# Amicus Curiae Brief — Norman v. Reed

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 500 U.S. 931

## Text

(Y . > Jl
Nos. 90- 6, 90-1435 Consoli ated

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991

- BARBARA J. NORMAN, ef ai..
VS.
DOROTHY REED, et ai..

Petitioners,

Respondents.

COOK COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD, et al.
vs. Petitioners,

DOROTHY REED, et ai.,
Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ILLINOIS
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

WILLIAM T. BARKER JOHN A. POWELL
(Counsel of Record) STEVEN R. SHAPIRO
GERALD E. FRADIN American Civil
Sonnenschein Nath & Liberties Union
Rosenthal! 132 West 43rd Street
8000 Sears Tower New York, New York 10036
Chicago, Illinois 60606 (212) 944-9800
(312) 876-8000 ARTHUR N. EISENBERG
HARVEY M. GROSSMAN New York Civil
Roger Baldwin Foundation Liberties Union
of ACLU, Inc. 132 West 43rd Street
20 East Jackson Boulevard New York, New York 10036
Suite 1600 (212) 382-0557

Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 427-7330

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Mernl! Corporation « Chicage - 312-910-2700

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
kt F _ eee EE l
IEE CI DUNNE vininsscrsicnsinncsnnccsconnssioenectenseseeenouccess l
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......... 7
SIT cihichreietitniencrniinstensineeesnsinsteeneionersndaeetentnicntesinvenianddsestons 10

I. THE REQUIREMENT THAT A PARTY MUST HAVE
SUPPORT IN ALL DISTRICTS OF A SUBDIVISION
BEFORE IT MAY RUN CANDIDATES IN ANY PORTION
OF THE SUBDIVISION UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
INFRINGES THE RIGHT OF POLITICAL
ASSOCIATION, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE
DISTRICTS ARE OF UNEQUAL POPULATION .......... 11

A. By Requiring Equal Numbers of Signatures
From Districts of Substantially Disparate
Population, Illinois Violates the
Requirement of Voter Equality in Selection
IID vicsniidsiicnicdsrcmesccainesnnscsoneecsneccesees 12

B. [linois Also Grants an Improper Preference
to Parties Whose Members Are Geographically

STII ddinstacencehtubsnpetnenintghsthinbinnnnsetdinetenenstessen 16

Il. ILLINOIS HAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGED
ON THE RIGHT OF THE HWP TO ASSOCIATE WITH
THE HWP CANDIDATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF
EXPANDING ITS ACTIVITIES INTO AN ADDITIONAL
SIIIIIIEIECUIIDTIIT ssnciencntssntrinsecnnsncsenneanscestiheentinestenncennees 19

III ci cncntincissistnstnntndescratcasevetantmistenissuieesiciiansenenmis 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)......... 8, 12, 16, 18
Bloomquist v. Thompson, 739 F.2d 525
CERI CAR, FERED cccoccosrncesnnssecnntinsiisitesisidanscae an 15
Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. Pee ncuniapiusinhinds 22
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). ceccccccccccccscoceceeecoeees., 11, 15
Cavanaugh v. Schaeffer, 65 Pa. Commw. 620, 444
A.B BSED (9GGED «.ccrccoissecasasinnciiicimnideiaiiiaamtan ant 15
Communist Party v. State Board of Elections,
518 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975)...... 15
Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel.LaFollette, 450
U.S. BG (BBBE) .....1 At the November 1990 election, voters approved a binding referendum
providing for election of all members of the County Board from 17 single-member
districts. The first election of that sort will be in 1994.

* The Election Code is contained entirely within Chapter 46 of the Illinois
Revised Statutes, and the section numbers therein are identical to the Code’s own
section numbers. Accordingly, 0 furthe: parallel cites to the Illinois Revised
Statutes will be given.

Id. Established political parties nominate candidates in primary
elections and the names and party designations of those nominees
then appear on the general election ballot. /d. § 7-1 et. seq. Parties
which are not established are designated minor parties and must
nominate candidates by petition. /d. § § 10-1 et seq.

In 1990, there were three parties established statewide: the
Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the Solidarity Party.’
No other political parties were established in Cook County. In
addition to the three statewide parties, the Harold Washington Party
(“HWP”) was established in the City of Chicago. (HWP Pet. 6.)
However, the status of the HWP in Chicago did not entitle it to
nominate candidates for Cook County offices, even those elected
from the City District.

A minor party seeking to nominate candidates by peution must
set forth “a complete list of candidates of such party for all offices to
be filled in the .. . . political subdivision at the next ensuing elec-
tion.” Election Code § 10-2. As interpreted by the Illinois Supreme
Court in this case, this provision requires a party seeking to present
any candidates to the voters of Cook County to nominate candidates
for all of the countywide positions and all positions on the County

> The Solidarity Party was formed in 1986 when Adlai Stevenson [I] was
nominated for Governor by the Democratic Party and found the candidates
nominated for Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of State unacceptable running
mates. By the time of the primary election, it was no longer possible to qualify for
the ballot as an independent candidate, so formation of a new political party was
necessary to run without associating with the unacceptable candidates. See
Stevenson v. State Board of Elections, 638 F. Supp. $47 ‘™.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd794
F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1986). A subsequent effort to merge the Solidarity Party into
the Democratic Party was vetoed by Governor James Ti» apson, the candidate who
defeated Stevenson. Solidarity Party Gets A Reprieve: Thompson's Veto Action
Will Let it Die A Natural Death, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25. 1987, at 24. Thus.
although now abandoned by its founders, the Solidarity Party has continued to hold
pmmary elections and will continue to do so as long as the occasional nominees
receive the necessary votes. There is a dispute as to whether the votes received at
the 1990 election were sufficient to allow that party to remain established. The
Attorney General of Illinois bas opined that it did not receive sufficient votes.

Board, both from the City District and from the Suburban District.
(Board Pet. App. 4a.)

Because Cook County is “a political subdivision in which
officers are to be elected from districts and at-large,” the nominating
petition is required “to consist of separate components for each
district from which an officer is to be elected.” /d. Thus, a petition
to nominate minor party candidates in Cook County was required to
contain three components: one for the county at large, one for the City
District, and one for the Suburban District.’

Formation of a new political party for the entire state requires
signatures of “1% of the number of voters who voted at the next
preceding statewide general election or 25,000 qualified voters,
whichever is less.” /d. To form a new party in a political subdivision
of the State, a nominating petition must be

signed by qualified voters equaling in number not less
than 5% of the number of voters who voted at the next
preceding regular election .. . However, whenever the
minimum signature requirement for a district or political
subdivision new political party petition shall exceed the
minimum number of signatures for Statewide new politi-
cal party petitions at the next preceding Statewide general
election, such Statewide petition signature requirement
shall be the minimum for such district or political subdi-
vision new political party petition.

Id.

Based on the votes cast in the 1986 election, 5% of the votes
cast would have been 73,818 for Cook County as a whole; 42,054 for
the City District; and 31,764 for the Suburban District. However,
because the statewide minimum was limited to 25,000, that number

6 In 1994, 18 components will be required, one at-large and one in each of
the 17 County Board Distncts.

would also suffice for each component of the petition. But the two
districts are mutually exclusive, so the requirement of 25,000 signa-
tures on each component means that the entire petition must contain
at least 50,000 signatures, double the number required for a statewide

petition.’

Nominating petitions for minor party candidates are required
to specify the name of the party represented by the candidates.
“However, such party shall not bear the same name as, nor include the
name of any established political party.” Election Code § 10-5.2.
There is no provision whereby a party established in one political
subdivision, such as the City of Chicago, may nominate candidates
under its own name or authorize an affiliated group to nominate
candidates under that name in another political subdivision, such as
Cook County.

At issue in this case is a duly filed petition seeking to nominate
petitioners Barbara Norman, et al. (“HWP Candidates”) as candidates
of the HWP for the various offices of Cook County to be elected at the
November, 1990 election. Those petitions bore roughly 44,000
signatures from the City District and roughly 7,800 from the County
District. (Board Pet. App. 46a). The HWP was formed by those
unhappy with what they felt was inadequate responsiveness of the
Chicago and Cook County Democratic Party to the concerns of the
African-American community. (HWP Pet. 6.)

Objections to the petitions were filed by Respondents Dorothy
Reed, Valerie A. Sutton, Patton L. Fletcher, Ervin S. Ricks, and
David Barrera (“Objectors”). (J.A. 6.) So far as pertinent here,
Objectors challenged (1) the failure of the petition to contain suffi-
cient signatures on its Suburban District component and (2) use of the
HWP name. (J.A. 6.)

7 In 1994, with the establishment of single-member County Board Distncts.
the total required would be 5% of the total vote in the 1990 election. Had that
system been in effect in 1990, it would have required a total of 73,818 signatures.
almost triple the requirement for a statewide petition.

The sole evidence on use of the HWP name indicated that the
nominations were made on behalf of an affiliate of the established
HWP and with the consent of Tim Evans, the sole candidate of the
established HWP and the person authorized by State law to appoint
party committees pending their election in the 1992 primary. (Board
Pet. App. 40a.)

The Cook County Officers Electoral Board ruled that the HWP
candidates were entitled to use the HWP name. (Board Pet. App. 41a.)
Because the Suburban District component had insufficient signa-
tures, it ruled that the Suburban District Candidates could not appear
on the ballot. (Board Pet. App. 48a.) But because the at-large
component and the City District component did have sufficient
signatures, it ruled that the other HWP candidates could appear on the
ballot for the at-large and City District offices. (Board Pet. App. 47a-
48a.)

The Objectors appealed, and the Circuit Court of Cook County
ruled that none of the HWP candidates could appear on the ballot.
(Board Pet. App. 22a-24a.) It ruled that the lack of sufficient
signatures on the Suburban District component was fatal to the
remaining components of the petition. (Board Pet. App. 23a-24a.)
That order was stayed by the Illinois Appellate Court, thus leaving the
Electoral Board order in effect. (J.A. 116.)

The Llinois Supreme Court, granted direct review and, on a 4-
3 vote, affirmed. (Board Pet. App. 2a-Sa.) The majority ruled that use
of the HWP name violated § 10.5 of the Election Code and that failure
to file sufficient signatures on the Suburban District component was
fatal to the entire petition. (Board Pet. App. 4a.) The stay previously
entered was vacated. (Board Pet. App. 4a.)

This Court stayed the [linois Supreme Court's order, thus
leaving the Electoral Board order in effect. (J.A. 118.) The HWP
candidates appeared on the ballot, and one of them received 15.4% of
the votes cast for the office she sought. Official Canvas of the Votes

7

Cast at the November 6, 1990 General Election (Cook County Clerk
1990). Thus, if the HWP was entitled to appear on the ballot, it has
become an established political party in Cook County, entitled to
nominate candidates at the next election.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Representative democracy rests upon the “consent of the
governed” and this “consent” is, in turn, obtained by permitting the
people to freely and fairly choose their political leaders. Alexander
Hamilton observed that the essence of representative government is
“that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.” 2
Elliot's Debates 257.

This unexceptional proposition was also explored by Chief
Justice Warren who noted that representative democracy “is under-
mined as much by limiting whom t+ veople can select as by limiting
the franchise itself.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547
(1969). Accordingly, our contemporary claim of commitment to
democratic government has a hollow ring when we design laws that
fail to confer upon our citizens the widest possible freedom to choose
among the candidates seeking public office.

“{A] voter hopes to find on the ballot a candidate who comes
near to reflecting his policy preferences on contemporary issues.”
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). “This does not mean
every voter Can be assured that a candidate to his liking will be on the
Dallot,” Dul a state may not discriminatorily obstruct the ability of
ike Tuaded ciuzens to put their candidates before the electorate. /d.

| Manor partes are unduly limited in their access to the ballot,
=@, ters are left without adequate alternatives to what they may
; ) S€ umsatisfactory offerings of the major parties. But the
ugmficance of ballot access is not measured solely by the ability of
* party Gomunees to be elected, for that would ignore

‘he Signuficant role that third parties have played in the
poliucal development of the Nation. Abolitionists,

Progressives, and Populists have undeniably had influ-
ence, if not always electoral success. As the records of
such parties demonstrate, an election campaign is a
means of disseminating ideas as well as attaining politi-
cal office. Overbroad restrictions on ballot access jeop-
ardize this form of political expression.

Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 185-86 (1979) (citations omitted); Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 787-88, 794 (1983). .

Minor parties also serve, as the HWP may do, as an alternative
means of political expression for constituencies dissatisfied with a
party to which they have previously adhered. If a constituency is large
enough or the new party forms coalitions with other voters, the new
party may itself become a major force. The renewed need of the old
party to compete for once-reliable adherents also may alter the
positions of that party, thus improving the lot of the formerly
dissatisfied group. The new party may instead alert another major
party to an electoral opportunity, thereby facilitating a transfer of
allegiance in return for greater attention to the constituency which the
new party sought to represent. For all of these reasons, the ability to
associate by forming or expanding new parties is of fundamental
importance to all citizens and is a significant factor in the democratic
dynamic which keeps government and the political system account-
able to the electorate.

A state may not broadly stifle this process by unduly burdening
or restricting the formation of new political parties. Even less may it
skew the process by granting some voters greater weight than others
or by making it easier for some groups to form new parties than for
other groups which are similarly situated with respect to the electoral
process. Illinois has done both of these forbidden things. It has given
greater weight to suburban voters by requiring equal numbers of
signatures from the City District and the Suburban District, even
though the latter is significantly less populous. Illinois has also
preferred groups with substantial followings in both districts over

more geographically concentrated and insular groups, such as the
Cook County African-American community, which is predomi-
nantly located in the City District.

The second of these impermissible effects stems from the
combination of two rules that, were each taken alone, might well be
unobjectionable. One is the requirement that a new party show a
modicum of support in each district where it nominates candidates
rather than accepting such a showing for the entire subdivision of
which the districts are a part. The other is the requirement that a new
party nominate candidates for all positions in all districts. If Illinois
accepted an overall showing of support for the entire County, then the
requirement torun candidates in all districts would not obstruct access
to the ballot. Conversely, if Illinois permitted a new party to run
candidates only at large and in those districts where they could show
the requisite support, then the requirement of a district-by-district
showing of support would not exclude any candidates who could play
a meaningful role in their respective elections. But the combination
of the two requirements greatly restricts ballot access by geographi-
cally concentrated groups, so that combination is forbidden even if
each requirement alone would be valid.

Hlinois has also directly restricted the ability of parties which
have attained a foothold in one political unit to associate with allies
or adherents desiring to seek office in another political unit under the
banner of the fledgling party. It has disallowed ballot placement for
candidates using the name of a party already established in a different
political subdivision. Dlinois forbids this even though the established
Party makes no objection to such use of its name and even though that
party describes the petitioning organization in the other subdivision
as an affiliate. Such an absolute prohibition is impermissible.

Even if Illinois might have prescribed specific procedures to be
followed in establishing such affiliations, it may not do so by
retroactively placing a stringent and unpredictable restrictive inter-
pretation on an ambiguous statute and then penalizing those who
acted before the procedures were defined for failure to correctly

10

forecast and comply with the not-yet-promulgated requirements.
Since Hlinois has yet to prescribe any procedure for affiliation among
local political parties, it may not penalize the HWP candidates for
acting on the basis of an informal affiliation.

ARGUMENT

There is no question here as to the HWP candidates’ “prelimi-
nary showing of a significant modicum of support” in the constituen-
cies from which they sought to be elected. Jeness v. Fortson, 403 U.S.
431, 442 (1971). The HWP candidates had more than 44,000
signatures on their City District component and over 50,000 signa-
tures on their at-large component. [linois requires no more than
25,000 signatures for any constituency, up to and including the entire
State.

By requiring both a full slate and 25,000 signatures on each
component, Illinois has effectively required of Cook County parties
double the number of signatures required for parties seeking to make
nominations for statewide office, with no reason of any sort, let alone
a compelling reason, for doing so. This fact alone shows a violation
of the constitutional requirement expounded in /Ilinois State Board of
Elections v. Socialists Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (because
25,000 signatures adequate for statewide candidacy, larger require-
ment for City of Chicago and Cook County unconstitutional). While
that violation alone would require reversal of the judgment below, the
HWP candidates surmounted even this unconstitutional hurdle: they
obtained more than 50,000 signatures on their petition.

Nonetheless, the HWP was disqualified from the ballot on two
grounds. Because it lacked sufficient demonstrated support in the
Suburban District, it was not permitted to run candidates countywide
or in the City District, despite its ample support in each of those

* The HWP candidates had only 7,800 signatures on their Suburban District
component, but they do aot here challenge exclusion of the suburban candidates
from the ballot.

11

constituencies. Moreover, because the HWP was already established
in the City of Chicago, candidates were forbidden to run under its
banner for Cook County office. Neither ground can withstand
constitutional scrutiny.

I. THE REQUIREMENT THAT A PARTY MUST
HAVE SUPPORT IN ALL DISTRICTS OF A SUB-
DIVISION BEFORE IT MAY RUN CANDIDATES
IN ANY PORTION OF THE SUBDIVISION UN-
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGES THE RIGHT
OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATION, ESPECIALLY
WHERE THE DISTRICTS ARE OF UNEQUAL
POPULATION.

“It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” NAACP v. Alu-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The freedom of
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
includes partisan political organization. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
357 (1976) (plurality opinion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15
(1976). “The right to associate with the political party of one’s choice
is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.” Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479
U.S. 208, 214 (1986).

In a representative democracy, “the voters can assert their
preferences only through candidates or parties or both.” Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). “{A] basic function of a political
party is to select the candidates for public office to be offered to the
voters at general elections.” Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 58. “The
right to form a party for the advancement of political goals means litde
if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an equal
opportunity to win votes.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31
(1968). Moreover, “limiting the opportunities of independent- minded
voters to associate in the electoral arena to enhance their political

12

effectiveness as a group” can “threaten to reduce diversity and
competition in the marketplace of ideas.” Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983).

Thus, it is well settled that restrictions on access to the ballot
burden both “the rights of individuals to associate for the advance-
ment of political belief, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of
political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.” /d. at 787. “Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). And the
right to vote is “heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one
of two [or three] parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for
a place on the ballot.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 31. Thus, “{i}f
the challenged law burdens the rights of political parties and their
members, it can surv' ve constitutional scrutiny only if the State shows
that it advances a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.” Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 222 (1989) (citations omitted).

Exacting scrutiny is particularly necessary here for two addi-
ional reasons. First, the Illinois scheme grants unequal power to
those voters residing in the Suburban District as opposed to those
residing in the City District. Second, Illinois gives preference among
political parties to those whose members are relatively equally
divided between the two districts and disadvantages parties of equal
size whose members are more concentrated in one district rather than
the other.

A. By Requiring Equal Numbers of Signatures
From Districts of Substantially vageree
Population, Illinois Violates the Requirer
of Voter Equality in Selection of Representa-
tives.

Voter equality is one of the most fundamental precepts of our
representative form of government.

ee eR

13

Once the geographical unit for which a representative is
to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the
election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race,
whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever
their income, and wherever their home may be in that
geographical unit.

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).

The seminal application of that principle to the ballot access
process came in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969). For indepen-
dent candidates for statewide office, Illinois required filing 25,000
signatures, including at least 200 from each of at least SO counties. At
the time, 93.4% of the State's registered voters resided in the 49 most
populous counties and only 6.6% resided in the remaining 53 coun-
ties. This Court found the distributional requirement inconsistent
with the constitutional requirement of voter equality, pointing out
that:

[I}t is no answer to the argument under the Equal
Protection Clause that this law was designed to require
Statewide support for .aunching a new political party
rather thag support from a few localities. This law
applies a rigid, arbitrary formula to sparsely settled
counties and populous counties alike, contrary to the
constitutional theme of equality among citizens in the
exercise of their political rights. The idea that one group
can be granted greater voting strength than another is
hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representa-
tive government.

Id. at 818-19.

The Court illustrated the forbidden discriminatory impact as
follows:

14

Under this Illinois law the electorate in 49 of the
counties which contain 93.4% of the registered voters
may not form a new political party and place its candi-
dates on the ballot. Yet 25,000 of the remaining 6.6% of
registered voters properly distributed among the 53 re-
maining counties may form a new party to elect candi-
dates to office. This law thus discriminates against the
residents of the populous counties of the State in favor of
rural sections. It, therefore, lacks the equality to which
the exercise of political rights is entitled under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 819.

Llinois then sought to replace this law by retaining the require-
ment of 25,000 signatures and limiting to 13,000 the number which
could be counted from a single county. The Seventh Circuit struck
down that version as conferring a similar discriminatory veto power:

Under section 10-2 the entire electorate of Cook
County, which represents 45% of all registered voters in
Illinois, may not form a new political party and place its
Candidates on the ballot. Yet any 25,000 of the remaining
55% of registered voters properly distributed among the
remaining 101 counties may form a new party to elect
candidates to office. Put another way, the approximately
2,750,000 registered Llinois voters in urbanized Cook
County do not have the power under section 10-2 to
create a Statewide political party to protect their own
peculiar interests, while 25,000 voters in any two or more
counties in rural downstate Illinois may create such a
Party to protect their distinctly different, and often com-
peting interests. This two-county requirement, like the
fifty county requirement in Moore, ‘discriminates against

- ws

15

the residents of the populous counties of the state in favor
of rural sections.”

Communist Party v. State Board of Elections, 518 F.2d 517,521 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975).’

This conclusion is confirmed by the explanation of Moore v.
Ogilvie in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). There this Court
upheld a system of matching funds for major party presidential
candidates requiring raising of specified funds in at least 20 states.
Reliance was placed on the unique and special need for dispersed
geographic support created by the presidential election system:
“A president is not elected by popular vote, but by winning the
popular vote in enough states to have a majority in the Electoral
College.” Jd. at 106. Moore was distinguished on the ground that:

Only 7% of Dlinois voters could have blocked a
candidate from qualifying for the ballot, even though the
statewide elections were decided by straight majority
vote. The clear purpose was to keep any person from
being nominated without support in downstate counties
making up only 7% of the vote, but those same voters
could not come close to defeating a candidate in the
general elecuon.

Id. at 144.

* Since Moore, requirements of equal oumbers of signatures from districts
of substanually disparate population have consistently been declared unconstitu-
tional. Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262, 1272(S.D. Ohio 1970),
aff d mem. 409 U.S. 942 (1972); Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314
F. Supp. 984, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd mem , 400 U S..806 (1970); Bloomquist
v. Thompson, 739 F.2d $25, $27-28 (10th Cir. 1984), Libertarian Party v. Beerman,
$98 F. Supp. $7,62(D. Neb. 1984); Socialist Workers Party». Hare, 304 F. Supp
534 (E.D. Mich. 1969); but see Cavanaugh v. Schaeffer, 65 Pa. Commw. 620, 444
A.2d 1308, 1310-11 (1982) (requirement of 100 signatures from each of five
counties upheld because four most populous counties had only 41 8% of population
and because case involved judicial election and judges were oo considered
“representatives’).

16

That analysis is equally valid here. The Suburban District is
30% less populous than the City District, as shown by the Census
figures and the apportionment of the County Board. Yet even though
the residents of the City District have the votes, if united, to control
all countywide offices and a majority on the County Board, the
residents of the Suburban District have the power to prevent the
formation of a political party to effectuate such control. Thus, there
is a Clear violation of Moore v. Ogilvie.

B. Illinois Also Grants an Improper Preference
to Parties Whose Members Are Geographi-

cally Dispersed.

Even if the equality of individual voters is maintained, this
Court has noted that

It is especially difficult for the State to justify a
restriction that limits political participation by an identi-
fiable political group whose members share a particular
viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.
“Our ballot access cases ... focus on the degree to
which the challenged restrictions operate as a mecha-
nism to exclude certain classes of candidates from the
electoral process. The inquiry is whether the challenged
restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the ‘avail-
ability of political opportunity.”

Anderson v. Celebrezze,460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983) (footnote omitted).
That is, a state may not skew the political process so as to favor some
identifiable viewpoints as opposed to others held by an equal number
of voters.

This sort of forbidden loading of the political dice is also
inherent in the statute at issue here. The combination of the full slate
requirement with a requirement of a district-by-district showing of
support limits ballot access to those parties with sufficient support in

— et i el el

17

all districts. This clearly favors groups which are roughly equally
dispersed between the two districts. As such a group grows in
numbers, the group will be able to meet the signature requirements in
both districts at about the same time. But a group of equal size which
is concentrated in one district would have a surplus of signatures in
one district and a deficiency in the other, so that it would need to grow
larger than a dispersed group to be equally able to qualify for the
ballot. The more heavily concentrated the group, the greater the
disparity in ability to qualify a party—to the point where a group
entirely located in one district, no matter how large, could never
qualify for the ballot.

Many identifiable interests in our society are concentrated
geographically. For example, African-Americans, a group to which
the HWP seeks to appeal, are concentrated in cities. On the other
hand, European- Americans are much more evenly dispersed, at least
in Cook County. Similarly, farmers are concentrated in rural areas,
while other occupations may be more evenly dispersed throughout a
state. A state may not structure the political process so as to prefer
some groups to others in ways not corresponding to their ability to
elect or defeat candidates once nominated. Thus, voters in one district
cannot be given a veto power over candidates to be nominated in
another district nor a veto power over the ability to nominate
candidates at-large who possess the requisite modicum of support in
the political subdivision as a whole.

Nor should it be dispositive that wider geographic support
might be necessary to obtain a majority for an at-large position. By
definition, new parties almost always will be at least third parties, so
even a strong plurality might win an election. More importantly, as
previously explained, the ability to field candidates can significantly
advance the political interests of a new party’s constituency even
without ever winning an election. Consequently, no one group or
identifiable class of groups may properly be given a preference over
another group or class of groups in obtaining a position on the ballot.

Cases which have held otherwise have focused exclusively on
the equality of power given to individual voters and failed to consider

18

how geographic distribution requirements disadvantage concentrated
groups of voters.'° Yet, by definition, the activities of political parties
involve groups of voters and not just individuals, so equal treatment
of equally numerous parties is a matter of constitutional concern.
Thus, the results reached in those cases should not be deemed

dispositive of the argument presented here, which does not appear to
have been considered. Moreover, several of the cases approve only

a requirement for signatures in half of the equal-population districts
involved, so those cases do not support the requirement here of

signatures in all districts.'' Similarly, none of them permitted lack of

'© Morritt v. Governor, 42 N.Y .2d 347, 397 N.Y.S.2d 929, 366N.E.2d 1285
(1977), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 434 U.S. 1029
(1978) (requirement of 100 signatures from each of half the Congressional districts
in the state to obtain position on primary ballot for statewide office); Udall v.
Bowen, 419 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd mem. 425 U.S. 947 (1976)
(S00 signatures from each Congressional district to place name on presidential
preference primary ballot); Libertarian Party v. Bond, 764 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1985)
(requirement signatures equal to | % of vote in all Congressional districts or 2% in
half of districts); Johnson v. Cuomo, $95 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (same
requirement as in Morritt for new political party presidential candidates); Liber-
tarian Party v. Davis, 591 F. Supp. 1561 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd 766 F.2d 865 (4th
Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1984) (200 signatures from each Congres-
sional district for new party presidential candidates).

'' Summary adjudications by this Court are not precedential as to more than
“the precise issues presented and necessarily decided... . . ’ A summary dispo-
siuoa affirms only the judgment of the court below and no more may be read into
[this Court's] action than was essential to sustain the judgment.” Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784 o.5 (1983).

In this regard, it is significant that Udall v. Bowen, 419 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.
Ind. 1976), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 947 (1976), did not involve a candidate with
geographically concentrated support but merely an inadvertent failure to make a
timely filing of one component of the petition. Thus, the plaintiff there could not
assert the rights of political parties, like the HWP. whose support is geographically
concentrated. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 757-58 (1973) (require-
ment of advance enrollment in party did not disenfranchise voter who could have
enrolled in timely manner but failed to do so).

footnote continued on page 19

19

support in one district to prevent placement on the ballot of candidates
in another district, when those candidates had ample support in the
district where they proposed to run.

This Court should now consider the problem of discrimination
against a geographically concentrated group and hold that this
discrimination, as well as the improper enhancement of the power of
the residents of the less populous Suburban District, violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.

II. ILLINOIS HAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IN-
FRINGED ON THE RIGHT OF THE HWP TO
ASSOCIATE WITH THE HWP CANDIDATES
FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPANDING ITS AC-
TIVITIES INTO AN ADDITIONAL POLITICAL
UNIT.

The HWP is an established political party in the City of
Chicago. (HWP Pet. 6.) As such, it has an established constitutional
right to associate with new and potential adherents for the purpose of
seeking “political power in the community.” Tashjian v. Republican
Party, 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986); Eu v. San Francisco Democratic
Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989). Moreover, this right includes “the
freedom to identify the people who constitute the association.”

footnote continued fron page 18

In Moritt v. Governor, 42 N.Y .24 347, 397 N.Y.S. 24929, 366N.E. 2d 1285
(1977), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 434 US. 1029
(1978), the issue presented in this Court related solely to a claim of unequal
weighting to the votes of those residing in different districts. While the districts
were of equal population, the distribution requirement was applied to a candidacy
in a party primary and party members were not equally distributed among distncts.
Thus, the claim was that the districts had disparate populations of those eligible to
participate in party affairs, thus making Moore v. Ogilvie directly applicable.
lurisd. Sumt., No. 77-524, 8-13. Rejection of that claim does not require that
distributional requirements be sustained against the different challenge presented
here.

20

Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214; Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel.
LaF olletie, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981). In Tashjian, the Court struck
down a Connecticut law which required voters in any party primary
to be registered members of that party even though the party wished
to permit independent voters to participate. The Court found that
because the statute limited the group of registered voters who could
participate in the pr.mary, the State impermissibly limited the party’ s
“associational opportunities.” 479 U.S. at 216.

The State of Illinois has similarly restricted the associational
rights of both the established HWP and the petitioners who wish to
participate in that party. This prohibition was imposed without regard
to the shared desire of the HWP and the HWP candidates to associate
with one another. Despite that desire, Dlinois absolutely prohibited
the use of the HWP name by the HWP candidates. On the record, the
established HWP had no objection to the use of the HWP name by the
HWP candidates. (Board Pet. App. 40a.) Both the HWP and the
HWP candidates regard themselves as affiliated. Thus, as in Tashjian,
there is no conflict between the associational interests of the party (the
established HWP) and those whose participation the party encourages
(the HWP candidates who seek to carry its banner). /d. at 216, n.7.

The interest asserted by Illinois is in preventing voter confu-
sion. (Board Pet. App. 39a.) But there can be no confusion unless the
two Organizations Claiming a single name are in fact independent of
one another rather than being affiliates.'? Tashjian teaches that while
a State has a legitimate interest in preventing voter confusion, that
interest does not make it permissible for the state to “act as the
ideological guarantor” of the established party by ensuring that voters
are not misled by a candidate whom the state views as not a “true”
member of the party. /d. at 220. A state has no interest in limiting who
a party can allow to operate under its name and in concert with it. The

'2 Tt is not necessary that they be the same, any more than the Democratic
Party of Cook County need be the same as the Democratic Party of DuPage County.
Itis enough that both groups regard themselves as being united in acommon cause.

ee sla arenmanenntincin ton. ee ee ee ee ee

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21

State of Illinois may have a legitimate concern in preventing two
different parties with the same name from running candidates in
different elections, but it cannot have a legitimate concern with whom
a political party chooses to include among its members. As this Court
has stated:

The Party’s determination of the boundaries of its
own association, and of the structure which best allows
it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the Consti-
tution.

Id. at 224.

Nor can [llinois support its action by asserting that the HWP
failed to follow the appropriate procedures to decide to affiliate with
the HWP candidates. (See HWP Pet. App. 17 (ruling of the Circuit
Court), 52-53 (dissenting opinion to Electoral Board decision)) To
begin with, it was not at all clear that amy action was necessary.
Neither the Electoral Board nor the Circuit Court believed the
prohibition on use of an established party name applied outside the
political unit(s) in which that party was established. (Board Pet.
App. 39a-40a, 20a-21a.) The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that
the Electoral Board and the Circuit Court misread the statute, but the
HWP and HWP candidates could hardly be blamed for having shared
that reading.

Moreover, even if the prohibition had been clear, there was
(and is) no established procedure for an established party to authorize
use of its name by aspirants to office in a different mrisdiction or to
affiliate with such aspirants. Thus, if the HWP chose the wrong
procedure, the cause lay largely in the failure of Illinois to prescribe
a procedure (or even to indicate that consent or affiliation was

possible). A

Since the State has failed to make such a procedure available
to the HWP, it cannot now attack the method by which the party has
itself decided to expand. Moreover, the State certainly cannot create

22

such a procedure after the fact and make it applicable to petitioners.
A restrictive interpretation of an election rule which compromises
fundamental rights may not be imposed without “forewarning” those
subject to the rule. Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046, 1055 (7th Cir.
1970).

In Briscoe, voters and Chicago aldermanic candidates barred
from ballots filed a civil rights action alleging that the election
authorities violated their constitutional rights by rejecting signatures
On nominating petitions for “highly technical reasons.” /d. at 1051.
The Seventh Circuit found that the authorities had employed a
restrictive interpretation, contrary to its own past practice, of vague
petition signature rules without any explanation or advance warning
to candidates. The effect of this new interpretation was to “nullify
previously acceptable signatures” at a ime when petition circulators
could no longer alter their circulating techniques. /d. at 1055. Because
fundamental rights were implicated, “those interested require certain
knowledge [at the time they act] of what is expected of them by the
state.” Jd. The Seventh Circuit therefore held that “where there is no
advance clarification or statement” of a rule, “the Constitution
permits enforcement of the statutory rule in only the least restrictive
and most obvious manner.” /d. at 1056.'° Application here, without
any advance notice, of an ambiguous rule in an extremely restrictive
way violates that principle.

Moreover, given the lack of specificity in the statute at issue
combined with the complete absence of advance warning to petition-
ers regarding the nature of the Rule’s application, the State cannot
constitutionally justify the complete exclusion of the HWP candi-
dates from the ballot. For even if the interpretation which prohibits

'3 See Griffin v. Burns, $70 F.2d 1065, 1075-79 (1st Cir. 1978) (unconsti-
tutional to retroactively apply new interpretation where effect would be to
disenfranchise voters whose ballots were cast in accordance with prior practice):
Gartrell v. Knight, 546 F. Supp. 449, 453-54(N_.D. Ala. 1982); Williams v. Sclafani,
444 F. Supp. 906, 911-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mem., 508 F.2d 1046 (2nd Cir.
1978).

{uti i lit aN i

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23

the petitioners from using the HWP name can be viewed as reason-
able, the harsh remedy of exclusion from the ballot cannot. Any voter
confusion resulting from use of the HWP name could be eliminated
simply by deleting that name from the ballot line on which the
candidates would appear. See Vasquez v. Municipal Officers Elec-
toral Board, 115 Wl. App. 3d 1014, 450 N.E. 2d 1379 (3rd Dist. 1983)
(allowing candidates to appear but requiring omission of confusingly
similar party name). Even if the objective is legitimate, the Consti-
tution requires a state to accom) sh that end narrowly and fairly so
as to avoid obstructing and diluting these fundamental liberties.
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).

The State of Illinois seeks to place a wall around the established
HWP without its consent and without any justification. By limiting
whom the HWP can associate with, the State has violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.

24

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Illinois should be reversed and the Order of the
Cook County Officers Electoral Board should be reinstated.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM T. BARKER
(Counsel of Record)

GERALD E. FRADIN
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal
8000 Sears Tower

Chicago, Dlinois 60606

(312) 876-8000

HARVEY M. GROSSMAN

Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc.
20 East Jackson Boulevard

Suite 1600

Chicago, Llinois 60604

(312) 427-7330

JOHN A. POWELL

STEVEN R. SHAPIRO
American Civil Liberties Union
132 West 43rd Street

New York, New York 10036
(212) 944-9800

ARTHUR N. EISENBERG
New York Civil Liberties Union
132 West 43rd Street

New York, New York 10036
(212) 382-0557

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0090%3A8. Public record. Not legal advice.
