# Reply Brief — Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 515 U.S. 1192

## Text

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1995
o

ALAN MEGHRIG AND MARGARET MEGHRIG,

Petitioners,
VS.

KFC WESTERN, INC.,
Respondent.
¢

On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

e

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS
e

Joun P. Zames
Counsel of Record

CuirFTON J. McFARLAND
McCuintock, Weston, BENsHOOF,
ROCHEFORT, RUBALCAVA
& MacCutsH
444 South Flower Street
Forty Third Floor
Los Angeles, California 90071
(213) 623-2322
Counsel for Petitioners

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...

RESPONDENT AND ITS SUPPORTING AMICI
IGNORE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE JURIS-
DICTIONAL STATEMENT AND RELATED POR-
TIONS OF THE RCRA CITIZEN SUIT
PROVISION, AND THE BROADER STATUTORY
AND COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTAL CON-

A. The Jurisdictional Statement and Related Por-
tions Of The RCRA Citizen Suit Provision Reaf-
firm The Limited Nature Of The District Courts’
ara sn NAT nny ae Op

B. The Federal Environmental Statutory Frame-
work, As Well As Its Legislative History And
The Legislative History Of The RCRA Citizen
Suit Provision, Reaffirm The Limited Jurisdic-
tion Of The District Courts..................

C. Congress Did Not Intend The RCRA Citizen Suit
Provision To Supplant CERCLA By Providing A
Mechanism In RCRA To Recover Cleanup Costs

D. RCRA Is One Of Several Vehicles By Which
Citizen Plaintiffs Can Address Property Contam-
I TOES d's. 666d 0 dk ins 6 Pees ia see oe

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS DO NOT HAVE
BROAD EQUITABLE JURISDICTION TO AWARD
“RESTITUTION” UNDER THE RCRA CITIZEN
SUIT PROVIBION 2... ccccrccccccscscvvcccessecs

IV.

Vil.

VIII.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ~— Continued

Page

A. Federal Courts Are Courts Of Limited Jurisdic-

C. The Porter-Hecht-Franklin Line Of Cases Does
Not Stand For The Proposition That District
Courts Have Inherent Common Law Equity
Jurisdiction To Award “Restitution” To Respon-
dent And Similarly Situated Plaintiffs.........

D. Respondent’s Understanding Of The Primary
Purpose Of RCRA And Its Role In Statutory
Interpretation Is Misplaced. ...........650055.

RESPONDENT'S CLAIM FOR MONETARY REIM-
BURSEMENT IS NOT A CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE
RESTITUTION ...... 0. ccc cccccereereecsneeseees

A RCRA CITIZEN SUIT CLAIM MAY BE FILED
ONLY WHEN AN ENDANGERMENT EXISTS....

RESPONDENT’S ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH
CORT V. ASH ARE UNAVAILING ...........555,

THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE BOTH OF THE
ISSUES BEFORE IT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUDI-
CIAL ECONOMY AND BECAUSE A CONFLICT
EXISTS IN THE CIRCUITS AS TO BOTH OF
THOSE ISSUES. ... 2. cre ccccncccvccccccccccess

LLU BION oc ccc ccc c ccc ccesvccseccosceees

10

12

14

15

17

19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 US.

I 10
Chutich v. Touche-Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.

Teubdviliuis Sepp dbecsanes ote keavdidsdtccnteceduc, a
City of Chicago v. Envt'l Defense Fund, __ US. ___

i RMR in IS a 15
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080 (1975)........... 19
Estate of Cowart v. Wicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,

I a 11
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986)—............... 7
Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 112

PD ed ddiuld Hind eadiens dee veewoeds 12, 13
Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995)............ 20
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Lid. v. Chesapeake Bay Founda-

- SS fF & 5 a ns 5, 6
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989)..6, 11, 15
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 587 (1944)................ 12
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F.

es Ge es EE, ED okdecccocecceceecovce: 16, 17
KFC Western v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995)..... 20
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2063

thi it abetted bad edheld dhibabededhueeenes ieee 14
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea

Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1 (1981)........... 2, 6, 17, 19

Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 451
ey er aa adas dhnsdndntes dunedddasvatonksess 10, 12

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page

PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 110 S.Ct. 2668 (1990).... 14

Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946)
neceséncccembededbeneeensndnasédhvesenceee 12, 13, 15, 16

Rodriquez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987).......... 14
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630

Se ccdanstececédeescdénsccowenecnrntbbass bondees< 11
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.

B8 Cees bodeces cs satdbbend ee dabdc bensenbedeesdee ede 19
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)...........0455. 16
Turner v. Bank of No. America, 4 U.S. 8, | L.Ed. 718

Gis i cacncansvahetncedundsGucmandesaneseddethadechbd 10
U.S. v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir.

SPE datononddnanaddnahcethanvuneiabstennnsenrecanse 15
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 465 U.S. 305 (1982)....... 20

Wyandotte Transp. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).... 16

STATUTES
SD WG BF hh 0 nb a cn cscbndecdscnnccddabanasoce vosee 6
GB Dae BH Gotten s vecvccckcscnaac cutebeedsdvedene cede 12
& USE. | GOS GF O00. GRCRAD. 2 oc ccccccdecscccces passim

42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seg. (CERCLA)........ 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

MISCELLANEOUS
S. Cooke, The Law of Hazardous Waste § 12.03(1) (1995)..... 7

D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1(1) (2nd ed. 1993)

peweebodns dbabsaubeusckdacd ch cednce cbhac cctaree 15, 16, 17
H.R. Rep. No 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984),

reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612............. 18
C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 7 (Sth ed. 1994)..... 10
en i ote cee tee pak esedbbocwebdedetes 10

I. INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

It is difficult to know where to begin to respond to the over 150
pages of argument and authorities submitted by Respondent and five
different amici curiae in opposition to Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits.'
Respondent and its supporting amici barely discuss the extensive
Statutory analysis set forth in Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits (which
analysis also formed the backbone of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
granted by this Court) and also spend little time addressing the
conflicting decisions rendered by the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth
Circuit courts of appeal. Instead, Respondent and its supporting amici
attempt an end run by fashioning an entirely new analytical focus: they
contend that federal district courts have broad, inherent authority to
render equitable relief and that Respondent here seeks equitable restitu-
tion, not damages.

That analysis is seriously flawed because it proceeds from a series
of false assumptions, the most notable of which include:

1. A misapprehension of the limited jurisdiction of federal
courts to render equitable relief in the face of a statute such as the
RCRA citizen suit provision here at issue;

2. A mischaracterization of this action as an equitable restitution
case, and

3. A pervasive, but absolutely erroneous, inference that the
citizen suit provision of RCRA is the only remedy available where
solid or hazardous waste presents an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to pullic health or the environment.

In attempting to carry forward this set of false assumptions,
Respondent and its supporting amici fail to meaningfully address
several critical features of the RCRA citizen suit provision, as well as
established authority of this Court and others:

1. Federal tourts are courts of limited jurisdiction and do not
have unbridled authority to grant equitable relief;

2. The full text of the jurisdictional section of the RCRA citizen
suit provision, not the excerpted portion repeatedly quoted by

' Although the United States has ostensibly filed a bnef in support of Petitioners,
that brief only supports Petitioners with respect to one of the two issues framed by this
appeal, the imminent and substantial endangerment issue, and supports Respondent's
equitable restitution wgument as to the second issue.

2

Respondent and its amici, evinces an intent to limit the relief available
to citizen plaintiffs;

3. Other, related portions of the RCRA citizen suit provision
reaffirm the limitation of that provision to injunctive relief, not post-
cleanup suits to recover monies expended,

4. The RCRA citizen suit provision does not exist in a vacuum,
but is one of a series of similar citizen suit provisions, contained in
federal environmental statutes, each with a legislative history that
confirms Congress’ intent to limit the remedies available to citizen
plaintiffs;

5. This Court's teachings in Gwaltney and Sea Clammers reaf-
firm the limited relief available to citizen plaintiffs under federal
environmental statutes and the need to follow the words of the statute
itself;

6. The legislative history of RCRA’s citizen suit provision fur-
ther confirms Congress’ intent to limit the relief available in citizen
suit actions;

7. The language and structure of the RCRA citizen suit provi-
sion require that an imminent and substantial endangerment exist at the
time suit is filed;

8. There is a well established body of state common law and
statutory remedies for environmental contamination. In the 20 years
since RCRA was first enacted, those common law and statutory
remedies have consistently been relied on to afford both injunctive
relief and cost recovery to injured plaintiffs; and

9. The leading authorities have long recognized a distinction
between a claim in restitution seeking to have something wrongfully
acquired by a defendant returned to a plaintiff and “damages”, seeking
to compensate a plaintiff for monies expended.

Although Respondent and its amici have erected an elaborate
analytical pyramid, the foundations of that pyramid are unsound. One
cannot simply ‘sidestep the words of the statute, or 25 years of
legislative history which traverses a number of federal environmental
statutes, or this Court’s precedents, or the past 20 years-plus of
common law and statutory development of property contamination
cleanup law in favor of an assertion that a claim for reimbursement of
costs is really an equitable ciaim that federal courts have broad
authority to adjudicate as a matter of “fairness”. Neither does lining up

3

a set of amici to reiterate these assertions turn a flawed argument into a
dispositive one.

Finally, lest Respondent's repeated incantations of considerations
of “fairness” and “conscience” create a misimpression of the equities
here, it will be well to remember the Petitioners and how fairness
impacts them. Although this federal action continues to be fought
beved solely on the pleadings, the parallel state court action brought by
KFC has moved ahead through two demurrers, an appeal and a
summary judgment in favor of defendants. Thus, several important
facts have now been established beyond dispute:

a. The Petitioners were teenaged siblings when they first took
title to the property, title having been placed in their name by their
father in 1963, unbeknownst to them. (J.A. 24)

b. Petitioners sold the property to their lessee, KFC, in 1975. At
no time between 1963 and 1975, or at any other time, did the
Petitioners ever cause or contribute to any contamination on the
property. (J.A. 25)

c. There is no evidence that any contamination in fact occurred
~ whether caused by the Petitioners or someone else — while the
Petitioners owned the property between 1963 and 1975. (J.A. 25)

d. There is evidence that service stations were operated on the
subject property by persons never sued by Respondent for approx-
imately 45 years before Petitioners bought it. (J.A. 5-20)

e. The Petitioners, who had nothing to do with any contamina-
tion on the property, are faced, 20 years after they last owned the
property and several years after contamination was discovered, with a
claim that has no express statute of limitations associated with it, and
only serves to prolong their agony.

Il. RESPONDENT AND ITS SUPPORTING AMICI IGNORE
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT AND RELATED PORTIONS OF THE RCRA
CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION, AND THE BROADER STAT-
UTORY AND COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTAL CON-
TEXT

Reviewing the brief for the Petitioners and the brief for the
Respondent may create an impression that two entirely different

4

statutes are being discussed. That is because he brief for the Respon-
dent largely ignores the thorough statutory construction analysis
advanced by Petitioners in favor of a more generalized series of
assumptions tied to Respondent's view of fairness. But that fairness
analysis is no substitute for a disciplined review of the language of this
particular statute, the legislative history of both the RCRA citizen suit
provision and federal environmental citizen suit provisions in general,
and the many alternative remedies available to parties faced with
environmental contamination. Those subjects are treated more fully in
the opening brief for the Petitioners, but we summarily review them
here in order to point up the breakdown in the analysis of Respondent
and its supporting amici.

A. The Jurisdictional Statement and Related Portions Of
The RCRA Citizen Suit Provision Reaffirm The Limited
Nature Of The District Courts’ Jurisdiction.

Respondent and several of its supporting amici have a common
habit of quoting only excerpts of the jurisdictional statement of the
RCRA citizen suit provision. They characterize the statute as one
granting district courts jurisdiction “to restrain any person” or to take
“such other action as may be necessary”. (Louisiana Amicus Br. 6, 8;
Resp. Br., 8; K&B Amicus Br., 6, 10, 15.)? But what the RCRA
jurisdictional statement in fact says is that the “district court shall have
jurisdiction . . . to restrain any person . . . to order such person to take
such other action as may be necessary, or both”. (Pet. App. 28.) Thus,
the plain words of the jurisdictional statement do not authorize the

2 We have adopted the following shorthand references to the various briefs filed in
support of Respondent: (a) the brief for the Respondent will be referred to as “Resp.
Br.”; (b) the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners is
referred to simply as “U.S. Amicus Br.”; (c) the brief of Amici Curiae Massachusetts,
Missouri, Alaska, Florida, Guam, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, West Virginia and Wisconsin is referred to as “Mass., et al.
Amicus Br.”; (d) the brief of the Bi-State Development Agency of Missouri-Illinois
Metropolitan District as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent is referred to as “Bi-
State Amicus Br.”; (e) the brief for the State of Louisiana through its Department of
Transportation and Development as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent is referred
to as “Louisiana Amicus Br.”; (f) the brief of Kaufman and Broad Home Corporation and
Kaufman and Broad South Bay, Inc. as Amici Curiae supporting Respondents is referred
to as “K&B Amicus Br.”

5

district courts to broadly “take such other action as may be necessary,”
but authorize those courts to restrain a person or to order a person to
take other necessary action, or both, and nothing more.

That this jurisdictional section authorizes the district courts to
provide injunctive relief to citizen plaintiffs and not monetary damages
is confirmed by several additional portions of the citizen suit provision:

1. Citizen plaintiffs must give 90 days notice to the EPA, to the
State, and to the alleged contaminator before undertaking a suit. If
citizens like Respondent KFC were authorized to clean up property
without giving notice, and then sue to recover their costs, this 90 days
notice requirement would make little or no sense. (Pet. Br., pp.
19-20);

2. Should EPA or the State elect to take charge of the contami-
nated site, a citizen suit is barred. (Pet. Br., p. 29);

3. There is no express statute of limitations provided for RCRA
citizen suits, as contrasted with other federal environmental cost recov-
ery statutes. (Pet. Br., pp. 23-24);

4. There is no set of guidelines for determining how the rea-
sonableness of cleanup costs sought to be recovered under RCRA
should be evaluated, as contrasted with the extensive regulations
defining reasonableness under CERCLA, the primary environmental
cost recovery statue. (Pet. Br., pp. 23-24);

5. The RCRA citizen suit provision authorizes an award of
attorneys fees, while the primary federal environmental cost recovery
statute, CERCLA, does not. This inconsistency strongly indicates that
Congress viewed the jurisdictional reach of RCRA as less than that of
CERCLA, since it chose not to provide an attorneys fees provision in
that latter statute. (Pet. Br., p. 26.)

3 Respondent KFC argues (Resp. Br., p. 10) that the notice provisions serve a
purpose even when provided post-cleanup. But the “purposes” noted by Respondent are
entirely de minimis and are unsupported by any legislative history or other evidence of
that purpose.

6

B. The Federal Environmental Statutory Framework, As
Well As Its Legislative History And the Legislative His-
tory Of The RCRA Citizen Suit Provision, Reaffirm The
Limited Jurisdiction Of The District Courts

We will not repeat the extensive analysis of the federal environ-
mental statutory framework within which RCRA fits. (Pet. Br. at pp.
26-34.) Suffice it to note at this juncture, however, that RCRA is one
of several federal environmental statutes which contain similar citizen
suit provisions. The legislative history of each of the statutes, begin-
ning with the 1970 Clean Air Act* and flowing through subsequently
enacted federal environmental statutes, confirms congressional intent
to limit the remedies available to citizen plaintiffs by excluding
jurisdiction to award damages. This concern was once again expressly
reaffirmed in the legislative history of RCRA itself.°

C. Congress Did Not Intend The RCRA Citizen Suit Provi-
sion To Supplant CERCLA By Providing A Mechanism
In RCRA To Recover Cleanup Costs

Petitioners have argued that, given the cost recovery remedy in
CERCLA, the primary federal environmental contamination statute,
and the limitations imposed on that remedy by Congress, Congress did
not intend to create a more sweeping cost recovery remedy under
RCRA by authorizing citizen suits to “restrain” or to “order such
person to take such action as may be necessary”. (Pet. Br. at 22-26).
Respondent counters that allowing a RCRA cost recovery remedy

4 This Court has examined environmental citizen suit provisions on three occa-
sions, in Gwaltney, Sea Clammers and Hallstrom. On each occasion, this Court refer-
enced the legislative histories of the various environmental citizen suit provisions back
to the genesis of these provisions, in the Clean Air Act of 1970. See, e.g. Hallstrom, 493
U.S. at 29 (examining the legislative history of the Clean Air Act citizen suit provision in
construing the RCRA citizen suit).

5 Most notably, as the legislative history of the 1984 RCRA amendments demon-
strates, Congress was concerned that a number of state law claims available to plaintiffs
could be added to RCRA federal court suits under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
(Pet. Br., pp. 31-32) Congress expressed both its concern for burdening the federal
courts with additional damages lawsuits and its awareness that. in the property contam-
ination context, a number of state law causes of action for property damage compensa-
tion were already recognized.

7

would not unduly “interfere” with the CERCLA remedy. (Resp. Br. at
39-43). Respondent misses the point.

The issue is not one of interference but one of Congressional
intent. It is noteworthy that CERCLA was enacted as a compromise in
the lame duck session of the 96th Congress after a huge legislative
effort. As the leading treatise notes:

“By 1980, Congress had been trying for two years to
enact some type of legislation to deal with the problem of
cleaning up hazardous waste sites. The eventual result —
[CERCLA] — was a compromise put together in the last
days of the 96th Congress... . ”

“The final version of the Act was conceived by an ad hoc
committee of Senators who finished a last minute compro-
mise which enabled the Act to pass.”

S. Cooke, The Law of Hazardous Waste
§ 12.03(1)(1995); See also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475
U.S. 355, 365 n.8 (1986).

To accept the arguments of Respondent and its supporting amici
would be to accept the proposition that the massive legislative effort
and epic compromise necessary to enact CERCLA, with its detailed
and limited cost recovery provision, was simply swept away by
Congress four years later. It simply does not square with legislative
reality to argue that: (1) the 98th Congress intended to create a broader
cost recovery in RCRA than it had earlier barely managed to create in
CERCLA, (2) that Congress did so in a single phrase in the RCRA
statute, although it deemed much lengthier and more comprehensive
provisions to be necessary in CERCLA, and (3) that Congress left nary
a trace of its bold intentions on this controversial subject in the
legislative history.

To the contrary, the existence, comprehensive nature and specific
features of CERCLA are very strong evidence that Congress did not

intend the RCRA citizen suit provision to provide a mechanism to
recover cleanup costs.

D. RCRA Is One of Several Vehicles By Which Citizen
Plaintiffs Can Address Property Contamination Issues

Respondent and its supporting amici both implicitly and explicitly
presume that the RCRA citizen suit provision represents the only
vehicle outside of CERCLA to address property contamination cleanup
and reimbursement issues. Thus, for example, the argument is oft-
repeated in the briefs supporting Respondent that, if plaintiffs like
Respondent KFC are only allowed to pursue injunctive relief under
RCRA and are only allowed to do so after giving 90 days notice, then
contaminated properties will continue to fester for months before any
relief can be obtained. (Louisiana Amicus Br., pp. 15-16; Mass., et al.
Amicus Br., pp. 24-25; K&B Amicus Br., p. 17; Resp. Br., pp. 36-37.)
That argument is fallacious, as confirmed by the KFC experience here.

KFC discovered the contamination in October 1988, fully cleaned
it up by March 1989, did not give the 90 day notice until Octo-
ber,1990, and commenced a state court action in December, 1991,
more than three years after it discovered the contamination and well
before it filed its RCRA action. (Pet. Br., pp. 4-5, 20.) In its state court
complaint, KFC alleged fully ten separate causes of action, nearly all
common law, and all seeking to recover KFC’s expenditures in clean-
ing up the site. Several of those causes of action, including nuisance,
trespass and negligence, could have served as a basis for injunctive
relief in October 1988, when the contamination was first discovered.®

Of course, notwithstanding their urgings that a RCRA cost recov-
ery action is necessary to fill a gap in the remedies available to citizen
plaintiffs, Respondent and its supporting amici fully realize that these
state common law and statutory remedies were and are already avail-
able to plaintiffs like Respondent. They make passing references to the

© The ten causes of action were for: (1) statutory cost recovery; (2) tortious breach
of duty; (3) private nuisance; (4) public nuisance; (5) equitable indemnity; (6) implied
contract; (7) ultrahazardous activity; (8) negligence; (9) unlawful business practices; and
(10) trespass. Following Petitioners’ demurrer, eight of those causes of action were
deemed barred by statutes of limitations of up to three years, and two others failed to
state a claim on which relief could be granted. It was only after Petitioners successfully
demurred to Respondent's complaint that KFC decided to pursue this action in federal
court for cost reimbursement under the RCRA citizen suit provision. (Pet. Br., pp. 5-6.)

9

availability of such relief, but obliquely demean those avenues by
referring to “difficulties of proof’ which purportedly accompany them
(Bi-State Amicus Br., pp. 15-16), and “short” statutes of limitations
(Louisiana Amicus Br., p. 3).? But there are no elements of proof in the
state common law causes of action available to Respondent that are
significantly different from those under RCRA. For example, Respon-
dent KFC would ultimately have to prove under RCRA that a contam-
inator “caused or contributed” to contamination, and those elements of
causation and contribution are inherent in virtually all of the common
law theories, including nuisance, trespass, negligence, etc. Neither is
the three year statute of limitations which applies to most of Respon-
dent’s state law causes of action “short”. And in the final analysis,
neither the fact that there may be difficulties of proof nor the length of
a statute of limitations has any bearing on whether Congress intended
to afford citizen plaintiffs a cost recovery remedy in the RCRA citizen
suit provision.

The fundamental truth is that RCRA has been in existence for
about 20 years, and countless plaintiffs, including Respondent KFC
have, during those 20 years, found several other common law bases
upon which to pursue their claims for cost reimbursement of all
manner of contaminated sites (including refined petroleum product
contamination which is excluded from CERCLA).

Ill. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS DO NOT HAVE BROAD
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION TO AWARD “RESTITU-
TION” UNDER THE RCRA CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION

The notion of a broad equitable power in the federal courts which
would apply to this action will not withstand closer analysis.

7 The Massachusetts, et al. amicus brief argues that states lack statutes which will
afford plaintiffs like Respondent KFC a remedy and that therefore RCRA should provide
that remedy for cost reimbursement. (Mass., et al. Amicus Br., p. 3.) But, as Massa-
chusetts and its co-amicus states know, states have numerous common law theories of
relief. Indeed, the Massachusetts, et al. brief makes reference to some of those at pages
15-17.

10
A. Federal Courts Are Courts Of Limited Jurisdiction

Unlike their state counterparts, federal district courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with general, open-ended
lawmaking power. Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981). As the leading treatise on federal courts
States:

“It is a principle of first importance that the federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction. Most state courts are
courts of general jurisdiction, and the presumption is that
they have jurisdiction over a particular controversy unless a
showing is made to the contrary. The federal courts, on the
other hand, cannot be courts of general jurisdiction. They
are empowered to hear only such cases as are within the
judicial power of the United States, as defined in the
Constitution, and had been entrusted to them by a jurisdic-
tional grant by Congress. Bender v. Williamsport Area
School District, 1988, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331; 475 U.S. 534,
541; 89 L.Ed. 2d 501. Because of this unusual nature of the
federal courts and because it would be not simply wrong but
indeed an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved
to the states if those courts were to entertain cases not
within their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must
demonstrate that the case is within the competence of such a
court. The presumption is that the court lacks jurisdiction in
a particular case until it has been demonstrated that jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter exists.” See, Turner v. Bank of
No. America, 4 U.S. 8, 11, 1 L.Ed. 718, 719 (1799). C.
Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 7 (Sth ed. 1994).*

Absent a congressional grant of authority to the federal courts to
formulate federal common law in the area delineated in a statute,
federal courts have general common law jurisdiction in only four
narrow areas: (1) cases involving the rights and obligations of the

8 Even amicus Bi-State acknowledges that “{OJuf Constitution has relegated to
Congress the ultimate say in what remedies, including equitable ones, the lower federal
courts may grant”, citing Article III of the Constitution. (Bi-State Amicus Br., p. 8.)

—

United States; (2) cases involving interstate and international disputes
implicating the rights of states; (3) cases involving interstate and
international disputes implicating relations with foreign nations, and
(4) admiralty cases. See, Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 640-641 (1981); See also Chutich v. Touche-Ross & Co., 960
F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1992). RCRA’s citizen suit provision contains
no grant of authority to the district courts to formulate general federal
common law, and the claims of Respondent KFC, as a private party, do
not fall within any of the four narrow areas in which federal courts
have general common law jurisdiction. The federal courts thus lack
jurisdiction to adjudicate KPC's federal common law claims for dam-
ages or for restitution.

B. The Plain Language Of 42 U.S.C. § 6972 Does Not Autho-
rize A Cause Of Action For Restitution

It is well-settled that the starting point for interpreting a statute is
the language of the statute itself. Estate of Cowart v. Wicklos Drilling
Co., 505 U.S. 469, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594, (1992); Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 25 (1989). When a statute speaks
clearly, the judicial inquiry as to its meaning is limited, except in
extraordinary circumstances. Estate of Cowart, supra.

There are three classes of persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972:

(1) any person alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard,
order, etc.. which has become effective pursuant to RCRA
(§ 6972(aX 1 A)); oF

(2) any person contributing to the past or present handling of
any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment
(§ 6972(aX 1B) (emphasis added)); or

(3) the Administrator, where the Administrator has failed to
perform any non-discretionary act or duty under RCRA (§ 6972(a)(2)).

In the case of an alleged violation, endangerment, or failure by the
EPA Admini ¢ + distri satin ante
42 USC. § 6972(a):

(1) t enforce the permit, standard, order, etc., referred to in
paragraph (a1) A),

12

(2) to restrain any person contributing to the past or present
handling of any solid or hazardous waste [which may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment);

(3) to order such person to take such other action as may be
necessary, or both;

(4) to order the Administrator to perform the act or duty
referred to in paragraph (2); or

(5) t apply any appropriate civil penalties under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(a) and (g) (emphasis added).

Any reasonable construction of these provisions leaves no doubt
that RCRA does not create a cause of action in restitution. The plain
language of § 6972 provides private citizens with a limited right to
bring an enforcement and/or abatement action in a district court against
specific classes of persons who are responsible for a violation of
federal environmental law that is ongoing at the time that suit is filed.

Respondent argues that the phrase “order such person to take such
other action as may be necessary” is not limited to injunctive relief.
But this analysis is plainly wrong. Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction. Northwest Airlines, supra, at 96-97. They are not free to
grant any and all relief asked of them, unless such relief is explicitly
authorized. They are limited by the enforcement/abatement remedies
expressly set forth in statutes which, like RCRA, have elaborate and
comprehensive enforcement and remedial abatement provisions.

C. The Porter-Hecht-Franklin Line Of Cases Does Not Stand
For The Proposition That District Courts Have Inherent
Common Law Equity Jurisdiction To Award “Restitu-
tion” To Respondent And Similarly Situated Plaintiffs

Respondent and its supporting amici argue that a line of cases

emanating from Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946)
and Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 587 (1944) and more recently
exemplified by Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 112
S.Ct. 1028 (1992) stands for the proposition that federal district courts
may award “restitution” to plaintiffs like Respondent under RCRA
based on a broad authority residing in federal courts to award equitable
relief. This analysis is misguided on several fronts. First, to the extent
Porter and Hecht are based on federal common law equitable jurisdic-
tion, they were actions brought by the United States, not by private

13

parties like KFC, and arguably within exception (1) (involving the
rights and obligations of the United States) noted above. Second and
or misquote the principles articulated in those cases. The critical
determination by this Court in Porter was as follows:

“Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and

inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in

equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized

and applied.”

Id. at 398 (emphasis added).

Although certain of the amici supporting Respondent ignore the phrase
in Porter “or by a necessary and inescapable inference”, that is a
critical part of the Court's ruling and the analysis of this issue. Here,
even assuming that the federal district courts have equitable jurisdic-
tion, there is a necessary and inescapable inference derived from
several sources that the district courts’ jurisdiction under RCRA’s
citizen suit provision is limited:

1. The language of the RCRA jurisdictional statement authorizes
federal district courts to “restrain” or to “order such person to take
such other action as may be necessary, or both”. That language restricts
the district courts’ equity powers significantly more than the broad
Statutory provision in Porter, which authorized the district court to
grant “a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other
order.” Id. at 397 (emphasis added), and by necessary and inescapable
inference restricts the court's equitable authority.

2. As reviewed elsewhere in this brief and in Petitioners’ Open-
ing Brief on the Merits, the RCRA notice provisions, citizen suit bar
provisions, lack of a statute of limitations, and attorneys fees provi-
sions reaffirm the limited scope of remedies available to citizens under
the Act and the necessary and inescapable inference of restrictions on
the district court's equity powers.

3. So, too, the antecedent citizen suit provisions in other federal
environmental statutes, along with their legislative history, make clear
spawn federal court litigation to recover costs.

Third, the Franklin case has no bearing on the RCRA statute. In
Franklin, the statute was absolutely silent on the subject of remedies
available to an aggrieved plaintiff. Accordingly, this Court determined

14

that, where a federal statute provides for a general right to sue (even an
implied right to sue as in that case but unspecified remedies), the Court
will presume the availability of all appropriate remedies, particularly
where the legislative history of related statutes evinces no Congres-
sional intent to limit those remedies. (/d. at 1032.) By contrast, RCRA
provides particularized citizen remedies, and its legislative history and
that of related statutes reaffirm the limitations on those remedies.’

D. Respondent’s Understanding Of The Primary Purpose Of
RCRA And Its Role In Statutory Interpretation Is Mis-
placed

Respondent and its supporting amici premise much of their argu-

ment concerning the broad relief available under RCRA’s citizen suit
provision on an assertion that the primary policy underlying the RCRA
statute is that “hazardous waste . . . should be treated, stored or
disposed of so as to minimize the present and future threat to human
health and environment.” (Resp. Br. at 36-37.) However, even assum-
ing that that is RCRA’s primary purpose, as this Court has previously
observed, construing a statute based on the primary purpose of legisla-
tion is ill-advised:

“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding

what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the

achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of
legislative choice — and it frustrates rather than effectuates
legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever
furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.”
Rodriquez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-526 (1987);
PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 646-647 (1990).'°

% Respondent and amici also claim that the savings clause of RCRA, 42 U.S.C
§ 6972(f), saves a private party plaintiff's federal common law causes of action in equity
and that those claims may be brought concurrently with a 42 U.S.C. § 6972 action.
(Resp. Br., pp. 12-13; K&B Amicus Br., pp. 8-9; Mass., et al. Amicus Br., pp. 15-17;
Louisiana Amicus Br., 13-14; Bi-State Amicus Br. p. 12.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. But this
savings clause does no more than preserve existing state law remedies. It does not create
or preserve a body of federal common law that 1s not part of the statute.

1© See also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs, __ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (1993)
(“vague notions of a statute's “basic purpose’ are nonetheless inadequate to overcome

15

Moreover, in Hallstrom v. Tillamook, this Court recently

~ addressed, and rejected, an argument that the RCRA statute should be

consirued liberally based on a broad Congressional intent in enacting
that statute:
“Rather, the legislative history indicates an intent to strike a
balance between encouraging citizen enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations and avoiding burdening the federal
courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits.
* > *

Giving full effect to the words of the statute preserves the
compromise struck by Congress.”
Id., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989).

-In any event, RCRA is primarily a regulatory statute that created a
“prospective cradle-to-grave regulatory regime governing the move-
ment of hazardous waste in our society.” U.S. v. Aceto Agric. Chem.
Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989); see also City of Chicago v.
Envt'l Defense Fund, __ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1590 (1994). And
even though, as Respondent concedes, RCRA’s primary purpose is to
ensure proper treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste,
RCRA’s primary purpose is not to ensure cleanup of improperly
disposed waste; that is the primary purpose of another comprehensive
federal statute: CERCLA.

IV. RESPONDENT’S CLAIM FOR MONETARY REIMBURSE-

MENT IS NOT A CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE RESTITU-
TION

Equitable restitution requires that something wrongfully taken
from a plaintiff be returned by a defendant. Thus, monies wrongfully
collected by defendant may be restored to a plaintiff (Porter, supra), or
personal property taken from a plaintiff may be ordered returned by
defendant. D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, infra.

But equitable restitution is a narrowly drawn remedy. It is not a
substitute for every damages claim in which a plaintiff seeks to be
compensated for out of pocket losses. The authorities make this clear:

the words of the text regarding the specific issue under consideration”).

16

“Restitution measures the remedy by the defendant's gain
and seeks to force disgorgement of that gain. It differs in its
goal or principle from damages, which measures the remedy
by the plaintiff's loss and seeks to provide compensation for
that loss.”

“The word restitution means restoration. Restitution is a
return or restoration of what the defendant has gained in a
transaction.”

D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1(1) at 555 (2d ed. 1993).

If Respondent's claim here can be characterized as equitable
restitution, then virtually any damages claim can be so denominated.
Equitable restitution is not a safety net for plaintiffs who are otherwise
barred from bringing a damages claim.

Respondent argues that the restitutionary relief it seeks is not
tantamount to an award of damages. But none of the cases cited by
Respondent support the proposition that restitution is available here.!!

'! For example, Respondent cites Porter for support, but the holding in that case
is unavailing. In Porter, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration sought
an injunction restraining future overcharges and requiring the landlord to return to the
tenants the excess rents collected. 328 U.S. at 396-397. But, as noted above, Porter is a
statutory interpretation case involving a statute significantly different from that here.
Moreover, what was properly characterized as restitution in Porter was the classic case
of a plaintiff seeking the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains secured in a transaction. /n re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F.Supp. 994, 1002 (D. Mass. 1989).

Neither is Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967), on point.
Wyandotte was an implied right of action case, not a case equating a damages claim with
an equitable restitution claim. /n re Acushnet River, supra. Moreover, the Court
expressly observed that Wyandotie's interpretation was contrary to: (1) the Court's prior
construction of the Act, (2) the Court's decisions on analogous issues of statutory
construction and (3) a major related federal statute and that Wyandotte's interpretation
lacked any indicia of Congressional intent. The parallels to Respondent's assertions here
are close.

The other Supreme Court precedent cited by Respondent, Tull v. United States, 48
U.S. 412 (1987), actually supports Petitioners. In Tull, the United States sought injunc-
tive relief and civil penalties under the Clean Water Act. In assessing the petitioner's
argument that he was entitled to a jury trial, this Court analyzed whether the civil
penalties sought by the United States were legal or equitable in nature. The Court firmly
rejected the government's argument that such penalties, even when determined by

17

Indeed, in attempting to distinguish this Court's decision in Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S.
1 (1981) (“Sea Clammers”), Respondent actually points the way for
Petitioners and for the Court. Respondent argues:

“Sea Clammers is not the controlling precedent in this case
for the simple reason that the Sea Clammers plaintiffs,
unlike Respondent, truly were seeking ‘damages’ — a term
this Court has defined to mean relief ‘intended to provide a
victim with monetary compensation for an injury to his
person, property or reputation’ and as distinguished from
equitable actions for specific relief such as restitutionary
awards of back pay.”

Resp. Br. p. 23 (emphasis added).

We could not agree more. What Respondent seeks here is compensa-
tion for an injury to its property, and that certainly is distinguished
from an equitable action for specific relief such as restitutionary
awards of back-pay, or return of specific property, as we noted at the
outset of this section.'?

V. A RCRA CITIZEN SUIT CLAIM MAY BE FILED ONLY

WHEN AN ENDANGERMENT EXISTS

Respondent and its amici urge that the “imminent and substantial
endangerment” referred to in the RCRA citizen suit provision describes
the nature of the solid or hazardous waste and not the conditions of
contamination at the time suit is filed. Respondent relies on the
subsection of the RCRA citizen suit provision that describes potential
defendants and provides that an action may be commenced:

reference to profits earned, are in the nature of restitution. The Court noted that
restitution “is limited to restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which
rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant,” (citing Porter). Id. at 424.

'2 Even assuming, arguendo, that what Respondent seeks can properly be charac-
terized as “restitution,” that does not end the inquiry. Respondents assume that a
restitutionary remedy is necessarily an equitable remedy. It is well to remember that the
jurisdiction of the law courts and equity courts overlapped with respect to restitution.
Indeed, the leading treatise notes that: “[rjestitution claims for money are usually claims
at law.” D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1(1) at 556. See also In re Acushnet River, supra,
at 1001-1003.

“against any person . . . who has contributed to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-
posal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment.”

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).

But the fair reading of this subsection is that suit can be brought
against persons who have engaged in or are engaging in certain
activities with respect to solid or hazardous waste that “may [presently]
present” an endangerment. In other words, suit can be brought when an
endangerment exists. This construction is confirmed by a straightfor-
ward reading of the subsection and by other subsections of the citizen
suit provision:

1. The statute elsewhere provides that a RCRA citizen suit
“shall be brought in the district court for the district in which . . . the
alleged endangerment may occur.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). This provision
clearly indicates that suit may be filed where a current threat exists.
The use of the present tense “may occur” allows for no other conclu-
sion. This provision clearly does not contemplate filing of suits where
a current threat no longer exists.

2. The notice provision provides that no action may be com-
menced prior to 90 days after notice to “the State in which the alleged
endangerment may occur.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A)(ii).

3. The citizen suit provision states that no such action may be
commenced if the EPA has taken specified abatement actions in
response to the activities “which may present the alleged endanger-
ment.” 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(2)(B).

Thus, the statutory language unambiguously allows suit only
where an endangerment exists. The legislative history is completely
consistent. The House Committee report states that the RCRA citizen
suit provision:

“Confers on citizens a limited right under section 7002 [42

U.S.C. § 6972] to sue to abate an imminent and substantial

endangerment... . ~

H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612.

19

VI. RESPONDENT’S ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH CORT V.
ASH ARE UNAVAILING

Petitioners have argued that the RCRA citizen suit provision does
not expressly provide a right of action for the recovery of cleanup
costs. Pet. Br. 13-16. Therefore, for such a right of action to exist, it
must be implied and must meet the test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975). Respondent and its amici counter that the RCRA citizen suit
does expressly provide a right of action to citizens and that Respondent
merely seeks to imply a remedy, so Cort v. Ash is inapplicable. But this
is a distinction without a difference.

As the Court expressly noted in Sea Clammers in discussing the
Cort v. Ash test:

“In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45

L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Court identified several factors that

are relevant to the question of implied private remedies.”

Sea Clammers, supra, at 17 (emphasis added.)
And as the Court has elsewhere noted:
“It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that
where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or
remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.”
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S., 11, 19 (1979); (emphasis added).
This Court has also stated that:

“In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional

intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided

precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.”
Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).

Vil. THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE BOTH OF THE
ISSUES BEFORE IT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUDICIAL
ECONOMY AND BECAUSE A CONFLICT EXISTS IN
THE CIRCUITS AS TO BOTH OF THOSE ISSUES

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed with this Court presented
two questions for review: (1)“whether the citizen suit provision of
RCRA . . . authorizes a private party suit for reimbursement of cleanup
costs” and (2)“whether the citizen suit provision of RCRA . . . can be

20

used to authorize a suit for contamination that was fully remediated
years before commencement of suit.” This Court granted certiorari as
to both issues.

The United States argues that it is only necessary for this Court to
reach one of the two issues presented to this Court, the imminent and
substantial endangerment issue. To the contrary, both should be
resolved here. Both were accepted for review by the Court, and the
interests of judicial economy would be served by resolving both now.
See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 465 U.S. 305, 321-322 (1982)
(Powell, J. concurring).

Moreover, a conflict clearly exists between the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits as to the second issue: the right of citizen plaintiffs to recover
cleanup costs under RCRA. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that RCRA authorizes a restitutionary remedy. KFC Western Inc.
v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d at 521. The Eighth Circuit had held that the RCRA
citizen suit “on its face does not provide for the recovery of remedia-
tion costs.” Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d at 1095 (8th Cir. 1995).

Vill. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
should be reversed. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit should be vacated

Dated: December 28, 1995.
Respectfully submitted,
Joun P. Zames
Counsel of Record

Curron J. McFarLanp
McCuintockx, Weston, Bensuoor,
Rocuerort, Ruspatcava & MacCuisx

Counsel for Petitioners

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0633%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
