# Amicus Curiae Brief — Mertens v. Hewitt Associates

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0265%3A10

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 508 U.S. 248

## Text

No. 91-1671 ; OV 19 1992

| BBFi0: OF Tre GEAR

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

WILLIAM J. Mertens, ALEX W. BANDROWSKI,
JAMES A. CLARKE. and RUSSELL FRANZ
Py pith ners.

HEWITT ASSOCIATES, an Illinois Partnershi;
On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
AMERICAN ASSOCLATION OF RETIKED PERSONS
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

STEVEN S. ZALEZNICK

CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES
(Counse! of Record)
AMERICAN ASSO! ON
OF RETIRED PERsoO°
601 E Street, N.W
2 Washington, DC 20049
(202) 454-2000
° NORMAN PS
P.O. Box 870582
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
(205) 348-1136
Counsel for Amicus Curiasg
American Association of
November 1992 Ret | Persons
= .

Wiieon - Eras PeintTinge Co inc. - 769-0096 WaseinocTow. D.C. 20001

® «fs co

~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHOR it...

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT

ERISA SECTION 502(a) (3) CREATES FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION OVER A’ PARTICI-
PANT’S CIVIL ACTION AGAINST A PER-
SON WHO KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATES
IN A FIDUCIARY’S BREACH OF TRUST

A. ERISA Section 502(a) (3) Embodies Trust
Law Principles, Which Recognize A Cause
Of Action Ayainst A Person Who Know-
ingly Participates With A Fiduciary In A
Breach Of Trust

B. The Language And Purpose Of ERISA Sup-
port Equitable Relief Against Non-Fiduci-
aries

1. The Ninth Circuit's Artificial Limitation
On Equitable Relief Under ERISA See-
tion 502(a) (3) Is Inconsistent With The
Intent of Congress In Enacting ERISA

2. Equitable Remedies Under Section 502
(a) (3) Are Available, Irrespective of
ERISA Section 409(a)

OBRA’S CREATION OF A CIVIL PENALTY
AGAINST NON-FIDUCIARIES WHO KNOW-
INGLY PARTICIPATE IN A BREACH OF
TRUST MAKES CLEAR THAT COURTS MAY
ASSESS PENALTIES AGAINST SUCH NON-
FIDUCIARIES

6

10

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS-—-Continued

Page
Ill. RECOGNITION OF A REMEDY AGAINST
A NON-FIDUCIARY IS CONSISTENT WITH
THIS COURT'S HOLDING IN MASSACHL-
SETTS MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. ».
RUSSELL SAS ae 4 13
es isbdansessemsonebocosncocs 14

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C.

1971) 5
Blythe v. Fleadale, 1 Ch. 337 (1889) 5
Brock ¢. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563 (CD. NJ. 1986) 4
Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339 (6th Cir.

1988) 4,12
Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. 1361 (D.Nev.

1984) 4
Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, lne., 974

F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1992) 1
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co... —— US.

. 112 S. Ct. 2589 (1992) 12
Fink wv. National Sar. & Trust Co. T72 F.2d 951

(D.C. Cir, 1985) 4,12
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.

101 (1989) 3,7. 8,9
Frevnd v. Marshall & Isicy Bank, 485 F. Supp.

629 (W.D. Wise. 1979) 4
Gilbert e. El Pase Co., 490 A2d 1050 (Del. Ch.

1984) 5
(irever v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363 (4th Cir.

1944) 9
Inqersoll-Ravd Co. v. McClendon, U.S.

111 S. Ct. 478 (1990) 10
International Community Corp. v. Vietor Young,

186 So. 24 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) 5
Lowen v. Tawer Asset Manage ment, lnc... 829 F.2d

1209 (2d Cir. 1987) 4,12
Massachusetts Mutual Lite lus. Co. v. Ressell, 473

U.S. 134 (1985) 8,13
Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d

1496 (9th Cir. 1984) 8

Nieto ev. Reber, 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir, 1988) 7, 12,18

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ¢. Ross, 733 F. Supp.
1005 (M.D.N.C. 1990)

Pension Fund Local 701 ©. Omni Funding Group,
731 F. Supp. 161 (DN LJ. 1990)

Pilot Life lee. Ca. ev. Dedeauwsr, 481 US. 41 C1987)

4

t
2.8

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. 442 U.S. 330 (1979) 10
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, lne., 463 U.S. 85 (1982) 6,7
Shuster v. North American Mortgage Loan Co., 40

N.E. 130 (Ohie 1942) 5
Smith v. Wede, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) 6
Tertile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.

448 (1957) 9
Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.

1982) 4,12

Wihittield «. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir.
1988), cert. denied sub nom. Kicpak v. Dole, 490

U.S. 1089 (1989) 4,12
STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

120 Cong. Rec. 829.932 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) 9

120 Cong. Rec. 829.942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) 2

Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 ef seq. 2

ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (b) 3.7.9
ERISA § 499(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) 6, 9, 10
SWRISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 11382(a) 13

ERISA § 502(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3) passim
ERISA § 502(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a) 05) 11, 12

ERISA § 502(/), 29 U.S.C. 5 11320/) 10, 11, 12
ERISA § 502(/) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 11320) 01) 11
ERISA § 502(/) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132¢/) (2) 11
ERISA § 4022, 29 U.S.C. § 1322 2

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1974 US. Code Cong. & Admin.

a News, 5038 8

H.R. Rep. Rep. Noe. 247, 101st Cong... Ist Sess.,
reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News, 1906 = 13
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
(OBRA). Pub. L. No. 101-239, 108 Stat. 123 10

S. Rep. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4838 2

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— ontinued

MISCELLANEOUS

A. Seott & W. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts (Ath
ed. 1989)

G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and
Trustees (2d ed. 1982)

Note, Liability of Bank for Aiding Fiducoary in
Purchase of Now-Leqal Securities, 47 Yale LJ.
299 (1937)

N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (oth
ed. 1992)

Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959)

Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trvst, 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 454 (1921)

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToRER Term, 1992

ee

No. 91-1671

WittiaM J. Merrens, ALEX W. BANDROWSKI,
JaMes A. CLARKE, and RUSSELL FRANZ,

‘ Petitioners,

Hewitt Associates, an Illinois Partnership,

Responden f.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

—————S

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The American Association of Retired Persons is a non-
profit membership organization of approximately 34
million working and retired persons age 50 and older.
(xe of AARI’s primary objectives is to promote the
economic security of individuals as they age. Through
educational and advocacy effort=. AARP seeks to increase
the avoilability, security. equity, and adequacy of public
and private pension and health plans

AARP’: members, and other older Americans who de-
pend on private employer-sponsored pension and health

plans subject to the Employce Retirement Income Seeurity
Act (ERISA), 20 ULS.C. 5 1001 ¢f sey., have a stake in
the reversal of the decision below, which holds that indi-
viduals who knowingly participate in a breach of trust
by «a fiduciary have no liability under federal law to
the plan participants they harm. The result of the alleged
breach in this case, and of respondent's alleged “knowing
particination” in the breach, was the insolvency of Peti-
tioners’ pension plan. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration assumed responsibility for paying plan benefits,
but only to the extent benefits were guaranteed under
Tithe IV of ERISA, see ERDSA § 4022, 20 USC. & 1322.
Because Petitioners’ plan benefits exceeded the maximum
guarantee amounts, Petitioners Jost significant portions
of the pensions that they earned during their working
lives and on which they depend to support themselves in
retirement.

The decision below, which is contrary to the holdings of
four other circuit courts of appeals, threatens the security
of retired and working Americans’ interests in hundreds
of thousands of pension and welfare benefit plans subject
to ERISA. AARP has a substantial interest in the reso-
‘ution of the issue, which has a direct and vital bearing
on our members’ retirement security.

STATEMENT OF THLE CASE

AAR adopts Petitioners’ Statement of the Case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Construing ERISA to authorize a cause of action
against « non-lidnciary for its knowing participation in
a fiduciary breach is consonant with the language and
urpore of the statute. Congress provided for “appro-
priate equitable relief” under ERISA Section 502141 +3)
and this Court's precedents make clear that the courts
may derive that relief from the emerging federal common
law. Pilot Lite tne. Co. «. Dedeaux, 451 UWS. 41, 56

”

(1987). Under trust law principles, with which ERISA
“ahounmds,” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, v. Bruch, Ano
U.S. 101, 110 (198%), equitable relief can inelude com-
pensatory damages against a person who knowingly par-
ticipates in another person’s breach of trust. The con-
trary interpretation of the court below is wrong because
it ignores these traditional equity and trust principles
and the broad language of Section 502ta+ (3).

The decision below also undermines the primary pur-
pose of ERISA to protect the interests of participants
by providing appropriate remedies and sanctions. See
ERISA Section 2+b+ 29 UUS.C. £ 1001tbs. The effect
of the court of appeals’ holding is’to deny participants
recourse against those whese improper actions enabled
a fiduciary to violate its statutory duties. Reversing the
decision below and applying traditional trust rules which
impose liability on non-fiduciaries would further ERISA's
purposes by preventing and deterring violations of the
statute’s fiduciary requirements.

ARGUMENT

I. ERISA SECTION W2(ajCh) CREATES FEDERAL
JURISDICTION OVER V PARTICIPANTS CIVEL
ACTION AGAINST A PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY
PARTICIPATES IN A FIDUCIARY’S BREACH OF
TRUST.

Petitioners seek relief against Hewitt Associates, whom
Petitioners allege knowingly participated in an ERISA
fiduciary’s breach of Wrust. (J.A. 38+. Section 50214143)
of ERISA, 20 U.S.C, £113264163). provides that a par-
ticipant may bring a civil action to obtain appropriate
equitable relief to redress violations or enforce provisions
of ERISA. The statutory question before the Court is
thus «tra ghtforward: i< “equitable relief” under Section
Wi2ia (5) available against a person who knowingly
issists a fiduciary in a breach of the tiduciary’s responsi-

bility? The answer, under traditional equity jurisdiction,
is that such relief is available.

Ignoring traditional equity principles, the court of ap-
peals held that Congress intended to apply the term
“equitable relief” narrowly under ERISA, limiting it to
non-compensatory forms of relief. This restrictive inter-
pretation of equitable relief is not only historically in-
accurate, but is at loggerheads with the remedial pur-
poses of ERISA. Moreover, four of the six courts of
appeals that have considered the question have held to
the contrary. Diduck +. Kaszychi & Sons Contractors,
lne., O74 F.2d 270 12d Cir, 1992); Whitfield v. Linde-
mann, 853 F.2d 1298 (Sth Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub
wont Alepak e Dole, 490 U.S, 1089 (19891: Brock +.
Hendershotl, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 19881; Lowen
re Tower Asset Management, lne., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220-
1221 ‘2d Cir. 19ST): Thornton «+. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064,
1078 «7th Cir. 1982); see also Fink v. National Sav. &
Trust Co,, 772 F.2d 951, 958 «D.C. Cir, 1985).'

A. ERISA Section 502(a)(3) Embodies Trust Law
Principles, Which Recognize A Cause Of Action
Against A Person Who Knowingly Participates
With A Fiduciary In A Breach Of Trust.

Courts of equity in both England and the United
States have historically exercised jurisdiction over trusts.
A. Seott & W. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts ‘Ath ed.
1s) £197, at ISS. (“Trusts are, and have been since

‘Tt is also a view that has been rejected by a number of district
courts in other cireuits. See, e.g. Pension Benefit Guar, Carp.
*, Ross, 733 FL Supp. 1005, 1008 (M.DIN.C, 1990); Pension Fund
Local 70! « Omni Funding Group, T31 F. Supp. 161, 176-179
(DN. 1900): Rroek ¢. Gerace, 685 F. Supp. 568, 566° CDN.
1986): Dongron «. Sehmouten, 502 F. Supp. 1861, 13895-13806 CD.
Nev. 1984): Freand ¢. Marshal! & Isley Bank, ASS Fo Supp. 629,
641-42 (WD. Wise. L9T7o),

vr

they were first enforced, within the peculiar province of
courts of equity.”'. The remedies utilized by equity courts
concerning when trusts are in their purview are thus,
by definition forms of equitable relief and are within
the power of a federal court to award under ERISA
Section 502(a1(3), 29 U.S.C. £ 1132¢a1 63),

There is no historical dispute concerning whether equity
courts could award money damages against a person who
knowingly participated in another person’s breach of
trust.

Anyone who participates with a trustee in a breach
of Uvust may be held liable in a court of equity to
the cestui que trust. If he has received and still holds
the Lrust property or its proceeds. he may be held as
constructive trustee thereof; (f l+ has never received
or no longer holds the trust property or its proceeds,
he may be held lichle in equity for damages,

Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 Harv. L.
tev, 454, 454 11921) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Blythe
. Flagdale, 1 Ch. 337, 351-52 (1889); Blankenship rv.
Boyle, 329 FL Supp. 1089, 1112 + D.D.C. 1971): Gilbert
r El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1984);
International Community Corp. vo Vietoruy Young, 486
So, 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 19861; Shuster ve. North
American Mortgage Loan Ce., 40 NE, 180, 143° (Ohio
1942). See also G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of
Trusts and Trustees £901 (2d ed, 1982) ‘trust “bene-
ficiary, as equitable owner of the trust res has the right
that third persons shall not knowingly join with the
trustee in a breach of trust.”+; Seott & Fratcher, supra,
£ 326.5; Restatement (Second) of Trusts £326 (1959);
Note, Liahility of Bank for Aiding Fiduciary in Purchase
of Nou-Leqgal Securities, 47 Yale Lud. 299, 299 61937)
(noting “the firmly-rooted doctrine that anyone know-
ingly aiding or participating in a breach of trust is joint-
ly and severally liable with the trustee.”).

Given the traditionally accepted meaning of equitable
reel, the language of Section 502¢ta'(3) authorizes a
participant or beneficiary in an employee benefit’ plan
to bring an action against a person who knowingly par-
ticipates in a fiduciary’s breach of duty under ERISA.
“We must give effect to this plain language unless there
is good reason to believe Congress intended the language
to have some more restrictive meaning.” Shaw v, Delta
Air Lines, lue., 463 U.S. 85. 97 11982).

Bb. The Language And Purpose Of ERISA Support
Equitable Relief Against Non-Fiduciaries.

The premise of the decision below is that if money
damages were available under Section 502¢a1(3), Section
409+ at's language requiring that fiduciaries “make good

. any losses to the plan resulting from such breach,”
29 ULS.C. § 1109+a), would be rendered superfluous. The
Ninth Cireuit’s limiting construction of Section 502
ia: (3) is wrong becnuse the provisions can be read to co-
exist to provide the full range of equitable relief as Con-
gress intended.

1. The Ninth Circuit's Artificial Limitation On
Equitable Relief Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3)
Is Inconsistent With Congressional Intent.

The object of statutory construction is to determine
the intent of the legislature. See Smith v. Wade, 461
Us. 30, 65 11985'. Canons of statutory construction
are merely aids in determining the legislature's intent.
“No single canon of interpretation can clarify with cer-
tainty exactly what the drafters intend.” N. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Coustrvettorn £ 45.05, at 23 5th ed.
1992),

The court of appeals, however, with a single-minded
focus on one of a myriad of canons of statutory construe-
tion interpreted ERISA in a manner demonstrably in-

‘

colsistent with Congress’ intent “to promote the interests
of employecs and their beneticiaries in employee benefit
plans.” Shaw v, Delta Air Lines, lne., 463 U.S. 85, 90
(1s2). Indeed, the Ninth Cireuit’s opinions in this case
and in Nieto v, Beker, 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir, 1988), are
utterly harven of any analysis of statutory purpose. The
opinions fail to point to a single expression of statutory
purpose in either ERISA or its voluminous legislative his-
tory that explains why Congress would want to insulate
from liability aiders and abettors of fiduciaries who breach
theiy statutory responsibilities. The result of this single-
minded focus is so inconsistent with ERISA’s purpose in
that it affords “less protection to employees and their
beneficiaries than they enjoved before ERISA was en-
acted.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 114 (1989),

ERISA’s statement of purpose, its legislative history,
and its interpretation by this Court, all stand in stark
contrast to the rigid and mechanical approach that the
court of appeals used in limiting Section 5021a1 (37's
reach. In ERISA’s declaration of policy, Congress stated
that ERISA was intended to “protect... the interests
of participants in employee benefit plans and their bene-
ficiaries, . . . by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.” 29
U.S.C. © 100Ltb+. The Ninth Cireuit, in contravention
of this purpose, would limit available remedies and, as
this cause so amply demonstrates, deny participants in
employee benefit plans recourse in the federal courts to
seek redress against parties whose improper actions en-
abled a fiduciary to violate its statutory duties. The
Ninth Cireuit’s holding is thus at odds with FRISA’s
congressiona! declaration of policy.

It is also at odds with ERISA’s legislative history. The
bili that emerged from conference to become ERISA
authorized participants to bring actions for equitable re-
lief. The committee reports <tate that Congress intended

S

Section 502ta118+ to provide “the full range of
equitable vemedics available in both state and federal
courts.” As discussed above, equity courts have long
granted relief against non-fiduciaries for knowing par-
ticipation in a trustee’s breach. Therefore, interpreting
ERISA to limit equitable relief would undermine the
protection of employee interests that is at ERISA’s core.

Moreover, this Court, reviewing ERISA’s legislative
history, has found that Congress intended for the federal
courts “to develop a federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERIDSA-regulated plans,” Firestowe
Tire & Rebheor Co. ce. Bruch, 489 US. at 110. quoting
Pilot Life lus. Co. v. Dedeaus, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
This authority includes the fashioning of appropriate
equitable relief under ERISA Section 502(a113), Masse-
chusclts Mutual Life Ins, Co. ve. Russell, A473 USS. 134,
155 11985) (Justice Brennan, concurring). Sce also 120
Cong. Ree. S20.942 «daily ed. Aug. 22. 1974) (remarks
of Senetor Javits, ranking minority member of Senate
Labor Committee: Congress “intend|s| that a body of
Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts
to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under
private Welfare and pension plans.” )."

ERISA’s legislative history points to the Labor-
Management Act as a model for its own enforcement
sechome., ThE. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 98d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). reprinted ty 1974 US. Code Cong. & Ad. News
5038, 5109. This Court has instructed that federal com-

2S. Rep. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin, News 4838.

‘The Ninth Circuit has itself observed that the congressional
invitation to develop a bedy of common law granted “authority to
the courts to develop princ’ples governing arens of the low regu-
lating employee benefit plans that had previously been the exclusive
province f state law.” Menhorn ev. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
TBS Fd 1406, 1490 (oth Cir, 1o84).

9

mon law in the context of the Labor-Management Act
involves

looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning
a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range
of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem... . state law, if compatible
. may be resorted to in order to find the rule that
will best effectuate the federal policy.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
457 (1957) ‘citations omitted).

As this Court has noted, ERISA “abounds with the
language and terminology of trust law.” Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, A886 U.S. at 110. ERISA’s over-
riding purpose is to protect the interests of participants
in employee benefit plans. ERISA Section 2¢bi, 29
U.S.C, 1001(b). Therefore, it is natural for courts to
turn to trust law for remedies that will enhance the pro-
tection of employee interests in pension and welfare
plans. See 120 Cong. Rec. $29,932 ‘daily ed. Aug. 22,
1974) ‘comments of Senator Williams, Chair of the
Senate Labor Committee: Congwress intended in ERISA
“to make applicable the law of trusts.”). Such relief is
“consonant with the purpose of the Act as declared by
Congress and plainly disclosed by its structure.” Gruver
ve. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir, 1944).

2. Equitable Remedies Under Section 502(a)(3) Are
Available, Irrespective of ERISA Section 109(a).

The premise of the court of appeals’ analysis—that
giving full effect to ERISA Section 502+a''3) would
render ERISA Section 409(a+ a superfluitv—is based
on a mistaken understanding of the statute and how its
enforcement provisions were constructed by Congress.
The separate provisions do not limit the relief available
to participants, but co-exist to provide a full range of
remedies under ERISA.

})

A plausible explanation for the interplay between See-
tions JO9 and 502ta+ 63) is evident from the statute itself.
Part dof Tithe Tof ERISA establishes standards for the
behavior of fiduciaries. Section 409ta). which appears
in this part of ERISA, mandates monetary awards against
breaching fiduciaries Who cause loss to a plan. By speci-
fving the types of relief available against fiduciaries undey
Section 409, Congress established a floor of relief for
specific cases, irrespective of the relief available under
the federal common law.

The provision of relief against fiduciaries under Section
Wa), however, does not mean that Congress intended
to preclude courts from awarding similar remedies
against non-fiduciaries under Section 5021a1(3). In See-
tion S02 tat t3+, Congress gave the courts the authority
to determine the type and scope of equitable relief neces-
sary to effectuate ERISA’s purposes. See lngersoll-Rand
Co. «. McClendon, 111 8S. Ct. 478, 486 (19904. Thus, in
uppropriate situations, the federal common law may pro-
vide for relief that meets the floor of specified remedies
under Section 409(a+. This construction of ERISA See-
tions 502(a) 13) and 409+) allows both provisions to co-
eXist, consistent with the principle of giving effect to all
of a statute’s provisions, See, eg., Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp, 442 US, 330, 3389 11979),

Il. OBRA’S CREATION OF A’ CIVIL PENALTY
AGAINST NON-FIDUCTARIES WHO KNOWINGLY
PARTICIPATE IN A BREACH OF TRUST MAKES
CLEAR THAT COURTS MAY ASSESS PENALTIES
AGAINST SUCH NON-FIDUCTARIES.

In 1980, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1989 (‘OBRA), Pub. L. No, 101-239.
£2101, 108 Stat. 123, which among other provisions, added
a new Section 502¢/), 29 U.S.C, £ 113821/) to ERISA. See-
tion 502i) provides that

1]

In the case of (Ay any breach of fiduciary responsi-
hility under tor other violation of) part four by a
fiduciary, or (Bi any knowing participation in such
* breach or violation by any other person, the Secre-
tary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary
oy other person in an amount equal to 20 percent of
the applicable recovery amount.

ERISA § 5021/1115, 29 U.S.C. § 1121/1661) Cemphasis
added).

The term “applicable recovery amount,” in turn, is
defined as

. any amount which is recovered from a fiduciary
or other porsenr with respect to a breach or violation
described in paragraph (1)—pursuant to any settle-
ment agreement with the Secretary, or (Bi ordered
by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other
person to a plan or its participants and beneficiaries
in a judicial proceeding instituted by the Secretary
under subsection (a) (2!) or tarde,

ERISA £ 5021/) 1:2), 29 U.S.C. £11821/162)) emphasis
added),

Thus, Section 50211) imposes an award of civil penalties
when the Secretary recovers damages under Section
HOZial (5+, 20 ULS.C. £ 1182¢a1 15). Section 502¢a) 15)
authorizes the Seeretary to bring a civil action “to enjoin
any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter, or (Br to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief ‘i+ to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any
provision of this subchapter.” Thus, Congress premised
the civil] penalty under Section 502'/) on the existing
availability of money damages as a form of “equitable
relief” against a person who knowingly participated in
a fiduciary’s breach of trust.'

‘Tn 1989, four of the five circuits that had considered the issue
had held that a participant could bring a civil ectlon for money
damages against a person who knowingly participated in a fidu-

12

In the case now before the Court, the court of appeals
rejected this apparent confirmation of the statute’s reach.
The court of appeals held that Section 502(/) “applies to
the Secretary only, not to plan participants.” (J.A. 43.)
Based on this construction, the court below reasoned that
only the Seeretary may obtain make-whole relief against
a non-fiduciary.

Section 5021/1, however, did not, as the court of ap-
peals apparently believes, create a new civil remedy under
which the Secretary could obtain monetary relief for
damages to the plan. Rather, it tacked on a civil penalty
to damages already recoverable by the Secretary under
Section 502'a''5', which was not amended. Since the
relevant language of Sections 502:a'(5) and (aii3) is
identical, the inescapable conclusion is that Section
H021a' 13+ also authorizes make-whole relief that would
have been granted by a court of equity. Sve Estate of
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co. 112 S.Ct. 2589. 2596
(1992) «“identical terms within an Act bear the same
meaning.” |

clary’s breach of duty. Whitfield v. Lindemann, 852% F.2d 1298 (5th
Cir, 1988). ecort. denied suh nom. Ale pak e«. Dole, 199 US. lor
1989): Brock «. Hendere hott, $40 F.2d 399, 342 (6th Cir, 1988 }
Lowen oe. Tower Asset Management Ine, 829 F 2d 1209. 1220-1221
2d Cir, 1987): Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, LOTR (7th Cir,
1982). Another circuit suggested in dictum its agreement. Fink
Vationel Sav, & Trust Co, 772 F.2d 951, 98 (D.C. Cir, 1985)
Moreover, most district courts that had considered the issue with
out the henefit ef guidance from a court of appeals also agreed
See note 1, infra.

* The court of appeals also reasoned that Congress failed to ex-
pressly overrule its earlier holding in Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868
9th Cir. 1988) when Congress enacted Section 502) 1). But Nieto and
Section 502(/) cannot coexist. ERISA Section 502(1) could not
he given effect opvainst non-fiduciaries unless Section 502/a) (3)'s
yrant of equitable relief permitted a find’ng of liability against
a person whe knowingly participetes in a fiduciary breach. The
Ninth Circuit's view that Congress acquiesced by not explicitly

13

Il. RECOGNITION OF A REMEDY AGAINST A NON-
FIDUCIARY IS) CONSISTENT WITH = THIS
COURT'S HOLDING IN MASSACHUSETTS MU-
TUAL INSURANCE CO. vc, RUSSELL.

The court of appeals in the instant case and in Nicto
opined that granting relief against a person for knowing
participation in a fiduciary breach would violate this
Court’s holding in Massachusetts Mutual Ins. Co. +.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145-146 (1985). In Russell, this
Court rejec' -d an invitation to find a private right of
action for extra-contractual damages implied in ERISA.
The Court observed that

The six carefully integrated civil enforcement pro-
visions found in § 502ta) of the statute as finally
enacted .. . provide strong evidence that Congress
did not intend to authorize other remedies that it
simply forgot to incorporate expressly.

Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 ‘emphasis in original).

Russell makes clear that the federal courts will not
imply remedies that Congress did not expressly include
in Section 502(a). Petitioners in this case have not, how-
ever, asked this or any other court to imply a remedy
that Congress did not include in the statute. Section
502(a113) expressly provides for “equitable relief,”
which traditionally has included damages for knowing
participation in a fiduciary’s breach. Certainly it is
within the authority that Congress granted to the federa!
courts to find that such a remedy remains an appropriate
form of “equitable relief’ under ERISA.

rejecting its holding in Nieto is thus seriously misenided. Sve«
HR. Ren. No. 247, lOlst Cong., let Sess. 77-78, reprinted in 1989
tS. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 1906, 1969-1970

14

CONCLUSION
ror the foregoing reasons, AARP respectfully asks the
Court to reverse the holding of the court below and to
iid Uhat non-tiduciaries are liable under ERISA for know-
ing participation in a fiduciary breach.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN S. ZALEZNICK
CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES
(Counsel of Record)
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
OF RETIRED PERSONS ~
601 E Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20049
(202) 434-2060

NORMAN P. STEIN
P.O. Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
(205) 348-1136
Counsel for Amicus Curias
American Association of
November 1992 Retived Persons

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0265%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
