# Amicus Curiae Brief — Lee v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 505 U.S. 830

## Text

s Sapreme Court, WS.
(14 14) conan
& (14,

Nos. 91-155 & 91-339 MAR 4 1992

| OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. and BRIAN RUMBAUGH,

Petitioners and Cross-Respondents,
VS.

WALTER LEE, Superintendent of Port Authority Police,
Respondent and Cross-Petitioner.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
_—————————————————————————————— __..________

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

KENT S. SCHEIDEGGER*
CHARLES L. HOBSON
JEANNE M. ANDRACHEK
Criminal Justice Legal Fdn.
2131 L Street (95816)

Post Office Box 1199
Sacramento, California 95812
Telephone: (916) 446-0345

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

*Attorney of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

May the solicitation and receipt of contributions be
prohibited from the public concourses of airports?

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ee ance veces ss deee es eees i
EE iv
interest OF amiicus Curine ....................0000- |
Summary of facts and case ....................... 2
ee eed cc ce ccs voescceeces 3
EEE Ee 4
I
The Court should address the solicitation question before
Sees UU POEM 2... ee eee 4
II
Solicitation is not exempt from regulation ........... 6
A. Pre-scnasumbureg Cases ................... 7
B. The SI re 14
itl

The government has substantial interests in restricting
unin..ted personal solicitation for the immediate

EE 16
IV

The state may constitutionally ban such solicitation in the

airport, regardless of whether it is a public forum .. 20

ESTEE 21

eu, ence, ARG Manmer................. 24

EE ee 27

(iii)

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991) . 6
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 95 L. Ed. 1233,

ue Soh |: eerrerrr errr 6, 12, 13, 14, 18
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 84 L. Ed. 1213,
pf Re Pree e 8, 14, 16, 20

Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence,
468 U. S. 288, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221,

104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984) .......... 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 85 L. Ed. 1049,

base 4. | Pperrererrerrr ere rey rrr sy 9
Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 87 L. Ed. 1324,

Gas A EU be idea ceesuvesesecdanaans 5
Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. 2d 112

ef ere rer rere Port roe rer re 12
Green River v. Bunger, 58 P. 2d 456 (Wyo. 1936).... 12

Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 69 L. Ed. 2d 298,
bee eee ree 18, 19, 25

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 925 F. 2d 576 (CA2 1991) ............. 2,3, 24

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147

(5): . & || ere A
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Barber, 650 F. 2d 430 (CA2 1981) ............ 3, 18

Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 87 L. Ed. 809,
RP te Re GU 0 os ovis as ues sassananactees 9

Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 82 L. Ed. 949,

ree reer ray 8
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 87 L. Ed. 1313,

Sr ae ae I 86 5's esi dA oa eee 5, 11, 13
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292,

GPS. CO BPC osc cee cece ee Oe OS
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395, 97 L. Ed. 1105,

a es WOE ag eos cng er seo 7

Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781, 101 L. Ed. 2d 669,
SUS DS. Ct. SOG7 CIFUB) . wc ccc eee ces 6, 7, 22

Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
444 U.S. 620, 63 L. Ed. 2d 73,

ed be 6, 7, 14, 15, 21, 22
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 155,
ek a PEN ach See en cee oe eats 7,8

Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,
467 U.S. 947, 81 L. Ed. 2d 786,

Pe Gs UU 66 cS edb Cesctabannk anueee lee
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 75 L. Ed. 1117,
PE GA PO RUMOED, 6 bn bb cee veccccedetouarouss 22

Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization.
493 U. S. 378, 107 L. Ed. 2d 796,

PE Os UU: oh os cewe sect ee ee ewes 13, 26
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342.

es I ei ee ee
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1,

103 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989)... 2.2.02... 13
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 89 L. Fd. 430.

Pe ee ee 669 oto wc eebencin 11, 12, 16, 21

Vi

United States v. Kokinda, 111 L. Ed. 2d 571,

110 S. Ce. 3115 (1990) ...........3, 45,6, 16, 19,5
United States v. O’Brien, 39) U. S. 367, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672,

2 ee SAYS ere eee y 4 i
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,

105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) ...... 25, 26
Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341

A EE PEL N GT Eis CTR TET 6

Regulations

Airport Rules and Regulations, the Port Authority of

New York and New Jersey, Chapter II] .......... 20
jee ek RF OATS | Peereerrerrere Sorere 18
43 Fed. Reg. 38824 (1978) ........ VTP OI ere

Treatise

R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court
Peutns Fie COE. THD os on ks 55 0 Ws ve wte, 16

Miscellaneous
American Heritage Dictionary 294 (2d Coll. ed. 1985) . 10

Leo, Fighting for Our Public Spaces,
U. S. News & World Report, Feb. 3, 1992 ......... 2

Wilson and Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Saje,
Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1989 .................... 2

Wilson and Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic Monthly, March 1982 . 2

a ee ee ee ree

a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 199]

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISIINA
CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. and BRIAN RUMBAUGII,

Petitioners and Cross-Respondents,
VS.

WALTER LEE, Superintendent of Port Authority Police,
Respondent and Cross-Petitioner.

_—-
a

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF)! is a
non-profit California corporation organized to participate
in litigation on behalf of victims of crime and the law-
abiding public.

In Question 3 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
petitioner states the issue as involving “speech that, at
worst, might cause [travelers] momentary delay.” In
reality, the worst is far worse. The conduct which petition-
ers seek to engage in concurrently with their speech
creates a situation fraught with potential for fraud, duress,
and victimization of the helpless. These concerns are not
based on idle speculation. They are based on the judicial-

1. CJLF has received written consent of the parties to file this brief.

Le)

ly determined facts from prior litigation involving the peti-
tioner.

The cumbersome machinery of the criminal justice
system is suited for dealing with major crime. It is
dismally ineffective in dealing with the widespread petty
crime that plagues our society today. Such crime is a
major factor in the growing, malignant cancer of decay
and disorder. See generally Leo, Fighting for Our Public
Spaces, U. S$. News & World Report, Feb. 3, 1992, at 18;
Wilson and Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, Atlantic
Monthly, Feb. 1989, at 46; Wilson and Kelling, Broken
Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic
Monthly, March 1982, at 29.

A decision that government is powerless to regulate in-
person solicitation for the immediate payment of money
would be detrimental to the rights of law-abiding persons
which CJLF was formed to protect. CJLF therefore has
an interest in this case.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

Petitioner, the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. (“Krishna Society”), seeks to engage
in activities it calls sankirtan in the major New York
airports. Those airports are operated by the Port Authori-
ty of New York and New Jersey. Respondent is the late
Walter Lee, who was superintendent of police for the Port
Authority. As of this writing a new superintendent has
not yet been substituted as a party.

Sankirtan “consists of ‘going into public places, dissem-
inating religious literature and soliciting funds to support
the religion.’ While the distribution or sale of religious
literature is a major part of the ritual, its primary purpose
appears to be fundraising.” /nternational Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925 F. 2d 576, 577
(CA2 1991). The Krishna Society and sankirtan are

FO ee AE ee

—_

described in detail in /niernational Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 151-154
(N.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F. 2d 430
(CA2 1981). Barber notes that while sankirtan traditional-
ly depended on “true speech and gentle speech,” the
theory and practice in the modern American branch of the
religion are dramatically different. See 506 F. Supp., at
152-153.

The Port Authority promulgated a regulation forbid-
ding both “sale or distribution of . . . written material” and
the “solicitation and receipt of funds” inside the airport “if
conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a continu-
ous or repetitive manner.” 925 F. 2d, at 578-579. The
Port Authority does not seek to limit either activity on the
sidewalk outside the airport. /d., at 578, n. 2. The
District Court struck down the regulation as to both the
literature distribution and the solicitation limits.

The Court of Appeals reversed in part, upholding the
ban on solicitation. The majority found the case indistin-
guishable from United States vy. Kokinda, 111 L. Ed. 2d
S71, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990), where this Court upheld a
similar ban on post office property. 925 F. 2d, at 582.
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
insofar as it struck down the ban on distribution of
literature. Jbid.

On the petition for certiorari, case 91-155, the Krishna
Society seeks to strike down the solicitation regulation.
On the cross-petition, case 91-339, the Port Authority
seeks to reinstate the literature distribution regulation. In
this Brief Amicus Curiae, CJLF will only address the
solicitation issue in the petition, ie. case 91-1595.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The concurring opinion in United States vy. Kokinda
stated that the government could prohibit personal

solicitation for immediate payment of money in the
circumstances of that case, regardless of whether the
location was a public forum. Whether this is correct ts an
important question that needs to be answered. The Court
should therefore address the solicitation issue first. The
public forum question can and should be addressed to
resolve the literature distribution question raised by the
cross-petition.

The statement that solicitation for a religious cause ts
“fully protected speech” is an oversimplification. A
careful analysis of precedents reveals that this sweeping
generalization is subject to important qualifications. First,
receipt of money or subscriptions is conduct, subject to
regulation. Second, solicitation is subject to reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions, the same as any
other speech.

The government has a substantial interest in regulating
personal solicitation for immediate payment. Past cases
show that such solicitation creates a situation fraught with
potential for fraud, duress, and thievery, beyond the ability
of the criminal law to effectively check.

The solicitation regulation deals with the manner of
combined speech and conduct. It is valid if it passes
either the O'Brien test or the time, place, and manner test.
It passes both. It is nondiscriminatory, content-neutral,
and leaves open ample alternatives for conveying the
Krishna Society's message.

ARGUMENT

I. The Court should address the solicitation question
before the public forum question.

United States v. Kokinda, (11 L. Ed. 2d 571, 10S. Ct
3115 (1990) upheld a ban on solicitation on the grounds
of a post office without a clear resolution of the question

of whether the grounds were a public forum. The Ko-
Kinda plurality based its decision on the conclusion that
the post office and its grounds were a non-public forum.
lil L. Ed. 2d, at 584, 110 S. Ct., at 3121. However, the
fifth vote was based on the assertion that “personal
solicitation on postal property for the immediate payment
of money” can be prohibited as a time, place, and manner
restriction, regardless of whether the property is a public
forum. 111 L. Ed. 2d, at 589, 110 S. Ct., at 3126 (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring in the judgment).

Amicus CJLF respectfully submits that the Court
should address Justice Kennedy's position in Kokinda first.
The Court can then proceed to the public forum issue to
answer the literature distribution question raised by the
cross-petition. This case presents an opportunity to clear
up a half century of rampant confusion regarding solicita-
tion, and that opportunity should be not be passed up.

in 1943, this Court decided a trilogy of cases involving
the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses. Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105; Martin v. Suthers, 319 U.S. 141:
Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157. Justice Jackson,
joined by Justice Frankfurter, wrote an opinion in Douglas
concurring in the result in that case and dissenting in
Murdock and Martin. After reviewing the record of the
Witnesses’ practices and the Court's decisions in Murdock
and Martin, he notes that “both opinions suggest that
there are evils in this conduct that a municipality may do
something about. But neither identifies it, nor lays down
any workable guide in so doing.” 319 U. S., at 177.

Such a workable guide is necessary, Justice Jackson
concludes. “|WJe must do our utmost to make clear and
easily understandable the reason for deciding these cases
as we do. Forthright observance of rights presupposes
their forthright definition. “I think the majority has failed
in this duty.” /d., at 182.

Justice Jackson’s warning proved correct. The field
remains confused. In Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622
(1951), the authors of Murdock and Martin stated that
those cases had been overruled. /d., at 649-650 (Black, J..
dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.). Schaumburg v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 (1980) said
they had not. In Riley v. National Federation of Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 796 (1988), the majority pro-
claims broadly that solicitation is “fully protected speech.”
Yet in Kokinda, supra, the plurality implies and the
concurrence holds that personal solicitation for immediate
payment is subject to substantially greater regulation than
pure advocacy of ideas.

As we will show in detail below, bans on solicitation in
general are different from prohibitions of the kind of face-
to-face solicitation for immediate payment of money
engaged in by the Krishna Society. Yet the lack of clear,
unequivocal authority for the distinction causes confusion.
Some district courts have applied broad language in some
of the cases to contexts far removed from the kinds of
activities involved in those cases. See, ¢.g., Young v. New
York Citv Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 345 (S.D.N-Y.
1990), rev'd, 903 F. 2d 146 (CA2 1990), cert. denied, 111
L. Ed. 2d 516, 111 S. Ct. 516 (panhandling in subway):
Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (panhandlers accosting people on streets).

To clear up this confusion, therefore, amicus respect-
fully requests that this Court address the question of
whether a state can prohibit the personal solicitation for
immediate payment of money, regardless of whether the
place of solicitation is a public forum.

Il. Solicitation is not exempt from regulation.
“Our prior cases teach that the solicitation of charita-

ble contributions is protected speech,” the majority stated
in Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C.. Inc., 487

U. S. 781, 789 (1988). Like many sweeping characteriza-
tions, this one glosses over subtle but important distinc-
tions. “By their very vastness, the themes to be translated
into law lend themselves too readily to the innocent
deceptions of rhetoric.” Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395, 415 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result). -

The word “solicitation” sweeps in a wide variety of
speech and conduct. Whether a_ particular form of
solicitation is protected is a question which cannot be
answered simply by pigeonholing it as “charitable solicita-
tion.” The statement “Give to my widows’ and orphans’
fund or I'll bash your face in” is not protected speech.

Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444
U. S. 620 (1980) is the case normally cited for the proposi-
tion that charitable solicitation is fully protected. Schawm-
burg is based on a discussion of a long line of cases. See
id., at 628-632. These cases do indeed support the
Schaumburg decision, but they do not support the more
extravagant extrapolations that have been made from that
decision. A review of these cases is necessary.

A. Pre-Schaumburg Cases.

In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. i147 (1939)? the Court
struck down an ordinance requiring a permit for any
house-to-house canvassing. In that case, the Jehovah's
Witnesses went house to house, distributing literature and
showing a card which asked for a small contribution to
support the distribution effort. /d., at 1S8. The ordinance
made no distinction between solicitation and distribution
of literature. /d., at 157. “It bans unlicensed communica-
“ion of any views or the advocacy of any cause from door
to door, and permits canvassing only subject to the power
of a police officer to determine, as a censor. what litera-

R
- Sometimes cited as Schinetder v. Ininegton.

ture may be distributed from house to house and who may
distribute it.” /d., at 163 (emphasis added).

The ordinance was struck down under Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U. S. 444 (1938), which had invalidated a sweeping
ban on all literature distribution. 308 U.S, at 164. The
censorship potential of the ordinance, permitting some to
solicit while others were banned, was particularly obnox-
ious. Ibid. The Court was careful to note, however, that
“reasonable hours” and “other features of such activities

.. may be regulated in the public interest without prior
licensing or other invasion of constitutional liberty.” /d.,
at 165. Schneider does not stand for the proposition that
in-person solicitation and receipt of money cannot be
prohibited. That aspect of Schneider's conduct was not
the basis of the permit requirement.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (19490) is another
prior restraint case, involving a license requirement for
solicitation.’ The statute empowered state officials to
decide which causes were “bona fide object|s| of charity”
and which were not. Only the approved charities received
the required certificate. /d., at 302.

This power of censorship vested in state officials
rendered the statute unconstitutional. /d., at 305. The
Cantwell Court was careful to note, however, that solicita-
tion for religious causes was not exempt from “general
and non-discriminatory legislation.” /d., at 304. “The
general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation,
which does not involve any religious test and does not
unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, ts
not open to any constitutionai objection, even though the
collection be for a religious purpose.” /d., at 305.

3. Cantwell is more famous tor ats holding reversing delendant’s other
convicuion for breach of the peace. The latter conviction involves the
degree to which we must tolerate imtolerant expression, an issue belore

this Court in In re Rk { Vv. N\ ; QO-76)78.

In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), a
license requirement for holding a parade was upheld. The
State court had construed the statute to require the
authorities to issue the license conditioned only on
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. /d., at
575-576. Cases involving blanket bans on expression oF
vesting standardless discretion in the licensing officials
were distinguished. /d., at 577-578.

Jamison vy. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) involved
distribution of handbills. The handbills publicized a
meeting to be held later and also included an offer to
deliver books in return for a small donation. Jamison
distributed her handbills in an orderly and quiet manner.
The books were not sold on the street, but would have
been delivered later. The books cost Jamison more than
the donation she requested. /d., at 414-415.

The ordinance was struck down on the authority of
Lovell, Schneider, and Cantwell. Jamison’s “clearly reli-
gious activity” could not be prohibited “merely because
the handbilils invite the purchase of books for the im-
proved understanding of the religion or because the
handbills seek in a lawful fashion to promote the raising
of funds for religious purposes.” /d., at 417.

The Jamison Court appears to have been convinced
that the defendant was engaged primarily in communicat-
ing ideas, and that the fund- raising aspect of her activity
was merely incidental. The same is true of the case which
comes closest to supporting the Krishna Society's position:
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).

Murdock involved a flat license tax on solicitation for
orders for goods of any kind. /d., at 106. The defendants
were, once again, Jehovah's Witnesses distributing their
literature. Whethei they were selling it or merely ee
it away and requesting donations was unclear. See id.. a
107. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, begins a a

10

long song of praise for the “colporteur,”* but then defines
the “single issue” narrowly: “the constitutionality of an
ordinance which as construed and applied requires
religious colporteurs to pay a license tax as a condition to
the pursuit of their activities.” /d., at 110.

Murdock then distinguishes religious activity from
“purely commercial.” /bid. In doing so, the Court takes
pains to stress that the fund-raising portion of the activity
was merely collateral, and that preaching and publicizing
the doctrine was the main object. /d., at 112.

It is clear from the discussion in Murdock that the
“purely commercial” does not include the press. The tact
that Thomas Paine’s pamphlets were sold is cited to
support the argument that sale does not equal “purely
commercial” activity. /d., at 111. Freedom of speech,
press, and religion are cited together as not being limited
“to those who can pay their own way.” /hid. Religious
groups and the press are again mentioned together as not
being free from all taxation. /d., at 112.

The Murdock holding is, therefore, not based on any
distinction between soliciting donations for religious
causes and selling newspapers. It is instead based on the
oppressive nature of the flat license tax. Even after going
to considerable lengths to characterize the activity as non-
commercial, Murdock relies on Commerce Clause prece-
dent for the onerous nature of this tax. See id., at 113.

The heart of Murdock is this: The tax “is a flat license
tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of
activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the Furst
Amendment. Accordingly, it restrains in advance those
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably
tends to suppress their exercise.” /d.. at 114 (emphasis

4 “A peddler of devotional Iterature.” Amerecan lerttave [Tncottonary 204

(2d Coll cd 1985S)

added). Read broadly, this passage may be taken to mean
that there is a constitutional right to solicit in person for
the immediate sale of printed matter or for a donation for
a religious cause. If that is what Murdock means, it has
long since been overruled, as we will show below. Read
narrowly, Murdock simply means that the flat license tax
is an oppressive burden on religion and the press, just as
it is ON Interstate commerce. If that is what Murdock
means, it is still good law, but it has no application to this
case.

Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), yet another
Jehovah's Witnesses case, was decided the same day as
Murdock, The ordinance in question prohibited persons
distributing literature door to door from ringing the
doorbell or knocking. /d., at 142. Citing Lovell, Schneider,
and Cantwell, the Court struck down this ordinance as a

violation of freedom of speech and press, not religion. /d.,
at 143.

Thomas vy. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) indicated that
the issue of solicitation as distinct from pure advocacy
remained open, despite the broad language of Murdock.
In Thomas, a labor union leader gave a speech in Texas
without the required organizer's card for labor solicitation.
He invited the crowd generally to join the union and also
singled out one member of the audience for an individual
appeal to join. Id., at 522-523.

The Court decided in favor of the labor leader.
However, it took pains to note that he did not receive or
solicit any funds, id., at S25, and that under the procedural
posture of the case the solicitation of the individual could
not be separately considered, id., at 528.

A permit cannot be required of one who seeks to
make a speech “to rally support for any social, business,
religious or political cause.” /d.. at 540. “Once the
speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct
which amounts to more than the right of free discussion

|?

a

comprehends, as when he undertakes the collection of funds
or securing subscriptions, he enters a realm where a
reasonable registration or identification requirement may
be imposed.” /bid. (emphasis added). Conduct is differ-
ent from speech, and collection of funds is conduct.

This brings us to Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951). Breard, like the present case, involved a flat
prohibition on in-person solicitation. The ordinance in
Breard prohibited door-to-door sales or solicitation of
orders. /d., at 624-625. After rejecting due process and
interstate commerce challenges, id., at 629-641, the Court
turned to the First Amendment question.

Breard was in the business of selling magazine sub-
scriptions. /d., at 624. Therefore, he had a First Amend-
ment argument. “Only the press or oral advocates of
ideas could urge this point. It was not open to the
solicitors for gadgets or brushe. ” /d., at 641. Breard was
in the same category as the Jehovah's Witnesses and
different from the Fuller Brush Company. The Court
agreed “that the fact that periodicals are sold does not put
them beyond the protection of the First Amendment.”
Id., at 642. However, the selling “brings into the transac-
tion a commercial feature.” /hid.

Breard is consistent with a narrow reading of Murdock,
but not a broad reading. Murdock had held that the
Witnesses’ activities were not rendered pure/y commercial
by the fact that the literature was sold, 319 U. S., at IIL,
but recognized “that religious groups and the press are
Inot| free from all financial burdens of government,” id.,
at 112. Breard similarly recognizes that publications are
still entitled to First Amendment protection, even though
they are sold for a profit, but that the protection Is not

5 Such enactments are commonly called “CGireen River” ordinances aller
Green River v. Fuller Brush Co 065 Vo 2d V12 (OAV VOSS) and Green
River v. Banger, S8 P. 24d 456 (Wyo. 1936), appeal dismissed tor want of

a federal question, 300) U.S. 638 (1937)

13

absolute. The rights of others must be considered. 341
U.S., at 642. In each case, the Court approaches the
activity in question as a protected First Amendment
activity, but with a commercial aspect to it which subjects
it to reasonable regulation and taxation. Compare Mur-
dock, supra, 319 U.S., at 114 (“Tt [the tax] is in no way
apportioned.”) with Swageart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of
Equalization, 493 U. S. 378, 389 (1990) (percentage sales
tax on Bibles, etc., constitutional): see also Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality) (“unnec-
essary sweeping statements in Murdock” disavowed).

Breard is not distinguishable trom Murdock on the
ground that subscription magazines are different from
charitable donations in any way relevant to the First
Amendment question. As discussed above, the rationale
Murdock itself precludes such a distinction. The cases are
distinguishable in that the regulation in Breard was
deemed reasonable, notwithstanding the protected status
of the publications, while the tax in Murdock was not. See
Texas Monthly, supra, 489 U.S... at 23, n. 10. If Murdock
is read more broadly to create a right to solicit free of
reasonable regulation or taxation, then it is to that extent
overruled by Breard, Texas Monthly, and Swaggart.

Breard distinguishes Martin v. Struthers by emphasizing
that Martin involved only the free distribution of literature.
Breard, 341 U. S., at 642-643. Yet Martin was decided the
same day as Murdock, and Murdock saw no significant
difference between the sale of a publication and the
distribution combined with solicitation of a donation. See
319 U.S. at 111. The difference between Breard and
Martin is the manner of solicitation. Martin simply left
leaflets with people advising them of a meeting. 319
U.S. at 142.) Breard employed “possibly persistent
solicitor|s},” 341 U. S.. at 644, who confronted people in
their homes, asking them to make an immediate change in
legal position, ie. contracting to purchase magazines.
Notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of press, the city had the power to protect people from

I4

such confrontations. That, amicus submits, is the true
distinction between Martin and Breard.

Breard confirms what Cantwell said 11 years earlier. A
“State may by general and non-discriminatory legislation
regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting
upon its streets... .” Cantwell, supra, 310 U. S., at 304.
The prohibition on door-to-door sales in Breard was a
reasonable regulation of the manner of solicitation,
justified by the interest of residents in avoiding “the
annoyances of house-to-house canvassing.” 341 U. S., at
644. The annoyance caused by salesmen is greater than
that caused by people distributing handbills. The ban on
door-to-door selling was therefore upheld in Breard, while
prohibitions on free distribution of literature in Lovell and
Martin were struck down.

B. The Schaumburg Case.

Schaumburg vy. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444
U. S. 620 (1980) dealt with a discriminatory prior restraint.
Charities were required to obtain a permit before solicit-
ing. /d., at 623-624. Some charities would be issued the
permit and some would not. Those that spent more than
75% of the proceeds for salaries and administrative
expenses would not be issued the permit. /d., at 624.

Schaumburg reviewed the history described above to
answer the contention that solicitation was completely
unprotected. See id., at 628. After reviewing the history,
Schaumburg concluded that charitable solicitation “has not
been dealt with in our cases as a variety of purely commer-
cial speech.” /d., at 632 (emphasis added).

This conclusion is fully consistent with the statements
in Cantwell and Breard that solicitation, whether for a
charity or a magazine, remains subject to reasonable
regulation. Unfortunately, in discussing Breard, Schawm-
burg dwells on the fact that charitable solicitation was not
involved in that case. 444 U. S., at 631-632. As explained

1S

ante, at 12-14, that is not the true distinction between
Breard on the one hand and Murdock and Martin on the
other.

On its facts, Schaumburg is straightforward. The 75%
requirement operated as a form of censorship. One
medium of communication, door-to-door solicitation, was
open to proponents of some causes but denied to those
deemed less worthy by the government. The connection
between the 75% requirement and the prevention of fraud
was too tenuous to justify such a regulation. /d., at 636-
637. There was no connection at all between the 75%
requirement and the protection of residential privacy and
safety. These interests are invaded to the same degree by
any solicitor. /d., at 638. :

Schaumburg thus plowed no new ground on the status
of solicitation. After Schaumburg, as before, charitable
solicitation is within the protection of the First Amend-
ment but subject to some regulation. The ordinance in
Schaumburg was simply held to be beyond the bounds of
permissible regulation. Schaumburg did not need to
discuss time, place, and manner regulations in any depth.
because the portions of the ordinance which imposed
those kinds of restrictions were not at issue. See id., at
622. n. 1, 639.

In part IV, we will explain why the Port Authority's
prohibition on the “solicitation and collection of funds” is
constitutionally permissible, both as a regulation of
conduct and as a time, place, and manner restriction.
First, though, we will explain in part III why the govern-
ment has a strong interest in regulating in-person solicita-
tion for immediate payment of money.

16

Ill. The government has substantial interests in

restricting uninvited personal solicitation for the
immediate payment of money.

Much of the confusion in this area results from a
failure to distinguish between solicitation in general and
a personal solicitation in which the target is asked to make
an immediate payment of money or some other change in
legal position. The difference was recognized in Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 540 (1945). It is central to the
“reasonableness” determination of the plurality in United
States v. Kokinda, 111 L. Ed. 2d 571, 586, 110 S. Ct. 3115,
3123 (1990), and it is the cornerstone of the Kokinda
concurrence, id., 111 L. Ed. 2d, at 589, 110 S. Ct., at 3125
(Kennedy, J.).

The state has significant interests in the prevention of
fraud and the prevention of duress. See, ¢.g., Cantwell vy.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306 (1940). As example of the
kinds of problems solicitation can involve, we refer to the
facts determined by the District Court in /nternational
Society for Krishna’ Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506
F. Supp. 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). We do not cite them as
the record in this case or imply that the Krishna Society
has engaged in similar frauds in the Port Authority's
airports. We cite them as “published material containing
facts which bear upon the reasonableness of legislation.”
R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court
Practice 565 (6th ed. 1986). These past abuses would be
equally relevant to the reasonableness of the regulation it
they had been perpetrated by an entirely unrelated
organization. They are relevant regardless of whether any
solicitors are presently perpetrating them in the airports.
Government interest is not limited to locking the barn
door after the horse is stolen.

The Krishna Society’s practices in Barber contrast
sharply with those of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Cantwell.
The latter were considered obnoxious precisely because
they pushed their intolerant beliefs so vigorously. 310

17

U.S, at301. A principal complaint in Barber was that the
solicitors concealed their religious affiliation. 506
I. Supp., at 158-159. Rather than spreading their Word,
they falsely or misleadingly told targets that the money
was for “worldwide education and food nates
programs or children’s drug programs,” id., at 159,
“starving children,” id., at 161. Items to be given away or
sold were intentionally chosen a1.d marked to conceal the
solicitor’s Krishna affiliation. /d., at 162. The cryptic
acronyin “ISKCON” was used as a part of this effort. /d.,
at 161.

Nor was misrepresentation the only form of fraud.
The solicitors intentionally miscounted change. They
folded over bills to shortchange people. /d., at 160. They
even stocped to targeting the mentally retarded. /d., at
161.

In addition to traud, the Krishna Society practiced
various forms of duress. Some were subtle, some were
not. Couples with young children were targeted. They
were considered “easy marks because they cannot afford
to divert their attention for very long from watching the
children. Thus, the persistent Krishna solicitor can be
relatively assured of a contribution, just so he will go away
and let the couple go about their business.” Id., at 161.
A related tec hnique was to intentionally hold bills tor a
long time, pretending to make change, until the target was
too tired or distracted to insist on the amount of change
the solicitor had agreed to give /d., at 159, 163. Solici-
tors with less imagination simply disappeared into the
crowd with the change, in one case taken from a young
woman afflicted with cerebral palsy. /d., at 161.

The District Court in Barber tound that regulation of
in-person solicitation was necessary “to combat widespread
fraud that cannot be effectivel checked by the criminal

is

justice system.” Id., at 169 (emphasis added).’ Theft of
small amounts by oral misrepresentation, shortchanging,
or subtle duress is extremely difficult to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt. Any criminal prosecution would involve
an expenditure of the victim’s time worth far more than
the amount taken. This is especially so in an airport,
where the victim is probably from out of town. Indeed,
unscrupulous solicitors probably select airports and state
fairs for precisely this reason.’

Many sources have recognized the special problems of
personal solicitation for immediate payment or other
change of legal position. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S.
622, 644 (1951) noted the problem of the “persistent
solicitor.” The Federal Trade Commission has for 20
years held that it is “an unfair and deceptive act” to make
a door-to-door sale without a three-day “cooling off”
period for the buyer to change his mind. 16 C.FER. §
429.1 (1991).°

The Postal Service came to a similar conclusion. and
the Kokinda plurality quoted its findings with approval.

“Since the act of soliciting alms or contributions
usually has as its objective an immediate act of
charity, 1t has the potentiality for evoking highly
personal and subjective reactions. Reflection

o. The Court of Appeals reversed, 650 IF. 2d 430 (CA2 1981). but substan-
ually the same regulation was ultimately upheld in /effron v Internation.-
al Soctety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
7. In addition to traud and duress, people also have an imterest in not
being, to use the vernacular. “hassled.” This interest might not by itsel!
be sufficient, and the Krishna Society therefore attempts to portray it as
the only interesi involved. Sce Petition tor Writ of Certioran, Question
3. In addition to the other interests, amicus submits, the “hassle tactor™
weiwhs in the balance as a government miterest.

§. “Door-to-door” is not mited to in-home sales for this purpose. I would
meclude sales on the street. /d.. Note Ia)

19

usually is not encouraged, and the person solicited
often must make a hasty decision whether to share
his resources with an unfamiliar organization while
under the eager gaze of the solicitor. ” United
States v. Kokinda, 111 L. Ed. 2d 571, 585, 110 S. Ct
3115, 3123 (1990) (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 38824
(1978)).

Justice Kennedy cites with approval a similar ban
promulgated by the National Park Service for the District
of Columbia Mall and other parks. 111 L. Ed. 2d, at S89-
S90, 11S. Ct, at 3126 (concurrence). These parks are
public forums. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 303, n. 2 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

Both Kokinda and Hejfron approved regulations which
banned or restricted in-person solicitation for immediate
payment in places where other forms of expressions were
freely allowed. Heffron was unanimous on this point. 452
U.S.. at 654; id., at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring in part):
id., at 663 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). “{I|]n-person
solicitation deserves different treatment from alternative
forms of solicitation and expression.” Kokinda, 111
L. Ed. 2d, at 589: 110 S. Ct., at 3126 (Kennedy, J.. concur-
ring in the judgment).

A civilized society must make its rules without forget-
ting its most vulnerable members. lo the seasoned,
sophisticated “frequent flyer.” airport solicitation may be
only a delay, an obstruction, and a nuisance.’ To the
inexperienced, the naive, the frail, the frightened, the
harried, or the physicaily or mentally impaired, it can be
much worse.

7, Potivuoners’ contention that Airy i sohlicitlulmw iw” weepled pu whee.” Pet.
Brief 19. as overstated. Tt would be more accurate to sav that veteran

travelers ure resigned te at because they believe nothing can be dom

20

IV. The state may constitutionally ban such
solicitation in the airport, regardless of whether it is
a public forum.

The regulation at issue in this case is Airport Rules
and Regulations, the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, Chapter II], which reads in part as follows
(emphasis added):

“B. Non-commercial activity at Port Authority air
terminals which are not occupied by a lessee,
licensee or permittee is subject to the following
conditions and restrictions:

“|. The following conduct is prohibited within the
interior areas of buildings or structures at an air
terminal if conducted by a person to or with pass-
ers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner

“(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures,
pamphlets, books or any other printed or written
material.

“(c) The solicitation and receipt of funds.”

The use of the conjunctive in paragraph (c) implies
that pure solicitation not accompanied by receipt would be
permitted. That is, a person who wished to explain his
cause to passers-by and ask them to make a donation
later, such as by mailing it in or by placing it in a collec-
tion box located somewhere else, would be permitted to
do so. Such a regulation, amicus submits, is precisely the
kind which this Court in Canavell v. Connecticut, 310-0. S.
296, 305 (1940) assured the nation would be permitted.
Paragraph (c) is valid regardless of whether the airport is
a public forum.

A. Conduct.

Collecting funds is conduct, and conduct is subject to
regulation, even when it is intertwined with advocacy.
Thomas vy. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945). The tradi-
tional test for regulation of “expressive conduct” is the
four-part test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), the draft-card burning case. The O'Brien test
applies “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ clements are
combined in the same course of conduct... .” /d., at
376. In such cases,

“a government regulation is sufficiently justified | 1]
if it is within the constitutional pewer of the Gov-
ernment; [2] if it furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and [4] if the incidental restriction on
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is -
essential to the furtherance of that interest.” /d.,
at 377 (numbers added).

The first point is rarely a problem. It refers to limita-
tions on government other than the First Amendment,
because otherwise the analysis would become circular.
O'Brien simply noted that the draft was within one of the
enumerated powers of Congress. /hid. The second part,
government interest, is discussed in part TIL, ane.

In Murdock v. Pennsvivania, 319 U.S. 10S, 112 (1943)
and Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Said 444
U.S. 620, 632 (1980), solicitation was held to be within
the category of noncommercial speech only because of its
connection within the religious and environmental messag-
es of the respective groups. The “free expression” in the
third part of O'Brien must therefore refer to the message
of the cause and not to solicitation itself.

The Port Authority's across-the-board ban on solicita-
tion and receipt of tunds meets the third part of the test.

9?

It applies equally to the Krishna Society and the Airline
Passengers’ Association. It is not being applied because
of disagreement with the message presented. See Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 295
(1984). The regulation differs sharply from the statutes in
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989) (flag burning) and
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (display of
red flag) which prohibit conduct typically only engaged in
by people of a disfavored viewpoint. Unlike the discre-
tionary permit cases, see ante, at 7-9, and percentage-test
cases, this regulation has no potential for favoring one
viewpoint over another.

For the fourth part of the O'Brien test, the word
“essential” must be read in the context of the facts and
holding of the case. No one could seriously contend that
a prohibition on draft-card burning was “essential” to the
draft in the sense that the Selective Service System would
collapse without it. It was enough that the continuing
availability of the cards “substantially furthers” the
functioning of the system and that “no alternative means
... would more precisely and narrowly assure” that
availability. 391 U.S., at 381.

The meaning of the fourth part of O’Brien is further
illustrated by Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, supra. The Court of Appeals had held that a ban
on camping in Lafayette Park (the quintessential public
forum) was “unnecessary and hence invalid, because there
are less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have
satisfied the Government interest... .” 468 U. S., at 299.
This Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals’
suggested alternatives “represent no more than a disagree-
ment with the Park Service over how much protection the
core parks require or how an acceptable level of preserva-

10. Schaumburg, supra. Secretary of State of Md v. Joseph He Munson Co.
467 U.S. 947 (1984): Riley v. National Federation of Blind of NC. Inc,
487 U.S. 781 (1988).

23

tion is to be attained.” Ibid. (emphasis added). See also
post, at 26 (“narrow tailoring”).

Fraud and extortion can, of course, be criminally
punished. Yet the victim who is falsely told the money is
going for starving children, see ante, at 17, may never
know that it does not. The mentally retarded target will
also never know. The person who is sold a record in JFK
Airport will not know he has been cheated until he gets
home to Tucson and plays it. Only then would he discov-
er that it contains a Krishna song and not a performance
by Stevie Wonder, as he had been intentionally led to
believe. See Barber, supra, 506 F. Supp., at 162. It is
unlikely he will return to New York to press charges. The
person who gives a dollar to get a persistent solicitor to
stop blocking his path or stop following him with repeated
entreaties will likely not want to testify in a criminal case.
The elderly woman who feels physically intimidated,
though no overt threat is made, will probably be unable to
state a case for a criminal prosecution.

In-person solicitation for the immediate payment of
money is therefore fraught with potential for widespread
but low-level crime. The only legitimate donation is one
given by a person who understands the nature of the cause
and genuinely wishes to support that cause. When a
person gives because of misrepresentation of the cause,
because. giving is the easiest way to be allowed to proceed
in peace, or because of fear, that person has been cheated
or robbed.

The Port Authority has decided that a nondiscrimina-
tory ban on repetitive solicitation and receipt of funds is
necessary. The Krishna Society, like the Community for
Creative Non-Violence, simply asks this Court to disagree.
The answer should be the same.

24

B. Time, Place, and Manner.

A limit on expressive conduct is valid if it passes the
O’Brien test even if it is an outright prohibition rather
than a mere time, place, or manner regulation. Converse-
ly, a time, piace, or manner regulation is valid if it passes
the test for such regulations, even if it regulates “pure
speech” rather than expressive conduct. It follows, then,
that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of expres-
sive conduct need only pass one test or the other to be
valid. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U. S. 288, 298, n. 8 (1984). In practice, though, most
regulations will pass both tests or neither, because the two
tests are “in the last analysis ... little, if any, differ-
ent... .” Id., at 298.

The regulation in this case, like the one in Kokinda,
restricts the manner of solicitation. The Port Authority
allows speech generally. See Pet. Brief 41. Nothing stops
the Krishna Society's members from explaining their
religion and asking people to make a donation at some
other time and place. The least intrusive way to collect
donations is for donors to mail them in.’ Alternatively,
the Port Authority would permit the Society to collect
donations on the sidewalk outside the airport. See
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
925 F. 2d 576, 578, n. 2 (CA2 1991). For donations too
small to justify postage, departing passengers, having been
informed inside of the purpose of the collection, could
leave them with a collector on the sidewalk.

These sianners of solicitation differ trom the manner
involved in Kokinda and the present case in that they give
the potential donor a “cooling off” period, similar to the
one required by the FTC for door-to-door sales. See ante,
at 18. Away from the “eager gaze of the solicitor,” the
potential donor can better reflect whether he really has

11. Amicus CILE collects afl of its “grass roots” donations mum this manner.

sufficient information about this ostensible charity, or
whether his funds would do more good elsewhere.

“Restrictions of this kind are valid provided |]] that
they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and [3]! that they
leave open ample alternative channels of communication
of the information.” Clark, supra, 468 U.S., at 293
(numbers added).

The first part of this test (the “TPM test,” for brevity)
is essentially the same as the third part of O'Brien.
Discrimination between viewpoints is the cardinal First
Amendment sin. A restriction passes muster if its “applies
evenhandedly to all,” and is not a “means of suppressing
a particular point of view.” Heffron v. International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 649 (1981).
“The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality,
in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner
cases In particular, is whether the government has adopted
a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The Krishna Society’s chosen
medium, not its message, is the basis of this regulation.

On this point, Heffron is dispositive. A nondiscrimina-
tory restriction on all would-be solicitors is content-
neutral. 452 U.S., at 648-649: see also Kokinda, supra,
111 L. Ed. 2d, 587-588. 110 S. Ct., at 3124-3125 (plurality):
id., LLL L. Ed. 2d, at 590, 110 S. Ct., at 3126 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment). //e//ron also noted that a
restriction which “prefers listener-initiated exchanges to
those originating with the speaker” is both content-neutral
and within the realm of time, place, and manner regula-
tion. 452 U.S., at 649, n. 12. A separation of advocacy
from collection is no more restrictive, and probably less
SO.

26

The second part of the TPM test, narrow tailoring, ts
essentially the same as the fourth part of O'Brien. This
regulation passes the test for the reasons discussed ante,
at 22-23.

Ward, supra, sheds further light on this part of the
TPM test. Ward flatly rejected the contention that the
regulation must be the least restrictive means to be valid.
491 U.S., at 798. “Rather, the requirement of narrow
tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the ... regulation pro-
motes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation. " /d., at
799. Clark, supra, applies the requirement by saying “if
the parks would be more exposed to harm without the
sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from
invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable
regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may be
carried out.” 468 U.S., at 297. The regulation here
clearly makes passengers less exposed to fraud and duress
than they would be without the regulation.

“The final requirement, that the guideline leave open
ample alternative channels of communication, is easily
met.” Ward, supra, 491 U. S., at 802. It is easily met in
this case as well. As we described at the beginning of this
part, ante, at 24, the Krishna Society is free to explain its
religion to travelers, if that is what it wishes to do. It is
free to encourage legitimate donations by mail or on the
sidewalk.

The only thing it is not free to do (as far as paragraph
(c) of the regulation is concerned) is collect donations
“under the eager gaze of the solicitor.” That method of
collection is most efficient for precisely the reason the state
has a strong interest in forbidding it. This manner of
solicitation collects money from people who would not
contribute if they thought it over and decided in private.
The First Amendment does not guarantee maximum
revenue. See Swageart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990).

27

The regulation prohibiting solicitation and receipt
funds is valid if it meets either the O’Brien test or the
time, place, and manner test. It meets both.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it
upholds the solicitation regulation, should be affirmed.

March, 1992
KENI S. SCHIEIDEGGER*
CHARLES L. HOBSON

JEANNE M. ANDRACIIEK

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

“Attorney of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0181%3A17. Public record. Not legal advice.