# appendices — Action For Children's Television v. Federal Communications Commission (Nos. 95-520, 95-509)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** appendices
- **Published:** January 1, 1995

## Text

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Nos. 93-1092, 93-1100

ACTION FOR CHILDREN’S TELEVISION; AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION; THE ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.; CAPITAL CITY/AMERICAN
BROADCASTING Co., INc.; CBS, INc.; Fox TELEVISION
STATIONS, INC.; GREATER Mepis, INC.; INFINITY
BROADCASTING CORPORATION; MOTION PICTURE Asso-
CIATION OF AMERICA, INC.; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BROADCASTERS; NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO; PEOPLE FOR
THE AMERICAN WAY; PosT-NEWSWEEK STATIONS, INC.;
PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE; RADIO-TELEVISION
News DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION; REPORTERS COMMIT-
TEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS; SOCIETY OF PRO-

FESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, Petitioners,

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

PACIFICA FOUNDATION; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF COM-
MUNITY BROADCASTERS; AMERICAN PUBLIC RADIO;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE BROADCASTERS;
INTERCOLLEGIATE BROADCAST SYSTEM; PEN AMERICAN

ENTER; ALLEN GIN 4 a
CENTER; ALLEN GINSBERG Pesisieners,

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

2a

Petitions for Review of an Order of the
Federal Communications Commission

Decided June 30, 1995

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and WALD, SIL-
BERMAN, BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, GINSBURG, SEN-
TELLE, HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, ROGERS, and
TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY,
in which Circuit Judges SILBERMAN, STEPHEN F.
WILLIAMS, GINSBURG, SENTELLE, KAREN Le-
CRAFT HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH concur.

Dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge HARRY T.
EDWARDS.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALD, in
which Circuit Judges ROGERS and TATEL join.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge:

We are asked to determine the constitutionality of sec-
tion 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications Act of
1992, which seeks to shield minors from indecent radio
and television programs by restricting the hours within
which they may be broadcast. Section 16(a) provides
that, with one exception, indecent materials may only be
broadcast between the hours of midnight and 6:00 a.m.
The exception permits public radio and television stations
that go off the air at or before midnight to broadcast
such materials after 10:00 p.m.

We find that the Government has a compelling interest
in protecting children under the age of 18 from exposure
to indecent broadcasts. We are also satisfied that, stand-
ing alone, the “channeling” of indecent broadcasts to the
hours between midnight and 6:00 a.m. would not unduly
burden the First Amendment. Because the distinction

interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 93 S.Ct. 2607,
2615, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). In enforcing section

1464 of the Radio Act, the Federal Communications
Commission defines “broadcast indecency” as

language or material that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs.

In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast |n-
decency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704, 705 n. 10
(1993) (“1993 Report and Order’). This definition has
remained substantially unchanged since it was first enun-
ciated in In re Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98
(1975).

4a

While obscene speech is not accorded constitutional
protection, “[sjexual expression which is indecent but
not obscene is protected by the First Amendment. . . .”
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93
(1989). “The Government may, however, regulate the
content of [such] constitutionally protected speech in
order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the
least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”
Id. Noting that broadcasting has received the most limited
First Amendment protection because of its unique perva-
siveness and accessibility to children, the Supreme Court
has held that the FCC may, in appropriate circumstances,
place restrictions on the broadcast of indecent speech. See
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750-51, 98
S.Ct. 3026, 3041, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (“when the
Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the
exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof
that the pig is obscene.”’).

In In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R.
930 (1987) (“Reconsideration Order’), the Commission
reviewed its decisions in three cases: In re Infinity Broad-
casting Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987), In re
Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987), and
In re Regents of the University of California, 2 F.C.C.R.
2703 (1987). One of these cases involved a morning
broadcast; the other two dealt with programs that were
aired after 10:00 p.m. In each of them, the agency found
that a radio station had introduced particularly offensive
pigs into American parlors in violation of section 1464.
The offending morning broadcast, for example, contained
“explicit references to masturbation, ejaculation, breast
size, penis size, sexual intercourse, nudity, urination, oral-
genital contact, erections, sodomy, bestiality, menstrua-
tion and testicles.” Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R.
at 932 (internal quotation marks omitted). The remain-

ing two were similarly objectionable. See id. at 932-33.

peek ym Pera ta ie nn pe A

(that is, would be held in violation
§ 1464) if broadcast when there is a reasonable
risk that children may be in the audience. .

Id. at 930-31. The Commission noted, however, that it
was its “current thinking” that midnight marked the time
after which

it is reasonable to expect that it is late enough to
ensure that the risk of children in the audience is
minimized and to rely on parents to exercise in-
creased supervision over whatever children remain
in the viewing and listening audience.

Id. at 937 n. 47.

In our review of the Reconsideration Order in Action
for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C.
Cir.1988) (“ACT I), we rejected the argument that
the Commission’s definition of indecency was unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad. /d. at 1338-40. But, al-
though we affirmed the declaratory ruling that found
portions of the morning broadcast to be in violation of

section 1464, id. at 1341, we vacated the Commission’s
pe with respect to the two post-10:00 p.m. broad-
casts. /d. In those instances, we considered the findings
on which the Commission rested its decision to be “more
ritual than real,” id., because the Commission had relied
on data as to the number of teenagers in the total radio
audience rather than the number of them who listened to

6a

the radio stations in question. We were also troubled by
the FCC’s failure to explain why it identified the relevant
age group as children aged 12 to 17 when it had

proposed legislation for the protection of only those
12. Id. at 1341-42. We further concluded that “the

eee el Ee eee “en-
forc{ing] the provisions of . . section [1464] on a 24

material, which was immediately challenged by Action
for Children’s Television and others. The following year,
we remanded the record to the Commission to enable it to
solicit information relevant to the congressionally man-
dated 24-hour ban; and in 1989, the FCC issued a “Notice
of Inquiry” for that purpose. In re Enforcement of Pro-
hibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464, 4 F.C.C.R. 8358 (1989) (“1989 NOT’).

After analyzing the public comment received in re-
sponse to the 1989 NOI, the Commission reported its
conclusions in Jn re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against
Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.R.
5297 (1990) (“/990 Report”). In the 1990 Report, the
FCC defined the category of persons to be protected under
section 1464 as “children ages 17 and under.” Id. at
5301. It then found that because

Id. at 5297.

We reviewed the 24-hour ban in Action for Children’s
Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C.Cir.1991)
(“ACT IT”). We again rejected petitioners’ vagueness and
overbreadth arguments, but we struck down the total ban
on indecent broadcasts because “[o]ur previous holding in
ACT I that the Commission must identify some reason-
able period of time during which indecent material may
be broadcast necessarily means that the Commission may
not ban such broadcasts entirely.” /d. at 1509.

after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
ACT II, 503 U.S. 913, 112 S.Ct. 1281, 117 L.Bd.2d 507
(1992), Congress again intervened, passing the Public
Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-356,
106 Stat. 949 (1992). Section 16(a) of the Act requires
the Commission to

promulgate regulations to prohibit the broadcasting
of indecent programming—

(1) between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. on any day by
any public radio station or public television station
that goes off the air at or before 12 midnight; and

(2) between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight on any day
for any radio or television broadcasting station not
described in paragraph (1).

47 U.S.C. § 303 note (Supp. [V 1992). Pursuant to this
congressional mandate, the Commission published a notice
of proposed rulemaking, /n re Enforcement of Prohibi-
tions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
7 F.C.C.R. 6464 (1992), and, in 1993, it issued regu-
lations implementing section 16(a). 1993 Report and
Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 711; 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1994).
These are challenged in the petition now before us.

8a

II. Discussion

Petitioners present three challenges to the constitu-
tionality of section 16(a) and its implementing regula-
tions: First, the statute and regulations violate the First
Amendment because they impose restrictions on indecent
broadcasts that are not narrowly tailored to further the
Government’s interest, which petitioners define as the
Promotion of parental authority by shielding unsupervised
children from indecent speech in the broadcast media;
second, section 16(a) unconstitutionally discriminates
among categories of broadcasters by distinguishing the
times during which certain public and commercial broad-
casters may air indecent material; and third, the Com-
mission’s generic definition of indecency is unconstitu-
tionally vague. Petitioners also assert that our decisions
in ACT I and ACT II compel the rejection of the newly
enacted restrictions both because there are insufficient
data to justify the new statutory ban and because the
Commission continues to include children ages 12 to 17
in the protected class.

The Commission argues that the Government's interests
extend beyond facilitating parental supervision to include
protecting children from exposure to indecent broadcasts
and safeguarding the home from unwanted intrusion by
such broadcasts. The Commission asserts that restricting
indecent broadcasts to the hours between midnight and
6:00 a.m. is narrowly tailored to achieve these compelling
governmental interests. It defends the exception allowing
public stations that go off the air at or before midnight
to broadcast such materials after 10:00 p.m. on the basis
that these stations would otherwise have no opportunity
to air indecent programs.

At the outset, we dismiss petitioners’ vagueness chal-
lenge as meritless. The FCC’s definition of indecency in
the new regulations is identical to the one at issue in
ACT II, where we stated that “the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Pacifica dispelled any vagueness concerns attending

9a

the [Commission's] definition,” as did our holding in
ACT I. 932 F.2d at 1508. Petitioners fail to provide any
convincing reasons why we should ignore this precedent.

We now proceed to petitioners’ remaining constitutional
arguments.

A. The First Amendment Challenge

It is common ground that “[sjexual expression which
is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment.” Sable, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836.
The Government may, however,

regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if
it chooses the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest.
Id. Thus, a restriction on indecent speech will survive
First Amendment scrutiny if the “Government's ends are
compelling [and its] means [are] carefully tailored to
achieve those ends.” /d.

The Supreme Court has “long recognized that each
medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems. .. . {OJf all forms of communication, it is
broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748, 98
S.Ct. at 3039-40. (citation omitted). The Court has iden-
tified two reasons for this distinction that are relevant
here:

First, the broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Amer-
cans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented
over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but also in the privacy of the home, where
the individual’s right to be left alone plainly out-
weighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.

10a

. . . Because the broadcast audience is constantly
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely
protect the listener or viewer from unexpected pro-
gram content. ...

Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to chil-
dren. . . . Other forms of offensive expression may
be withheld from the young without restricting the
expression of its source. Bookstores and motion
picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from
making indecent material available to children. .. .
The ease with which children may obtain access to
broadcast material, coupled with the concerns [over
the well-being of youths] recognized in Ginsberg {v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d
195 (1968)], amply justifies specific treatment of
indecent broadcasting.

Id. at 748-50, 98 S.Ct. at 3040-41. As Justice Powell
observed in Pacifica,

[t]he difficulty is that. ..a physical separation of
the audience [such as that possible in bookstores and
movie theaters] cannot be accomplished in the broad-
cast media. ... This... is one of the distinctions
between the broadcast and other media . {that]
justif[ies] a different treatment of the broadcast media
for First Amendment purposes.

438 U.S. at 758-59, 98 S.Ct. at 3045 (Powell, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). Despite
the increasing availability of other means of receiving
television, such as cable (which is not immune to the
concerns we address today, see Alliance for Community
Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 123-125 (D.C.Cir.1995) ),
there can be no doubt that the traditional broadcast media
are properly subject to more regulation than is generally
permissible under the First Amendment.

Unlike cable subscribers, who are offered such options
as “pay-per-view” channels, broadcast audiences have no

lla

choice but to “subscribe” to the entire output of traditional
broadcasters. Thus they are confronted without warning
with offensive material. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49,
98 S.Ct. at 3039-40. This is “manifestly different from a
situation” where a recipient “seeks and is willing to pay
for the communication. . .” Sable, 492 U.S. at 128, 109
S.Ct. at 2837; see also Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415,
1420 (11th Cir.1985) (distinguishing Pacifica from cases
in which cable subscriber affirmatively elects to have
specific cable serivce come into home).

In light of these differences, radio and television broad-
casts may properly be subject to different—and often
more restrictive—regulation than is permissible for other
media under the First Amendment. While we apply strict
scrutiny to regulations of this kind regardless of the
medium affected by them, our assessment of whether sec-
iton 16(a) survives that scrutiny must necessarily take
into account the unique context of the broadcast medium.

1. The compelling Government interests

In examining the Government’s interests in protecting
children from broadcast indecency, it is important to
understand that hard-core pornography may be deemed
indecent rather than obscene if it is “not patently offen-
sive” under the relevant contemporary community stand-
ards. The Second Circuit, for example, has found that
the “detailed portrayals of genitalia, sexual intercourse,
fellatio, and masturbation” contained in a grab bag of
pornographic materials (which included such notorious
films as “Deep Throat”) are not obscene in light of the
community standards prevailing in New York City.
United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchan-
dise, Schedule No. 2102, 709 F.2d 132, 134, 137 (2d
Cir.1983). Therefore, as Justice Scalia has observed,

[t]he more narrow the understanding of what is
“obscene,” and hence the more pornographic what
is embraced within the residual category of “inde-

12a

cency,” the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon
greater assurance of insulation from minors.

Sable, 492 U.S. at~132, 109 S.Ct. at 2840 (Scalia, J.,
concurring ).

The Commission identifies three compelling Govern-
ment interests as justifying the regulation of broadcast
indecency: support for parental supervision of children,
a concern for children’s well-being, and the protection of
the home against intrusion by offensive broadcasts. Be-
cause we find the first two sufficient to support such regu-
lation, we will not address the third.

Petitioners do not contest that the Government has a
compelling interest in supporting parental supervision of
what children see and hear on the public airwaves. In-
deed, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the Govern-
ment’s fundamental interest in helping parents exercise
their “primary responsibility for [their] children’s well-
being” with “laws designed to aid [in the] discharge of
that responsibility.” Ginsberg v. New York, 390 USS.
629, 639, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1280, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968).
This interest includes “supporting parents’ claim to au-
thority in their own household” through “regulation of
otherwise protected expression.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
749, 98 S.Ct. at 3040 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although petitioners disagree, we believe the Govern-
ment’s own interest in the well-being of minors provides
an independent justification for the regulation of broad-
cast indecency. The Supreme Court has described that
interest as follows:

It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a
State’s interest in safeguarding the physical and

psychological well-being of a minor is compelling.
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon

the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people
into full maturity as citizens. Accordingly, we have
sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical

13a

and emotional well-being of youth even when the
laws have operated in the sensitive area of consti-
tutionally protected rights.

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57, 102 S.Ct.
3348, 3354, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed.
645 (1944) (“It is [in] the interest of youth itself, and
of the whole community, that children be both safe-
guarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth
into free and independent well-developed . . . citizens.”).

While conceding that the Government has an interest
in the well-being of children, petitioners argue that be-
cause “no causal nexus has been established between
broadcast indecency and any physical or psychological
harm to minors,” Joint Brief for Petitioners at 32, that
interest is “too insubstantial to justify suppressing indecent
material at times when parents are available to supervise
their children.” Jd. at 33. That statement begs two ques-
tions: The first is how effective parental supervision can
actually be expected to be even when parent and child
are under the same roof; the second, whether the Govern-
ment’s interest in the well-being of our youth is limited
to protecting them from clinically measurable injury.

As Action for Children’s Television argued in an earlier
FCC proceeding, “parents, no matter how attentive, sin-
cere or knowledgeable, are not in a position to really
exercise effective control” over what their children see
on television. In re Action for Children’s Television, 50
F.C.C.2d 17, 26 (1974). This observation finds con-
firmation from a recent poll conducted by Fairbank,
Maslin, Maullin & Associates on behalf of Children Now.
The survey found that 54 percent of the 750 children
questioned had a television set in their own rooms and
that 55 percent of them usually watched television alone
or with friends, but not with their families. Sixty-six per-
cent of them lived in a household with three or more

l4a
television sets. Compare 1989 NOI, 4 F.C.C.R. at 8361

even less effective supervision over the radio programs to
which their children listen. According to these studies,
each American household had, on average, over five
radios, and up to 80 percent of children had radios in
their own bedrooms, depending on the locality studied,
ida; tential af idl: anita nee dh tm, Seaton eee
own radios, more than half of whom owned headphone
radios. Id. at 8363. It would appear that Action for
Children’s Television had a firmer grasp of the limits of
parental supervision 20 years ago than it does today.

With respect to the second question begged by peti-
tioners, the Supreme Court has never suggested that a
scientific demonstration of psychological harm is required
in order to establish the constitutionality of measures
protecting minors from exposure to indecent speech. In
Ginsberg, the Court considered a New York State statute
forbidding the sale to minors under the age of 17 of
literature displaying nudity even where such literature was
“not obscene for adults... .” 390 U.S. at 634, 88 S.Ct.
at 1278. The Court observed that while it was “very
doubtful” that the legislative finding that such literature
impaired “the ethical and moral development of our
youth” was based on “accepted scientific fact,” a causal
link between them “had not been disproved either.” /d.
at 641-42, 88 S.Ct. at 1281-82. The Court then stated
that it “d{id] not demand of legislatures scientifically
certain criteria of legislation. We therefore cannot say
that [the statute] . . . has no rational relation to the
objective of safeguarding such minors from harm.” /d. at
642-43, 88 S.Ct. at 1282 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted ).

15a

In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US.
675, 684, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164-65, 92 L.Bd.2d 549
(1986), the Court did not insist on a scientific demonstra-
tion of psychic injury when it found that there was a
compelling governmental interest in protecting high school
students from an indecent speech at a high school assem-
bly. It noted that its prior cases “recognize the obvious
concern on the part of parents, and school authorities act-
ing in loco parentis, to protect children—especially in a
captive audience—from exposure to sexually explicit, in-
decent, or lewd speech.” Id. In Bethel School District and
Ginsberg, of course, the protection of children did not
require simultaneous restraints on the access of adults to
indecent speech. The Court, however, has made it abun-
dantly clear that the Government’s interest in the “well-
being of its youth” justified special treatment of indecent
broadcasting. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50, 98 S.Ct. at
3040-41 (“The ease with which children may obtain
access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns
recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of
indecent broadcasting.”); see also Sable, 492 U.S. at 131,
109 S.Ct. at 2839 (“compelling interest [in] preventing
minors from being exposed to indecent telephone mes-
sages” ).

Finally, we think it significant that the Supreme Court
has recognized that the Government’s interest in protect-
ing children extends beyond shielding them from physical
and psychological harm. The statute that the Court found
constitutional in Ginsberg sought to protect children from
exposure to materials that would “impair[] [their] ethical
and moral development.” 390 U.S. at 641, 88 S.Ct. at
1282 (emphasis added). Furthermore, although the
Court doubted that this legislative finding “expresse{d]
an accepted scientific fact,” id., it concluded that the leg-
islature could properly support the judgment of

parents and others, teachers for example, who have
[the] primary responsibility for children’s well-being

l6a

... [by] .. . assessing sex-related material harmful
to minors according to prevailing standards in the
adult community as a whole with respect to what
is suitable material for minors.

Id. at 639, 88 S.Ct. at 1280 (internal quotation marks
omitted ).

The Court noted, in the context of obscenity, that

[i]f we accept the well nigh universal belief that good
books, plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the
mind, enrich the human personality, and develop
character, can we then say that a... . legislature may
not act on the corollary assumption that commerce
in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused on
obscene conduct, have a tendency to exert a corrupt-
ing and debasing impact leading to antisocial be-
havior . . . The sum of experience . . . affords an
ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensi-
tive, key relationship of human existence, central to
family life, community welfare, and the development
of human personality, can be debased and distorted
by crass commercial exploitation of sex.

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct.
2628, 2638, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973). Congress does not
need the testimony of psychiatrists and social scientists in
order to take note of the coarsening of impressionable
minds that can result from a persistent exposure to sex-
ually explicit material just this side of legal obscenity.
The Supreme Court has reminded us that society has an
interest not only in the health of its youth, but also in
its quality. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168, 64 S.Ct. at 443
(“A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon
the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.”). As Irv-
ing Kristol has observed, it follows “from the proposition
that democracy is a form of self-government, . . . that if
you want it to be a meritorious polity, you have to care

17a

about what kind of people govern it.” Irving Kristol, On
the Democratic Idea in America 41-42, Harper & Row
(1972).

We are not unaware that the vast majority of States
impose restrictions on the access of minors to material
that is not obscene by adult standards. See 1989 NOI, 4
PCCC.R. at 8368-72. In light of Supreme Court prece-
dent and the social consensus reflected in state laws, we
conclude that the Government has an independent and
compelling interest in preventing minors from being ex-
posed to indecent broadcasts. See Sable, 492 USS. at
126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836 (Government's compelling inter-
est in well-being of minors extends “to shielding [them]
from the influence of literature that is not obscene by
adult standards” ).

Petitioners argue, nevertheless, that the Government's
interest in supporting parental supervision of children and
its independent interest in shielding them from the influ-
ence of indecent broadcasts are in irreconcilable conflict.
The basic premise of this argument appears to be that the
latter interest potentially undermines the objective of fa-
cilitating parental supervision for those parents who wish
their children to see or hear indecent material.

The Supreme Court has not followed this reasoning.
Rather, it treats the Government interest in supporting pa-
rental authority and its “independent interest in the

of its youth,” Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640, 88
S.Ct. at 1281, as ‘cmmitunainens objectives mutually sup-
porting limitations on children’s access to material that is
not obscene for adults. /d. at 639-40, 88 S.Ct. at 1280-
81. And while it is true that the decision in Ginsberg
“denie[d] to children free access to books . . . to which
many parents may wish their children to have uninhibited
access,” id. at 674, 88 S.Ct. at 1298 (Fortas, J., dissent-
ing), as Justice Brennan pointed out in writing for the
majority, “the prohibition against sales to minors [did]

18a

not bar parents who so desire{d] from purchasing the
{material} for their children.” Jd. at 639, 88 S.Ct. at
1280; see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50, 98 S.Ct. at
3040-41; id. at 769-70, 98 S.Ct. at 3050-51 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting ).

rents can be at home to supervise what their children see
and hear. It is fanciful to believe that the vast majority
of parents who wish to shield their children from indecent

regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it
chooses the least restrictive means to further the arti-
culated interest. . . . [Bjut to withstand constitutional

Sable, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836-37 (in-
ternal quotations marks omitted). Petitioners argue
that section 16(a) is not narrowly drawn to further
the Government’s interest in protecting children from

a. Definition of “children”

Petitioners concede that it is appropriate to protect
young children from exposure to indecent broadcasts.
They remind us, however, that in ACT /] we found it
“troubling [that] the FCC ventures no explanation why
it takes teens aged 12-17 to be the relevant age group for
channeling purposes” in light of the fact that in an earlier
legislative proposal, “the Commission would have required
broadcasters to minimize the risk of exposing to indecent
material children under age 12,” 852 F.2d at 1341-42 (em-
phasis in original), and that in ACT I/ we directed the
Commission on remand to address the question of the
appropriate definition of “children.” 932 F.2d at 1510.

Although, in ACT I], we made no mention of the fact,
in its 1990 Report, the FCC defined “children” to include
“children ages 17 and under.” 5 F.C.C.R. at 5301. The
agency offered three reasons in support of its definition:
designed to protect children from

‘if
+f

20a

indecent speech use the same stamdard (citing 47
U.S.C.A. § 223(b)(3) (Supp. Il 1990) (forbidding inde-
cent telephone communications to persons under 18)); most
— laws penalizing persons who disseminate sex-

ncitpcenaiials tattadas tn iliioen aden Picea eae and
scum Eaaaeen Coan tines hous aanael inne
tutionality of statutes protecting children ages 17 and
under (citing Sable, Ginsberg, and Bethel School Dis-
trict.). Id.

We find these reasons persuasive and note, as the Com-
mission did in the 1/993 Report and Order promulgating
regulations pursuant to section 16(a), that the sponsor
of that section, Senator Byrd, made specific reference to
the FCC’s finding that “there is a reasonable risk that
significant numbers of children ages 17 and under listen
to radio and view television at all times of the day or
night.” 138 Cong.Rec. § 7308 (1992) (statement of Sen.
Byrd). In light of Supreme Court precedent and the
broad national consensus that children under the age of
18 need to be protected from exposure to sexually explicit
materials, the Commission was fully justified in conclud-
ing that the Government interest extends to minors of
all ages.

b. The midnight to 6:00 a.m. “safe harbor”

Although, for the reasons set forth in Part II. B. below,
we will require the Commission to allow the broadcast of
indecent material between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., we
will address the propriety of section 16(a)’s midnight to
6:00 a.m. safe harbor. We do so for two reasons: First,
in addressing the “narrowly tailored” issue, the parties
have focused their arguments on the evidence offered by
the Commission in support of the section’s 6:00 a.m. to

iH
A
i
ub
i

strictions on the broadcast of indecent speech in order
to protect the well-being of our youth. 438 U.S. at 749-
51, 98 S.Ct. at 3040-41. We have since acknowledged
that such restrictions may take the form of channeling
provided “that the Commission . . . identify some reason-
able period of time during which indecent material may
be broadcast... .” ACT Il, 932 F.2d at 1509. The
question, then, is what period will serve the compelling
governmental interests without unduly infringing on the
adult population’s right to see and hear indecent material.
We now review the Government’s attempt to strike that
balance.

The Supreme Court has stated that “a government body
seeking to sustain a restriction on . . . speech must demon-
strate that the harms it recites are real and that its restric-
tion will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”

Edenfield v. Fane, —— U.S. : , 113 S.Ct. 1792,
1800, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993); see also Turner Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. FCC, ——— U.S. ‘ , 114

S.Ct. 2445, 2470, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (same).
The data on broadcasting that the FCC has collected re-
veal that large numbers of children view television or
listen to the radio from the early morning until late in the
evening, that those numbers decline rapidly as midnight
approaches, and that a substantial portion of the adult
audience is tuned into television or radio broadcasts af-

22a

ter midnight. We find this information sufficient to sup-
port the safe harbor parameters that Congress has drawn.

The data collected by the FCC and republished in the
Congressional Record for June 1, 1992, indicate that
while 4.3 million, or approximately 21 percent, of “teen-
agers” (defined as children ages 12 to 17) watch broad-
cast television between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m., the number
drops to 3.1 million (15.2 percent) between 11:30 p.m.
and 1:00 a.m. and to less than 1 million (4.8 percent)
between 1:45 and 2:00 a.m. 138 Cong.Rec. $7321. Com-
parable national averages are not available for children
under 12, but the figures for particular major cities are in-
structive. In New York, for example, 6 percent of those
aged 2 to 11 watch television between 11:00 and 11:30
p.m. on weekdays while the figures for Washington, D.C.,
and Los Angeles are 6 percent and 3 percent, respectively.
Id. at $7322.

Concerning the morning portion of the broadcast re-
striction, the FCC has produced studies which suggest that
significant numbers of children aged 2 through 17 watch
television in the early morning hours. In the case of
Seattle, one of two medium-sized media markets sur-
veyed, an average of 102,200 minors watched television
between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., Monday
through Friday; in Salt Lake City, the average was 28,000
for the period from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. 1/993 Re-
port and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 708.

The statistical data on radio audiences also demonstrate
that there is a reasonable risk that significant numbers of
children would be exposed to indecedent radio programs
if they were broadcast in the hours immediately before
midnight. According to the FCC, there is an average
quarter-hour radio audience of 2.4 million teenagers, or
12 percent, between 6:00 a.m. and midnight. /d. Just
over half that number, 1.4 million teenagers, listen to
the radio during the quarter hour between midnight and

23a

12:15 a.m. on an average night. 1990 Report, 5 F.C.C.R.
at 5302.

It is apparent, then, that of the approximately 20.2
million teenagers and 36.3 million children under 12 in
the United States, see 1989 NOI, 4 F.C.C.R. at 8366;
n. 33; Nielsen Television (ndex National TV Ratings Feb-
ruary 24-March 1, 1992 127, a significant percentage
watch broadcast television or listen to radio from as early
as 6:00 a.m. to as late as 11:30 p.m.; and in the case of
teenagers, even later. We conclude that there is a reason-
able risk that large numbers of children would be exposed
to any indecent material broadcast between 6:00 a.m.
and midnight.

Petitioners suggest that Congress should have used
station-specific and program-specific data in assessing when
children are at risk of being exposed to broadcast in-
decency. We question whether this would have aided
the analysis. Children will not likely record, in a Nielsen
diary or other survey, that they listen to or view programs
of which their parents disapprove. Furthermore, changes
in the program menu make yesterday’s findings irrelevant
today. Finally, to borrow the Commission's phrase, such
station- and program-specific data do not take “children’s
grazing” into account. As the Supreme Court observed in
Pacifica, “[b)jecause the broadcast audience is constantly
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely pro-
tect the listener or viewer from unexpected program con-
tent.” 438 U.S. at 748, 98 S.Ct. at 3040. (In Pacifica,
the objectionable broadcast was heard by a child in a car
that was being driven by his father.) For this reason, we
agree with the Commission that such data would not be
“instructive.” 1993 Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 711.

The remaining question, then, is whether Congress, in
enacting section 16(a), and the Commission, in promul-
gating the regulations, have taken into account the First
Amendment rights of the very large numbers of adults
who wish to view or listen to indecent broadcasts. We

24a

believe they have. The data indicate that significant num-
bers of adults view or listen to programs broadcast after
midnight. Based on information provided by Nielsen in-
dicating that television sets in 23 percent of American
homes are in use at 1:00 a.m., the Commission calculated
that between 21 and 53 million viewers were watching
television at that time. 1989 NOI, 4 F.C.C.R. at 8362;
see also id. at 8381, 8393 (in Chicago, approximately
15 percent of adults watch broadcast television at mid-
night, and approximately 18 percent do so in Washington,
D.C.). Comments submitted to the FCC by petitioners
indicate that approximately 11.7 million adults listen to
the radio between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., while 7.4
million do so between midnight and 1:00 am. 1992
Comments at 8 n. 3 (reprinted in Joint Appendix at 348).
With an estimated 181 million adult listeners, this would
indicate that approximately 6 percent of adults listen to
the radio between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. while 4

percent of them do so between midnight and 1:00 a.m.
Id.

While the numbers of adults watching television and
listening to radio after midnight are admittedly small,
they are not insignificant. Furthermore, as we have noted
above, adults have alternative means of satisfying their
interest in indecent material at other hours in ways that
pose no risk to minors. We therefore believe that a mid-
night to 6:00 a.m. safe harbor takes adequate account
of adults’ First Amendment rights.

Petitioners argue, nevertheless, that delaying the safe
harbor until midnight will have a chilling effect on the air-
ing of programs during the evening “prime time” hours
that are of special interest to adults. They cite, as ex-
amples, news and documentary programs and dramas that

deal with such sensitive contemporary problems as sexual
harassment and the AIDS epidemic and assert that a

broadcaster might choose to refrain from presenting rele-
vant material rather than risk the consequences of being

purpose of channeling, Seen bb maton te ACT T ae
reaffirmed in ACT II, 852 F.2d at 1343-44; 932 F.2d at
1509, and which Congress has how codified, is to provide
a period in which radio and television stations may let
down their hair without worrying whether they have
stepped over any line other than that which separates pro-
tected speech from obscenity. Thus, section 16(a) has
ameliorated rather than aggtavated whatever chilling ef-
fect may be inherent in section 1464.

Petitioners also argue that section 16(a)’s midnight to
6:00 a.m. channeling provision is not narrowly tailored
because, for example, Congress has failed to take into
consideration the fact that it bans indecent broadcasts
during school hours when children are presumably subject
to strict adult supervision, thereby depriving adults from
listening to such broadcasts during daytime hours when
the risk of harm to minors is slight. The Government's
concerns, of course, extend to children who are too young
to attend school. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749, 98 S.Ct.
at 3040 (“broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children,
even those too young to read”). But more to the point,
everi if such fine tuning were feasible, we do not believe
that the First Amendment requires that degree of precision.

In this case, determining the parameters of a safe har-
bour irivolves a balancing of irreconcilable interests. It is,
of course, the ultimate prerogative of the judiciary to de-
termine whether an act of Congress is consistent with the
Constitution. Nevertheless, we believe that deciding where
along the bell curves of declining adult and child audiences
it is most reasonable to permit indecent broadcasts is
the kind of judgment that is better left to Congress, so

26a

long as there is evidence to support the legislative judg-
ment. Extending the safe harbor for broadcast i

to an earlier hour involves “a difference only in degree,
not a less restrictive alternative in kind.” Burson v. Free-
man, 504 U.S. 191, 210, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 1857, 119
L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (reducing campaign-free boundary
around entrances to polling places from 100 feet to 25 feet
is a difference in degree, not a less restrictive alternative in
kind); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30, 96
S.Ct. 612, 640, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (if some limit on
campaign contributions is necessary, court has no scalpel
to probe whether $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as
$1,000). It follows, then, that in a case of this kind,
which involves restrictions in degree, there may be
range of safe harbors, each of which will satisfy the “nar-
rowly tailored” requirement of the First Amendment. We
are dealing with questions of judgment; and here, we de-
fer to Congress’s determination of where to draw the line
just as the Supreme Court did when it accepted Con-
gress’s judgment that $1,000 rather than some other figure
was the appropriate limit to place on campaign contribu-
tions.

Recognizing the Government’s compelling interest in
protecting children from indecent broadcasts, Congress
channeled indecent broadcasts to the hours between
midnight and 6:00 a.m. in the hope of minimizing chil-
dren’s exposure to such material. Given the substantially
smaller number of children in the audience after mid-
night, we find that section 16(a) reduces children’s ex-
posure to broadcast indecency to a significant degree. We
also find that this restriction does not unnecessarily inter-
fere with the ability of adults to watch or listen to such
materials both because substantial numbers of them are
active after midnight and because adults have so many
alternative ways of satisfying their tastes at other times.
Although the restrictions burden the rights of many adults,
it seems entirely appropriate that the marginal convenience
of some adults be made to yield to the imperative needs of -

27a

the young. We thus conclude that, standing alone, the
to 6:00 a.m. safe harbor is narrowly tailored
to serve the Government's compelling interest in the well-

B. The Public Broadcaster Exception

Section 16(a) permits public stations that sign off the
air at or before midnight to broadcast indecent material
after 10:00 p.m. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 note. Petitioners
argue that section 16(a) is unconstitutional because it
allows the stations to present indecent material two hours
earlier than al) others.

Congress has provided no explanation for the special
treatment accorded these stations other than the follow-
ing: “In order to accommodate public television and radio
stations that go off the air at or before 12 midnight, the
FCC’s enforcement authority would extend [to] the hour
of 10 o'clock p.m. for those stations.” 138 Cong.Rec.
$7308 (statement of Sen. Bryd). The Commission has
done little better. In its 1993 Report and Order, the
agency °xplained the preference as follows:

In balancing the interests at stake, it appears reason-
able to afford public broadcasters that do not operate
during the regular safe harbor time period at least
some opportunity to air indecent material as op-
posed to forcing them to extend their broadcast day
beyond that which is economically feasible. Con-
gress carved out this exception apparently as a kind
of “rough accommodation” of its concerns for public
broadcasters

8 F.C.C.R. at 710. In its brief, the Commission justifies
the disparate treatment accorded public and commercial
broadcasters who sign off the air at midnight by suggest-
ing that the latter may be able to finance the extension
of their broadcasting day through the sale of advertising
time. The agency also argues that allowing these public
stations to begin broadcasting indecent material at 10:00

28a

p.m. despite the significantly larger number of children
in the radio and television audiences represents a reason-
able trade-off because it serves the “substantial” (as op-
posed to “compelling”) governmental interest in accom-
modating the free speech rights of those stations. The
Commission does not address the phenomenon of “chil-
dren’s grazing” that it used so effectively in arguing

against the relevance of program-specific statistics.

Because Congress has made no suggestion that minors
are less likely to be corrupted by sexually explicit material
that is broadcast by a public as opposed to a commercial
station, and because section 16(a) was adopted in reluc-
tant response to our rejection of the earlier statute impos-
ing a total ban on indecent broadcasts, we can only con-
clude that Congress created the exception as a result of a
misunderstanding of our directive in ACT //. Our in-
struction that the Commission must “afford broadcasters
clear notice of reasonably determined times at which in-
decent material safely may be aired,” 932 F.2d at 1509
(internal quotation marks omitted), did not require that
every station be given some opportunity to broadcast in-
decent material. Rather, it was our expressed view that
a clearly articulated channeling rule, as opposed to a
case-by-case apporach, was necessary to enable broad-
casters to know when they might safely air indecent ma-
terial. As the Supreme Court has observed, in this unique
medium, “[iJt is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 89
S.Ct. 1794, 1806, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969).

Whatever Congress’s reasons for creating it, the prefer-
ential safe harbor has the effect of undermining both the
argument for prohibiting the broadcasting of indecent
speech before that hour and the constitutional viability of
the more restrictive safe habor that appears to have been
Congress’s principal objective in enacting section 16(a).
In Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.

29a

221, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987), the Su-
preme Court addressed a state sales tax that provided a
tax exemption for religious, professional, trade, and sports
journals, but not other magazines. The Court invalidated
the selective application of the sales tax, m part because
the articulated interest of encouraging “fledgling” publish-
ers did not apply to struggling magazines other than those
specified. /d. at 232, 107 S.Ct. at 1729. The Court
found that even assuming there was a compelling interest
in protecting such publishers, a selective exemption is not
narrowly tailored to achieve that end. /d.; accord Min-
neapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissoner
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-92, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 1375-
76; 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983) (state tax that exempted
first $100,000 worth of ink and paper from state use tax
unconstitutionally discriminated against small group of
larger newspapers in violation of First Amendment).

Similarly, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., —— U.S. ——, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99
(1993), a municipal ordinance imposed a ban on news-
racks dispensing commercial publications because they
were unsightly but did not impose this ban on newsracks
dispensing newspapers. The Court struck down the regu-
lation, finding that the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial newsracks bore “no relationship what-
soever to the particular interests that the city has asserted.
It [was] therefore an impermissible means of responding
to the city’s admittedly legitimate interests.” /d. at ,
113 S.Ct. at 1514 (emphasis in original).

Congress has failed to explain what, if any, relationship
the disparate treatment accorded certain public stations
bears to the compelling Government interest—or to any
other legislative value—that Congress sought to advance
when it enacted section 16(a). This is not a case like
Alliance for Community Media, 56 F.3d at 127-28, in
which we allowed the FCC to require the segregation and

30a

blocking of indecent programs on leased-access channels
while not imposing a similar restriction on public access
channels. There, the Commission was able to justify the
disprate treatment by carefully documenting the relation-
ship between the regulation at issue and the problem to be
solved, namely, the uninvited intrusion of indecent mate-
rial into leased-access channel programming. Here, Con-
gress and the Commission have backed away from the
consequences of their own reasoning, leaving us with no
choice but to hold that the section is unconstitutional inso-
far as it bars the broadcasting of indecent speech between
the hours of 10:00 p.m. and midnight.

C. Our Decisions in ACT I and ACT I/

Petitioners maintain that our holdings in ACT / and
ACT Il preclude our findings that section 16(a) is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the Government’s compelling
interest as defined by them. While we have addressed
their principal arguments above—and have done so in a
manner that we believe to be consistent with our holdings
in those two cases—we point to certain essential differ-
ences between this case and those with which we dealt in
ACT I and ACT Il.

ACT I involved an asessment of the constitutionality of
channeling decisions that had been made by the FCC on
its own initiative; here we are dealing with an act of Con-
gress which, as the Supreme Court has pointed out,
enjoys a “presumption of constitutionality” that is not to
be equated with “the presumption of regularity afforded
an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate.” Motor Ve-
hicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 n.9, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866 n. 9, 77 L.Ed.2d
443 (1983). It is true, of course, that in ACT I! we
vacated a total ban on indecent broadcasts that Congress
had attached to an appropriations bill. In doing so, we
stated that our holding in ACT /

932 F.2c at 1509. Having declared Congress's 24-hour
ban unconstitutional because of its totality, we remanded
the case to the Commission with instructions to redeter-
mine,
after a full and fair hearing, the times at which in-
decent material may be broadcast, to carefully re-

age group population, and the scope of the govern-
ment’s interest in regulating indecent broadcasts.

Id. at 1510 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omit-
ted). In doing so, we made no mention of the fact that
subsequent to our decision in ACT /, the Commission
had accumulated substantial information and comments
relating to the banning of indecent broadcasts and had
stated its reasons for defining “children” to include those

While our holdings in this case are generally consistent

with those in our two earlier decisions, we acknowledge
that there are significant differences in our approach to
certain of the issues. To the degree that the analyses in

It is so ordered.

33a

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Chief Judge, dissenting:

In this case, the majority upholds as constitutional a
total ban of “indecent” speech on broadcast television and
radio between the hours of 6 a.m. and midnight.’ The

1 At issue is the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub.L.
No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949, 954 (1992) (“section 16(a)”).
Section 16(a) of Act provides:

FCC Regulations—The Federal Communications Commission
shall promulgate rgeulations to prohibit the broadcasting of
indecent programming— . ,
(1) between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. on any day by any public
radio station or public television station that goes off the
air at or before 12 midnight; and
(2) between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight on any day for any
radio or television broadcasting station not described in

ing of tadecent speech between the hours of 10 p.m. and midnight.
The majority reaches this conclusion because “Congress has failed
any

ernment fails to satisfy the acknowledged constitutional
strictures.

The Government advances three goals in support of the
statute: first, it claims that the statute facilitates parental
supervision of the programming their children watch and
hear; second, it claims that the ban promotes the well-

gramming assumed to be harmful; and, finally, it contends
that the ban preserves the privacy of the home. Enforce-
ment Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 705-06. The majority finds
the first two interests compelling, and so finds it unneces-
sary to address the third. I, too, will focus on the first two
interests, which I find to be unsupported.

interests can stand together. “Congress may properly
pass a law to facilitate parental supervision of their chil-
dren, i.e., a law that simply segregates and blocks inde-
cent programming and thereby helps parents control
whether and to what extent their are

such programming. However, a law that effectively bans
all indecent programming—as does the statute at issue in
this case—does not facilitate parental supervision. In my
view, my right as a parent has been preempted, not facili-

showing that my children are in fact at risk of harm from

6:00 a.m. safe harbor is narrowly tailored to serve the Govern-

ment’s compelling interest in the well-being of our youth.” It is
this holding that will be the focus uf this dissent.

35a

exposure to indecent programming.” Alliance for Com-
munity Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 145 (D.C.Cir. 1995)
(Edwards, C.J., dissenting).

Furthermore, the two interests—facilitating parental
supervision and protecting children from indecent ma-
terial—fare no better if considered alone. With respect
to the alleged interest in protecting children, although the
majority strains mightily to rest its finding of harm on
intuitive notions of morality and decency (notions with
which I have great sympathy), the simple truth is that
“{t}here is not one iota of evidence in the record . . . to
support the claim that exposure to indecency is harmful—
indeed, the nature of the alleged ‘harm’ is never ex-
plained.” Id. There is significant evidence suggesting a
causal connection between viewing violence on television
and antisocial violent behavior;* but, as was conceded by
Government counsel at oral argument in this case, the
FCC has pointed to no such evidence addressing the ef-
fects of indecent programming. With respect to the inter-
est in facilitating parental supervision, the statute is not
tailored to aid parents’ control over what their children
watch and hear; it does not, for example, “segregate”
indecent programming on special channels, as was the
case in Alliance for Community Media,’ nor does it pro-

2 See, e.g., ALBERT BANDURA, AGGRESSION: A SociaAL LEARNING
ANALYs18 72-76 (1978); WtLLiamM A. BELSON, TELEVISION VIOLENCE
AND THE ADOLESCENT Boy (1978); Grorce Comstock, THE Evo-
LUTION OF AMERICAN TELEVISION 159-238 (1989); Monroe M. Ler-
KOWITZ ET AL., GROWING UP TO BE VIOLENT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY
OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGGRESSION (1977); L. Rowell Huesmann
et al., The Effects of Television Violence on Aggression: A Reply
to a Skeptic, in PSYCHOLOGY AND SociaL PoLicy 191 (Peter Sued-
feld & Philip E. Tetlock eds., 1992); David Pearl, Familial, Peer,
and Television Influence on Aggressive and Violent Behavior, in
CHILDHOOD AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE: Sources oF INFLUENCE,
PREVENTION, AND CONTROL 231, 236-37 (David H. Crowell et al.
eds., 1987).

* Alliance for Community Media involved the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-

36a

mote a blocking device which individuals control. Rather,
section 16(a) involves a total ban of disfavored program-
ming during hours when adult viewers are most likely to
be in the audience.

Because the statutory ban imposed by section 16(a) is
not the least restrictive means to further compelling state
interests, the majority decision must rest primarily on a
perceived distinction between the First Amendment rights
of broadcast media and cable (and all other non-broad-
cast) media. The majority appears to recognize that sec-
tion 16(a) could not withstand constitutional scrutiny if
applied against cable television operators; nonetheless, the
majority finds this irrelevant because it believes that
“there can be no doubt that the traditional broadcast
media are properly subject to more regulation than is gen-
erally permissible under the First Amendment.” This is
the heart of the case, plain and simple.

Respectfully, I find the majority's position flawed.
First, because I believe it is no longer responsible for
courts to provide lesser First Amendment protection to
broadcasting based on its alleged “unique attributes,” I
would scrutinze section 16(a) in the same manner that
courts scrutinize speech restrictions of cable media.

Second, I find it incomprehensible that the majority can
so easily reject the “public broadcaster exception” to sec-
tion 16(a), see note 1 supra, and yet be blind to the ut-
terly irrational distinction that Congress has created be-
tween broadcast and cable operators. No one disputes
that cable exhibits more and worse indecency than does
broadcast. And cable television is certainly pervasive in
our country. Today, a majority of television households

385, § 10, 106 Stat. 1460, 1468 (1992) and Jn the Matter of Imple-
mentation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 2688 (1993), which included
a segregate-and-block scheme.

37a

have cable,‘ and over the last two decades, the percentage
of television households with cable has increased every
year. However, the Government does not even attempt
to regulate cable with the same heavy regulatory hand it
applies to the broadcast media. There is no ban between
6 a.m. and midnight imposed on cable. Rather, the Gov-
ernment relies on viewer subscription and individual dis-
cretion instead of regulation comercial cable. Viewers
may receive commercial cable, with all of its indecent
material, to be seen by adults and children at any time,
subject only to the viewing discretion of the cable sub-
scriber. “Furthermore, many subscribers purchase cable
service to get improved [broadcast] television reception,
and a number of basic cable subscriptions are packaged to
included channels that offer some indecent programming:
so these subscribers will get indecent programming
whether they want it or not.” /d., 56 F.3d at 149 (Ed-
wards, C.J., dissenting). In other words, the Government
assumes that this scheme, which relies on personal sub
scription and individual discretion, fosters parental choice
and protects children without unduly infringing on the
free speech rights of cable operators and the adult
audience.

4 Approximately 59 million households have cable television
ResearcH & PoLicy ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL CABLE
TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, CABLE TELEVISION DEVELOPMENTS: IN-
pusTRY Overview, Fall 1994, at 1-A (citing A.C. Nielsen Co. &
Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Marketing New Media, June 20, 1994) .
see also Alliance for Community Media, 56 F.3d at 124-25 (citing
H.R.Conr.Rep. No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1992) (noting
that more than sixty percent of all households with television,
subscribe to cable)); id. (citing S.Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2¢
Sess. 8 (1991) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1992, pp. 1133, 1135,
1288 (noting that “[cJable television has become our Nation's
dominant video distribution medium”) ).

5In 1975, the percentage of television households with cable
was 18%; in 1985, the percentage was 45%; and in 1994, estima-
tion suggest between 62% and 63% of television households have
cable. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, at 1-A, 2-A.

stitutional in part because, in allowing parents to sub-
scribe to cable television as they see fit, Congress has fa-
cilitated parental supervision of children. In other words,
Congress may ban indecency on broadcast television be-
cause parents can easily purchase all the smut they please
on cable! I find this rationale perplexing.

no attempt to search out the least speech-restrictive means
to promote the interests that have been asserted. For these

reasons, section 16(a) should be struck down as uncon-
stitutional.

I. First AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR THE
BROADCAST MEDIA

casting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, —— US. . , 114
S.Ct. 2445, 2456, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“TBS”)

peeiteiiiae chtnetaaaieneeeta mame
other media.”)* ; FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California, 468 U.S. 364, 376, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3115, 82
L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) (“Wi ere a similar ban . . . applied

eataien.
See, e.g., FCC v. Factiee Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748, 98
S.Ct. 3026, 3040, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (“[{O}f all forms of communication, it is broad-
casting that has received the most limited First Amend-
ment protection.”).

The absurdity of this bifurcated approach—applying
a relaxed level of scrutiny to content-based regulations of
broadcast and a strict level of scrutiny for content-based
regulations of non-broadcast media—is most apparent in
a comparison of the Supreme Court’s analysis of broad-
cast and cable. In Pacifica, a plurality of the Court ap-
plied a reduced level of scrutiny in determining the First
Amendment rights of a broadcasting station. 438 U.S.
at 748-50, 98 S.Ct. at 3039-41. Last year, however, a
majority of the Court held that cable television is entitled
to the same First Amendment protection as all other non-
broadcast media. TBS, ——— U.S. at ——, 114 S.Ct. at
2456-57, There is no justification for this apparent di-
chotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence. Whatever

*“Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 89
S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 871 (1969) (television), and National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed.
1344 (1943) (radio), with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974) (print), and
Riley v. National Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 108
S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (personal solicitation).” TBS,
—- US. at ——., 114 S.Ct. at 2456 (parallel citaitons omitted).

40a

the merits of Pacifica when it was issued almost 20 years
ago, it makes no sense now."

The justification for the Supreme Court's distinct First
Amendment approach to broadcast originally centered on
the notion of spectrum scarcity. The electromagnetic
Le Se Ey te ee ene. Aeon ee

be broadcasters than frequencies available and broad-
casters wishing to broadcast on the same frequency may
have interfered with each other—and required regulation
to assign frequencies to broadcasters. See TBS, —— U.S.

‘In beginning their analysis of content-based regulations of
broadcast, Court opinions often cite to the now-familiar quotation
from Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 348 U.S. 495, 508, 72 S.Ct.
777, 781, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952): “Each method [of expression]
tends to present its own peculiar problems.” See, e.g. Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 748, 98 S.Ct. at 3039-40; Red Lion Broadcasting Co.,
Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1804-05, 23 L.Ed.2d
371 (1969); League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377, 104 S.Ct.
at 3106. In fact, these opinions seem to attribute more to the
Court’s statement in Joseph Burstyn than appears warranted.
Compare Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 508, 72 S.Ct. at 781 ( ‘Each
method tends to present its own peculiar problems.”) with Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 748, 98 S.Ct. at 3089 (“We have long recognized that
each medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems.” (citing Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502-08, 72 S.Ct.
at 780-81)) and Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-87, 89 S.Ct. at 1805
(“(D)ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differ-
ences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.” (citing
Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 508, 72 S.Ct. at 781)).

More glaringly, these opinions fail to quote the sentence that
follows. In Joseph Burstyn, the Supreme Court struck down a law
which forbade the showing of any motion-picture film without a
license, that could be withheld if a censor found the film sacri-
legious. In determining that motion pictures were within the
protection of the First Amendment, the Court stated: “Each
method tends to present its own peculiar problems. But the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amend-
ment’s command, do not vary.” 343 U.S. at 503, 72 S.Ct. at 781
(emphasis added). Certainly with respect to broadcast and cable,
the peculiar problems or differences between the two media do not
justify different levels of First Amendment protection.

4la

at ——., 114 S.Ct. at 2456. The Court reasoned that the
Government could impose limited content restraints and
certain affirmative obligations on broadcasters on account
of spectrum scarcity. See id. at ——, 114 S.Ct. at 2457
(citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390, 89 S.Ct. at 1806-07).
In 1978, the Court provided two additional rationales—
broadcast was uniquely intrusive into the privacy of the
home and uniquely accessible to children—which justified
relaxed scrutiny and thereby reduced the First Amend-
ment protection accorded to broadcasters. See Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 748-49, 98 S.Ct. at 3039-40. These justifica-
tions—spectrum scarcity, intrusiveness, and accessibility
to children—neither distinguish broadcast from cable, nor
explain the relaxed application of the principles of the
First Amendment to broadcast.

A. Spectrum Scarcity

In 1943, the Court determined that the “unique char-
acteristic” of broadcast—that “[u]nlike other modes of ex-
pression, radio inherently is not available to all”—ex-
plained “why, unlike other modes of expression, it is
subject to governmental regulation.” National Broadcast-
ing Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226, 63 S.
Ct. 997, 1014, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943) (“NBC”). Twenty
Ct. 997, 1014, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943) (“NBC”).
Twenty-six years later, the Court spun out the First
Amendment implications of -this burgeoning scarcity
theory. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-90, 89 S.Ct. at 1805-
07. The Court first offered an economic scarcity theory,"
finding that “[w]here there are substantially more indi-

* Interestingly, in responding to Government’s argument that
cable and broadcast are alike in that they both are beset by “market
dysfunction,” the TBS Court stated that “the special physical
characteristics of broadcast transmission, not the economic char-
acteristics of the broadcast market, are what underlies our broad-
cast jurisprudence.” ——— U.S. at ——., 114 S.Ct. at 2457 (citations

omitted). Apparently, the Court is now prepared to abandon the
economic scarcity theory.

42a

viduals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies
to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right
of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”* Jd. at
388, 89 S.Ct. at 1806. The Court also offered a tech-
nological scarcity theory: recognizing the need to prevent
“overcrowd[ing of] the spectrum,” id. at 389, 89 S.Ct.
at 1806, the Court held that, “[bJecause of the scarcity of
radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put
restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views
should be expressed on this unique medium,” ™ id. at 390
89 S.Ct. at 1806.

Although the Supreme Court has not declared the dis-
tinction between broadcast and other media a dead one,
it has not lately given the distinction an enthusiastic en-
dorsement. In fact, in recent years the Court has only

*The scarcity theory justifying regulation of broadcast was
hinged in part on a public trust notion: “those who are granted
a license to broadcast must serve in a sense as fiduciaries for the
public.” League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377, 104 S.Ct. at
3116.

1 The Court recently restated this concern: “if two broadcasters
were to attempt to transmit over the same frequency in the same
locale, they would interfere with one another’s signals, so that

neither could be heard at all.” TBS, —— U.S. at ——, 114 S.Ct.
at 2456 (citing NBC, 319 U.S. at 212, 68 S.Ct. at 1007-08).
" See also TBS, —— US. at ——, 114 S.Ct. at 2457 (noting

that spectrum scarcity “has been thought to require some adjust-
ment in traditional First Amendment analysis to permit the Gov-
ernment to place limited content restraints, and impose certain
affirmative obligations, on broadcast licensees” (citing Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 390, 89 S.Ct. at 1806-07)); League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. at 377, 104 S.Ct. at 8116 (“The fundamental distinguish-
ing characteristics of the new medium of broadcasting that, in
our view, has required some adjustment in First Amendment
analysis is that ‘[b)roadcast frequencies are a scarce resource
[that] must be portioned out among applicants.’” (quoting Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 101, 98 S.Ct. 2080, 2086, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973))).

43a

grudgingly upheld the distinction. See, e.g., TBS, ——
US. at - , 114 S.Ct. at 2456-57. On a few
occasions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
mounting criticism against its scarcity rationale. See id.
at ——, 114 S.Ct. at 2457 (noting, that “courts and com-
mentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its
inception”);"* League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at
376-77 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 3115-16 n. 11. Nevertheless,
to date, the Court has declined to revisit the validity of
the scarcity rationale. See TBS, —— US. at , 114
S.Ct. at 2457 (“[W]e have declined to question its con-
tinuing validity as support for our broadcast jurispru-
dence . . . and see no reason to do so here.”); League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 3116
n. 11 (“We are not prepared, however, to reconsider our
longstanding approach without some signal from Con-
gress or the FCC that technological developments have

In TRS, —— US. at --— n. 5, 114 S.Ct. at 2457 n. 5, the
Court cited some of those courts and commentators: Telecom-
munications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508-09
(D.C.Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919, 107 S.Ct. 3196, 96
L.Ed.2d 684 (1987); Lee BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 87-
90 (1991); Lucas Powe, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 197-209 (1987); MATTHEW SPITZER, SEVEN Du1RTY
WoRrDs AND Stx OTHER Stories 7-18 (1986); R.H. Coase, The Fed-
eral Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1, 12-27 (1959);
Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part 1: Why Can't
Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 Mp.L.Rev. 212, 218-40
(1987); Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amend-
ment on the Information Superhighway, 107 Harv.L.Rev. 1062,
1072-74 (1994).

™ The League of Women Voters Court noted that “[{t)he pre-
vailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum scar-
city has come under increasing criticism in recent years,” and that
“(e}itics, including the incumbent Chairman of the FCC, charge
that with the advent of cable and satellite television technology,
communities now have access to such a wide variety of stations
that the scarcity doctrine is obsolete.” 468 U.S. at 376-77 n. 11,
104 8.Ct. at 3115-16 n. 11 (citing Mark 8. Fowler & Daniel L.
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
Tex.L.Rev. 207, 221-26 (1982)).

44a

advanced so far that some revision of the system of broad-
cast regulation may be required.”).* In my view, it is no
longer responsible for courts to apply a reduced level of
First Amendment protection for regulations imposed on
broadcast based on an indefensible notion of spectrum
scarcity. It is time to revisit this rationale.

For years, scholars have argued that the scarcity of the
broadcast spectrum is neither an accurate technological
description of the spectrum, nor a “unique characteristic”
that should make any difference in terms of First Amend-
ment protection.” First, in response to the problem of
broadcast interference when multiple broadcasters attempt
to transmit on the same frequency, critics point out that
this problem does not distinguish broadcasting for
print * and is easily remedied with a system of administra-
tive licensing or private property rights." Another prob-
lem alluded to by the Court in Red Lion is the claim
that the spectrum is inherently limited, in contrast to
cable stations or newsprint. Today, however, the nation

In 1987, the Commission explicitly provided that “signal” to
the Supreme Court in holding that, “the scarcity rationale devel-
oped in the Red Lion decision and successive cases no longer justi-
fies a different standard of First Amendment review for the elec-
tronic press. Therefore, in response to the question raised by the
Supreme Court in League of Women Voters, we believe that the
standard applied in Red Lion should be reconsidered and that the
constitutional principles applicable to the printed press should be
equally applicable to the electronic press.” /n re Complaint of
Syracuse Peace Council against Television —— WTVH Syracuse,
New York, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5068 (1987); see also Matthhew L.
Spitzer, The Constituitonality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U.
L.Rev. 990, 1011 (1989).

15 For a particularly thorough rejection of various scarcity argu-
ments, see Spitzer, supra, at 1018-20, and notes 12-14 supra.

16 See Spitzer, supra, at 1013-15.

17 Coase demonstrated that one can efficiently distribute rights
to scarce resources through a market system. See Coase, supra,
at 12-27.

% This court has found that “[b]roadcast frequencies are much
less scarce now than when the scarcity rationale first arose in
National Broadcasting Co. . . . and it appears that currently
‘the number of broadcast stations ... rivals and perhaps surpasses
the number of newspapers and magazines in which political mes-
sages may effectiviey be carried.’” Telecommunications Research

707 F.2d 1448, 1459 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008, 104
S.Ct. 525, 78 L.Ed.2d 709 (1983)). This court went on to note,
“{i}ndeed, many markets have a far greater number of broadcast-
ing stations than newspapers.” /d.; see also Cass R. SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM oF FREE Speecn 54 (1993) (noting
that most cities have far more television and radio stations than

nomic scarcity argument superfluous.
In short, neither nor economic scarcity
distinguish broadcast from other media. And while some

those too young to read.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749, 98
S.Ct. at 3040." This characteristic, however, fails to dis-

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48a

It is relevant that Pacifica was a plurality opinion
which provided a very limited holding. See 438 U.S. at
750, 98 S.Ct. at 3041 (“It is appropriate . . . to empha-
size the narrowness of our holding. . . . The Commission’s
decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under
which context is all-important.”), The Court has subse-
quently emphasized that Pacifica’s holding was “emphati-
cally narrow,” Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. vy.
FCC, 492 US. 115, 127, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2837, 106
L.Ed.2d 93 (1989), essentially confirming that Pacifica
never was seen to be a seminal statement of constitutional
law. But beyond the narrowness of the Court's decision,
it seems clear now that Pacifica is a flawed decision, at
least when one considers it in light of enlightened eco-
nomic theory, technological advancements, and subse-

pursuant to a bifurcated First Amendment analysis.”
II. Futt First AMENDMENT PROTECTION

49a

section 16(a) and the Enforcement Order under the stric-
tor lovel of scrutiny courts apply 10 content-besed regula-
of cable. This means “the most exacting scrutiny”
be applied “to regulations that suppress, disadvan-
or impose differential burdens upon speech because
of its content.” TBS, —— U.S. at ——, 114 S.Ct. at
Court indicated that the “exacting
prongs: the Government's interests
and the method of regulation
chosen must be “the least restrictive means” to achieve
those es interests. 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct.

is the essence of the test, I think.

the majority views the broadcast media
as disfavored in the application of First Amendment
rights, relying principally on Pacifica; however, my col-
leagues nonetheless agree that section 16(a) reflects a con-

5
ES

my view, there is no way that section 16(a) can survive
exacting scrutiny.

A. Content-Based Regulations

In explaining the reasons for applying heightened or
exacting scrutiny, the Supreme Court recently stated:

At the heart of the First Amendment lies the
principle that each person should decide for him or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence.

TBS, —— U.S. at ——., 114 S.Ct. at 2458. This fun-

damental principle means that “the First Amendment .. .
does not countenance governmental control over the con-

% The Justices voted 8-1 on this issue, although a majority of
the Court found that the regulations were content neutral and ap-
plied intermediate scrutiny on this basis. See TBS, —— USS. at
—, 114 §.Ct. at 2469.

50a

tent of messages expressed by private individuals.” Jd.’
Because section 16(a) and the Enforcement-Order ban
indecent expression,” they constitute content-based regu-
lations, which have traditionally raised the red flag of
exacting scrutiny. As the Court stated in Sable, “[t}he
Government may, however, regulate the content of con-
stitutionally protected speech in order to promote a com-
pelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest.” 492 U.S. at 126, 109
S.Ct. at 2836. At issue in this case is whether the Gov-
ernment’s interests are indeed compelling and whether it
has chosen the least restrictive means to further its as-
serted compelling interests.

hear only what was acceptable for children. See, ¢.g.,
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383, 77 S.Ct. 524,
525-26, 1 L.Ed.2d 412 (1957); Sable 492 US. at 127,
109 S.Ct. at 2837 (finding that “this case, like Butler,

or
its content.” Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96,
92 8.Ct. 2286, 2290, 38 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).

** Section 16(a) applies to “language or material that, in con-
text, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.
sexual or excretory activities or organs.” Enforcement Order, 8
F.C.C.R. at 705 n. 10.

S5la

presents [the Court] with ‘legislation not reasonably re-
stricted to the evil with which it is said to deal’”) (quot-
ing Butler, 352 U.S. at 383, 77 S.Ct. at 526).

When First Amendment rights are at stake, appellate
courts cannot defer to a legislative finding, but must make
an independent inquiry to assess whether the record sup-
ports the Government’s interests. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129,
109 S.Ct. at 2838; Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1543-44, 56
L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (assessing legislative finding or “dec-
laration” that clear and present danger existec). The
Court has found this “particularly true where the Legisla-
ture has concluded that its product does not violate the
First Amendment.” Sable, 492 U.S. at 129, 109 S.Ct.
at 2838.

B. Compelling Interests

The FCC claims that section 16(a) serves three com-
pelling governmental interests. The ban is meant, first,
to support parental supervision of children; second, to
promote the well-being of minors; and third, to preserve
the privacy of the home. Enforcement Order, 8 F.C.C.R.
at 705-06. Only the first two interests are at issue.

With respect to the interest in facilitating parental su-
pervision, the Supreme Court has stated that the law has
“consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to av-
thority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society.”
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S.Ct. 1274,
1280, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968). It is entirely reasonable
for “[t}he legislature [to] properly conclude that parents
and others . . . who have this primary responsibility for
children’s well-being are entitled to the support of laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.” Jd. Sim-
ilarly, with respect to the Commission’s second interest,
protecting the well-being of its youth, the Court on nu-

58a

The second factor contributing to the Bantam Books holding was
that scheme’s failure to provide the merchant with notice that its
>ublications would be listed as objectionable. 372 U.S. at 71, 83
5.Ct. at 639. That same failure does not afflict the FCC
forfeiture scheme. The FCC routinely sends the targeted
broadcaster both an LOI and an NAL, and after its receipt of each
the broadcaster has an opportunity to represent its position to the
FCC. SOF 44 10-11. The broadcaster and its attorneys also
frequently make supplemental written and oral presentations to the
Commissioners and other FCC staff members in an effort to
persuade the FCC not to issue a forfeiture order. SOF { 11.

The third factor leading to the Bantam Books holding was the
Rhode Island Commission’s failure to explain its categorization of
books as obscene or objectionable. 372 U.S. at 71, 83 S.Ct. at
639. This scheme does not share that failing either. Here, the
D.C. Circuit already has upheld the FCC’s definition of indecent
broadcasting, see supra p. 6, against overbreadth and vagueness
challenges. ACT J, 852 F.2d at 1335-40; ACT II, 952 F.2d at
1508. The same could not be said of Rhode Island’s definition of
obscenity. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 64, 83 S.Ct. at 636.
Here, the FCC also must explain why the subject broadcast was
indecent before issuing a forfeiture order. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).
No such requirement existed in Rhode Island.

The final factor weighing in against the Rhode Island scheme
was that scheme’s success at complete suppression of the targeted
publications. In Bantam Books, the Commission’s actions
resulted in the complete suppression of the targeted publications.
Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 63, 64, 67-68, 71, 83 S.Ct. at 635,
636, 637-638, 639. Unlike the Rhode Island scheme, the FCC’s
supposed system of informal censorship does not completely ban
indecent broadcasts. By its own terms, this scheme allows the
broadcast of indecent speech during particular times of the day.
As already discussed, the FCC only bans the broadcast of
indecent material outside of the “safe harbor” period. Licensees
are free to broadcast indecent material at any time between 8:00
p.m. and 6:00 a.m. SOF 49. Before the FCC even begins
investigating an indecency complaint, its staff first determines

59a

whether the broadcast aired outside of that safe harbor. SOF 4 9.
Any “chill” the plaintiff may feel from forfeiture scheme
disappears with the daylight.

Infinity is free from the risk of forfeiture as long as it broadcasts
its indecent material during the safe harbor of the evening and
early morning hours. The merchants in Rhode Island had no
similar respite. This court will not construe the FCC forfeiture
scheme as a system of censorship when that system only operates
for two-thirds of the broadcasting day.

These distinctions demonstrate that the schemes at issue in
Bantam Books and this case are not the same.“ The court
cannot, based on Bantam Books, construe the FCC’s forfeiture
scheme as one of prior restraint and censorship. The FCC is
enforcing a court-approved definition of indecency through a
system that provides for notice and judicial review. This is not
the prior review and censorship of broadcast material. This is the
FCC’s regulation of an industry that serves at the pleasure of the
public interes:. Plaintiff may feel a chill because of the FCC’s
forfeiture scheme, but that chill is temporal only and has not been
unconstitutionally inflicted. Accordingly, the court grants the
FCC’s motion for summary judgment on Infinity’s constitutional
claim and denies Infinity’s motion for summary judgment.’

Ill, CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, the court
concludes that it has jurisdiction only over the constitutional claim
asserted, that only Infinity Broadcasting Corporation has standing

'* The court recognizes that Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C.Cir.1975) questioned whether the FCC
forfeiture scheme could be unconstitutional under Bantam Books. 515
F.2d at 403. That question was raised in dicta however, and did not
address the distinctions this court has drawn.

'S Because the court concludes that the FCC forfeiture scheme does not
constitute a system of prior restraint and censorship this court need not
address plaintiffs’ due process argument.

60a

to bring that claim, that the constitutional claim is ripe only as to
Infinity, and that the FCC’s forfeiture scheme does not violate the
First Amendment. An appropriate Order shall issue this date.

6la

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

This case comes before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction, and plaintiffs’ and defendant’s
cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated in
the accompanying Memorandum Opinion issued this date it is
hereby ORDERED that:

1. The court GRANTS the FCC’s motion to dismiss count III of
plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

2. The court GRANTS the FCC’s motion to dismiss the
following plaintiffs for lack of standing: Action for Children’s
Television; the American Civil Liberties Union; the Association
of Independent Television Stations, Inc.; EZ Communications,
Inc.; Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc.; Fox Television Stations,
Inc.: the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.; the
National Association of Broadcasters; the National Association
of College Broadcasters; National Public Radio; People for the
American Way; Post- Newsweek Stations, Inc.; the Public
Broadcasting Service; the Radio- Television News Directors
Association; Shamrock Broadcasting, Inc.; the Society of
Professional Journalists; 20 South Fork Broadcasting Corporation:
and 20th Century Fox Film Corporation.

3. The court GRANTS the FCC’s motion to dismiss plaintiff
Greater Media, Inc. because Greater Media’s claim is not yet
ripe.

4. The court GRANTS the FCC’s motion to dismiss plaintiff
Evergreen Media Corporation based on considerations of comity.

5. The court DENIES the FCC’s motion to dismiss plaintiff
Infinity Broadcasting Corporation’s constitutional claim arising
from the 1990 Notice of Apparent Liability.

6. The court GRANTS the FCC’s motion for summary
judgment on counts I and II of plaintiff's complaint and ENTERS
summary judgment for the FCC on those counts, which are
hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

62a

7. The court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
in its entirety and DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction as moot. This case now stands DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

63a

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS

U.S. Const., amend. I:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.

U.S. Const., amend. V:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

47 U.S.C. § 503. Forfeitures

(b) Activities constituting violations authorizing imposition

(1) Any person who is determined by the Commission in
accordance with paragraph (3) or (4) of this subsection, to have—

(A) willfully or repeatedly failed to comply substantially with
the terms and conditions of any license, permit, certificate, or
other instrument or authorization issued by the Commission;

(B) willfully or repeatedly failed to comply with any of the
provisions of this chapter or of any rule, regulation, or order

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issued by the Commission under this chapter or under any
treaty, convention, or other agreement to which the United
States is a party and which is binding upon the United States;

(C) violated any provision of section 317(c) or 509(a) of this
title; or

(D) violated any provision of section 1304, 1343, or 1464 of
Title 18;

shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture penalty. A
forfeiture penalty under this subsection shall be in addition to any
other penalty provided for by this chapter; except that this
subsection shall not apply to any conduct which is subject to
forfeiture under subchapter II of this chapter, part II or III of
subchapter ITI of this chapter, or section 507 of this title.

(2)(A) If the violator is (}) a broadcast station licensee or
permittee, (ii) a cable television operator, or (iii) an applicant for
any broadcast or cable television operator license, permit,
certificate, or other instrument or authorization issued by the
Commission, the amount of any forfeiture penalty determined
under this section shall not exceed $25,000 for each violation or
each day of a continuing violation, except that the amount
assessed for any continuing violation shall not exceed a total of
$250,000 for any single act or failure to act described in
paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(B) If the violator is a common carrier subject to the provisions
of this chapter or an applicant for any common carrier license,
permit, certificate, or other instrument of authorization issued by
the Commission, the amount of any forfeiture penalty determined
under this subsection shall not exceed $100,000 for each violation
or each day of a continuing violation, except that the amount
assessed for any continuing violation shall not exceed a total of
$1,000,000 for any single act or failure to act described in
paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(C) In any case not covered in subparagraph (A) or (B), the
amount of any forfeiture penalty determined under this subsection
shall not exceed $10,000 for each violation or each day of a

the Commission, or its designee, by written notice. In deter-

(3)(A) At the discretion of the Commission, a forfeiture penalty
may be determined against a person under this subsection after
notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the Commission or
an administrative law judge thereof in accordance with section
554 of Title 5. Any person against whom a forfeiture penalty is
determined under this paragraph may obtain review thereof

(A) the Commission issues a notice of apparent liability, in
writing, with respect to such person;

of such person, by registered or certified mail; and
(C) such person is granted an opportunity to show, in

such person apparently failed to comply; (ii) set forth the nature
of the act or omission charged against such person and the facts
upon which such charge is based; and (iii) state the date on which
such conduct occurred. Any forfeiture penalty determined under
this paragraph shall be recoverable pursuant to section 504(a) of
this title.

(5) No forfeiture liability shall be determined under this
subsection against any person, if such person does not hold a
license, permit, certificate, or other authorization issued by the
Commission, and if such person is not an applicant for a license,
permit, certificate, or other authorization issued by the
Commission unless, prior to the notice required by paragraph (3)
of this subsection or the notice of apparent liability required by
paragraph (4) of this subsection, such person (A) is sent a citation
of the violation charged; (B) is given a reasonable opportunity for
a personal interview with an official of the Commission, at the
filed office of the Commission which is nearest to such person's
place of residence; and (C) subsequently engages in conduct of
the type described in such citation. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not apply, however, if the person involved is
engaging in activities for which a license, permit, certificate, or
other authorization is required, or is a cable television system
operator, if the person involved is transmitting on frequencies
assigned for use in a service in which individual station operation
is authorized by rule pursuant to section 307(e) of this title, or in

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the case of violations of section 303(q) of this title, if the person
involved is a nonlicensee tower owner who has previously
received notice of the obligations imposed by section 303(q) of
this title from the Commission or the permittee or licensee who
uses that tower. Whenever the requirements of this paragraph are
satisfied with respect to a particular person, such person shall not
be entitled to receive any additional citation of the violation
charged, with respect to any conduct of the type described in the
citation sent under this paragraph.

(6) No forfeiture penalty shall be determined or imposed against
any person under this subsection if—

(A) such person holds a broadcast station license issued

under subchapter III of this chapter and if the violation charged
occurred—

(i) more than | year prior to the date of issuance of the
required notice or notice of apparent liability; or

(ii) prior to the date of commencement of the current
term of such license,

whichever is earlier; or

(B) such person does not hold a broadcast station license
issued under subchapter II] of this chapter and if the violation
charged occurred more than | year prior to the date of issuance
of the required notice or notice of apparent liability.

For purposes of this paragraph, “date of commencement of the
current term of such license” means the date of commencement
of the last term of license for which the licensee has been granted
a license by the Commission. A separate license term shall not
be deemed to have commenced as a result of continuing a license
in effect under section 307(c) of this title pending decision on an
application for renewal of the license.

47 U.S.C. § 504. Forfeitures

(a) Recovery

The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into
the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable,
except as otherwise provided with respect to a forfeiture penalty
determined under section 503(b)(3) of this title, in a civil suit in
the name of the United States brought in the district where the
person or carrier has its principal operating office or in any
district through which the line or system of the carrier runs:
Provided, That any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo:
Provided further, That in the case of forfeiture by a ship, said
forfeiture may also be recoverable by way of libel in any district
in which such ship shall arrive or depart. Such forfeitures shall
be in addition to any other general or specific penalties provided
in this chapter. It shall be the duty of the various United States
attorneys, under the direction of the Attorney General of the
United States, to prosecute for the recovery of forfeitures under
this chapter. The costs and expenses of such prosecutions shall
be paid from the appropriation for the expenses of the courts of
the United States.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0655%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
