# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Conroy v. Aniskoff

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 507 U.S. 511

## Text

j

®1-1353
CASE NO. | OFFICE OF THE CLERK

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

THOMAS F. CONROY, PETITIONER
v.

WALTER S. ANISKOFF, JR.,
THE INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN
OF DANFORTH, MAINE, AND
H.C. HAYNES, INC., RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PETER A. ANDERSON
Counsel of record for Thomas F. Conroy
202 Exchange Street, Suite 200
Bangor, Maine 04401
Tel. (207) 947-0303

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether §525 of the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as
amended, 50 U.S.C. Appendix §525,
protects a member of the United States
Armed Forces, during military service,
from seizure and sale of his real
property by a municipal taxing
authority for unpaid taxes on that real
property levied during the period of
military service without a showing of
prejudice resulting from that military

service.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES,
STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES ... Page

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND
UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF

OPINIONS IN THE INSTANT

CASE seeeeeeeneteeneeneeneeneneeeeee#e Page
JURISDICTION *eeeteenteee#teeeeee Page
THE STATUTE INVOLVED ....... Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....- Page
ARGUMENT *eenteeeeeeneeneeeneeeeee# # Page

APPENDIX *“ree@eeeneeeneteeeeeentee ee *# *# @ Page

CASE NO.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

THOMAS F. CONROY, PETITIONER
v.

WALTER S. ANISKOFF, JR.,
THE INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN
OF DANFORTH, MAINE, AND
H.C. HAYNES, INC., RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PETER A. ANDERSON
Counsel of record for Thomas F. Conroy
202 Exchange Street, Suite 200
Bangor, Maine 0440]
Tel. (207) 947-0303

TABLE OF CASES,
STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES

Le Maistre v. Leffers,
et.al. 333 U.S. 1 (1948) .. Page

Mouradian v. The John

Hancock Companies,

930 F.2d 972

(lst Cir. 1991) ........... Page

Townsend v. Secretary

of Air Force,

947 F.2d 942

(4th Cir. 1991) .........2+. Page

Mason v. Texaco, Inc.,
862 F.2d 242
(10th Cir. 1988) .......... Page

Bickford Ve U.S.,
656 F.2d 636
(Ct. Cl. 1981) eoeeeeeeeeenee Page

Pannell v. Continental

Can Company, Inc.,

554 F.2d 216

(Sth Cir. 1977) ....eee200- Page

Ricard v. Birch,

529 F.2d 214

(4th Cir. 1975) wwscceeeees Page
Ray v. Porter,

464 F.2d 452

(6 Cir. 1972) ceccccccccces Page

14, 22

16

15

15

16

15, 16

Wolf v. C.I.R., Day v. Jones,
264 F.2d 82 187 P.2d 181
(3rd Cir. 1959) .........2.2. Page 15 (Ut. 1947) wcaceeeseseeeeese Page 17

Peace v. Bullock,
40 So.2d 82
(Ala. 1949) eeeteeeeeeseee#8eeteee#€e’?. Page 17

King v. First Nat Bank STATUTES
of Fairbanks,
647 P.2d 596

(Ak. 1982) eeeeoeeoeeoeeeeee00 Page 17 P.L. 102-12 eevee eeeeeeeveee Page 20

Syzemore v. County of 50 U.S.C. App. §520 ....... Page 17

Sacramento, 127 Cal. Pptr.

741 (1976) eeeeeeevoeveeee ere Page 17 50 U.S.C. App. §521 eee eeee Page 17, 20

King Ve Zagorski, 50 U.S.C. A . §522 eee eee Pa 17

207 So.2d 61 _ "7 “a

(Pla. 1968) eeeeveveeeeeeeeee Page 16 50 mF App. §523 eee05eee Page 17

Illinois Nat. Bank of 50 U.S.C. App. §525 ....... Page 7, ll,

Springfield v. Gwinn, 12, 14,

61 N.E.2d 249 15, 17

(IT11. 1945) wwneseeeeeeeees Page 17 18, 19,
21

Donaghy v. Leighton,

351 A.2d 125 50 U.S.C. App. §526 .....+. P 7

(Me. 1976) *enerieeneteeneteee#nseeee#ee#e Page 10 PP . —- :

50 De® eCe A . l se © ft fe © @ 7

McCance v. Lindau, ~ wages

492 A.2d 1352 50 U.S.C. ; ; ee

(Md. 1985) eoeeeeeneeneneeneeeee Page 17, 18 ° . APP $992 , stat rage ss
36 MoR.S.A. $943 wrsccccces Page 10

Bailey v. Barranca,

488 P.2d 725

(N.Mex. 1971) ..... TeTTTTT Page 16

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF OPINIONS IN THE INSTANT CASE

The opinion of the Superior
Court of the State of Maine was
rendered on November 6, 1990, and is
contained in the Appendix. The opinion
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
was rendered on November 27, 1991, and
is contained in the Appendix. It may be

found at 599 A.2d 426 (Me. 1991).

JURISDICTION

On November 27, 1991, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,
entered a judgment affirming the
decision of the Maine Superior Court
entered on February 19, 1991.

This Court has jurisdiction to
grant a Writ of Certiorari because the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the
court of last resort in the State of
Maine, has decided a federal question
in a way that conflicts with the
decisions of other state courts of last
resort and with the decisions of
several United States Courts of
Appeals. Further, this Honorable Court
has jurisdiction because the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, has decided an
important question of federal law ina

-5-

way which conflicts with the applicable
decision of this Court.

28 U.S.C. §1257 confers
jurisdiction on this Court to review
the judgment in question by Writ of

Certiorari.

THE STATUTE INVOLVED

§525. Statutes of limitations as

affected by period of service

The period of military service
shall not be included in computing any
period now or hereafter to be limited
by any law, regulation, or order for
the bringing of any action or
proceeding in any court, board, bureau,
commission, department, or other agency
of government by or against any person
in military service or by or against
his heirs, executors, administrators,
Or assigns, whether such cause of
action or the right or privilege to
institute such action or proceeding
shall have accrued prior to or during
the period of such service, nor shall
any part of such period which occurs

oFe

after the date of enactment of the
Soldiers’ and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
Amendments of 1942 be included in
computing any period now or hereafter
provided by any law for the redemption
of real property sold or forfeited to
enforce any obligation, tax, or

assessment.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner was on active
duty with the United States Army from
November 26, 1966, through the date of
trial, without interruption. He owned
two lots in the Town of Danforth,
Maine, on which minimal taxes were
assessed. Despite the Petitioner's
keeping the Town of Danforth advised of
his changing addresses, he received no
tax bills for the years 1984, 1985, and
1986. The Town of Danforth had
continued to send them to an earlier
address and they did not reach him at
his many duty stations throughout the
world. The Town of Danforth then seized
his land for taxes and sold it pursuant
to the law of the State of Maine. Under
Maine law, a lien is placed on the

-9-

property and the owner has 18 months in
which to redeem before title ripens in
the municipality. 36 M.R.S.A. §943.

The Maine statute provides a procedure,
employed by the Town of Danforth, by
which the municipality's tax title may
be perfected and the owner's right to
redeem the property may be foreclosed
without actual notice to the property
owner, provided notice is mailed to the
property owner's "last known address."
Such notice was mailed, in this
instance, to Petitioner's former
address as reported to the Town of
Danforth in 1983. Upon foreclosure,
title vests absolutely in the
municipality, and the municipality is
not required to account for any
proceeds from its sale or use of the

property. Donaghy v. Leighton, 351 A.2d
-10-

125 (Me. 1976). At trial the parties
Stipulated that all of the Maine
statutory proceedings allowing the Town
to acquire property for non-payment of
taxes were properly followed and that,
were it not for §525 of The Soldiers'
and Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940,
as amended, the Town would have
perfected title in this case.

The Town of Danforth acted
despite the provisions of The Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940,
50 U.S.C. App. §50i et. seg.
Respondents, Walter Aniskoff, Jr. and
H. C. Haynes, Inc., purchased the non-
existent interest of the Town of
Danforth and each received a guitclaim
Geed therefor. Despite subsequent
notice of the Petitioner's ownership
and lack of consent, H.C. Haynes, Inc.

-ll-

clear-cut timber on the land and
carried it away.

The Petitioner's action sought
restoration of his title in the land
and statutory damages and costs for
trespass. The Petitioner raised the
applicability of §525 of The Soldiers'
and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act in his
complaint. The Maine Superior Court
held that §525 of The Soldiers' and
Sailors’ Civil Relief Act did not apply
to protect the Petitioner from the
seizure and sale of his land unless he
could demonstrate that his military
service caused him some hardship which
rendered him unable to pay his taxes.
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine, the only issue raised by the
Petitioner, was the protection afforded
him by §525 of The Soldiers’ and
Sailors’ Civil Relief Act. The Supreme

o) 2e

Judicial Court of Maine, on November
27, 1991, affirmed the decision of the

Maine Superior Court.

ol3<

In Le Maistre v. Leffers, et.
al., 333 U.S. 1 (1948), this Court held
that the provisions of §525 of The
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act
of 1940, as amended, protected a
serviceman who owned land in Florida on
which taxes became delinquent from
seizure and sale of the property by
local taxing authorities for delinquent
taxes while he was on active duty in
the United States Navy. This Court
stated that the provisions of §525 were
clear and unequivocal and protected a
serviceman from seizure of his real
estate for taxes and the subsequent
sale to pay those tdxes. Despite this
decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held to the contrary and ruled

=)

that §525 did not offer your Petitioner
that protection.

The United States Courts of
Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as
the United States Claims Court, have
held that §525 is absolute and no
showing of prejudice is required. The
mere status of being on active duty in

the United States Armed Forces is all

that is required. Mouradian y. The John
Hancock Companies, 930 F.2d 972 (lst
Cir. 1991) (dictum); Mason v. Texaco,
Ince, 862 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1988);
Ricard vy. Birch, 529 F.2d 214 (4th Cir.
1975); Ray v. Porter, 464 F.2d 452 (6th
Cir. 1972); Wolf v. C,I.R., 264 F.2d 82

(3rd Cir. 1959); Bickford v. U.S., 656
F.2d 636 (Ct. Cl. 1981). The United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
-15-

Circuit has held to the contrary and
required of the serviceman a showing
that his military service prejudiced
him in his ability to attend to his

private business. Pannell v.

Continental Can Company, Inc., 554 F.2d
216 (5th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, in a

recent unpublished opinion, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit apparently overruled Ricard v.
Birch without referring to it. Townsend

vy. Secretary of Air Force, 947 F.2d 94?
(4th Cir. 1991) (text on Westlaw).

In addition, two state court
decisions have had held that a showing
of prejudice by the service member was
necessary. Bailey vy. Barranca, 488 P.2d

725 (N.Mex. 1971) and King v. Zagorski,
207 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1968). Other state

courts have held precisely the

-16-

contrary, that is, that no showing of

prejudice is necessary. See e.g.

Peace vy. Bullock, 40 So.2d 82 (Ala.
1949); King v. First Nat Bank of
Fairbanks, 647 P.2d 596 (Ak. 1982);
Syzemore vy. County of Sacramento, 127
Cal. Rptr. 741 (1976); Illinois Nat.
Bank of Springfield vy. Gwinn, 61
N.E.2d 249 (I11. 1945); McCance vy.
Lindau, 492 A.2d 1352 (Md. 1985); Day
vy. Jones, 187 P.2d 181 (Ut. 1947).

If other sections of The
Soldiers’ and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
make “hardship” a relevant factor, then
it is significant that §525 does not.
Por example, attention is respectfully
invited to §§520, 521, 522, 523, 526,
and 531. Since Congress made hardship a
factor in all of those sections,
Congress could have made hardship a

olJe

factor in §525. That it chose not to do
so is of extreme importance.

The opinion in McCance v.
Lindau, 492 A.2d 1352 (Md. 1985),
contains a detailed analysis of the
history of §525 and comes to the
conclusion that if the United States
Congress had intended to require the
servicemen to demonstrate hardship
under §525, it would have been a simple
matter for Congress to have added that
provision. As the Court in McCance
pointed out, more than sixty years have
elapsed since §525 was first enacted.
If there had been any discontent with
the application of that section,
Congress could have either repealed or
amended it. Congress has declined to do
so, however, despite its revisions of
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief

oi 8-

Act numerous times since its enactment.
On March 18, 1991, President
Bush signed the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act Amendment of 1991.
Pub. L. No. 102-12, 102d Congress, lst
Sess. 105 Stat.32. As a result of the
Persian Gulf War, Congress once again
considered §525. Once again it left it
untouched except for substituting
"October 6, 1942" for "the date of
enactment of The Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942."
Since Congress changed §525 slightly,
the omission of a further amendment
requiring a demonstration of hardship
Clearly was not through oversight.
Indeed, Congress enacted two new
provisions to protect service personnel
which require no showing of hardship.
In addition to the existing protection

o}9-

of §521 concerning stays of actions,
Congress provided that all civil
actions then pending involving members
of the armed forces were stayed until
June 30, 1991, without any requirement
to demonstrate hardship. P.L. 102-12,
§6(a). Congress further enacted a new
section which provides that those
personnel providing professional
services will be eligible to have their
professional liability policies
suspended during active service without
regard to hardship. Under this
provision liability insurance carriers
may not charge premiums for
professional liability coverage during
active service by the insured. Carriers
must either refund any premiums paid
for future coverage or credit the
premiums toward premiums to be paid

o20-

after active service ends. 50 U.S.C.
App. §592. Again Congress required no
demonstration of hardship just as it
has required no showing of hardship to
invoke the benefits of §525.

Congress is certainly aware
that some provisions of The Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act require a
showing of hardship and some do not;
nonetheless, Congress has left §525
intact and essentially unchanged.
Section 525 is triggered by the status
of the service member. Section 525 has
never contained a requirement of
hardship and does not now contain such
a requirement. If Congress had wished
to overturn the majority rule and
require a demonstration of hardship to
invoke the protection of §525, it would
have done so. That it has chosen not to

o2l«

do so must not be lightly disregarded.
In view of the foregoing,
Petitioner respectfully submits that it
is entirely appropriate for this
Honorable Court to grant his petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme
Judicial Court of the State of Maine in
order that this Court may resolve the
conflicts which exist between the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
on this issue and between the decision
of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and
this Honorable Court's decision in Le
Maistre v. Leffers and in order to
afford Petitioner the protection
granted by the statutes of the United
States embodied in The Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act. The
Petitioner therefore respectfully
requests that this Honorable Court

o22<

grant his Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter A. Anderson

Counsel of record for Thomas F. Conroy
202 Exchange Street, Suite 200

Bangor, Maine 04401

Tel. (207) 947-0303

=23<

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
WASHINGTON, ss. CIVIL ACTION
Docket No. CV-88-04

Thomas F. Conroy,
Plaintiff

DECISION AND
ORDER

Vs.

Walter Aniskoff, Jr.
and

The Inhabitants of the
Town of Danforth

Defendants

Docket No. CV-88-04
Thomas F. Conroy,
Plaintiff

DECISION AND
ORDER

VS.

H.C. Haynes, Inc.,

eee eee eee ee

Defendant

This matter comes before this
Court as two separate causes
consolidated together, pursuant to M.R.
Civ. P. 42(a), for the purposes of the
present jury waved trial. Trial was
held before this Court on September 26,

1990, at which time all four parties

o2ée

appeared through their respective
counsel. All parties submitted to this
Court appropriate memoranda of law in
support of their respective positions.
After consideration of the entire
record, as well as all the evidence
submitted, including pertinent
stipulations, this Court finds as
follows.

PACTS

The parties to this matter do not
Significantly dispute the pertinent
facts.

Plaintiff, Thomas Conroy, is a
Colonel in the United States Army. He
has been on continuous active duty with
the Army since November 26, 1966. To
date, plaintiff is still on active
duty. Since entering the Army,
plaintiff has been stationed at the
following locations:

a -

Fort Campbell ......... 11/67-9/67
Republic of Vietnam ... 11/67-11/68
Eglin AFB, FL .....+--+- 12/68-10/70
Fort Benning, GA ...... 10/70-7/71
Fort Devens, MA ....... 8/71-7/73
Boston Army Base, MA .. 7/73-6/75
Fort Leavenworth, KS .. 7/75-7/76
Republic of Korea ..... 8/76-8/77
Fort Devens MA ........ 9/77-5/80
Westover AFB MA ....... 6/80-7/82
Fort Devens MA ........ 8/82-1/86
Rome, Italy .....+++e+++ 1/86-8/86
Brunssum, Netherlands . 8/86-present
On or about May 1, 1973, while
stationed at Fort Devens, MA.,
plaintiff purchased the real estate at
issue here and located in Danforth,
Maine. Plaintiff paid all real estate
taxes due on the property from the date
of purchase until 1984. Significantly,
plaintiff paid said taxes while

~26<

stationed in Korea. Though stationed at
Fort Devens, Ma., during~two of the
years in question, plaintiff claims
that he did not receive the tax bills
assessed and due on his Danforth
property for the years of 1984 and
1985. Concerned, plaintiff claims that
in late 1985 he forwarded written
correspondence to Danforth regarding
these two bills but never received a
reply. Upon his move overseas,
plaintiff took no further action in
1986.

Due to expired tax liens assessed
against plaintiff's property for the
years of 1984, 1985, and 1986, Danforth
sold said property to Defendants
Aniskoff and Haynes, Inc. The record
amply demonstretes that Danforth did
send notices to plaintiff at his Fort
Devens address regarding the tax bills

o2t~

for these three years; all were
returned as "undeliverable as addressed
and unable to forward." The Town never
received notice that plaintiff had
changed his address. The Town also sent
plaintiff notices of tax liens and
impending automatic foreclosure which
were also returned as undelivered. The
Town, on or about December 22, 1986,
sold plaintiff's property to said
defendants.

The following stipulation entered
into on September 29, 1990, by all
parties is also significant:

It is hereby
stipulated that all the
statutory proceedings
allowing the Town to
acauire property for non-
payment of taxes were
properly followed in this

@28<

particular instance,
including notice and
recording requirements; and
that were it not for the
Soldiers and Sailors Civil
Relief Act, the Town title
would have been perfected
in this particular

instance.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's sole claim in this
action is that the acquisition of this
property by the Town and subsequent
sale of said property to defendants
herein is void pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
App. § 525. He claims that because §
525 tolls the redemption period
provided by state law, the Town could
not acquire valid title to his
property. This Court notes that the

o2%e

issue regarding the interpretation and
application of 50 U.S.C. App. § 525 to
the facts underlying this matter is
both novel and one of first impression
within this federal circuit and this
state.

Title 50 U.S.C. App. § 525, § 205
of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil
Relief Act (SSCRA), reads in pertinent
part:

Statutes of Limitations as
affected by period of
service.

The period of military
service shall not be

included in computing any

period now or hereafter to
be limited by law...for th>
bringing of any proceeding

in any court, board,

bureau. commission,

=30<

department or other agency
of government...against any
person in military
service...whether such
cause of action or the
right or privilege to
institute such action or
proceeding shall have
accrued prior to or during
the period of such service,
nor shall. any part of such
period which occurs after
the date of enactment of
[this Act] be included in
computing any period now or
hereafter provided by any
law for the redemption of
real property sold or
forfeited to enforce any
obligation, tax, or

assessment.

This Court notes that judicial
interpretation of this statute has
developed a split of authority. Some
courts have interpreted the relevant
language as creating an absolute bar to
the running of any limitations period;
military service of any kind tolls any,
limitations period, the pendency of
which period then runs again from the
date that military service is
terminated. See, e.g., Le Maistre v.
Leffers, 333 U.S. 1 (1948); Mason v.
Texaco, Inc., 862 F.2d 242 (10th Cir.
1988); Ray v. Porter, 464 F.2d 452 (6th
Cir. 1972); Bickford v. United States,
656 F.2d 636 (Ct.Cl. 1981); McCance v.
Lindau, 492 A.2d 1352 (Md.App. 1985);
Syzemore v. County of Sacramento, 127
Cal.Rptr. 741 (Cal.App.3d 1976). The
interpretation of § 525 adopted in this
line of cases is founded on the general

@32<

principle of statutory interpretation
providing that where the language of a
statute is clear, it is to be applied
according to its plain meaning; courts
should not re-write statutes no matter
how absurd the result. See, e.g.,
McCance, 492 A.2d at 1356-57.

Other courts decline to adopt this
rigid interpretation and instead hold
that, with respect to career military
servicemen, no limitations period is
tolled merely because of military
service status; limitations periods may
be tolled upon a showing that said
military service resulted in hardship

excusing timely legal action. See,

@.g., Pannell v. Continental Can Co.,

Inc., 554 F.2d 216 (5th Cir 1977);

Bailey v. Barranca, 488 P.2d 725 (N.M.

1971); King v. Zagorski, 207 So.2d 61
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). The

o33<

interpretation of § 525 adopted in this
line of cases is alternatively based on
the fact that the SSCRA was only
intended to provide relief for one
subject to military service by
conscription who is called away from
civilian life to distant lands and
faced with threats of war. See, e.g.,
King v. Zagorski, 207 So.2d at 64-65.
These courts find the tolling of
limitations periods applicable to
career military servicemen not
handicapped by their military status to
be absurd and illogical. See, e.g., id.
at 67; Bailey, 488 P.2d at 728.

This Court discerns another
critical difference between the two
juxtaposed line of cases. The former
can all be distinguished factually from
the latter cases. In the former line of
cases, with the exception of Le

o34<

Maistre, § 525 is used as a shield to
protect the serviceman from the
application against him of limitations
periods which would have barred him
from asserting otherwise untimely non-
real estate related causes of action.
See Mason, 862 F.2d at 242 (products
liability case involving personal
injury and wrongful death claims); Ray,
464 F.2d at 452 (automobile collision
resulting in personal injury);
Bickford, 656 F.2d at 636 (military
back-pay and allowances); McCance, 492
A.2d at 1352 (assault, assault and
battery, and negligence claims);
Syzemore, 127 Cal.Rptr. at 741
(personal injury claim against city).
This Court also believes that Le
Maistre is distinguishable from the
instant case on the basis of its facts.

See 333 U.S. at 1. Although the case

-35-

clearly involved the application of §
525 to a limitation of redemption
period, it also just as clearly
involved a non-career military
serviceman. Id. at 3. The petitioner
there was on active duty from August
18, 1942, until only December 18, 1945.
Id. Said duty occurred during times of
actual war. This Court interprets La
Maistre to rest firmly on the fact that
it involved a non-career military
serviceman who was called to defend his
country during war ; "(T]he Act must be
read with an eye friendly to those who
dropped their affairs to answer their
country's call." Id. at 6.

This Court is persuaded by the
cardinal rule of statutory construction
that demands that statutes be
interpreted to avoid absurd,
unreasonable or illogical results. See

=36-

e.g., State v. Rand, 430 A.2d 808, 817
(Me. 1981). As the Bailey and King

courts have so forcefully recognized:

Mr. Bailey's
contention, distilled to
its essence, is that
regardless of all other
factual and legal
considerations, by virtue
of the above quoted
statute, he must
automatically prevail. If
his position be
meritorious, it would mean
that a career service
person could buy real
estate, ignore and
disregard his tax
responsibilities for
perhaps thirty years and
then at his leisure during

o37e

the redemption period

following discharge,

reclaim the property.
Bailey, 488 P.2d at 728.

To permit a tax
delinquent to finally
redeem under such
circumstances would be
tantamount to giving a
license to a career service
man to acquire real
property and then with
impunity refuse to pay
taxes thereon for so long
as he should elect to
remain in the service, plus
six months thereafter;
while casually weighing
whether his investment was
worthwhile....Such
interpretation would give a

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career man an unwarranted
weapon not intended by the

act.

King, 207 So.2d at 67. Even the McCance

court recognized the absurdity created

by its interpretation:

In holding that § 525
is to be applied
unconditionally to those on
active military duty, we
are cognizant of the
possibility that absurd
results may ensue.
Conceivably, a career
military serviceman could
for any reason or for no
reason at all wait 30 years
or more before filing a law
suit. The Damoclean sword,
suspended by a single
section of the SSCRA over

-39-

the head of the civilian

populace, was placed there

by Congress. It is for

Congress to sheath or

remove that sword, if it so

desires.
McCance, 592 A.2d at 1357.

Accordingly, this Court interprets
§ 525 to be of limited applicability.
In the case of a career military
serviceman, § 525 will toll the running
of a redemption period only where the
serviceman can show a hardship caused
by active duty in the military. In the
present case, this Court finds that
plaintiff is a career military
serviceman. As such, plaintiff has made
no such hardship allegation. Nor did he
present any evidence from which this
Court might infer that active duty in
the military created such a hardship.

-40-

Accordingly, SSCRA § 525 affords
plaintiff no relief from the Town's
acquisition and subseguent sale of his
Danforth, Maine, property.

WHEREFORE, the entry is:

This Court finds in favor of
defendants in both matters CV-88-04 and
CV-88-78. Accordingly, both CV-88-04
and CV-88-78 are dismissed.

DATED: Nov. 6, 1990
/s/

—_——

Eugene W. Beaulieu
Justice, Superior Court

-4l-

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
Reporter of Decisions
Decision No. 6005

Law Docket No. WAS-90-575

THOMAS F. CONROY

TOWN OF DANFORTH et al.

Argued September 3, 1991

Decided November 27, 1991

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS,

WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, and

COLLINS, JJ.

-42-

PER CURIAM

Thomas F. Conroy, who is now a
colonel in the United States Army and
has been on continuous active duty
since 1966, brought the present action
in the Superior Court (Washington
County, Beaulieu, J.) seeking to quiet
title to certain land in Danforth that
the Town of Danforth had purported to
acquire from him by statutory
foreclosure of a tax lien mortgage for
nonpayment of taxes. In the action,
which also sought damages for trespass,
Conroy joined as additional defendants
two private parties to whom the Town
had sold the land by quitclaim deed
after the statutory 18-month period of
redemption had expired. For the purpose
of this action, the parties made the
following stipulation:

[A]ll of the statutory

-43-

proceedings allowing the 7 judgment for the Town of Danforth and

Town to acquire property the other defendants.

for nonpayment of taxes As the sole issue on his appeal
were properly followed in to this court, Conroy challenges the
this particular instance, Superior Court's interpretation of the
including notice and Soldiers' and Sailor's Civil Relief
recording requirements; Act. We are evenly divided on that
and...were it not for the issue.

Soldiers'and Sailors' Civil Accordingly, the entry is:
Relief Act [of 1940, as Judgment for defendants

amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ affirmed by an evenly

501-591 (1988)], the Town's divided court.

title would have been

Al "
perfected in this 1 concurring

Attorney for the Appellant:

particular instance. fetes i. cebeonen.’ ten. tocethet
0 ;
Rejecting Conroy's contention, a Ang = eae St

B re) Mai 04401
the court ruled in a full opinion that angor, maine

Attorneys for the Appellees:

the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Kevin M. Cuddy, Esq. (orally)
; CUDDY & LANHAM

Act did not protect Conroy from the Building 4 West - Suite C
, ; 700 Mt. Hope Ave.

running of the 18-month redemption Bangor, Maine 04401

(for H.C. Haynes, Inc.)
period. The court accordingly entered Y 4

-45-
-44-

John A. Mitchell, Esq. (orally)
273 Main St.

Calais, Maine 04619

(for Walter Aniskoff, Jr.)

Torrey A. Sylvester, Esq. (orally)
64 Main St.

Houlton, Maine 04730
(for Town of Danforth)

-46-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0246%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.