# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Homer B. Teel v. Tennessee

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 498 U.S. 1007

## Text

(2)
ous eos a

HOMER B. TEEL,
Petitioner

vs

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee

Respondent
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Homer B. Teel respectfully moves the Court for
leave to proceed herein in forma pauperis, in accordance
with the provisions of Title 28 United States Code, Section
1915, and Rule 39 of the Rules of this Court. The affidavit
of Homer B. Teel in support of this Motion is attached
hereto. Homer B. Teel was declared indigent in the Trial
Court below, and Edwin Z. Kelly, Jr. and L. Thomas -Austin
were appointed to represent Homer B. Teel at the Trial level
and throughout his appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court.

Presented herewith is a Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari of the moving party.

”
This the Ye day of October, 1990.
tee Oe fl
. —“ San Z. Y, JR.
P. 0.
309 Bet - of Drive

Jasper, TN 37347
(615) 942-6911

~ ORIGINAL

Se

L. THOMAS AUSTIN EIVED
P. 0. Box 666
Dunlap, TN 37327 | OCT ¢ 1990
ie tet Cha | OFFICE OF THE CxE%K
SUPREME

COUR, U3 of
ay

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

HOMER B. TEEL,

)
Peon, , 90-5887
- No.
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Respondent

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

I, Homer B. Teel, being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am the Petitioner in the
above-styled c:se; that in support of my Motion to Proceed on a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
without being required to prepay fees, costs or give security therefore, I state that because of my
poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefore and that I
believe I am entitled to redress.

I further swear that the responses which I have made below relating to my ability to pay
the cost of my prosecuting the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari are true.

1. I am presently unemployed and incarcerated at the Riverbend Maximum Security

Institution.

2. I have received no income within the past twelve months from a business,
profession or other form of self-employment or from rent payments, interests,
dividends, or from any other source.

3. I own no cash or checking or savings account.

4. I own no real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles or other valuable property.

RATE nr me

Sworn to and subscribed before me
On this the __24 day of Oct +, 1990.

GULLY

NOTARY PUBLIC AATL
My Commission Expires: UDb-FY

NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED sm} () ase 5887

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

HOMER B. TEEL,
Petitioner,
versus
STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER:

Edwin Z. Kelly, Jr.
Attorney at Law

P. O. Box 869

309 Betsy Pack Drive
Jasper, TN 37347
(615) 942-6911

L. Thomas Austin
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 666
Dunlap, TN 37347
(615) 949-4159

TIONS D FOR REVIEW
WHETHER S AVAILABLE WHEN A
° IN A FELONY

HETHER THE PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE BEEN
VIOLATED BY THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT’S FIRMANCE
OF HIS CONVICTION AND INTENCE OF DEATH IN VIEW OF THE

SCOURT’S POST JUDGMENT ORDER THAT HAIR SAMPLES

D_AND COMPARED
WITH THE ITI *S HAiR WHEN SUCH ANALYSIS
AND COMPARISON HAVE NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented-----------------------------------

Table of Contents------------- ween - - - - - - -

Table of Authorities--------------------------~--------

Opinion Bel OW--<--<<<- 3 meee ene eee +--+

Jurisdiction

Constitutional Provisions Involved--------------------

Statement of

Issue 2
Conclusion--

Index To The

the Case----<--<------------ ~~ + ee

Appendix---------------------------------

of de

iii

16

17

oS Ae ee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Bell v. Watkins,
692 F.2d 999, 1005-1006 (5th Cir. 1982)

cert. denied 464 U.S. 843,
104 S.Ct. 142, 78 L.Ed.2d 134 (1983)

Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194,
10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)

Chapman v. State of California,
386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,

17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)

Connecticut v. Johnson,
460 U.S. 73, 95 n. 3,
103 S.Ct. 969, 972 n. 3,
74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983)

Godfrey v. Georgia,
466 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, at
1764-1765, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980)

Hoover v. Garfield Heights Municipal Court,
802 F.2d 168, 175-178 (6th Cir. 1986)

cert. denied 480 U.S. 949,
107 S.Ct. 1610, 94 L.Ed.2d 796 (1987)

Polsky v. Patton,
890 F.2d 647, 651

(3d Cir. 1989)

Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570, 92 L.Ed.2d 460
106 S.Ct. 3101 (1986)

Tennessee, State of v. Gaddis,
530 S.W.2d 64 (1975)

Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893,
26 L.EG.2d 446 (1970)

-iii-

15

10

11

12

10, 11

13, 14

14

*4

Constitutioris, Statutes and Rules

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Fifth Amendment

Sixth Amendment

Fourteenth Amendment
United States Code

28 U.S.C. Section 1257

28 U.S.C. Section 2101

-iv-

NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990

HOMER B. TEEL,
Petitioner,
versus
STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

The Petitioner, Homer B. Teel, respectfully prays that

a writ of certiorari be issued to review the judgment and

opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee filed on May 29,

1990, affirming his conviction and sentence of death by

electrocution.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion below of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
appears in the Appendix as A-1 hereto and as of the date of
this writing, the decision has not been reported. A
petition for rehearing on behalf of Petitioner was filed and
a copy is attached in the Appendix as A-2. That Petition
was denied by the Tennessee Supreme Court by its Order filed

on July 9, 1990, which appears in the Appendix as A-3.

JURISDICTION

This Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is filed within
90 days from the date of denial of the Petition for
Rehearing, and is thus timely filed pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 13. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under

28 U.S.C. Section 1257 and 28 U.S.C. Section 2101.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

I. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Amendment V:

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment. or
indictment by a grand jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be awitness against himself; nor be
deprived of life, liberty and property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation".

It. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Amendment VI:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his

defense".

III. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Amendment XIV:
"....(N)or shall any state deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws".

-5-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Homer B. Teel, was indicted by the Grand
Jury of Marion County, Tennessee, on February 2, 1987, for
murder in the first degree of Tara M. Stowe. The State of
Tennessee filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty
relying upon the statutory aggravating factors that the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel and that
it involved torture or depravity of mind, and that the
murder was committed while the Petitioner was engaged in the
commission of aggravated rape upon the victim.

Edwin Z. Kelly, Jr. and L. Thomas Austin were appointed
as attorneys for Homer B. Teel by Order of the Trial Court
and have continued to represent him through date.

On August 31, 1987, the trial of Petitioner commenced
in the Circuit Court of Marion County, Tennessee, with the
Honorable Buddy D. Perry, Circuit Judge, presiding. It was
the State’s theory that Homer B. Teel committed first degree
murder upon a fourteen year old girl, Tara M. Stowe, during
the commission of rape, and that the murder occurred in
November of 1986. Homer B. Teel questioned whether a mu~der
had been committed and denied guilt.

On September 4, 1987, the jury returned a verdict
against Petitioner finding him guilty of murder in the first
degree. A separate sentencing hearing immediately followed
thereafter, and the same jury returned its verdict on

September 5, 1987, reporting that punishment should be death

odin
due to the statutory aggravating circumstance that the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and that it
involved depravity of mind while the Petitioner was engaged
in committing rape.

The indictment in this case did not charge felony
murder and during a pre-trial hearing, the Assistant
Attorney General for the State made the following comment:

-++++-eI might add also that Mr. Austin
made a mistake in what he told the
Court. All the indictment charges is
murder. The sexual aspect of it is one
of aggravated factors that’s listed in a
notice. He is not charged with any
sexual offense and a jury won’t even
know about a sexual offense possibly
till bifurcated part of the trial,
that’s the reason we did it that way.
We do not have to prove rape, we do not
have to prove any type of sexual offense
at all, until after Mr. Teel has’ been
found to be guilty. That’s an
aggravated factor that was listed. But
basically, there’s no reason to
challenge this at this point. (Motion
Hearing conducted on March 23, 1987, at
pages 34-35)

Counsel for the Petitioner objected during the guilt phase
of the trial to the introduction of proof of rape; however,
such proof was allowed by the Trial Court. Rape thus became
the gravamen of the State’s case. In its charge to the
jury, the Trial Court charged as to common law first degree
murder, and gave a partial definition of felony murder,

failing however to define for the jury the felony of rape.

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-7-

A Motion for New Trial (See Appendix A-4) was
filed on behalf of the Petitioner setting forth numerous
allegations of error, which was overruled; however, at that
time the Trial Court did order the State to conduct an
analysis of hair that was found in the hand of the victin,
Tara M. Stowe, and to compare said hair samples with hair of
the Petitioner. (See Appendix A-5) The Petitioner agreed to
this analysis as a request had been made by his counsel that
this be done. It was brought out during the course of the
trial that hair was found in the victim’s hand and that no
further analysis had been requested by the State. The Trial
Court ordered that this be done; however, this has never
been accomplished.

Pursuant to Tennessee statute, a direct appeal was made
to the Tennessee Supreme Court, and its Opinion was filed on
May 29, 1990, which is attached hereto as Appendix A-1. In
that Opinion, at pages 26-28, the Honorable Tennessee
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Drowota, held that
the Trial Court’s failure to define rape during the guilt
phase was error as this was an essential element of the
offense charged. The Tennessee Supreme Court went on to
say that the law is unsettled as to whether harmless error
analysis is available when a Trial Court fails to instruct
on an essential element of an offense and held in the unique

circumstances and total context of the subject case that

=e
said omission was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the evidence was
sufficient to support the conviction and the sentence and
that the jury verdict approved by the Trial Judge accredits
the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves
all conflicts in favor of the State’s theory. It failed to
address the Trial Court’s post-conviction order that a hair
analysis and comparison be made.

In his Petition for re-hearing filed with the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, the Petitioner sought further review
relative to the Trial Court’s Order for hair analysis and
comparison and the Trial Court’s failure to define rape to
the jury during the guilt phase of the trial. (See Appendix
A-2) That Petition was dismissed without comment by Order
of the Tennessee Supreme Court filed on July 9, 1990. (See
Appendix A-3)

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari follows.

A review on a Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of
right, but rests within the discretion of the reviewing
Court and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. Petitioner respectfully submits
that there are special and important reasons for issuing a
Writ of Certiorari in this case. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee has decided important questions of § Federal
Constitutional Law, which should be settled by this Court.

I. WHETHER HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IS AVAILABLE WHEN

A TRIAL COURT OMITS THE DEFINITION OF RAPE IN A FELONY
MURDER CHARGE PREDICATED UPON RAPE?

Research indicates that the law is unsettled as to
whether harmless error analysis is available whena trial
court fails to instruct onan essential element of an

offense. See, e.g., Polsky v. Patton, 890 F.2d 647, 651 (3d

Cir. 1989); Hoover v. Garfield Heights Municipal Court, 802

F.2d 168, 175-178 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 480 U.S.
949, 107 S.Ct. 1610, 94 L.Ed.2d 796 (1987); Bell v. Watkins,

692 F.2d 999, 1005-1006 (5th Cir. 1982) cert. denied 464
U.S. 843, 104 S.Ct. 142, 78 L. Ed.2d 134 (1983). There is
thus a conflict among the various Federal Courts of Appeal
relative to this issue.

In the case sub judice, the Tennessee Supreme court has

determined that the Trial Court’s failure to define rape in

-10-
its jury instruction during the guilt phase of the trial
constituted an omission of an essential element of the crime
charged and was thus error (A-1 at page 26).

Since this Honorable Court’s decision in the case of
Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,
17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), there has been no absolute directive
given by this Honorable Court as to whether the trial
court’s failure to instruct on an essential element of an
offense can be dubbed “harmless". As this Honorable Court
stated in the Chapman case, supra, “it emphasizes an
intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional
errors that affect substantial rights" of a party.

In the case of Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 92 L.Ed.2d

460, 106 S.Ct. 3101 (1986), harmless error analysis was held
to apply to a murder conviction where the jury was
unconstitutionally instructed that homicide was presumed to
be malicious. It is suggested, however, that the decision
in Rose supports the conclusion that application of harmless
error analysis is not appropriate in Petitioner’s case. The
jury in your Petitioner’s case was precluded from weighing
the facts to determine if the Petitioner had in fact
committed rape as defined by Tennessee law. The jury was
totally uninformed as to what constitutes rape.

It is suggested that the Trial Court’s error in the

instant case was similar to that committed by the trial

‘ss

-ll-

court in the case of Hoover v. Garfield Heights Municipal
Court, supra. In that case, the trial court failed to

instruct the jury that it had to find that Hoover’s arrest
was lawful in order to convict him of resisting arrest. The
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed the
conviction and held that this error was not harmless as_ it
prevented the jury from considering an essential element
that in fact constituted a directed verdict as to that
element. In that case, the Court, in analyzing the Rose,
supra, decision, commented at page 177 thereof as follows:

However, a closer reading of Rose
supports the conclusion that application
of harmless error analysis is not proper
in the present case. The Court observed
that harmless error analysis would not
apply if a trial court directed a
verdict for the state in a criminal
case. 106 S.Ct. at 3106. The Court
concluded, however, that a Sandstrom
error was not the equivalent of a
directed verdict. Id. at 3107. In
doing so, it importantly distinguished
the cases involving Sandstrom errors,
where the jury is instructed to presume
an eleme t from predicate facts, from
the cases involving instructional errors
which completely prevent the jury from
considering an element. See id. at 3107
n. 8 (" ‘Because a presumption does not
remove the issue of intent from the
jury’s consideration, it is
distinguishable from other instructional
errors that prevent a jury from
considering an _ issue.’") (quoting
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 95
n. 3, 103 8.Ct. 969, 972 n. 3, 74
L.Ed.2dad 823 (1983) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)). The implication of this
statement is that when an instruction
prevents the jury from considering a

-12-

material issue, it is equivalent to a
directed verdict on that issue and
therefore cannot be considered harmless.

In a capital case, the trial court’s failure to
instruct on an essential element of the crime charged should
never be held harmless. To do so sets the stage for the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.
What a State must do in order to constitutionally authorize
capital punishment was prescribed by this Honorable United

States Supreme Court as follows in the case of

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, at

1764-1765, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980):

This means that if a State wishes
to authorize capital punishment it has a
constitutional responsibility to tailor
and apply its law in a manner that
avoids the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty. Part
of a State’s responsibility in this
regard is to define the crimes for which
death may be the sentence in a way that
obviates "standardless [sentencing]
discretion. (citations omitted) It must
channel the sentencer’s discretion by
“clear and objective standards" that
provide "specific and detailed
guidance," and that “make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death. (citations omitted)

Failure to properly instruct the jury as to the definition
of rape when rape is the underlying felony upon which the
charge of felony murder is based most definitely affected a
substantial right of the Petitioner herein. To deem such
omission "harmless" appears contrary to this Honorable
Court’s requirement that the death penalty not be inflicted

arbitrarily and capriciously.

ae ae ¥8; : : 4k
ANALYSIS COMPARISON HAVE NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED?
At the trial of this cause it came out through the

testimony of the State’s pathologist, Dr. King, that the
victim had hair in her hand, indicating that there had been
a struggle and the victim had pulled the hair of her
assailant. At the same time the trial court overruled the
Petitioner’s motion for a new trial, it ordered the State of
Tennessee to cause a qualified person to examine the hair
samples in Dr. King’s possession relative to this case and
that the same be compared to hair samples of the Petitioner.
The results of the analysis were to be reported to the trial
court. (See Appendix A-5) It is the position of the

Petitioner that since there has never been an analysis

conducted by the State of Tennessee as of this date, this

leaves the trial court’s record at less than "final". This
issue was again presented to the Tennessee Supreme Court by
petition for rehearing on behalf of the Petitioner. (See
Appendix A-2).

In the Tennessee case of State v. Gaddis, 530 S.W.2d 64

(1975), the defendant was being tried under a drug - related
offense, and the trial court had denied his pre-trial motion

for a sample or specimen of the alleged drug to be used in

atten
conducting an independent scientific analysis. The
Tennessee Supreme Court in that case attempted to settle the
law and to determine proper procedures and guidelines for
disposition of motions for samples or specimens in drug
cases. The instant case is somewhat different, in that here
the record reveals the hair found in the victim’s hand was
disclosed during cross examination of the State’s
pathologist, however, the trial court found the Petitioner’s
motion well taken and granted same. (See Appendix A-5).
Speaking for the Tennessee Supreme Court in the Gaddis,
supra, case, Justice Henry observed:

We note an emerging trend toward broad
and reciprocal discovery in criminal
cases. The days of trial by ambush are
numbered. Rapidly fading is what Dean
Pound described as the "sporting theory
of justice". In Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 90 §&.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d
446 (1970), the Supreme Court said:

The adversary system of trial is
hardly an end in itself; it is not yet
a poker game in which players enjoy an
absolute right always to conceal their
cards until played. We find ample
room in that system, at least as far
as ‘due process’ is concerned, for the
instant Florida rule, which is
designed to enhance the search for
truth in the criminal trial by
insuring both the defendant and the
State ample opportunity to investigate
certain facts crucial to the
determination of guilt or innocence.
399 U.S. at 82, 90 S.Ct. at 1896.

-15-

We note the liberal provision of Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and the amendments thereto
which became effective August 1, 1975.

Full discovery is consonant with

requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215

(1963) holding that due process requires
that the prosecution disclose evidence
favorable to the accused.

(537 S.W.2d at page 69)

In the case sub judice, it must be assumed from the
ruling of the trial court that he determined that the
evidence that became apparent during the trial of this case
on cross-examination of the State’s pathologist might have
had an impact on the trial of this cause, and he thus
ordered the State of Tennessee to perform the sample
analysis and comparison. It should be noted that a pretrial
motion seeking exculpatory evidence had been filed on behalf
of the Petitioner.

Ignoring the trial court’s order in this regard and not
giving significance to it so as to allow the jury verdict to
be reversed or, alternatively, the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
failure to remand the case for an enforcement of the trial

court order, deprives the Petitioner of his life without due

process of law.

-16-

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully asks this most Honorable
Supreme Court of the United States to grant his Petition for
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Questions of Constitutional law are presented in this

Petition which are of paramount interest and importance.

This the 2nd day of October, 1990.

Respectfully submitted,

COUNSEL EPETLONER> 7 4
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ian CA le | Fis le

q . DWI Zz. 4° ’

CU J

L. THOMAS AUSTIN

-17-
INDEX TO APPENDIX

Opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee-------------- A-1
Petition for Rehearing on behalf of Petitioner--------- A-2
Order on Petition to Rehear-<--<-<-<<-<-<-<<-<-<-<------------- A-3
Motion for New Trial and Order-----------------~-------- A-4
Order of Trial Court Overruling Motion to

Examine and Compare Hair Samples------------------ A-5

Charles w. Burson
Attorney General ¢ Reporter

John Knox w
Solicitor Genera

C. Anthony Da

Assistant Pm —onay MO
ashville, Tennessee ral
Dien t ttm Pope, Jr.

District a
Pikeville, _— —~ mae

SPIN rico w

30 AFFIRMED.

——

1 The Defendant, Homer "Butch" Teel, appeals directly
2 to this Court his conviction of first degree murder and the

3 sentence of death imposed by the jury. He raises numerous

4 issues in this appeal, including: the trial court's failure

S to suppress statements made by the Defendant to detectives

6 and to various jailhouse inmates while in custody, the

7 court's failure to exclude testimony of the State serologist,

8 the court's failure to exclude evidence relative to the

9 condition of the decedent's body as found, errors alleging
10 prosecutorial misconduct, errors relating to the denial of
ll continuances and change of venue and the sufficiency of the
12 evidence to support the conviction and the sentence. After a
13 careful review of the entire record and the law, we find
14 these issues to be without merit. We, therefore, affirm the
15 conviction and the sentence.

16 .

17 The events leading up to the murder and disappear-
18 ance of 14-year-old Tara Stowe and the subsequent arrest of
19 the Defendant Teel will be described in detail in order to
20 give meaning to the sixteen issues which we will consider on
21 appeal. The Defendant was convicted of the murder of Tara
22 Stowe in Marion County on the night of November 29, 1986.
23 Tara lived with her grandmother in Tiftonia, Tennessee. Her
24 grandmother had gone to Dallas, Texas, for several days and
25 Tara was staying with her aunt, Betty Davis. On Saturday
26 evening, November 29, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Betty Davis
27 left her mobile home in Tiftonia to pick up her mother,
28 Tara's grandmother, in Chattanooga. Tara and Betty's daugh-
29 ter, Kerry, were left at the mobile home with some of their
30 friends, John Dagnun, David Dagnun and Tony Dagnun. Tara

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

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spoke on the telephone with the Defendant who was an ac-
quaintance of hers. Later that evening Tara rode with her
friends, John, David and Tony, in the back of a pickup truck
driven by John's father to the Egypt Hollow community of
Marion County, where the Dagnuns lived. She was let out
about 10:00 p.m. near the trailer where “Butch” Teel lived
with his grandmother.

The Defendant, “Butch” Teel, who was raised by his
grandmother, was 20-years-old. He did not know his father,
and his mother had died six years before the events in this
case occurred. He had spent his entire life in the Egypt
Hollow area and attended school up to the ninth grade.

About the time that Tara arrived in Egypt Hollow on November
29, Tim Sexton and the Defendant were driving to Betty
Davis's mobile home. On the way there, Sexton was told by
the Defendant that their friend, James Dagnun, was living in
the woods in a tent in Egypt Hollow, because John Dagnun, Sr.
had taken out a warrant charging James with whipping little
David Dagnun. James Dagnun, cousin of John Dagnun, Jr., and
David Dagnun, was Tara Stowe's boyfriend. Upon arriving at
Betty Davis's, the Defendant asked for Tara and was told that
she had gone with the Dagnuns to Egypt Hollow. The two then
Grove back to Egypt Hollow, where they found Tara sitting on
the steps of a church. When Tara advised them that she was
waiting for her boyfriend, James Dagnun, the Defendant said
that he would take her to the place where James was hiding to
avoid arrest. Sexton drove up Murphy Hollow Road and left
the Defendant and Tara at a large rock beside the road around
10:35 - 10:40 p.m. Central Standard Time. When the Defendant

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sald that he and Tara were going up on the mountainside to
find James Dagnun, Sexton asked if he could go with them.
The Defendant refused and told him that James wanted him to
bring only Tara. Sexton then left.

On the evening of November 29, both Betty Davis and
Tim Sexton saw James Dagnun's high school class ring on
Tara's hand. On the days immediately after Tara's disap-
pearance, “Butch” Teel was seen wearing the ring Dagnun had
given to Tara. On Sunday, November 30, the Defendant told
John Dagnun he had not seen Tara; and on the following
Wednesday, he threatened John because he had seen John
searching for Tara. The Defendant also asked John if he
thought he had “hurt” Tara. On Thursday, Teel told Sexton he
had gotten the ring from Tara the night of November 29 and,
the last time he saw Tara, she was leaving Egypt Hollow
walking toward the interstate. Ronnie Nunley testified that
he was 23-years-old and acquainted with the Defendant and
that, sometime after Tara was reported missing, the Defendant
had told him who she was and had asked him if he wanted a
“bone from Tara."

Detective Bill Schroeder of the Marion County
Sheriff's Department began investigating the disappearance of
Tara Stowe on December 4, 1986. He went to the Teel resi-
dence and while talking with Teel, noticed a class ring on
his hand. The detective asked Teel to go with him to the
Sheriff's office and the Defendant agreed. The Defendant
told Schroeder that Tim Sexton had left him and Tara in the
hollow and he last saw Tara walking towards the interstate.

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The Defendant claimed that Tara had given him the class ring.
When Detective Schroeder arrested the Defendant, he became
irate and said that Schroeder “would never find anything or
prove anything on him." The Defendant made several state-
ments about how to get rid of a human body and suggested
several locations where authorities might search. These
sites were several miles from where Tara's body was eventu-
ally found. On December 6, the Defendant told Detective
Schroeder that on the night she disappeared Tara had left the
hollow with James Dagnun to get beer and that James had given
him the ring.

On December 27, 1986, after an exhaustive search,
the badly decomposed body of Tara Stowe was found lying in a
ravine alongside a creek approximately 65 feet from the guard
rail on Murphy Hollow Road. The body was located 248 feet
from Egypt Hollow Road and approximately 3500 feet from the
point where Sexton last saw Tara alive. Expert testimony
indicated the body had probably been dragged into the ravine
by animals. Some 36 feet away, investigators found a dark,
wet, stained depression where, in the opinion of forensic
anthropologist Dr. William M. Bass, the body had originally
lain. Tree limbs over the depression indicated an attempt
had been made to cover the body. Six to eight feet away,
authorities found Tara's slacks and underpants. Certain
items of her jewelry were lying in the depression.

The body was face down with the jacket, bra and
blouse pulled over her head in a manner inconsistent with
animal activity. Hair was stuck to the fingers of her left

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land. An autopsy by Dr. Frank King, the Marion County
Medical Examiner, and an examination of the bones of the
throat, particularly the hyoid bone, by Dr. Bass indicated
that the victim suffered trauma to her neck at the time of
death. Dr. King testified that the cause of death had been
“neck trauma," consistent with one of the following: manual
strangulation, ligature strangulation, a blow to the neck, or
@ cut to the neck that was not deep enough to reach the
underlying bones. From the condition of the body, Dr. King
could make no conclusion whether the victim had engaged in
sexual intercourse near the time of her death. A forensic
serologist, however, found spermatozoa consistent with human
spermatozoa on a sample taken from the crotch of the victim's
underpants.

When Detective Schroeder informed Teel that the
body had been discovered and photographed, the Defendant
responded, “Good, give me some for my scrapbook.” When the
Defendant was being booked upon the murder charge, he asked
Schroeder about the strength of the case. The Defendant said
that he had an “ace in the hole” and "no one else was in it
with me." Later, Teel called Schroeder to his cell and asked
him about the elements of the degrees of murder and whether
it was first degree murder if you killed a person by acci-
dent. .

The State introduced several inmates from the
Marion County and Franklin County Jails who testified that
the Defendant had either admitted the killing or made in-
criminating statements to them. The first, Pandora Edwards,

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testified that, while she was in a cell next to Defendant's
in the Franklin County Jail, the Defendant told her about
“some fourteen [year-old] that he had raped, beat up, and cut
and buried." Defendant said this had occurred at night and
he was unable to sleep because he kept seeing the victin.
Edwards’ cellmate, Eddie Mae Tate Wilkerson, testified the
Defendant said he had killed and buried the girl because she
was his girlfriend and she was seeing another man. Inmate
Charlie Algood testified that he overheard Defendant tell
another inmate that he committed the crime but that they
didn't have any witnesses. James Graham testified that
Defendant told him that a girl was missing and that he would
be charged with murder if she had been killed. Defendant
said that the authorities had not found anything yet and that
they probably would not. Defendant also admitted the killing
to Stephen Morgan. While watching televised news reports of
the search for Tara with the Defendant, Morgan and another
inmate, George Caldwell, heard the Defendant say, “You're a
long ways away from finding the body," and make other similar
remarks. The Defendant also told Caldwell that the body was
300 feet from the road. As stated earlier, when found, the
body was 248 feet from Egypt Hollow Road.

The most damaging testimony was that of Ernest
Morrison, himself a capital defendant from Georgia who had
temporarily shared a cell with Defendant and Earl David
Crawford at the Marion County jail. Morrison testified that
he and the Defendant talked about the murders with which they
were charged. The Defendant told Morrison that he had met
“the girl" close to a church and had asked her to go

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somewhere with him. The two had ridden with a third person
"so far down the road” when Defendant asked to be let out and
told the driver to go on. After the Defendant and the victim
walked up the hill, Defendant made her perform fellatio on
him. The two then walked through the woods, and the Defen-
Gant removed the victim's pants and panties and had sexual
intercourse with her. All of this time, the victim was
pleading with him not to hurt her. After this, the Defendant
grabbed the victim by her hair and told her, “(W)ell, you
know, it's your time. ... I can't, you know, stand no more
of it." He then walked her down to the creek where he forced
her to kneel and perform fellatio again. After this, he
pushed her to the ground, forced her head into the creek and
drowned her. He then took her ring, dragged her up the hill,
laid her body in the brush, and covered her up, according to
his account, not caring whether she was buried.

The defense presented the testimony of the Defen-~
dant's grandmother and of Shirley and Darrell Williams, who
lived in the grandmother's trailer. They said that on the
night of November 29, Tara Stowe had come to the trailer and
left when she learned that the Defendant was not there. The
Defendant himself had come home later sometime between 11:00
and 11:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time and had remained there
the rest of the night. Darrell Williams testified that he
had seen James Dagnun in “the hollow" on November 29. He
also had seen Dagnun riding in his father's car “sort of like
he was trying to avoid being seen" during the time of the
search and later, after the body had been found, cleaning
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James Lewis, cellmate of inmates Stephen Morgan and
James Graham, testified he heard the two planning to make up
testimony against the Defendant in order to get probation.
Earl David Crawford, Morrison's cellmate, testified that
Morrison and the Defendant did not get along and that he had
never heard any conversation between them in which the
Defendant told Morrison about the murder.

The Defendant testified that he had been with James
Dagnun at Paralee's, a local hangout in Egypt Hollow, on
November 29. Both he and James had talked with Tara on the
telephone at that time. Later, the Defendant and Tim Sexton
went to the Betty Davis residence and asked for Tara. They
later went to Egypt Hollow, where they saw Tara sitting on
the steps of a church. The three then drove up into the
hollow, stopped and got out of the car. The Defendant said
that after Tim left, James arrived. James and Tara began to
argue because James's mother wanted him to get his ring back
from Tara. James took the ring off Tara's hand and gave it
to the Defendant to keep for a couple of days. The Defendant
last saw Tara and James Dagnun arguing as they "left back out
towards the hollow" in the direction of the interstate. The
Defendant then went home.

In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of
John Dagnun and Tim Sexton that Darrell Williams had told
them that the Defendant had not come home until six o'clock
the morning after November 29. Jan Gifford, a friend of
James Dagnun's mother, testified that James Dagnun had been
at her house at Trenton, Georgia, from 7:00 p.m. November 29,

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until 2:00 p.m. the next day. Gifford's testimony, as well /
as that of several other witnesses, clarified that James
Dagnun did not testify at trial because at that time he was
hospitalized at a burn center in Augusta, Georgia.

Neither the State nor the Defendant presented any

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additional proof at the sentencing hearing.

Defendant contends in his first issue that the
trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress
certain statements made to Detective Schroeder and to fellow
inmates while he was in custody and that the trial court
erred in failing to grant his application for interlocutory
appeal of the court's order overruling his motion to sup-
press. We are of the opinion that the statements made to
Detective Schroeder and to fellow prisoners were properly
admitted.

The Defendant argues that the statements should be
suppressed because they were the result of an illegal arrest
and were made in violation of his rights under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. The substance of Defendant's
argument is that his statements should not be admitted
because he was held for almost three weeks under the “pre-
tense” of two other outstanding charges and the other inmates
were acting as agents of the State when they heard his
comments. It was revealed during the suppression hearing
that, after learning that the Defendant was the last person

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seen with Tara Stowe and that he had also been seen wearing
her ring, Detective Schroeder went to the Defendant's trailer
on the evening of December 4, 1986. Schroeder met with the
Defendant and, after telling him why he was there and ascer-
taining that he was wearing the victim's ring, advised the
Defendant of his Miranda rights. When the Defendant asked if
he was under arrest, Schroeder said no, but that it was
possible that he might be placed under arrest later. The
Defendant then consented to go to the station and remarked
that he had nothing to worry about.

Once at the jail, Schroeder again advised Defendant
of his rights. The Defendant then told Schroeder about how
he and Sexton had picked up Tara and how, after giving him
the ring, she had walked away down the road. Schroeder
testified that the Defendant was free to leave the station at
the time this first statement was made. After speaking with
Sexton and his parents around midnight, however, Schroeder
informed the Defendant that, based upon Defendant's and
Sexton's statements, he was going to charge him with con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor under
T.C.A. $37-1-156. Thereupon, on December 5, 1986, at ap-
proximately 2:00 a.m., the Defendant was arrested on a

juvenile warrant on those charges and held in the Marion
County jail.

Around 9:00 a.m. that same morning, Georgia offi-
cers informed Schroeder that the Defendant had been charged
with aggravated assault in Dade County, Georgia, and that his
bond there had been revoked. The Georgia authorities

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sequested a hold be put on the Defendant. At 11:00 a.m.,
after speaking with his family and after again being given
his rights, Defendant gave Detective Schroeder a written
statement. Subsequently, while being held at the jail, the
Defendant made additional statements on December 6, 15, and
18, 1986. Detective Schroeder testified that he had advised
Defendant of his rights each time that he spoke with him
except on those occasions when the Defendant flagged him down
as he walked through the jail and initiated a general con-

versation.

On December 23, 1986, the contributing charge was
dismissed in Juvenile Court at Shroeder's request. On
December 27, 1986, Defendant was charged with first degree
murder, and counsel was appointed on December 29. The
statements given during his booking on December 27 were
extemporaneously initiated by the Defendant as were the
questions he asked about the charges and the case on January
11, 1987. Defendant was indicted on February 2, 1987.

Detective Schroeder also testified that he had
never asked or directed any inmates to question the Defen-
dant; that the other prisoners at the jail would simply tell
him about Defendant's statements. The only other witnesses
at the suppression hearing were the Defendant's grandmother,
who testified about the night he was picked up at the trail-
er, and Assistant District Attorney Mike Caputo, who testi-
fied primarily about the circumstances of a statement that

was not used at trial.

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Regarding the Defendant's first statement on the
evening of December 4, regardless of whether the Defendant
was in custody, the proof is clear that Defendant voluntarily
waived his Fifth Amendment rights after they were given.
Since the case was only under investigation and no adversary
proceedings had begun, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel

was also not violated. See State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d
280, 286 (Tenn. 1980).

As to the written statement given on the morning of
December 5, the Defendant, who was in custody, was once more
given his Miranda rights and waived them. Adversary pro-
ceedings had still not been initiated. That Defendant was
being held on other charges did not require the suppression
of these statements, in this case, on Sixth Amendment

grounds. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477,
489, 88 L. Ed.2d 481 (1985).

The Defendant complains that he was interrogated by
his fellow prisoners at the insistence of police officers.
There was no proof at the suppression hearing that any of the
inmates were acting as agents for the State or that the State
deliberately induced, enticed, or prompted these communica-
tions so as to require their suppression. See Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2630, 91 L. Ed.24 364

(1986); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.ct. 2183,

65 L. Ed.2d 115 (1980).

As the final part of this issue, Defendant argues
that the trial court erred in denying his application for

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interlocutory appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress.
Defendant claims that he was effectively deprived of his
Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution
because he was left with no choice regarding whether to take
the witness stand. It is clear that the denial of an inter-
locutory appeal did not irreparably injure any of Defendant's
rights and that all issues that could have been raised on
interlocutory appeal have been preserved for review on this
appeal. See State v. Martin, 634 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1982); State v. Hartsfield, 629 S.W.2d 907 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1980); State v. Gawlas, 614 S.W.2d 74 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1980). There is no merit to this argument and Defen-
dant's first issue is denied.

II

Defendant next insists that the trial court erred
in refusing to grant his motions to continue or to exclude
the testimony of Ernest Morrison or Jan Gifford.

(a)

Defense counsel filed its first motion for contin-
uance on August 12; 1987, on the grounds that the State had
not properly complied with discovery motions and had
furnished the requested information on July 31, 1987, only
one month before trial. The witness list contained the names
of twenty one potential witnesses spread throughout Marion,
Hamilton, Franklin and Knox Counties in Tennessee and one
witness, Ernest Morrison, who was located in Augusta,

Cecrgia. The motion was heard on August 12 and overruled
“subject to you having an adequate opportunity to get in
touch with these people.” On August 31, the first day of
tcial, defense counsel renewed their motion to continue, but
at that time the motion was directed primarily toward the
alleged inability of the defense to learn Ernest Morrison's
complete criminal record and not toward any difficulty in
locating and investigating the other witnesses. This motion
was denied. The Defendant does not allege that counsel never
interviewed the witnesses in advance nor does he state how
many of the witnesses were unknown before disclosure.

We have held that the grant or denial of a request
for continuance rests within the sound discretion of the
trial judge and will not be disturbed uniess the requesting
party makes a clear showing of prejudice. Moorehead v.
State, 219 Tenn. 271, 409 S.W.24 357, 358 (Tenn. 1966); State
¥. Goodman, 643 S.W.24 375, 378 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
Defendant has not made the clear showing of prejudice neces-

sary for reversal under the record in this case.
(b)

During the trial, defense counsel made oral motions
to exclude the testimony of Ernest Morrison and that of Jan
Gifford, a rebuttal witness called by the State at the end of
the trial proceedings. Defense counsel argued during these
oral objections and motions that allowing these witnesses to
testify was prejudicial to the Defendant because it prevented
his adequately preparing his defense regarding these

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witnesses and rendered his cross-examination of these wit-

nesses essentially worthless.

Defendant avers the defense had little opportunity
to investigate Morrison's background, primarily his criminal
convictions. Morrison was one of the twenty-one witnesses
whose existence the Defendant learned about on July 31, one
month before trial. The record shows that defense counsel
conferred with Morrison before trial and also that a copy of
his convictions was given to Defendant before trial. Mor-
rison admitted to the murder, armed robbery and rape charges
which were pending in a capital case in Georgia. Defendant
fails to explain how Morrison could have been impeached with
greater effect. The Defendant also presented the testimony
of Earl David Crawford to impeach Morrison. No prejudice has
been shown entitling the Defendant to relief. Cf. State v.
Garland, 617 S.W.2d 176, 185 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).

The Defendant argues that the “surprise” testimony
of Jan Gifford on the last day of trial, creating an alibi
for James Dagnun was highly prejudicial. The Defendant
attempted to shift the blame to Dagnun by testifying that
Tara was last seen with James. Jan Gifford rebutted this by
establishing that James was at her home in Trenton, Georgia,
at that time. The State submitted at trial that the issue
was raised by the Defendant's testimony. The witness ex-
Plained that she received her subpoena for trial on the day
of her testimony and that no officer discussed the case with
her before that date.

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A request for discovery of names of witnesses does
not include the State's rebuttal witnesses. See Raybin, 9
Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure, $13.16 (1984). A
contrary rule would require the State to anticipate every
possible issue the defense might raise. Since the testimony
was proper rebuttal to an issue raised by the Defendant's
testimony, the State had no duty to disclose the witness's
name in advance.

The Defendant makes no showing of how Jan Gifford's
testimony or cross-examination might have been different if
he had known she would testify. In addition, the Defendant
has failed to establish any prejudice requiring reversal.

Ill

Defendant alleges in his third issue that the trial
court erred in failing to grant his motion for a change of
venue. Defendant filed a pre-trial motion for change of
venue and the trial court took the motion under advisement
pending a completion of voir dire. At the beginning of
trial defense counsel supplemented the motion by filing an
affidavit and various newspaper clippings. After completion
of jury selection the Defendant did not renew his motion for
change of venue.

Venue may be changed where it appears to the court
that due to undue excitement against the defendant in the
county where the offense was committed, or for any other
cause, a fair trial could not be-had. Tenn. R. Crim. P.

-17-

Tifa). The matter of change of venue is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not
be ceversed absent an affirmative and clear abuse of discre-
tion. State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 360 (Tenn. 1982);
State v. Hoover, 594 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). Our
examination of the newspaper articles and a reading of the
voir dire shows no abuse of discretion.

Iv

Defendant avers that the jury selection procedures
deprived him of an impartial jury. He contends that the
process of “death qualifying" prospective jurors permitted by
the trial court produced a jury biased in favor of the State
on the issue of guilt or innocence, and one not fairly
representative of the community, in violation of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Sections 6, 8 and 9, of the Tennessee Consti-
tution. This argument has been rejected by both the Tennes-
see and United States Supreme Courts. See State v. Wright,
756 S.W.24 669, (Tenn. 1988); State v. Coker, 746 S.W.24
167, 171 (Tenn. 1987); State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447, 450,
453-55 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Melson, 638 S.w.24d 342, 362
(Tenn. 1982); Houston v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1980);

and Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.
Ed.24 137 (1986).

As a part of this argument Defendant also specifi-

cally challenges the exclusion of prospective jurors Wilkins,
Ivey, Hicks and Cartwright because of their views on the

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death penalty. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105
S.Ct. 844, 851-852, 83 L. Ed.24 841 (1985), the United States

Supreme Court held that a trial court may constitutionally
exclude from capital sentencing juries those jurors who are
unwilling or unable to obey the law or to follow their oath.
We have examined the record and find that the responses of
the excused prospective jurors supports the trial court's
decision to exclude them.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred
during voir dire in refusing to excuse prospective jurors
Trantham and Soileau for cause and in excusing prospective
jurors Hicks and Cartwright for cause.

We have read the voir dire examination of Trantham
and Soileau and find no error in the court's refusal to
excuse them for cause. Furthermore, even if there had been
error as to one of them, Defendant failed to exhaust his
peremptory challenges, having reserved one of the fifteen.
Since he was not forced to accept an incompetent juror and
did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, he is not entitled
to relief. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. —- 108 S.Ct. 2273,

101 L. Ed.2d 80 (1988); State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.24 239,
246 (Tenn. 1989).

Our examination of the voir dire of prospective
jurors Hicks and Cartwright reveals no error under Wainwright
v. Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 852, in their excusal.

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vI

Defendant avers that the trial court erred in
failing to exclude the testimony of the State's serologist.
He contends her testimony that spermatozoa consistent with
human spermatozoa were found on a sample from the victim's
underpants was irrelevant to the charge of first degree
murder absent an indictment for first degree murder in the
perpetration of rape. Rape, Defendant argues, was not 4
material proposition during the guilt phase of this trial.
Even if relevant, Defendant avers, the prejudicial effect of
the testimony outweighed its probative value.

We find no merit to either argument. First,
although an indictment charges murder in the common law form
and does not specifically mention that the killing was
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
one of the felonies named in the first degree murder statute,
the charge may be proven with evidence that the killing was
committed in perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, one
of these felonies. State v. Johnson, 661 S.W.2d 854, 860-861
(Tenn. 1983). Evidence tending to show rape was thus rele-
vant. Second, despite the inability of the pathologist to
say that a rape had occurred because of the condition of the
body and the inability of the serologist to determine how ol¢
the spermatozoa were, the probative value of this evidence,
which supported Defendant's admissions he had raped the
victim, was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See
State v. Banks, 564 S.W.24 947, 951-953 (Tenn. 1978).

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Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in
overruling his request for a DNA test. The Defendant sought
#n examination of the spermatozoa found on the victim's
clothing for a DHA comparison with that of the Defendant.
Defendant's request was first made at the hearing on the
motion for a new trial at which time the oral request was
Genied. Defendant has not attempted to explain why this
request was not made before trial or to present any evidence
suggesting that a DNA test would produce admissible evidence.
We find no merit to this issue.

vit!

In Defendant's next issue, he avers the trial court
erred in admitting evidence relative to the condition of the
decedent's body as found and particularly as to anything that
occurred to the body subsequent to death. The Defendant says
that evidence that the body had decomposed and had been
Gisturbed by animals was irrelevant and, if relevant, that
its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect

under State v. Banks, 564 S.W.24 at 951-953.

Testimony on these matters was relevant to explain,
among other things, how the body had been moved from its
original location, why there was no physical evidence of rape
and why the exact cause of death could not be determined. It
also indicated the length of time the victim had been dead.
The testimony regarding these facts was restrained and in no

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way unnecessarily lurid or gruesome. No photographs of the
body were shown to the jury. The trial judge did not err in

admitting the testimony of Dr. Bass.

1x

Defendant next objects to as irrelevant Detective
Schroeder's testimony at the guilt hearing that Defendant had
told him that one way to get rid of a body was to feed it to
pigs and that he wanted pictures of the body for his scrap-
book. He also objects to admission of his statements about
putting a body in a graveyard and the various places where
authorities should search for bodies on the mountain. All of
these statements are relevant to show malice and those
concerning the location of the body evince a desire to
mislead the authorities and to evade prosecution from which
guilt may be inferred. See Marable v. State, 203 Tenn. 440,
313 S.W.2d 451, 459 (1958). The most questionable statement
is that about the ‘photographs for the Defendant's scrapbook,
but any error here is clearly harmless in light of the proof.

State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951-953.

Defendant avers that the trial court erred in
failing to suppress statements made by Defendant to various
jailhouse inmates. Defendant ‘argues that the authorities
violated his Sixth Amendment rights by using inmates to
“interrogate” him. This argument has already been discussed
in Issue I. As further grounds for suppression, Defendant,

-22-

oy ——

et a jury out hearing at trial, presented the testimony of
three prisoners - Scholtz, Freeman and Green - who had been
incarcerated with him after his indictment, to the effect
that Detective Schroeder had asked Scholtz to wear a bug in
the cell with Defendant and had inquired if these prisoners
“knew anything on" the Defendant. Schroeder testified that
their testimony about the bug was false but that Scholtz on
his own had volunteered to wear a bug. Schroeder reiterated
that he had never asked any prisoner to elicit information
from the Defendant. The trial court found that there had
been no effort by the Sheriff's Department to solicit the
information and that the Department had simply “availed”
itself of listening to what the inmates had heard the Defen-
dant say; therefore, there was no constitutional violation.
The evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the

trial court. See State v. O'Guinn, 709 S.W.2d 561, 565
(Tenn. 1986).

xI

The Defendant complains of the State's examination
of Pandora Edwards during which the Attorney General unsuc-
cessfully tried to elicit testimony that the Defendant had
said the victim was “a whore" and "deserved it." Despite the
prosecution's questions, Edwards persisted in testifying that
the Defendant had said nothing good or bad about the victim.
Defendant objected to this line of questioning, and after a
jury-out hearing, the trial court sustained the objection and
gave curative instructions to the effect that the prosecu-

tor‘'s questions had been improper and should not be

-23-

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considered. We find the prosecutor's questions improper;
however, we find his actions harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Payne, ___ $.W.24 _ (Tenn. 1990).

xII

Defendant next argues that prejudicial prosecuto-
rial misconduct occurred during the State's cross-examination
of the Defendant when the Attorney General attempted to
Gramatize areas of conflict in the testimony of the Defendant
and other witnesses. The trial judge sustained Defendant's
objections and at one point gave the jury a curative and
explanatory instruction on the unfairness of “blanket” type
questions. Defendant requested no mistrial. There was no

reversible error.

Finally, the Defendant complains about the State's
argument at the sentencing hearing that the victim had begged
for her life. In State v. Beasley, 536 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn.
1976), we held that a prosecutor's argument must be supported
by evidence introduced at trial and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from that evidence. Contrary to Defendant's
assertion that there was no proof that the victim had begged
for her life, the testimony of Ernest Morrison that the
victim pleaded with Defendant fully supports this argument.

Id. at 330, State v. West, 767 S.W.2d 387, 394 (1989).
XIII
-24-

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ae ws x a Se Ss lhe le ee Oe oo oe le le
ese @~S&@eeewenwrrevw2weweeneu#eu#kb sd

The Defendant contends that the instructions at the
guilt phase were erroneous. He challenges the instruction on
first degree murder because it included a partial definition
of felony murder, i.e., the instruction tracked the statutory
language of T.C.A. §39-2-202(a), but did not define for the
jury the felony upon which a first degree murder conviction
could be based, here rape. It is clear there was no erroc in
instructing the jury on felony murder under the indictment
although separate counts on that charge would have been
preferable. See State v. Barnes, 703 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tenn.
1985). It is erroneous, however, for the trial court in such
cases to omit a definition of the felony alleged to support
first degree murder. The words defining the offense of first
degree murder have a technical meaning and it is the trial
court's duty to give such meaning to the jury in the charge
and not merely to use the language of the statute. Poole v.
State, 61 Tenn. 288, 293-294 (1872); see also T.P.I. Crim.
20.02. Rape as a basis for a first degree murder conviction

was a theory presented to the jury in this case.

While the Defendant did object to charging felony
murder under the indictment and raised this as an issue on
his motion for a new trial, he did not specifically object to
the omission of the definition of rape in the charge or
request additional instructions on this point. When told by
the trial judge before the chargé, that the court intended
only to instruct the first degree murder statute, Defendant
made no objection. While there is authority that mere
meagerness of the charge under such circumstances is not

reversible error in the absence for a request for an

-25-

so ow femUmMmelmlCUCOlmlmUCUMGShLUCCNULUCUCU

Te ee ee
ow offs GO YW e&® wweeoeweewnwvwanwe ww Ff ©

additional charge, see Haynes v. State, 720 S.W.2d 76, 85
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1986), a defendant has a constitutional

cight to a correct and complete charge of the law. State v.
Staggs, 554 S.W.24 620, 626 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Lee, 618
S.W.24 320, 323 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). The charge here
omitted is one that is fundamental in nature, essential to a
fair trial, so that the failure to request that rape be
Gefined does not preclude a finding of error. See State v.
Martin, 702 S.W.2d 560, 563-564 (Tenn. 1985); Pope v. State,
212 Tenn. 413, 370 S.W.2d 488, 489 (1963). It is the duty of
the trial judge without request to give the jury proper
instructions as to the law governing the issues raised by the
nature of the proceedings and the evidence introduced during
trial, and simply reading a statute to the jury when the
statute contains words requiring clarification does not
satisfy “the demands of justice” or the defendant's consti-
tutional right to trial by jury. State v. McAfee, 737 S.W.2d
304, 308 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

The law is unsettled as to whether harmless error
analysis is available when a trial court fails to instruct on
an essential element of an offense. See, ¢€.g-., Polsky v.-
Patton, 890 F.2d 647, 651 (34 Cir. 1989); Hoover v. Garfield

Heights Municipal Court, 802 F.2d 168, 175-178 (6th Cir.
1986), cert. denied 480 U.S. 949, 107 S.Ct. 1610, 94 L.Ed.24

796 (1987). Harmless error analysis has been applied,
however, where the trial court has failed to define a sepa-
rate felony which is an essential element of the felony with
which a defendant is charged. For example, in State v. Lee,

-26-

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See ae a oe at ml

618 S.W.24 at 323, the court held that the trial court's
failure to define “murder” in a case involving a charge of
solicitation to commit first degree murder was error harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Bel) v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999,
1005-1006 (Sth Cir. 1982) cert. denied 464 U.S. 843, 104
S.Ct. 142, 78 L. £4.24 134 (1983), the Fifth Circuit held
that the trial court's failure to define the felonies of
kidnapping and armed robbery underlying a charge of capital
murder was harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L. E4.24 705 (1967). In most cases
where the courts have rejected a harmless error analysis, the
omission from the instruction, unlike that in the present
case, prevented the jury from considering a material issue so
that the trial court's failure to instruct was the equivalent
of a directed verdict. See Hoover _v. Garfield Heights
Municipal Court, 802 F.2d at 177.

In the present case the jury returned a verdict
that the Defendant was “guilty of murder in the first de-
gree." The jury was completely and correctly instructed as
to the elements of first degree, common-law, premeditated
murder, and the evidence is clearly sufficient to support a
conviction on this charge. Also, at the sentencing phase,
without the presentation of any evidence additional to that
presented at the guilt phase, the same jury was fully in-
Structed on the elements of rape in connection with aggra-
vating circumstance (i)(7) and in its sentencing decision,
only a short time after its decision as to guilt, expressly
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder had been
committed in the perpetration of rape. Cf. State v. Carter,

-27-

714 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tenn. 1986). For these reasons, we are
of the opinion that the omission of the definition of rape in
the first degree murder charge, in the unique circumstances
and total context of this case, is harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Finally, the Defendant complains that a portion of
the malice instructions created a presumption of malice in
violation of Sandstrom _v. Montana, 442 U.S. 10, 99 S.Ct.
2450, 61 L. Bd.2d 39 (1979). The malice instruction in this
case speaks only of an inference of malice. It neither
presumes malice nor requires the inference to be drawn.

There is no Sandstrom error. See State v. Martin, 702 S.W.2d
560; State v. Bolin, 678 S.E.2d 40, 44-45 (Tenn. 1984).

XIV

Defendant's next issue is whether the aggravating
circumstance found by the jury is proper and supported by the
evidence. The jury was instructed as to two statutory
aggravating circumstances, T.C.A. § 39-2-203(1)(5) and (7).
The verdict form used in this case specified that “the jury
must verbatim write and specifically list below ... the

1 T.C.A. $§39-2-203(1)(5) sets forth the aggravating
circumstance that the “murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity
of mind.” Section 39-2-203(1)(7) states the aggravating
circumstance that the murder was committed while the
defendant was “engaged in committing, or was an accomplice in
the commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was
fleeing after committing or attempting to commit" certain
listed felonies, in this case rape.

-28-

particular statutory circumstance or circumstances found by
the jury,” and the charge included the instruction that “the
jury must include and reduce to writing the specific aggra-
vating circumstance or circumstances so found.“ Neverthe-
less, the jury returned as its aggravating circumstance the
following: “The murder was especially heinous, atrocious in
that it involved depravity of mind while the Defendant was
engaged in committing rape." This was a finding not in
strict compliance with the instructions. However, the
statute makes no requirement of a verbatim statement of the
aggravating circumstances. See T.C.A. §39-2-203(g). The
finding of the jury is sufficient to comply wich the statute
in that the aggravating circumstances found are clearly those
allowed by the statute and permit effective appellate review

of the sentence. Cf. State v. Henley, 774 S.W.24 908, 917
(Tenn. 1989).

‘

Defendant argues that the aggravating circumstance
in (1)(7) was not supported by the proof because the jury's
finding of rape was not supported by the evidence. There is
mo merit to this argument. The Defendant's confession of
rape to two fellow prisoners corroborated by the presence of
human spermatozoa on the victim's clothing, the location of
her pants and underpants away from the body, and the posi-
tioning of her jacket and brassiere over her neck and head,

is sufficient to support the finding that the murder occurred
during the commission of a rape.

-29-

The Defendant avers that the evidence was not
sufficient to support the conviction and the sentence. Where
the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, the relevant
question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Findings of
guilt shall be set aside only if the evidence is insufficient

to support this finding. T.R.A.P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virgin-
da, 443 U.S. 370, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed.24 560 (1979).

A jury verdict approved by the trial judge accred-
its the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves
all conflicts in favor of the State's theory. State v.
Williams, 657 S.W.2¢ 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). On appeal the
State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence and all reasonable or legitimate inferences which

may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 835
(Tern. 1978).

We are of the opinion that the evidence is suffi-
cient to support a finding that the Defendant was guilty of
first degree murder. The proof established that the Defen-
dant was the last person seen with Tara Stowe on the night
she disappeared and that he was seen shortly thereafter
wearing a class ring which had been in her possession. He
lured her into a secluded area on the pretense that her
boyfriend was waiting there for her. When Tim Sexton drove
the Defendant and Tara up Murphy Hollow Road and asked to go

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with them, the Defendant refused. Tara's boyfriend, James
Dagnun, was actually in Trenton, Georgia, at that time.

Before he was arrested, the Defendant made state-
ments to acquaintances which incriminated him. Four days
after the disappearance, he asked John Dagnun if he thought

the Defendant had hurt Tara. He told Tim Sexton that Tara

had given him the ring which she was wearing the night she
Gisappeared. He asked Ronnie Nunley if he wanted a “bone
from Tara". The Defendant admitted raping Tara to two fellow
prisoners. Several others overheard the Defendant admit to
the murder.

Regarding sentencing, the Defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of depravity
necessary to support aggravating circumstance (i)(5). The
proof here amply supports a finding of Gepravity. Cf. State
v. Cooper, 718 S.W.2d 256, 259-260 (1986) (defendant's
feelings of fright and helplessness supported finding of
torture and depravity); v. » 703 S.W.24 106, 119
(Tenn. 1985) (abduction and vicious rape of victim in remote
wooded area created a jury issue on torture and depravity);
see also State v. House, 743 S.W.24 141 (Tenn. 1987) (evi-
dence supported this circumstance where defendant lured
victim from home at night under pretense that her husband had
been in automobile wreck only to assault, rape and murder
her).

-31-

The Defendant, in his final issue, questions the
constitutionality of the Tennessee death penalty statute.
The Defendant contends that the aggravating circumstance
found in 39-2-203(1)(5) (the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity
of mind) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the
recent United States Supreme Court decision of Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. __, 108 &.Ct. 1853, 100 L. Bd.2d 372
(1988). This identical argument was addressed and rejected
in our recent decision of State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239
(Tenn. 1989). See also Clemons v. Mississippi, __U.S.___,

110 S.Ct. 1441, 1449-1450, 1451, _ L.8d.2d (1990)
(impliedly approving Mississippi Supreme Court's construction
of “especially heinous” as limited to “conscienceless or

pitiless and unnecessarily torturous").

The Defendant also argues that the court's charge
at sentencing informing the jury of all eight statutory
mitigating circumstances was error under State and Federal
law. While this Court has held that only those mitigating
circumstances raised by the evidence should be charged, State
v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 608 (Tenn. 1984), in the absence of
a showing of prejudice, this errof would generally benefit
the Defendant and does not require reversal. See State v.
Carter, 714 S.W.2d at 251 (Tenn. 1986). Defendant next
argues that the failure of the instructions to limit the
mitigating factors that the jury may consider results in the
sentencer's unchanneled discretion contrary to Godfrey v.

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Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L. Ed.24 398
(1980). Since the rule is clear, however, that a sentencer
at a capital trial may not be precluded from considering any
relevant mitigating evidence, see Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1670-1671, 90 L. Ed.24 1 (1986),
there is no merit to this argument.

Defendant also asserts that the statute's failure
to require the jury to list the mitigating circumstances it
finds prevents adequate appellate review. The United States
Supreme Court recently rejected this very argument in Clemons
v. Mississippi, 110 S.Ct. at 1449. The Defendant's final
argument is that the Tennessee statute, specifically T.C.A.
$39-2-203 (f), requires the sentencer to unanimously deter-
mine the existence of a mitigating circumstance before the
jury may consider it contrary to the dictates of Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. __, ‘*® %.Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed.2d 384
(1988). Under the Tennesse spatute, which contains none of
the features found objectionable in Mills, the jury need not
agree upon the existence of any mitigating factors and each
individual juror is free to consider any circumstances he or
she may deem mitigating in reaching a decision. State v.
Thompson, 768 S.W.2d at 250-252.

We have reviewed the sentence of death in accord
with the mandates of T.C.A. §39-2-205 and are satisfied that
the evidence warrants imposition of that penalty. Our
comparative proportionality review convinces us that the
sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate

to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the

-33-

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~-

nature of the crime and the Defendant. See, ©@.g-, State v-

House, 743 S.W.24 141; State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d 106.
The sentence of death will be carried out as provided by law

on the 24th day of July , 1990, unless otherwise ordered by
this Court or by other proper authority. Costs are adjudged
against the Defendant.

Chief Justice —

Concur:
Fones, Cooper, Harbison and O'Brien, JJ.

-%4-

ee 4 ae

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Appellee, .
)
|v. ) MARION CRIMINAL
)
) S/C No. 88-57-I
HOMER B. TEEL, )
' )
Defendant -Appellant. )
ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR

The Defendant-Appellant, Homer B. Teel, has filed a
Petition to Rehear in the above-captioned case. After
careful consideration, the Court is of the opinion that the
Petition to Rehear is not well taken and the same is denied
at the cost of Appellant.

The Appellant has also filed in this Court a Motion
to Stay Execution, which has been set for July 24, 1990.
Appellant states in his motion that he contemplates filing a
petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
Upon consideration of the motion, the Court stays the
execution presently set for July 24, 1990, and reschedules
the execution date for September 14, 1990. This 9th day of
July, 1990.

PER CURIAM

a{u/9e

— 7 rr ae ape at >

j

-” ~~ = ne
a . ’ ~

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MARION COUNTY, TENNESSEE

FEBRUARY TERM, June 1, 1988 ‘
MINUTE BOOK 57 - PAGE 99

BE IT REMEMBERED, That # District Court began and held on this the
lst day of June, 1988, Present and presiding the Honorable BUDDY PERRY
Judge of the 12th Judicial District of the State of Tennessee when the
following proceedings were had and entered of record to-wit:

STATE OF TENNESSEE NO. 1460 -

vs. IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

ee ee ee ee

HOMER B. TEEL MARION COUNTY, TENNESSEE

ORDER OVERRULING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

This cause came on for hearing on the lst day of
June, 1988, before the Honorable Buddy Perry, Circuit Judge,
upon defendant's motion for a new trial, and after hearing
argument of counsel and considering all of the record in this
cause and especially defendant's motion for a new trial, the
Court was of the opinion that said motion should be in all
things overruled.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that defendant's motion for a new trial be and the same is
herein in all things overruled.

This lst day of June, 1988.

Okay

WHEREUPON COURT ADJOURNED UNTIL CIRCUIT JUDGE {
JUNE 2, 1988.

APPROVED: BUDDY PERRY /s
Judge

. a ed ee in tn! ae te ae eee oe eee gata eee a z = ~~ e Pa =
ee @ oe | ’ : j
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MARION COUNTY, TENNESSEE | . It 1s Te 9 TTS that the State of

JUNE TERM - June 9, 1988

Tennessee cause a qualified person to examine the hair
MINUTE BOOK’S7 - PAGE 272 ¥

samples in the possession of Dr. King relative to this case,”

BE IT REMEMBERED, That a District Court began and held on this the which were testified to by Dr. King at the trial of this
9th day of June, 1988. Present and presiding the Honorable Buddy D.
Perry Judge of the 12th Judicial District of the State of Tennessee .

when the following proceedings were had and entered of reocrd to-wit!

case and that said hair samples be compared with hair

samples of the Defendant, Homer Butch Teel. The obligation

STATE OF TENNESSEE

Plaintiff
vs No. 1460

HOMER “BUTCH” TEEL

Defendant -

ORDER

Various motions came on for hearing before the

Honorable Buddy Perry, District Judge, on the list day of

June, 1988. The Defendant's counsel had previously

presented orally to the Court on September 21, 1987, a

motion requesting the Court to compel the State of Tennessee

to have a qualified person examine the hair samples in the

possession of Dr. King relative to this case, which was
.

testified to by Dr. King at the trial of this case and that

said hair samples be compared with hair samples of the
Defendant, which the Defendant has agreed to be taken.

Additionally, the Defendant's counsel Orally moved
on June 1, 1988, that a DNA test be conducted and that a
comparison be made of his Spermatozoa with that of the

spermatozoa found by the State's Serologist, Julia Merry,

when examining certain clothing that was presented to her by

the State in this case. the Defendant acknowledged that he

would voluntarily submit such a sample for comparison

Purposes.

The Court upon hearihg the argument of counsel and

based upon the entire record in this cause does grant the

Defendant's Motion relative to comparison of hair samples

and does deny his motion relative to a DNA test and

comparison of spermetotos, n|

of the State in this regard is conditioned upon Homer Butch
Teel voluntarily consenting to the appropriate removal of
hair follicles from his head and pubic area for comparison
purposes.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the results of said
analysis be reported to this Court within ea reasonable
period of time.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion
relative to a DNA test and a comparison of his spermatozoa
with that testified to by the State Serologist, Julia Merry,
as having been located on che victim's clothing be and the
same is hereby denied.

Upon request of the Defendant, the Court's action
in denying his motion for a DNA test and comparison of
spermatozoa should be considered as an additional complaint
of error in his Motion for New Trial which shall be reviewed
by the appropriate Appellate Court since said new trial

motion has been overruled.

ENTER, this the GF day of June, 1988, to be
effective as of June l, 1988.
rcu ge

AP PROVED:

J. WILLIAM POPE, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Pikeville, TN 37367

Cs #'h JUNE 10, 1988.

t APPROVED: BUDDY PERRY /s/
ov: ~{vwee pre
L. T AUSTIN

Pp. O. x 666
Dunlap, TN 37327
(615) 949-4159

AND

KELLY & KELLY, P.C.
P. O. Box 869
Jasper, TN 37347
(615) 942-691

i

WHEREUPON COURT ADJOURNED UNTIL

Oh

LAW OFFICE

KELLY & KELLY, P.C.
POST OFFICE BOX 869
308 BETSY PACK DRIVE

JASPER. TENNESSEE 37347 Supreme Court of the United States
Honorable Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Clerk
sabe sient ae October 2, 1990
> on eee ie FAK .NO, 942-2940 Page 2
EOWW Z (ZACK) KELLY. JR
WELLIAM . GOUGER. JR October 2, 1990 RECE|
. VED Thank you very much for your assistance and
OCT - 4 1990 cooperation.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK Sincerely yours,
Supreme Court of the United States SUPREME COURT, U.S.
Honorable Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Clerk

Office of the Clerk
Washington, D.C. 20543

Re: Homer B. Teel’s Motion

for Leave to Proceed in EZKJr/sf
Forma Pauperis and enclosures
Petition for Writ of cc: Honorable Charles W. Burson
Certiorari Attorney General, State of Tennessee
450 James Robertson Parkway
Dear Mr. Spaniol: Nashville, TN 37243-0485
I am enclosing herewith for filing the following L. Thomas Austin, Esquire
in Forma Pauperis documents relative to Homer B. Teel: P. O. Box 666

Dunlap, TN 37327
1. Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma

Pauperis, with Homer B. Teel’s attached, Mr. Homer B. Teel -
notarized affidavit of indigency, #117983
Station A. West, Unit I 10/1
2. Separate document as required by new Rule Nashville, TN 37219-5255

29 evidencing proof of service of said Motion
for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and
Affidavit,

3. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

4. Separate document as required by new Rule
29 evidencing proof of service of Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.

This is the first occasion that Attorney Austin
and I have had to file any documents with your office, and
in the event anything further is needed from us in this
regard, please advise.

I will certainly appreciate your forwarding to me
your acknowledgment card indicating your receipt of the
enclosed documents.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
HOMER B. TEEL,

Petitioner
Vs

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee
z
°o
.

Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Edwin Z. Kelly, Jr., a member of the Bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States and one of the counsel of
record for Homer B. Teel, Petitioner herein, hereby certify
that on the 2nd day of October, 1990, pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 29.5, I served a copy of the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Tennessee on the Attorney
General of Tennessee, Charles W. Burson, by depositing the
same in the United States Post Office, Jasper, Tennessee,
with first-class postage prepaid properly addressed to
Respondent’s counsel at the following address:
Honorable Charles W. Burson
Attorney General, State of Tennessee
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0485
Phone No. 615-741-4492

All parties required to be served have been

This the 2nd day of October, 1990. GK.
"“ hy

served.

y Pack Driv
Jasper, TN 37347
(615) 942-6911

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
HOMER B. TEEL,

Petitioner
vs No.

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Edwin Z. Kelly, Jr., a member of the Bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States and one of the counsel of
record for Homer B. Teel, Petitioner herein, hereby certify
that on the 2nd day of October, 1990, pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 29.5, I served a copy of the Motion for Leave to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis on the Attorney General of
Tennessee, Charles W. Burson, by depositing the same in the
United States Post Office, Jasper, Tennessee, with
first-class postage prepaid properly addressed to
Respondent’s counsel at the following address:
Honorable Charles W. Burson
Attorney General, State of Tennessee
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0485 -
Phone No. 615-741-4492
All parties required to be served have been

served.

1990.

This the 2nd day 7 ee

a

_—" “EDWIN 2.

309
(615) 942-6911

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0130%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.