# Record and brief — United States v. Kozminski

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 487 U.S. 931

## Text

a
No. 86-2000-CFY Title: United States, Petitioner
Status: GRANTED Vv.

Ike Kozminski, et al.

Docketed: Court: United States Court of Appeals
June 15, 1987 for the Sixth Circuit

Counsel for petitioner: Solicitor General

Counsel for respondent: Ziemba,Carl, Solicitor General

Entry Date Note Proceedings and Orders

1 Jun 15 1987 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.

2 Jun 15 1987 #Appendix of petitioner United States filed.

3 Jul 22 1987 DISTRIBUTED. September 28, 1987

4 Aug 31 1987 F Response requested -- WJB, HAB.

5 Sep 19 1987 Brief of respondents Ike Kozminski, et al. in opposition
filed.

6 Sep 23 1987 REDISTRIBUTED. October 9, 1987

8 Oct 13 1987 Petition GRANTED.
EAA AAAAAAAEAEAAAAAAAAEAAAAEEAEEEEAEEEEEEREARERHEHHRHHRHEEE

10 Nov 25 1987 Order extending time to file brief of petitioner on the

merits until December 14, 1987.
11 Dec 14 1987 Brief of petitioner United States filed.
12 Dec 17 1987 Joint appendix filed.

13. Dec 29 1987 Record filed.
* Certified copy of C. A. proceedings received.
14 Dec 30 1987 Brief of respondents Ike Kozminski, et al. filed.
15 Jan 4 1988 Record filed.
* Certified copy of original record, box, received.
16 Jan 5 1988 CIRCULATED.
17 Jan 5 1988 SET FOR ARGUMENT. Tuesday, February 23, 1988. (3rd
case). (1 hour).
18 Jan 13 1988 G Motion of International Society for Krishna

Consciousness of California, Inc. for leave to file a
brief as amicus curiae filed.

19 Jan 29 1988 X Reply brief of petitioner United States filed.

20 Feb 22 1988 Motion of International Society for Krishna
Consciousness of California, Inc. for leave to file a
brief as amicus curiae GRANTED.

21 Feb 23 1988 ARGUED.

PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

| In the Supreme Court of the

OcTOBER TERM, 1986

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
IKE KOZMINSKI, ET AL.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS
Assistant Attorney General
DONALD B. AYER
Deputy Solicitor General
ROGER CLEGG
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
RICHARD J. LAZARUS
Assistant to the Solicitor General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
IRVING L. GORNSTEIN
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether “involuntary servitude,” as prohibited and
made criminal by the Thirteenth Amendment and 18
U.S.C. 241 and 1584, is present only where a person com-
pels another to remain in his service through physical or
legal coercion or, if the victim is a minor, an immigrant, or
a mental incompetent, through fraud and deceit.

(1)

ERE Rn re a
EEE ERE SEL A ee
Constitutional and statutory provisions involved ............
EE ee ee ee
Reasons for granting the petition .........................
EE EE ne en ee 15

TABLE OF CONTENTS

aN SO

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (Sth Cir. 1977),

cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978) .................. 10
United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981) .... 14
United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert.

RG rrr 14
United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert.
CO. ccc cccsecwecccsccees 6, 9, 10

United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964)... 7, 10
United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (1ith Cir. 1985) ... 10, 14

Constitution and siatutes:

U.S. Const.:

Amend. V:
Double Jeopardy Clause .................... 9
oe ves ccees enh sebbnbeees 10
ee passim
EE Ee ee 2, 5, 8, 11, 13
ns oe ec hadandeseesesceeséesed passim
el dh aan ce eeneteabedn 2

(111)

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986
\

No.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
Vv.

IKE KOZMINSKI, ET AL

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

The Solicitor General petitions for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, sitting en banc,
(App. la-71a) is not yet reported. The panel opinion of the
court of appeals (App. 72a-106a) is not yet reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (App. 107a) was
entered on April 16, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED

The pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions
are set forth at App. 11Sa.

(1)

2

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, respondents, Ike and
Margarethe Kozminski and their son John Kozminski,
were convicted of conspiring to deprive two mentally
retarded white adult males of their Thirteenth Amendment
right to be free from involuntary servitude, in violation of
18 U.S.C. 241. Ike and Margarethe Kozminski were also
convicted of holding the two adults to involuntary ser-
vitude, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1584. John Kozminski
was acquitted on that count. Ike and Margarethe Kozmin-
ski were each sentenced to five and ten years’ imprison-
ment on the two counts, their sentences were suspended,
and they were placed on probation for two years. Ike Koz -
minski was also fined $20,000 and ordered to pay
$6,190.80 as restitution to each of the two victims pur-
suant to 18 U.S.C. 3579(a)(1). John Kozminski was
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, his sentence
suspended, and he was placed on probation for two years.
He was also fined $10,000.

1. At trial, the government established that in 1967
Margarethe Kozminski picked up Robert Fulmer while he
was walking down the road and took him to work on the
Kozminski family farm (App. 73a). At the time, Fulmer
was working at another farm, and Mrs. Kozminski simply
left a note telling Fulmer’s former employer that he had
gone (ibid.). Mrs. Kozminski later told several people that
she had kidnapped Fulmer (ibid). Fulmer has an IQ of 67
(ibid.). He has lived in foster homes since he was five, and
he spent some of his childhood at a training school (IV Tr.
134-135).

Louis Molitoris came to the Kozminski farm in the early
1970’s (App. 73a). Molitoris had been living ont! streets
in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and had sometimes used the
Kozminski barber shop there as a place to sleep (ibid.).
Some time after they met, Ike took Molitoris to work on

3

his farm (ibid.). Molitoris has an IQ of 60 (ibid.).
Molitoris had once been institutionalized at a state mental
hospital (V Tr. 66).

The evidence indicated that the men were housed in an
insect-infected dilapidated trailer with no heat and a
refrigerator that did not work (App. 74a; II Tr. 51; III Tr.
24; IV Tr. 45, 143-144, 147-153, 155; V Tr. 15-16, 104).
They were often worked from 3:00 in the morning until at
least 8:30 at night, without vacation and without pay (ex-
cept for small gifts on holidays and for the county fair)
(ibid.). They were dressed in tattered clothes that were in-
adequate for warmth (App. 74a; III Tr. 20). They were
sometimes provided moldy bread to eat and were not pro-
vided with proper nutrition (II Tr. 62; Ill Tr. 30, 32; IX
Tr. 208).'

Both men were also denied proper medical care (App.
74a). On one occasion, Fulmer cut off the tip of his
thumb, and the Kozminskis would not let him have it
treated at a hospital (ibid.). Neighbors later saw Fulmer’s
thumb covered with dirt and encrusted with blood (III Tr.
115, 171). Molitoris was once gored by a bull and at
another time kicked by a calf, but on both occasions the
Kozminskis refused his request to see a doctor (V Tr.
71-73).

The Kozminskis subjected Fulmer and Molitoris to
physical abuse for not doing their work as they were
directed (App. 74a). Specific instances of such abuse
presented at trial include Ike’s conduct in slapping
Molitoris across the side of the face (II Tr. 139), striking

' There was, of course, evidence presented tending to controvert the
adverse conditions and conduct demonstrated by the government.
There was testimony, for example, that Ike Kozminski delivered
groceries, including luncheon meat, hot dogs, bread, ice cream, and
potatoes, every week (IV Tr. 154); that Fulmer and Molitoris were
taken out to dinner al a restaurant approximately once a week (IV Tr.
201; V Tr. 91); that they were taken to professional baseball games on
several occasions (IV Tr. 203-204; V Tr. 96); and that Ike paid for
Fulmer’s teeth (V Tr. 26).

4

Fulmer’s ear with the back of his hand (II Tr. 211-212),
kicking Fulmer (III Tr. 22; IV Tr. 141), slapping Molitoris
across the back (III Tr. 125), and hitting Molitoris with his
fist cutting him over his eye (I1V Tr. 158-159); Margarethe
dragging Molitoris off a tractor, throwing him in a ditch,
and kicking him three or four times (III Tr. 22), and slap-
ping Fulmer (V Tr. 39); and John grabbing Molitoris and
ripping off part of his shirt (III Tr. 23), and slamming him
against the wall (III Tr. 137). The Kozminskis’ herdsmen
were specifically instructed to hit Fulmer and Molitoris if
necessary to get them to work (II Tr. 37), and Molitoris
was beaten nearly every day by one of the herdsmen (IV
Tr. 157-158). The Kozminskis also frequently directed
abusive language and obscenities to the men; they called
them names such as “stupid bastard” and “[njigger
motherfucker” (App. 74a; II Tr. 138, 211; III Tr. 21; IV
Tr. 82-83).

The Kozminskis told the men they were not to leave the
farm (II Tr. 100; IV Tr. 170; V Tr. 74). The Kozminskis
also threatened to return the men to institutions if they did
not do what they were told (App. 19a; IV Tr. 167). Ona
number of occasions, the men attempted to run away and
the Kozminskis or one of their employees went after them
and brought them back (App. 74a).

The Kozminskis told the men not to talk to others and
told others not to talk to them (App. 74a). Once when
Fulmer used the phone to call a neighbor, Margarethe
Kozminski ripped the phone from the wall and told him
never to use it again (App. Sa; IV Tr. 168). They told
Molitoris that a neighbor might shoot him (III Tr. 73). To
further avoid interference, the Kozminskis falsely told
neighbors, farm hands, and visitors that the men were in
their custody (App. Sa; III Tr. 71, 96, 153; IV Tr. 84).

The Kozminskis also discouraged relatives from con-
tacting the men, and discouraged the men from contacting
their relatives (App. 74a). Once when Fulmer’s sister called

5

to arrange a visit, Margarethe told her that Fulmer would
be upset by such a visit and that she should not come (IV
Tr. 101). Margarethe made the same represeniation to
Fulmer’s brother (X Tr. 206). Fulmer once told Ike Koz-
minski that he would like to visit his brother and sister,
and Ike replied that they did not care about him (App. 5a;
IV Tr. 173). Shortly after Molitoris came to the farm, the
Kozminskis had him burn the trunk containing all his
possessions — including his family pictures — because, they
claimed, the trunk had cockroaches (App. Sa).

Over the years, Fulmer and Molitoris asked others to
help them leave the farm (App. 74a). Molitoris once
begged a visitor to call the police to take him away (II Tr.
199-200). A neighbor testified that Fulmer told him he had
to get away from the Kozminskis because “ ‘they are kill-
ing me’ ” (III Tr. 171). And a temporary resident on the
farm testified that Molitoris came to his trailer weeping
and asked him to take him away from *he farm when he
left (IV Tr. 85).

In August of 1983, a newly hired herdsman helped the
men to leave the farm. While the Kozminskis were out of
town, the herdsman notified county officials of the condi-
tions under which the men lived (II Tr. 58-59). When the
sheritf and a social service employee came to the farm,
Fulmer and Molitoris asked to be taken away before the
Kozminskis returned (IV Tr. 44-52). The men were then
taken to an adult foster care home (ibid.).

2. At the close of the evidence, the district court in-
structed the jury concerning the meaning of “involuntary
servitude.” The same instructions applied to both the Sec-
tion 1584 count and the Section 241 count (for conspiring
to deprive Fulmer and Molitoris of their Thirteenth
Amendment rights). See App. 109a-112a; XI Tr. 131-137,
154. The court instructed the jury that it was “to determine
if there was a means of compulsion used, sufficient in kind
and degree, to subject a person having the same general

6

station in life as the alleged victims to believe they had no
reasonable means of escape and no choice except to re-
main in the service of the employer” (App. 110a). The
court stated that involuntary servitude “may include situa-
tions in which * * * coercive acts or words cause persons
in employment to believe they cannot freely leave employ-
ment if the acts are done or the words spoken with the in-
tent to cause this result” (App. 109a). The court cautione1
the jury that “an employer can use any legitimate means to
retain the services of an emp[ljoyee, such as offering the
employee benefits, or seeking to convince the employee
that he would be better off if he continued in his employ-
ment” (App. 110a).

3. The court of appeals initially affirmed the convic-
tions (App. 72a-106a). The court rejected respondents’
claim that Section 1584 would be unconstitutionally vague
if not limited to cases of physical or legal coercion (App.
77a-78a). Adopting the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1454-1455, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984), the court concluded that Sec-
tion 1584’s “mens rea requirement vitiated vagueness con-
cerns” that might otherwise be presented by a broader con-
struction of the statute (App. 78a).

4. Onrehearing en banc, a majority of the court of ap-
peals reversed (App. la-7la). The court held that the
district court had improperly instructed the jury on the
standard for proving involuntary servitude and remanded
for a new trial. According to the majority, a holding to in-
voluntary servitude occurs only when (id. at 12a):

(a) the servant believes that he or she has no viable
alternative but to perform service for the master (b)
because of (1) the master’s use or threatened use of
physical force, or (2) the master’s use or threatened

use of state-imposed legal coercion (i.e. , peonage), or
(3) the master’s use of fraud or deceit to obtain or

7

-maintain services where the servant is a minor, an im-
migrant or one who is mentally incompetent.

According to the majority, the district court’s charge was
too broad because it “would appear to criminalize general
psychological coercion without fraud, deceit, force or
legal coercion and would include all individuals within the
covered class of victims subject to psychological coercion,
not just the particularly vulnerable classes” (id. at 14a).
Finding sufficient evidence from which a jury could con-
clude that the victims were mentally incompetent and that
the defendants practiced fraud and deceit in maintaining
their services, the court remanded for a new trial on that
limited ground (id. at 14a-15a).?

Five judges dissented (App. 50a-68a), concluding that
the majority had constructed “an arbitrary definition [of
involuntary servitude] that raises more questions than it
answers” (id. at Sila). The dissent emphasized that the
definition “not only unduly focuses on the means of ac-
complishing involuntary servitude, but also, at least as to
its third prong, would define and /imit the classes of per-
sons to whom it applies” (ibid. (emphasis in original)). Ac-
cording to the dissent, involuntary servitude occurs
whenever “ ‘the subjugation of the will of the servant is so
complete as to render him incapable of making a rational
choice’ ” (id. at 52a (quoting United States v. Shackney,
333 F.2d 475, 488 (2d Cir. 1964) (Dimock, J., concurring))
and the master intends that result (App. 52a).’

? The majority also held that the district court erred in admitting ex-
pert psychological testimony that the defendants had broken Fuimer
and Molitoris of their will to leave by involuntarily converting them
(App. 15a-17a). The majority concluded that for expert testimony to
be admissible, it must conform to a generally accepted explanatory
theory and that the testimony on involuntary conversion did not
satisfy that requirement (/bid.).

’ The dissent concluded that the district court acted within its
discretion in admitting the government’s expert testimony on involun-
tary conversion (App. 53a-68a). According to the dissent, a district

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision of the court of appeals misconstrues the
terms of 18 U.S.C. 1584 and the Thirteenth Amendment‘
to limit the scope of their respective prohibitions of “in-
voluntary servitude.” According to the court of appeals, a
person is held to involuntary servitude, within the meaning
of those prohibitions, only when the person’s service is
compelled by physical or legal coercion, unless he is a
minor, immigrant, or mental incompetent, in which case
service compelled by fraud or deceit is also barred. These
arbitrary limitations find no support in the text of either
provision and frustrate the clear intent of Congress and of
the Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit in-
voluntary servitude wherever it is imposed. The decision
also aggravates a split in the circuits on a matter which, for
historical and practical enforcement reasons, demands na-
tional uniformity. Accordingly, this Court’s review is
clearly warranted.

court has discretion to admit expert psychological testimony
regardless of whether it conforms to a generally accepted explanatory
theory (id. at $4a-$9a). The dissent also pointed out that other courts
of appeals have rejected the standard used by the majority (see id. at
58a-59a n.5). Finally, the dissent concluded that, in any event, the
district court was justified in finding that the expert testimony con-
formed to a generally accepted theory (id. at 60a-66a).

* The jury instruction regarding the meaning of “involuntary ser-
vitude” that the court of appeals overturned related both to
respondents’ Section 1584 conviction and their Section 241 conviction
for conspiring to deprive Fulmer and Molitoris of their Thirteenth
Amendment rights (see page 5, supra). As noted by the court of ap-
peals (App. 2a n.3), the parties agreed that the statutory and constitu-
tional definitions of “involuntary servitude” were identical.

* Although the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new
trial on two grounds — its ruling that the jury instructions too broadly
detined involuntary servitude and its ruling that certain government
expert testimony was improperly admitted (see note 2, supra) —we
have confined our petition to the involuntary servitude issue, which

9

1. The courts of appeals are in conflict on the precise
issue presented in this case. To date, three circuits have
directly addressed the issue whether involuntary servitude
is limited to certain methods of compulsion or to certain
classes of victims. Each has construed Section 1584 dif-
ferently. The resulting confusion in the lower courts war-
rants this Court’s review. se

Unlike the Sixth Circuit in this case, the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 855 (1984), * rejected an arbitrary construction of the
scope of Section 1584 and of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit held that “[cjonduct other than the use,
or threatened use, of law or physical force may, under
some circumstances, have the same effect as the more

we believe is the more pressing issue for this Court's review. Hence, we
do not challenge here the court of appeals’ determination that a new
trial is warranted. This Court's review is nonetheless appropriate
because absent reversal of the court of appeals’ construction of in-
voluntary servitude, we will be forced to retry respondents based on
an (incorrect) legal theory, under which highly relevant evidence will
be inadmissible and acquittal therefore will be more likely. Should the
jury acquit respondents on remand, moreover, we would not then be
able to seek review of that result. Indeed, absent review now by this
Court, we will be precluded in the future from maintaining Section
1584 prosecutions in the Sixth Circuit that, like this case, depend on
coercive means outside of the Circuit’s reading of the statute. And, in
light of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the government would be un-
likely ever to have the opportunity to seek appellate review of this
issue in the Sixth Circuit.

* We opposed certiorari in Mussry on the ground that the case was
then in an interlocutory posture and petitioners were, following the
court of appeals decision, in precisely the same position they would
have occupied had the district court denied their motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, we did not address the merits of the petition. See Memo.
in Opp. at 3-4 & n.4, Singman v. United States, No. 84-91. Of course,
while this case is also in an interlocutory posture, review now is ap-
propriate because the government would not be equally free to seek
further review after remand (see note 5, supra).

10

traditional forms of coercion — or may even be more coer-
cive” (726 F.2d at 1453). According to the Ninth Circuit,
the “crucial factor” is not the precise character of the
means of coercion, but “whether a person intends to and
does coerce an individual into his service by subjugating
the will of the other person” (ibid.). The court thus con-
cluded, consistent with the jury instructions struck down
by the Sixth Circuit in this case, that “{a] holding in in-
voluntary servitude occurs when an individual coerces
another into his service by improper or wrongful conduct
that is intended to cause, and does cause, the other person
to believe that he or she has no alternative but to perform
the labor” (ibid.). The court specifically rejected (id. at
1454-1455) the claim, accepted by the Sixth Circuit in this
case, that Section 1584 would be void for vagueness under
the Due Process Clause if construed to extend beyond
physical or legal coercion.

The decision of the Sixth Circuit in this case is also in-
consistent with the decision of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (1964). Both the
Ninth and Sixth Circuits read Shackney as holding that in-
voluntary servitude, within the meaning of Section 1584, is
confined to circumstances where the defendant has sub-
jugated the will of another through physical or legal coer-
cion. See App. 6a; Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1452. Neither the
Sixth Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit agrees with that stand-
ard.’

* In dictum, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have both suggested
their agreement with the Ninth Circuit standard or at least their
disagreement with the standard now adopted by the Sixth Circuit. See
United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167 (Sth Cir. 1977) (“the law
takes fio account of the means of coercion”), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1007 (1978); United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 833-834 (11th Cir.
1985) (“[vJarious forms of coercion may constitute a holding in in-
voluntary servitude”).

2. The Thirteenth Amendment proclaims that “in-
voluntary servitude *** shall [not] exist within the
United States.” Section 1584 expresses Congress's commit-
ment to that principle by making it unlawful to “knowing-
ly and willfully hold{} to involuntary servitude * * * any
other person for any term.” In each, the commitment to
the elimination of involuntary servitude is unqualified.
Except for the obvious exclusion of criminal punishment,
there are no words of limitation. Involuntary servitude is
condemned, in all circumstances and irrespective of the
precise manner by which it is brought about.

The district court in this case accordingly instructed the
jury that to find the respondents guilty of violating Section
1584 and Section 241 (for conspiring to violate the Thir-
teenth Amendment rights of another) it must find that the
defendants possessed the requisite specific intent and that
“there was a means of compulsion used, sufficient in kind
and degree, to subject a person having the same general
station in life as the alleged victims to believe they had no
reasonable means of escape and no choice except to re-
main in the service of the employer” (App. 1 10a). Hence
the court did not instruct the jury that it could consider
only “means of compulsion” of a specified character, such
as physical or legal coercion. Nor did the court instruct the
jury that only certain classes of individuals were suscepti-
ble to some kinds of coercive measures. The court instead
defined “means of compulsion” in terms of the human
condition the law was designed to condemn — involuntary
servitude —thereby allowing jury consideration of any
coercive means “sufficient in kind and degree” to produce
that forbidden result. The court instructed the jury con-
cerning the difference between coercive means and the em-
ployer’s “use [of] legitimate means to retain the services of
an emp[ljoyee, such as offering the employee benefits, or
seeking to convince the employee that he would be better

12

off if he continued in his employment” (ibid.), and made
clear that the latter falls outside the scope of Section 1584
(App. 110a).

The court of appeals reversed respondents’ convictions
on the erroneous ground that the jury instructions
overstated the scope of Section 1584 (and thereby of the
Thirteenth Amendment). The court did not dispute the
district court’s formulation of the requisite state of mind
in the victim, agreeing that “involuntary servitude” re-
quires a showing that “the servant believes that he or she
has no viable alternative but to perform service for the
master” (App. 12a), and that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to conclude in this case “that the victims
believed that they had no viable alternative but to perform
the labor in question” (id. at 15a). The court nonetheless
held that even if one were (as in this case) to establish that
a defendant intentionally and successfully sought to create
that subjugated state of mind in the victim, Section 1584
would still be violated only if it could be further estab-
lished that the state of mind was caused exclusively by
physical or legal coercion, or, if the victim is a minor, im-
migrant, or mental incompetent, by fraud and deceit.

These restrictions have no basis in the relevant statutory
and constitutional language. Both the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and Section 1584 condemn the intentional creation
of a result: involuntary servitude. Neither prescribes the
means by which that result is achieved or distinguishes be-
tween different types of individuals, based on their
membership in certain formal legal categories, such as
minors, immigrants, and mental incompetents. Nor is
there any reason to suppose that involuntary servitude
results only from certain coercive means or occurs only to
certain classes of persons in the context of Section 1584
and the Thirteenth Amendment. Just as involuntariness
may be established in a variety of different ways in other
more familiar legal contexts, ranging from contract

13

and tort law to criminal procedure, so too may it be shown
in establishing involuntary servitude.

The court of appeals’ decision itself provides little, if
any, support for its restrictive gloss on Section 1584. The
court readily acknowledges that one of Section 1584’s
parent statuies “was designed to reach a broader class of
exploitation than was previously covered by laws dealing
with slavery, involuntary servitude and peonage” (App.
10a), and that Section 1584 was itself a deliberate expan-
sion upon all prior laws (App. 9a & n.5). The court never
explains the basis for its conclusion that Section 1584 is,
except for certain “legally incapable” persons, limited to
“physical or legal coercion.” Nor does the court’s support
for the exception justify its narrow scope.

We do not doubt that Congress has the authority to im-
pose limitations on the scope of Section 1584 that are com-
parable or even identical to those fashioned by the court of
appeals in this case. Congress, however, has not enacted
these limitations and, while the scope of Section 1584 may
be less precise as a result, a judicial preference for greater
precision neither substitutes for congressional intent nor
excuses judicial legislation.

3. The issue presented in this case is important to the
United States. The court of appeals’ decision will impede
our ability to maintain successful prosecutions under Sec-
tions 1584 and 241 (for conspiring to violate the Thir-
teenth Amendment) in many meritorious circumstances.
For instance, where, as in this case, the defendant used
some limited physical force in combination with other
means of coercion—such as isolating the victim,
withholding wages, denying needed medical assistance,
and verbally abusing the victim —the Sixth Circuit stand-
ard would preclude any reliance on those other means of
coercion.* Even introduction of evidence of a defendant’s

* Such coercive techniques were utilized by respondents in this case
for the specific purpose of compelling service by Fulmer and Molitoris

14

fraudulent and deceitful activities would be allowed only
in a narrow class of cases, which may not include the pres-
ent case.? Most of our Section 1584 prosecutions depend,
as does this case, on a combination of coercive measures
(see note 8, supra).

Perhaps even more important, an individual’s entitle-
ment to protection from involuntary servitude currently
depends on the jurisdiction in which he happens to reside.
Circumstances that would constitute involuntary servitude
in the Ninth Circuit would not similarly be considered in-
voluntary servitude in the Sixth Circuit and might not be
so considered in the Second Circuit. The Thirteenth
Amendment, particularly in light of its historical context,
expresses a national commitment. For this additional
reason, this Court’s resolution of the current conflict in
the courts of appeals is warranted.

(see pages 3-5, supra) and these and comparable techniques have been
utilized in other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d at
830, 832 (placing victim in unfamiliar setting; verbal abuse; inducing
alcohol dependency), United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 564 (4th
Cir. 1981) (verbal abuse; withholding wages); United States v. Harris,
701 F.2d 1095, 1098 (4th Cir.) (denying medical assistance), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983).

* The court of appeals remanded for a new trial only after con-
cluding that “there [was] evidence from which a jury could conclude
(1) that the victims believed that they had no viable alternative but to
perform the labor in question, and (2) that the victims were mentally
incompetent and the defendants practiced fraud and deceit in main-
taining the victims’ service” (App. 15a). Thus, the court of appeals ap-
parently held that the presence of some physical abuse did not justify
the admission of evidence of nonphysical coercion unless the victims
fell within its third category. Nor is there any guarantee that on re-
mand the jury (or judge) will conclude that the victims in this case
were “mentally incompetent” and, hence, evidence of respondents’
fraud and deceit may ultimately be deemed inadmissible; indeed, we
note that the district court ruled that the victims were “competent” to
testify.

15

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS
Assistant Attorney General

DONALD B. AYER |
Deputy Solicitor General

ROGER CLEGG
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

RICHARD J. LAZARUS
Assistant to the Solicitor General

JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
IRVING L. GORNSTEIN
Altorneys

JUNE 1987

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1986— 161 463/40380

APPENDIX

In the Supreme Court of the

OctToser Term, 1986

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
Vv.
lke® KOZMINSKI, ET AL.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS
Assistant Attorney General
DONALD B. AYER
Deputy Solicitor General
ROOCER B. CLEGG
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
RICHARD J. LAZARUS
Assistant to the Solicitor General
Jessica DUNSAY SIL VER
IRVING L. GORNSTEIN
Attorneys
Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Appendix A (court of appeals’ opinion dated 4/16/87) . la
Appendix B (court of appeals’ opinion dated 8/23/85). la
Appendix C (court of appeals’ judgment dated 4/16/87) 07a

Appendix D (relevant jury instructions).............. 108a
Appendix E (relevant constitutional and statutory pro-
St tscadtdseodeebeesdeedoksonteddeesndeboes 11Sa

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 84-1288

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

IkE KOZMINSKI, MARGARETHE KOZMINSKI,
AND JOHN KOZMINSKI, DEFENDANT-APPELL ANTS

On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Michigan

DECIDED AND FILED APRIL 16, 1987

Before: LIVELY, Chief Judge; ENGEL, KEITH,
MERRITT, KENNEDY, MARTIN, JONES, CONTIE*,
KRUPANSKY, WELLFORD, MILBURN, GUY, and
NELSON, Circuit Judges.

MERRITT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
ENGEL, CONTIE, MILBURN and NELSON, JJ., joined.
KENNEDY, J. (pp. 18-19), WELLFORD, J. (p. 20), and
KRUPANSKY, J. (pp. 21-49) delivered separate concurring
opinions. KEITH, J. (p. 50) delivered a separate dissenting

* Honorable Leroy J. Contie became Senior Circun Judge July 1,
1YR6.

(la)

2a

opinion. GUY, J. (pp. 51-68) also delivered a separate dis-
—- —_— jomed by LIVELY, CJ., MARTIN and

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted the defen-
dants, a dairy farmer and his wife, of two federal crimes: (1)
“willfully holding to involuntary servitude” two retarded
farm workers,’ and (2) conspiring to deprive the workers of
their constitutional right to be free from “involuntary
servitude” as guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment?
Their son was also convicted on the conspiracy charge. On
appeal the defendants contend that the court below erred in
broadly defining “imvoluntary servitude” to include purely
psychological coercion in addition to slavery, peonage, serf-
dom and other forms of physical or legal coercion.’ They also

‘Section 1584, Title 18, punishes as a felony: “
. . y: “Whoever k
pry tee holds to mvoluatary servitude or sells nto any condition
voluntary tude, an term, brings
a the United States pm fn yds og ai
section 241, Title 18, states the conspiracy offense as follows: ~
two OF More Persons conspire Lo injure, Oppress, panne ae A
any citizen in the free exercise of enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States...”

The Thirteenth Amendment reads: “Section |. Neither
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime —_
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United

of any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2.
= Snes shall have power to enforce this article by appro-

*The inal court instructed the .
. jury to incorporate the
- ey servitude from § 1584 into § 241 which aeanon
hirteenth Amendment. The parties do not challenge the process of
—_ the statutory definition into the constitutional defini-
ton, al the Kozmuinshis argue that the § 1584 definition which
was incorporated was incorrect. For the reasons stated below. we agree
that the § 1584 standard was incorrect, and it should not have been
applied im esther conteat. We do not reach the Question of whether
i was proper for the inal court to use the same standard for § 241
and § 1584 since this issue was not raised by the partes.

3a

argue that the court below erred in admutting expert psycho-
logical testimony tending to show that the two victims were
held in servitude through “involuntary conversion” or
“brainwashing.” After reconsidering the legislative develop-
ment and purpose of the two nineteenth century criminal
statutes in question, we agree with the defendants that the
court below erred in defining involuntary servitude too
broadly, and we agree that the psychological testimony
should not have been admitted.

The government does not contend that the two men were
forcibly held to work on the farm. In its en banc brief, the
governnment concedes that the men were “free to leave,”
“came back on their own accord” but “believed they had no
place else to go.” Brief for Appellee at 15. Nevertheless the
government contends that the defendants’ efforts to isolate
the men from contact with the outside world through a pat-
tern of verbal and physical abuse, as well as harsh living and
working conditions, exerted a form of extreme psychological
coercion upon the men given their low intelligence. Accord-
ing to the government's theory of the case, this coercive con-
duct, referred to as “involuntary conversion” or “brain-
washing,” is sufficient to constitute “involuntary servitude.”

The servants, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris, lived
and worked on the Kozminski dairy farm for more than ten
years as general farm laborers. They brought in the cows for
milking twice a day, cleaned up the barn during milking,
repaired and cleaned farm equipment, hauled teed for the
cows and did other farm chores. Dr. Harley Stock, a clinical
psychologist, found that Fulmer’s 1.Q. ts 67 and Molitoris’
is 60. ,

Robert Fulmer lived in foster homes until he was eleven
years old. He then entered a training school for boys where
he learned to do general farm work. In the 1950's and 60's,
he worked as a farm hand on various farms. One evening

da

in 1967, Ike and Margarethe Kozminski and their son,
Michael, picked up Fulmer on a road near the farm where
he was working. Fulmer agreed to work for them in exchange
for food and a place to live. Fulmer worked on the Kozmin-
ski's dairy farm in Stockbridge, Michigan until 1968 when
he moved to the Kozminski’s farm in Chelsea, Michigan.

_ The other farm worker, Louis Molitoris, had been institu-
tionalized at the Ypsilanti State Hospital and had been a
_ groundskeeper al a cemetery in Ann Arbor, Michigan prior
to coming to the Kozminski's farm. In the early 1970's Moli-
toris was unemployed and lived on the streets of Ann Arbor.
During the winter, Ike Kozminski, who also ran a barber
shop, occasionally allowed Molitoris to come into his shop
to get warm and to sleep. Ike Kozminski thereafter offered
to give Molitoris a place to stay, food and cigarettes if he
would work on the Kozminski dairy farm. Molitoris agreed.

The government offered testimony about the condition
Fulmer and Molitoris’ life on the fm iachadinn thale Geton
quarters, their physical treatment, their isolation on the farm
and how the Kozminsk:'s held them out to the community.
Several witnesses testified that the men lived in squalor. The
trailer they occupred was hithy having no running water, a
broken refrigerator and maggot-infested food. Nevertheless
the men apparently had working bathroom facilities nearby.
Moreover, Fulmer and Molitoris were responsible for clean-
ing their own quarters. Mrs. Kozminski cooked meals for Ful-
mer when he lived at the Stockbridge farm until he told her
he wanted to cook for himself. Thereafter, the Kozminskis
provided Fulmer and later Molitoris with groceries.

The testimony about the men’s physical treatment includes
neighbors’, tenants’ and co-workers’ descriptions of the men
being slapped, choked and kicked on several occasions. John
and Margarethe Kozminsh: denied striking the men. Ike Koz-
minski testified that he kicked Fulmer for hitting a cow with
a crowbar and he threw a pail at him for not repairing a leak

Sa

ike also testified that he hit Molitoris “as hard as | could,”
after Molitoris hit him while they were loading pigs.
The men often drove a tractor on the road. Several wit-
nesses also testified that they had seen the men in town or
in other locations away from the farm. On occasion they left
the farm to visit family members or friends. They sometimes
“sneaked away” from the farm. They “hid” with neighbors.
Two witnesses testified that tke, Margarethe and John Koz-
minski brought the men back to the farm and discouraged
them from leaving. Four witnesses testihed that the men
asked them to remove them from the farm.

The government contends that the Kozminskis tried to 1so-
late the men from their families and the outside world. The
Kozminskis told visitors on the farm to ignore Fulmer and
Molitoris and the men were told not to speak to visitors. Mar-
garethe Kozminski pulled a telephone off the wail in the barn
when Fulmer used it to call a neighbor. Shortly after Molitoris
moved to the farm, Ike and Margarethe apparently ordered
him to burn the trunk which contained his belongings, includ-
ing family pictures, allegedly because they contained cock-
roaches. Ike Kozminski told Fulmer his brothers and sister
did not care about him. Margarethe discouraged Fulmer’s
sister and brother from visiting him. She also discouraged
Molitoris’ sister from calling him.

Witnesses testihed that the Kozminskis told neighbors and
visitors to the farm the men were in their custody and were
wards of the state, although Mrs. Kozminski denied these
allegations. Both she and Ike Kozminski testified that at one
tume they had a farm hand who was a ward of the state.

The court below gave a general charge on involuntary servi-
tude. Under its instructions, the jury could convict the defen-
dants of holding the workers to involuntary servitude through
psychological as well as physical coercion. It did not set out
a specific theory of involuntary servitude or confine the jury's
deliberations to a particular definition of the crime. Instead,

6a

it left the definition of “involuntary servitude” up to the jury
under a general charge. This Court granted en banc review
vacating the judgment of a three-judge panel of the Court,
Judge Krupansky, dissenting, which had affirmed the convic-
tions and judgments of the court below with respect to each

i

The Courts of Appeals are squarely in conflict in their inter-
pretation of the words of § 1584, “whoever knowingly and
willfully holds [another] to involuntary servitude.” The two
polar cases are United Siates v. Shackney, 333 F.24 475 (24
Cur. 1964) Friendly, J.), and United States v Mussry, 726 F.2d
1448 (9h Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984) (Reinhardt,
J). in Shackney, the Second Circuit gave “involuntary
servitude” a narrow construction. The court effectively lim-
ited the concept to slavery and peonage: the use or threat
of physical punishment to enforce work, and the use of

state-imposed legal coercion to make a debtor work for his
creditor. .

The Ninth Circuit, like the trial court below and the panel
decision of our Count, adopis a more expansive interpreta-
tion that includes the use of purely psychological coercion
The Ninth Circuit opinion, like the jury instruction of the
court below, leaves the precise nature of the crime to the jury
under a general charge; “The crucial factor is whether a per-
son intends to and does coerce an individual into his service
by subjugating the will... .” 726 F.2d at 1453. Although the
Second and the Ninth Circuits differ on whether
cal coercion can cause “involuntary” servitude within the
meaning of the statute, both courts agree that the coercion
—physical, legal or psychological—must produce in the vic-
tum the same basic state of mind. The coercion must cause
6 9aen ae that he has “no alternative,” Afussry,
24 at 1453, or “no id” |
590 Obs ane way to avoid” the labor. Shackney.

7a

The difficulty of the statutory construction question pres-
ented and the lack of agreement among the Circuits have
prompted us to reread and reconsider the unusual legislative
development and history of § 1584. The history of the statute
begins in 1807 when Congress passed a statute prohibiting
the slave trade, and it ends in 1948 when Congress, while
codsfying the criminal laws into Title 18, combined the slave
trade and involuntary servitude statutes into the present lan-
guage of § 1584. (The text of these statutes and their historical
development 1s summarized in a chart attached herelo as an
Appendix )

The words, “hold to involuntary servitude” as used in
§ 1584, emanate directly from an 1874 statute designed to
outlaw the so-called “Pudrone” system of importing, selling
and explouing the labor of Italian children in the United
States. The 1874 Pudrone statute punished “whoever shall
knowingly and wilfully bring into the United States any
person inveigled or. kidnapped. . .with intent to hold. . to
any involuntary service,” of “cause to be sold, into any condi-
tion of involuntary servitude, any other person.” The 1874
statute goes on to say that “every person who shall knowingly
and wilfully hold to imvoluntary service any [such] per-
son. . shall be deemed guilty of a felony... .” The original
statute 1s narrower than the presenti § 1584 because the old
statute requires that the victim be “imported” or “sold” prior
to the servitude, whereas § 1584 eliminates the requirement
of umportation or sale prior to the holding of involuntary ser-
vilude.

The metamorphosis of the Paudrone statute into its present
form took place in two stages. The 1909 general revision of
the criminal law altered the language of the old statute slightly
but continued the requirement of importation or sale At the
tume of this revision, Congress beheved that the broad lan-
guage of the 1874 statute should be retained because the
Padrone system and other similar forms of exploitation stil
flourished This sentiment ts vividly ilustrated by Senator

Sa

Henry Cabot Lodge's remarks during debate on the 1909
revision.

ligated the qucstion of the importation of Mahan
boys into this country. . . | happen to be one of those
who made investigation into what was known as the
padrone system. The padrones were men in New

the fact that it is a crime, does not seem to me to
make it desirable, therefore, 10 do away with all the
Statutes which were designed to punish the crime
and which make a crime

The declaration of the thirteenth amendment tw the
Constitution is not of itself sufficient. so 1 think that
saniues of sumilar mature on the statute bouks of the
Unued States should remain in order to prevent
crimes of that character, whether they occur among
the Chinese immigrants or whether among the padro-
nes who exist in New York and in some of our other
large cies

42 Cong Rec. 1122 (1908) (statement of Sen Lodge) (empha-
+13 supplied)

Senator Heyburn, the chicl proponent of the penal law revi-
son, also argued for the reenactment of the P*

Ya

wn order to protect classes of individuals who “can not protect
themselves”.
[T)hes criminal statute 1s intended only to enable
the law to reach those who come here without being
a party to ther coming here or without being a party
to the disposition of their services or the control of
thear rights, whether they be children of wresponsible
; years and conditions or whether they be people who.
because of thew environment or the conditions of
thew lives. can not protect themselves.
42 Cong. Rec. 1115 (1908) (statement of Sen. Heyburn) (em-

pha.ts supplied)

| .

None of the cases listed above, which attempt to define
of give content to a standard of involuntary servitude under
§ 1584, rely on the legislative purpose of the | Padrone a”
statute or its judicial interpretation. Judge Friendly in

ment which had been a 2
statutes: 1584 hestorcal and revision Hotes Other
saan changes cnamerated wn the revision notes, the 1948 recodifice

S Rep No. 1620. eiuh Cong. 2d Sess 1 (1948 The origunal intent

of Congress preserved “)

Specihcally, the legssiative history surrounding the Padrone
Statule suggests that i was designed to reach a broader class
of exploitation than was previously covered by laws dealing
laws clearly covered circumstances involving the use or
threatened use of law or physical force to constitute a
“holding im involuntary servitude ” The Padrune statute was
aimed at a form of exploitation that was more subtle securing
the services of an individual who 1s incapable of giving legally
vahd consent.

Judge Blatchford, writing two years prior to his elevation
to the Supreme Court, slustrated this purpose of the Pudrone
statute in United Siates » Ancarola, | F.676(C CS DN Y.
1880) In affirming Ancarola’s conviction for violating the
Padrone statute, Judge Blatchford addressed the propnety of
the trial Court's yury charge which had instructed that the age

als, subject to his control, could not properly be con-
sidered as rendering him voluntary service. They
were incapable of exercising will or chowe afhrma-
lively on the subject. They were cast off by their par-
ents, in violation of the law of Maly, and thei being
in this country at all with the defendant was, on all
the facts, really involuntary on their paris, although
the sham form of thei consent was gone through
with.

Ancarola, | F. at 683.

lla

As discussed above, Judge Friendly docs not focus on the
Padrone statute and the interpretation thereof The Shachney
standard thus fails to address the full range of conduct pro
scribed by § 1584 such as that held criminal in Ancarola. tn
establishing our standard, we have attempted to give effect
to the 1874 statute im a way that is consistent with the princ:-
ple of narrow construction of criminal statutes Accordingly.
the standard we adopt modihes the Shackney standard to
include the type of servitude outlawed im the 1874 statute
as interpreted im the Ancarola case.

We conclude that a “holding to involuntary servitude”
occurs when (a) the servant believes that he of she has no
viable alternative but to perform service for tie master (b)
because of (1) the master's use or threatened us of physical
force, or (2) the master's use or threatened wie of state-
imposed legal coercion (i ¢. peonage’), or (3) the master's
use of fraud of decent to obtain of maintain services where
the servant 6 @ menor, an UMMigsant oF ONE who 1s Mentally
tacompetent ta cases im the last Category, it must be shown
that the servant is under a disability to recognize of resist
the master’s fraud os deceit because of the servant's vulnera-
belity as a member of one of these classes In order to be found
guilly under the statute, the masier musi intentionally hold

ac. of ding to 8 CONditIOg, then you will be banding
thas ho tecanded on bah nosh abe oo —
Darged om the indictment aod this

tnarcla | F at 682 (emphasu supplied)
"See eg. Pollock +. Williams, 322 US 4 (1944), Basley » Alabama

2190 S 21900901) 1X A Bickel & B Sched. History of the Supreme
( wrt of the Unued Sraser. The
1910-21 620-907 (1984)

7
|
|

peonage vulnerable
and 1s designed to protect extremely

Soa ed individuats covered Gy ts 1874 Padrone statute,

classes similar to those who lack the capacity to contract at

common law

deeds ~ Unued
( nued
Cul con demoed 43 US 1214 u“h
aoe iat cher. 655 F 2d 562, $67 (4th Ce 196i The Cwcen
requires “such fear of physical harm that the eataid ten,
of the victum’s opportwamies for ” Unuaed States
F .

I4a

Heyburn's statement quoted above that the sla
were intended to protect “childeen of irresponsible sears ans

The Dastrict Cowrt did not limit the masters or the servants

We reverse and remand the case for
mew tral for these
sons. After a careful review of the evidence, we conclude tha

15a

we should not order a judgment of acquittal, as the defen-
dants contend, because there is evidence from which a jury
could conclude (1) that the victims believed tha: they had
no viable alternative but to perform the labor in question,
and (2) that the victims were mentally incompetent and the
defendants practiced fraud and deceit in maintaining the vic-
tums’ services.

The Kozminskis also contest the admissibility of the expert
psychological testimony presented at tnal by Dr. Harley
Stock. Dr. Stock testified that given the victims’ low mental-
ity, the psychological pressures exerted upon them created
an “involuntary conversion” to complete depe: lency akin
lo “captivity syndrome,” a psychological phenomenon aris-
ing from prolonged physical captivity. This testimony was
offered to show that Fulmer and Molitoris were the victims
of psychological coercion and had been “brainwashed” into
serving the Kozminskis. This evidence ts inadmissible
because a foundation was not laid to establish its conformity
to a generally accepted explanatory theory.

The admissibility of expert testimony ts governed by Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opimion or otherwise.

For expert testimony to be admissible under Rule 702, a four-
part test must be met: (1) a qualihed expert, (2) testifying
on a proper subject, (3) in conformity to a generally accepted
explanatory theory, (4) the probative value of which out-
weighs any prejudicial effect. United States v Green, $48 F.2d
1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977) (emphasis supplied), United States

l6a

v Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 469
U.S. 868 (1984). The elements of this four part test under
Green constitute preliminary questions for purposes of Rule
104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As such, the trial
judge must find that the expert and the proposed testimony
meet the Green criteria prior to admitting the testimony: this
is NOt a jury question. See Fed. R. Evid. 104 advisory com-
mittee’s note; 11 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal
Practice, § 702.10{3} (2d ed. 1985)."*

It does not appear that a proper foundation was laid under
the third element of the Green test. The criticisms voiced by
Drs. Emanuel Tenay and Robert Walsh suggest that Dr.
Stock’s “involuntary conversion” theory is not scientifically-
recognized. Dr. Tenay stated that he had never heard of Dr.
Stock's “involuntary conversion” theory prior to trial. Dr.
Tenay went on to note that the phenomenon of “ideological
conversion” which is associated with captivity syndrome
would have “no application” to the present situation, and
that it would be “ridiculous” to attempt to apply it. Dr. Walsh
testihed that he considered involuntary conversion to be
equivalent to brainwashing and opined that Dr. Stock’s diag-
nosis “exceeded sound professional practice.”

Dr. Stock attempted to establish his theory by incorporat-
ing the well-established “captivity syndrome.” Although cap-
tivity syndrome is a generally accepted explanatory theory,
it has no application to this case. Drs. Tenay and Stock both
agreed that “captivity syndrome” has ten necessary elements:

(1) Prolonged captivity; (2) continuous around the
Clock supervision, such as guarding: (3) an isolated
environment; (4) removal of all supports; (5) an
attack on personality; (6) a lack of privacy; (7) as-

"The argument that United States y Green should be overruled 1s
made for the first time in Judge Guy's en banc dissent, and the coun
has not considered or voted on this issue

17a

hu the total personality, (8) a systematic use
we and punishment; (9) a tearing of the fab-
ric of the personality, and (10) the building up of

a new personality.

minski's dairy farm are alleged to be, they fall short of those
found in a Chinese prison camp. Accordingly, captivity ~¢"
drome is inapplicable as a matter of law given the facts
this case. Therefore, a proper foundation was not laid . ;
Stock’s testimony under the third element of the Gree
standard and it should have been excluded.

Ne 4
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court ts reverse
and the case remanded for a new trial under the standards

enunciated herein.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge, concurring. | concur generally
in Judge Merritt's opinion. However, because he adopts a
totally subjective standard of involuntariness, | think there
needs to be some mention of the relationship of the standard
to the intent of the defendants. Psychological coercion which
can be established only through testimony of expert witnesses
presents a significant problem with respect to a defendant's
intent and knowledge. Can a master be guilty of holding
someone in involuntary servitude where the master, a lay per-
son, doesn’t know that the servant remains involuntarily? If
expert testimony is necessary for the jury to find the servitude
involuntary, it would seem that a defendant also needs that
expert knowledge.

Where the master uses force or the threat of force or state-
imposed legal coercion to require the servant to remain, the
intent to hold the servant in involuntary servitude is appar-
ent. Here evidence that the master treated the servants cruelly
and provided deplorable living conditions was relevant to
establishing involuntariness only because of the clinical psy-
chologist’s testimony that such treatment, alternated with
kind treatment, such as providing a nice Sunday dinner,
made the servants dependent and unable to leave. Conduct
which had such effect, but without evidence that the master
knew or should have known of that effect, does not tend to
prove intent. In the case of psychological coercion, the jury
should be required to find that the defendant knew his con-
duct would cause the victim to remain involuntarily. The
master does not hold the servant to involuntary servitude
unless the master knows that the servant serves involuntarily.

I agree that the case should be remanded for a new trial
because of defendants’ acts which made it less likely that oth-
ers would help Fulmer and Molitoris to leave the farm, the
jury could find these acts were intended to keep them there
and that the victims were incapable of acting on their own
initiative. Representation by the Kozminskis that Fulmer
and Molitoris were wards of the court, acts which tsolated

19a

ictims from their families and the community, and tell-
ng the victims that they had no place to go or would have
to return 10 an institution, could be found to be fraud or
deceit which prevented Fulmer and Molitons from leaving
the farm and prevented others in the community from assist-
ing them to do so, when they were incapable of acting on

their own.

of case in Unised Stases v. Shackney333 F 24 47 -
a ee

United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9h Cir), cert. denied

is Set out in United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165. 1168
Cir. 1977), which sequices proof of physic. | harm or rene
able fear of harm and coercion imposed ty a defendant on
4 victim before @ prosecution may be sustained:
\A] defendant is guilty of holding a person to invol-
unary servitude if the defendant has placed him in
such fear of physical harm that the victim is afraid
to leave regardless of the victim's opportunities for

1 would therefore reverse and remand in this case

2la

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge, concurring | concur m
Judge Merritt's well-reasoned opimon and the decision of the
majority to reverse the judgment of the inal court and its
order to remand this case for further action not inconsisicnt
with the judgment of the majority of the en banc court

| write separately merely to observe that Dr. Stock, speak-
ing through the record, takes exception to the following
hypotheses upon which the logic of the dissent secks to evolve
us reasoning:

1. that his expert opinion testimony advancing the
novel concept of involuntary conversion and tts
relationship to mvoluntary servitude was not
anchored in the scientifically accepted theory of
captivity syadrome,

2. that hes novel concept was not a scientific explan-
atory theory of frst umpression but one that had
screntihc field to which it belonged,

3. that the transcript of the record does not conicst
his novel concept as scientific theones that had
gained general acceptance within the particular
screatinc held to which they belonged.

Dr. Stock insisted throughout his testimony, as demon-
strated by the record, that the scientifically recognized and
accepted theories of “captivity syndrome” and ~post-
traumatic stress disorder” were seminal to his concept of
“ynvoluntary conversion” as ut related to mvoluntary servi-
tude. The entire thrust of the government's evidence was
structured upon the keystone of his efforts to correlate his
conclusions with “captivity syndrome” and ~ post-traumatic
stress disorder” Hes mability to accomplish this calculated
result withen the mandates of cxarsting legal precedent gives
rise to thes order of reversal and remand to the trial court.

lt should be initially noted that the defendants were con-
victed of a Conspuracy to violate the nights of Fulmer and

22a

Motors to be free from involuntary servitude in violation
of 18 USC § 241 and of actually holding Fulmer and Moli-
tors to voluntary servitude and preventing them from leav-
slat tot da onitentainee
| of | |
As charges mandated proof of intent to commu
It was not the government's theory im presenting this case
that ether Fulmer or Molstors were restrained from leaving
the farm and the defendants’ employment by esther physical
force or threats of physical furce. Rather, u was the thrust
of the government's proof that both Fulmer and Molitors.
“sa result of an “involuntary conversion” became
“psychological hostages” and lost their “will” to leave the
farm and the service of the defendants
Dr Stock’s testemony was the only evidence that addressed
the very essence of the government's charges, and was, there-
fore, the sime qua non of the jury's verdict, without which
the conviction could not siand

An appropnate pot of departure for my chronology
+ dcnston of and purpose fot the rue that ete the San
dard to be apphed im considering the admussibulity of scicn-
the evidence im the form of experi testimony.

The rule is simply stated in United States » Brown, $57
F 2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977), and echoed in its progeny
within and without this circust im the following language

A necessary predicate to the admission of scientific
evidence 1s that the principle upon which it 1s based
must be sufhciently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance im 4 particular ficld to which it
belongs,” Frye v United States, $4 App. D.C. 46, 293
F. 1013, 1014 (1923). In Unwed States » Franks
Sit F.2d 25, 33 w.12 (6th Cir, 1975), we equated
general acceptance in the scientific Community with
4 showing that the scientific principles and proce-

2a

dures on which the caper testimony 1s based are
rchable and suthciently accurate

The purpose for the rule 1s equally simple. It evolved to
avord the potential prejudicial umpact of “the aura of special
rehability and trustworthiness” which attaches to expert testi
mony admitied without proper foundation which may con-
fuse or musiead the wer of fact and thus defeat a defendant's
right to a fae tral,

Perhaps the purpose behind the rule 1s best articulated tn
Brown, $57 F.2d at $56, where this court admonished:

A courtroom 1s not a research laboratory The fate
of a defendant in a criminal prosecution should not
hang on his ability to successfully rebut screntihe
evidence which bears an “aura of special rehability
and trustworthiness,” although in reality the witness
1s testafyong on the basis of an unproved hypothesis
in an isolated caperiment which has yet to gam

mn ts held. See ¢ g. Untied States ¥ Ama-
ral 488 F 2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cur. 1973), Prove ¥
United States, 293 F. at 1014.

The permussible limits of expert testimony have been tradi-
tionally delegated to the sound discretion of the inal court
The scope of thes discretion has been broadly construcd, and
the tnal court's exercise of ts discretion 1s to be sustained
“yniess it is manifestly erroneous.” Brown, 557 F.2d at 556,
United States » Green, $48 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cw. 1977)
See also United States ¥ August, 745 F.2d 400, 407 (6th Cir.
1984) However. such discretion must be exercised, on an
ad hoc bases, by balancing the probative value of the evidence
against ots preyuduial effect upon the defendant's right to a
fa tial See Fed R Eved 403

I fully recognize and cadorse the proposition that absolute
certainty of result of unanimity of screatihc Opimion ts not
required for admissibility so bung as the conflicting testimony

d4a

concerning the concls sions drawn by the
on generally accepted ond telable scientiac pacisies

Having reviewed the rule that is decisive to the admissibul-

v Franks, S11 F-2d 25, 33 0.12 (6th Cir ,

US. 1042 (1975); United States ¥ Green $48 F.2d 1261 (oun

SS ae United States » Brown, $$7 F.2d $41 (6th Cir.
: anal Sees «. Sate 595 F.2d 359 (6th Cir), cert

F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). — a

ea -

25a

the Kozmunshis resided in the vicinity of the farm where Ful-
mer and Molitorss lived and worked, they seldom visited the
farm more frequently than once a week Fulmer often com-
to provide Kozminshi with an insight into the problems
inherent to operation of the farm.

The lifestyles of both Fulmer and Molitons pror to coming
to the defendants’ farm reflected an unforwunate history of
Prior to working as a farm hand for the defendants, Molions,
who was 60 years of age, was a street person who got his food
where he found it, “had slept in cardboard boxes in the
winter” and in an old ice boa, and “drank homemade wine ~

Of greatest signihcance im addressing the opimon testi-
mony of Dr Stock within the content of this case are the con-
cessions of the parties that (a) neither Fulmer nor Molitoris
were ever physically confined of restrained, (b) they were at
all umes physically free to leave the farm at will, (c) they Anew
they were free to leave the farm, (a) they did un fact individually
and together leave the farm on numerous occasions, (ec) they
returned of their own accord or were picked up by the defen-
dants as a result of telephone calls from third parties," (f) they
associated freely with each other, with other farm hands
working the farm, and with newghbors on occasion, (g) they
remained at or returned to the defendants’ farm, in the words
of Fulmer, “because he had no place to go”

‘On occamons when Fulmer or Moltons were picked up as a result
of telephone calls trom third parties, there 1» 80 indication that they
were forcefully returned to the larm

48

and subsequently adopted by this circust im Green. S48

at 1268, and applied in Brown, $57 F 2d at United
States » Smith, 1% F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir), cert. denied
105 SCu. 213 (1984)

Brown, $537 Fld at $56.

i
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i
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Th
i
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H
dite

frecerved even greater
a , ier exposure amd acceptance than
Ht ts emteresting to mote at thes puncture thal an ——
of Dr. Stocks testimony discloses that whenever he resoried
to supporteng an opensoe of Comchusson by published research
oF peer endorsement, he referred, wuh experienced subtlety
not to bis theory of progression from “involuntary conver-
— “psychological hostage” to “involuntary
~ but rather to the conditions of “captivity
mre and “post-traumatic stress disorder,” both of
wethen the scremtih& Community to whech they belong.
Dr Stock’s damagong. if not fatal, admissions condemned
bes opinion testimony a5 « hypothecation that had not

——— ES

:
Q What « your hen af capereme wevetuntar
© epguard w m+ ubeaien, on servitude

A Theo
he test—thes © my Beet case of emvoluntary servi-

Q Se thes os the beet case that
cnen yow Nave dea with the so-called
of ehatever — merece vcr jouw ean ® phrase 1i— was
~~ ummedhete 20d 6Os nw)

ee
ee ae
le A a Al ata

ee ee ee

_*

29a

tice, confused the situation” and “ridiculous” and an

approval of the pronouncements in United States v. Sufel.
433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 US. 994
(1971), that “neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty
in a test suffices to render it inadmissible in court. Every new
development must have its first day in court.” The expression
in Stifel. however, must be tempered with the longstanding
teachings of Green, Brown, Brady, and Franks Certainly, the
application of Stifel would not apply to a theory of first
impression as testihed to by Dr. Stock.

A. No. I think the threat in this case was smmediate and obvi-
ous.

Q That 1s the conclusion you reached, isn't “?

A. That ss rmght

Q. But your testimony 1s you have never dealt with this type
of situation before, usn't that correct”

A. That's correct.

Q. You have never tested with regard to this situation
before’

A. Well, if I have never dealt with ut, I never could have testi-
hed betore

Q You have never been called upon to make 4 diagnosis oF
an evaluation im thes area before, 1 that right”

A. Right

In Brown, thts court recognized the ,
the ties of facta to extenaibty eslontife taduiaune nut
dehed effective response under circumstances where the s¢1-
entihe theory had no demonstrable standard against which
ut could be evaluated, tested, or ;

There are good reasons why not every ostensibly
sciemtific technique should be recognized as the
basis for expert testimony. Because of its apparent
objectivity, an opinion that claims a scientific basis
is apt to carry undue weight with the trier of fact.
In addition, it is difficult to rebut such an opinion
except by other experts or by cross-examination

cize the means by which it was reached drawing
their own conclusions from the underlying facts.
Brown, 557 F.2d at 556, quoting United States v
56, ' Baller, 519
F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir), cert. denied. 423 US. 1019 (1975).

The scope and magnitude of the confusion prejudice
generated by Dr. Stock's testimony cannot iret appreci-
ated without an analysis of his reasoning. Dr. Stock postu-
lated in this particular case, the basis for the post-traumatic
= disorder as defined in the literature is the captivity syn-

ome The captivity syndrome is the underlying event that
causes the post-traumatic stress disorder, what occurs to people
im captiviuy ” (emphasis added) Dr. Stock thereupon devel-
oped his logic in the following manner on direct examination.

Q. Well, isn't it true that you contemplate . . . telling
the jurors, if allowed to do so, that the so-called
iraumatic event occured”

3la

A. No. What | am contemplating telling the jurors,
if the allegations are true, that it is my Opinion,
based on information that | had available to me
and my knowledge as an expert witness, that
these individuals did indeed suffer the captivity
syndrome. They suffered from captivity syn-
drome.

On cross-examination he proceeded:

Q. Despite the fact there is not literature on that
subject at all through the second day of February
of 1984 that you are aware of or have read?

A. No. There is a lot of literature about the captivity
syndrome

Q. In relation to individuals who supposedly are
kept under the conditions which exrsted here?

A. Yes. In the sense it may not have been called
involuntary servitude, but the conditions are
analogous to other such happenings.

Q What were the analogous conditions?

A. Well, Mr. Stringer went through the |! points
{Dr. Lifton’s defined eleven essential elements
underlying “captivity syndrome”). If you would
like, I'd be glad to go through it again.

Q. But those were all basically, were they not, where
somebody was kidnaped of concentration camps
or a prisoner of war camp?

A. That 1s right

(emphasis added).
On further direct cxaamination he elaborated:

Q But you have examined these men and have an
opinion as to whether or not they suffer a post-
traumatic stress syndrome that would be consis-

32a

tent with a captivity syndrome prior to the time
you examined them, ts that correct?

A. Yes. Based on my understanding of the scientific
lnterature and my clinical experience in the area.

Q. In fact, they did suffer from the captivity syn-
that would have affected their psychological abil-
ity to leave or end the —to leave the environment
that was causing this syndrome; is that correct?

A. Yes. lt seems to me the bottom-line question is
if people have an opportunity to escape when
they are being held in any situation, why don't
they? Captivity syndrome explains that.

THE COURT: Would you tell me how would you
defne the captivity syndrome?

THE WITNESS: The captivity syndrome, Your
Honor, are psychological, are environmental manip-
ulations that occur to make people's normal think-
ing, feeling and reactions.

(emphasis added).

Simply stated, Dr. Stock posited that Molitors and Fulmer
developed “captivity syndrome” as a result of the living con-
ditions and treatment intentionally imposed upon them by
the defendants which induced “post-traumatic § siress
disorder” that destroyed their will to voluntarily leave the
farm and employ of the defendants, even though they were
tree to do so, thereby transforming them into “psychological
hostages” bound to “involuntary servitude” for the
defendants?’ Dr. Stock further hypothecated that the

"Direct examination of Dr Stock
Q Do you have any caplanation for thew not leaving the farm
where they were, the Kozminshs farm”

33a

“captivity syndrome,” as discussed by Dr. Lifton in his pub-
lished research of American prisoners held captive by the
Chinese during the Korean war, and the “brainwashing”
which induced “ideological conversion,”* were analogous to
the techniques employed by the defendanis in their continu-
ing efforts to intentionally control Molitoris and Fulmer.
Even the most casual review, however, will disclose that
the eleven criteria wdentihed by Dr. Lifton as essential to the
“brainwashing” implemented by the Chinese to achieve the
thought control necessary 10 accomplish the “ideological
conversion” characterized as “captivity syndrome” are
ment to which Moliutoms and Fulmer were exposed.

Initially, ot should be noted that the “brainwashing” tech-
niques employed by the Chinese as studied by Dr. Lifton were
scientifically conceived, scientifically implemented, and sci-
entihcally monitored around the clock. The techniques were
professionally structured into a planned, systematic, progres-
sive program calculated to totally pervert and/or destroy an
individual and to change his behavior and his beliefs. Essen-

A. Yes, on the surface, it appears that they had numerous
opportunitics to leave, and the quesinon to me, interesting
Question, 1s why didn’t they.

It's my Opinion that they were psychological hostages, that
even though they had the physical ability to get away from
the farm, they were so tied to the farm that these [deten-
danis| were the oaly Caretakers, they became psychology-
cally substituted parents for them They could not form
the requisiic mical © cxcape __.

“although the record disclosed that the term “ideological

conversion” refers to the efforts of the Chinese to influcace the

cal behefs of Amencan captives with a view toward having them

denounce the United States for propaganda purposes, the record does

not reflect that the term bears any relationship to the term “involuntary

conversion” as comed by Dr Stock

34a

tial to effective metamorphosis of the prisoner was an
environment of physical captivity, a realization ~~ Ye futility
of escape or rescue, and the use of force or the ever-preseni
threat of force and even death

lized by the Chinese in systematically phasing a captive
through the stages described by Dr. Lifton's writings as essen-
tial to inducing “captivity syndrome” does the attempted cor-
relation of Dr. Lifton’s criteria to the living conditions and
treatment to which Molitons and Fulmer were exposed
become incomprehensible.* The “brainwashing” discussed by
Dr Lifton involved total sensory deprivation. The prolonged
coahnement of the prisoner entailed total isolation in a room
of muted space without access to any reference pot and
without hope of escape or rescue, tsme and all concept of ume
were chminated, the prisoner was permitted to see no one
but his guard, the prisoner slept only as permitied, he was
permitted to hear only what he was intended to hear, he was
spoken to only by his captors, he was physically humibaicd,
he had no toulet facilities, he was permitted no pnvacy when
performing normal bodily functions, he was under around
the clock surveillance by his guard, and the prisoner was con-
stantly placed in fear of his life The wasidious procedure con-
stituted a total assault on the individual personality calcu-
lated to force him to recant all of his personal and ideological
values and accept the values and beliefs of his captors.

*The essential elements for inducing the “captivity syndrome” as
enumerated by Dr. Robert Lifton were

(1) prolonged captivity, (2) contumuous around the clock
supervision, such as by guarding, (3) an isolated enviroameni.
(4) removal of ali supports, (5) on attack oa personality, (6) a
lack of prvacy, (7) assault upon the total a
systematic use of reward and punishment, (9) a tearnag of the
fabric of the personality, (10) the building up of a new person.
ality and (11) miwalistic behaviors, which was not considered
by Dr. Stock om his analysis.

3Sa

in ght of this Comparative analysis, any aticmpt to equate
the “brainwashing” practiced by the Chinese to induce Dr.
Lifton’s “captivity syndrome” with Dr. Stocks “involuntary
ion” and ~ psychological hostage” was, mn the language

of Dr. Emanuel Tenay.® “ridiculous” and an “invention of
Stock.” Dr. Robert Walsh,” characterized Dr. Stock’s analogy

“Dr Emanual Tenay ss a graduate from the University of Munich.
Germany, School of Medicume He interned at Michaci Reese Hospital
wn Checago, Minos. completed his psychiatnc resedency at Elgin Siate
Hospital He attended post-graduate school at the University of Michi

|
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;

a
airy and Neurology and «s certhed as a specialist Dy the Amencan
Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and also acted on ts Board of
—Eaamuners He 1s a diplomat of the Amencan Board of Forensic Psyche
atry He os a derector of the Detrou Recenwing Hospual, Depariment
of Psychiatry He enjoys stad privileges at all of the major hosprtats
m the Detrou area, Beaumont, Harper, Grace. Si Joha.
Senas, and Cottege Hospual of Grosse Powute He 1s a member of the
Amerncan Psychiatry Associanon, a Fellow of the Amencan ( ollcge
of Forcasec Scrences. a member and pasi preudeni of the Michigan
Psychiatnsis Society and a number of other professional orga uzations
wm the ummedhate geographa area He has published m caces, of sev-
enty professsonal paper and has lectured to vanous law cafo cement
agencies as well as professsonal groups He has conducted seminars
foreasx psy hairy the country He has appeared
aa witness on of the Unsed Siates government

m a aumber of crumenal matiers, ic. the Jack Ruby
Garwood Vietnamese Captive case, and the Theodore case

has written professsoral papers—treatuses on Concentration camp sur
vivors and captives of prisoner of war camps He delivered a paper
at an international sympossum on the psychiainn aspects of Captivity

"De Robert R. Walsh is a board-cemified clinical po hologist
lecensed by the State of Mictagan and an employee of the © se Prison
of Southern Michigan sence 1974. where he caer uses ultematec respons:
belity for virtually the total mental health care of approamately 5 UOU
prnomers resedeng om the central regec> of the Mactigan Department

dants' farm
There 1s no controversy between the parties as to a dehni-
soo ef pee cnmmatis cisars Genntes, © & wath ideatiied ty

tssuc
On vou dere, Dr Stock under cross-caamination conceded

Q. Now, sir, is there Inerature dealing with the sub-
yect matier of involumary servitude as being
equatable to involuntary Conversion, that you
are aware of

A. Not that | am aware of

Q You know of none, right?

A. That's correct.

Both Doctors Tenay and Walsh conirmed that the terms
“ynvolumtary conversion” or “psychological hostage” could
not be found wn any psychiatric of ps chological teatbouk or
im any psychiatric of psychological lntesature

Even Dr. Stock, in a colloquy with the court, stated

THE COURT: ... but is captivity syndrome and
involumtary conversion the same thing’

THE WITNESS: ... well, | guess t's not exactly the
same thing If we look ot a circle, the captivity syn-
drome «s another circle
The imterrelationship of s “post-traumatic stress disorder”
diagnosis with Dr Stock's formulations 1s more diff ult to
comprehend lt would appear that under Dr Stock 's reason.
ing, “on thus particular case _. the post-traumatic stress disor-
der the captivity syndrome.” Dr. Stock had previously
equated the cause of “captivity syndrome” with the living

of Corrections He has 8 bachelor's and master's degree from Mu higen

the subject and ws 6 scholar im the fcid

It generally requires the individual to have been
a very severe stressor, and the book |

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= ting “sound professional practice and confused the conditions experienced by Molitors and F uimer at the defen-

q
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reoccurrence of the stimulus event of something
remotely resembling «, luke the whirring of a hel).
copter or the backfiring of a car, produces a very.
very clear dramatic effect on the individual

Va

Again, thes 1s the diagnostic criteria from the mao-
ual. The frst thing that is required 1s the casstence
of a recogmizable siressor that would evoke signih-
cant symptoms of distress in almost everyone

And again this is the type of stressor I've men-
toned before, very severe, very ble-threatening
(renerally the individual ts in a situation where at
least at some pownt during it they don't know if they
are goung to survive They are really faced with the
imminent possibility of death and no control from
thew perceptual standporal over it

of the trauma as evidenced by at
least one of the following One, recurrent and intru-
sive recollections of the event These are very vivid
memories of re-capersencing of ut, really As | men-
thoned before, the veteran walking down the sirect,
for example, that he hears the whirring of a helicop-
ter om the at Automatically, psychologically and
mentally, at that point he is back in Nam. He may
start acting very erratically He may become very
dangerous

[Tihere is &@ numbing of responsiveness to oF
reduced involvement with the external workd begin
ning sometime after the trauma 1s shown by at least
one of the following One, markedly diminished
interest im one of more ignihcant activities: Gener.
ally you have to know what the person's interests
were before. They often withdraw. They may have
had ahobby They may have been good im some par.
tnular vocatton They are no longer interested in
thes, they don't do it. It's @ very Obvious sign to peo-
ple around them, spouse siblings, thes sort of thing

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camps, victims of an exceptionally brutal or
assault of other violent criminal act, victims of a severe

:
i

and Fulmer were exposed

With thes as I am constrained to re-examine
Dr. Stock's in an effort to give some fabric to his
testimony

Hies cramimation reflects the following dialogue:

Q But you have examined these men and have an
opinion as to whether or not they suffered a post
traumatnc stress syndrome that would be consis

tent with a captivity syndrome prior to the time
you cxamuned them, 1s that correct?

A Yes Based on my understanding of the scientific
hterature and my chaical capernence im the arca

Q. ta fect, they did suffer from that captivity sye-
drome and, sow, posttraumatic stress syn
drome. that would have affected then psycholog-
ical ability to leave of end the—to leave the
environment that was causing this syndrome, is
that correct?

A Yes it seems to me the bottom-line question
if people have an opportunity to escape when
they are being held in any stteation, why don't
they? Captivity syndrome caplains that

He proceeded to develop his logn Dy stating im response to
the court

THE COURT Wheat do you describe as the con-
dition that you would define as

the captivity syndrome?’

THE WITNESS. The condition «© the breaking
down of tree will, of conscious
and volitional chone

so traumatized that they host thew will to voluntarily leave the farm
Hes capressed conctumon appear to be comtradwtory am hight of he
com ero to the Court that hi reports reflected ao diagnos of “post
traumatn vires dusorder ~ Both Dry Tenay and Walsh ato ruled owt

the dragmose

dla

THE COURT And is relewance m this cave
whal, as you understand u’

THE WITNESS Explaming why of these people
had opportuanties to wath way
{sec}, why they did not

Upon further examination by the count, Dr Stock responded

Q There & no place mm your report __ that post-
traumatn disorder, enther chromn of delayed.
casts om thes Case, 6 that correct’

A. That's correct.

Upon further examination he conceded that the collapse
of the captewes’ well, as described by Dr. Lifton, was not «
critenon tor a diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder

Q_ Where vader post traumate stress disorder docs
say the breaking down of will & part of the
crvtera, that «6 what you told the Court’

A | would mctede that ender the death camps. con-
centration Camps, prisoner of war

Q im avenge pou 6 that Noted mm the criterna”
A. The brewking down, speciivally. we. 4s ee

fomphases added)

De Stock, 9 a purely conchusery manner, thercalter sum.
marized hes ratronate after goung full Curcte by restatong hes
srcate& ally unsupported theses that although the ~\ aptivity
syedrome” was anchored om forcible phys al confacment
and was mot cquatable to the living Conditions capenenmcd
by Molton aad Fulmer, and the facts of those hveng cond:
toms would aot supper the diagnos of “post traumata
vires disorder” was nevertheless hes opemion that both
Mohtorns and bulmer were “psychotage al hostages” who had

4la

ao will to beawe the defendants’ farm and were therefore
bowed to “mvobumtary ser tude”
Q Doctor, the basis of your opemon, you have
assumed ali of the facts a5 truce, 6 that correct,
that have bece retated to you’

A Yeu W's my feelings Mf they were, f they were
true, thea, thes 6 what occurred

And you have bterally um your eleven points [Dr
denng “Captivity syadrome yes .
aumber one. conctuded ehh 6 a conclusion,
that captivity carsts’
A Ves, io the prcteignal sme
fomphass added)

serwetede” of a “peychological hostage” situation. It ts
acumen from a forceful physical confinement and sys-

43a

tematic coercive environment calculated to induce
“wWeological conversion,” which is the essential predicate for
“captivity syndrome,” to psychologically induced involuntary
servitude in a environment free of forceful physical confine-
ment of psychological coercion that gives rise to the defen-
tants’

The dissent would bridge the vital gap, although Dr Stock
was unable to do so, by characterizing Dr. Stock’s use of the
term imvoluntary Conversion as merely a description to con-
vey the recognized effects of the captivity syndrome How-
ever characterized, Dr. Stock’s expressions to the jury,
intended as osicnsibly expert opinion predicated upon suth-
crently established professional principles and as having
gained general acceptance in the particular held to which ut
belonged, stand naked and ignored by his peers and hind sup-
port only im this initial airing of his own personally taslored
theory.*

The dissent again misconstrues the issues on appeal when
urges that, since the defendants clected to present two
experts who contradicted Dr. Stock’s analogy of the
“captivity syndrome,” it was for the jury to evaluate the
weight of the evidence. The weight of the evidence is not in
question, the threshold issue is the admissibility of the evi-
dence that must be initially addressed. Brown, 557 F.2d at
556, addressed the issue thusly:

Conflicting testimony concerning the conclusions
drawn by caperts, so lung as they are based on a gen
erally accepted and rehable scientific primiple
ordinarily go to the weight of the testimony rather
than to its admissibility.

(emphasis added) The language presumes a competent
caper witness and testimony which ts based upon demon-

"This was the first twume that he testified to his theories “this 1s my
hrst case of wmvoluntary servitude *

44a

strated rchable principles which have been suthcrently estab-

lished to have gamed general acceptance im the particular
held to which they belong

In sum, thes case represents 4 classical cxaampl- of the man-
ner in which expert testimony, admitted without proper foun-
dation, can confuse or mislead the ter of fact and thereby
defeat a defendant's mght to a fair trial Without doubt, Dr
Stock's opinion conveyed apparent objectivity as 1s evident
ned undue weight with the tner of fact and precluded effec.
live response beyond an ineffective general demal Since Dr
Stock's theory had received no exposure among his peers.
qualthed persons had no opportunity to esther validate Dr
Stock’s results or criticize the means by which he reached
his oprmons. Thus, paraphrasing the admonition of Brown
$57 F.2d at 556, the courtroom in the present case was a
research laboratory The fate of the defendants in this criminal
prosecution rested on their ability to successfully rebut scien
tite evidence which had an “aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness.” although in reality, Dr. Stock was testifying
to an unproved hypothesis in an isolated cxapermment which
had not gained general acceptance in its held.”

“11 would appear that the dissent would overrule overwhelming legal
precedent im this circus and throughout the nation that recognizes the
necessity for a strong countervailing resiraint on the admission of
caper testimony to protect a defendant's mghi to a faw tinal

Alter recogmizing that:

There are good reasons why not every ostensibly screntihc
technique should be recognized as the basis for exper testi
mony Because of us apparent objectivity, an Opinion that
claums a screntific bases 18 apt wo carry undue weight with the
trier of fact Vn addivwon, 1 65 dificult to rebut such an opinion
except by other experts or by cross-examination based on a
thorough acquaintance with the underlying —— In
order to prevent deception of mistake and to the
possibility of effective response. there musi be a demonstrable.

4Sa

| would therefore reathrm the sound pronouncements by
thes corcunt on Green, Brown, and Brady and reverse the trial

The competency of Dr. Stock to testify as an capert witness
was placed in issue by the government and the court as dem-
onstrated by the following dialogue:

Ms Morgan (government counsel} Your Honor, we
would offer Dr. Stock as an expert in the held of
Forensic Psychiatry and offer his expert testimony
to the Jury

THE COURT | don't pass on qualifications, it's up
to the jury Go ahead and interrogate him.

Initially ut should be noted that Dr. Stock was offered “as
an expert in the held of Forensic Psychiatry” Dr. Stock was
neither a medical doctor nor was he qualihed in the specialty
of psychiatry, let alone in the held of forensic psychiatry This
alone should have made his competency suspect.

The tral court obviously abdicated us mandatory duty to
psss upon the competency of a witness offered as an caxapert
The dissent would dismiss this refusal to act by citing to
defense counsel's lature to object. The rehance is misplaced

objec tive procedure for reaching the opinion and qualified per
sons who can evther duplicate the result of Critwizte the means
by which ut was reached, drawing thew own conclusions from
the underlying tacts

Brown, 357 F 2d at $596 (emphasis added) The dissent disregards the
admonmtion with the observation that the “defense produced two
eaperts who diflered with and ecflectiwely crtiwed Dr Stock's
testemony ~

lt « trwe that after the tral court erroneously admitted Dr Stock's

highly preyudn ial testimony, the defendants presented two eaperts to
contradict Dr Stock's operons, however, they had no alternative after
the Count permitted him to testify

46a

The sahent purpose for entering an objection during tral
1s to alert the tral court to an issue which demands is alten-
ton and to record for appellate review the court's disposition
for appropriate review. After the court disposed of the objec-
tron, counsel were thereafter obliged to abide by the ruling
and to proceed with the tral of the action. Manness v Meyers.
419 US. 449, 459, 95 S.Ct. 584, 591, 42 L.Ed 2d 574 (1975).

This court has construed Fed R.Evid. 702 to permit the
admission of expert testimony only when it is presented by
(1) a qualihed expert; (2) testifying on a proper subject,
(3) on conformity to a general accepted explanatory theory,
(4) the probative value of which outweighs any prejudicial
effect. Green, 548 F.2d at 1268. The appellants have also
charged the tral court with error in permitting the govern-
ment's expert to testify and to capress Opinions Contrary to
the first mandate of Green Green, $48 F.2d at 1268, para-
phrases Fed R_Evid. 702 as follows:

To permit expert testimony to be heard by the jury,
the trial court must frst determine whether the spe-
ciahzed knowledge involved “will assist the ter of
fact to understand the [other] evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue.” Then i must satisfy itself that
the proffered witness is “qualihed as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, or education ..~
Appellate review of such sensitive discriminations by
lower courts may only be rationally accomplished on
an ad hoc basis

(emphasis added).

The non-delegable duty is, a5 a matter of law, placed
squarely upon the shoulders of the trial pudge Stated difler-
enily, competency of a witness to testify us for the judge to
decide while credibility of the witness is left to the jury
United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir, 1973),
cert demed, 416 U.S. 989 (1974). Expert testemony is admuis-

47a

sible only when the witness ts in fact an expert and 1s accepted
as such by the court. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148,

and pass upon that competency when the facts of his expertise
demanded a court ruling. More specihcally, defendants chal-

an ved hypothesis derived for an isolated purpose and
which has no acceptance im the scientific held to which ut
belongs

An examination of Dr. Stock’s credentials" reflected aca-

"The record duclosed that Dr Stock’s academic credentials
included a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology from the University

sive capenence in testing and evaluating children and adoles-
literature im the field of psychiatry characterized as
“victomization,” which he defines as dealing with victims of
taking, and natural disasters. His knowledge of “captivity
syadrome™ resulted from reading Dr. Lifton’s book.

The defendants have not questioned Dr. Stock's compe-
tency to admunister individual intelligence tests of personal-
ily assessment tests, to conduct group testing, and to interpret
and evaluate individual mental retardation levels, the extent

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and i my work at the Forensx Center | have evaluated anu
treated individuals who were menially retarded

of the examination that he conducted of Fulmer and Moli-
toms that was described as extensive in the dissent Defen-
dants have taken no exception to his opmmions Concerning the
mental retardation levels of Moluonms or Fulmer All of the
of his expertise and trang His eapenence and traning in
the area of testing, interpreting, and evaluating levels of retar-
dation did not, however, qualify him as an caper i the uare-
tated held discussed im Dr. Lifton’s book. Moreover, absent
any correlation im the record between “terromsm”™ inciuding
“hostage-taking™ and Dr. Lifton’s “captivity syndrome,” Dr.
Stocks eaperence in the area of “terrorism” lends no weight
to his qualbhcations to advance a theory beyond his expertise
which had not received recognition, validation, or general
acceptance in the field to which i belonged"

In ght of De Stock’s questionable credentials and hus
highly convoluted and often confusing and contradictory tes-
temony, the tral court, at the very least, had a duty to protect
the defendants’ nghi to a fas inal by exerceseng sts mandatory
duty to rule on Dr Stock’s competency to appear as an capert
witness ADdiacation of thes duty by the tral cour constituted
plain error | would therefore also reverse the tnal court on
this issue

Accordingly, ut would appear that the record herein does
Aol suppor the hypotheses upon which the dissent relics

Syadrome™ by Dr Stock The record also fails to disclose any

between the clewen pounts of De Lifton’s “captiwnty syndrome” and
the crvtera that weduces “Stockholm Syadrome ~

50a

KEITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. | concur in Judge Guy's
well-reasoned dissenting opinion. However, | write sepa-
rately to highlight soune of my concerns about this case. I feel
that the majority opinion unduly restricts the scope of 18
U.S.C. § 1584. Judge Guy correctly states that fraud and
deceit are not the only ways to subjugate the will of another.
Also, limiting the class of victims to minors, immigrants and
mental incompetents is underinclusive and without merit.

| am especially disturbed with the majority's treatment of
the expert testimony issue. | think that the majority's reliance
of the factors in United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th
Cir. 1977), is misplaced. The Green analysis should be lim-
uted to determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.
In this case, the testimony of Dr. Stock was based on his clini-
cal findings, not on an esoteric theory.

Based on the above, | think the Court is committing an
egregious error in the position that it has taken.

Sla

GUY, Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by LIVELY, Chief
Judge, MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges. | respectfully
dissent from the majority's conclusions in both part II and
part Ill of the opinion.

it is clear that 18 U.S.C. § 1584 is lacking in definitional
precision when it makes criminal the holding of one in
“involuntary servitude.” Whether this is the genius of this
section or a deficiency to be cured by judicial legislation is
not so clear. The majority apparently concludes it is a def-
ciency and proceeds to cure it by substituting an arbitrary
definition that raises more questions than it answers. In dis-
cussing this specific section, Judge Dimock, who concurred
in Shackney, prophetically wrote:

To have an arbitrary classification which will resolve
with equal facility all of the cases that would arise
under the statute is indeed a tempting prospect. It
is much harder to have to work under a statute
which will raise difficult questions in the borderline
cases inevitable whenever the application of a stat-

ute depends upon an appraisal of the state of the
human mind.

333 F.2d at 488.

The problem with the definition offered by the majority
is that 1t not only unduly focuses on the means of accomplish-
ing involuntary servitude, but also, at least as to its third
prong, would define and /imit the classes of persons to whom
it applies. | see no necessity for the former and no justifica-
tion for the latter.

Whenever one attempts to define by setting out the means
of accomplishment the risk of underinclusion ts considerable.
What is needed 1s a definition of “involuntary servitude” not
a listing of examples of how it may be accomplished. | would
offer as an acceptable definition, at least for “involuntary,”

52a

that suggested in the concurring opinion in Shackney: “Where
the subjugation of the will of the servant is so complete as
to render him incapable of making a rational choice, the ser-
vitude is involuntary ....” /d. at 488. lt goes without saying
that since this is a criminal statute, the master would, of
course, have had to intend this result.'

The “fraud and deceit” prong of the majority's test appar-
ently is the creation of the majority as is the limiting of the
classes to whom it is to apply. Prongs (1) and (2) of the pro-
posed test—physical force and legal coercion—are the slav-
ery and peonage tests. “Fraud and deceit,” however, are not
terms of art in the arena of involuntary servitude cases and
would seem to cover an almost limitless range of conduct.
Since | write in support of a more flexible definition than
that offered by the majority, it is not the breadth of the pro-
posed definition that is troubling. | simply see no need to
specifically reference “fraud and decent” to the exclusion of
other means. | would agree that fraud and deceit, in addition
to physical force and legal coercion, are ways of subjugating
the will of anoi:her—but they are certainly not the only ways,
nor are they necessarily the most egregious.

| am also puzzled as to why the “fraud and deceit” excep-
tion, if there is to be one, should be limited in its application
to minors, immigrants, and mental incompetents. Where it
is necessary to resort to The Restatement (Second) on Con-
tracts to interpret a criminal involuntary servitude statute,
| become concerned thal revision, not interpretation, is
underway. Furthermore, the inclusion of “immigrants” as a
special class cannot be supported by reference to the Padrone
Statute as the majority suggests As the appendix to the major-
ity Opinion itself indicates, the antecedent statutes reference

ca)

*L think that the legislative history utilized by the majority is more
helpful on the question of what “servitude” means. | would concur
that the servitude contemplated is of a type associated with slavery
and peonage

S3a

“any person inveigled or forcibly kidnapped in any other
country, with intent to hold such person so inveigied or kid-
napped in confinement or to any involuntary service ... .”
This 1s hardly the definition of an immigrant.

| would offer as the final evidence in support of the proposi-
tion that the majority's new definition causes more problems
than it cures the fact that, when it is applied to the instant
case, the result is a remand for a retrial on the fraud and
deceit theory even after the majority rules out Dr. Stock's
testimony. Although | would affirm the original conviction,
I nonetheless find it strange and unsettling to send a criminal
case of this nature back for a retrial on a theory never advo-
cated by the government or defended against by the defen-
dants in the first trial.

This is not an easy definitional question and it is one on
which reasonable minds and federal circuits might differ. |
write in dissent, however, primarily because | believe the
majority has rewritten rather than interpreted 18 U.S.C.
§ 1584.

I have even greater concern for the ramifications of part
Ill of the majority's decision than I do part Il. This concern
is predicated, at least in part, by the frequency with which
courts deal with these problems. Involuntary servitude cases
are few and far between, whereas cases in which experts tes-
tify are a daily occurrence.

Due to what the record tells us about the condition of the
victims of this alleged crime and how traumatic the trial was
for them, | doubt very much that there will ever be a retrial
pursuant to our remand. Even if there is, I do not consider
it a matter of global significance whether Dr. Stock is allowed
tw testify or not.? However, | am concerned about the ratio-

711 1s not clear from the majyonty opimion whether the foundational
problems that they find mandate exclusion of Dr. Stock's testimony
are correctible in a second tral.

S4a

nale used for the exclusion of this evidence being used in
other cases. As | will develop further, infra, | submit that our
decision in United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th c ir.
1977), on which the majority wholly relies, should be clarified
if not overruled by this en banc court—not extended.

A.

The majority cites United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261
(6th Cir. 1977), as setting forth the standards to be applied
in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.Green,
convicted of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled sub-
stance, Dimethyliryptomine, challenged expert testimony
admitted at trial. First, he challenged the testimony of 4
chemist from the Food and Drug Administration who testi-
hed, among other things, as to the threat posed by the drug,
its effects upon the body, the procedure by which it may have
been classified as a controlled substance, and its relationship
to LSD. Second, Green challenged the testimony of a DEA
agent who testified as to the number of dosage units which
were theoretically manufacturable from the chemicals found,
the anticipated purity of the final product, the sireet price
of a dosage unit, and the details of other illegal drug transac-
tions that had no relation to the defendant. Id at 1264-65.

Significantly, the Green court first noted that Fed. R. Evid.
702 set forth the test for admissibility of expert testimony.
$48 F.2d at 1268. Nevertheless, the court found Rule 702
deficient when applied to criminal cases, in that it failed to
include among the factors to be balanced by the trial court
the potential prejudicial impact of the expert testimony upon
the substantial rights of the accused. /d Consequently, rely-
ing on United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th
Cir. 1973), the court adopted “for use in criminal appeals
the four criteria proposed in 4maral for review of trial court
decisions concerning expert testimony: ‘|. qualihed expert,
2. proper subject; 3. conformity to a generally accepted

55a

explanatory theory, and 4. probative value compared to prej-
udicial effect.’” Jd?

To the extent that the Green court suggested that its test
must be applied to all expert testimony in criminal cases,
such holding ts clearly inconsistent with common practice.
To the contrary, many types of expert testimony are regularly
received in criminal cases without resort to standards such
as those set forth in Green. Green describes the type of test
courts generally employ when analyzing the admissibility of
scientific evidence. To my mind, there is a difference between
the type of scientific testimony to which such a test is nor-
mally applied, and the expert testimony of a clinical psychol-
ogist like Dr. Stock.

Dr. Stock did not simply take two individuals, whom he
had never met or spoken to, and based on a set of known
facts attempt to fit them into a theory. Rather, he extensively
interviewed Fulmer and Molitoris, performed a battery of
psychological tests, reviewed medical histories, and
acquainted himself with the circumstances under which they
lived. Dr. Stock testified that his opinion was derived from
his clinical evaluation of the two men, including the objective
tests he administered, as well as his experience in this field
and the accepted theory of involuntary conversion. As a
result, Dr. Stock's testimony is no different than the clinical
assessments of psychologists and physicians regularly
received by trial courts. | am unable to distinguish this type
of testimony from, for example, that of a psychologist or psy-
chiatrist testifying on the issue of a criminal defendant's san-
ity. Essentially, Dr. Stock testified, after careful examination

"i 1s not readily understandable why the Green coun found 1 neces-
sary to adopt any special test for the admussibility of expert testimony
in Criminal cases In finding that the tnal cour erred in admitting the
testimony, the court concluded that the testimony was irrelevant and
prejudicial, determinations commonly made under Fed R Evid 401
and 403. Even more significant us the fact that 4maral was decided
before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted.

S6a

of the individuals as well as the background facts, that the
victims’ wills were overborne. This is neither novel theory
nor outside the general area of expertise of a psychologist or
psychiatrist. It ts certainly not the application of a scientific
test.

The majority assumes that opinion testimony offered like
that of Dr. Stock’s must be submitted to the Green test for
scientihic evidence. Yet, the rationale for such a test, as
explained by this court in United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d
541 (6th Cir. 1977), does not support such a conclusion:

“There are good reasons why not every ostensibly
scientific technique should be recognized as the
basis for expert testsmony. Because of its apparent
objectivity, an opinion that claims a scientific basis
is apt to carry undue weight with the trier of fact.
In addition, it ts difficult to rebut such an opinion
except by other experts or by cross-cxamination
based on a thorough acquaintance with the underly-
ee
take and to allow the possibility of effective
response, there must be a demonstrable, objective
persons who can esther duplicate the result or criti-
cize the means by which it was reached, drawing
their own conclusions from the underlying facts.”

557 F.2d at 556 (quoting United States v Baller, $19 F.2d
463, 466 (4th Cir), cert. denied. 423 U.S. 1019 (1975)).

This statement indicates the two traditional concerns
involved with scientific testimony: (1) that objective scien-
the testimony will bear an “aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness,” Brown, 557 F.2d at 556, and (2) that a

“minimal reserve of experts exist who can critically examine
the validity of a screntific determination in a particular case,”
United States v. Addison, 49% F.2d 741, 744(D.C. Cir. 1974).

Nesher of these concerns 1s implicated by the testimony of
Dr. Stock.

57a

Dr. Stock’s testimony on the state of mind of the victims
was nol predicated on a scientific technique but on the type
of subjective analysis that a clinical psychologist is trained
to perform. In a recent case, the California Supreme Court

rejected the argument that expert ao testimony
should be subject to the same test as sci testimony:

lt is important to distinguish in this regard between
expert testimony and scientific evidence. When a
witness gives his personal opinion on the
stand—even if he qualifies as an expert—the jurors
may temper their acceptance of his testimony with
a healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that
all human beings are fallible. But the opposite may
be true when the evidence is produced by a machine:
like many laypersons, jurors tend to ascribe an inor-
dinately high degree of certainty to proof derived
from an apparently “scientific” mechanism, instru-
ment or procedure. Yet the aura of infallibility that
often surrounds such evidence may well conceal the
fact that it remains experimental and tentative.

Here, by contrast, no such methods are in issue.
We have never applied the Kelly-Frye rule to expert
medical testimony, even when the witness is a psy-
chiatrist and the subject matter is as esoteric as the
reconstitution of a past state of mind or the predic-
tion of future dangerousness, or even the diagnosis
of an unusual form of mental illness not listed in
the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric
Association ....

People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24,
208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984) (permitting expert psychological
testimony on eyewitness identification). See also United
States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1985) (expert opin-
ion as to cause of explosion based in part on comparison

58a

between actual explosion and demonstration does not claim
a “scientific basis,” but falls more properly within “other spe-
cialized knowledge” category of Fed. R. Evid. 702; as such,
it does not carry with it any “aura” of special reliability and
general acceptance in the particular field is not required).

Likewise, the second concern, relative to whether experts
exist who can effectively refute the scientific evidence being
admitted, is not relevant. Here, the defense produced two
experts who differed with and effectively criticized Dr.
Stock’s testimony. The defense was not prejudiced by being
unable to locate experts to respond to Dr. Stock’s testimony.‘

Moreover, to the extent that the Brown court suggested that
it is somehow unfair to burden the defendant with the neces-
sity of obtaining experts to rebut the prosecution's case, or
to gain a thorough acquaintance with the underlying princi-
ples of the expert’s testimony, such a suggestion was explicitly
rejected by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Notes of Advi-
sory Committee to Fed. R. Evid. 705 (rule “assumes that the
cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential
for effective cross-examination”).

The Green test is actually derivative of Frye v. United
States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Bul see infra Part
C. It is therefore noteworthy that the court which first intro-
duced the Frye standard for testing the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence has stated that the standard applies to
“questions of admissibility of expert testimony based on new
methods of scientific measurement ....” United States v.
Addison, 498 F.2d at 743 (emphasis added).*

“lt appears clear from the record that the government knew it would
have to present testimony on the victims’ state of mind in a case wheic
there was an obvious lack of physical restraint present. The sefense
was always aware of this and prepared accordingly.

*The Frye test has been the subject of vigorous criticism. See United
Siates v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235-37 (3d Cir. 1985), and authori-

59a

The concerns contemplated by the Green-Frye test can be
adequately addressed by Rule 403 in these circumstances.
For instance, the unwarranted “aura of reliability” that may
surround the evidence may be assessed by its tendency, if
any, to mislead the jury. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1985); see also McCormick, Handbook
of the Law of Evidence § 203 at 608-609 (3d ed. 1984).* And
to the extent that the Green-Frye standard works to assure
the availability of more than one expert on the topic
involved, that value can be preserved under the Federal Rules
of Evidence as well. Courts may consider the availability of
experts to evaluate the evidence in determining whether
undue prejudice might result from its admission.

Since we are considering this case en banc, it would be an
appropriate time to reconsider the premise in Green that
expert testimony in criminal cases should be judged by a dif-
ferent standard than in civil cases. This result is certainly not
dictated by the Federal Rules of Evidence which were rela-
tively new at the time Green was decided. It appears to me
that the fact that a jury, after consideration of all the evi-
dence, including any expert opinions allowed into evidence,
must find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
is all the differentiation that is necessary or called for.

ties cited therein. The courts that have moved away from Frye have
adopted a reliability test. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238 (relying in
part on this court's opinion in United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25,
33 n.12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975)); 3 J. Weinstein
& M. Berger, Weinsiein's Fvidence § 702(03) at 702-18 to 702-20,
United States v. Williams, $83 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979).

*jury instructions are also a tool for dispelhng an unwarranted aura
of reliability, as jurors are usually instructed, as they were here, that
they should give an expert's opinion only such weight as they think
it deserves, and should reject it if they “conclude that the reasons given
in support of the opinion are not sound.” (App. 154.)

60a

Assuming, however, that the majority is correct in going
on to apply the four part test of Green, the first inquiry ts
whether the expert is qualified. No one here has challenged
the qualifications of Dr. Stock, and in fact, he appears emi-
nently qualified to offer an opinion on the victims’ state of
mind.’ The second element, whether the subject is a proper
one for expert testimony, has been implicitly answered by
this court’s definition of involuntary servitude. The first
prong of the majority's test is that “the servant believes that
he or she has no viable alternative but to perform service
for the master.” Consequently, the servant's state of mind
is a crucial factor in this formula. The majority has, however,
undercut iis adoption of this standard with its conclusion that
the type of expert testimony offered here on the victims’ state
of mind is inadmissible. If the proposition is accepted that
something less than actual physical restraint can result in vio-
lation of the statute prohibiting involuntary servitude, partic-
ularly in the case of a victim who is mentally incompetent
and may thus become an involuntary servant by virtue of
the master’s deceit or fraud, then any qualified psychiatrist
or psychologist should be able to testify that in a particular
instance the will of the victim was overborne to the point
that his service was involuntary.

The third inquiry is, of course, the crucial one here; that
is, whether the testimony is in “conformity with a generally
accepted explanatory theory.” 548 F.2d at 1268. As stated
above, this element has its genesis in Frye. At the same t'me,
it has undergone a subtle but important change.

The court in Frye held:

"iy “qualeed” I mean to suggest more than just paper credentials.
Here, Dr. Stock had worked with the victims and conducted extensive
testing He was completely familiar with their long penod of servitude
and the circumstances surrounding it

6la

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses
ihe line between the experimental and demonstrable
Stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twi-
light zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be suf-
ficiently established to have gained general accep-
tance in the particular field in which it belongs.

293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). “General acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs” is the criterion still widely
applied today. Yet in Green, this standard has become
“conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory.” The
distinction is important because in Frye the emphasis was
placed upon the technique or methodology employed to reach
a result, yet in Green the focus has been transferred to the
theory. In other words, rather than assessing the “thing from
which - deduction is made,” we have focused on the deduc-
tion itself.

When adopting the Green test, the court relied on United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152, where the Ninth Circuit
stated: “Because of the peculiar risks of expert testimony,
courts have imposed an additional test, i.c., that the testi-
mony be in accordance with a generally accepted explanatory
theory.” In support of this characterization, the Ninth Circuit
cited Frye and United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). Stifel correctly sets
forth the language used in Frye, 433 F.2d at 438, 441 (record
affords support for the proposition that neutron activation
analysis has gained “general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs”). The Ninth Circuit has never cited
Amaral for “conformity to a generally accepted explanatory
theory.”*

*in fact, the Ninth Circuit has apparently adopted a “reliability”
standard. See United States v. Gwaltney, 7190 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir.

62a

In applying this factor, the majority concludes that Dr.
Stock’s testimony is inadmissible because a foundation was
not laid to establish its conformity to a generally accepted
explanatory theory. In arriving at this conclusion, the court
relies on the testimony of defendants’ experts who criticized
Dr. Stock’s theory. In addition, the majority, after listing the
elements of captivity syndrome, determines that the facts
presented at trial do not support the existence of these factors.
Accordingly, the court holds that captivity syndrome is inap-
plicable as a matter of law.

While this type of analysis may be compelled by the Green
formula, I have serious concerns

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1242%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
