# Reply Brief — Arkansas v. Oklahoma

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0079%3A05

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 503 U.S. 91

## Text

OFFICE OF THE CLema |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

STATE OF ARKANSAS, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WINSTON BRYANT EDWARD W. WARREN, P.C.
Attorney General DAVID G. NORRELL

MARY STALLCUP (Counsel of Record)

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GARY E. MARCHANT
GENERAL KIRKLAND & ELLIS

200 Tower Building Suite 1200

4th & Center 655 Fifteenth St., N.W.

Little Rock, AR 72201 Washington, D.C. 20005

JAMES N. McCorpD (202) 879-5070

CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE WALTER R. NIBLOCK

207 West Center Street THE NIBLOCK LAW FIRM

ANNE ROBERTS BOBO Fay etteville, AR 72702

A.D.P.C. & E. ———<

P.O. Box 8913 Staseee Law Wenne

Little Rock, AR 72219-8918 193 West Lafayette

March 15, 1991 Fayetteville, AR 72702

SS

WILeon - Eras Printine Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS * .........................

ID icctrcteiettintircinenitnnitnnevticccnmnenion

I. RESPONDENTS’ DEFENSE OF THE DECI-
SION BELOW ACTUALLY EMPHASIZES
THE NEED FOR SUPREME COURT RE-

Il.

RESPONDENTS’ SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS
DO NOT DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE ISSUES PRESENTED ...............................

A.

B.

Respondents’ Assertion Of “Correctness” Is
Not A Reason For Denying Review ..............

Respondents Fail to Explain Away The Con-
flict Created By The Tenth Circuit’s Deci-
sion

Respondents Cannot Artificially Limit The
Tenth Circuit’s Decision To An Interpreta-
tion Of Oklahoma Water Quality Standards..

. The Permit Renewal Proceedings Do Not

Diminish The Need For Immediate Review
ENE SMEs ET ee a

. The Facts Of This Case Confirm the Ex-

treme Scope Of The Tenth Circuit’s Deci-

* There have been no changes in the parties to the proceedings
listed on page ii of Arkansas’ petition.

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279
i. ) Yh oe et eae
_,lUinois Vv. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) ....
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
CUTIE canittastitletensindonistenissstinscciiaadadaiansiasinihiaaaaneaiads
Shearson/American Express Inc. Vv. McMahon,
Re

Statutes and Regulations

CWA § 401, 88 U.S.C. § 1841 ..........2...... eee eceeee ones
CWA § 402 (b) (5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b) (5) ............
CWA § 402 (d) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1842 (d) (2) ............
CWA, § GEG, SB UB. § BGO anna ancccecncccrcesceeccensceseccses
et 8 8 een

Miscellaneous

EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,099 (Sept. 22, 1989) —...........
Letter from Brita Haugland Cantrell, Assistant
A.G. of Oklahoma to Arkansas Dept. of Pollu-
tion Control & Ecology, Dec. 21, 1990 ................
Comments of U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Fish and
Wildlife Service, to U.S. EPA, Region 10, Feb.
| a Se ee Pe
Motion of Oklahoma for Leave to File Complaint,
Oklahoma v. Arkansas (No. 93, Orig.), motion
denied, 460 U.S. 1020 (1988) .........-..0.. 0.
Rebuttal Testimony of Jack H. Gakstatter, EPA
Office of Research & Development (Index No.
Jy §" SS | eee

aA kr ww Ww

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondents’ brief in opposition is most revealing for
the points that it implicitly concedes and declines to ad-
dress. See Section I infra. But even the points that
Oklahoma does choose to address in no way diminish the
need for Supreme Court review or demonstrate that this
case is inappropriate for resolution of the issues pre-
sented. See Section II infra.

I. RESPONDENTS’ DEFENSE OF THE DECISION
BELOW ACTUALLY EMPHASIZES THE NEED
FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW.

In defending the decision below, Oklahoma readily con-
firms the sweeping nature of the Tenth Circuit’s first
holding regarding the applicability of downstream state
standards to facilities in upstream states. Not only must
EPA and state permitting agencies apply the downstream
state standards, but they have absolutely no discretion to
depart from or interpret those standards. See, e.g., Br.
Opp. at 11, 16 (mandating “strict compliance’). In re-
spondents’ view, the Tenth Circuit was fully justified in
giving downstream states a veto power over the permit-
ting of sources in upstream states.

Similarly, Oklahoma is quick to support the absolute
nature of the Tenth Circuit’s second holding requiring a
ban on new permits. Although respondents suggest the
ban might not apply in other states (a point addressed
in Section II.C infra), Oklahoma explicitly endorses the
mandatory and immediate nature of the ban where it
does apply. The ban even precludes issuance of permits
for new sources that would have no detectable adverse
effect on water quality. Br. Opp. at 13-14. As shown by
EPA, Arkansas, and the states and cities submitting
amicus briefs, however, this ban would dramatically
change the existing regulatory system, and whether in-
tended or not by Oklahoma, it is already being invoked
by federal agencies in other states and circuits. See infra
note 4,

| 2

Finally, apart from a passing disclaimer, respondents
prefer to ignore the revolutionary impact of the Tenth
Circuit’s decision. See EPA Pet. at 13, 23; Ark. Pet. at
8, 26-29. As the petitions by both EPA and Arkansas
demonstrate, and the amicus briefs submitted by other
states, cities and industries confirm, the change in law
mandated by the Tenth Circuit will severely disrupt the
Clean Water Act (CWA) permitting process and jeop-
ardize the permits for countless facilities now under con-
struction or in planning. See Brief of Colorado et al. as
Amici Curiae at 8-9; Brief of Montana as Amicus Curiae
at 6; Brief of The Association of Metropolitan Sewerage
Agencies et al. as Amici Curiae at 17-18; Brief of
Champion International Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae at
12-13. Again, Oklahoma treats that impact as only ap-
propriate, and it offers these other affected parties no
quarter.

After a decade of disputes with Arkansas over inter-
state waterways, Oklahoma has finally achieved its own
parochial objectives in the Tenth Circuit. But the rest
of the nation now has to live with the disruptive effects
of the Tenth Circuit’s decision, absent review by this
Court. Respondents’ effort to ignore these nationwide
consequences does not make them disappear.

II. RESPONDENTS’ SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS DO NOT
DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES
PRESENTED.

A. Respondents’ Assertion Of “Correctness” Is Not A
Reason For Denying Review.

Respondents’ primary ground for opposing certiorari
is that they believe the Tenth Circuit’s decision is clearly
“correct.” Br. Opp. at 15. Most prevailing parties feel
that way. Before succeeding in the Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, Oklahoma fully agreed that these interstate issues
were substantial and itself urged that resolution by the
Supreme Court was necessary. Motion of Oklahoma for
Leave to File Complaint, Oklahoma v. Arkansas (No. 93,
Orig.), motion denied, 460 U.S. 1020 (1983). Moreover,

3

respondents base their new patina of clarity on nothing
more than isolated snippets of statutory language and an
unsubstantiated assertion that the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion is consistent with current practice under the CWA.
Br. Opp. at 16-17.

The question presented is whether the CWA compels
permitting agencies to apply, without any deviation or
flexibility, the standards of downstream states. Arkansas
contends that the statute gives agencies the discretion to
apply these standards and to decide how they should be
considered in any given case. Oklahoma’s rigid view to
the contrary certainly is not compelled by the statute
(even the Tenth Circuit needed over thirty pages to jus-
tify its conclusion), and that view has not previously
been accepted in any other litigation. Moreover, Okla-
homa’s view completely ignores the language in § 402,
among other provisions. Section 402 was specifically in-
tended by Congress to address the precise question at is-
sue and expressly treats downstream standards as a dis-
cretionary consideration, rather than as automatically
applicable. CWA § 402(b) (5), (d) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(b) (5), (d) (2); Ark. Pet. at 14-15."

Respondents are on even weaker ground in asserting
that the Tenth Circuit’s holding is consistent with the
current administration of the CWA. Respondents offer
no evidence to support this claim and, in fact, the amicus
briefs filed by various states directly contradict the re-
spondents. As those briefs explain, the current prac-
tice of states with approved permitting programs is to
consider only the water quality standards of the source
state, and not downstream states, when evaluating a per-
mit application. Brief of Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae
at 6; Brief of Montana as Amicus Curiae at 6. Thus,
far from supporting the Tenth Circuit’s decision, the ac-

1 It would make no sense to suggest that EPA has even less dis-
cretion in the application of downstream standards when it is the
permitting agency under § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341.

4

tual practice in administering the Act runs directly con-
trary to the court’s new construction.

Respondents’ assertion of “correctness” is further re-
futed by the untenable situation created as a result of
the Tenth Circuit’s elimination of any mechanism for
balancing the competing interests of upstream and down-
stream states. As the brief submitted by the municipal
amici demonstrates, the statutory scheme must provide
some flexibility to accommodate both upstream and down-
stream state interests. Brief of The Association of Metro-
politan Sewerage Agencies et al. as Amici Curiae at 7-14.
Indeed, even Oklahoma agrees that some mechanism for
accommodation must exist and suggests that EPA can
“disapprove” downstream standards that would unrea-
sonably affect upstream interests. Br. Opp. at 23. Un-
fortunately, both the courts and EPA have concluded
that, under § 510 of the CWA, the Agency “is not author-
ized to disapprove a State water quality standard on the
basis that EPA considers the standard to be too strin-
gent.” EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,099 (Sept. 22, 1989);
Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1284
(D.S.D. 1979). Adoption of the Tenth Circuit’s position
would therefore remove the only available mechanism for
EPA to mediate interstate disputes over the application
of conflicting water quality standards.

Finally, notwithstanding Oklahoma’s wishful charac-
terization, EPA does not support Oklahoma’s position on
this issue. The Tenth Circuit’s decision effectively elim-
inates any Agency flexibility or discretion in applying
downstream state standards, and EPA’s petition clearly
confirms that it is seeking review of the court’s inter-
state holding. As EPA concluded, the Tenth Circuit’s
decision “has significantly undermined EPA’s authority
to implement the Clean Water Act by usurping EPA’s
role under the Act as arbiter of interstate water pollu-
tion disputes.” EPA Pet. at 12-13. Consequently, even
though EPA may advocate a somewhat different ap-
proach than the Arkansas petitioners, Oklahoma’s char-
acterization of EPA’s position should be recognized as

5

nothing more than an attempt to obfuscate the court’s
radical departure from current practice.*

B. Respondents Fail to Explain Away The Conflict
Created By The Tenth Circuit’s Decision.

Respondents’ rhetoric and superficial readings similarly
fail to explain away the conflict between the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s holdings and the decisions of this Court and other
circuits. With respect to International Paper Co. v. Ouel-
lette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), Oklahoma dismisses this
Court’s detailed discussion of the issue as mere dicta.
This “distinction” simply reflects a refusal to examine the
substance of the Court’s decision. The Supreme Court’s
preemption holding necessarily required the Court to in-
terpret the Clean Water Act’s provisions on the interstate
application of water quality standards before the Court
could decide whether these provisions conflicted with, and
therefore preempted, the application of a downstream
state’s common law. See Ark. Pet. at 12 n.10. Thus, this
Court’s conclusion in Ouellette that a downstream state
could not impose its standards under the CWA on out-of-
state sources was an essential part of the Court’s holding.
In any event, lower courts are not free to disregard at
will this Court’s explanation of the law. See Shearson/
American Express Inc. V. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268
(1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (a statute that has been construed by the Supreme
Court “acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if
the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress it-
self’).

Respondents are equally mistaken in attempting to dis-
tinguish J/linois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985), on the
ground that it only dealt with state common law. Br.

2In fact, respondents’ brief is internally inconsistent on this
issue. At some points in their brief, respondents do concede that
EPA’s “present position” would allow for “administrative balanc-
ing” between the downstream standard and “other considerations.”
Br. Opp. at 21-22.

6

Opp. at 19. In fact, this decision involved the interstate
application of both Illinois common law and the Illinois
water quality standards adopted under state statutes and
approved under the Clean Water Act. 731 F.2d at 406.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit held that a downstream
state could not apply either its common law or its water
quality standards against out-of-state sources. Jd. at
414. In short, a fair reading of these and the other de-
cisions addressed in Arkansas’ petition demonstrates a
substantial conflict in the precedent, which can only be
resolved by this Court.

C. Respondents Cannot Artificially Limit The Tenth
Circuit’s Decision To An Interpretation Of Okla-
homa Water Quality Standards.

Having won their own ban on any new Arkansas dis-
charges that reach their border, Oklahoma now suggests
that this ban might not apply in other states. While the
ban on new permits that Oklahoma advocated below may
have been confined in this manner, the Tenth Circuit
made clear that it was adopting a much more sweeping
holding than the argument advanced by Oklahoma. In-
deed, in justifying its decision not to remand the case,
the court explicitly stated that it was creating a new test,
going far beyond the position advocated by Oklahoma,
and that the parties “did not recognize the real signifi-
cance of this issue.” Ark. Pet. App. at 54a n.40.

The nationwide applicability of the court’s permit ban
is readily demonstrated by the court’s opinion. Specifi-
cally, the court predicated the ban on its interpretation of
the Clean Water Act, rather than on Oklahoma’s non-
degradation standard. See, e.g., Ark. Pet. App. at 82a.
The Tenth Circuit repeatedly relied on the intent of Con-
gress and the legislative history of the CWA to justify
its permit ban holding, without even referring to the in-
tent of the specific Oklahoma standard involved in this
case. See, e.g., id. at 88a (“the agency’s decision is in-
consistent with the language of the Clean Water Act, as
interpreted in light of the legislative history, and frus-
trates the policy that Congress sought to implement”)

7

See also id. at 76a, 78a-79a. In addition, the Tenth Cir-
cuit emphasized that the permit ban is triggered by a
pre-existing violation of any relevant water quality
standard.’ See, e.g., id. at 54a, 75a. According to the
court, EPA’s failure to impose a permit ban upstream
from an existing water quality violation was the “prin-

cipal flaw in the agency’s decision-making rationale.”
Id. at 75a,

In sum, regardless of what Oklahoma may have in-
tended, the Tenth Circuit’s permit ban is applicable to
any stream with an existing violation of a water quality
standard. Oklahoma’s artificial construction therefore
cannot avoid the severe nationwide impact described by
Arkansas’ petition and the amicus briefs. See, e.g., Ark.
Pet. at 27-29. In fact, the Tenth Circuit’s holding al-
ready is being applied nationwide exactly as predicted
by the Arkansas petition.*

D. The Permit Renewal Proceedings Do Not Diminish
The Need For Immediate Review By This Court.

Respondents also suggest that this case is inappro-
priate for review because the Fayetteville facility’s dis-
charge permit is up for renewal and Arkansas, rather
than EPA, is now the permitting agency. Br. Opp. at 25.

* Furthermore, as explained in EPA’s petition, even if the court’s
holding had been based on an interpretation of Oklahoma’s non-
degradation standard rather than the CWA, the holding would still
have a dramatic nationwide impact because every state is required
to adopt a similar non-degradation policy based on EPA’s model
standard. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.

*For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and other
interest groups have submitted comments on a draft NPDES permit
(AK-004978-6) in Alaska arguing that the permit must be denied
because there is a pre-existing downstream violation of a relevant
water quality standard, based specifically on the Tenth Circuit's
decision. See, e.g., Comments of U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Fish
and Wildlife Service, to U.S. EPA, Region 10, Feb. 12, 1991. Thus,
despite respondents’ characterization, the Tenth Circuit's permit
ban holding is already being used to block new permits throughout
the nation, even in contexts that involve only a single state.

8

This suggestion is a red herring and has no bearing on
the appropriateness of review. Respondents’ own brief
states that “the Court of Appeals’ decision establishes the
law to be applied in such subsequent proceedings.” Id. In
addition, Oklahoma has made clear its intention to use the
Tenth Cireuit’s decision to block the renewal of the Fay-
etteville permit." Moreover, Oklahoma does not point to
any specific change in the Oklahoma standards or the
other circumstances of the case that would make the Tenth
Circuit’s holdings less relevant or determinative in the
permit renewal proceeding.

Thus, as a matter of law and fact, the permit renewal
proceedings do not in any way moot the issues presented
by Arkansas’ petition. In addition to the factors dis-
cussed abuve, the Fayetteville plant’s ability to continue
operating during the lengthy renewal proceedings will
depend on the legal validity of the existing permit. Ab-
sent review, Oklahoma will undoubtedly contend that the
Tenth Circuit’s decision requires the Fayetteville plant
to immediately stop discharging into the Illinois River
basin, forcing the plant to shut down. Consequently, even
Oklahoma was ca * not to suggest that the Tenth
Circuit’s decision is

Moreover, NPDEs . nits are issued for a maximum
of five years. Because evidentiary hearings on a permit
are conducted after the permit is issued, and given the
length of time it takes for judicial review after comple-
tion of the evidentiary hearings, there would almost never
be time to get Supreme Court review of a permit deci-
sion if the time for revie.v expires at the end of the five
year permit period.

5 See, e.g., Letter from Brita Haugland Cantrell, Assistant A.G.
of Oklahoma to Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control & Ecology,
Dec. 21, 1990 (Oklahoma “preserves all rights won in EPA v.
Oklahoma, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990) as applied to that permit
and any successive permits for the Fayetteville discharge. This
objection to the Fayetteville permit, upheld by the Tenth Circuit in
that case, likewise applies to this draft Permit and any successive
permits.’”’).

9

Finally, the appropriateness of immediate review by
this Court is reinforced by the tremendous consequences
of these issues for the nation as a whole. With each day
that passes, the Tenth Circuit’s decision is exacerbating
interstate conflicts, disrupting permit programs, jeopar-
dizing the permits for countless public and private facili-
ties across the nation, and otherwise creating intolerable
uncertainty for the expenditure of scarce public resources.
While Oklahoma’s primary interest may be in preserving
its victory in the court below, the rest of the country
needs an immediate resolution by this Court.

E. The Facts Of This Case Confirm the Extreme Scope
Of The Tenth Circuit’s Decision.

While the factual context of this case is not critical
for deciding the central legal issues presented, a bal-
anced portrayal of the record before EPA demonstrates
the extreme scope and consequences of the Tenth Circuit’s
decision.

For example, the quality of the Fayetteville effluent
actually exceeds the quality of the Illinois River in Ar-
kansas and Oklahoma, contrary to respondents’ insinua-
tion that the plant is polluting the river. At most, re-
spondents presented evidence suggesting that the Fayette-
ville discharge may increase phosphorous levels in the
Illinois River at the Oklahoma border by six pounds per
day. Br. Opp. at 11.° However, respondents fail to men-
tion that this small amount of additional phosphorous
will be accompanied by a proportionally much larger in-
crease in water flow, since most of the water discharged
by the Fayetteville facility originally came from outside
the Illinois River basin.

The concentration of phosphorous and other substances
in the Fayetteville effluent will therefore actually be lower
than in the Illinois River at the point of confluence. Thus,

® Every expert who testified at the permit hearings concluded
that the Fayetteville effluent would result in no change in any
observable parameter of water quality. See, e.g., Ark. Pet. App. at
130a-132a.

10

the Fayetteville discharge will result in a net dilution of
pollutants in the river and actually improve water qual-
ity by, for example, increasing dissolved oxygen levels.
Ark. Pet. App. at 139a. Moreover, EPA’s expert witness
at the hearings on the Fayetteville permit testified that
the facility’s discharge will improve Oklahoma water
quality because it “will result in much less algal growth
in Lake Frances and improved water clarity in the Illi-
nois River below Lake Frances as well as benefiting Lake
Tenkiller.” Rebuttal Testimony of Jack H. Gakstatter,
EPA Office of Research & Development (Index No. EPA-
4, Log. No. 121, p. 5).

The fact that the Tenth Circuit’s decision would now
prevent the City of Fayetteville from operating its $40
million state-of-the-art plant further demonstrates the
extreme nature of the Tenth Circuit’s holdings. As even
the Oklahoma Department of Health acknowledged, the
Fayetteville plant incorporates “the most thorough and
complete treatment currently available.” Ark. Pet. App.
at 105a. There is absolutely no question that the new
Fayetteville facility is environmentally superior to the
previous plant it has replaced. Allowing Oklahoma to
block this improvement simply cannot be reconciled with
the purposes and objectives of the CWA.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for those stated in the
petitions, a writ of certiorari should be granted.

WINSTON BRYANT
Attorney General

MARY STALLCUP

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL

200 Tower Building

4th & Center

Little Rock, AR 72201

JAMES N. McCorp
CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE
207 West Center Street
Fayetteville, AR 72701

ANNE ROBERTS BOBO
A.D.P.C. & E.
P.O. Box 8913

Little Rock, AR 72219-8913

March 15, 1991

11

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. WARREN, P.C.

DAVID G. NORRELL
(Counsel of Record)

GARY E. MARCHANT

KIRKLAND & ELLIS

Suite 1200

655 Fifteenth St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 879-5070

WALTER R. NIBLOCK
THE NIBLOCK LAW FIRM
P.O. Drawer 818
Fayetteville, AR 72702

NANCY L. HAMM
HAMM LAW FIRM

193 West Lafayette
Fayetteville, AR 72702

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385013_0079%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
