supplemental Decree, and Memo- Pleadings (1 Fisheries Case) (Sept. 24 1949)
randum in Support of the Motion of the United Memorial of the United Kingdom ett.
States and in Opposition to the Motion of the 1951 CJ, Pleadings ( (U.K. v. Nor.),
State of Louisiana (filed Jan. 3, 1968) (Ak. Ex. annex III (Jan = io Fisheries Case),
85-168), Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. 11 4a, __ a 217, 224

Counter-Memorial of Norway (U.K. v. Nor.), 195]

(IDG) ..ccsevesvinivecsiseechinstuisiaiaieesiaipiaisaasiiaiumaall 159, 160
LC.J. Pleadings (1 Fisheries Case) (July 31,

Brief for the United States (Aug. 1968) (Ak. Ex. 1950)...
25-34. US. te 05900) Ee a. 95
Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969) «0... 157, 160-61, 162 ics a Yaar (U.K. v. Nor.), 195]

Reply Brief for the United States (Sept. 1968) (Ak. 1950)... (2 Fisheries Case) (Nov. 28,
S an kidman!!! lke 96, 97

Th), A 162 yo me: of the United Kingdom, 1951 1.C.J

xvi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Other Materials

Hans W. Baade, Proving Foreign and International
Law in Domestic Tribunals, 18 Va. J. Int'l L.
619 (1978) .ncnccccececesesssserererserensnsensnensnsnnsnsnenenenenneneness 273

Max W. Ball, Petroleum Withdrawals and Restora-
tions Affecting the Public Domain (U.S. Geolog-

ical Survey Bull. 623, 1916) ....-.------ev-eseerreeeeeeee 412, 425
David W. Barnes, Statistics as Proof (1983) ....2.---ec0eeeee 268
Ernest C. Baynard, Public Land Law and Proce-

dure § 1.1 (1986) ...-.eccccseenesnesnsnnennenennennsnnensnnsnnsnnenes 408

P.B. Beazley, Maritime Limits and Baselines: A
Guide to Their Delineation (The Hydrographic
Society, Spec. Pub. No. 2, 2d ed. rev. 1978)

(U.S. Ex. 85-229) ......esesecesesneneenenensnnnnenenens 209, 212, 214
Frederick W. Beechey, Narrative of the Voyage of

the Blossom (London 1831) .....-.----esrenersenennennennes 363
Black's Law Dictionary

6th Od. 1990 .....cccceccersercesscersensensensnesneesennnnnennaneennanens 321

Bd Od. 1933 ..ceccecensencercenssssnrsreenernsnsenssnsenssnssossnssnseness 371

Vd Od. 1910 ...ccececcessersecesseorerseneneenssnesesnnensennenssnnennenees 371

Ex. 85-61, U.S. Ex. 85-223) ..--cccevsenceeneernnrnennenennnennees 71,
73, 75, 79, 80, 88, 96, 116, 127, 188

S. Whittemore Boggs, Delimitation of Seaward
Areas under National Jurisdiction, 45 Am. J.
Int’l L. 240 (1951) (Ak. Ex. 85-96, U.S. Ex. 85-
DIA) cececuseseenssssesssssnsreresssnensnsensnenensnsenensneneness 88, 127, 128

OTHER MATERIALS

Susan B. Boyd, The Legal Status of the Arctic Sea

Can. YB. Int'l L. rye a Proposal, 22

E.D. Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Mineral
snnaroes and the Lane ef the See: The Areas
ithin National Jurisdiction (1984)

John L. Burdick et al., Cold Regions: Descriptions
and Geotechnical Aspects, in Geotechnical Engi-
my hom ye 1 (Orlando B. Anders-

& Duwayne M. Anderson eds. 1978) ................ 271

Jonathan |. Charney, The Offshore Jurisdic.

’ tion

the States of the Aone tyr +d
of Canada—A Comparison, 12 Ocean Dev. &
Int’! L. 301 (1983), also in The Law of the Sea
and Ocean Industry: New Opportunities and

Restraints 426 (Douglas M. Johnston & Norman
G. Letalik eds., 1984) .

“an i 171
: Colombos, nternational Law
Sea (6th rev. ed. 1967) es 273
B. acter ae
Beyer ed., 28th ed. 1987) ........ babs Nascraadon tal 180
l —- Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Pp ny Law Treatise (3d ed. 1994) |... 335
Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance
Constitutional Document, 95 4
929 (1995) ooo cccecoecsssoee imc 384
Euclid, The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements
(Thomas L. Heath trans., 2d ed., Dover reprint
Ri a el Maca 213
The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander ete o.. 520

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, 8 Int’! and Comp. L.Q. 73
(1959) (Ak. Ex. 85-406) ........cccccccecseereeneeeneneenennenanees 197
Stewart French & John C. Reed, Boundaries and
Status of Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 (Arctic

Inst. of N. Am., July 1971 & rev. & expanded
Sept. 1971) (Ak. Exs. 102, 103) ..........-c0000 349-50, 380

Thomas W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea
| |) a 290, 291

1 Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law
(1940) (Ak. Bx. 8S-SZ) ..20...000-.ccccescccccreevsreserceersonses 67-68

William E. Hall, /nternational Law (4th ed. 1895)
CRS Ss ae 65, 67

Robert D. Hodgson, /slands: Normal and Special
Circumstances, in Law of the Sea: The Emerging
Regime of the Oceans 137 (John K. Gamble &
Giulio Pontecorvo eds. 1974) .........cccccccseeeeereeenennens 272

Robert D. Hodgson & Lewis M. Alexander,

Towards an Objective Analysis of Special Cir-
cumstances (Law of the Sea Inst., Univ. of R.L.,

Occasional Paper No. 13, 1972) (Ak. Exs. 85-
401, -403, U.S. Ex. 85-222) ............... 206, 209, 212, 214

R.H. Kennedy, A Brief Geographical and Hydro-
graphical Study of Straits Which Constitute
Routes for International Traffic, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.13/6 & Add. 1, in U.N. Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 1 Official Records 114, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.13/37 (1958) .........cc.ccccccssoressereeeeesesees 70

OTHER MATERIALS shixe

Ernest de K. Leffingwell, The Canning River
Region, Northern Alaska (U.S. Geological Sur-
Professional Paper 109, 1919) (U.S. Ex.
prs Se 241, 363, 429
Myres S. McDougal & William T. Burke, The
Public Order of the Oceans (1962) a a ee 303

Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekee :
The Supreme Court's Management of lis Orit
nal Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 Me. L.

Rev. 185 (1993), reprinted in 138 Proc. Am
Phil. Soc’y 195 (1994)... Sie 7

i be Ex. 84A-404) oo. 235, 236, 237, 238, 258
‘A. Marmer, Tidal Datum Planes (U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, Special Pub. No. aT 235

cen, att et ee ROLES KEEL TO 274
| John B. Moore, Digest of International
(1906) SR em halon iwdngen seubeusecte 70, 102

the Sea (1.A. Shearer ed. 1982) .... 182, 204, 273-74, 297

Donald J. Orth, Dictionary of Alaska Place Names
(U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 567,
rev. 1971) (Ak. Ex. 75) ..........cccsscssososss...... 361, 362, 363

l TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

R.S. Patton, The Three-Mile Limit [1930] (Ak. Ex.
85-56, U.S. Ex. 85-200) ......ccssescersersseesenceesnerennenenees 187

G. Etzel Pearcy, Measurement of the U.S. Territo-
rial Sea, Dep’t St. Bull., June 29, 1959, at 963
(Ak. Ex. 85-138), reprinted as Dep't of State
Pub. 6879, General Foreign Policy Series 139

(U.S. Ex, 85-231) ...ccccccssrcerersereenceennnnnnenensnnsnenes 136, 164
Donat Pharand, The Law of the Sea of the Arctic

(1973) ....c.ecsrcsssesscsssersensessorersnsenessensnorsnsesenensensenens 273-74
Richard R. Powell, The Law of Real Property (rev.

Od. 19BB) ......ccccsccseesssscscssscessvvesensensenssessossrsrsnnsesenss 370

Malcolm J. Proudfoot, Measurement of Geographic
Area (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, 1946) (excerpted in Ak. Ex. 85-77 and
U.S. Ex. 85-706) ......ccccsssccssscssssrsersseeessesesssensonsnees 80-83

Reginald W. Ragland, A History of the Naval Petro-
leum Reserves and of the Development of the

Present National Policy Respecting Them
(1944) .......cceccesceorersessserenseonsssenssnsenseossossossnseenses 412, 428

Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When
Agencies Break Their Own “Laws,” 64 Tex. ke
Rev. 1 (1985) .......:ccscccsersnerssesessensensensenennessnsnnsnnnensenes 335

John C. Reed & Stewart French, Boundaries, and
Status of Land and Resources, of Naval Petro-
leum Reserve No. 4 (Arctic Inst. of N. Am., rev
& expanded Mar. 1975) (Ak. Ex. 105) .......e-seeesees 354

Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Tent. Draft No. 1, Apr. 26, 1957) ...... 125

Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Tent. Draft No. 2, May 8, 1958) ........ 125

OTHER MATERIALS l
1
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign i
Relations
of the United States (1986) ................. seat 186
— The Concept of a Bay as In-
aters, 13 Surveying and Mapping 432
(1953) (Ak. Exs. 85-43, EGY ae 187

US. De Pm ge ‘
S. *to
Ws D Pub. 10-1, 1962-64)
22, 53, 59, 60, 84, 85. 88.93
: , , SJ : + 94, 99, 100,
101, 102, 103, 104, 108, 111, 115, 128. 134
142, 147, 156, 173, 187, 188, 231, 232, 234

235, 236, 237, 258. 259 261. >
’ , ’ > , 62,
370, 376-77, 381, 414, 486 site

~— Ney ¥~ sari yaa on Intervention
ourts, Agencies Arbitrat
Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1968) a

~~ W. Skadel, The Coastal Boundaries of
aval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 (University of

Alaska Sea Grant Program, Alaska
Sea
Rep. No. 73-12, 1974) (Ak. Ex. 10) a

Resources of Northwestern Alaska
(U.S.
Geological Survey Bull. 815, 1930)

Robert L. Swanson, Variability o
Tidal Datums
and Accuracy in Det rey!

‘obert W. Swensen, Legal Aspects of Mineral Re-

sources Exploitation, in Paul W. Gates, Hist

sovessvevevessussesessnnosooesssoososceseneosusvedsbvecesersssssseees 16,

lii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Clive Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in
International Law (1979) ....-++-s-sssssenenenereenenene® 273, 274

Donald M. Taylor, Man-made Permafrost Islands
for Offshore Drill Sites? Ocean Industry, Nov.
1972, Bt 42 .accececsscsssrersersenenennensnsessncssensnssnenssnenees® 272-73

Bo J. Theutenberg, The Evolution of the Law of the
Sea: A Study of Resources and Strategy with

Special Regard to the Polar Regions (1984) .......-+++: 274
James E. Thompson, Geometry for the Practical
Man (M. Peters ed., 3d ed. 1962) ..eccsssvsereerereeesreenenes 213

Kathleen L. Walz, The United States Supreme
Court & Article VII of the 1958 Convention on
the Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone, \1

USF. L. Rev. 1 (1976) ...-.:-ssserssersesnerennnnnnsnenenes 212, 213
Gayl S. Westerman, The Juridical Bay (1987) ...----. 183, 199
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (3d ed. 1916) ...----++000 372

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987) .....-- 321

Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., Study of Withdrawals and
Reservations of Public Domain Lands (U.S. Pub-
lic Land Law Review Comm’n, | Background
Studies, 1969 & photo. reprint) .....-+-+-----esesre0" 395, 473

Charles A. Wright & Arthu: H. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure, Civil §§ 1909, 1917
(1972) .ccessosssvssneenecssensnsnnennssnsssnennccnscnnsenssesees 525-26, 548

Charles A. Wright, Arthur H. Miller, & Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Juris-
diction § 4416 (1981) .....s+:+-ssssesrsrsenennenensenensnnensnserens 553

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1995

No. 84, Original
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
Vv.

STATE OF ALASKA

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER

Drew S. Days, III, Solicitor
idic«h United States De-

Bruce Bothelo
dant Attorney General of Alaska, for defen-

Louis
is F. Claiborne, Deputy Solicitor
Assistant Solieg General and Special
Gueaien Ge General; Michael W. Reed and
Cesrics W. Findlay, Il, Environment and Natural Resources
G US. Department of Justice for - T
Thomas Koester, Assistant Attore —

D.C., for Amoco Production Co. et al. as amici curiae
opposing the motion for leave to intervene.

I
INTRODUCTION

A. Nature of the controversy

These proceedings concern the rights to lands underlying
tidal waters off the Arctic coast of Alaska. The objective is
to identify the lands belonging, respectively, to the United
States and the State of Alaska. Important oil and gas re-
serves have been discovered nearby, and the controversy
arose from the desire of both sovereigns to grant leases for
exploration of these offshore areas.

The rights of the United States and Alaska depend on
interpretation of the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1315 (1988), and related doctrine. In general, the
Submerged Lands Act grants to the states the lands under
tidal waters out to three miles from their coastlines, and the
United States retains the rights over resources of the conti-
nental shelf beyond the three-mile limit.

Determining the rights of the parties involves two kinds
of issues. One is the location of the coastline from which the
three-mile belt is to be measured. The other is what lands
under tidal waters, if any, are part of federal reservations
along the Arctic coast and are excepted from the operation of
the Submerged Lands Act.

B. Initial proceedings

On May 30, 1979, the United States moved the Court for
leave to file an original bill of complaint, setting out a dis-
pute over the right to offer lands in the Beaufort Sea for min-
eral leasing. Alaska expressly acquiesced. Memorandum of
Nonopposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint (June
8, 1979). The Court granted the motion on June 18, 1979.
442 U.S. 937.

The complaint stated that the submerged lands in contro-

4 1. INTRODUCTION

versy, in the view of the United States, were located in the
Beaufort Sea “more than three geographical miles seaward
from the ordinary low-water mark and from the outer limit
of inland waters along the coast of Alaska.” Complaint,
4 1V. Alaska submitted its Answer to the Complaint on Sep-
tember 12, 1979. At the same time, the State sought leave to
file a counterclaim alleging that the United States also
claimed rights along the north coast of Alaska in submerged
lands under certain inland waters. Counterclaim, 4 IV.

In particular the counterclaim sought a decree quieting
Alaska’s title to the offshore submerged lands lying inside
the barrier islands north of the Arctic National Wildlife
Range and to the submerged lands underlying the inland
waters of Harrison Bay, Smith Bay and Peard Bay. The
Wildlife Range (now called the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge) faces on the eastern part of the Arctic coast, be-
tween approximately 141° and 146° west longitude. The
three named bays are in or adjacent to the National Petro-
leum Reserve—Alaska, which lies on the west side of the
Arctic coast between about 151° and 162° west longitude.
By comparison, the dispute that gave rise to the United
States’ complamt was focused primarily on the coast bo-
tween 146° and 150° west fongitude, around Prodhoe Bay.
See figure 1.1.

The United States, while denying the clams advanced by
Alaska, agreed that teave onght to be granted to the State to
file wts counterclaum See Momorandum of the United States
m Response to Alaska’s Motion for Leave w File Counter-
claim and Answer to Counterclaim (Dec. 14, 1979).

The Court appointed the Special Master on February 19,
1980, 444 U.S. 1065, and a referred the Motion for Leave to
File Counterclaim to the Master on March 3, 1980, 445 US.
914

C. ALASKA'S COUNTERCLAIM 5

C. Alaska’s counterclaim

At the urging of the parties and for the reasons elaborated
below, the Master determined to consider the issues tendered
by the counterclaim—subject, of course, to this Court's ulti-
mate ruling.

In the complaint the United States sought a decree declar-
ing its rights as against Alaska “in the subsoil and seabed
underlying the waters adjacent to Alaska in the area of the
Beaufort Sea” and enjoining interference with those rights.
Complaint at 6. The rights of the United States in the Beau-
fort Sea depend on the issues raised by the counterclaim as
well as those raised by the complaint. Both the Arctic Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge and the National Petroleum Reserve—
Alaska border the Beaufort Sea, which extends along the
Arctic coast eastward from Point Barrow.' As to the Petro-
leum Reserve, the State had already instituted litigation in
the district court. Alaska v. United States, Civ. No. J75-13
(D. Alaska; renumbered No. A78-069; partial consent judg-
ment entered Dec. 7, 1984; dismissed Nov. 26, 1986). As to
the Wildlife Refuge, the State had previously informed the
Department of the Interior that it intended to challenge the
federal position. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Leave to File Counterclaim, at 15 n.1.

The Court’s original jurisdiction to entertain the counter-
claim, like the complaint, is conferred by Article III, section
2, clause 2 of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2)
(1988). Consent to suit is to be found in 28 U.S.C. § 2409a
(1988). California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59 (1979); Califor-
nia ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 457 U.S.
273 (1982). Although the federal district courts have con-
current jurisdiction, the Court has repeatedly indicated that

' The Arctic coastline of the Petroleum Reserve also includes a por-
tion facing the Chukchi Sea, from Point Barrow west to Icy Cape.

6 lL. INTRODUCTION

coastal boundary disputes between the United States and a
state should be resolved in original suits here. eres
rel. State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 457 U.S. at =
n.6; United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 186 n.2 (1975);
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 85 n.143 =
Accordingly, it seems clear that the issues raised by _
counterclaim should, sooner or later, be brought before

"Se avoid piecemeal litigation, the parties and the Special
Master have deemed it proper to treat them now. It is true
that the issues raised by the counterclaim could have been
considered separately and that the Court has been willing to
entertain the same case again and again until all issues at
finally resolved. E.g., United States v. Louisiana, ee ,
699 (1950); id., 363 U.S. 1 (1960); id, 382 U.S. 288 (1 pin
id , 394 U.S. 11 (1969); id, 404 U.S. 388 (1971), id, ~
U.S. 17 (1972); id. 420 U.S. 529 (1975); id. 422 yo |
(1975); id., 446 U.S. 253 (1980); id., 452 U.S. 726 (1981);
id. , 456 U.S. 865 (1982). But the burden of these cases on a

crowded docket makes it desirable, when possible, to com-

i all maritime boundary controversies pertaining to the
post area in a single proceeding. This entails granting
Alaska leave to file its counterclaim. By

The Master further agreed, at the parties urging, that he
might proceed to hear the counterclaim without first subaat
ting an interim report on the motion for leave to file. =
the time and conditions for the filing of additional plead.
ings,” to “direct subsequent proceedings, and to “submi

well have been raised by an amended complaint; and they
did not require the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdic-

D. THE JOINT STATEMENTS OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED 7

tion beyond familiar bounds. The Court has consistently
agreed to hear federal-state disputes over submerged lands
and boundaries.” And the Court has stated that its “object in
original cases is to have the parties, as promptly as possible,
reach and argue the merits of the controversy presented.”
Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 644 (1973).

To that end, the parties have submitted and the present
Report recommends resolution of all the issues that must be
answered to fix the lines delimiting Alaska’s submerged
lands underlying tidal waters for the whole of its Arctic coast
from the Canadian border to Icy Cape. Accordingly, I rec-
ommend that Alaska’s Motion for Leave to File Counter-
claim be granted nunc pro tunc.

D. The joint statements of questions presented

To identify the disputed issues with particularity, the par-
ties submitted to the Special Master in May 1980 a Joint
Statement of Questions Presented and Contentions of the
Parties.’ Some ten issues were identified. After a first evi-
dentiary hearing in July 1980, and partly as a result of expert
testimony there given, it became necessary to augment the
Statement of Questions Presented. A Supplement to the
Joint Statement, adding three questions, was filed in Septem-
ber 1980. Two more issues were added by a Second Supple-
ment to the Joint Statement, filed in July 1984.

The entire list of fifteen questions, in their original order

? See Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping’ The Supreme
Court's Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45
Me. L. Rev. 185, 200, 211 (1993), reprinted in 138 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc’y
195, 209, 219 (1994),

* The original Joint Statement and the two Supplements thereto are
readily identifiable in the Special Master’s record as the only printed
documents filed initially with him.

Xx Il. INTRODUCTION

but without the statements of contentions, is given in Appen-
dix A. The Git quastion, wheten Alene ees oaeee
leave to file its counterclaim, has already been treated Ove.
The body of this report deals with the remaining questions,
grouping them according to subject matter.

E. The motion for leave to intervene

On May 12, 1981, the Inupiat Community of the Arctic
Slope and the Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation moved for
leave to intervene in the case, claiming rights over areas in
dispute between the United States and Alaska. On June 8,
the Court referred the motion to the Special Master. 452
U.S. 913. Briefs opposing the motion were filed by the orig-
inal parties and, as amici curiae, by Amoco Production
Company et al., the mineral lessees of a portion of the con-
tested area.4 The movants filed a reply brief. The Master
heard oral argument on the intervention motion on March
26, 1982.5 as

On the Inupiats’ theory of the case, their rights were to

areas beyond the three-mile limit. Several of the issues in

the Joint Statement and Supplement affected the location of
the three-mile limit, since they involved determining the
coastline from which the three miles are measured. On the
issues as framed by the original parties, the Inupiats were

‘ To permit mineral leasing during this litigation, the parties entered
an interim agreement on October 26, 1979, as authorized by the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, § 7, 43 U.S.C. § 1336 (1988), and Alaska
Stat. Ann. § 38.05.137 (1989). See Joint Statement 2 & App. |. A joint
federal-state lease sale, covering the area between 146° and 150° west
longitude, was held in December 1979. | am informed that oil company
artnet tenet nit edn now in escrow.

5 Unlike most of the transcript, the volume for March 26, 1982, is not
numbered.

E. THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE 9

aligned with the United States in seeking to maximize the
area beyond the three-mile limit. Ultimately, the Inupiats’
interests were adverse to the United States, and they were
pursuing their claim in the federal district court. Inupiat
Community v. United States, Civil No. A81-019 (D. Alaska,
filed Jan. 19, 1981).

The Master’s report on the intervention motion (Appen-
dix B) was submitted to the Court on January 10, 1984. For
the reasons there stated, the report recommended that the
motion to intervene be granted, subject to several restric-
tions. In general, the intervention was to be limited to issues
not yet submitted; the intervenors were to be restricted to
supporting the position of the United States; and their parti-
cipation was to continue so long as they could credibly claim
an interest in the disputed areas. Report of Jan. 10, 1984, at
40-42. An order implementing these recommendations was
issued on the same day (Appendix C).

At the suggestion of the Master, supported by all parties,
the Court did not immediately review the report on interven-
tion, merely ordering it filed. 465 U.S. 1018 (Feb. 21,
1984).

A final decision against the intervenors, in their
suit against the United States, was reached in 1985. Inupiat
Community v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska
1982) (granting summary judgment for defendants), aff'd,
746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820
(1985). By a letter of October 23, 1985, the intervenors in-
formed the Special Master that they no longer appeared to
satisfy the conditions for continued participation in the pres-
ent action. Accordingly, the Master issued an order on June
3, 1986 (Appendix D), dismissing the intervenors from fur-

ther participation, but not from their obligation to bear their
due share of costs, as ultimately determined by the Court, for
the period during which they participated.

10 |. INTRODUCTION

F. Additional proceedings before the Special Master

Two of the questions presented in the Joint Statement and
supplements did not require the taking of evidence. One was
the question of Alaska’s counterclaim (question 1). The
other was subsequently settled by a joint survey and a stip-
ulation (question 14).

By agreement, the other questions were divided into three
groups for the purposes of trial. It was decided first to hear
evidence and argument on the questions pertaining to the
National Petroleum Reserve—Alaska (questions 7 and 8 and,
as later added, question 11), the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (questions 9 and 10), and the effect on the coastline
of a pier extension at Prudhoe Bay (question 6). The evi-
dence was heard on July 28 and 29, 1980.

Post-trial briefs on these issues were filed in November
1980 and February 1981. On March 24, 1981, however, the
Court decided Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
which Alaska suggested significantly affected the claim to
tidal water bottoms within the Petroleum Reserve and the

Wildlife Refuge. After a lapse of time due to the interven- .

tion proceedings, the United States and Alaska submitted a
joint motion respecting the issues of these areas on October
31, 1983.

The Master granted the motion by an order of January 4,
1984, noting that the subject matter had no implications for
the Inupiat petitioners for intervention. As will be explained
more fully in section VIII, the order relieved the State of a
concession it had made and invited supplemental briefs on
the relevance of the Montana case. At the same time, a
newly discovered map was permitted to be introduced in evi-
dence. The supplemental briefs and reply briefs were sub-
mitted in January and February 1984. The Master heard oral
argument on the same issues, together with the issue of the
pier extension, on March 4, 1985. Transcript [hereafter
“Tr.”}, vol. 17. A second set of supplemental briefs was

F. ADDITIONAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SPECIAL MASTER 1]

prompted by the Court’s decision in Utah Division
Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987), and vai ar
were received in September and October 1987.

. The second set of evidentiary hearings was confined to a
single issue from the Joint Statement, the status as an island
ofa formation known as Dinkum Sands (question 5). These
hearings, requiring nearly three weeks, took place in July
and August 1984, with the participation of the intervenors as
well as the original parties. Briefs were submitted in March
and May 1985. The Master heard oral argument on the Din-
oe a in June 1986. Tr., vol. 24.

inaily, in May and June 1985, the last group of iss
was reached for hearing: the effect of offshore islands on os
legal coastline (questions 2, 3, 4, 12, and 13) and the status
of southern Harrison Bay as a juridical bay (question 15)
Briefing followed in the fall of 1985 and spring of 1986, and
final oral arguments were held in November 1986. Tr., vol.
25. The intervenors did not participate in these proceedings

Besides the formal hearings, the Master has made a site
Visit to the Prudhoe Bay area with counsel for Alaska and the
United States. The visit took place on July 31 and August |
1980, just after the first evidentiary hearings, and included

observations of Dinkum Sands (question 5) and the pier ex-
wey Prudhoe Bay (question 6).

s the several parts of the rt were com
the Master has circulated nent the cematae
parties, under an order for confidentiality, for technical
review and comment.® The circulation process, which began

; ® Rule 53(e5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Before filing the master’s report a master may submit a draft thereof to
counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions.”
oe Rule 17.2 states that the Federal Rules, “when their appli-
1S appropriate, may be tak i i igi
peering wee y en as a guide to procedure in an original
For precedents for circulating a draft report to counsel in original

12 I. INTRODUCTION

in 1989, has proved a valuable aid to accuracy. As now sub-
mitted, the Report incorporates both technical corrections
and revisions reflecting the Master’s own further review.

actions, see Texas v New Mexico, Report of Special Master Caries 1]
Mocyers, at 4 (1936), exceptions sustained in part and overraed im port,
432 US. 124 (1937), Arizona v. California, Report of Special Master
Semon H. Réfkiad (7960), at 3, qnprowed in part and disapprowed in pari,
373 US. 346 (7953).

PART ONE
ALASKA’S COASTLINE

15

II
THE LEGAL BACKGROUND

All the issues concerning the location of Alaska’s coast-
line share the same legal background, outlined here.

It was long the received doctrine that new states, upon
their admission to the Union, in general become vested with
title to the beds of navigable waters within state boundaries.
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-31 (1894). In 1947, the Court quali-
fied this rule to distinguish between inland navigable waters,
such as lakes and rivers, and the marginal sea traditionally
claimed as a three-mile belt along the Nation’s coasts. The
Court explained that the precedents had involved only inland
navigable waters. For the marginal sea, it held that federal
rights were paramount:

[W]e are not persuaded to transplant the Pollard rule of
ownership as an incident of state sovereignty in relation
to inland waters out into the soil beneath the ocean, so
much more a matter of national concern. If this rationale
of the Pollard case is a valid basis for a conclusion that
paramount rights run to the states in inland waters to the
shoreward of the low water mark, the same rationale leads
to the conclusion that national interests, responsibilities,
and therefore national rights are paramount in waters
lying to the seaward in the three-mile belt.

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 36 (1947). With
the Court’s decision in California, the right to issue oil and
gas leases in coastal waters came to rest with the states if the
waters qualified as inland, and otherwise with the Federal
Government. The Court recognized, however, that there
might be “many complexities and difficulties” in locating the
exact line between inland waters, including harbors, bays,
and rivers, and the marginal sea. /d. at 26.

The distinction between inland waters and the marginal

16 ll. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND

sea was traditionally a distinction of international law. Un-
der that tradition, the sea is divided into inland waters, the
marginal or territorial sea, and the high seas. See United
States v. Louisiana (Alabama and Mississippi Boundary
Case), 470 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1985); United States v. Louisi-
ana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1969);
1 Aaron L. Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries 22-24
(U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Pub. 10-1, 1962). With the 1947
California decision, the international distinction was seem-
ingly made applicable to a domestic controversy between the
Federal Government and a state.

Congress disagreed with the 1947 California decision. In
May 1953 it enacted the Submerged Lands Act, ch. 65, 67
Stat. 29 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 130!-1315
(1988)), which gave the states all the United States’ right,
title, and interest in “lands beneath navigable waters within
the boundaries of the respective States.” § 3(a)-(b)(1), 43
U.S.C. § 1311(a)}{b)(1). These included lands out to a line
three miles seaward from the coastline, § 2(a)(2), 43 U.S.C.

§ 1301(a)(2), and for most states were not to extend beyond —

this three-mile belt, § 2(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b). The Act
defined the term “coast line” to mean “the line of ordinary
low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct
contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward
limit of inland waters.” § 2(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c). The
phrase “inland waters” was still left undefined.'

The next major development was an international one. In
April 1958, the first United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea adopted a convention that did attempt to define

| As to lands of the continental shelf lying beyond those granted to
the states, Congress confirmed federal jurisdiction and control. Sub-
merged Lands Act § 9, 43 U.S.C. § 1302; Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, ch. 345, .§ 2(a), 3, 67 Stat. 462 (Aug. 7, 1953) (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1332 (1988)).

ll. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 17

inland waters. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516
U.N.T.S. 205. This Convention, which the United States
signed in 1958, was approved by the Senate in 1960 and rati-
fied by the President in 1961. The Convention took effect in
1964 upon approval by the requisite number of nations.

In 1965, the Court handed down its second decision in the
California litigation, this time on the meaning of “inland
waters” in the Submerged Lands Act. United States v. Cali-
fornia, 381 U.S. 139 (1965). The Court found first that Con-
gress had meant io leave the definition of “inland waters” to
the courts. 381 US. at 150-60. It noted that the 1947 opin-
ion clearly indicated that ‘inland waters’ was to have an in-
pg eye and it found that, unlike the situation in

, the Convention now provided “a settled international
rule defining inland waters.” 381 U.S. at 162, 163. The
Court concluded that the meaning of “inland waters” in the
Submerged Lands Act should conform to the Convention:

It is our opinion that we best fill our responsibili of giv-

ing content to the words which Congress on la

adopting the best and most workable definitions available.

? The relevant provisions of the 1958 Convention have in general
Haan carried forward, with some additions, into a later treaty United Na-
Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, in The Law

of the Sea, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983). See also U.N. Office for
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The Law of the Sea: Baselines, an
sow an he tae et Prentcions of tha Untied Nations Comen
a .N. Sales No. E.88.V.5 (corrected printing
The United States did not sign the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982
a opposed the provisions, not relevant here, on deep seabed min-
» &.. agreement changing these provisions was reached in July 1994,
convention and agreement have now been transmitted to the Sen-

ate for advice and consent. S. Treaty
(Oct. 7, 1994). Doc. No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.

18 ll. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, agproved by the Senate and ratified by the Presi-
dent, provides such definitions. We adopt them for pur-
poses of the Submerged Lands Act. This establishes a
single coastline for both the administration of the Sub-
merged Lands Act and the conduct of our future interna-
tional relations (barring an :..: yon- e 7 a Td
: . . fom

" , a =. , .
. my anit Mr . .. ‘ “ee 2 =
- bY - @. i ’ = ~4 “ : : . .~™ y: ee . fe -_*- . :
. : : — — — — if Dinkum Sands is anisiand ~-. — - -

| t.. ; - : =
Lome oe TAGs fags ro sax Fyeet 04 |
bh?» | Mg OSES
.- er =. > +

eA Ws ‘ a
, Ad 4 P Compsied A ‘
: “Horrison Boy” doted 1955, “Beechey Point” doted 1955, &

, ae 4, ;
i( AS ./ whe oA : é
j + , e . . . . °
** a - ? ‘ ‘Ge. .* ae * . *

~— 4 At L *
oe S * ae . q :. : 7 , otha’: > : . ;
: trom US Geologic! Survey topographic serves |'250,000 Maps
“Fiaxman isiond”

IZ Wits ie th Te, 2, 58 “et
PE Nine ae Rae iy ‘s .- ome GS, ane alias wy $ fee
ay : : _ «+ * «se> . > Federal Contention in the Leased Area
. 2. » .# ~%e Nore Ameraan Dene of 1927 P *2 P . :

¢ 1so"00 as . « ~ :
- " ' ’
EEE

Figure 3.2

, 146°00

4
/WATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE »

ros 4

B. ALASKA’S POSITION 25

B. Alaska’s position

Alaska contests the United States’ position at several
points. Its basic objection, however, is to the claim that
there are federal submerged lands that are wholly or largely
surrounded by state-owned submerged lands.

The objection is grounded in history. The most salient
feature of the history, according to Alaska, is that the United
States never claimed there were high seas in such areas until
well after Alaska became a state. E.g., Tr. 3532. In Alas-
ka’s view, it gained the rights to the disputed lands at state-
hood, and these rights could not later be taken away. E£.g.,
Tr. 3528-29, 3585-86.

Alaska has proposed three other methods, as alternatives
to the United States’ method, by which to draw the dividing
line between state and federal lands offshore. The first
method corresponds to questions 2 and 12 of the Joint State-
ment; the second method, to questions 3 and 13; and the
third method, to question 4. See Tr. 2521-25. The methods
are introduced briefly below. The legal theories offered in
support of the several methods will be treated in later sec-
tions.

1. Questions 2 and 12: straight baselines

The Convention provides an alternative to the normal
baseline described in section A. Questions 2 and 12 of the
Joint Statement refer to this alternate method:

Question 2: Should the extent of Alaska’s submerged
lands in the leased area be determined on the basis of
“straight baselines”?

Question 12: Should the extent of Alaska’s offshore sub-
merged lands between Icy Cape and the Canadian border,
not included within the “leased area,” be determined on
the basis of “straight baselines”?

26 ill. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

The straight baseline provisions appear in Article 4 of the
Convention:

Article 4

1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented
and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the
coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in
drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the terri-
torial sea is measured.

2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general direction of the
coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be suf-
ficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to
the regime of internal waters.

6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight base-
lines on charts, to which due publicity must be given.

Figure 3.3 illustrates the use of Article 4 baselines for a
fringe of islands near the coast, using the same hypothetical
coastline as figure 3.1. Straight baselines join the islands;
there is no fixed limit on their length. Waters on the land-
ward side of the baselines become inland waters. Extending
outward from the straight baselines, which form the seaward
limit of inland waters, are both the territorial sea and the
three-mile belt granted by the Submerged Lands Act. With a
three-mile territorial sea, these coincide.

Alaska proposes the use of Article 4 baselines along the
Arctic coast subject to a limitation that no straight baseline
be more than ten miles long. For the hypothetical coastline
of figures 3.1 and 3.3, the result would be as shown in figure
3.5 (page 31). In the areas actually in dispute, the distances
between adjacent islands are in fact all less than ten miles.
Figure 3.4 shows, for the leased area, the approximate

B. ALASKA'S POSITION 27

MAINLAND
Is
SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 4 STRAIGHT BASELINES

Figure 3.3. Article 4 straight baselines. The baselines shown are not
limited by the distance between islands. For the effect of limiting Article
4 baselines to ten miles, as Alaska proposes, see figure 3.5.

28 Il. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

straight baselines proposed and the three-mile limit beyond
them.’

As a comparison of the schematic figures makes plain,
straight baselines can significantly increase a state’s inland
waters. Although less obvious from the figures, they can
also increase the area within the three-mile belt. Under the
arcs-of-circles method (fig. 3.1), the belts around islands
may overlap, so that on the seaward side the perimeter of the
three-mile belt comes to a point. With straight baselines be-
tween islands (figs. 3.3, 3.5) such points are eliminated,
bringing additional smal! wedge-shaped areas inside of the
three-mile belt. Alaska has referred to these as the “pointed
intrusions of high seas.” AB 27.

With straight baselines of up to ten miles (fig. 3.4),
Alaska would gain, as inland waters, the areas inside the is-
lands that were shown as federal enclaves or cul-de-sacs in
figure 3.2. It would also gain numerous wedge-shaped areas
that newly come within the three-mile limit. East and west
of the leased area, the additions to lands inside the three-mile
limit are fewer and are only of the second type.

” Again the exact lines depend on the outcome of question 5. See
supra note 6. If Dinkum Sands is an island, then straight lines join it to
its neighbors on each side. Otherwise, one longer line (about 9.2 nautical
miles) joins the neighbors directly. See AB 29.

= 4
i _ ee | *
- = fa - "y - + 6
o .
~ 4 4

- - % P ) ‘

‘ : —— —uv mee if Dinkurn Sands is an tsiand-
j = ; a >. . 4 . .
oe eee _- ee ° if Dinkum Sands ts not an isiand
. “ = - . b* « ° ? +
= : Comoves fram US Geologico! Survey topograpmc senes | 250,000 Maps

Morrison Boy” dotec 1955. “Beechey Pont” doted 1955. & “Ficxumon isiond”
Gotec 1955. mune rewsions 1962

ae os fe State of Alaska Contention in the Leased Area
s+ :

States now argues for: ay pet Ce way Ge Unie’

The term “coast line” means the line
. of ordinary lo
water along that portion of the coast of the main continent

nant Act, quoted supra page 37, should be read as limiting grants into
The sean an in the same way as grants into the Atlantic and Pacific.
and F(S\(d\2), below. : rosea ety gong

40 lll. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line
marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and in the
case of any island seaward of such coast, means the line
ot ordinary low water around such island.

99 Cong. Rec. 4240 (1953).'' The purpose, Senator Douglas
indicated, was to foreclose expansive state claims where
there were “remote islands” lying off the coast, as in Califor-
nia. Senator Long of Louisiana objected that the amendment
would cover all offshore islands, even nearby ones such as
the Chandeleur Islands fringing the Louisiana coast, where it
was generally agreed that the intervening waters were inland
waters. The amendment was defeated. 99 Cong. Rec. 4240-
43 (1953).

pee. concludes that to apply the normal baseline provi-
sions of the Convention to near-shore island fringes is con-
trary to the intent of Congress. It suggests that the Court's
1965 decision in United States v. California pertained only
to remote islands like those off the California coast.

I agree with the United States that Alaska’s argument
comes too late. In California the Court found, after a thor-
ough review of just this history, that Congress had no intent
as to the definition of inland waters but meant to leave its in-
terpretation to the courts. It read the rejection of the Doug-
las amendment as merely rejecting the idea that Congress
should adopt its own definition. 381 U.S. at 150-60. After
the California decision adopted the Convention’s definition
for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act, 381 U.S. at 161-
67, the Court went on in the Louisiana Boundary Case to
apply that same definition to near-shore island fringes. '?

|! For the committee version of the definition, which Senator Douglas
sought to amend, see S. Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1953). The
committee version was the same as that ultimately enacted.

\2 Except, as Alaska emphasizes, for Chandeieur and Breton Sounds,
which the United States had conceded to belong to Louisiana and for a

D. STATUTORY PROVISIONS 41

United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 394
U.S. 11, 66-73 (1969); id, Report of Special Master Walter
P. Armstrong, Jr., at 49-52 (1974) (U.S. Ex. 85-415), re-
printed in Reed et al., supra note 8, at 181, and in 59 I.L.R.
249 (ruling that Caillou Bay was not inland water); id , 420
U.S. 529 (1975) (accepting the Master’s report).

(2) The meaning of “open sea”

Second, Alaska argues that the definition of “coast line”
in the Submerged Lands Act has two parts. The coastline
consists of (1) “the line of ordinary low water along that por-
tion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea”
and (2) “the line marking the seaward limit of inland
waters.” § 2(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c). The Court has ruled
on the part concerning inland waters, Alaska says, but it has
not determined what Congress meant by the other part of the
definition, “the line of ordinary low water along that portion
of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea.”

Furthermore, Alaska argues, Congress intended the
phrase “in direct contact with the open sea” to include only
the seaward side of near-shore barrier islands. It relies par-
ticularly on remarks of Senator Holland, in opposition to the
Douglas amend aent (supra page 39), that “the coastline of
Louisiana was along the outer line of the great bow of is-
lands which comprise the Chandeleur Islands” and that under
the committee’s bill “there would be no question about the
outer rim of the Chandeleur Islands being that portion of the
coast which is in contact with the open sea.” 99 Cong. Rec.
4242 (1953). Alaska would draw its own coastline similarly,
along the outer rim of its barrier islands. In addition to Sen-
ator Holland’s statement, Alaska refers to (1) the ordinary
meaning of “open sea,” (2) contemporaneous administrative

time described as inland water. | will consider the implications of that
concession later.

42 ill. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

interpretations of the Submerged Lands Act, (3) the comple-
pa language of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1988), which applies to lands “lying
seaward and outside of” the lands conveyed to the State un-
der the Submerged Lands Act, and (4) the undesirability of
enclaves and pockets of high seas.

On first examination Alaska’s position appears plausible.
I conclude, however, that Alaska’s interpretation of “coast
line” is inconsistent with the 1965 California decision. First,
the Court there took “open sea” simply to mean any waters
other than inland waters:

It is precisely that problem of defining what constitutes

open sea and what constitutes inland waters which we

must decide in the present case.

... . [T]Jhe Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, to which we became a party in 1961,
now establishes rules for separating the open sea from
inland waters.

381 U.S. at 162 n.25. When it made this remark, the Court
was specifically concerned with the meaning of “inland
waters” in the Submerged Lands Act, see id. at 149, 161, and
it was not considering the Act’s usage of “open sea.” The
Court did also indicate, however, that it was adopting the
Convention’s definitions for all purposes concerning delimi-
tation of the coastline. Thus it said in California that its
action “establishes a single coastline for both the administra-
tion of the Submerged Lands Act and the conduct of our fu-
ture international relations,” id. at 165. Later the Court was
even more explicit:
The decision in the second California case . . . held that
Congress had le‘t it up to this Court to define the “coast
line” from which the standard three-mile grant was to be
measured.

D. STATUTORY PROVISIONS 43

United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155, 158 (1967).

Second, even if one reads California as passing only on
the definition of inland waters, Alaska’s position is still in-
consistent with the decision. The coastline Alaska contends
for would consist not only of the low-water line along the
seaward side of the barrier islands but also of straight lines
connecting the islands. In Alaska’s own view, the latter
would become the seaward limit of inland waters. Tr. 3514.
The State’s position would thus create two kinds of inland
waters: those that qualify as inland under the Convention
(without using Article 4) and those resulting from the inter-
pretation of “open sea” in the Submerged Lands Act. To
recognize the second class as inland waters would contra-
vene California’s holding that the definition of inland waters
should conform to the 1958 Convention.

This conclusion is supported by the testimony of expert
witnesses for both sides. Alaska’s witness on the subject
was Dr. J.R. Victor Prescott, a reader in geography at the
University of Melbourne (since promoted to full professor).
Professor Prescott testified initially that the mainland shore
inside the barrier islands was not in direct contact with the
open sea, Tr. 2926-27, 2931-36, 2951, but he later changed
his position and said that a coast facing the open sea is one
that does not face inland waters. Tr. 2953, 2975-79, 2985~
87. Dr. Robert Smith, Chief of the International Boundary
and Resource Division in the Office of the Geographer, De-
partment of State, testified for the United States in support of
the latter position. Tr. 3202, 3276-79.

Alaska suggests that its reading of “open sea” can be
reconciled with California by considering the lines joining
the islands to be straight baselines, which Article 4 of the
Convention authorizes. Tr. 3525. The conditions for using
straight baselines, however, are severely limited, as I shall
discuss in the next section, and in any case they are indepen-
dent of the meaning of “coast line” in the Submerged Lands

44 Ill. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

Act. I conclude that the “open sea” argument adds no extra
weight to Alaska’s case.

E. The impermissible contraction theory

According to the analysis so far, Alaska’s grant under the
Submerged Lands Act is measured outward from its coast-
line; the coastline depends on the seaward limit of inland
waters; and inland waters are to be defined according to the
Convention.

Under the Convention, waters can qualify as inland
waters in three ways: (1) they are landward of the normal
baseline or of the closing line across a bay, river, or harbor;
(2) the method of straight baselines is used, and they are
landward of a straight baseline; or (3) they qualify as a his-
toric bay.

The United States’ position, as already described, calls for
use of the first method. In general the normal baseline is the
low-water line (Article 3), with special provisions for bays
(Article 7), harbor works (Article 8), and rivers (Article 13),
but not for fringing islands. United States v. Louisiana
(Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 11, 66-73 (1969).

Alaska argues for applying the Convention’s second
ground for inland waters, straight baselines, but not for the
third ground, historic bays.'? Alaska also offers another the-

'3 By Article 7(6) of the Convention, “so-called ‘historic’ bays” are
exempted from the usual rules for bays (Art. 7(1)}-7(5)). The Court has
applied the doctrine cf historic bays (or, more generally, of historic in-
land waters) to one fringing island situation, namely Mississippi Sound.
United States v. Louisiana (Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case),
470 U.S. 93 (1985). The Court found there that “the United States has ef-
fectively exercised sovereignty over Mississippi Sound as inland waters
from the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 until 1971, and has done
so without protest by foreign nations.” 470 U.S. at 102.

The evidentiary requirements for historic inland waters are stringent,
as the quotation just given indicates. Alaska does not claim to be able to

E. THE IMPERMISSiBLE CONTRACTION THEORY 45

ory that is independent of the Convention, which may be
called the “inland waters at statehood” argument. In this
section I examine the legal bases of these arguments; in sec-
tion F, I examine the underlying facts.

1. Article 4 straight baselines

Straight baselines under Article 4 of the Convention are
the first of Alaska’s proposed methods for determining the
State's rights in submerged lands. See supra section B(1)
and figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.

The parties agree that the north coast of Alaska meets the
geographical conditions for straight baselines, as described
in Article 4(1), supra page 26. Alaska’s witness, Dr. Pres-
cot, drew such lines, and the United States agreed that, if
Article 4 baselines were to be used at all, Dr. Prescott’s lines
were in general appropriate. See Tr. 2893-2920, 2921-24:
Ak. Exs. 85-920A through 85-920T; AB 22-31.

The parties also agree, however, that the Convention
makes the use of straight baselines permissive, not manda-
tory. Within the United States, the decision whether to use
straight baselines is normally one for the Federal Govern-
ment, not the states. United States v. California, 381 U.S.
139, 167-69 (1965); United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana
Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 11, 72-73 (1969); United States
v. Louisiana (Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case), 470
U.S. 93, 99 (1985); United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 94
n.9 (1986). Thé United States has chosen not to draw
straight baselines under Article 4. Joint Statement 7. The

satisfy them for the lands along its north coast. Cf United States v.
Alaska, 422 US. 184 (1975) (holding evidence insufficient to show Cook
porto we bay). Alaska does rely, however, on some of the same evi-
dence as for Mississippi Sound about the ice of the Uni
ma rene general practice o United

46 lll. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

general rule would thus foreclose Alaska’s claim to Article 4
baselines.

The cases have left room, however, for a possible excep-
tion to the general rule. In the 1965 California case, Califor-
nia argued that, if its inland waters were to be determined
according to the Convention, they should be determined
using Article 4. The Court, rejecting this argument, said that
the State could not use Article 4 baselines to extend our
international boundaries, beyond their traditional limits,
against the expressed opposition of the United States:

We agree with the United States that the Convention rec-
ognizes the validity of straight base lines used by other
countries, Norway for instance, and would permit the
United States to use such base lines if it chose, but that
California may not use such base lines to extend our inter-
national boundaries beyond their traditional international
limits against the expressed opposition of the United
States... . [A]n extension of state sovereignty to an inter-
national area by claiming it as inland water would neces-
sarily also extend national sovereignty, and unless the
Federal Government’s responsibility for questions of ex-
ternal sovereignty is hollow, it must have the power to
prevent States from so enlarging themselves. We con-
clude that the choice under the Convention to use the
straight-base-line method for determining inland waters
claimed against other nations is one that rests with the
Federal Government, and not with the individual States.

381 U.S. at 167-68. At the same time, the Court remarked
that a contraction of a State’s recognized territory by the
United States in the name of foreign policy would be highly
questionable: -
The national responsibility for conducting our interna-
tional relations obviously must be accommodated with the
legitimate interests of the States in the territory over

E. THE IMPERMISSIBLE CONTRACTION THEORY 47

which they are sovereign. Thus a contraction of a State’s
recognized territory imposed by the Federal Government

- _ name of foreign policy would be highly question-
e.

Id. at 168. To evaluate Alaska’s argument, it thus becomes
relevant to determine whether the use of straight baselines
off Alaska’s north coast would be an extension (or the fail-
ure to use them a contraction) compared to former practice
In the Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. 11 (1969)
Louisiana wanted to use Article 4 baselines connecting the
mainland and fringes or chains of islands along the coast.
~ at 66-67. The Court held to its position in California.
94 U.S. at 72-73. It added that, if the United States refused
to extend its coastline, it would not matter that the motiva-
lion was partially domestic:

While we agree that the straight baseline method was de-
signed for precisely such coasts as the Mississippi River
Delta area, we adhere to the position that the selection of
this optional method of establishing boundaries should be
left to the branches of Government responsible for the
formulation and implementation of foreign policy. It
would be inappropriate for this Court to review or over-
turn the considered decision of the United States, albeit
partially motivated by a domestic concern, not to extend

its borders to the furthes: extent consonant with interna-
tional law.

Id. But, the Court said, if the United States had contracted
its territory from a position that had been its “consistent offi-
cial international stance . . . , it arguably could not abandon
that stance solely to gain advantage” over Louisiana. /d at
74 n.97. Louisiana was to be permitted to argue before the
Special Master that the United States “had actually drawn its
international boundaries in accordance with the principles
and methods embodied in Article 4” in the past:

48 lll. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

Louisiana further contends that the United States is
estopped from denying the “inland water” status of such
areas by its concession in earlier stages of this litigation
that the areas between the mainland and all the offshore
islands were inland waters. . . .

It might be argued that the United States’ concession

reflected its firm and continuing international policy to
enclose inland waters within island fringes. It is not con-

tended at this time, however, that the United States has

taken that posture in its international relations to such an

extent that it could be said to have, in effect, utilized the
straight baseline approach sanctioned by Article 4 of the
Convention. If that had been the consistent official inter-
national stance of the Government, it arguably could not
abandon that stance solely to gain advantage in a lawsuit
to the detriment of Louisiana. Cf. United States v. Cali-
fornia, 381 U.S. 139, 168: “[A] contraction of a State’s
recognized territory imposed by the Federal Government
in the name of foreign policy would be highly question-
able.” We do not intend to preclude Louisiana from argu-
ing before the Special Master that, until this stage of the
lawsuit, the United States had actually drawn its interna-
tional boundaries in accordance with the principles and
methods embodied in Article 4 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

Id. at 73 n.97 (1969).'4
The parties have disputed exactly what showings would

\4 In the Louisiana Boundary Case, the Master later found that the
United States had not used straight baselines. United States v. Louisiana
(Louisiana Boundary Case), Report of Special Master Walter P. Arm-
strong, Jr. (1974) (U.S. Ex. 85-415), reprinted in Reed et al., supra note
8. at 181, and in 59 1.L.R. 249. The Court accepted the Master’s report.

420 U.S. 529 (1975).

E. THE IMPERMISSIBLE CONTRACTION THEORY 49

have to be made to bring Alaska within the di
e dictum of
Louisiana Boundary Case. The most fundamental ao
ment, however, is clear: Alaska would be required to show
oo —* United States’ present position represents a contrac-

on of territory, compared to its position at the relevant time
ne scena the past. Only if this first showing is made does
wt ce necessary to decide what other requirements there

The next section, section F, will review th
ction, ; e facts about

whether Alaska’s territory has been contracted. ;

2. Inland waters at statehood

The argument for using Article 4 straight baselines, in-
troduced in the previous section, begins from the Court’s
rer 9 in the 1965 California case and the Louisiana
See, Case. Those statements, especially in California,

phasized the interests of the Federal Government and the
states as sovereigns. Alaska also makes a separate argument
which is independent of Article 4 and which rests on its

rights of property. In the Joint Statement it fi i
second position as follows: agra

'S Other requirements that have been
iechidetae Gateninn suggested or at least touched
|. That the United States must have foll inci
Unit owed “the principles and
— embodied in Article 4” quite literally, including even the pub-
sage of charts showing straight baselines in accordance with Article
dig = ge But see Tr. 3558-59 (United States). For Alaska’s
pense , 107, 150-51; ARB 51-52 & app. A at 35-36: Tr.
2. That the United States must have contracted i i
! its territory “solely to
a in a lawsuit to the detriment of” Alaska. USB 57-63. ag
see Tr. 3527 (Alaska), 3562 (United States) (agreeing for different rea-
7 oe is irrelevant).
: all mie Ps i
desman the criteria for a historic bay must be met. USB 55-56; Tr.

50 lll. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

The State of Alaska contends that the submerged lands
between the mainland and the barrier islands in the leased
area underlie waters which Congress considered inland
waters at the time Alaska was admitted to the Union. Ac-
cordingly, Alaska submits (1) that those lands vested in
Alaska at the moment of statehood under the Pollard rule
_. . and cannot be divested by any subsequent change of
law; and (2) that the same result obtains under the Sub-
merged Lands Act.

Joint Statement 9-10. See also Tr. 3528-29, 3585-86; ARB
39-45.

The argument has two strands, one based on the Pollard
rule and the other on the Submerged Lands Act. In the sec-
ond strand, the claim is that the Submerged Lands Act g~ant
to Alaska took effect in January 1959 and so that Alaska’s
rights must be determined as of that date. This claim cannot
be sustained. The same reasoning would lead one to say
that, because the Submerged Lands Act took effect for the
first forty-eight states in 1953, the rights of those states must
be determined as of 1953. But the United States took that
position in the 1965 California case, and the Court rejected
it. 381 U.S. at 164-65. Nor did Congress impose a special
reading on the Submerged Lands Act as applied to Alaska.
On the contrary, the Congress that enacted the Alaska State-
hood Act intended that Alaska be treated under the Sub-
merged Lands Act like the other states. See supra section
D(1).

The other part of Alaska’s argument is based on the Pol-
lard doctrine, which says that new states, upon admission to
the Union, take title to the beds of inland navigable waters
within their boundaries. Alaska says the disputed areas were
considered inlend waters at statehood by virtue of the ten-
mile rule—the sucond of its proposed delimitation methods.
Therefore, Alaska concludes, actions purporting to divest it
of these areas would be an impermissible contraction of its

E. THE IMPERMISSIBLE CONTRACTION THEORY $1

territory under the 1965 California and Louisiana Boundary
cases.
: The United States responds that the ten-mile rule was
not an unqualified principle and most likely would not
serve to enclose the waters shoreward of the barrier islands
off the North Slope of Alaska.” USB 6. Further, it says that
the rule was not its policy at Alaska’s statehood in January
1959: “[T]he federal evidence indicates that the United
States ceased following the so-called ten-mile rule for inter-
national purposes as soon as the Convention had been signed
in 1958. USB 8-9. See also USB 18-42 (giving the
United States’ version of the policy over the years); USB
53-54 (on the qualifications to the rule); USRB 9 n.3, 13-14
(also on the qualifications). Finally, the United States argues
pene re ne the — at statehood in 1959, the doctrine of
. Hagan does not free iti i
phat mae ze the definition of inland

I turn to the evaluation of these arguments in section F.

3. General remarks

Alaska points out that it is not attempting to show that the
waters inside barrier islands qualify as historic bays under
Article 7(6) of the Convention. Rather, it seeks to show that
these waters were inland by virtue of a general delimitation
system that the United States employed at the times signifi-
cant to the development of Alaska’s rights. AB 124-25: Tr.
3531-32. Either because the system amounted to a long-
standing use of straight baselines, or because the system
made the waters inland at the moment of statehood, a later
move to the normal baseline provisions of the Convention
dg Alaska’s view, an impermissible contraction of its

If this were a historic bay case, the burden would be on
Alaska to show, inter alia, a long-continued exercise of gov-
ernmental authority over the disputed areas as inland waters.

§2 Il. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 172-75
(1965); Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. 11, 74-78
(1969); United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975); Ala-
bama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 470 U.S. 93 (1985).
| assume arguendo that something less than the disclaimer of
a historic bay might amount to an impermissible contraction
of a state’s territory.'® To relax the requirements, however,
is not to shift the burden of proof. Alaska must at least show
that the disputed areas were once part of its territory. Where
no particularized claim to these areas has been made, it
would require a rather well-established and well-defined rule
for inland water delimitation to imply such a claim. For
such a rule, Alaska relies on the Alabama and Mississippi

Boundary Case.

F. Past delimitation practice of the United States

The past practice of the United States in delimiting its
inland waters and territorial sea bears on two related but dis-
tinguishable questions, raised in sections E(1) and E(2):

1. Has there been a contraction of Alaska’s recognized
territory within the meaning of the California and Louisiana
Boundary cases?

2. Were the disputed areas considered inland waters at
Alaska’s statehood?

In addition, a review of the practice will lead to a con-
clusion about Alaska’s final theory, which is based on the
assimilation of certain waters to the territorial sea.

1. The Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case

As noted in section B(2), the Court has already made a
finding as to the delimitation practice of the United States in
1959. The context of that finding was a controversy over the
status of Mississippi Sound. The Court said:

6 The United States suggests the contrary. See supra note 15.

F. PAST DELIMITATION PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 53

Prior to its ratification of the Convention on March 24
1961, the United States had adopted a policy of enclosing
as inland waters those areas between the mainland and
off-lying islands that were so closely grouped that no en-
trance exceeded 10 geographical miles. This 10-mile rule
represented the publicly stated policy of the United States
at least since the time of the Alaska Boundary Arbitration
Se Ts ee anes tote ange Gallen wave
aware United States had adopted this policy. In-
dou the Wiha Sieh? pedlee eoneted oat torah
length by both the United Kingdom and Norway in the
celebrated Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 1.C.J. 116.
Nor is there any doubt, under the stipulations of the par-
ties in this case, that Mississippi Sound constitutes inland
waters under that view.

United States v. Louisiana (Alabama and Mississippi Bound-

ary Case), 470 U.S. 93, 106-07 (1985) (footnotes omitted)
In a footnote the Court added: ,

The United States confirmed this policy in a number of
official communications during the period from 1951 to
1961. See Report of Special Master 48-54. Also, the
United States followed this policy in drawing the Chap-
man line along the Louisiana coast following the decision
in United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950). See
Shalowitz, at 161. In a letter to Governor Wright of Mis-
SiSSippi, written on October 17, 1951, Oscar L. Chapman,
then Secretary of the Interior, indicated that if the Chap-
man line were extended eastward beyond the Louisiana
a it would enclose Mississippi Sound as inland

470 U.S. at 106 n.9.

The parties agree that the Court’s finding in the Alabama
and Mississippi Boundary Case was one of fact, and Alaska
does not seek to invoke collateral estoppel against the United

54 Il. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

States. Rather, Alaska has introduced evidence aimed at
proving the ten-mile rule independently—including, among
many other documents, those referred to in the Court's foot-
note and in the Master’s report there cited. The United
States contests Alaska’s interpretation of the evidence. It
says that the Court’s statement of the ten-mile rule was
overly broad and was not necessary to the decision.

| agree with the United States that the ten-mile rule was
not strictly necessary to the decision. It was one element
among others contributing to a finding that Mississippi
Sound was a historic bay. See supra page 44 n.13.

As to the scope of the rule, the United States explains that
the matter was not fully briefed. Tr. 3567. The explanation
seems correct. In his report (supra page 30), Special Master
Armstrong quoted numerous statements of the pre-Conven-
tion policy for delimiting inland waters, id. at 39-42, 48-53,
and he concluded:

On March 24, 1961 the United States ratified the Ge-
neva Convention, which, as noted in United States v. Cal-
ifornia, supra, represented a departure from its previously
held position; therefore the material quoted above repre-
sents the publicly stated position of the United States
from 1903 (Alaskan Boundary Arbitration) to that date.
Under that position, there is no doubt that Mississippi
Sound constituted inland waters, as none of its mouths
exceeds ten miles in width.

Id. at 53-54. There is considerable variation among the
statements the Master quoted in support of this conclusion,
but as I read the report, he did not select any particular state-
ment of policy as being more accurate or more authoritative
than the others. Rather, the selection was ascribed to him by
Mississippi in its reply brief to the Court:

Neither does the United States take issue with the Mas-

ter’s finding that the United States prior to the effective

F. PAST DELIMITATION PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 55

date (September 10, 1964) of the Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea had adopted a policy of enclosing as internal
waters those areas between the mainland and offlying
islands which were so closely grouped that no entrance
exceeded ten (10) nautical miles in width. (Report, pp.
41-44 and 48-54).

Reply Brief for the State of Mississippi at 26-27, Alabama
and Mississippi Boundary Case, 470 U.S. 93 (1985) (foot-
note omitted). At oral argument, counsel for Alabama de-
scribed the policy somewhat differently:
[T]}he ten-mile rule . . . is basically a rule that inland
waters of the United States which are straits or sound{s]
which lead to other bodies of inland water, which are no

more than ten miles wide, should be dealt with -
closed as inland water. sy ps tg

Transcript of oral argument, Alabama and Mississippi
Boundary Case (Ak. Ex. 85-231a), at 37. The Court’s a
ion then stated the rule in the language Mississippi had used,
with a correction in the duration to accord with the Master’ s
er “ U.S. at 106-07.
ven this history, I do not believe that the i

Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case tence wr
upon what statement of the rule most accurately reflected
United States policy regarding near-shore islands. For Mis-
sissippi Sound, the differences among statements apparently
made no difference in result. For the northern coast of
Alaska, that may not be the case. Moreover, as the differing
descriptions just referred to suggest, the exact nature of the
United States’ historic practice is a matter of some intricacy.
Because of the Court’s statement in the Alabama and Missis-
sippi Boundary Case, | have included in this report a more
detailed examination of the practice than might otherwise
have seemed necessary.

56 lll. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

2. United States policy to 1929

In the 1947 California case the Court found that, shortly
after we became a nation, our statesmen took actions that led
to acquisition by the Federal Government of a three-mile
belt of marginal sea:

From all the wealth of material supplied, . . . we cannot

say that the thirteen original colonies separately acquired

ownership to the three-mile belt or the soil under it, even
if they did acquire elements of the sovereignty of the En-
glish Crown by their revolution against it.

At the time this country won its independence from
England there was no settled international custom or un-
derstanding among nations that each nation owned a
three-mile water belt along its borders. . . .

It did happen that shortly after we became a nation our
statesmen became interested in establishing national
dominion over a definite marginal zone to protect our
neutrality. Largely as a result of their efforts, the idea of
a definite three-mile belt in which an adjacent nation can,
if it chooses, exercise broad, if not complete dominion,
has apparently at last been generally accepted throughout
the world .. . . That the political agencies of this nation
both claim and exercise broad dominion and control over
our three-mile marginal belt is now a settled fact. . . .

Not only has acquisition, as it were, of the three-mile
belt been accomplished by the National Government, but
protection and control of it has been and is a function of
national external sovereignty.

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 31-34 (1947) (cita-
tions and footnotes omitted).

The parties have traced the development of this claim to a
marginal belt and, with it, the development of the doctrine of
inland waters, from whose seaward limit the marginal belt
begins. Rather little of the early material deals specifically

F. PAST DELIMITATION PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 57

with waters behind islands. The authorities that do exist,

however, provide background useful for understanding later
efforts at codification.

a. Delaware Bay

The first relevant precedent was an opinion submitted in
1793 by Attorney General Edmund Randolph to Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson. Seizure in Neutral Waters, 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 32. Although the facts involved a bay rather than
islands,'’ the opinion quoted one passage relevant to both.
The following comes from the seventeenth-century Dutch
writer Hugo Grotius:

[I]t seems to appear that the property and dominion of the
sea might belong to him who is in possession of the lands
on both sides, though it be open above as a gulf, or above
and below as a strait; provided it is not so great a part of
the sea, that, when compared with the land on both sides,
it cannot be supposed to be some part of them.

1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 36 (quoting Grotius, Of War and Peace,
book 2, ch. 3, sec. 7) (emphasis added). The significance of
this passage has recently been noted in connection with an-
other dispute involving islands less than ten miles apart.
United States v. Maine (Massachusetts Boundary Case),
Report of Special Master Walter E. Hoffman, at 34-36, 38,

'? Randolph held that Delaware Bay was within the territory of the
United States and that the shi had i i
- es ip Grange had therefore been illegally seized
On the basis of Attorney General Randolph’s opinion, Delaware
nas Saag elie as Shenae billed Geetenadithe ttead tam and Gen
under the 1958 Convention, as a juridical bay less than 24 miles wide.
Ak. Ex. 85-208, at 7 (attachment to letter from Edmund B. Clark, Depart-
ment of Justice, to Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of
State (Sept. 23, 1968)); Ak. Ex. 85-215 (letter from Leonard C. Meeker to
Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold (Apr. 8, 1969)).

58 ill. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

62-63 (Oct. Term, 1984) (U.S. Ex. 85-903), reprinted in
Reed et al., supra note 8, at 703, exception overruled, 475

U.S. 89 (1986).'8

b. Long Island Sound

Another early case, this one concerning Long Island
Sound, was decided by the New York Court of Appeals in
1866. Mahler v. Norwich & New York Transportation Co.,
35 N.Y. 352. A fatal boating accident took place on the
sound, and the plaintiff charged the transportation company
with negligence. The trial court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the collision occurred outside the jurisdiction
of the State of New York. The Court of Appeals, reversing,
found that the place of the accident was within the state
boundary. To construe the boundary statute as excluding the
waters of the sound, the Court said,

would be an abandonment, by a maritime power, of juris-

diction over an inland body of water, inclosed within the

'S In the dispute before Special Master Hoffman, Massachusetts
claimed Vineyard Sound and Nantucket Sound as historic inland waters
under Article 7(6) of the 1958 Convention. Report at 9, 10. The Master
found that both sounds were “the kinds of bodies of water which both En-
glish and American practice [during the colonial and early national pe-
riods} would have considered suitable for treatment as inland, county
waters” or “waters inter fauces terrae." Id. at 37-38.

Ultimately Special Master Hoffman concluded that Massachusetts had
established historic title to Vineyard Sound, Report at 61, but not to Nan-
tucket Sound because there had been no timely actual assertion of juris-
diction, id at 64-66. Regarding the effect of the ten-mile rule as found
by the Court in the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, the Master
repeated that “while either the United States or Massachusetts cou/d have
treated Nantucket Sound as internal waters, their actions and fishing stat-
utes, standing alone, could only serve as an exercise of jurisdiction, but
fell short to show any actual intent to establish jurisdiction over Nan-
tucket Sound.” Report at 69.3 n.1.

F. PAST DELIMITATION PRACTICE OF THE UNITED ST ATES 59

State at each of its termini, and with no outlet to the
ocean except under the command of our cannon from
either shore.

That Long Island Sound was included within the terri-
torial dominions of the British Empire, at the date of the
charter from Charles the Second to the Duke of York, isa
Proposition too plain for argument. It was an inland arm
of the sea, washing no shores but those of the provinces,
and with no opening to the ocean, except by passing be-
tween British headlands less than five miles apart... .
The rule is one of universal recognition, that a bay, strait,
sound or arm of the sea, lying wholly within the domain
of a sovereign, and admitting no ingress from the ocean,
except by a channel between contiguous headlands which
he can command with his cannon on either side, is the
subject of territorial dominion. . . . Within this rule, the
islands at the eastern extremity of Long Island Sound are
the fauces terrae, which define the limits of territorial
authority, and mark the line of separation between the
open ocean and the inland sea.

Id. at 354-56 (citations omitted). Either by the charter to the
Duke of York or by the revolution, the states had succeeded
to the rights of the king, id. at 356, and New York had not
relinquished these rights (so far as pertinent here) to the Fed-
eral Government, id. at 357. Furthermore, New York’s ju-
risdiction over Long Island Sound was supported by long
usage and had never been disputed. /d at 360.

. Although the Mahler case does not state a ten-mile rule,!9
it has been cited as a principal authority for treating islands

'? The range of cannon, mentioned in the opinion, was conventional
taken to be three miles. See | pana |. thant, Shoeant tue Band
aries 24-26 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Pub. 10-1, 1962).

60 II. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

less than ten miles apart as enclosing inland waters. | Shalo-
witz, supra note 19, at 108 n.7. See also id. at 141 n.73,.20

c. Cuba and the Florida keys

Another early occasion for considering the effect of is-
lands was a dispute between the United States and Spain
over the breadth and delimitation of the territorial sea off the
coast of Cuba. On August 10, 1863, Secretary of State Sew-
ard wrote to Mr. Tassara, the Spanish Minister, protesting
Spain’s claim to a six-mile breadth but acknowledging that,
along some parts of the coast, the baseline would be a line of
offshore keys:

The undersigned has further ascertained, as he thinks,
that the line of keys which confront other portions of the
Cuban coast resemble, in dimensions, constitution and
vicinity to the mainland, the keys which lie off the South-
ern Florida coast of the United States. The undersigned
assumes that this line of keys is properly to be regarded as
the exterior coast-line, and that the inland jurisdiction
ceases there, while the maritime jurisdiction of Spain be-
gins from the exterior sea front of those keys.

Ak. Ex. 85-29. As I shall describe shortly, the United States

20 Long Island Sound itself is now treated (together with part of Block
Island Sound) as a juridical bay under Article 7 of the Convention.
United States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case),
469 U.S. 504 (1985). Under the Court’s interpretation of the Convention,
that result was made possible only by a finding that Long Island could be
treated as part of the mainland. /d at 514-20. Previously, Long Island
Sound (but not Block Island Sound) was claimed as historic internal
waters. Id at 509.

Alaska has not argued that the islands off its Arctic coast could be

treated as part of the mainland.

F. PAST DELIMITATION PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 61

later quoted this letter as representative of i iti
its own positi
regarding the baseline and the treatment of islands.2! os

d. The Alaska boundary arbitration

Although the preceding materials provide some authority
for treating waters inside islands as inland waters, Alaska
re the “full formulation” of a ten-mile rule for islands to

Alaska boundary arbitration of 1903. AB 48. This arbi-
ome conducted pursuant to treaty between the United
poe and Great Britain, is reported in Proceedings of the

askan Boundary Tribunal, 8. Doc. No. 162, 58th Cong
2d Sess. (1903-04) (hereafter Proceedings). ‘

The general area of concern in the arbitration was the
Alaska panhandle, that is, the southeastern part of Alaska
and not the Arctic coast. The issue was the boundary line
between the United States and Canada. This line, inland
from the Alexander Archipelago, was first described in a
=~ yreress Russia and Great Britain in 1825. Decision
may laskan Boundary Tribunal, 1 Proceedings, pt. 1 at

. The same boundary description had been used in the
iy by which Russia ceded Alaska to the United
my r o Argument of the United States, 5 Proceedings,

The boundary was defined in terms of the ocean and the
coast. In part, it was to follow “the summit of the mountains
situated parallel to the coast,” provided, however that when-
ever the summit was “more than 10 marine leagues from the
ocean, the boundary would be “a line parallel to the wind-
ings of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance

2! The letter does not describe the Uni

ited States’ present position. It

mantis foe keys do not enclose inland waters.

a States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791, 793 (1976); id, Supplemental
eport of Special Master Albert B. Maris (1975) (U.S. Ex. 85-507)

reprinted in Reed et al., supra note 8, at 575. ,

62 ill. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

of 10 marine leagues therefrom.”22. Thus, Alaska was to in-
clude a strip, or lisiére, whose inland boundary was at most
ten leagues from the coast and, if the mountains referred to
were nearer, at their summit.

22 The 1825 treaty, as translated from the French in the opinion of the
United States members of the tribunal, read as follows:

Ill. The line of demarcation between the possessions of the High
Contracting Parties, upon the coast of the continent, and the islands of
America to the northwest, shall be drawn in the manner following: —

Commencing from the southernmost point of the island called
Prince of Wales’ Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54° 40’
north latitude, and between the 131st and the 133rd degrees of west
longitude (meridian of Greenwich), the said line shall ascend to the
north along the channel called Portland Channel, as far as the point of
the continent where it strikes the 56th degree of north latitude, from
this last-mentioned point, the line of demarcation shall follow the
summit of the mountains (‘la créte des montagnes’) situated parallel
to the coast, as far as the point of intersection of the 141st deg, ce of
west longitude (of the same meridian); and, finally, from the said
point of intersection, the said meridian line of the 141st degree, in its
prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean, shall form the limit between
the Russian and Brit’sh possessions on the continent of America to

the north-west.

IV. With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the
preceding Article, it is understood:

First. That the island called Prince of Wales’ Island shall belong
wholly to Russia.

Second. That wh © «er the summit of the mountains (‘la créte des
montagnes’) which extend in a direction parallel to the coast, from the
56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st
degree of west longitude, shall prove to be at the distance of more
than 10 marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British
possessions and the line of coast which is to belong to Russia, as
above mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings of
the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of 10 marine
leagues therefrom.

| Proceedings, pt. | at 47.

F. PAST DELIMITATION PRACT ICE OF THE UNITED STATES 63

lowing all the sinuosities of the mainland shore. Case of
Great Britain, 3 Proceedings, pt. 1 at 79-80. F or Lynn
Canal, a mainland indentation more than ten miles wide, it
proposed a crossing where the canal first narrowed to ten
miles or, with a stricter rule, to six miles. Jd 23
The United States argued that this procedure confused the
— coastline with the political coastline. In the United
oom ree the treaty used “coast” to mean the physical
re ine 0 the mainland, including al! its sinuosities. Thus
isiére ran inland from (for example) the head of Lynn

> In support of a ten-mile line. G itai
a ten- , Great Britain quoted the ba i
rule from a convention on North Sea fisheries: “Ast regards aa

1. The precise limits within which international regards bay
* *
as territorial waters have never been ce om ms i

national ity over the i i i j
‘dean waters claimed, are evidence going to jus-
3. If the size and configuration of an ing i
opening is such that the li
may rightly be drawn from headland to headland, the belt of territorisi
water is to be measured from the line outwards.

Id. at 32.

64 I. THE EFFECT OF ISLANDS ON THE COASTLINE

Canal and not from some more seaward line. In contrast, the
United States said that the political coastline ran outside the
islands of the Alexander Archipelago. Counter Case of the
United States, 4 Proceedings, pt. 1 at 31-32; Argument of
the United States, 5 Proceedings, pt. 1 at 14-18 (Ak. Ex. 85-
41).24 Spelling out this position at oral argument, counsel
for the United States said: ©

24 The United States said in its Counter Case:

The political coast line (since all arms of the sea not exceeding six
miles, and in some cases more, in width, and all islands are practically
treated as portions of the mainland) extends outside the islands and
waters between them. In the present instance the political or legal
coast line drawn southward from Cape Spencer would cross to the
northwestern shore of Chichagof Island and follow down the western
side of that island and of Baranof Island to Cape Ommaney; at this
point it would turn northward for a short distance and then cross
Chatham Strait to the western shore of Kuiu Island; thence again turn-
ing southward along that shore and along the outlying islets west of
Prince of Wales Island, the line would round Cape Muzon and pro-
ceed eastward to Cape Chacon; thence following northward along the
eastern shore of Prince of Wales Island to Clarence Strait it would
cross the latter at its entrance and proceed southeastward to the paral-
lel of 54°40’ at the point where it enters Portland Canal. Thus the
political coast line of Southeastern Alaska does not touch the main-
land between Cape Spencer and 55° of north latitude.

Counter Case of the United States, 4 Proceedings, pt. | at 31-32. To

similar effect was the printed argument of the United States:
The boundary of Alaska,—that is, the exterior boundary from which
the marine league is measured,—runs along the outer edge of the
Alaskan or Alexander Archipelago, embracing a group composed of
hundreds of islands. When “measured in a straight line from headland
to headland” at their entrances, Chatham Strait, Cross Sound, Sumner
Strait and Clarence Strait, by which this exterior coast line is pierced,
measure less than ten miles. That fact, according to the authorities
quoted in the British Counter-Case, pp. 24—28, places them within the
category of territorial waters. All of the interior waters touching upon
the /isiére, such as Behm Canal, Taku Inlet and Lynn Canal are, in the

F. PAST DELIMITATION PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 65

[The political coast line] is an imaginary line which
the law superimposes upon the physical coast line as a
basis. But for the purposes of international law, instead
of following all the convolutions and sinuosities of the
Coast, it Is permitted to go across the heads of bays and
inlets, and it is in that particular that the rule of interna-
tional law comes in as to the width of bays and inlets,
either 6 or 10 miles. We are not encumbered with that
question, because the British Case contends that they
must be 10 miles, and we do not dispute it, and these out-
side inlets are 10 miles... . The minute you establish it,
the minute you fix it, all waters back of it, whether they
are waters in the Archipelago there of Alexander or the
Archipiélago de Los Canarios, of Cuba, they all became.
as Hall says, salt-water lakes: they are just as much inte-
rior waters as the interior waters of Loch Lomond ___.
Argument of Hannis Taylor, 7 Proceedings 611 (in Ak. Ex.
85-18).25 It is this statement of position on behalf of the
United States that is said to constitute the “full formulation”

the political 4 ap address the location of

Argument of the United States, 5 Proceedings
, pt. | at 15-16. Fora
depiction of the boundary described, see Ak. Ex. 85-901 A. Related testi-
mony appears at Tr. 2632-40, 2716~20, 2745-47. See also Ak. Ex. 85-
99, U.S. Ex. 85-328 (containing a 1952 Justice Department memoran
dum, “Alaskan Boundary

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0005%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.
