# Record and brief — Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 490 U.S. 332

## Text

No. 87-1703-CFX Title: F. Dale Robertson, Chief of the Forest Service, et

Status: GRANTED al., Petitioners
Vv.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, et al.
Docketed:
April 14, 1988 Court: United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Vide:
87-1704 Counsel for petitioner: Solicitor General
Counsel for respondent: Amster,Glenn J., Bricklin,David A. ,
Entry Date Note Proceedings and Orders
1 Feb 17 1988 Application for extension of time to file petition and

order granting same until March 30, 1988 (O’Connor,
February 18, 1988).

2 Mar 18 1988 Application for further extension of time to file
petition and order granting same until April 14, 1988
(O’Connor, March 23, 1988).

3 Apr 14 1988 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.
4 May 6 1988 = The Forest Service generally reviews special use permit applica-
tions for major developments through a two-stage process. In the first
stage, the Forest Service examines the general environmental and
financial feasibility of the proposed development. The environmental
study is usually conducted through the preparation of an environmen-
tal impact statement in accordance with NEPA’s requirements
(§ 102(2MC), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2KC)), while financial feasibility is
determined through a conventional assessment of the developer's
resources. Once the Forest Service determines that a general scheme
for development is environmentally sound and financially feasible, the
Forest Service may issue a special use permit to plan, construct, main-
tain, and operate the development. However, prior to any construc-
tion activity, the Forest Service must approve the developer's master
plan for development, construction, and operation of the project. In
the second stage, the Forest Service reviews the developer's proposed
master plan. Based on this plan, (he Forest Service also completes an
additional environmental analysis of on-site impacts. Only after com-
pletion of the second environmental analysis and final approval of the
completed master plan may the developer begin construction. All con-
struction and operation of the facility must be in accordance with the
master plan and the permit’s other requirements.

6

level—serving up to 8,200 skiers at one time—as the
preferred development option (id. at 6-22).‘

The Early Winters Study made clear that a decision to
‘go forward with a ski resort would not result directly in
development; rather, “(further environmental analysis
and review will be required prior to any decision by the
Forest Service to allow a specific development at Early
Winters, and by the responsible state and local govern-
ment agencies, prior to any authorization to develop non-
Forest Service lands.” Early Winters Study |. Following is-
suance of a special use permit, the developer would have
to submit a detailed mountain and base development plan
for the Forest Service’s approval, providing the precise ski
area design (id. at xvi). At this stage, the Study explained,
site-specific mitigation plans would be required (ibid.).

Although it was too early to design a detailed mitigation
plan, it was not too early to identify significant anticipated
effects that major development might have on Sandy
Butte and the surrounding communities. The Early
Winters Study evaluated the potentia! effects on air and
water quality, vegetation, wildlife, fisheries, timber
resources, socio-economic conditions, land use, recrea-
tion, transportation, and public services. Early Winters
Study 65-145. In each of these areas, the Study considered

* The alternatives ranged from maintaining the status quo (no ski
hill development) to developing a ski area capable of serving 10,500
skiers at one time. The Early Winters Study did not give detailed con-
sideration to expansion of existing ski areas at other locations or
development of new ski areas at other locations. The North Cascades
Study had considered these options and had concluded that — of 23 ex-
isting and potential sites — Sandy Butte was the only site in the State of
Washington suitable for development as a major ski area. See Early
Winters Study 6-7; see also App., infra, Sla-S2a.

7

both the impacts within and outside the National Forest,
denominating On-site impacts as primary and off-site im-
pacts as secondary (ibid.).°

The Study concluded that all of the alternatives, in-
cluding the “no action” option, would adversely affect
Methow Valley’s mule deer population and the region’s air
quality. In the case of the mule deer, the Study observed
that the ski resort itself could reduce their range and fawn-
ing habitat but that, even if the ski resort were not built, the
anticipated growth in human population on surrounding
non-federal land would disturb the mule deer herds. Early
Winters Study 75-76. In the case of air quality, the Study
concluded that the construction and operation of the ski
resort would not have a measurable impact, but the secon-
dary impacts from development of nearby private land
would have a significant effect that would increase with
successive levels of development (id. at 65-67). In both
cases, the Study identified measures to reduce or eliminate
the adverse effects (id. at 14-18, 68-69, 77-78). The Study
specifically cautioned, however, that these suggestions were
conceptual, that they would be made more specific in
subsequent steps of the planning process, and that addi-
tional mitigation measures might be required (id. at 14).*

* The Study acknowledged that the evaluation of off-site impacts
was hampered by the absence of any specific development plans.

“Since there are no pending proposals or plans to develop off-site
lands, the evaluation of off-site impacts is not site-specific. It is

general in nature, acknowledging to the extent practicable the impacts
associated with the growth that is likely to be induced by development
of Sandy Butte for skiing. The evaluation of off-site impacts {is} in-
cluded to provide a more complete picture of the likely effects of ski
development at Early Winters and alert other jurisdictions to decisions
to [be] made.” Early Winters Study 1-3.

* The Study suggested that on-site wildlife effects could be
mitigated by locating runs, lifts, and roads in a minimally disruptive
manner and by restricting travel and other activities in sensitive areas

3. The Regional Forester reviewed the Early Winters
Study and concurred in the Study’s recommendation sup-
porting a ski resort capable of serving 8,200 skiers at one
time. He accordingly issued a decision, on July 5, 1984, to
seek a qualified developer (App., infra, 63a-7la).’ The
Regional Forester explained that the highest development
alternative (serving up to 10,500 skiers at one time) “would
provide maximum utilization of the recreation resource
opportunities and increased economic benefit to the area”
(id. at 65a), and that the “no action” alternative “would
cause the least disruption to the natural environment”
(ibid.), but the selected alternative “provides a balance of
concerns for the physical and biological components of
the human environment in addition to concerns for social
and economic welfare” (ibid.). He further observed that
adverse environmental effects would result from all of the
alternatives, including the “no action” option, that these
adverse effects would result almost exclusively from off-
site development, and that “[p]jractical measures to reduce

during fawning season (Early Winters Study 14-16). The Study
repeated that “[s}pecific mitigation for wildlife at the ski development
can only be determined in review of the Master Plan” (id. at 16). The

’ This decision was an important but preliminary step in the permit-
ting process. See note 3, supra. It established that development of a
certain size and character was environmentally feasible and preferable
to other alternatives, but it did not determine whether MRI (which ini-
tially proposed the development) or some other applicant would
qualify for or obtain the special use permit.

the adverse impacts have been, or are in the process of
being, implemented by Okanogan County” (id. at 67a).*

On October 1, 1984, the Methow Valley Citizens Coun-
cil et al. (MVCC) requested, pursuant to % C.F.R.
211.18, that the Chief of the Forest Service reverse the
Regional Forester’s decision. He denied that request, with
an extensive discussion of the reasons supporting his deci-
sion, on December 16, 1985 (App., infra, 49a-62a).
MVCC then filed this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon. The complaint con-
tended, among other claims, that the Early Winters Study
did not conform with NEPA's requirements, that the
Forest Service's decision to develop Sandy Butte was not in
the public interest, and that the Forest Service had violated
the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.
1600 ef seqg., and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 ef seg.
The parties agreed to submit the issues to a United States
magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c).

The magistrate dismissed through summary judgment
MVCC"’s claims under the National Forest Management
Act and the Clean Air Act, and, after a hearing to supple-
ment the administrative record, he rejected all of MVCC’s
remaining claims (App., infra, 20a-48a). The magistrate

* These efforts included the development of various local restric-

tal Protection Agency, and the State Department of Ecology,
Okanogan County commuted itself to develop and enforce an air
quality ordinance and other mitigation measures necessary to main-
tain air quality within the standards of the state air quality umplemen-
tation plan. The Forest Service, in turn, agreed to ensure that
measures sufficient to maintain air Quality were in place betore allow-
ing any construction of permatted facilites at Sandy Butte See Supp.
E.R. 47.48.

10

concluded that the Forest Service's decision to go forward
with the issuance of a special use permit was unreviewable
under Ninth Circuit precedent (id. at 28a-30a); that even if

it were reviewable, it was not arbitrary and capricious (id. —

at 30a n.4); and that it did not violate due process (id. at
3ia). The magistrate next held that the Early Winters
Study satisfied NEPA's requirements for ap cavironmen-
tal impact statement (id. at 3ia-47a). He rejected MVCC’s
argument that the Srudy's discussion of alternative
development sites was inadequate (id. at 34a-38a), observ-
ing that “the North Cascades Winter Sports Study, a work
cited in the [Barly Winters Study] and available to the
public, had identified Sandy Butte as the only area in the
Okanogan Forest having good potential as a major ski
development” (id. at 37a), and that expansions of sites “a
hundred or more miles away from the Okanogan National
Forest are not reasonable alternatives” (ibid.). The
magistrate further determined that the Forest Service ade-
quately discussed the project's environmental impacts (/d.
at 38a-47a). He specifically rejected MVCC’s contentions
that the Forest Service was obligated to prepare a “worst
case” analysis of the possible impacts (id. at 40a, 45a) and
that the Early Winters Study gave insufficient analysis to
possible mitigation measures (id. at 4la-42a, 45a-46a).

4. MVCC appealed the magistrate’s decision directly
to the court of appeals (see 28 U.S.C. 636(cX(3)). The court
reversed the magistrate’s determination, holding that the
Early Winters Study failed to satisfy NEP A's requirements
and that the Forest Service's decision to issue a special use
permit was arbitrary and capricious (App., infra, 1a-19a).

The court found the Early Winters Study to be flawed in
three respects. First, the court held that the Study should
have given detailed consideration to the possibility of ex-
panding existing ski resorts as one of the alternative
development proposals, rejecting the magistrate’s deter-

11

mination that these were not feasible alternatives (App.,
infra, 8a-1la). Second, the court held that the statement
did not provide a sufficiently detailed discussion of the en-
vironmental impacts of the proposed project on mule deer
and air quality (id. at lla-16a). The court specifically
stated that if the government is unable to obtain adequate
information on the effects of the project on mule deer, the
government must conduct a “worst case” analysis of the
environmental impacts (id. at 13a, 14a).° Finally, the court
held that Section 102 of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4332) “requires
that ‘action be taken to mitigate the adverse effects of
major federal actions’” (App., infra, 17a).'° The court
specifically ruled that an environmental impact statement
must contain both a detailed plan to mitigate any adverse
environmental effects and an analysis of the plan’s effec-
tiveness (ibid.).'' Having failed to include such a detailed
plan, the Early Winters Study was “inadequate as a matter
of law” (id. at 19a).

With respect to the Forest Service’s decision to issue a
special use permit, the court acknowledged (App., infra,
3a-4a) that its prior precedent had indicated that such deci-
sions are not reviewable under the Administrative Pro-

* The cous. dased this requirement on its recent decision in Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1058-1059
(1987).

'® The court quoted Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102,
1111 (D. Haw. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).

'' The court stated: “ ‘The importance of the mitigation plan can-
not be overestimated. It is a determinative factor in evaluating the
adequacy of an environmental impact statement. Without a complete
mitigation plan, the decisionmaker is unable to make an informed
judgment as to the environmental impact of the project — one of the
main purposes of an environmental impact statement.’ ” App., infra,
19a (quoting Oregon Natural Resources Council, 820 F.2d at 1055).

12

cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 701-706. The court
concluded, however, that subsequent Forest Service
regulations had since created “ ‘law’ for this court to
apply” and that the decisions were therefore now
reviewable (App., infra, 4a-Sa). The court then held that
the relevant Forest Service regulations (36 C.F.R.
251.54(e)(4) and 36 C.F.R. 251.56(a)(1)(ii)) require “an
adequate mitigation plan” (App., infra, 5a n.3), and that
the mitigation plan contained in the Early Winters Study
was so inadequate that the “decision to grant the special
use permit could be none other than arbitrary, capricious,
and an abuse of discretion” (ibid.).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The court of appeals has departed from the teachings of
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), and
has imposed significant new NEPA obligations on federal
agencies. The court’s decision, which builds upon its prior
decision in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh,
820 F.2d 1051 (1987),'? requires all environmental impact
statements to contain detailed and demonstrably effective
mitigation plans and to include a “worst case” analysis
whenever the agency lacks information or adequate scien-
tific methodology to determine precisely a potential en-
vironmental effect. Neither NEPA nor its implementing
regulations authorize these court-created directives. The
court of appeals’ decision also incorrectly construes the
Forest Service’s special use permit regulations to impose
similar mitigation obligations. The court’s rigid new re-
quirements would actually impede the goal of informed

'2 The Solicitor General has sought review of the Oregon Natural
Resources Council decision through a petition for a writ of certiorari
filed simultaneously with this petition.

13

agency decision-making by preventing federal agencies
from carrying out their resource management respon-
sibilities through systematic project development. The
court’s clear deviation from established precedent has
great practical significance owing to the vast expanse of
federal lands and the numerous planned and potential
federal projects located within the Ninth Circuit.

1. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA directs that federal
agencies proposing actions that significantly affect the
quality of the human environment must prepare a detailed
statement on “the environmental impact of the proposed
action.” 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). This requirement serves
two purposes: First, it obligates the agency to consider the
environmental consequences of the proposed action; and
second, it assures the public that the agency has considered
environmental concerns in the decisionmaking process.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).

As this Court has explained, “NEPA does set forth
significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its man-
date to the agencies is essentially procedural.” Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 558. Further-
more, “the only procedural requirements imposed by
NEPA are those stated in the plain language of the Act”
(id. at 548). “The procedural duty imposed upon agencies
by [Section 102(2)(C)] is quite precise, and the role of the
courts in enforcing that duty is similarly precise.” Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976). “The only role
for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a ‘hard
look’ at environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject
itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the
choice of the action to be taken’ ” (id. at 410 n.21 (citation
omitted)). Furthermore, the courts should defer to the
judgment of the Council on Environmental Quality

14

(CEQ)—the agency responsible for assuring proper im-
plementation of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4344) — which has pro-
mulgated regulations for preparing environmental impact
statements. “CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to
substantial deference.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S.
347, 358 (1979).

The court of appeals ignored these established principles
and, relying solely on its own precedent, created two
significant new NEPA requirements. The court incorrectly
held that an agency must include in every environmental
impact statement (a) a fully developed plan to mitigate en-
vironmental harm; and (b) a “worst case” analysis of
potential environmental harm if relevant information con-
cerning significant environmental effects is unavailable or
too costly to obtain.'*

a. The court of appeals based its mitigation require-
ment on the fundamentally mistaken premise that Section
102 of NEPA “requires that ‘action be taken to mitigate
the adverse effects of major federal actions’ ” (App., in-
fra, 17a (citation omitted)). Neither Section 102, nor this
Court’s decisions interpreting that provision, impose any
such requirement. The court obtained its proposition from
a 1974 district court decision, Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar,
389 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Haw.), that was reversed

') We believe that the court of appeals also erred in holding that the
Early Winters Study’s discussion of development alternatives was in-
adequate, but we do not press that question in this Court. The court
appears to have agreed that the reasonableness of the alternatives
depends essentially upon the scope of the proposed action as defined
by the agency (App., infra, 9a). But the court proceeded to ignore the
agency’s own description of the scope of its action. Nevertheless, the
question of appropriate alternatives is somewhat factbound and less
significant than the mitigation and worst case issues. Furthermore, the
government may be able to cure that supposed deficiency on remand
without an excessive commitment of time and resources.

15

on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 999 (1976).'* The district court decision was
dubious authority even when its ink was fresh; this Court's
subsequent decisions in Vermont Yankee and Kleppe
demonstrate that the decision was quite clearly wrong.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that Section 102 re-
quires the agency to consider and inform the public of
potential environmental impacts; it does not require the
agency to “elevate environmental concerns over other ap-
propriate considerations.” Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).

The court of appeals’ imposition of a substantive duty
to mitigate environmental harm is also inconsistent with
the CEQ regulations implementing NEPA. Those regula-
tions require an agency to identify mitigation possibilities
in the environmental impact statement in the course of
discussing project alternatives and the resulting en-
vironmental effects. See 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h).
In addition, an agency must state, as part of its ultimate
decision, whether it has adopted mitigation measures (40
C.F.R. 1505.2) and, if it has, it must implement those
measures (40 C.F.R. 1505.3). These regulations ensure
that decisionmakers consider opportunities to mitigate en-
vironmental harm, but they do not impose a duty to adopt
such measures. The decision whether to adopt mitigation
measures, like the decision whether to go forward with the
project itself, is left to the expert agency's informed discre-
tion. Compare Sirycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council,
Inc., 444 U.S. at 227; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp., 435 U.S. at 558; Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n.20.

'* The district court decision in Stop H-3 states, without any cita-
tion of authority, that “NEPA implies a requirement that action be
taken to mitigate the adverse effects of major federal actions.” 389 F.
Supp. at 1111 (emphasis added).

16

The court of appeals not only imposed a new substan-
tive duty to mitigate environmental harm, it also imposed
a concomitant procedural obligation — derived solely from
its own precedents—to develop a “ ‘complete mitigation
plan’” (App., infra, 19a (quoting Oregon Natural
Resources Council, 820 F.2d at 1055)).'* As in the case of
the substantive duty to mitigate harm, this procedural re-
quirement to develop a detailed mitigation plan finds no
source in Section 102 of NEPA. The CEQ’s implementing
regulations recognize that potential mitigation measures
should be identified—as was done here (see pages 6-7,
supra)—but they do not require development of a com-
plete mitigation plan. The court’s blanket statements that
the “‘importance of a mitigation plan cannot be
overestimated’” (App., infra, 19a (quoting Oregon
Natural Resources Council, 820 F.2d at 1055)) and that
“ ‘ijt is a determinative factor in evaluating the adequacy
of an environmental impact statement’ ” (ibid.) find no
support whatsoever in NEPA or the CEQ regulations.

The court of appeals’ decision on this score would have
severe consequences. As the facts of this case demonstrate,
the decision would prevent an agency from evaluating the
environmental consequences of a proposed project
through the familiar and sensible concept of staged project
development.'* In particular, it would prevent an agency

'S The court first suggested that agencies must provide a detailed
discussion of mitigation measures in Northwest Indian Cemetery Pro-
tective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 697 (Sth Cir. 1985), cert.
granted on other grounds, No. 86-1013 (May 4, 1987). That case cited
Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 1982), which made no
mention of mitigation at all. The court later expanded the obligation
to prepare a detailed mitigation plan in Oregon Natural Resources
Council, 820 F.2d at 1055.

'* See, e.g., D. Dannenbring & M. Starr, Management Science: An
Introduction $48 (1981) (“A project is itself a combination of many

17

from making any initial feasibility determinations until the
entire project planning process has been completed and a
complete mitigation plan has been developed. This ap-
proach pervasively conflicts with the CEQ’s regulations
mandating early application of NEPA (40 C.F.R. 1501.2,
1502.5(b)), encouraging tiered environmental analysis (40
C.F.R. 1502.20), and forbidding agencies from commit-
ting resources in a manner that will bias the agency's
ultimate decision (40 C.F.R. 1502.2(f)). As a practical
matter, the court’s approach would frustrate or impede a
wide range of federal and federally permitted projects.
Here, for example, the Forest Service could offer potential
developers . assurance whatsoever that it will issue a
special use permit for the Early Winters project unti! a
developer has spent several years and millions of dollars to
provide comprehensive plans on which to base a detailed
mitigation plan. More generally, agencies would be forced
to defer complete environmental analysis until far along in

the planning process and to invest resources on a large “

scale before making even preliminary decisions. By defer-
ring the environmental analysis to satisfy the requirements
of this decision, the agencies would run the grave risk of
having proposed projects enjoined on the ground that ir-
retrievable commitments have been made without the re-
quisite environmental analysis.

“As Vermont Yankee made clear, NEPA does not re-
quire agencies to adopt any particular internal decision-
making structure.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at
100. NEPA and its implementing regulations were
deliberately structured to permit federal decisionmakers
great latitude to determine the appropriate scope of their
environmental discussion and evaluation. See, e.g.,
Strycker’s Bay Neighorborhood Council, 444 U.S. at

varied and complex tasks or activities. These tasks are interdependent
in that most cannot begin until some other task has been completed”).

227.'’ The court’s decision here would eliminate this
latitude by forcing agencies to fit all of their actions into
the court’s rigid and counterproductive formula for en-
vironmental decisionmaking. The court's formula is par-
ticularly unsuitable for federal agencies such as the Forest
Service, which must manage vast acreages of federal lands
through long-range planning techniques'* and must
therefore engage in staged decisionmaking.

b. The court of appeals also erred in concluding
(App., infra, 13a) that a “worst case” analysis is required
whenever an agency is unable to obtain information on
which to base a reasoned decision. The court noted (id. at
13a n.11) that CEQ regulations had at one time required
that environmental impact statements evaluate uncertainty
by including a “worst case analysis and an indication of
the probability or improbability of its occurrence” (40
C.F.R. 1502.22 (1985)), but that CEQ had subsequently
rescinded that requirement.'* The court determined that
the “worst case” requirement nevertheless remains in effect
because “the regulation was merely a codification of prior
NEPA easelaw” (App., infra, 13a n.11), citing its previous
decision in Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic

'” See also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 837-838 (Mh
Cir. 1986); River Road Alliance, Inc. vy. Corps of Engineers, 764 F.2d
445, 448 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1055 (1986); Friends of
Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (Mh Cir.
1985); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d
1041, 1047 (ist Cir. 1982).

'® See generally Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and Resource Plan-
ning in the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev. 1 (1985).

'* We have reproduced the relevant portions of CEQ’s present
regulation and the rescinded “worst case” regulation in the appendix,
infra, 73a-7Sa.

19

Sprays, Inc. v. Clark (SOCATS), 720 F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984).

The SOCATS decision mistakenly derived that proposi-
tion from Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir.
1983). The question in Sigler was whether the Army Corps
of Engineers was required to comply with the CEQ regula-
tion under the particular facts of that case. The Fifth Cir-
cuit first admitted that while there is “some language in
NEPA which may be said to endorse generally the concept
of a worst case analysis” the statute’s “literal language does
not require a worst case analysis” (id. at 969). The court
next noted that a series of judicial decisions had recog-
nized that NEPA does contemplate that agencies would
engage in “ ‘[rjeasonable forecasting and speculation’ ”
concerning future environmental effects, including the

“probabilities of the occurrence” and the “ ‘cost of uncer-

tainty —i.e. the costs of proceeding without more and bet-
ter information’ ” (id. at 970).?° The court then stated that
the “CEQ’s worst case analysis merely codifies these
judicially created principles” (id. at 971). Thus, the Fifth
Circuit effectively concluded that the worst case regulation
was the CEQ’s mechanism for implementing certain
judicially recognized NEPA objectives. The court did not
hold that the worst case methodology was the only
allowable mechanism for effecting those general goals.
The CEQ has adhered to the objectives identified in
Sigler, but has determined that “the ‘worst case analysis’
requirement is an unproductive and ineffective method of
achieving those goa’s” (51 Fed. Reg. 15618, 15620

*® The court specifically cited Scientists’ Institute for Public Infor-
mation, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carolina
Envil. Study Group v. United States, $10 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir.
1975); and Alaska v. Andrus, $80 F.2d 465, 473-474 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
vacated on other grounds swh nom, Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v.
Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978).

20

(1986)).2' The CEQ has therefore adopted “a wiser and
more manageable approach to the evaluation of reason-
ably foreseeable significant adverse impacts in the face of
incomplete or unavailable information” (id. at 15620).??
The court of appeals’ decisions in this case and in Oregon
Natural Resources Council effectively overrule the CEQ’s
new regulation and install worst case analysis as a perma-
nent feature of NEPA compliance.

2! The CEQ had received frequent complaints that the worst case
approach was not an effective method for addressing uncertainty and
led to excessive paperwork and delays. 51 Fed. Reg. 15619-15620
(1986). “Experts in the field of risk analysis and perception stated that
the ‘worst case analysis’ lacks defensible rationale or procedures, and
that the current regulatory language stands ‘without any discernible
link to the disciplines that have devoted so much thought and effort
toward developing rational ways to cope with problems of uncertain-
ty.” ” $0 Fed. Reg. 32234, 32236 (1985). The CEQ itself found that the
methodology “can breed endless hypothesis and speculation” (51 Fed.
Reg. 15620 (1986)) and “has proved counterproductive, because it has
led to agencies being required to devote substantial time and resources
to preparation of analyses which are not considered useful to decision-
makers and divert the EIS process from its intended purpose” (50 Fed.
Reg. 32236 (1986)). We described some of these difficulties in a
previous petition for a writ of certiorari in SOCATS. See Clark v.
Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc., cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1028 (1984) (White and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). The
CEQ’s effort to alleviate these difficulties, after the denial of certiorari
in SOCATS, by revision of its regulations has now been repudiated by
the court of appeals.

22 The CEQ’s revised regulation provides that when relevant infor-
mation cannot be obtained because the costs of obtaining it are exor-
bitant or the means to obtain it are not known, the environmental im-
pact statement must identify the unavailable information and its
relevance, must summarize existing scientific information bearing on
foreseeable environmental impacts, and must contain the agency's
evaluation of those impacts based on research methods generally ac-
cepted in the scientific community. 40 C.F.R. 1502.22.

21

This aspect of the court of appeals’ decision is obviously _
contrary to this Court’s recognition in Andrus v. Sierra
Club, that the CEQ’s judgment is entitled to “substantial
deference” even when the agency has changed its regula-
tions governing NEPA compliance (442 U.S. at 358). See
also, ¢.g., American Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967). As in the case of its
new mitigation requirements, the court of appeals holding
here would have severe consequences. As the CEQ has ex-
plained, federal agencies would be forced to conduct
wasteful and time-consuming inquiries into speculative
impacts that lack “a firm connection between credible
science and the hypothetical consequences of an agency’s
proposed action.” 50 Fed. Reg. 32236 (1985). This sort of
“pure conjecture * * * lacking a credible scientific basis is
not useful to either the decisionmaker or the public” (ibid.
(emphasis in original)).

2. The court of appeals not only misconstrued NEPA,
it also misconstrued the Forest Service's regulations gov-
erning the issuance of a special use permit. The principal
regulation involved in this case requires special use
authorizations to contain terms and conditions that will
“minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish
and wildlife habitat and othewise [sic] protect the environ-
ment.” 36 C.F.R. 251.56(a)(1(ii).?* The court interpreted
this provision to require “an adequate mitigation plan”
(App., infra, Sa n.3). The court then reasoned (ibid. ):

Since the mitigation “plan” here at issue is so vague
and undeveloped as to be wholly inadequate, [citing
the court’s discussion of NEPA mitigation re-
quirements], the Regional Forester’s decision to grant

7) We have reproduced the relevant portions of the Forest Service
regulations in the appendix, infra 7Sa-76a.

22

the special use permit could be none other than ar-
bitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.

Thus, the court concluded that the Forest Service regula-
tion incorporates the court's judicially created NEPA
mitigation requirements.

The court’s reasoning here is seriously flawed. The
Forest Service regulation makes no mention of mitigation
plans and was never intended to incorporate the sort of
“complete mitigation plan” that the court itself
created — without statutory authority —in Oregon Natural
* Resources Council v. Marsh, supra. The Forest Service
operated under guidelines, even prior to NEPA, that
directed the agency to minimize harm to resources.** In
1980, it revised its regulations to reflect their present form
(45 Fed. Reg. 38324 (1980)). However, the Forest Service
has never suggested, at any point in that process, that its
regulations require a complete mitigation plan, at the per-
mit stage, of the kind the court of appeals imposed here.
Instead, the Forest Service has routinely imposed terms
and conditions similar to those ultimately imposed in this

* See 1963 Forest Service Manual § 2140.1 (in planning special
uses, the agency’s objective is to manage and protect resources and to
minimize adverse effects to projects); § 2134 (special use permits must
contain stipulations that ensure maintenance of productivity of land
and resolution of conflicts with other planned of prospective uses).

25 & special use permit was issued to MRI on July 21, 1986, shortly
after this case was argued before the court of appeals. The special use
permit conditioned all construction on the Forest Service's prior ap-
proval of a fully developed master plan, which was to contain detailed
mitigation measures. The initial permit also put the developer on
notice that it would be required to protect scenic and esthetic values,
prevent soil erosion and degradation of water, soil, and air quality,
and immediately to cease construction upon discovery of ar-
chaeologically or historically significant material. See U.S. Dep't of

23

The court of appeals’ holding here “runs roughshod
over the established proposition that an agency’s construc-
tion of its own regulations is entitled to substantial
deference.” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986). See,
e.g., United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977)
(“In construing administrative regulations, ‘the ultimate
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which
becomes of a aeden it is plainly er-
roneous or inconsistent regulation.’ ”, quoting
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)). The Forest Service’s interpretation of its regula-
tion here is plainly reasonable and should be respected.
The court’s decision, which requires every special use per-

“mit henceforth issued to contain a detailed plan to mitigate

on- and off-site effects, creates yet another unjustified
obstacle to development and use of federal lands.

3. The court of appeals’ decisions in this case and in
Oregon Natural Resorces Council v. Marsh, supra, would
greatly expand the federal agencies’ substantive and pro-
cedural duties under NEPA. None of the newly imposed
duties finds its source in NEPA or in its implementing
regulations; rather, they are purely judicial creations. Fur-
thermore, the court's two decisions have confirmed those
duties as a settled element of the Ninth Circuit's peculiar
Courts MEPA prosoteas tes os —

. great practical significance.
As we have already explained, the court's newly fashioned
NEPA obligations would impose substantial burdens on
the federal government, private developers and, ultimate-
ly, the taxpaying public, without corresponding benefits.

Agriculture Forest Service Special Use Authorization, Region 06, User
~% 4171 (Methow Recreation Inc.) paras. 41, 44, 48, 49, 50, 54, 62.

24

Indeed, these court-imposed requirements are not only
contrary to sound environmental decisionmaking, they are
contrary to the goals of NEPA and the procedures created
by the CEQ for achieving those goals. The resulting costs
would be enormous even if limited to the projects within
the Ninth Circuit owing to the vast expanse of federal
lands and the numerous planned and potential federal
projects subject to that court's rulings. This Court’s review
is therefore warranted.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.?*
Respectfully submitted.

Jerraey P. Miweae

Assistant to the Solicitor General
Peres R. STEENLAND, Jr.
Vicar L. PlawuT

Altorneys
Aran 1988

* The Court may wish to consolidate this case with Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Council, No. 87-____, of to order that the
cases be heard in tandem. The government's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari im that case (which is being filed semultancously with this peti-
tion) presents overlapping, but not identical, NEPA issues.

A Rh ll al

a ee eee ners

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-4108
D.C. No. 85-2124-DA

, METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

v.
REGIONAL FORESTER, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

WILLIAM M. Da_e, JRr., Magistrate, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
July 6, 1987— Portland, Oregon

Filed December 1, 1987

Before: ALFRED GOODWIN and WARREN J. FERGUSON,
Circuit Judges, and ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, Jr..*
District Judge.

Opinion by Judge FERGUSON

* Honorable Albert Lee Stephens, Jr., Senior United States District
Judge, Central District of California, sitting by designation.

(la)

2a

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge:

Sandy Butte overlooks the Methow Valley, an un-
spoiled, sparsely populated area on the eastern side of the
North Cascade Mountains in the State of Washington.
The Methow Valley provides critical winter range and
migration corridors for Washington’s largest migratory
deer herd. Sandy Butte is a 3,900-acre parcel in the
Okanogan National Forest. The upper one-third of Sandy
Butte is entirely roadless. In 1978 appellee Methow
Recreation, Inc. (MRI) applied for a “special use” permit
to develop and operate a four-season destination ski resort
on Sandy Butte and a large parcel of private land it had ac-
quired adjacent to Sandy Butte. The proposed develop-
ment is known as the Early Winters project. The project is
expected to spawn extensive commercial and residential
development in the Methow Valley.

Pursuant to requirements of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332, mandating
completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
analyzing the environmental impacts of “major” govern-
mental actions, the appellee Forest Service studied the
question of whether it should allocate Sandy Butte for use
as a downhill ski area. In 1982 the Forest Service published
a draft EIS on a proposal to designate Sandy Butte for use
as a major ski area capable of serving 8,200 skiers at one
time (SAOT). The final EIS was issued in 1984. Based on
its contents, in July 1984 the Regional Forester issued a
“Record of Decision” which adopted a “future manage-
ment plan” for Sandy Butte. The plan allocated the area
for use as a ski area capable of serving 8,200 SAOT. The
record of decision also approved the issuance of a special
use permit to MRI for the Early Winters Project.'

' A special use permit is necessary whenever a private party seeks to
use lands owned by the federal government. The Forest Service issues
special use permits under authority derived from 16 U.S.C. § 497.

3a

In December 1985, appellants Methow Valley Citizens
Council, et al. (MVCC), brought this action in the District
Court for the District of Oregon alleging violations of the
National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614,
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626, and NEPA.
Pursuant to local rule, the case was assigned to a United
States Magistrate. The National Forest Management Act
and Clean Air Act claims were dismissed upon motions for
summary judgment and are not raised on appeal. The re-
maining NEPA issues were tried before the district court
and the court affirmed the Forest Service’s Record of
Decision, dismissing the remaining claims. MVCC subse-
quently filed this appeal.

The issues facing this court are whether the district court
erred in holding that the Regional Forester’s decision to
issue a special use permit is not reviewable and in its deter-
mination that the EIS adequately discussed alternatives to
the proposed project, impacts to the deer herd, impacts on
air quality, other significant impacts, and mitigation
measures. Jurisdiction of this court is found under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706, governs judicial review of agency actions. Sec-
tion 702 grants standing to challenge an agency action to
anyone adversely affected by such action, except where the
statute under which the action was taken precludes judicial
review, Or where the action is committed to agency discre-
tion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). While there is no claim
here that judicial review is barred by statutory preclusion,
there is dispute as to whether the Regional Forester’s is-
suance of a special use permit is an action

4a

committed to agency discretion such that it is removed en-
tirely from the scrutiny of judicial review. The district
court held that it was committed to agency discretion and
not subject to judicial review.

The district court cited two cases — Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) and Ness
Investment Corp. v. United States Dept. of Agric., Forest
Service, 512 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1975)—in support of its
decision. In Citizen to Preserve Overton Park, the
Supreme Court emphasized that action committed to
agency discretion by law is “a very narrow exception . . .
_applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn
in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to
apply.’ ” 401 U.S. at 410 (citation omitted). In Ness, this
court held that the denial of a special use permit was not
judicially reviewable because there was no “law to apply”
by which the court could assess the legality of the agency’s
decision. The court held that neither the authorizing
statute, 16 U.S.C. § 497, nor the very general language of
corresponding regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 251.1 et seq., of-
fered standards by which the agency’s action could be
tested. Jd. at 715, 716. Contra Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d
1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 1975). Thus central to our decision in
Ness was the lack of formal guidelines for the issuance of
special use permits.

The district court failed to note, however, that in 1980 —
prior to the commencement of activities relevant to this
action—the Forest Service issued detailed supplemental
regulations which, while not entirely removing the deci-
sion to issue a special use permit from agency discretion,
do impose specific obligations on the authority consider-
ing issuance. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.54-251.56. These
guidelines, binding upon the Regional Forester when
deciding whether to grant MRI its special use permit for
development of the Sandy Butte area, constitute sufficient

j
:
y
'

Sa

“law” for this court to apply to confer jurisdiction over the
‘matter. See Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1556
(9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Hall, J., concurring).? Thus we
hold that the Regional Forester’s decision to issue a special
use permit is subject to judicial review’ where review in-
volves an inquiry into whether the proper factors -were
considered by the Forestry Service. See Save the Bay, Inc.
v. Administrator of E.P.A., 556 F.2d 1282, 1295-96 (Sth
Cir. 1977).*

* In Wallace v. Christensen, Judge Hall correctly noted that

[t}he inquiry into whether there are regulations which a court may
look to in reviewing an agency decision is a component of the sec-
tion 701(a)(2) determination of whether a matter is committed to
agency discretion by law ... If there are no statutory or
regulatory directives then a court may conclude that the agency
action at issue falls into that narrow class of cases in which there
is no law to apply.

802 F.2d at 1556 (Hail, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

> The magistrate stated that if he did have jurisdiction to review the
Regional Forester’s decision to issue the special use permit, then he
believed that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. However,
an application for a special use permit must include “measures and
plans for the protection and rehabilitation of the environment during
construction, operation, maintenance, and termination of the project
", 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(e)(4), and each special use authorization
“shall contain .. . [t}erms and conditions which will . . . minimize
damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and
otherwise [sic] protect the environment”. 36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a)(1 (ii).
Thus the Code of Federal Regulations specifically requires the ex-
istence of, among other things, an adequate mitigation plan. Since the
mitigation “plan” here at issue is so vague and undeveloped as to be —
wholly inadequate, see infra, the Regional Forester’s decision to grant
the special use permit could be none other than arbitrary, capricious
and an abuse of discretion.

* Save the Bay involved a challenge to the issuance of a permit pur-
suant to authority granted under the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The Fifth Circuit considered

6a

The National Environmental Policy Act, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 4332, provides in relevant part that when an EIS
must be prepared — whenever a major government action
is proposed — it must include

a detailed statement by the responsible official on —
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action.
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented.
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action.
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man’s environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2K(C). Section 4332(2)(E) adds that all
agencies of the Federal Government shall, to the fullest ex-
tent possible
study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives
to recommended course of action in any proposal
which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alter-
native use of available resources;
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2,E).

There are two purposes served by preparation of an

EIS. The statement should “provide decision-makers with

whether it had jurisdiction in light of the statute’s broad language ex-

plaining that “[ojnce the relevant factors are before the agency, it can
weigh them within [its] broad mandate with an expertise to which the
restraining powers of judicial review could add little.” 556 F.2d at
1295. Nevertheless, the court held that “[jjudicial review, however,
can quite easily be effective to assure that all those factors receive the
agency's attention.” Jd. at 1296.

——

.
|

Ja

an environmental disclosure sufficiently detailed to aid in
the substantive decision whether to proceed with the proj-
ect in light of its environmental consequences,” Trout
Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974),
as well as “provide the public with information and an op-
portunity to participate in gathering information.”
Citizens for A Better Henderson v. Hodei, 768 F.2d 1051,
1056 (9h Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).

An EIS aids the agency’s own decisionmaking process
by ensuring that the agency has before it “ ‘all possible ap-
proaches to a particular project . . . which would alter the
environmental impact and the cost-benefit balance.’ ”
State of Alaska v. Andrus, $80 F.2d 465, 474 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated in part sub nom. Western Oil & Gas v. Alaska,
439 U.S. 922 (1978) (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating
Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1971)).

A.

The findings of fact underlying a lower court's decision
on the adequacy of an EIS are reviewed for clear error.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson,
795 F.2d 688, 696 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
1971 (1987). “Interpretations of [environmental] regula-
tions present questions of law, which are reviewable de
novo.” Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817
F.2d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Sierra Club v. Union
Oil Co. of California, 813 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir.
1987)). “We review de novo the district court’s determina-
tion of whether the EIS is reasonably thorough in discuss-
ing the significant aspects of the probable environmental
impact of the proposed agency action.” Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir.
1987) (citation omitted). This requires application of a

8a

“rule of reason” because a “reviewing court may not ‘fly
speck’ an EIS and hold it insufficient on the basis of in-
consequential, technical deficiencies.” Kunzman, 817 F.2d
at 492. In other words, “whether a particular deficiency,
or combination of deficiencies in an EIS is sufficient to
warrant holding it legally inadequate, or constitutes mere-
ly a ‘fly speck,’ is essentially a legal question, reviewable de
novo.” Jd. at 493.

To explain the obligations set forth in section 4332, pro-
visions in the Code of Federal Regulations address, inter
alia, the discussion of alternatives’ and the discussion of
the foreseeable environmental consequences of these
various alternatives* which must be included in an EIS.
“The detail that NEPA requires in an EIS depends upon
the nature and scope of the proposed action.” California
v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982).

A.

To be adequate, an environmental impact statement
must consider every reasonable alternative. Friends of En-
dangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 988 (9th Cir.
1985); California v. Block, 690 F.2d at 766-67; Adler v.
Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1097 (9th Cir. 1982) (“this court
has held the alternatives discussion to be subject to
‘reasonableness.’ ”); Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641
F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981); Lange v. Brinegar, 625
F.2d 812, 818 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The discussion of alter-
natives in an E.1.S. statement is subject to a construction
of reasonableness.”). An EIS is rendered inadequate by

* 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
* 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16.

.
}

9a

the existence of a viable but unexamined alternative.
Citizens for a Better Henderson, 768 F.2d at 1057 (cita-
tions omitted). Furthermore, even if an alternative re-
quires “legislative action”, this fact “does not automatical-
ly justify excluding it from an EIS.” City of Angoon vy.
Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986) (footnote
omitted), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 197 (1987). Thus, the
range of alternatives considered must be sufficient to per-
mit a reasoned choice. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485
F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961
(1974).

Here the Forest Service’s purpose —to provide a “winter
sports opportunity” — is broadly framed in terms of service
to the public benefit. It is not, by its own terms, tied to a
specific parcel of land. Compare City of Angoon, 803
F.2d at 1021; Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1286. There
appears no tenable reason for the Forest Service to be
wedded exclusively to the development of Sandy Butte.
Thus it should have appeared obvious that investigation
was warranted to determine whether the development of
winter sports opportunities could be pursued at alternative
sites.’

Appellants have offered evidence suggesting that other
sites may be well suited for the type of recreational
development envisioned by the Forest Service. Unlike
Sandy Butte, the sites discussed by the appellants are not
adjacent to land owned by defendant MRI, but under the

’ The Forest Service’s final EIS listed four alternatives, including
their preferred course of action, in addition to the alternative of “no-
action” mandated by statute. Yet all four of the “action” alternatives
required development of Sandy Butte. No consideration was given in
the EIS to ways of achieving the Forest Service's goal through other
options, such as the expansion of existing downhill ski areas in other
parts of Washington State.

10a

directive given to the Forest Service in its manual,* that
fact does not preclude consideration of other reasonable
alternatives. Moreover, since we find it reasonable to
assume that expansion of existing ski areas would have less
environmental impact than would the construction of an
entirely new ski area,’ while possibly achieving a com-
parable net increase in the total capacity of skiers served,'°
such alternatives might have been appropriate for in-
vestigation.

* The manual provides in relevant part that
A permit shall not be granted simply to provide a commercial
profit-making opportunity. The Forest Service is not required to

accommodate a desire of an individual applicant, a real public
service or other justification must be evident . . . to show at least

that the use meets a public need and will not conflict with Na-
tional Forest objectives, programs or purposes.
Forest Service Manual § 2710.3.

* In Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774,
778 (9h Cir. 1980), the defendants intended to construct a new four-
lane highway which pass through parkland in plaintiffs’ town. The
EIS was held to be deficient because it failed to consider the alter-
native of improving and widening a two-lane highway already in ex-
istence. This court stated that “the alternative ... was both
reasonable and obvious, and that therefore the EIS is deficient... .
The use of a narrower than four-lane road is made even more obvious
by the possibility that parkland would thereby [be] spared.” /d. at 784
(citations omitted). See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th
Cir. ERD CRS So Snes es ee Se See 0 Oey
developed areas for future resource extraction and use, the . . . deci-
sional process ends its inquiry at the beginning.”).

'© For example, one of the existing ski areas in Washington State
has plans in motion to expand into a destination ski resort. A 1981
development report prepared for the Mission Ridge ski area details an
intended expansion of the facility to accomodate an additional 3,900
SAOT, to make its total capacity 6,500 SAOT.

—

Pues ee ee ee or ee

|
.
|
;
;

This court, however, would not require that the Forest
Service explore an unreasonably broad range of alter-
natives. Rather, the range “need not extend beyond those
[alternatives] reasonably related to the purposes of the
project.” Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1286 (citations
omitted). Thus, the Forest Service should more clearly ar-
ticulate its goal, specifically identifying the market and
geographic pool of skiers targeted. This will provide a
clear standard by which it can determine which alter-
natives are appropriate for investigation and consideration
in its EIS. In its present state, the EIS’s discussion of alter-

natives to the proposed action is inadequate as a matter of
law.

The district court held that the EIS adequately discussed
the environmental impacts of the Early Winters project
and its alternatives. We do not agree.

The Magistrate’s error resulted, in part, because he
assumed that the law distinguished between primary and
secondary impacts. Such a distinction would only confuse
the issue. Rather, it is well established that NEPA and the
Council on Environmental Quality guidelines require
discussion of a// significant impacts proximately caused by
the proposed action — whether they, by convenience, are
termed “primary” or “secondary”. See Coalition for Can-
yon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 783 (9th Cir.
1980) (“so-called ‘secondary’ impacts are often as signifi-
cant as ‘primary’ effects.”); Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at
1238 n.9 (“The central focus should not be on a primary/
secondary impact analysis but upon those impacts (either
primary or secondary) which have a ‘significant impact’

12a

upon the environment.”); see also Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir.
1977).

This court would not require the government to specu-
late on impacts in order to “foresee the unforeseeable”.
See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir.
1975). However,

{ijt must be remembered that the basic thrust of an
agency’s responsibilities under N&I?A is to predict the
environmental effects of proposed action before the
action is taken and those effects fully known.
Reasonable forecasting and speculation is thus im-
plicit in NEPA, and we must reject any attempt by
agencies to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by
labeling any and all discussion of future environmen-
tal effects as “crystal ball inquiry”.
Id. at 676 (quoting Scientists’ Institute for Public Informa-
tion v. A.E.C., 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
Thus we find it imperative that the Forest Cervice evaluate
the reasonably foreseeable significant effects which would
be proximately caused by implementation of the proposed
action. Port of Astoria, Oregon v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467,
478 (%h Cir. 1979) (EIS must address those reasonably

likely consequences of a proposed development that would
have an environmental! impact).

2.

Plaintiffs argue that the development in the Methow
Valley that is reasonably certain to follow development of
Sandy Butte will cut off the deer herd’s migration route,
usurp fawning and staging areas and eliminate winter
range — all of which are vital to the herd’s survival. In con-
trast, the Forest Service believes that “with the imple-
mentation of mitigation measures” the impacts to the mule

3a

deer will be minor. This court fails to see the logic with
which the Forest Service reaches this conclusion, since not
only has the effectiveness of these mitigation measures not

Service’s conclusions in the EIS. He stated that the data
was inadequate in terms of assessing the impacts of, for
example, residential development reasonably certain to
follow development of ski slopes on Sandy Butte.

The Forest Service is presently preparing a detailed and
comprehensive study of the mule deer. However, just as
the subsequent preparation of mitigation measures will
not cure a deficient EIS, see infra, neither will a subse-
quent study providing information essential to assessment
of the environmental impacts of a proposed action and its
alternatives.

If a government agency has difficulty obtaining ade-
quate information upon which to make a reasoned assess-
ment of the environmental impacts of a course of action, it
may not simply negate the existence of these impacts.
Rather, it has an obligation to engage in what is called a
“worst-case” analysis.'' This is because “NEPA requires a
‘worst case analysis’ when ‘the information relevant to
adverse impacts is essential . . . and is not known and the
overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or . . . the in-

'' The worst case analysis requirement was codified in 1979, 40
C.F.R. § 1902.22, and rescinded in 1986. This rescission, however,
does not nullify the requirement, Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1058 2.8, since
the regulation was merely a codification of prior NEPA caselaw. See
Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720
F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); see

* glso Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir.

1984).

l4a

formation . . . is important and the means to obtain it are
not known. . . .” Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d
at 988 (quoting Seve our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d
1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984)).
The purpose of the analysis is to carry out NEPA’s
mandate for full disclosure to the public of the poten-
tial consequences of agency decisions, and to cause
agencies to consider those potential consequences
when acting on the basis of scientific uncertainties or
gaps in available information. The analysis is formu-
lated on the basis of available information, using
reasonable projections of the worst possible conse-
quences of a proposed action.
Save our Ecosystems, 747 © 2d at 1244-45 (quoting 46
Fed. Reg. 18032 (1981)); see Oregon Natural Resources
Council, 820 F2d at 1059.

An absence of critical information renders it impossible
for the Forest Service to make a reasoned decision in the
disposition of a special use permit application. The EIS’s
cursory discussion of the impacts to the mule deer herd,
based on incomplete information, is inadequate as a mat-
ter of law. If the Forest Service finds that the new com-
prehensive study of the mule deer still provides incomplete
information, a worst-case analysis would be required for
the areas in which information is lacking.'?

'? & district court has held that “fw jithout accurate evidence of the
effectiveness of . . . mitigation techniques, the Forest Service must
prepare a worst case analysis.” Ner?. Wildlife Federation v. United
Seates Forest Service, 992 F. Supp. 931, 943 (D. Oreg. 1984). This
court expresses no opinion as to whether a worst case analysis is
necessarily required im the absence of an evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of mitigation measures. However, we do recognize the in-
herent limitation on a decisionmaker’s ability to make a reasoned deci-
sson as to the environmental impacts of a proposed action where in-
formation contained m an EIS ss mcomplete or maccurate.

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15a

3.

Appellants also contend that the district court erred in
its assessment of the adequacy of the EIS’s discussion of
impacts On air quality.

a.

The Pasayten Wilderness has been designated a “Class
I” area by Congress. This means that its air is so un-
polluted as to require heightened protection. Appellants
believe that pollution in the Methow Valley proximately
caused by the proposed development of Sandy Butte will
significantly deteriorate the air quality in the Pasayten
Wilderness and that this was not revealed in the EIS. Ap-
pellees contend, and the district court held, that the EIS’s
discussion of air quality impacts to the Pasayten Wilder-
ness is adequate. We disagree.

The EIS concluded that no Class I area would be im-
pacted by the proposed action. In reaching this conclusion
the government relied on data that was based upon an
estimate of the difference in elevation between the floor of
the Methow Valley and the lowest portion of the ridge
separating the Methow Valley from the Pasayten Wilder-
ness—an estimate that has since been shown to be
egregiously incorrect. This error casts significant doubt on
the assumption that the ridge forms a physical barrier that
would prevent air pollution trapped beneath the inversion
layer in Methow Valley from entering the wilderness area.
Incorrect assumptions usually lead to incorrect conclu-
sions. Thus the district court’s conclusion, that the infor-
mation relied upon by the government in preparation of
the relevant section of the EIS was adequate, is clearly er-
roneous. The Forest Service must reassess the impacts
upon the Pasayten Wilderness.

16a

Appellees acknowledge that without effective mitigation
measures, the state standards for Total Suspended Par-
ticulates will be exceeded in nearly all of the areas of the
upper Methow Valley as a result of foreseeable growth and
development stimulated by the Early Winters project.
This, presumably, is why the Regional Forester in his
Record of Decision approving the special use permit ap-
plication required that an air quality management pro-
gram be developed. However, we interpret NEPA and sec-
tion 497 as requiring this type of inquiry and analysis
before a permit application can be approved.'’

'} Appellants have made two additional arguments relating to air
quality which merit attention. First, they argue that the development
of Sandy Butte and the growth it will spur will likely expend the
degradation increment available for this area under the federal
Prevention of Significant Deterioration program. They suggest that
the government is required to include in its EIS an assessment of how
this exhaustion of the increment will limit opportunities for future
commercial development in the Methow Valley. We disagree.
“[Ajssuming compliance [with federally established maximum
threshold levels of pollution], growth management decisions were left
by Congress for resolution by the states.” Alabama Power Co. v. Cos-
tle, 636 F.2d 323, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Second, appellants argue that the EIS is inadequate as a matter of
law because it did not discuss the foreseeable significant carbon
monoxide emissions from wood stoves. While the precise amount of
air quality degradation that would result from these emissions is not
entirely clear, given that even the highest estimate places the impact at
still far below the applicable national standard, this omission is prob-
ably not sufficient to render the EIS inadequate. However, since a new
EIS must be prepared, inclusion of an analysis of carbon monoxide
emissions produced by wood stoves would assist the decisionmaker in
making a fully informed decision.

Pew oe oa

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1

17a

e

Section 4332 of NEPA requires that “action be taken to
mitigate the adverse effects of major federal actions.”
Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (D.
Hawaii 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976). Thus an agency
cannot decide to “act now and deal with the environmental
consequences later.” North American Wild Sheep v.
United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1181 (9th
Cir. 1982). Consequently, an EIS must include a thorough
discussion of measures to mitigate the adverse en-
vironmental impacts of a proposed action. Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1055
(9th Cir. 1987). “A mere listing of mitigation measures is
insufficient to qualify as the reasoned discussion required
by NEPA.” Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 697. “More-
over, the EIS must analyze the mitigation measures in
detail and explain the effectiveness of the measures.” 820
F.2d at 1055; see Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 697. And
we note that the subsequent preparation of an elaborate
mitigation plan “would not absolve a failure to prepare an
adequate EIS.” Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1284.

' Provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations govern-
ing the award of special use permits impose an affirmative
duty on the appellees to develop the necessary mitigation
measures before the permit is granted.'* Similarly, the EIS

'* The relevant section provides that

Each special use authorization shall contain: (1) Terms and con-
ditions which will . . . (ii) minimize damage to scenic and esthetic
values and fish and wildlife habitat and othewise [sic] protect the
environment; ... and (2) such terms and conditions as the
authorized officer deems necessary to . . . (vi) require siting to
cause least damage to the environment, taking into consideration
feasibility and other relevant factors . . .

36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a).

18a

must also contain a detailed explanation of the specific
measures which will be employed to mitigate the adverse
impacts of a proposed action. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f),
1502.16(h).

The Forest Service’s EIS contains scattered pages in
which they enumerate possible mitigation measures and
identify mitigation goals that would be necessary to pre-
vent excessive adverse impacts. These various discussions,
however, are presented in very general terms, lacking both
a detailed description of required or possible mitigation
measures, and any analysis as to the effectiveness of these
measures.

The Forest Service argues that further specificity as to
the mitigation measures for on-site impacts can only be
provided when the permittee presents a master plan of
development. The Forest Service also maintains that they
have satisfied the mitigation discussion requirement for
another reason. In its EIS, there is a brief discussion of
measures that could be required by local government to
mitigate off-site impacts. Pursuant to this discussion, the
Forest Service executed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with Okanogan County, the Washington Depart-
ment of Ecology, and the Environmental Protection
Agency. In very general terms, the MOU identifies mitiga-
tion tasks and assigns responsibilities to various parties.

It is true that contractual obligations to insure the
mitigation of adverse environmental consequences may
not be a prerequisite to a statutorily adequate EIS. Preser-
vation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th
Cir. 1982) (When efforts to mitigate the adverse environ-
mental effects are “to be undertaken by third parties, their
commitments, while they need not be contractual, must be
more than mere vague statements of good intentions.”)
(citation omitted). However, the MOU offers no
assurance whatsoever that the vague mitigation objectives

—

;
;
i
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3
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19a

it features — performance of almost all of which would be
the responsibility of third parties to the permit pro-
cess — would ever in fact be achieved or even that effective
measures would ever be designed (let alone implemented),
if the Early Winters development were to proced. C7.
Preservation Coalition, 667 F.2d at 860 (“Since many of
the “mitigations’ proposed by the agency were . . . poten-
tial actions to be taken by [third parties] reliance on
them . . . was improper.”) (footnoted omitted).

As this court stated in Oregon Natural Resources Coun-
cil v. Marsh,

[t}he importance of the mitigation plan cannot be
overestimated. It is a determinative factor in
evaluating the adequacy of an environmental impact

Statement. Without a complete mitigation plan, the
decisionmaker is unable to make an informed judg-

ment as to the environmental impact of the proj-
ect — one of the main purposes of an environmental
impact statement.
820 F.2d at 1055 (citation omitted). The EIS’s discussion
of mitigation measures is inadequate as a matter of law.

IV.

The decision of the district court is reversed and

remanded for entry of appropriate relief in accordance
with this opinion.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

No. 85-2124-DA

MetHow VaALLFY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS,

Vv.
REGIONAL FORESTER, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

{June 25, 1986]

Peterson, Chief of the Forest Service, heard plaintiffs’ appeal. (A.R.

2la

ll. Procedural posture

In a previous opinion dated April 30, 1986, | identified
the parties and briefly summarized the claims in the com-
plaint. Plaintiffs are public interest and environmental
groups concerned variously with the protection of the en-
vironment, social, and economic amenities and resources
of the Methow Valley. Some of the members of these
groups reside in Methow Valley. Others use Methow
Valley for recreational, educational, scientific or employ-
ment purposes. The group in the forefront of the con-
troversy regarding Early Winters is Methow Valley
Citizens Council (MVCC). Defendants are various United
States Forest Service officials and the probable developer
of Early Winters, Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI).

12). On December 16, 1985, Peterson affirmed the July 15, 1984,
Record of Decision im all respects. (A.R. 57). The Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture declined to review Peterson's decision.
(A.R. 58). See 36 C.F.R. § 211.189 f2). This action was filed on
December 17, 1985.

All citations to “A.R.” refer to consecutively numbered tabs in the
three volume administrative record, a part of the trial record marked
as government's exhibit 102. The EIS is marked as government's ex-

The following glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in this
oprmon ts provided for the convenience of the reader:

APA Administrative Procedures Act.
CEQ Council on Environmental Quali y
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
MOU \iemorandum of Understanding
MRI Methow Recreation, Inc.

MUP Multiple-Use Plan

MVCC Methow Valley Citizens Councii
NEPA National Environmentai Policy Act
NFMA Natrona! Forest Management Act
PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration
TSP Total Suspended Particulates

T-W-C MUP = Twist-Winthrop-Concully MUP

22a

In response to the various pretrial motions then before
me and for reasons explained in the opinion, ‘1 granted
summary judgment to the defendants on two claims. |
held that the Forest Service had not violated either 1) the
National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 and other scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. or 2) the Clean Air Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7626. | denied summary judgment on all remaining
claims.

A court trial was held on issues identified in a pretrial
order signed by all of the parties and approved by the
court. First, plaintiffs contend that the Forest Service
Record of Decision to issue the permit must be set aside
because it was arbitrary and capricious and not supported
by substantial evidence. Second, they argue that a change
in agency position on delaying the release of the en-
vironmental impact statement and Record of Decision
violated their constitutional right to due process. Third,
they argue that the environmental impact statement, en-
titled “Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study” (the
EIS), is inadequate under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4231-4370a and
associated regulations. | find for the defendants on all
claims. The Recotfd of Decision stands. The action is
dismissed.

Il. Background

To put this case in perspective, it is necessary to begin
with a rather extensive background section. MRI applied
for a permit to develop and operate Early Winters on ap-
proximately 3,900 acres in the Okanogan National Forest,
a forest which contains approximately 1,706,000 acres of
land, on August 21, 1978. The Early Winters project had
its genesis many years before that time, however. In the

en = ee ow

23a

early 1960s, federal study teams began surveying the .
North Cascade Mountains for possible designation of na-
tional park and wilderness areas. Aware of the federal ef-
fort, ski industry representatives conducted their own
surveys of potential ski areas in the western United States.
From these surveys, Sandy Butte emerged as a potential
site for a desirable ski area. (A.R. 46A).

In 1968, Congress designated the North Cascades Na-
tional Park. 16 U.S.C. § 90. The legislation directed the
Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to “agree on the
designation of areas within the park on recreation areas or
within national forests adjacent to the park and recreation
areas needed for public use facilities. . . . [Such public
use facilities, including . . . lodges, campsites, and ski
lifts, shall be constructed according to a plan agreed upon
by the two Secretaries.” 16 U.S.C. § 90d-3. The national
park legislation referred to above led to joint study by the
National Forest and National Park Services of potential
winter sports activities and sites in the North Cascades
area and to the development of a North Cascades Recrea-
tion Plan. (A.R. 57 at 2).

In 1970, the Forest Service completed a work entitled
the North Cascades Winter Sports Study. (A.R. 43C). It
examined the opportunities for cross-country skiing, ex-
pansion of existing downhill ski resorts, and the develop-
ment of new skiing facilities. This study identified Sandy
Butte as having the highest potential of any site in the
State of Washington for development as a major destina-
tion ski area. (A.R. 57 at 2).

In 1974, the Park Service and the Forest Service issued
the Joint Plan for the North Cascades area. (A.R. 21A).
Like the studies that had preceded it, this plan recognized
Sandy Butte as a promising site for downhill skiing
facilities. (A.R. 21A at 33).

24a

In 1976, Congress enacted the NFMA. In 1977, the
Okanogan Forest Supervisor adopted the Twisp-
Winthrop-Concolly Unit Plan (T-W-C MUP). The MVCC
appealed the approval of the multiple use plan (hence
“MUP”) to the Regional Forester. The plan was ultimately
remanded because of deficiencies in the planning process,
particularly the T-W-C MUP’s treatment of roadless
areas. (A.R. 57 at 3).?

Because the T-W-C MUP never went into effect, the
previous plans, including the 1968 Winthrop MUP with its
1970 revision as well as the 1974 Joint Plan for the North
Cascades, remained in force.

At the time the T-W-C MUP was remanded, Phase II of
the Roadless Area review [sic] and Evaluation (RARE II)
was well underway.’ Under the RARE II project, the
Forest Service inventoried all roadless areas within the Na-
tional Forest System, some 190 million acres containing
154 National Forests and 19 National Grasslands. RARE
II allocated all roadless areas to one of three planning
categories: wilderness, nonwilderness, and future plan-
ning. Controversy arose about what a nonwilderness
designation meant. California brought suit against the
Fores’ Service, claiming that the EIS was inadequate
becawse it failed to make site specific evaluations. In 1979,
» district court agreed and enjoined the Forest Service
from taking any action that might change the wilderness

2 A “roadiess area” is defined as “{ajn area of undeveloped Federal
land within which there are not improved roads maintained for travel
by means of motorized vehicles intended for highway use.” FSM §
8260(B\3\1). Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v.
Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 583 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).

’ The Forest Service’s efforts in RARE II's precursor, RARE |,
were halted when a federal court enjoined development pursuant to
the plan until the Forest Service completed an EIS. Wyoming Outdoor
Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).

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25a

character of the disputed areas in California until it filed
an EIS that satisfied NEPA’s requirements. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th
Cir. 1982). The precarious legal foundation on which
RARE II found itself brought the ill-fated program to an
effective halt in states outside California.

MRI applied for a special use permit in 1978. The Forest
Supervisor announced his decision to study the feasibility
of a ski area at Sandy Butte. MVCC appealed the decision
to accept and process the permit application. The Chief
Forester concluded that MRI’s application could be proc-
essed if development was consistent with existing plans
and satisfied all procedural requirements, including

‘ NEPA. Former Department of Agriculture Assistant

Secretary M. Rupert Cutler affirmed the Chief Forester’s
decision. However, he directed the Chief to “ensure that
such applications are not approved until the area is ap-
propriately allocated in a land management plan and the
project considered through the appropriate environmental
review process.” (A.R. 4A at 2). By the time the appeal
reached Cutler, work on the T-W-C plan had been
dropped in favor of drafting the Okanogan NFMA plan.
The Regional Forester made inquiries whether the 1968,
1970 Winthrop MUP satisfied Cutler's directive quoted
above. Associate Deputy Chief Housley responded with a
simple answer: “No.” (A.R. 4B). Housley was concerned
primarily with the fact that no decision had yet been made
as to whether to allocate Sandy Butte for wilderness land.
It seems fair to say that Housley interpreted Cutler’s deci-
sion to allow study of the permit application, but not to
issue the permit until the Okanogan NFMA plan (in which
allocations to wilderness would be made) was complete.
The Forest Service proceeded simulianeously with con-
sideration of MRI's permit application and with prepara-
tion of its NFMA plan for Okanogan National Forest. A

was completed in due course but not released, apparently
because the Forest Service was concerned that release

would be successfully challenged in court under the prin-
ciples of California v. Block. He stated: “A substantial
amount of time would be needed to revise the Sandy Butte

. Ud. at 2).
ta) han
Cutler dated June 8, 1984, the author indicated that an
amendment to the Washington Wilderness Bill had been
added “that would alter the intent and effect of your rul-
ing.” (A.R. 21D at 1). The letter goes on to state: “Your

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27a

successor in the Reagan Administration is interpreting
your decision as appropriate only because the roadless
lands involved were not considered for wilderness designa-
tion in Rare Il.” (/d.) MVCC indicated it did not feel “that
the passage of the Washington Wilderness Bill fulfills the
intent of the Cutler Decision and hope that you will lend
your support at this time in upholding that decision.” (/d.
at 2).

The Washington State Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No.
98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (Washington Wilderness Act) became
law on July 3, 1984. It designated various public lands in
Washington as wilderness. Sandy Butte was purposefully
not among those chosen. Recognizing that the NFMA
authorized continued management of forest lands under
existing land and resource plans pending the completion
forest plans, the Senate Committee Report accompanying
the wilderness bill through Congress specified the manage-
ment direction for Sandy Butte:

That area of the Okanogan National Forest known as
Sandy Butte has been excluded from wilderness desig-
nation in S. 837. It is the intent of Congress that land
use management of Sandy Butte proceed, without
delay, in accordance with existing multiple-use
management plans, consistent with the National En-
vironment Policy Act (NEPA). The designation by
Congress in S. 837 of appropriate wilderness areas in
Washington State makes it unnecessary to further
withhold the Sandy Butte/Early Winters Alpine
Winter Sports Study FEIS pending completion of the
Okanogan Forest Plan. The Forest Service and the
Department of Agriculture are directed to allow the
evaluation process for the Sandy Butte development
to proceed without additional delay, given that Con-
gress has determined that the roadless upper third of
Sandy Butte is without wilderness characteristics.

(AR. 21F at 11); S. Rep. No. 461, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1984). . :

With these facts in mind, | now turn to a discussion of
plaintiffs’ claims. Additional facts will be discussed below
as they become necessary.

A. Wes the Forest Service decision to issue the special use permit
arbitrary and capricious”

Plaintiffs claim that the Regional Forester’s decision
should be set aside because he acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and did not rely on substantial evidence in
reaching the decision to issue the special use permit. As a
threshold matter, | must determine whether the court has
the power to review this contention in the context pre-
sented in the pretrial order.

The Administrative Procedures Act (APA), provides:
(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions
thereof, except to the extent that —(1) statutes pre-
clude judicial review; or (2) agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law.

§$ U.S.C. § 701(a).

No statute precludes judicial review of the Forest Ser-
vice’s Record of Decision. The court is concerned here
with the exception in § 701(aX2). In Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the
Supreme Court emphasized that the § 701(a)(2) exception
where “agency action ts committed to agency discretion by
law” is “a very narrow exception . . . applicable in those
rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ ” 401
U.S. at 410 (citation omitted).

In Ness Investment Corp. v. United States Depariment
of Agriculture, $12 F.2d 706 (Mh Cir. 1975), plaintiff

29a

sought review of a Forest Service decision that a company
was unqualified to receive a special use permit to operate a
resort. In that case, the Forest Service action was autho-
rized and taken pursuant to statutory authority provided
in 16 U.S.C. § 497. The company argued that § 701(a)(2)
did not apply. The court disagreed. “The statute, [16
U.S.C. § 497], is with respect to the proper recipient of a
special use permit, drawn in such broad terms that there is
no law to apply.” /d. at 715. Contra Sabin v. Butz, 515
F.2d 1061, 1067 (10th Cir. 1975).

Subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have not interpreted
Ness to mean that judicial review of agency action taken
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 497 or similar broadly-worded
discretionary statutes is completely foreclosed in all cir-
cumstances. As one of these decisions stated:

In considering whether administrative action is
“committed to agency discretion by law” within the
meaning of the APA, the test “is not whether a statute
viewed in the abstract lacks law to be applied but
rather, whether ‘in a given case’ there is no law to be
applied.” Strickland v. Morton, [519 F.2d 467, 470
(%h Cir. 1975)] (emphasis in original). Thus the ex-
istence of some law generally applicable to the subject
matter in question will not necessarily remove ad-
ministrative action from the “committed to agency
discretion” rubric. There is “law to apply,” only if a
specific statute limits the agency’s discretion to act in
the manner which is challenged.

Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Santa
Clara, 439 U.S. § 859 (1978).

The discretion afforded the Forest Service is not limited
to the mere identification of a qualified recipient of a per-
mit; it extends equally to the more basic decision to issue

30a

an rmit at all. Plaintiffs’ challenge—however
one —is essentially a claim that the Forest Service had
either no basis or relied on an improper basis in reaching
the decision on whether or not to issue the permit for Early
Winters. That decision is “committed to agency discre-
tion” and is not reviewable. Ness, 512 F.2d at 715. See also
Arizona Power Authority v. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231, 1239
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977). But cf. Sierra
Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985) (en-
vironmental challenge to Bureau of Land Management
decision to amend California Desert Conservation Area
Management Plan pursuant to Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976; agency’s factual findings in sup-
port of decision to be overturned only “if arbitrary and
capricious” citing Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F.2d 686, 691
(9th Cir. 1985) and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). .
Under the circumstances presented in this case, there is
no law to apply as to the propriety of the challenged deci-
sion. Ness and its progeny necessitate the conclusion that

§ 701(a)(2) deprives the court of any power to consider.

plaintiffs’ contentions.‘

4 If the case law of the Ninth Circuit allowed the court to engage in
a substantive review of the Regional Forester’s detision, | would af-
firm it because it is neither arbitrary nor capricious. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A). It is not the court’s place to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency on the decision to issue the permit. The decision
reached is without doubt a rational and lawful one. The substantial
evidence test of § U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) does not apply to either the issue
of the propriety of the decision or the adequacy of the EIS under
NEPA because the Regional Forester’s decision is not a “case that is
“subject to” formal adjudicatory hearings or formal rule-making “ The court of appeals’ discussion of this issue implies that the Early
Winters Study neglects to discuss the secondary effects of the proposal
(Petition App., | la-12a). This notion is unfounded. The EIS discusses in
detail the significant adverse effects of the project, virtually all of which are
secondary in nature. Early Winters Study 65-71, 73-76, 79-101, 121-135.
The district court cited the uncertainty and speculation involved in predict-

ing secondary effects as one of the considerations involved in determining
wenn Sw hla amy tp
of a discussion of significant effects (Petition App., 38a).

© By the time this case proceeded to trial, the Forest Service had entered
into agreements with federal, state and local agencies to develop mitigation
programs. These agreements in turn led the responsible agencies to under-
take extensive studies of air quality and mule deer issues, for example, so
that mitigation measures could be implemented prior to the time the antici-
pated secondary growth occurred (Petition App., 41a-42a, 4Sa-46a).

6

The district court concluded that the Forest Service's
actions were evidence of informed decision-making and
responsive to the potential effects of the project, citing
Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1985) (Peti-
tion App., 42a). Again, however, the court of appeals
ignored this and other precedent which hold that where the
ability to control secondary effects is outside the jurisdiction
of the federal agency, it is sufficient and reasonable for the
EIS to identify mitigation measures for consideration by
those local and state agencies with authority in the area. See
Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 n.6
(9th Cir. 1982) (mitigation measures developed in close
cooperation with local government with jurisdiction was a
significant factor in determining EIS efficacy); City and
County of San Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498,
501 (9th Cir. 1980) (court approved practice of relying
upon cooperative efforts with city to relieve significant
adverse traffic impacts).

The court of appeals’ decision would impose significant
and unwarranted obligations on federal agencies and would
substantially affect the ability of the private sector to parti-
cipate in federal resource management activities. To require
federal agencies to engage in a worst case analysis of
impacts or to develop and model the potential effectiveness
of measures to mitigate effects that are only indirectly
related to the federal action and may not occur for 10-20
years would cause endless delay in agency decision-making.

The purpose of NEPA is to assist agencies in assessing the
environmental effects of proposed actions. Baltimore Gas &

Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983). It is not intended to bring resource
management to a grinding halt as the agency searches for
answers to the unending inquiries posed by the environ-
mental sciences. See National Helium Corp. v. Morton,

7

486 F.2d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
993 (1974).

CONCLUSION

MRI joins the Solicitor General in urging this Court to
review the court of appeals’ decision in this case. The court's
departure from 'ong-standing NEPA decisions by this Court
and its failure to adhere to generally accepted judicial prac-
tices will have a chilling effect not only on federal agencies,
but also on private businesses that participate with those
agencies in federal resource management activities.

The petition for a writ of cc... »rari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

GLENN J. AMSTER
HILuis, CLARK,
MARTIN & PETERSON, PS.
$00 Galland Building
1221 Second Avenue

Seattle, Washington 98101
(206) 623-1745

Counsel for Respondent

Methow Recreation, Inc.
May 6, 1988

OPPOSITION
BRIEF

In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987

-.
ww

F. DALE ROBERTSON, CHIEF OF THE
FOREST SERVICE, ET AL.,

Petitioners,
v.

METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.,
Respondents.

s.
—_

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

— =
NS

Davmw A. Brick

Backus & GenvLer

Counsel of Record for
Respondents

Suite 1015

Fourth & Pike Building
1424 Fourth Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98101

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. Whether the National Environmental! Policy Act
requires federal agencies to analyze potentia! mitigation
measures when the agency expressiy relies upon those
measures to conclude that a proposal’s env -onmenta! im

pacts will be acceptable

Z Whether the Early Winters special use permit
was issued in violation of Forest Service regulations ré
quiring the permit to im inde conditions to minimiz

environmental impacts

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Respondents accept petitioners’ description of the
parties to the proceeding. Methow Valley Citizens Coun-
cil, Washington Environmental Council, and Sierra Club
are all not-for-profit corporations. None of the respon-
dents has any parent companies, subsidiaries, or affiliates.
This statement is provided pursuant to Supreme Coaurt
Rule 28.1.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Questions Presented tet eacneeeteemeeneciee i
Parties to the Proceeding ... Oe eiaeney On
Statutory Provisions and Regulations I: Involved 0... 2
Statement of the Case ..... a 2
Reasons for Denying the Petition s

1. The Court of Appeals Did Not Hold That the
Forest Service Violated a Substantive Require-
ment to Impose Mitigation Measures 10

2. This is Not the Proper Case to Address the Court’s
Peripheral Finding That a ‘‘Worst Case Analy-
sis’’ is Required Where Essential Information
Cannot Reasonably be Obtained . lias 12

3. The Court of Appeals easily § Held That the
EIS’s Discussion of oe Measures Was

Inadequate __ . 16

4. The Court of Appeals nice Held That the
Forest Service Regulation Requires Imposition of
Conditions to Mitigate Environmental Impacts 21

Conclusion Se
ee App. 1

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Page

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) —..10, 12, 16, 17

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
ee Lpaneelaniniets —

City of Springfield v. Kibbe, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct.
1114, rehearing denied 107 S.Ct. 1966 (1987) 11,13

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Aigist, 450 U.S. 346 (1981)...11, 18

Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473
2 FF f 4g 18

Equal Opportunity Employment Commission v.
Federal Labor Relations Board, 476 U.S. —,
ff lll CF

Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers
CP a ND GS ESS aaa

Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S, 390 (1986) 0000s

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 832
F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
oo eC EE

Public Services Corp. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm., 582 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1978)... 19

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
— 8S ee mad 11, 12,18
STATUTES

Administrative Procedure Act
RR ae SS A a , ae

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

42 U.S.C. § 4331 ef seq. SS ee

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) |
42 U.B.C. § 488202) (C) econ oveveovoesossse

ReecuLaTions

36 C.F.R.
36 C.F.R.
36 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R,
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.
40 CLFLR.
40 C.F.R.

251.56 (a) ..........
251.56(a) (1)

FE

ES A ce eC
1502.2(f) ooo

ty

3

1102, 1111 (D. Hawaii 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
$33 F.2d 434 (9h Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999
(1976). Thus an agency cannot decide to “act now and
deal with the environmental consequences later.”
North American Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of
Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 1982). Conse-
quently, an EIS must include a thorough discussion
of measures to mitigate the adverse environmental
impacts of a proposed action. Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th

Cir. 1987).
As this passage demonstrates, the court unambiguously
concluded that Section 102 of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4332) re-
quires federal agencies to mitigate adverse environmental
effects and that, as a consequence, the agency’s en-
vironmental impact statement must include a detailed
discussion of mitigation. Thus, the court of appeals’
declaration that agencies have a substantive duty to
mitigate environmental harm is crucial to its holding and
therefore establishes circuit precedent. Indeed, it is reveal-
ing that the respondents in Marsh contend that “[t}he
Solicitor General’s objection to a substantive duty to
mitigate is more properly raised in his petition for a writ of
certiorari [in Methow Valley)” (87-1704 Br. in Opp. 6 n.4).
We have shown in our petition (at 16-18) and in our re-
ply brief in Marsh (87-1704 Br. 4-5) that the court of ap-
peals also erred in imposing a new procedural requirement
that federal agencies include a detailed mitigation plan in
every environmental impact statement. Respondents con-

_ tend (Br. in Opp. 18-19) that under the court’s holding the

agency’s duty to prepare a detailed mitigation plan comes
into play only when the agency has relied upon thre benefits
of mitigation to conclude that a project’s environmental
effects will be acceptable. But there is no basis in the court

4

of appeals’ opinion for respondents’ suggested interpreta-
tion—which is, in any event, quite implausible since,
under that interpretation, the agency’s obligation to set
forth a detailed mitigation plan in the environmental im-
pact statement would depend on events that occur after
the preparation of that document. '

2. Respondents indicate that they stand ready to de-
fend the court of appeals’ invalidation of the Council on
Environmental Quality’s (CEQ’s) rescission of its “worst
case” analysis regulation (Br. in Opp. 15 n.14), but they
maintain that the issue is not properly raised in this case.
Respondents characterize the court’s instruction to the
Forest Service that unless the agency develops certain
wildlife information on remand it must employ a worst
case analysis as a “peripheral observation” (id. at 12, 13)
that is not “ripe for review” (id. at 14-15). But the agency is
not free to ignore the court of appeals’ instruction.’
Should the agency find that its wildlife study is in-
conclusive, it must then comply with the court’s mandate
to prepare a “worst case” analysis — notwithstanding the

' Moreover, respondents’ contention incorrectly characterizes how
the Forest Service used its environmental impact statement — the Early
Winters Study—in this case. The Early Winters Study included a
thorough description of the environmental effects of the proposed
project alternatives (at 65-145), and then identified certain means that
would be available to ameliorate those effects (at 14-18, 68-69, 77-78).
The Forest Service ultimately approved one of the Early Winters
Study’s project alternatives and directed the development of mitiga-
tion measures described in the study. But the Forest Service did not
base its approval of that project alternative on the guaranteed success
of those mitigation measures, and there is no basis for respondents to
impute that thought process to the agency. See Pet. App. 63a-7 1a.

? The court stated (Pet. App. 14a (footnote omitted)): “If the Forest
Service finds that the new comprehensive study of the mule deer stil!
provides incomplete information, a worst-case analysis would be re-
quired for the areas in which information is lacking.”

5

CEQ'’s rescission of that regulatory requirement. While the
worst case issue is, perhaps, more unavoidably presented
in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, supra, the
issue is properly raised here as well. For the reasons we
have stated in our petition (at 18-21) in this case, and in
our petition (at 15-18) and reply brief (at 5-8) in Marsh,
this matter was wrongly decided by the court of appeals in
both cases and warrants this Court’s review.

3. As we have shown in our petition (at 21-23), this
Court should also review the Ninth Circuit's related
holding that Forest Service regulations require the agency
to incorporate a complete mitigation plan into its special
use permits.’ Respondents appear to agree (Br. in Opp.
23) with the court of appeals that the regulations require a
fully developed mitigation plan for both off-site and on-
site impacts. That result incorrectly imports the court of
appeals’ mistaken vision of NEPA’s requirements into the
Forest Service’s regulations governing special use permits.

The Forest Service regulations at issue here require
“measures and plans for the protection and rehabilitation
of the environment during construction, operation,
maintenance, and termination of the project” (36 C.F.R.
251.54(e)(4)) and “[t}erms and conditions which will * * *
minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish
and wildlife habitat and othewise jsic] protect the environ-

’ Respondents urge (Br. in Opp. 22) that this issue is no longer sub-
ject to this Court's review because the Forest Service will have to issue
a new permit after it has completed certain revisions to the Early
Winters Study. As an initial matter, it is not clear that a new special
use permit would have to be issued. Only if the Regional Forester
determines to change his decision would a new permit be necessary.
Moreover, even if the revisions to the Early Winters Study would
result in issuance of a new permit, there is no reason to expect that
those revisions would lead the Forest Service to revise the mitigation
conditions that were the subject of the court of appeals’ holding.

6

ment” (36 C.F.R. 251.56(a)(1)ii)). They do not reference
NEPA's requirements, nor do they independently specify
the detail necessary for compliance or the extent to which
off-site or third-party mitigation measures must be incor-
porated. In this case, the special use permits in fact con-
tained a variety of mitigation measures (see Pet. 22 n.25;
Br. in Opp. 5-6 n.5). The court of appeals had no authori-
ty to rewrite the agency’s regulations in order to find those
measures inadequate.

For the reasons stated above and in the petition, it is
therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted.

CHARLES FIuED

Solicttor General

JUNE 1988

US GOVERNMENT PRONTING OFFICE 1088— 202 0397/6051"

~

PR PS Cn ge Ot

RESPONDENT’S

BRIEF

EO EO

* > =

oe Ss ae SO eel

1.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the National Environmental Policy Act
required the Forest Service to include in the Early
Winters Study:

(a) a detailed plan for mitigation of environmental
impacts where primary or on-site impacts are
addressed througt a phased environmental review
process and secondary or off-site impacts can only be
addressed when there is a specific proposal for
secondary development; and

(b) a “worst case analysis” of potential environmen-
tal harm if the regulation requiring such analysis has
been rescinded and is being applied to a study only
now underway.

Whether Forest Service regulations require the devel-
opment of a particular kind of plan to mitigate envi-
ronmental impacts prior to issuance of a special use
permit for recreational use of national forest land.

L THE DISCUSSION OF MITIGATION MEASURES
IN THE EIS WAS ADEQUATE UNDER THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT ..

A.

The Judicial Role Is to Ensure that an
EIS the Purposes of NEPA ..........

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

Page
B. The “Worst Case Analysis” ee Suse
Not Apply to the Deer Herd Pvcseecees 27
C. The “Worst Case Analysis” Requirement Is
Only One Means of Implementing the Goals of
PERS PNaGatebecdsedesecessccccceccecs 28
een eeednsdunt neceebesesecesscenes 29
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) .... 10
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 US. 347 (1979)............ 8, 28
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).............. 10, 11, 21
City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. __,108 S. Ct. 197 (1987) ...... 14
City wf Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
SMEG b Rede ebdsceseceucescescesscceseces 17
Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d
atl caceuedeeebdesecccecceecess 17
Concerned Citizens on 1-190 v. Secretary of Transpor-
tation, 641 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981)............... 17, 18

County oe v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d
1368 ir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064
STR cehbaneudevedesesscececesoseces 13, 16

PCRS CONSeeeSecececsotcesecccees 7, 16, 17, 18, 27

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-—Continued

Page
Foundation for North American Wild S v. United

States Dep't of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir.

GOP e a cccncsccencestensscauosguneeaceeseceesseuce 17
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) . 6, 10, 11, 14, 16
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926 (1986)................ 8, 23
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Adams,

482 F. Supp. 170 (D. Minn. 1979) .......... 17, 18, 21
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peter-

son, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other

grounds sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-

tery Protective Ass'n, __ U.S. __, 108 S. Ct. 1319

GORD onc eccéneunccnectcsetesncpacenesenseceoncce: 18
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 832 F.2d

1489 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Marsh

v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, No. 87-1704

GUD Wie TED ccs cvececcorscccecesstscdesneestess 18
Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851

OR OP ee re 8, 23
Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir. 1983)..... 26
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,

GOO Ghee GD GH cc ccecccececepssencees« 11, 14, 21
Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.

ISU s bape cecccnceccdudesedsedecsodetedéenns’ .. 10
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519

SPD covcccccecnccanenaceanencencounssns 6, 11, 14, 20

Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir.
Gee on ncecuccncoccscoeseseensacesessan eaves

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued
Page

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
Ge OP Gs accccebicsccsbeddcetrccccccecessceces 9

State Environmental Policy Act, Revised Code of
Washington, ch. 43.21C (1983 &

Ce I SEED wawesccccvevccccccccascccceccecccs 5
BD Ge © BONO oc cc cccccccccccccsesesvecs 8, 22
36 C.FR. § 251.56 (a)(1){ii) «eee 8, 22
ee cdc cchacvctcscanectcvonsccccdee 20
Se se Es wv ccasencccccscovccncnesscusss 20
Gp Gee Oe A che cccscccccvesesccsceccanceds 7, 12
Sp Ge PE cadanscccccccvccseccececss 25, 26, 27
GP ee Ee Ma Seccnceccsccadevetevasseseussieca 20
SD Gee OF vc enbnieccccccssncsccceccccecs 7, 12

Methow Valley Air om Regulation, Okanogan
County Board of Health (September 9, 1986)...... 19

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988
= Qo
No. 87-1703

Qe

F. DALE ROBERTSON,
Chief of the Forest Service, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, et ai.,
Respondents.

—o—

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
METHOW RECREATION, INC.

Respondent Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI)' supports
the position of the Solicitor General and urges this Court

1. MRI's 1978 a tion to the Forest Service for a spe-
cial use permit to a major destination ski area on
Butte in the Okanogan National Forest (hereinafter
“Early Winters project”) triggered preparation of the Early
Winters Study. (For the Court’s convenience, the Solicitor Gen-
eral has lodged a of the Early Winters Study with the
Clerk of the Court.) MRI is a corporation. It does
not have any subsidiaries, but is affi with EWR, Inc., a
Delaware corporation.

2

to reverse the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.

a

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

MRI adopts the statement of the Solicitor General set
forth in the Brief for Petitioners and provides the follow-
ing additional statement.?

The decision under review in this case is the first
phase of an environmental review and permitting proc-
ess. An environmental impact statement (hereinafter
“EIS” or “Early Winters Study”) was prepared by the
Forest Service for the Early Winters project. This EIS
analyzed the environmental consequences of allowing
national forest lands on Sandy Butte to be used for down-
hill skiing. Early Winters Study xvi.

This first-phase evaluation of the potential for skiing
at Sandy Butte would not result directly in development.
The EIS clearly noted that there would be additional
opportunities for environmental review prior to actual

development of the Early Winters project:

A Forest Service decision to ski dev
at Early Winters does not construction of a
ski nor does it authorize

particular
development of any non-Forest Service lands.

2. The appendices to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
are cited as “Petition App., __.”

3

Service to allow a specific development at Early Win-

cane aasndion Beat Enns Guat ond lot qoven-
ment agencies, prior to an thorization to
non-Forest Service lands. ~~

Early Winters Study 1.

Once the Forest Service determines that a general
plan for ski development is environmentally acceptable,
it may consider issuing a special use permit. In this
second phase of review, the Forest Service requires the
applicant to prepare a detailed development plan (called
a “Master Plan”) prior to undertaking any construction
activities. Id. at xvi. This Master Plan describes and illus-
trates the specific facilities to be constructed on the ski
hill. Id. On the basis of this specific development plan,
the Forest Service evaluates environmental impacts in
greater detail and determines site-specific mitigation
measures. /d.

In the next stage of the environmental review and

3. The focus of this case has been the impacts to the local
mule deer population that may occur as a result of secondary

would result directly from the development of the Early
Winters project (Petition App., 67a).*

This off-site or secondary development is not a part
of the ski area proposal, nor would it occur on land under
the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. In the absence of a
specific proposal for development, the EIS discussion of
secondary impacts is correspondingly less detailed than
that devoted to primary impacts:

In addition to disclosing on-site impacts of the ski
development at Early Winters, the EIS also discloses
off-site impacts that each alternative might have on
community facilities, socio-economic and other envi-
ronmental conditions in the Upper Methow Valley.

Since there are no pending proposals or plans to
develop any off-site lands, the evaluation of off-site

impacts is not site-specific. It is general in nature,
acknowledging to the extent practicable the impacts
associated with the growth that is likely to be
induced by development of Sandy Butte for skiing.

Early Winters Study 1-3.

Though less detailed, the disclosure in the EIS of
significant secondary impacts caused the Regional For-
ester to impose conditions in his decision to allow the ski
area development to move forward.5 As these impacts

4. This conclusion has never been challenged (Petition
App., 38a, 42a).

5. In his Record of Decision, the Regional Forester

required that the Forest Supervisor participate with state and
local agencies in the formu'ation of mitigation programs, and

would occur on non-Forest Service lands, the Regional
Forester directed the Forest Supervisor to work cooper-
atively with state and local agencies to assist those agen-
cies in responding to the impacts of future growth and
development. Thus, the Forest Service decision in this
case, as well as state and local laws,® ensure that second-
ary development will be subject to additional environ-
mental review when actual projects are identified. Early
Winters Study 1-3; see Petition App., 67a-70a.

The Forest Service did not intend for the Early Win-
ters Study to be the final word on the environmenta!
impacts of the ski area development: “Many areas of
concern can only be resolved at later stages of the

that efforts be substantially underway to develop and imple-
ment mitigation measures before issuance of the special use
permit. See Petition App., 68a.

For example, the EIS warned that secondary development
could significantly impact the Okanogan mule deer herd. This
disclosure caused the Forest Service to require that state and
local agencies formulate a plan to minimize the effects of this
development on the mule deer population. This requirement,
in turn, led to the initiation of a study which would identify
existing conditions of the deer herd. The purpose of this study
was to provide baseline information for a better understanding
of the environmental impacts of future development. (Petition
App., 42a.) See also infra note 17.

6. Washington has a “little NEPA,” the State Environmen-
tal Policy Act, which requires state and local agencies to
engage in detailed environmental review of “major actions.”
Revised Code of Washington, ch. 43.21C (1983 & West Supp.
1988).

planning process.” Early Winters Study xvi. The express
purpose of discussing secondary effects in the EIS was to
provide a more complete picture of the likely impacts of
ski development, in order to alert the public and those
governmental agencies with jurisdiction to the issues
which may arise in the future.” Early Winters Study 3.

The court of appeals failed to acknowledge the rela-
tionship between the Early Winters Study and the
sequence of environmental review adopted by the Forest
Service.

>

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

MRI joins in the arguments presented by the Solicitor
General and adds the following:

1. The well-established precedent of this Court
holds that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
“does set forth significant substantive goals for the
Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially
procedural.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
The only role for a court is to ensure that an agency has
taken a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of
a proposed action. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,

7. In his response to the administrative appeal filed by
the Methow Valley Citizens Council (MVCC), the Chief of the
Forest Service reiterated that additional environmental review
would occur in the future (Petition App., 58a).

410 n.21 (1976). In the case of the proposed use of Forest
Service lands on Sandy Butte for skiing, there can be no
doubt that the Forest Service took a “hard look” at the
probable environmental impacts.

2. In preparing the Early Winters Study, the Forest
Service determined that NEPA compliance was best ful-
filled by phasing the review of primary or on-site impacts
of development. This determination is consistent with
regulations issued by the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20, 1508.28; Village of
False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d. 605, 615-16 (9th Cir. 1984).
The court of appeals utterly failed to acknowledge, much
less show any deference to, the agency decision to phase
environmental review.

3. The probable significant impacts of the ski area
are those related to induced growth and accompanying
secondary development. The EIS discussion of these sec-
ondary impacts and related mitigation measures is less
detailed than that devoted to primary impacts. This
approach is consistent with NEPA. See Enos v. Marsh, 769
F.2d. 1363, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1985). The basis for this
distinction is that secondary development may be the
result of, but is not a part of, the Early Winters project;
there is no specific proposal for development of non-
Forest Service lands. Regulation of this unknown future
development, including the mitigation of probable
impacts, will be the responsibility of state and local agen-
cies. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in holding the
EIS inadequate for failing to include a detailed mitigation

plan.

4. Forest Service regulations do not require the
adoption of a particular kind of mitigation plan prior to
the issuance of a special use permit. See 36 C.FR.
§§ 251.54(e4) and 251.56(a)(1 Mii). The court of appeals
failed to defer to the Forest Service's interpretation of its
own regulations. See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939
(1986). The court also erred in equating the analysis of
NEPA requirements with the analysis of the Forest Ser-
vice special use permit regulations, contrary to its own
approach in Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d.
851, 859 (9th Cir. 1982).

5. Finally, the court of appeals erred in holding that
a “worst case analysis” would be required if future
studies indicate that environmental information is lack-
ing. The CEQ rescinded the “worst case analysis” regula-
tion in 1986, and that determination is entitled to
substantial deference. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 US.
347, 358 (1979). Moreover, the worst case analysis is not a
codification of prior NEPA case law, as the court of
appeals asserts. In any event, the worst case analysis
requirement would not apply to the particular study
identified by the court of appeals, regardless of whether
information was lacking.

The court of appeals’ decision misconstrued NETA,
improperly invaded the discretion of the Forest Service
and the district court, and disregarded the mandates of
this Court.

ARGUMENT

Il. THE DISCUSSION OF MITIGATION MEA-
SURES IN THE EIS WAS ADEQUATE UNDER
Hr NATIONAL ENVIi ONMENTAL POLICY
ACT.

MRI joins in the arguments presented by the Solicitor
General. MRI also wishes to stress that the underlying
issue in the questions presented to this Court is the
adequacy of an EIS prepared for the limited purpose of
determining whether Forest Service lands on Sandy Butte
should be used for skiing.

The court of appeals held the discussion of mitiga-
tion measures in the EIS to be inaiequate. The apparent
reasons for this holding are that the discussion was not
detailed enough, and some mitigation measures seemed
to the court to be uncertain in their implementation (Peti-
tion App., 17a-19a). In so holding, the court of appeals
ignored the state’ purpose of the EIS, substituted its
judgment as to the environmental consequences of the
proposed action, and neglected to defer to the Forest
Service decision as to how best to proceed under the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 ef
seq. (NEPA). The court of appeals thus failed to heed the
mandates established by this Court over the last decade.

A. oe ee ee on ee C8 an
EIS the Purposes of NEPA.

In reviewing the adequacy of an EIS, this Court has
focused on whether the EIS in a particular case advances
the purposes of NEFA. These purposes are to inform the

decision-maker as to a proposal’s probable impacts and
to assure the public that the agency considered those

impacts. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 462 US. 87, 97 (1983). The various
courts of appeal, including the Ninth Circui

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1389%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
