# Amicus Curiae Brief — Ricketts v. Vickers > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1303%3A06 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1987 - **Citation:** 479 U.S. 1054 ## Text IN THI Suprene Court of the Tlnited States OcTOBER TERM. |9®*‘ MOTORS CORPORATION (s;ENERAI On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE Ot} THE ERISA INDUSTRY COMMITTEI “PORT OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN SI HARRIS WEINSTEIN NW AMY N. Moor! PO. Box 756¢ Covington & Burlins Washington, D.( 1201 Pennsylvania Ave 10? ) 662-600% NW P.O. Box 7566 eenady for Anticus Caries Washington, D.C. 20044 The ERISA Industry Committee November 22 BE BEST AVAILABLE COPY l TABLE OF CONTENTS THE INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE.... REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT I. The United States Courts of Appeals Have Divided on a Recurring Issue of Federal Jurisdic- The Sixth Circuit Erred in Holding That This Case Was Precis Removed From State Court.. 8 TE u TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 US. 504 SOAP Ponnesyeenstenssnaicsensnnsennensenintentinmsseneenisiameense ce Austin v. General American Life Insurance Co., 498 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ala. 1980). Avco Corporation v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Inter- national Association of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 | SIP pcosereysorsneresesssieenenssemneesseeanbionstonsenesineseensanie..... Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, LOS S. Ct. 2380 (1985) oo ccccceceeeeeeeeccccc Workers Unions and Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 719 F.2d 760 (Sth Cir. 1983)... Page passim il STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974), 29 U.S.C. FE a es Tt I rciceeiseitinintnesncnnnincenenanivnesinns © PRLS, SP We FL EDBCS) occccccccccccscccessceccceees § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ow. EE od TL |) ec Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, c. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 ef seg. ITT TIT iat cecattniceioneiaieserinerosecitgniecenaddddeninisennenn tiaras etcncceinisanininindisnigiaenenveneee 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. ES SECURE SES AE Rc eS, ST H.R. Rep. No: 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News ae iiacladhditdabaiiesseaienainnbdeintienemninnies Page passim 8 passim passim oO ~ IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1985 No. 85-688 GENERAL Motors CORPORATION, Petitioner, Vv. ARTHUR TAYLOR, Respondent. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE ERISA INDUSTRY COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI The issue presented in this case is whether a defendant can remove from state to federal court an action to recover benefits under an employee benefit plan regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).' The courts of appeals have divided on this issue, and its proper and prompt resolution is a matter of great significance to employers who maintain employee benefit plans regulated by ERISA and to employees who rely on these plans. The ERISA Industry Committee submits this brief amicus curiae supporting the petition for certiorari in order to urge the ' Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 ef seq. a 2 Court to resolve this important question of federal jurisdiction. In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 36.1, the ERISA Industry Committee has submitted this brief within the time allowed for the filing of an opposition to the petition, and it has filed with the Clerk of this Court written consents to its participation from all parties to the proceeding below.2 THE INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE The ERISA Industry Committee (“ERIC”) is a nonprofit association of over one hundred corporations doing business in a wide variety of American industries. A list of ERIC’s members is set forth in the appendix hereto. All of the members of ERIC do business in more than one state, and some members maintain pension and welfare plans that provide benefits to employees in all fifty states. ERIC’s membership includes a broad cross-section of major employers maintaining pension and welfare plans for their employees. Disability payments are among the benefits provided by such plans. Millions of persons are covered by plans that provide disability and other benefits. Most claims for benefits made under these plans ae resolved without controversy. Inevitably, however, some claims are disputed, and some disputed claims result in litigation. Although the litigated cases represent a small percentage of the aggregate number of claims filed, most of ERIC’s members are involved in benefit claim litigation each year. Some are involved in only a few suits each year. Others may face several dozen benefit claim suits in a single year. Individual members of ERIC may be named as defendants in suits arising under the same benefit plan in a number of different states. Many of these suits are filed in state courts, and ERIC’s members therefore frequently confront the question whether such actions may be removed to a United States district court. 2 Separate petitions for certiorari have been filed by the two defendants in this acon. The companion petition is styled Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Taylor, No. 85-686. For these reasons, it is of central importance to the members of ERIC that there be an authonitative resolution of the issue presented here. Unless this Court decides in what circumstances defendants may remove cases brought in state courts to contest the denial of benefits under ERISA-regulated plans, many members of ERIC will experience repeated dis- putes over the forum in which such actions should be heard. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT The decision below demonstrates the conflict of decisions among the United States courts of appeals on the issue pre- sented in this case. The issue is an important and recurring one, and also is one on which the court below has erred. I. The United States Courts of Appeals Have Divided on a Recurring Issue of Federal Jurisdiction. As the Sixth Circuit acknowledged in the opinion below, the removal of benefit claim cases to federal courts is the subject of a direct conflict in decisions among the United States courts of appeals. Taylor v. General Motors Corporation, 763 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 1985), App. Sa.2 The Sixth Circuit held in this case that ERISA’s preemption of state law claims does not provide a basis for removal. See id. at 219-20, App. 6a-8a.4 3 All citations to pages of the Appendices refer to the Appendices to General Motors Corporation's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. * See also Powers v. South Central United Food & Commercial Workers Unions and Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 719 F.2d 760 ( Sth Cir. 1983). In Powers, the beneficiary of an employee welfare pian had sued the plan in State court under a Texas consumer protection statute, alleging that a plan fiduciary had misrepresented the plan’s coverage. The defendant removed the case to federal district court on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was preempted by ERISA. The district court held that the case had been properly removed because the conduct of which the plaintiff complained was ac- tionable under ERISA as a breach of fiduciary duty, and the ERISA cause of action preempted plaintiff's state cause of action. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that defendant’s ailegation that ERISA preempted the state cause of action merely stated a defense to plaintiff's claim and thus did not create an adequate basis for removal 4 The Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Ree v. General American Life Insurance Co., 712 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. i983). There the plaintiff had brought suit in state court to recover disability benefits under an insured welfare plan offered by his employer. The Tenth Circuit, although “[r]ecognizing that there is some split of authority,” held “that the insurance program of the sort here involved does come within the ambit of ERISA, and that the case was properly removed.” 712 F.2d at 452. The district courts have also diverged in determining whether claims for benefits under ERISA-regulated plans are removable.$ Unless this Court resolves the issue, the respective powers of state and federal courts to hear a large number of suits ® will remain the subject of uncertainty and confusion. Il. The Sixth Circuit Erred in Holding That This Case Was Improperly Removed From State Court. Respondent’s action was properly removed to federal court because his claim can be maintained only under ERISA. The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, permits defendants to re- move to federal court “any civil action brought in a State court 5 Compare Tolson v. Retirement Committee of Briggs & Stratton Retire- ment Plan, 566 F. Supp. 1503 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (holding that removal is appropriate where state cause of action is preempted by ERISA) and Calhoon v. Bonnabel, 560 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same) with Lederman v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1020 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that removal is not appropriate in action against insurer for benefits under ERISA-regulated plan) and Austin v. General American Life Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (same). 6 Although no published statistics are available to show the number of ERISA cases removed to federal court each year, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts compiles such statistics for its own use. A Civil Program Analyst for the Administrative Office’s Statistical Analysis and Reports Division, Non-Criminal Branch, has advised the amicus that 424 ERISA cases were removed from state courts to the federal district courts during the period from July |, 1984, to June 30, 1985. The same Civil Program Analyst has informed the amicus that a total of 5,214 ERISA cases were docketed in the federal courts in the same period, including the 424 removals. Letter from Pamela D. Crawford, Civil Program Analyst, to Amy N. Moore ( November 19, 1985). of which the district courts of the United States have orginal jurisdiction ... .” Thus, a defendant has the nght to remove an action “arising under the... laws...of the United States” on the ground that such an action falls within the original jurisdic- tion of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because of the preemption provisions of ERISA, sections 502(a) and 514(a), respondent’s action necessarily “arises under” federal law and lies within the original jurisdiction of the district court. The conclusion of the court below that it need not deter- mine whether ERISA preempts respondent’s claim is based on its finding that “plaintuff has not asserted a federal claim.” 7 See Taylor vy. General Motors Corporation, 753 F.2d at 219, App. 6a. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit failed to recognize the distinction between a case in which federal preemption constitutes a discrete defense to a claim under state law and a case in which federal law supersedes state law that impinges on an area exclusively of federal concern. This distinction is clearly set forth in a respected treatise on the federal courts: [P]reemption is used in the law in more than one sense. In many instances pre-existing state nights of action are cut off by federal law. In these situations preemption is a defense to the state claim, and the rule that jurisdiction must be based on the complaint rather than on defenses is enough to defeat removal. There are other situations, however, of which § 301 of the [Labor-Management Relations] Act is the most conspicuous, in which it ts held that federal law has taken over an entire subject matter and made it inherently federal....If state law has been pre- empted in this sense, so that a state nght of action has been replaced by a federal mght of action, plaintiff ’ The complaint does not identify the body of law that is said to provide the basis for the relief sought. See App. 25a-29a. However, a defendant's ability to remove a case should not depend on the presence of legal citauons in the complaint. See Calhoon v. Bonnabei, 560 F. Supp. 101, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing cases ) 6 necessarily is stating a federal claim whether he wishes to do so or not, and the case is removable. C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 216 (4th ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted). This distinction between claims that are inherently governed by federal law and state law claims overcome by federal law defenses provides the basis for the decision in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22-27 ( 1983).® It is difficult to imagine a plainer expression of congres- sional intent to replace state rights of action with federal nghts of acuon than that found in ERISA. Congress included in ERISA two provisions that demonstrate the breadth of the intended preemption of state law in cases arising from federally regulated employee benefit pians. These are the specific preemption provisions of section 514(a) of ERISA and the jurisdictional provisions of section 502(a) of ERISA. Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that the statute “shall supersedé any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan....” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The preemption provision reflects Congress’s judg- ment that “{t]he emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans required . . . the displacement of State action in 8 In Franchise Tax Board, a California agency filed suit in state court to enforce levies against funds held in an ERISA-regulated trust for the benefit of several delinquent taxpayers. This Court found that the lower courts had improperly invoked ERISA as a basis for removal of the action. The Court noted that the defendants could look to ERISA for a preemptive defense to the state tax levy, but it found that ERISA did not provide the plainua with a preemptive cause of action because ERISA “neither creates nor expressly denies a cause of action in favor of state governments to enforce tax levies or for any other purpose.” 463 U.S. at 25. The opinion carefully distinguished a tax levy case from a benefit claim by the beneficiary of an ERISA-covered plan. Jd. at 24. The Court noted that section $02(a) of ERISA affirmauvely creates a cause of action in favor of plan beneficiaries, and so might provide a basis for removal of an action that sought to recover benefits under state law Id.; see page 7, infra. The very core of the present case Is respondent’s effort to recover benefits provided by an employee benefit plan that is governed by ERISA the field of private employee benefit programs.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits). This Court has read the preemption provision of ERISA broadly to effectuate the congressional intent. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981). In addition to the explicit preemption provision of section 514(a), Congress gave the federal courts broad jurisdiction over cases involving ERISA-governed benefit plans in section 502(a) of ERISA. Congress emphasized that cases brought under the authority of section 502(a) were to be decided under naticnally applicable principles of federal law. Congress stated, moreover, that this grant of jurisdiction under section 502(a) was intended to be analogous to the grant of jurisdiction over labor disputes found in section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Both grants of jurisdiction, Congress said, were intended to establish causes of action “arising under the laws of the United States....” 9 This Court has long recognized that section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act preempts state rights of action to enforce contractual mghts under collective bargaining agreements covered by the Act, and so provides a basis for the removal of such actions to federal court. See Avco Corporation v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Association of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). In Aveo, this Court held that complaints advancing causes of action under collective bargaining agree- ments governed by federal law are removable to federal court whether or not the plaintiff purports to plead a case solely under state law. A similar rule must prevail in employee benefit cases, if the congressional will is to prevail. In fact, in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, this Court stated, “It may be that, as with § 301 as interpreted in Avco, any state action coming within the scope of § 502(a) of ERISA would be removable to federal district court, even if an * The legislative history of section 502(a) of ERISA states that actions under section 502(a) “are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.” H.R. Rep. No. !280, 93d Cong.. 2d Sess. 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5107 otherwise adequate state cause of action were pleaded without reference to federal iaw.” 463 U.S. at 24 ( footnote omitted ). '° The allegations of respondent’s complaint necessarily made the present case removable under these principles. Re- spondent filed a two-count complaint against General Motors Corporation and its insurer, Metropolitan Life, in a Michigan trial court. He claimed wrongful discharge and improper termination of his disability benefits. His rights under General Motors’ employee benefit and insurance programs are at the core of the controversy. The second count pleaded in the state court expressly rested on the provisions of General Motors’ disability benefit plan and alleged that benefits due to petitioner under that plan had been wrongfully withheld. Section 4 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1003, specifically includes such plans among those that ERISA regulates. Accordingly, respondent’s action is one that could have been brought in the federal courts under section 502(a) of ERISA. The action is brought within the exclusive coverage of federal law by both section 502(a) and section 514(a), and therefore is one that should be removable as of rieli: seader 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Because it did not und»rstand the controlling force of these principles, the Sixth Circuit sistakenl» failed to recognize that a claim for disability benefits u» ‘er an ERISA-regulated plan is | within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. ~ ERISA expressly provides a cause of action in favor of the respondent and expressly preempts the state cause of action under which he brought his complaint. For these reasons, respondent’s benefit claim is subject to the same analysis that this Court applied to section 301 of the Labor-Management '© A claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan is clearly “within the scope of § 502(a) of ERISA.” Although this Court held in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 ( 1985), that a state mandated- benefits statute was saved from preemption by § 514(b) of ERISA as a state law “which regulates insurance,” nothing in the decision suggests that this insurance savings Aduse applies to a claim for benefits under an insured welfare benefit plan. Nor does it appear that respondent has suggested that § 514(b) should apply to this case. But see Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311 (Sth Cir. 1985) (holding that ERISA does not preempt common law claims against insurers for disability payments ) Relations Act in Avco: his claim “is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of [the federal statute].” Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. at 23 ( describing the Avco holding). Thus, the action was properly removed to federal court. CONCLUSION This case was properly removed to the United States District Court because Congress intended issues affecting em- ployee benefit plans regulated by ERISA to be governed by federal law. Thus, Congress included in ERISA a broadly- worded clause preempting all state laws insofar as they “relate to any employee benefit plan.” ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The action therefore is one “arising under” the laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and accordingiy was properly removed to the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. It is of paramount importance that this statutory provision be honored. Employers cannot fairly and effectively negotiate and administer employee benefit plans with nationwide cov- erage unless questions concerning the rights of plan benefi- clanes are resolved by the application of Amiform principles of federal law. These principles are most effectively developed and consistently applied by the federal courts, which are familiar with ERISA and with the precepts of federal tax and labor law that often contribute to the resolution of ERISA cases. If plaintiffs are permitted to defeat federal jurisdiction by filing their complaints in state court and arguing that they rest their claims solely on preempted provisions of state law, then defendants in benefit claim suits will be denied the access to a federal forum with which Congress provided them. The question whether plaintiffs may force employee ben- efit cases to be litigated in state court is a recurring question that merits this Court’s attention. In the absence of a prompt and definitive resolution of this important junsdictional issue by this Court, the confusion among the inferior federal courts will persist, and the development of the uniform federal law that 10 Congress mandated for the governance of employee benefit plans will be impaired The petition for a wnt of certioran should be granted. Of Counsel: HARRIS WEINSTEIN AMY N. Moore Covington & Burling 1201 Pennsyivania Ave.., N.W P O Box 7566 Washington, D.C. 20044 November 22, 1985 Respectfully submitted, JOHN M. VINE (Counsel of Record) 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. P.O. Box 7566 Washington, D.C. 20044 (202 ) 662-6000 Attorney for Amicus Curiae The ERISA Industry Committee APPENDIX la THE ERISA INDUSTRY COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP LIST November, 1985 Aetna Life & Casualty Company Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc Allied Corporation Aluminum Company of America AMAX Inc. American Telephone & Telegraph Company Amoco Corporation Apache Corporation Adantic Richfield Company Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Bank of America N.T. & S.A. Bankers Trust Company Bell Communications Research Bell South Corporation Bethlehem Steel Corporation The Boeing Company Bristol-Myers Company Buck Consultants, Inc. Champion International Corporation The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. Chevron Corporation Ciba-Geigy Corp. Citibank, N.A. The Coca-Cola Company Columbia Gas System Service Corp Combustion Engineering, Inc. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co he Continental Group, Inc. Coopers & Lybrand Dana Corporation Dart & Kraft Inc. Deere & Company Delta Air Lines Inc. Digital Equipment Corp 2a R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company The Dow Chemical Company Dow Corning Corp. Dresser Industries, Inc. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Incorporated Eastman Kodak Company Eli Lilly and Company Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States Exxon Corporation Federated Department Stores. Inc. FMC Corporation Ford Motor Company General Electric Company General Mills, Iric Genefal Motors Corporation W.R. Grace & Co. The Greyhound Corporation Grumman Corporation GTE Corporation Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. Frank B. Hall Consulting Company John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. A.S. Hansen, Inc. Hazlehurst & Associates, Inc. H.J. Heinz Company Hewitt Associates ICI Americas, Inc. International Business Machines Corporation International Harvester Company International Paper Company International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation Internorth, Inc. Johnson & Higgins, Inc. Johnson & Johnson Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. The LTV Corporation Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company William M. Mercer, Inc. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co 3a Mobil Oil Corporation Mutual Life Insurance Compar ° of New York Nabisco Brands, Inc. NYNEX Corporation Occidental Petroleum Services, Inc. Olin Corporation Owens-Illinois, Inc. Pacific Gas & Electric Company J. C. Penney Co., Inc. Pennzoil Company PPG Industries, Inc. Procter & Gamble Company The Prudential Insurance Company of America Ralston Purina Company RCA Corporation R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. Rockwell International Corporation Sara Lee Corporation Sears, Roebuck and Company Shell Oil Company - The Southland Corporation Sperry Corporation Standard Oil ‘Company of Ohio Sun Company, Ins. Tenneco Inc. Texaco Inc. Textron Inc. Time Incorporated Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crost y Inc. The Travelers Insurance Company TRW Inc. Union Camp Corporation Union Carbide Corporation United S:ates Steel Corporation Unocal Corporation United Technologies Corporation U S WEST, Inc. Westinghouse Electric Corporation The Wyatt Company Xerox Corporation CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on this 22nd day of November, 1985. I served the foregoing brief on each of the parties by sending three copies thereof by first class mail, postage prepaid, to: Davip M. Davis, Esq. General Motors Corporation 3044 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48202 WiLtiaM J. Toppeta, Esq. One Madison Avenue New York, New York 10010-3690 DENNIS P. BRESCOLL, Esq. Brescoll & Associates, P.C. 48 North Walnut Street Mt. Clemens, Michigan 48043 JOHN M. VINE --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1303%3A06. Public record. Not legal advice.