# Opposition Brief — Cooper v. Oklahoma

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0779%3A03

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1996
- **Citation:** 517 U.S. 348

## Text

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— OFFICE OF THE CLI7’

SUPREME COURT. UL:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BRYON KEITH COOPER, Supreme Court, U.S,
F
Petitioner, eee
AUG 14 1995
vs.
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, —

Respondent.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

W.A. DREW EDMONDSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA

SANDRA D. HOWARD, OBA #11873*
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF, CRIMIN?", APPEALS
112 State Capitol Building
Oklahoma City, OK 73105
(405) 521-3921

* COUNSEL OF RECORD

August 14, 1995

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .

REASONS FOR REFUSING TO GRANT THE WRIT

PROPOSITION I

THE OKLAHOMA STATUTES ALLOCATING THE BURDEN TO THE
DEFENDANT TO PROVE INCOMPETENCY BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE DO NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.

CONCLUSION

CASES CITED

Addington v. Texas,
411 U.S. 418 99 S.Ct. 1804,
60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)

Cooper _v. State,
889 P.2d 293 (Okl.Cr.1995)

Martin v. Ohio,
480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098,
94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) .

Medina v. California,
505 U.S. , aan oak. 2578,
120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992)

Olim v. Wakinekona,
461 U.S. 238 103 S.Ct. 1741,
75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983)

Parke v. Raley,
506 U.S. , 113 8.ct. ,

121 L.Ed.2d 391, 405 (1992)

ii

21 0.S.
22 0.S.,
22 0.S.,

22 0.S.

701.7 (A)
§ 1175.1
§ 1175.3

§ 1175.4

(B) (Supp. 1994)

22 0.S.

§ 1175.4

(1991)

(Supp.

(1991)

1993)

iii

“~

1. Whether it is constitutional for a state to require a
criminal defendant to sustain his claim of incompetency by clear

and convincing evidence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BYRON KEITH COOPER,
Petitioner,
Case No. 95-5207

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee

Comes now Respondent, the State of Oklahoma, by and through
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, and
in respond to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorar|, states
the following:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Byron Keith Cooper, hereinafter referred to as Petitioner, was
tried and convicted for first degree murder in violation of
Okla.Stat.tit. 21, 701.7(A) in the District Court of Oklahoma
County. On September 8, 1989, the body of Harold Sheppard was
found in his home at Northeast 13th and Fonshill streets in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Based on interviews with people in the
neighborhood, authorities estimated that Sheppard was stabbed to
death September 4, 1989. Petitioner became a suspect after using
Mr. Sheppard’s J.C.Penney card. Petitioner initially admitted
murdering Mr. Sheppard but later retracted the admission. A watch
and two camera belonging to Mr. Sheppard was found in the home
where Petitioner had been staying. At Mr. Sheppard’s house,
authorities found Petitioner’s fingerprints on a tiashlight, a

metal can, a watch case and a carton of cigarettes. Petitioner’s
prints were also found on the charge receipt he signed at the J.C.
Penney store at Shepherd Mall.

The jury found the existence of five aggravating
circumstances: (1) that Petitioner had previously been convicted of
a felony involving violence; (2) that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel; (3) that the murder was committed for
the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
prosecution; (4) that the murders were committed while Petitioner
was serving a sentence on a felony conviction; and (5) that there
existed a probability Petitioner would commit criminal acts of
violence which would constitute a continuing threat to society.

On January 10, 1995, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
issued an opinion affirming Petitioner’s conviction in Cooper vy.
State, 889 P.2d 293 (Okl1.Cr.1995). Rehearing was denied February
13, 1995. Petitioner is now seeking review by this Court.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Under Oklahoma law, a criminal defendant has the burden of
proof in demonstrating whether he is competent to stand trial.
This burden is sustained by introducing clear and convincing
evidence. The defendant is presumed to be competent for the
purposes of the allocation of the burden of proof and burden of
going forward with the evidence. Okla.Stat.tit. 22 § 1175.4 (B)
(Supp. 1994). Petitioner claims this standard of clear and

convincing evidence is so harsh that it violates Petitioner’s right
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

In the opinion below, The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
found that Oklahoma’s competency statutes are constitutional as
they did not "offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as

fundamental”. Cooper, 889 P.2d at 303 quoting Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2577, 120 L.Ed.2d 353,
363 (1992).

CONVINCING EVIDENCE DO NOT VIOLATE DUE

Oklahoma statutes provide that, in order to be competent, a
defendant must have sufficient ability to consult with an attorney
and the defendant must be able to understand the nature of the
charges and proceedings being brought against him. Okla.Stat.tit.
22, § 1175.1 (1991). Once an application to determine competency
has been filed, the court must hold a hearing to examine the
application. If the court finds the application to have merit, the
court must order an examination by doctors or appropriate
technicians who shall examine the defendant and determine if he can
appreciate the nature of the charges, if he is capable of assisting
his attorney and others. Okla.Stat.tit. 22, § 1175.3 (Supp. 1993).
Following an initial determination by doctors or technicians, the
court is required to hold a hearing on the issue of competency. At

4

that hearing, the defendant is presumed competent and must prove by
clear and convincing evidence he is incompetent. Okla.Stat.tit. §
1175.4 (1991).

Petitioner, relying on Medina v. California, 505 U.S. __, 112
S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), argues that requiring him to
prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence violates
due process standards. Petitioner contends the burden of proof
should be by a preponderance of the evidence. He claims requiring
the defendant to sustain the burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence is violative of the Due Process Clause.

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in this case
h in which Oklahoma’s statutes governing competency were found to
be constitutional is thorough and well-reasoned. That court began
its analysis with a discussion of the fundamental concept of Due
Process. The court noted:

It may however be stated generally that due
process of law requires an orderly proceeding
adapted to the nature of the case in which the

citizen has an opportunity to be heard, and to
defend, enforce, and protect his rights.

Cooper, 889 P.2d at 301 quoting Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 191,
194 (1878). The court noted this Court’s pronouncement that Due
Process Clause has limited operation and that the category of
infractions that violate "fundamental fairness" has been defined
very narrowly". Cooper, 889 P.2d at 301 quoting Medina, 120
L.Ed.2d at 362.

As the Oklahoma court recognized, this Court in addineton y.
Texas, 411 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) held

—_—

that the function of the burden of proof is to “instruct the
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks
he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication". The Addington court also noted
the standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the
litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the
ultimate decisions. The Oklahoma court noted that, in considering
what standard should govern in a competency proceeding, it must
assess the presumption of competency with the extend of the
defendant’s interest in not being tried while incompetent and the
State’s interest in being assured a defendant is not attempting to
feign incompetence. Cooper, 889 P.2d at 302. The court also noted
that a truly incompetent criminal defendant, though his attorneys
and experts, can prove incompetency with relative ease. Cooper,
889 P.2d at 303. Balancing these standards, the court found that
forcing a defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence does
not offend principles of fundament fairness. [d.

This is consistent with this Court’s holding in Qlim_v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813
(1983) that "process is not an end in itself". The constitutional
purpose of due process if to protect a substantive interest to
which an individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement. ld.
The interest here is that a defendant may not be tried while
incompetent. The procedures for protecting this interest are left
to the individual states.

This Court has emphasized the preeminent role of the States in
preventing and dealing with crime and the reluctance of the Court
to disturb a States’ decision with respect to the definition of
criminal conduct and the procedures by which the criminal laws are
to be enforced in the courts, including the burden of producing
evidence and allocating the burden of persuasion. Martin v. Ohio,
480 U.S. 228, 232, 107 S.Ct. 1096, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987).

In Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. __, 121 L.Ed.2d
391, 405 (1992), this Court noted, in the context of allocating the
burden of proof in challenging the validity of a prior guilty plea
to the defendant, that "(t]he Due Process Clause does not, however,
require a State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis
that it aw produce results more favorable to the accused". Parke,
121 L.Ed.2d at 405, quoting Medina, 120 L.Ed.2d at 367.

Oklahoma has chosen to require a clear and convincing standard
to the quantum of proof required to prove incompetent. Petitioner
claims he had previously been found to be incompetent and it was
against fundamental fairness to require him to take responsibility
for proving his incompetency be clear and convincing evidence.

In Medina, this Court held that allocating the burden of proof
to the defendant in competency proceedings does not violate due
process standards. Although the issue in Medina was who bore the
burden of proof rather than the standard of proof, the rationale
behind the Medina decisions is equally applicable to a challenge as
to the proper burden of proof standard. The rationale behind the
Medina decision is that while a defendant has a right not to stand

trial while incompetent, states are free to establish their own
rules for determining competency. The Court held:

Once a State provides a defendant access to
procedures for making a competency evaluation,
however, we perceive no basis for holding that
due process further requires the State to
assume the burden of vindicating the
defendant’s constitutional right by persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant is
competent to stand trial.

Medina, 120 L.ed.2d at 366. The Medina court also dispelled the
argument made by Petitioner herein that it is against fundamental
fairness to demand that the defendant take responsibility for
proving his incompetency. The Court held:

Once a competency hearing is held, however,

the defendant is entitled to the assistance of

counsel, and psychiatric evidence is brought

to bear on the questions of the defendant's

mental condition. Although an impaired

defendant might be limited in his ability to

assist counsel in demonstrating incompetence,

the defendant ‘s inability to assist counsel

can, in and of itself, constitute probative

evidence of incompetence, and defense counsel

will often have the best-informed view of the

defendant’s ability to participate in his

defense.
Medina, 120 L.Ed.2d at 366 (citations omitted). This is true
regardless of whether the standard if by a preponderance of the
evidence or by clear and convincing evidence. This is also true
regardless of whether the defendant had previously been adjudicated
by a court to be incompetent to stand trial.

This Court has recognized that a state procedures does not run

afoul of the Constitution simply because another method may seem to

be fairer or wiser or to "give a surer protection to the prisoner

at the bar". Medina, 120 L.Ed.2d at 367 quoting Snyder vy.
8

—_

Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed 674 (1934).
State procedures are only unconstitutional if they "offend some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental". Medina, 120 L.Ed.2d at
364. The Oklahoma court acknowledged this concept and properly
found that requiring Petitioner to bear the burden of proof by
clear and convincing evidence did not violate fundamental fairness.
Petitioner has presented nothing to the contrary and this Court
should deny review of this issue.
CONCLUSION

Petitioner has provided no basis for review by this Court.
The Oklahoma statute allocating the burden of proving incompetency
to the defendant by clear and convincing evidence is a proper
exercise of state legislative power and does not violate due
process. This Court should refuse to grant certiorari review.

Respectfully submitted,

W.A. DREW EDMONDSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

SANDRA D. HOWARD, OBA #11873
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF, CRIMINAL APPEALS

112 State-Capitol
Oklahoma City, OK 73105
(40S) 521-3921

. ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

NO. 95-5207 UG 16 1995

OFFICE OF THE cure
SUPREME COURT. U.S

‘RECEIVED
|

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 0O

BRYON KEITH COOPER,
Petitioner,
vs.

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Sandra D. Howard, a member of the bar of this Court, do
hereby certify that I have thie ///* day of August, 1995, served
a copy of Respondent's Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on counsel for
Petitioner, Robert A. Ravitz, Oklahoma County Public Defender, 320
Robert S. Kerr, Room 611, Oklahoma City, OK 73102, with adequate
first class postage All parties required to be served have been

served.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0779%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
