# Amicus Curiae Brief — Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western NY

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0684%3A22

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 519 U.S. 357

## Text

5 afeig No. 95-1065 ai. -

Supreme Court, U.S.
IN THE FILED

Supreme Court of the United States 995

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

CLERK
> a =

REVEREND PAUL SCHENCK and DWIGHT SAUNDERS,
Petitioners,
-——V,—

PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN NEW YORK, et al.,
Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL WOMEN’S ASSO-
CIATION, AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION,
CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, CONNECTICUT
WOMEN’S EDUCATION AND LEGAL FUND, INC., FAMILY
PLANNING ADVOCATES OF NEW YORK STATE, INC.,
JEWISH WOMEN INTERNATIONAL, LAMBDA LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, NATIONAL CENTER
FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR WOMEN, NORTHWEST WOMEN’S LAW CENTER,
WOMEN’S LAW CENTER OF MARYLAND, WOMEN’S
LAW PROJECT, AND YWCA OF THE U.S.A. AS AMICI
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

EVE C. GARTNER
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL E. ERDOS
CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE
LAW & POLICY
120 Wall Street
New York, New York 10021
(212) 514-5534

Dated: July 1, 1996 Counsel for Amici Curiae

7
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
oe
csc eee es eee sce see eecese ili
Gunmen Ge ARLE CURIABR 2... ccc ccc ccccccceces l
ig sa 2
eee ea ease dad wee 00506 66 08 3
I. The Buffer Zone And The Cease And Desist
Provision Are Constitutional Because They
Protect A Captive Audience Exercising The
Right To Reproductive Privacy .................... 3
A. The Captive Audience Doctrine Applies
Here Where Patients Are Seeking Access
To Reproductive Health Care Facilities ........... 4
1. The Injunction Appropriately Protects
Patients’ Substantial Privacy Interests ........ 7
2. Absent The Injunction, Patients Would
Be At Risk Of Substantial Harm ........... 10
3. The Patients Here Are Truly “Captive”
To Petitioners’ Invasive Tactics............ 15

B. The Injunction Protects This Captive Audience
And Burdens No More Speech Than Necessary .... 18

Il. The Cease And Desist Provision Also Is Constitutic
Because It Is Only Triggered By The Targeted Patient
Communicating Her Unwillingness To Hear Additional

“Counseling” ......--ssscceccececssescerecees

[Il. Injunctions Have Consistently Been Granted In Other
Contexts Where The Right Of The Listener To Be Left
Alone Outweighs The Interests Of The Speaker .....-.

CONCLUSION... ccc cece cece rcrrccccresseccsees

APPUIGMK 2. ccc cccccccesesnceeeee eens eumume

Pe et Lo en ee 6

a -

~
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) ................. 2

American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656

EE LE 12
Bering v. Share, 721 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1986) ............ 19
Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) ......... 8
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,

I ee cc ccc ccc cc ccccccccce 6, 17
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp.

EE ETT . 6,17
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) .... 2... 2 eee, 20
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191

DUES eG eee ebcecesccccccccc: 5, 15, 20, 21
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) ............ passim
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,

EE ee ccc cc ccc cecccccs 6, 17, 23, 24
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ................. 5
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) .............. 5, 20
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852

EEE SEIT 29
E.E.0.C. v. Sage Realty Corp.,

507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) .........0.0...... 29

iv

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,

422 U.S. 205 (197S) 2... cece cece eee eecenes 6,7, 17
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726

GED occcccdcdeccesecsdatedcucess 6, 14, 17, 25
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474

OD vc cccckececccstecesececcdcccececs passim
Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318

(D. Minn. 1995) ... 0... cece cece eee e ee eeeee 18
Frye v. District 1199, 996 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1993) .......-. 8
Gilbert v. State of Oklahoma,

765 P.2d 1208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) ......... 27, 28
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) .......-. 5
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) ......-. 28

Heffron v. International Soc. For Krishna Consciousness,
452 US. GOD (IGRI) 2. i ccc cece cece c ce eecescces 3

Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670
(Colo. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied,
No. 95$C593, 1996 Colo. LEXIS 136 (Feb. 26, 1996) 9, 20

Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 401 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. 1991) ....... 20
Jew v. University of lowa, 749 F. Supp. 946

(S.D. lowa 1990) .. 2... cece ee eee eens 29
Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942),

adopted on rehearing as opinion of Court,

pte 7... eer 25

Vv

Jordan v. Wilson, 662 F. Supp. 528

(MLD. Alle. 1987) ... 2. ccc ccc cece eee, 29
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ............ 6, 22, 24
Lee v. International Soc'y For Krishna

Consciousness, 50S U.S. 672 (1992) ............... 1]
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. $77 Rea wa eer rs 6

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974)

(1994)

PPOUUOROKEKOESEU CEES OeSObe60666 0: passim
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) .........__. . 23
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 ( SEE wéneons 29
Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253 (NJ. 1994),

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2264 (1995) ............_.. 21
NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, 442 U.S. 773 RE re x
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. $75 a ea 11
NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958) ........ 28
Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center

. . Inc,

626 So.2d 664 (Fla 1993) .................... 4,8
People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742

PE asc cccbhsadoneeccsdcwace. 27

vi
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of San Mateo County v.
Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617
SL es SE oc cd aewnecacesedecveseseesees« 13

Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates
for Life, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988) ........... 12, 21

Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue Western New York,
799 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) ............ passim

Pro-Choice Network v. Walker, 994 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1993) . 16

Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Schenck,

GP FG Bre GRO Ge GRU cc ccc ssccccseccess passim
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) ........ 9
RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, SOS U.S. 377 (1992) .......... 29
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383

Ps ds eckeekeacta se beestneescoens 28
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486

PO ME c Sb eb cb be dhe cede crtsoed sees ss 28
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577

(E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990) .... 13
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ........ 2... 2.2.2 eee ues 4

Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, .
oe! SL PTT TTT weenes passim

Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 68 F.3d 1169
ESS GSES a ee 23, 24

vii

Schramek v. Bohren, 429 N.W.2d 501

Se SU ch ebownededdaees ce ceeds 26, 27
State v. Baumann, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 261,

532 N.W.2d 144 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1995) .......... 20, 21
State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173 (S.D. 1996) ......... 26, 27
Taylor v. United States, 358 F Supp. 384

Se eh deneneweekadedbaeseeb ce cacwe 15
United States v. Allen, 317 F.2d 777 (2d. Cir. 1963) ....... 15

United States v. Cooley, 787 F. Supp. 977 (D. Kan. 1992) ... 14

United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) ........... 2,4
United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325 (Sth Cir.),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975) ................. 15
United States v. Omirly, 488 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1973) ...... 15
United States v. Rutherford, 332 F.2d 444 (2d. Cir.),

cert. denied, 377 U.S. 994 (1964) ................. 15
United States v. Silver, 196 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.Pa. 1961) .... 15
STATUTES
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

A ny 28
ns i a il ee a 26

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior:
Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, Crowding
SUED bce cseddeckacncdesedsdheseesssoudes« 12

Lynne Bumpus-Hooper, Anti-Abortion Leader Draws
‘Battle Plan,’ Orlando Sentinel Tribune,

fh PPPPPPTTTISTIIT LITT eee 14
G. Burrow & T. Ferris, Medical Complications During
Pregnancy (3d ed. 1988) ... 2... cece cence ennees 10

Catherine Cozzarelli & Brenda Major, The Effects
of Anti-Abortion Demonstrators and Pro-Choice
Escorts on Women’s Psychological Responses to
Abortion, 13 Journal of Social & Clinical
Popshaiony 406 (IDRS) on ccccccccccccvccsccees 12

D. Danforth and J. Scott, Obstetrics & Gynecology
i Cs c.et tndversunnd deebahe weees re

Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right
Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 153 (1972) .. 24

Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (1966) ........... 12
Warren M. Hern, Proxemics: The Application of Theory to
Conflict Arising from Antiabortion Demonstrations,
12 Population and Environment 379 (1991) .......... 12
Catherine F. Klein & Lesley E. Orloff, Providing Legal
Protection for Battered Women: an Analysis of State
Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801 (1993) 25, 26
National Abortion Federation, Incidents of Violence and
Distruption Against Abortion Providers, 1995 (Jan. 1996) 14

Rovinsky and Guttmacher's Medical, Surgical &
Gynecological Complications of Pregnancy
512 (S. Cherry et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985)

iouomeee ee os 10
Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine,
19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 85 (1991) .............. 9,17
Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace,
25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1990) ............... 28
Robert Sommer, Personal Space: The Behavioral
Basis of Design (1969) ........................ 12

Williams Obstetrics (F. Gary Cunningham
et al. eds., 19h ed. 1993).............. 10

l

This amicus curiae brief is submitted in support of
Respondents Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, et al.
By letters already filed with the Clerk of the Court, Petitioners
and Respondents have consented to the filing of this brief.

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The American Medical Women’s Association, American Public
Health Association, Catholics for a Free Choice, Connecticut
Women’s Education and Legal Fund, Inc., Family Planning
Advocates of New York State, Inc., Jewish Women International,
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Center for
Lesbian Rights, Northwest Women’s Law Center, National
Organization for Women, Women’s Law Center of Maryland,
Women’s Law Project, and YWCA of the U.S.A. are advocacy
and/or educational organizations that seek to ensure women’s
equal rights and to protect women’s access to safe reproductive
health care. Amici curiae have a particular interest in halting the
concerted violence, harassment and intimidation being directed
against women seeking abortions and against clinics, physicians
and staff providing abortion services. Amici seek to ameliorate
the current public health and public safety crisis resulting from
the violence and climate of fear created by anti-choice militants
and the resultant shortage of physicians and clinics willing to
provide abortion services. Individual statements of interest of
each amici are attached hereto as Appendix A.

2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici curiae respectfully urge this Court to uphold the
decision of the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (hereinafter "Court of Appeals”). This Court has
“regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish ‘to
propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so
whenever and however and wherever they please.’" United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983) (citing Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966)). The district court fulfilled
this need to take accouni of the context in which expressive
activity occurs by issuing a measured response to a persistent
campaign of obstructive, coercive, and harassing conduct by
Petitioners and their co-defendants (hereinafter “Petitioners” or
“defendants”) targeted at women who seek abortions and the
clinics, physicians and staff who provide these essential services
in the Western District of New York. While the constitutionality
of the limited restrictions on Petitioners’ intimidating and
disruptive activities is amply supported by the State’s interests in
protecting women’s reproductive rights and public safety (see
Brief of Respondents), amici focus on additional grounds of
support recognized by this Court: The permeable buffer zone and
the cease and desist provision are constitutional under this Court's
well-established privacy doctrines regarding captive audiences and
notice remedies.

Because the injunction protects from serious harm a
captive audience exercising the constitutional right to reproductive
choice, and because it does not preclude many forms of
communication that could reach the targeted audience, it must be
upheld as constitutional. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,
114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). This Court has firmly established the
constitutionality of restrictions on harassment and coezcion
targeted at a captive audience. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988). Here, patients seeking time-sensitive health services in
order to exercise their right to reproductive privacy cannot avoid
the invasive and offensive maneuvering of the protesters and so-
called "sidewalk counselors,” subjecting them to serious physical
and psychological harm. These patients thus comprise a “captive

3

audience” entitled to the protection of the limited restrictions the
district court ordered to afford them access to medical facilities.
These narrowly drawn provisions burden no more speech than
necessary because they ensure that Petitioners have alternative
avenues of communicating their message. They therefore pass
muster under Madsen and reflect a proper balance between the
privacy rights and health needs of patients and the rights of those
who seek to deter them from exercising their constitutionally
protected choice.

Further support for the cease and desist provision’s
constitutionality is found in the fact that it is appropriately
conditioned on notice of unwelcomeness given by the listener.
This Court has squarely held that it is constitutional to restrict
speech based on notice communicated by a listener that further
communication is unwanted. Rowan v. United States Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).

The constitutionality of the challenged restrictions is also
supported by analogous decisions in the contexts of domestic
violence and sexual harassment. In these settings, courts have
protected unwilling listeners’ privacy rights by limiting harassing
and intimidating speech and activities that cause harm to the
recipients. In light of well-established jurisprudence upholding
against First Amendment challenge protective orders to remedy
domestic violence, and injunctions to prevent continuing sexual
harassment in the workplace, this Court similarly should find that
the challenge to the instant injunction is without merit.

ARGUMENT

I. The Buffer Zone And The Cease And Desist Provision
Are Constitutional Because They Protect A Captive
Audience Exercising The Right To Reproductive Privacy.

This Court repeatedly has emphasized that the “First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s
views at all times and places or in any manner that may be
desired." Heffron v. International Soc’y For Krishna

4

Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (citations omitted); see
also Grace, 461 U.S. at 177-78. In particular, "the right of every
person ‘to be let alone’ must be placed in the scales with the nght
of others to communicate.” Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736. Courts
protect this important privacy right through application of the
captive audience doctrine.

Through this doctrine, courts account for the difference
between generalized speech and speech or expressive conduct
directed at an individual by protesters who “do not seek to
disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon
the targeted [individual], and to do so in an especially offensive
way.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486. Accordingly, government can
limit discourse where "substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). This principle carries even
greater force in the reproductive health care context. The
injunction at issue responds to an intolerable invasion of the
privacy rights of individuals seeking to enter women’s medical
facilities. The buffer zone and the cease and desist provision
ensure that those “held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance,”
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 (quoting Operation Rescue v.
Women’s Health Center, Inc, 626 So.2d 664, 673 (Fla. 1993)),
can freely exercise their constitutional right to reproductive
privacy and can avoid having their health endangered through
badgering and intimidation by abortion opponents.

A. The Captive Audience Doctrine Applies Here Where
Patients Are Seeking Access To Reproductive Health
Care Facilities.

This Court has recognized that government may regulate
speech in order to protect an unwilling listener or viewer when
that listener or viewer is a “captive audience." Frisby, 487 U.S.
at 487. Given that the invasive anti-choice activities at issue here
target and “capture” an audience at a medical facility attempting
to exercise the right to reproductive privacy, the captive audience
doctrine clearly applies here.

5

In Frisby, this Court upheld a town ordinance banning
targeted picketing on the public streets' in front of private
residences. The Court found “the target[s] of the focused
picketing” to be "captive" because they had “no ready means of
avoiding the unwanted speech." 487 U.S. at 487. Although
“complete bans" on expressive activity in residential
neighborhoods are unconstitutional, see id. at 486, the Court
recognized that anti-choice picketing of the homes of doctors who
perform abortion is an “activity [that] inherently and offensively
intrudes on residential privacy,” id. at 486, and noted that the
Town Board justified the ban because targeted residential
picketing "causes emotional disturbance and distress to the
occupants . . . [and] has as its object the harassing of such
occupants.” /d. at 477 (alteration in original).

While "we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectionable speech," Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21
(citation omitted), this Court has responded with equal force to

In its amicus brief, the AFL-CIO misleadingly describes a "spectrum"
of cases: on one end are cases, such as Frisby, “that recognize a
heightened privacy interest in the home;" on the other end are cases
“involving speech on the ordinary public street." Brief of AFL-CIO at
28. This mistaken analysis is highlighted by Frisby itself, where the
speech at issue took place on public streets and sidewalks. In fact, the
Court regularly protects targeted audiences from speech oceurring in
public spaces that are unsuited for unfettered expression; there is no
right to “address a group at any public place and at any time.” Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) ("Cox I”) (Black, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992) (upholding prohibition of solicitation of votes and display or
distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of polling place);
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding ban on picketing
near school); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) ("Cox IT")
(upholding prohibition of certain picketing near courthouse). As Frisby
makes clear, what is dispositive in a “captive audience” analysis is not
whether the speech occurs in public, but rather whether it intolerably
intrudes on the privacy of its target either because of special privacy
interests implicated or because of the degree of captivity.

6

the need to protect certain captive audiences outside the home.
For example, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974), a plurality of the Court upheld a prohibition on political
advertisements in public streetcars in part because the passengers
were a captive audience. See also Lehman, 418 U.S. at 305-08
(Douglas, J., concurring); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
730 (1978) (prohibiting daytime broadcast of indecent radio show
heard in the car while father was driving with young son). The
Court likewise has found that children at assemblies or graduation
ceremonies in school are captive audiences. See Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
Moreover, even where a citizen is on a public street, the Court
has applied captive audience principles to protect her from
unavoidable speech. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949),
the Court upheld a regulation prohibiting vehicles from emitting
loud broadcast noises while on city streets. The Court stated that
"{iJn his home or on the street [the unwilling listener] is
practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy . .
. except through the protection of the municipality." Jd. at 87
(emphasis added).’

2 That the home has not been the determinative factor in captive
audience cases is further supported by cases in which a captive audience
argument was rejected. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60 (1983) (recipient of objectionable mailing can easily avert
eyes and discard mail); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (same). Rather than being dispositive,
presence in the home has lightened the burden on the listener to avoid
unwanted speech because of the substantial privacy interests involved.
See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 ("the home is different” because it is not
one of the "many locations [where] we expect individuals simply to
avoid speech they do not want to hear"); FCC, 438 U.S. at 749 n.27
("Outside the home, the balance between the offensive speaker and the
unwilling audience may sometimes tip in favor of the speaker, requiring
the offended listener to turn away."); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 210-11 (1975) ("burden normally falls upon the viewer" to avoid
speech); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. Thus, the Court in these cases did not
(continued...)

7

In short, “rights of ‘captive audiences’ to be free . . . of
unwanted speech ... [exist] even in traditional fora . . . when
circumstances indicate a heightened need to protect the right of
the [viewer or] listener to be left alone." Pro-Choice Network of
Western New York v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 392 (2d Cir. 1995).
Such a heightened need to protect captive audiences exists where
“substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner,” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21, or where “the degree
of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure." Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209. The
present context provides a classic example of a captive audience
entitled to protection because the privacy interests, the potential
harm, and the degree of captivity are great.

1. The Injunction Appropriately Protects Patients’
Substantial Privacy Interests.

The privacy interests involved here are substantial; in fact,
they are even stronger than the residential privacy protected in
Frisby.’ First, this case involves patients entering medical

* (...continued)
dismiss the captive audience argument out of hand if the home was not
implicated, but, instead, found that the viewer or listener could avoid the
Given the substantial privacy interests at stake here, as in Frisby,
the patients should not bear a heavy burden to avoid the intimidating
and offensive speech. In other words, patients at a reproductive health
care should not be forced to “escape” unwanted speech. However, even
if the burden did fall upon them, the patients here cannot avoid the
speech. See infra.

5

As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Madsen:
The [Frisby] reasoning applies with even greater force where
the object of targeted picketing is the medical
dweller. While targeted picketing of the home
threatens the psychological well-being of the
(continued...)

facilities, not “the rough-and-tumble world of politics.” Brief of
Family Research Council at 25. As this Court has recognized,
medical settings demand tranquility:

Hospitals, after all are not factories or mines or
assembly plants. They are hospitals, where human
ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike
often are under emotional strain and worry, where
pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of
the day’s activity, and where the patient and [her]
family . . . need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and
helpful atmosphere.

Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted);* see also NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, 442 U.S. 773
(1979) (recognizing right to ban solicitation in hospitals where
such activity interferes with patient care); Beth Israel Hospital v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (same); Frye v. District 1199, 996
F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1993) (in response to disruption caused by
striking nursing home workers outside facility, court upholds
injunction limiting number of picketers to three and prohibiting
picketing within twenty-five feet of nursing home driveway).
Privacy is thus critical to patients seeking care at medical
facilities, who are no more “free to come and go”, Brief for
Petitioners at 42, than are residents of a home. See Pro-Choice

* (...continued)
“captive” resident, targeted picketing of the hospital
or clinic threatens not only the psychological but
the physical well-being of the patient held “captive”
by medical circumstance.

Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 673.

* See also Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 389 (quoting Pro-Choice
Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue Western New York, 799
F. Supp. 1417, 1433-34 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)) ("Here, in the context of
health care facilities treating women who are already undergoing the
stress normally associated with having an abortion, there is an attendant
need for a calm, quiet, stress-free atmosphere.”).

9

Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1434 (defendants’ “noisy, disruptive,
invasive, threatening and intimidating activities are clearly
inappropriate in such a setting”).

Privacy in this context also implicates autonomy. “The right
to make our own choices is essential to our conception of
ourselves as free thinking, independent, autonomous individuals.”
Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19
Hastings Const. L.Q. 85, 108 (1991); see Pro-Choice Network,
799 F. Supp. at 1435 ("To think as one chooses, to believe as one
wishes, are important aspects of the constitutional right to be let
alone.") (quoting Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,
468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Integral to this autonomy is
“the ability to choose for ourselves what ideas and thoughts we
want to be exposed to.” Strauss, supra, at 110. This Court has
long recognized that this right to privacy encompasses not only
personal decisions generally, but particularly decisions involving
abortion and procreation. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54
(1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(“[t}hese matters[] involv[e] the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy”). Accordingly, women who
seek access to medical facilities in order to exercise their
constitutionally-protected right to reproductive privacy are entitled
to protection from the invasive activities of the defendants, which
infringe upon this right by impeding their ability both to make
reproductive choices free from unwanted intrusions and to
effectuate these choices.°

* See also Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 675 (Colo. Ct. App.
1995) (impermissible to “limit{] . . . the right of a private citizen to
determine whether to permit others to confront [her] concerning medical
care or treatment”), cert. denied, No. 95SC593, 1996 Colo. LEXIS 136
(Feb. 26, 1996).

* In addition, the constitutional right of “informational privacy,”

protecting the confidentiality of women seeking abortions, see Casey,

505 U.S. at 898, 901 also supports an application of the captive
(continued...)

10

2. Absent The Injunction, Patients Would Be At
Risk Of Substantial Harm.

The need to protect a captive audience seeking reproductive
health care is highlighted by the severe harms caused by
defendants’ tactics.’ The hostile and intimidating confrontational
tactics employed by anti-choice individuals severely endanger
women’s health: “This harassment and intimidation causes stress
and sometimes even physical injury to the patients . . . and
generally disrupts the atmosphere necessary for rendering safe and
efficacious health care." Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 383.
As exemplified by the experiences in the instant case, these
harassing and charged encounters impede women’s access to
necessary health care at crucial moments, and in some cases
produce traumatic physical and psychological effects.*

*( vontinued)

by videotaping women seeking access to the clinics, as well as their

vehicles and license plates, in order to create the legitimate “fear that
their identities might be revealed.” Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp.
at 1426.

’ These harms are greater than those relied on by this Court in Frisby,
where the Court did not rely on any showing that the picketing caused
harm to the targeted abortion provider or his family. At a minimum, to
intrude upon the privacy of the patients here in such a harmful way is as
“especially offensive” as was the targeted residential picketing in Frisby.
487 U.S. at 486.

* These effects are particularly detrimental for women who need an
abortion to protect their health, such as when they suffer from
congenital heart disease and advanced coronary artery disease, and
cancer. See Williams Obstetrics 790-92 (F. Gary Cunningham et al.
eds., 19th ed. 1993); D. Danforth and J. Scott, Obstetrics & Gynecology
433, 441-42, 494-97 (Sth ed. 1986); G. Burrow & T. Ferris, Medical
Complications During Pregnancy 41 (3d ed. 1988); C. Pauerstein,
Clinical Obstetrics 630, 647 (1987); Rovinsky and Guttmacher's
(continued...)

11

Patients are targeted for harassment immediately prior to,
during, and after a surgical procedure.’ As detailed by the
health risk for women. “Women who have been the target of
‘sidewalk counseling’ or other ‘rescue’ demonstrations usually
enter the medical facilities visibly shaken and severely distressed."
Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1427. Stress and anxiety
cause hypertension and elevated blood pressure, and often require
sedation or special counseling; "[p)atients may become so agitated
that they are unable to lie still in the operating room thereby
increasing the risks associated with surgery." Pro-Choice

* (...continued)

Medical, Surgical & Gynecological Complications of Pregnancy 512-15
(S. Cherry et al eds., 3d ed. 1985). Women who are compelled to
terminate their pregnancies due to severe fetal anomalies, because their
pregnancies result from rape or incest, or for many other personal and
moral reasons also are at risk of significant harm as a result of

* Here, as in Madsen, “the picketing is directed primarily at patients
and staff of the clinic.” 114 S. Ct. at 2527. Certain women visiting the
target younger-looking women because they are the ones most likely to
be seeking an abortion. They also target cars that arrive at the facilities
with out-of-state license plates. . . ." Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp.
at 1425. .

Whether it be intimidating a woman by crowding her or hounding
her after she requests no further face-to-face “counseling,” “the
temptation and opportunity for coercion or obstruction are at their
greatest." Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 396 (citing Frisby, 487 U.S.
at 486). Cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969)
(upholding content-based statutory restriction on employer speech
because risk of nonpersuasive coercion great in labor relations setting);
Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672,
684 (1992) (upholding ban on solicitation at airport because “face-to-
face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an appropriate target of
vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering
physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation.”).

12

Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1427."° These conditions, in turn,
will force physicians to anesthetize their patients with higher
doses of sedatives or, if the hypertension is severe, to turn the
patient away altogether. /d. In some instances, these conditions
“lead{] to incomplete or inaccurate health history reports which
the client completes soon after entry to the [clinic]." Portland
Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, 859 F.2d
681, 683 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, the stress from anti-abortion
demonstration tactics can prolong a patient’s recovery time, see,
e.g., American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.
Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1985), and often
adversely affect a patient’s post-operative psychological health,
see Catherine Cozzarelli & Brenda Major, The Effects of Anti-
Abortion Demonstrators and Pro-Choice Escorts on Women's
Psychological Responses to Abortion, 13 Journal of Social &

‘© Among the plethora of tactics used by the protesters to stress
patients is the invasion of their personal space. Dr. Alice Hoagland, an
expert in behavioral medicine and “social impact theory,” testified that
invasions by a large number of people can be a significant adverse stress
factor from as far away as 25 feet; from five feet or less — even by only
a few demonstrators -- could cause a stress reaction that is extreme.
Preliminary Injunction Transcript at 742-53. Her testimony is in accord
with accepted “social impact” theory, see, e.g., Irwin Altman, The
Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory,
Crowding 54, 62 (1975) ("{C}lose contact with strangers . . . is aversive
and leads to discomfort .. . . [W)hen someone crosses a personal-space
boundary, anxiety or stress often results."); Edward T. Hall, The Hidden
Dimension 122 (1966) ("When stress increases, sensitivity to crowding
rises -- people get more on edge - so that more and more space is
required as less and less is available"). and particularly as that theory
relates to anti-choice activity at abortion clinics, see Warren M. Hern,
Proxemics: The Application of Theory to Conflict Arising from
Antiabortion Demonstrations, 12 Population and Environment 379, 386
(1991) ("The strategy of antiabortion activists is to make the targets of
their protests acutely uncomfortable by purposefully violating accepted
cultural norms for the use of space, and to use social distances in
deliberately inappropriate ways."). See generally Robert Sommer,
Personal Space: The Behavioral Basis of Design 26-57 (1969); Hall,
supra, at 107-122.

13

Clinical Psychology 404 (1994) (impact study of anti-abortion
demonstrations conducted at plaintiff Buffalo Gyn Womenservices
during summer of 1990 revealed that such demonstrations
increased post-abortion depression).

Additionally, patients who are prevented or intimidated from
gaining access to a clinic, or sent home because of their anxiety,
delay obtaining their abortions.

This delay can increase the risks associated with an abortion.
For example, the delay may move ths »r-gnancy from the
first trimester to the second trimester curing which the risks
associated with the procedure increase. Other women who
are seeking a post-abortion check-up might delay their
appointment or simply cancel it altogether, thereby enhancing
the possibility of complications. For some women who elect
to undergo an abortion, clinic medical personnel prescribe
and insert a device known as a pre-abortion laminaria to
achieve cervical dilation. In these instances, timely removal
of the laminaria is necessary to avoid infection, bleeding and
other potentially serious complications. If a woman
returning to have the laminaria removed finds that her access
to the clinic entrance is blocked or impeded . . .
complications may result.

Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1427."'

The stress caused by defendants’ tactics -- and the hesitancy
to enter the clinics -- is aggravated by patients’ reasonable fear of
violence. Patients and staff are well aware of the extreme
measures abortion opponents have taken against patients seeking

See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of San Mateo County v. Holy
Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617, 620 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(women are often so upset by protesters that they reschedule
procedures); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 582 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (woman denied necessary medical services in Pennsylvania as a
result of blockade), aff'd, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990).

14

reproductive health care and their health care providers. Since
1977 there have been more than 1,800 acts of violence towards
abortion providers, staff, and patients. These include 5 murders,
12 attempted murders, 41 bombings, 106 arsons, 266 death
threats, 97 assaults, 2 kidnappings, and 351 clinic invasions.
National Abortion Federation, Incidents Of Violence and
Disruption Against Abortion Providers, 1995 | (Jan. 1996).
These events are seldom isolated, local events; they are part of a
campaign coordinated and planned strategically on a national
level. For example, the "success" of a massive clinic assault and
blockade mission headed by Operation Rescue in Wichita, Kansas
in 1991, see United States v. Cooley, 787 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D.
Kan. 1992), led it to launch similar campaigns. Only two months
after the district court issued a preliminary injunction in this case,
Operation Rescue conducted the massive "Spring of Life"
blockade campaign in Buffalo, in which over 600 arrests were
made and five defendants in the instant case pleaded guilty to
criminal contempt for violating the preliminary injunction.’

This Court must consider the national climate of fear created by
anti-choice violence when analyzing the privacy interests of the
patients at the clinics and the impact of harassment on those
patients who come to clinics already fearing potentially deadly
violence."

'2 Shortly thereafter, Petitioner Schenck conducted a nationwide
“twelve-week Operation Rescue training program designed to teach
leaders in the anti-abortion movement the most effective techniques to
further their cause." Lynne Bumpus-Hooper, Anti-Abortion Leader
Draws ‘Battle Plan,’ Orlando Sentinel Tribune, February 21, 1993, at
B3. He urged anti-abortion activists, inter alia, to become
“subversives,” and to blockade and gain control of medical facilities. /d.

'' Indeed, the context of fear and intimidation surrounding reproductive
health care clinics is similar to other contexts where the government's
interest in public health and safety justify restrictions on speech.
Recognizing that context can alter the meaning of speech, i.e., a
“message” in one context can become a “threat” in another, the federal
courts have upheld even content-based restrictions on speech in order to
(continued...)

15

3. The Patients Here Are Truly "Captive" To
Petitioners’ Invasive Tactics.

In addition to the substantial privacy interests at stake, as
well as the severe harm caused by infringement of these interests,
application of the captive audience doctrine is compelled by the
degree of captivity of the patients needing to enter the medical
facilities. As the district court found, these patients “cannot, as a
practical matter, escape” defendants’ expressive activity. Pro-
Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1436.

The court’s factual findings illustrate an arsenal of extreme
tactics employed by the defendants which render patients unable
to avoid them. On a regular basis -- both before and after the
court’s initial injunction -- patients, Respondent clinics and
physicians, and their staff have been confronted with harassment,
intimidation, and physical abuse by the defendants. See id. at

'? (continued)

protect public health and safety. For example, although a statute
prohibiting comments or jokes about a "bomb" or “hijacking” might be
unconstitutional in some contexts, the courts have upheld statutes
criminalizing even offhand remarks about bombs or hijacking if made in
airports or airplanes. See United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325 (Sth
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975); United States v. Omirly, 488
F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Rutherford, 332 F.2d 444 (2d.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 994 (1964); United States v. Allen, 317 F.2d
777 (2d. Cir. 1963); Taylor v. United States, 358 F.Supp. 384 (S.D. Fla.
1973); United States v. Silver, 196 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.Pa. 1961). In
doing so, courts not only recognized the heightened interests in security
and public safety inherent in airline travel, but also looked to the history
of aviation terrorism and the consequences of terrorist threats -- whether
real or pranks -- that led Congress to enact laws banning such speech.
Accordingly, Petitioners’ exhortation for the Court to “address the
present petition independent of the national controversy out of which it
arises,” Brief for Petitioners at 18, is in direct conflict with constitutional
jurisprudence. See also Burson, 504 U.S. at 200-06 (100-foot polling
buffer zone was necessary to ensure the right to vote in light of this
country’s history of voter intimidation and election fraud).

16

1423-27. Defendants physically blockaded clinic entrances, often
by chaining themselves together. /d. at 1424. They formed
“constructive blockades” by congregating around the entrances
and in the driveways, making loud and disruptive noises, and
harassing patients and staff. Jd. They further forced themselves
upon and intimidated patients and staff by surrounding, pushing,
grabbing, shoving, and yelling at them. Jd. They also engaged in
so-called "sidewalk counseling,” where anti-choice “counselors”
yell at, badger, and harass patients while invading their personal
space. Id. at 1424-25. "[E]ven when women seeking access to
the clinics signal their desire to be left alone, defendants continue
to follow right alongside them and persist in communicating their
message.” Id. at 1436."

These pitched activities "force women seeking access to [the
medical facilities] to run a gauntlet of demonstrators, picketers
and ‘sidewalk counselors." Jd. They cannot avoid the throngs
of protesters who complicate access to the clinic in order to deter
them from receiving health care; nor can they evade the persistent
badgering of “sidewalk counselors. They are crowded and
pursued, their personal space is invaded, their eyes and ears are
bombarded. As in Lehman, where they go, so goes the
message."

These patients cannot “simply . . . avoid speech they do not
want to hear.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. "Defendants’ aggressive
conduct makes it impossible for women entering the clinics
simply to avert their eyes or cover their ears in order to avoid

— o—

'* See also Pro-Choice Network v. Walker, 994 F.2d 990, 992 (2d Cir.
1993) (involving contempt judgments in case at bar) (one of the
defendants pursued and harassed patients for an entire city block, even
after repeatedly being asked to leave them alone).

'S However, unlike the commuter in Lehman, or the driver in FCC,
patients cannot escape the protesters’ harassment by simply looking
away or turning the channel. Thus, the degree of captivity is even
greater here than in cases relying on that factor to support application of
the captive audience doctrine.

17

receiving defendants’ message." Pro-Choice Network, 799 F.
Supp. at 1436. Unlike the drive-in movie passersby in Erznoznik
and the courtroom visitors in Cohen, women targeted and
pursued while seeking access to reproductive health clinics for
medical care cannot avoid offensive and relentless "sidewalk
counseling” by looking in a different direction; nor should they
have to “stop up [their] ears.""© Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529; cf.
FCC; Bethel School District. Unlike the recipients of
objectionable mail in Bolger and Consolidated Edison, patients

here cannot simply take the defendants’ "messages" and toss them
in the trash.

In sum, as this Court recognized in Madsen, patients seeking
access to reproductive health clinics are a captive audience
entitled to protection: "[T]argeted picketing of a hospital or clinic
threatens not only the psychological, but the physical well-being
of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance.” 114 S. Ct.
at 2526 (citation omitted).'’ Thus, "[t]he First Amendment does
not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean
efforts to escape the [invasiveness] of political protests.” Jd. at
2528. Ultimately, "[t}he only choice women have if they want to
avoid the message is to forego their constitutional right to have an
abortion.” Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1436. This

'© To do so would directly infringe on the patient's autonomy: “by
closing off one’s ears, one cannot listen to those sounds one wishes to
hear.” Strauss, supra, at 118.

It is no answer to suggest that women seeking access to the
medical facilities are not a captive audience because they are exposed to
objectionable speech for a limited time. See Brief of AFL-CIO at 27.
Even brief exposure to the harassment and intimidation by defendants
can adversely effect the patients’ health. Thus, as this Court found in
dismissing a similar argument in FCC, “(this) is like saying that the
remedy for assault is to run away after the first blow.” 438 U.S. at 748-
49.

" See also id. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (The First Amendment "does not encompass attempts to abuse an
unreceptive or captive audience") (emphasis added).

18

burden is too great. Accordingly, the district court properly
recognized that the state has a significant interest here in
protecting a captive audience through the limited restrictions
against the defendants’ invasive tactics.

B. The Injunction Protects This Captive Audience And
Burdens No More Speech Than Necessary.

The narrow injunctive provisions protect women attempting
to exercise their constitutional right to reproductive choice from
the harms caused by aggressive and hostile abortion opponents.
See Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 391-92 (provisions “provide
a vulnerable group of medical patients with some relief from the
duress caused by unwelcome physical proximity to an extremely
vocal group of demonstrators"). Moreover, they allow ample
opportunity for these demonstrators to convey their message.
Thus, because these provisions burden no more speech than
necessary to serve an important governmental interest, they pass
constitutional muster under Madsen. 114 S. Ct. at 2525-28.

As in Madsen, the buffer zone is necessary to ensure access
to the clinics and to soften the blow of the myriad anti-choice
confrontational tactics which "[take] their toll on the clinic’s
patients."'* Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 388 (quoting
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521). The buffer curtails the harassment
that begins the moment the woman approaches the facility and
continues even as she is leaving, and prevents the "constructive
blockades" which frequently result in delayed medical care. See
Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1424. It alleviates the
crowding, yelling, pushing, and grabbing which "cause(] stress
and sometimes even physical injury,” id., and prevents the
invasions of patients’ personal space, id., which can have
significant adverse physical and psychological effects.

'§ See Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318, 1329 (D. Minn.
1995) (upholding “buffer zone . . . adopted as a practical device used by
the police to protect those actively exercising their rights from those
who would prevent its exercise”).

eee

19

Although the radius of the buffer is only fifteen feet, this
distance is sufficient to give patients critical personal space to
avoid the most disturbing "in your face" tactics, and helps create
the “atmosphere necessary for rendering safe and efficacious
health care." Jd. Yet, at the same time, the district court’s
“carefully drawn restriction{]," id. at 1434, is limited to allow
ample opportunity for the speech of those seeking to stop women
from receiving that care. In assessing the burden to speech in
Madsen, this Court found significant that "the buffer zone was
narrow enough to place petitioners at a distance of no greater than
10 to 12 feet from cars approaching and leaving the clinic. . . .
Protesters standing across . . . from the clinic can still be seen and
heard...." 114 S. Ct. at 2527. So too here, a buffer with "a
very short radius [of] fifteen feet," Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d
at 389, will ensure that the protesters’ "message will still be
conveyed.” Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1437.
Defendants “can still picket, carry signs, pray, sing or chant in
full view of people going into the clinics or just passing by."

Id.” Cf. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483-84 (upholding restriction on
focused picketing of residences which left ample alternatives for
generalized communications within neighborhood).

In fact, the term “buffer zone" is a misnomer. Because the
zone has such a short radius, most non-verbal means of
communication, such as placards, will not be affected. Moreover,
the injunction here -- unlike the one approved in Madsen -
allows a significant amount of verbal expression, both because of

19

See also Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2 ("petitioners are not
prevented from expressing their message in any one of several different
ways, they are simply prohibited from expressing it within the 36-foot
buffer zone"); Bering v. Share, 721 P.2d 918, 931 (Wash. 1986)
(injunction’s speech-free zone in front of reproductive health care clinic
provides ample opportunity for speech since for anyone desirous of
counseling, "it is a very short walk to the end of the block where
picketers are free to ‘counsel’). Obviously, Petitioners need not relocate
"to a meeting hall or a town park elsewhere.” See Brief of The
Rutherford Institute at 11.

20

its radius and because counseling is permitted without geographic
restriction if not rebuffed by a patient. Thus, as the Court of
Appeals deemed it, “permeable buffer" better describes the
restriction on speech communicated towards women inside the
zone. Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 387.

The injunction’s mandate that the permeable buffer zone
float with the patient or her vehicle as they approach or leave the
clinic also is necessary. Given a buffer of only fifteen feet
around the clinic entrance, the district court employed a float to
ensure that patients can get between their cars and the clinics
without having anti-choice extremists approach them at close
range unless they want it. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 674 (eight-foot
personal zone within 100-foot radius from clinic entrance

“depriv(es} protesters of the opportunity to intimidate or make
other physical contact with the patients or staff"); State v.
Baumann, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 261, at *21, 532 N.W.2d 144
(Wisc. Ct. App. 1995) (injunction’s “ten-foot bubble [surrounding
any person entering or exiting the clinic] . . . ensures freedom of
movement, free of intimidation, for those who do not wish to
engage in conversation"); Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 401 S.E.2d
530, 534 (Ga. 1991) (injunction’s 5- foot cease and desist bubble
that extends 50 feet from clinic "affords a clinic patient,
physician, or employee the ability to exit a vehicle and approach
the site of medical care without being swarmed, jostled, and
yelled at from close range by protestors”).

Indeed, the district court’s approach was quite conservative.
It refused to employ a larger, non-moving buffer -- even one, as
in Madsen, that imposes an absolute ban on speech -- which
would have moved demonstrators even further away from their
targets, despite the fact that these more restrictive zones have
consistently withstood judicial scrutiny in this Court. Cf, e.g.,
Madsen (36-foot no-speech zone); Burson (100-foot zone around
polling entrances); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)
(prohibition on congregating within 500 feet of foreign embassy);
Cox II (ban on picketing near courthouse applied to prohibit
protesters from coming within 100 feet of state courthouse in

ee ee eee oe ae ee

21

Baton Rouge).”

Burson is particularly instructive because, in the face of
countervailing fundamental rights and an analogous need to gain
access to a physical facility in order to exercise that right, the
Court upheld under strict scrutiny a content-based restriction more
burdensome than the content-neutral restriction at issue here.
Burson upheld a Tennessee statute that -- in order to combat voter
intimidation and election fraud -- imposed a 100-foot buffer zone
around polling entrances in which votes could not be solicited and
campaign materials could not be displayed or distributed. The
intimidation of women exercising their fundamental right to
reproductive choice in this case is at least as compelling as the
historical voter intimidation and election fraud recognized in
Burson. \n Burson, the Court noted that "labor men" were afraid
to vote and stayed away from the polls, 504 U.S. at 201 n.7, and
that agitators engaged in heated competition involving “sham
battles” aimed at keeping away elderly and timid voters. /d. at
202. Similarly, the district court below discussed the often
“charged encounters" at the clinics during which the “sidewalk
counselors” invaded the women’s personal space and persisted to
harass, badger, intimidate and yell “even after the patients
signal[ed] their desire to be left alone." Pro-Choice Network, 799
F. Supp. at 1425. Just as the campaign agitators in Burson
targeted elderly and timid voters, the "sidewalk counselors” here
target young women and those who occupy cars with out-of-state
license plates. Jd. The need for safe, unfettered access to
medical facilities here is at least as compelling as the need for
safe access to polling places. Given Burson’s holding that the
100-foot buffer zone met strict scrutiny, it would defy reason for

* See also, e.g., Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253 (NJ. 1994)
(upholding injunction’s 100-foot buffer around home of abortion
provider), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2264 (1995); Baumann (affirming
twenty-five foot buffer zone around reproductive health care clinic,
noting it is even less restrictive than the zone in Madsen); Portland
Feminist Women's Health Center, 859 F.2d at 685-87 (affirming
injunction’s twenty-five foot clear zone around the entrance to
reproductive health care facility).

22

this Court not to find that the narrower bubble zone here meets
the more relaxed Madsen standard.

Like the buffer zone, the cease and desist provision “ensures
that the injunction does not hamper Project Rescue’s message,
only its intimidating method of demonstration.” Pro-Choice
Network, 67 F.3d at 389. It prohibits only harmful tactics --
intimidation, harassment, the invasion of personal space, and
badgering -- foisted upon a captive, unwilling audience in need of
medical care. See id. at 391. This Court must recognize that, in
the context of reproductive health clinics, persistent “counseling”
in the face of a request to withdraw is not “peaceful.” Madsen,
114 S. Ct. at 2529. Thus, “the ‘cease and desist’ provision is
necessary in order to protect the right of people approaching and
entering the facilities to be left alone." Pro-Choice Network, 799
F. Supp. at 1435. Moreover, because this provision protects
patients only from unwanted communication, it allows more
speech than have the restrictions in other captive audience cases:

In this case, the “cease and desist" provision shields only
unwilling listeners from defendants’ message. In
Lehman and Kovacs, however, both willing and
unwilling listeners were prevented from hearing the
speakers’ message. Thus, the Court’s “cease and desist”
provision advances the values of the marketplace of
ideas by permitting listeners to exercise their autonomy
to make their own determinations among competing
ideas. Once a woman seeking access to one of the
clinics has made a determination not to listen to
defendants’ message, defendants must respect her
choice.

Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1436.

23

Il. The Cease And Desist Provision Also Is Constitutional
Because It Is Only Triggered By The Targeted Patient
Communicating Her Unwillingness To Hear Additional
“Counseling.”

This Court has held that a “notice remedy"-- by which a
restriction on expression is triggered when a targeted recipient
gives notice that further communication is not desired -- is a
constitutional means of protecting one’s right to be let alone.
Rowan, see also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943)
(householders have right to indicate that they are unwilling to be
disturbed by door-to-door distribution of literature). “The First
Amendment protects the right of a prospective recipient of
[speech] to refuse the communication as well as the right of the
prospective communicant to offer it." Sabelko v. City of Phoenix,
68 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding cease and desist
ordinance governing abortion clinics) (citing Martin; Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).

In Rowan, this Court unanimously upheld a federal statute
that allows a recipient of unwanted mail to give notice to the
sender that she wishes no further mailings and requires the sender
both to remove the recipient’s name from its mailing lists and to
stop all further mailings to that person. In upholding the statute,
the Court relied on the fact that it called for a notice remedy, as
well as the fact that the mailings were offensive and intrusive.
The Court noted that under the statute, “the mailer’s right to
communicate is circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the
addressee giving notice that he wishes no further mailings from
that mailer.” 397 U.S. at 737. Although the statute “impede[{s]}
the flow of even valid ideas, . . . no one has a right to press even
‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient." /d. at 738. See also
Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 542 n.11 (state could achieve
goal of "protecting consumers against overly intrusive bill inserts
. . . by requiring [company] to stop sending bill inserts to the
homes of objecting customers”).

The cease and desist provision operates virtually identically
to the notice remedy in Rowan, in that a “sidewalk counselor”

24

need not cease communicating face-to-face until the targeted
patient gives notice that she does not wish further “counseling.”
The provision here, however, is on even stronger constitutional
footing than that in Rowan. While the inconvenienced
householder in Rowan merely had to throw out unwanted mail,
see also Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 542, the patients trying
to enter reproductive health care facilities have no choice, absent
an injunction, but to listen to persistent anti-choice badgering and
harassment. Moreover, as a result of the anti-choice “counselor's”
unwillingness to take “no” for an answer, the potential physical
and psychological harm caused by his communication is more
severe than that of the merely offensive unwanted advertisements
in Rowan. See Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1424-26.

Unlike the cease and desist provision here, the “no approach"
provision that the Supreme Court invalidated in Madsen did not
contain a notice remedy. Rather, that provision barred
demonstrators from “proffer[ing] their advice at an intimate range
unless the counselees ‘indicate[d] a desire to communicate by
approaching or by inquiring of the [counselors]."" Pro-Choice
Network, 67 F.3d at 390 (quoting Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522).
Thus, the Madsen remedy, which disallowed speech unless the
prospective listener invites it, is very different than the remedy
here, where speech is allowed until the listener says “stop.” As
the Court of Appeals in this case and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals have found, this distinction is dispositive. Pro-Choice
Network, 67 F.3d at 390; Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 68 F.3d at
1173.

The cease and desist provision is consistent with the
proposition that the First Amendment protects the right of every
citizen to “reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there
must be opportunity to win their attention.” Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949); see also Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v.
Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 153, 193 (1972) (a “notice remedy” “preservies} for those
wishing to speak an opportunity to get at least ‘one shot’ at all
potential audiences"). Like the statute in Rowan, but unlike the
"no approach” provision in Madsen, the cease and desist provision

25

does not prevent "sidewalk counselors” from reaching willing
listeners. Cf. FCC, 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing FCC on this basis because the FCC ban prohibited
willing listeners form hearing the broadcast); Lehman (curtailing
speech even to willing viewers).”’ Because the notice remedy is
invoked only when the listener indicates that no further
communication is desired, this tips the “scales” in favor of “the
night of every person to be let alone.” Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736;
see Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (although the speaker has the “right to offer
‘sidewalk counseling’,” this right "does not encompass attempts to
abuse an unreceptive or captive audience”) (emphasis added).

Ifl. Injunctions Have Consistently Been Granted In Other
Contexts Where The Right Of The Listener To Be Left
Alone Outweighs The Interests Of The Speaker.

The correctness of the Court of Appeals’ decision becomes
even more apparent when it is viewed in light of other areas of
law where courts have adopted context-sensitive First Amendment
analyses and allowed listener-protective relief to prevent unique
harms. Of especial relevance are decisions rejecting First
Amendment challenges to comparable restrictions in the domestic
violence and sexual harassment contexts.

Orders of protection -- like the injunctive provisions at issue
-- restrict speech based, in part, on injury and harm tq the
recipient. Cognizant of this harm, courts have consistently
rejected First Amendment challenges to orders of protection and
domestic violence statutes. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E.

* Petitioners’ use of Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942)
(Stone, C.J., dissenting), adopted on rehearing as opinion of Court, 319
U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam), is inapposite. See Brief for Petitioners at
37. That case dealt with a publisher who, no matter whether he
“withheld” or “withdrew” the privilege to publish, prevented the
audience from receiving the restricted message. In the instant case, it is
the audience itself -- the patient -- who decides. Thus, the fact that she
first hears the message is meaningful.

26

Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801,
905, 907 (1993). For example, in Schramek v. Bohren, 429
N.W.2d 501 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals rejected a First Amendment challenge raised by a woman
who had been ordered, pursuant to the state spousal abuse statute,
to stay away from her husband’s residence, to avoid contacting
her husband unless he consented in writing, and to arrange
visitation with their child through a third party. Schramek, 429
N.W.2d at 503.” The court noted that the statute was “not
directed at free speech but at the suppression of physical abuse or
the threat thereof,” and that "[e]ven if the sanctions of the statute
indirectly prohibit speech, the state can ban speech directed
primarily at those who are unwilling to receive it." Jd. at 506
(citing Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2504).

Similarly, in State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173 (S.D. 1996),
the South Dakota Supreme Court responded to a campaign of
physical and verbal abuse of the defendant against his ex-wife by
issuing a protective order directing defendant to “not verbally
contact Plaintiff in any manner, which includes phone contact or
contact through third parties, and . . . not verbally abuse or
threaten Plaintiff." /d. at 174. In rejecting a First Amendment
challenge, the court held that the protective order satisfied the

2 The plaintiff in Schramek challenged the state spousal abuse statute
itself rather than the protective order. Domestic violence and spousal
abuse statutes are directly analogous to the injunctive provisions here
because those statutes specifically authorize broad injunctive relief based
on “reasonable grounds” that an individual already has or might in the
future engage in domestic abuse. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 813.12 (1994),
cited in Schramek, 429 N.W.2d at 504; Klein & Orloff, supra, at 901
(“Most state statutes recognize the relevance of a past abusive act to
provide a context to evaluate present fear and danger."). Moreover, the
proposition that “there must be a long history of repeated wrongful or
threatening behavior of a specific defendant against a specific plaintiff”
in order to justify a buffer zone, Brief of Family Research Council at 12
n.7, if true, precisely describes the conduct of the defendants towards the
health care providers and their patients in this case.

27

Madsen standard for injunctions. The court found that the
interests in preserving residential privacy and "the mental and
emotional health of the vulnerable" were compelling, and that
"[tJo shield victims of domestic violence from threats and
intimidation, court must sometimes prohibt all contact between
the abused and the abuser." /d. at 176. See also Gilbert v. State,
765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (upholding state
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act and "reject[ing] any notion
that the First Amendment . . . ever covered threatening or abusive
communications to persons who have demonstrated a need for
protection from an immediate and present danger of domestic
abuse");” People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985).

The reasonable apprehension of violence and both physical
and psychological harm, particularly in light of past misconduct,
is common to both the clinic disruption and domestic violence
contexts. As with domestic violence, "sidewalk counseling” and
focused picketing by the defendants involves communications that
frequently are threatening or abusive. And like survivors of
domestic abuse, the women trying to obtain medical care here
suffer the same reasonable apprehension of serious harm. This is
reflected in the abusive practices previously employed by the
defendants, and is exacerbated by the extensive history and
escalating level of violence associated with anti-choice protests.
Thus, just as domestic violence statutes authorize injunctive relief
based on reasonable grounds of past or likely violent conduct in
order to safeguard the victims of such violence, the injunction
here provides patients with a means of getting into and out of a
clinic without risking severe physical and psychological
hardship.”

*® The husband in Gilbert was ordered, among other things, "not to
visit with . . . or otherwise interfere with his wife . . . and to remain
away from her residence.” 765 P.2d at 1209.

** These provisions are far less restrictive of expression than the "stay
away” orders and other broad restrictions in Hauge, Schramek and
(continued...)

28

Sexual harassment provides another analogous context. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1996),
prohibits conduct and speech which constitute “quid pro quo"
harassment or which create a “hostile environment." See Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). In Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
the court enjoined sexually harassing speech that created a hostile
environment, specifically rejecting a First Amendment challenge
to the hostile environment sexual harassment doctrine.” The
court reasoned that an injunction could restrict the speech at issue
because, inter alia, the interest in eliminating discrimination in
the workplace justified the infringement on speech, that the
female workers were a captive audience,” and that the

* (..continued)

Gilbert. Rather than imposing a blanket prohibition of a wide range of
conduct with no geographic limit, the buffer zone and cease and desist
provisions only restrict demonstrating within a fifteen foot radius of the
clinic or woman, and only restrict "sidewalk counseling” within this
radius after a targeted woman communicates her unwillingness to be
“counseled.”

*S The plaintiff alleged hostile environment sexual harassment based on
the prominent posting of pictures of nude women throughout the
workplace and the constant barrage of insulting and derogatory
comments she received form male co-workers. Id. at 1494-99. The
court enjoined the defendant company from maintaining the hostile
environment. /d at 1541. Prohibited conduct included sexual comments
made in the presence of an employee who had indicated that such
conduct was unwelcome. /d. at 1542.

%® —"{W]Jomen employees . . . may be forced to endure unwanted
messages by virtue of being unable to leave the workplace. If a woman
really wants to avoid the offensive speech, she may be forced to leave
her job." Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1990). See also NLRB v. United Steelworkers,
357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958) (Warren, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("{e}mployees during working hours are the classic captive
audience"); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383, 401-02
(continued...)

29

injunction was narrowly tailored to remedy this discrimination.
Id. at 1535-36. Other courts have similarly concluded that the
First Amendment does not protect hostile environment sexual
harassment liability under Title VII. See, e.g., Jew v. University
of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946, 961 (S.D. lowa 1990); Jordan v.
Wilson, 662 F. Supp. 528, 533-34 (M.D. Ala. 1987); Doe v.
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862-63 (E.D. Mich. 1989);

E.E.0.C. v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 610 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).

Recognizing the serious harm that results from "[rJequir{ing]
a man or woman [to] run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for
the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living,”
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), this
Court has signalled that the First Amendment does not prohibit
remedies that restrict sexually harassing speech in the confines of
the workplace. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
389-90 (1992). For similar reasons, the First Amendment does
not prohibit the narrowly drawn injunction issued here, which
ensures that women needing reproductive health care can avoid "a
gauntlet of harassment and intimidation"”’ in order to exercise
their constitutionally protected right to choice.

* (...continued)
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (workers at jobsite were captive to harassing messages
delivered over loudspeakers; only way to avoid speech was to quit jobs).

Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1424.

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully urge this
Court to affirm the decision of the en banc Court of Appeals.

Eve C. Gartner
(Counsel of Record)
Michael E. Erdos
Center for Reproductive
Law & Policy
120 Wall St., 18th FI.
New York, New York 10005

Counsel for Amici Curiae

EO

APPENDIX

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

ae

The American Medical Women’s Association (""AMWA"),

founded in 1915, is a non-profit organization of 12,000
women physicians and medical students. AMWA
unequivocally supports the right of the pregnant patient, in
consultation with her physician, to make a personal,

. ' medically-informed decision whether or not to continue a

Bx pregnancy.

The American Public Health Association ("“APHA"), founded
in 1872, and with a membership of 55,000, is the oldest and
3 largest multi-disciplinary society of public health
rf. professionals in the world. Throughout its history, the
4 | APHA has been in the forefront of countless efforts to
a | protect and promote personal and public health. The
im: ) APHA's membership includes physicians, nurses, social

% child health specialists who are experts in both prenatal care,
neonatology, women’s health issues and drug abuse
prevention and treatment.

Catholics for a Free Choice ("“CFFC"), founded in 1973, shapes
and advances sexual and reproductive ethics that are based
on justice, reflect a commitment to women’s well-being, and
respect and affirm the moral capacity of women and men to

ei | . Through discourse, education, and advocacy, CFFC works in

; | the United States and internationally to infuse these values
catholic social thinking and teaching. CFFC has offices in

Washington, DC, Mexico City, Mexico, Montevideo,

Uruguay and Sao Paolo, Brazil. Individuals in forty US

states operate as affiliated independent activists.

Connecticut Women’s Education And Legal Fund, Inc. is a
non-profit women’s rights organization incorporated in 1973,
with over 1,400 members. Its mission is to work through

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to end sex discrimination and to empower all women to be
full and equal participants in society. The Connecticut
Women’s Education and Legal Fund, Inc. seeks to join this
brief as amicus curiae because it is committed to protecting
women’s reproductive rights and because it believes in the
underlying premise that unwelcome behavior can tigger
restrictions on a person's right to free expression.

Family Planning Advocates Of New York State, Inc. ("FPA")

is the only statewide voluntary organization in New York
dedicated to promoting access to the full range of quality,
confidential reproductive health services for all women,
regardless of age, income, geographical location or other
circumstances. Its members include more than 140
organizations spanning a wide range of health, welfare and
religious groups, including a substantial number of abortion
providers, in addition to thousands of individual members.
FPA believes that every woman in New York has a
fundamental right, under the federal and New York State
Constitutions, to privacy in determining whether or not to
bear a child and that access to providers of abortion services
is an integral component of this night.

Jewish Women International is an organization of 75,000

Jewish women in the United States and Canada) Among its
aims is to help women in improving the quality of life for

themselves, their families, and society. In line with this goal,

Jewish Women International has worked for more than 20
years to assure a woman’s right to choose in matters of
reproductive rights. Jewish Women International believes

that abortion clinic violence is pointless, destructive behavior,

and it has pressed for stiff penalties to be imposed on
perpetrators of these crimes.

Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund ("Lambda") is a

national public interest law organization that advocates for
the rights of lesbians, gay men, and those with HIV/AIDS
through impact litigation and education. The constitutional
questions implicated in the struggle of women to control

A-2

their bodies are similar to those faced by lesbians and gay
men who have a deep interest in the right of individuals to
engage in intimate association without government
interference. Lambda is specifically interested in the issue
raised by this case because the right to be free from
harassment and violence is of importance to lesbians and gay
men, who have themselves been targets of such campaigns;
at the same time, Lambda has a vital interest in assuring that,
while curbing violence, the law protects legitimate protest.
Lambda represents a community with a deep need and
respect for the First Amendment, inasmuch as the full civil
nghts of lesbians and gay men have not yet been recognized.
Lambda is keenly interested in striking the appropriate
balance between permitting expression and curbing violence.

The National Center for Lesbian Rights ("NCLR"), formerly

the Lesbian Rights Project, is a non-profit public interest law
firm, founded in 1977, and devoted to the legal concerns of
women who encounter discrimination on the basis of their
sexual orientation. NCLR is particularly well-suited to offer
amicus assistance to this court in this matter, as NCLR
attorneys regularly litigate the constitutional issues implicated
here. Specifically, NCLR is concerned about the right to be
free from harassing conduct and expression, as well as the
right to reproductive choice. NCLR has participated in
several reproductive rights cases.

The National Organization for Women ("Now") is the nation’s

largest feminist organization devoted to the advancement of
women’s nights, with over 280,000 members and more than
600 chapters in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
NOW has, since its inception, worked for reproductive
freedom for all women. In addition to bringing the cases
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.
798 (1994), and Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,
113 S. Ct. 753 (1993), it is also the plaintiff in several cases
with existing injunctions similar to the ones at issue here,
including New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 41
F.3d 794 (2d Cir. 1994), and Nat'l Org. for Women v.

Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

The Northwest Women’s Law Center, based in Seattle,

Washington, is a non-profit public interest legal organization
that works to advance the legal rights of women through
litigation, education, legislative advocacy and the provision
of a free information and referral phone service for women
with legal problems. Since its founding in 1978, the Law
Center has been dedicated to representing the interests and
rights of women seeking abortions. The Law Center has a
long history of litigation and participation as amicus curiae
in cases locally and throughout the country on behalf of
women seeking safe and legal abortions. The Law Center
has also been instrumental in the passage of legislation that
provides safe access to abortion services.

The Women’s Law Center of Maryland is an advocacy

organization whose membership consists of attorneys and
judges in the State of Maryland. In existence since 1971, the
goal of the Women’s Law Center is to promote the legal
rights of women through litigation, legislation and education.
The Women’s Law Center has worked to protect
reproductive nights for all women, including participation as
amicus curiae in cases dealing with the issue. The Women’s
Law Center believes that the issues involved in this case are
critical to the legal rights of women.

The Women’s Law Project is a nonprofit feminist law firm

based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania devoted to winning
equality and justice for women. A primary focus of the Law
Project’s mission is to secure reproductive freedom for all
women. Since it’s founding in 1974, the Law Project has
challenged generations of restrictive abortion statutes on
behalf of women’s health care providers and the patients they
serve. The Law Project served as co-counsel for plaintiffs in
ACOG v. Thornburgh, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center v. Knoll, challenging the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act. The

A

medical providers from anti-choice violence, harassment and
intimidation. In Roe v. Operation Rescue, the Law Project
won a federal injunction that continues to protect women’s
health care providers in southeastern Pennsylvania from mass
blockades and other concerted acts of interference with
patients and clinic staff. Since the tragic slayings of clinic
workers in Massachusetts in December 1994, Law Project
attorneys have redoubled their advocacy efforts with federal
and local law enforcement officials to protect reproductive
health care providers and to enforce the criminal laws
vigorously against anti-choice offenders.

The YWCA of the U.S.A. was founded in 1858 and is one of the

oldest women’s organization in the country. Its mission is
the empowerment of women and girls and the elimination of
racism. It serves 1,004,000 women and their families
through 374 community and student YWCAs at 4,000 sites.
The YWCA of the U.S.A. is a member of the World
YWCA. The YWCA supports the right of a woman to make
her own decisions related to her reproductive health. The
YWCA also supports measures that will assure the protection
of persons from violence.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0684%3A22. Public record. Not legal advice.